Sanskrit Language Study
There has been interest expressed here in Sanskrit language study. How is this language studied? In American universities, this is typically done by the instructor assigning lessons from a book, and then in class answering questions that arise from the students doing these lessons. There is often very little actual instruction given by the instructor. Most of the instruction comes from the book. When this is the case, this is something that can just as well be done online. Then the only real need to pay thousands of dollars for a professor, or more often a graduate student, to do this, is for those who need the credential.
We suggest purchasing and using Judith Tyberg's First Lessons in Sanskrit Grammar and Reading, to serve as the instructor. This is available at Amazon for $13.95. Any questions that arise from going through these lessons can be discussed here on this forum. Nancy Reigle will be available for this, as time permits. She started studying this book with the late Judith Tyberg in 1978. This book is highly recommended to start one's studies of Sanskrit with.
A detailed listing of what books are available for Sanskrit study can be found in "Sanskrit Language Study: An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Materials in English" (attached here, and also at: http://www.easterntradition.org/etri%20bib-sanskrit%20study.pdf). For those who want a more advanced course, there are several options. A couple of these can be used for self-study, but most require an instructor. Among the latter is the Devavanipravesika: An Introduction to the Sanskrit Language, by Robert Goldman and Sally Sutherland Goldman. Nancy studied this book in an exceptional class with the co-author, Sally Sutherland (Goldman), at University of California, Berkeley, and can also reply to questions on its lessons.
Whatever book you choose, we wish you well in this difficult but rewarding study.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 4 with commentary:
So by what and by how many means of valid knowledge are these three categories, i.e., the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower, established (or ascertained)? Which (category) by which means of valid knowledge? Here in this world, an object of valid knowledge is established (or ascertained) by a means of valid knowledge, as rice by prastha-s (a measure of weight), etc., and sandalwood paste, etc., by a scale. Therefore, the means of valid knowledge should be defined (verse 4):4. Perception, inference, and trustworthy testimony are held to be the three means of valid knowledge, since all means of valid knowledge are established (as being included in these three). It is through a means of valid knowledge that an object of valid knowledge is established (or ascertained).
“Perception” is as follows: The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, and the nose are the five sense-faculties. Sound, touch, form, taste, and smell are the five objects of these five, respectively. The ear apprehends sound; the skin, touch; the eye, form; the tongue, taste; and the nose, smell. This is the means of valid knowledge called perception.
An object which cannot be apprehended by perception or inference is to be apprehended by trustworthy testimony. For example, Indra, king of the gods, or the northern Kurus, or the nymphs in heaven, and so on, are not to be apprehended by perception or inference, but are apprehended by trustworthy testimony. Moreover, it has been said:
"Scripture is trustworthy testimony (testimony of a trustworthy teacher). (They) know a trustworthy teacher (to be such) because (he is) free from faults. He who is free from faults will not make an untrue statement, since no reason would arise (to do so).
He who is engaged in his own duties, is free from attachment and aversion, and is always respected by those of like kind—such a one is to be known as trustworthy."
All means of valid knowledge are established (as being included) in these (three) means of valid knowledge. Jaimini (holds that there are) six means of valid knowledge. What are these means of valid knowledge? Presumption (arthāpatti), probability (sambhava), negation (abhāva), imagination (pratibhā), tradition (aitihya), and analogy (upamāna) are the six means of valid knowledge. Presumption is of two kinds: seen, and heard. Seen: e.g., if in one case an embodied existence is apprehended, then in another also an embodied existence is apprehended. Heard: e.g., Devadatta does not eat during the day, and yet he looks plump. Therefore, it is understood that he eats at night. Probability: e.g., when (the measure) prastha is stated, four kuḍavas (in it) are probable (since one prastha equals four kuḍavas). What is called negation is distinguished as antecedent, mutual, total, and consequent. Antecedent negation: e.g., Devadatta in boyhood, youth, and so on. Mutual negation: (e.g.,) the non-existence of a pot in cloth. Total negation: like horns on a donkey, or the son of a barren woman, or a flower in the sky. Consequent negation is negation due to destruction, like burnt cloth; e.g., because of seeing parched grain, the absence of rain is understood. Thus, negation is of several kinds. Imagination: e.g.,
"The country to the south of the Vindhya mountains and to the north of the Sahya mountains, on the earth extending to the sea, is lovely."
When this is said, imagination arises that there are lovely qualities in that country. Imagination is a cognition which follows (an utterance). Tradition: e.g., as people say that a yakṣiṇī (sprite) lives here in the banyan tree; this is tradition. Analogy: e.g., a gavaya (a species of ox) is like a cow; a pond is like the ocean. These six means of valid knowledge are included in the three, perception, etc. Firstly, presumption is included in inference; then probability, negation, imagination, tradition, and analogy are included in trustworthy testimony.
Therefore, “since all means of valid knowledge are established (as being included)” in three only, (these) “are held to be the three means of valid knowledge.” This says (i.e., means): By these three means of valid knowledge, the means of valid knowledge are established. This is the rest of the sentence (that has to be supplied).
“It is through a means of valid knowledge that an object of valid knowledge is established (or ascertained).” The objects of valid knowledge (to be established or ascertained) are primary substance, the (principle of) intelligence, the (principle of) self-consciousness, the five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, the five great elements, and spirit. These twenty-five principles are called the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower. Of these, some are to be established (or ascertained) by perception, some by inference, and some by scripture. Thus the three means of valid knowledge have been stated.
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In verse four of the SaMkhya the word perception is named as one of the means of valid knowledge. Webster’s un-abridged dictionary calls perception a wide word. There are many definitions. Four are:
- A mental image: concept.
- An impression of an object obtained solely by use of the senses.
- A physical sensation interpreted in the light of experience [from memory].
- A direct or intuitive cognition.
On the “Indian Philosophy Simplified” web site on SaMkhya the definition of perception is made accurate by citing two Sanskrit words:
1 nirvikalpa = indeterminate perception [no knowledge of the form or name of the object].
2 savikalpa = determinate perception [perception is made determinate by processing and differentiating in the mind from memory].
Referring to #4 above do you think there is such a thing as direct or intuitive cognition?
I know it is a lot of work but would you consider parsing the verses?
Could you direct me to the Hari Dutt Sharma Sanskrit text on this web site? I cannot find it.
Thank you,
Harold
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The means of valid knowledge called dṛṣṭa or pratyakṣa, translated as "perception," is understood in Gauḍapāda's commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā to refer to the avenue of knowledge provided by the five senses. Through the ear we perceive sound, through the eyes we perceive form, etc. So perception is how we know something by means of the five senses.The terms nirvikalpa and savikalpa that you cited from a website are not found in either the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā nor in Gauḍapāda's commentary thereon. I do not know where they come from. Of course, our senses just provide the raw data of perception, and our minds may or may not register what we perceive and determine what it is and conceptualize it.The idea of a direct or intuitive cognition as perception, if you mean by this a perception that is not based on data from the five senses, is also recognized. David adds here that:The Buddhist writer Dharmakīrti recognizes this as "yogic perception." Usually in the Hindu systems "perception" refers to the direct perception of the senses, and pratyakṣa is therefore often translated as "direct perception." This is as opposed to parokṣa, in this sense "indirect perception," or higher yogic perception. This latter is regarded as being possible for yogis and sages, and what they perceive is the means of valid knowledge here called āpta-vacana, "trustworthy testimony."Yes, the verses should be parsed, and I will do so shortly.The Har Dutt Sharma Sanskrit text of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā is found under "Sanskrit Documents," shown on the home page, and then under the sub-heading "Hindu Documents." That takes you to an alphabetical listing of texts. It is currently listed there as no. 14 (http://www.theosopher.net/dzyan/hindu/samkhya_karika_and_gaudapada_...), and his English translation is listed there as no. 15.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 5:
prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ tri-vidham anumānam ākhyātam |
tal liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam āpta-śrutir āpta-vacanaṃ ca || 5 ||[without sandhi:
prativiṣaya-adhyavasāyaḥ dṛṣṭam tri-vidham anumānam ākhyātam |
tat liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam āpta-śrutiḥ āpta-vacanam ca || 5 || ]
5. Perception is the ascertainment (by the senses) of their respective sense-objects. Inference is said to be of three kinds; it is preceded by (knowledge of) the defining characteristic (liṅga) and that which has the defining characteristic (liṅgin). Trustworthy testimony is (that of) trustworthy teachers and revealed scriptures.prativiṣaya- (of [their respective] sense-objects) adhyavasāyaḥ (the ascertainment [by the senses]) dṛṣṭam (perception) [is]; tri-vidham (of three kinds) anumānam (inference) ākhyātam (is said [to be]);tat (it) [is] liṅga- (the defining characteristic ) liṅgi- (and that which has the defining characteristic) pūrvakam (preceded by [knowledge of]); āpta- (trustworthy teachers) śrutiḥ (and revealed scriptures) āpta-vacanam (trustworthy testimony) [is] ca (and) [not used in this translation; would precede last sentence].Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 5, with commentary:
What are the definitions of these? This (the text) states (verse 5):5. Perception is the ascertainment (by the senses) of their respective sense-objects. Inference is said to be of three kinds; it is preceded by (knowledge of) the defining characteristic (liṅga) and that which has the defining characteristic (liṅgin). Trustworthy testimony is (that of) trustworthy teachers and revealed scriptures.
“Perception” (dṛṣṭa), i.e., perception (pratyakṣa), is the ascertainment by the ear, etc., of their respective sense-objects, i.e., of the sense-objects, sound, etc.; this is the meaning.
“Inference is said to be of three kinds”: having an antecedent (pūrvavat), having a remainder (śeṣavat), and perception from a universal (sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa). Having an antecedent means that which has an antecedent. For example, by the rising of clouds one establishes (that it is going to) rain, because of (this) being seen before. Having a remainder: for example, finding one pala (a measure) of water from the sea to be salty, saltiness of the rest, too, is (inferred to be) the case. Perception from a universal: (for example, when) seen to get from one place to another place, the moon and the stars (are inferred to) have motion, as in the case of (the person) Caitra. Just as, seeing (the person) named Caitra get from one place to another place, (one infers that) he has motion, so the moon and the stars (have motion). Similarly, from seeing a mango tree in blossom (at one place), one establishes by perception from a universal that mango trees are in blossom at other places (also). This is perception from a universal.
Moreover, “it is preceded by (knowledge of) the defining characteristic (liṅga) and that which has the defining characteristic (liṅgin).” It, i.e., the inference, is preceded by (knowledge of) the defining characteristic, where that which has the defining characteristic is inferred by the defining characteristic. For example, a mendicant (is inferred to be such) by (perceiving) a staff. (It is) also preceded by that which has the defining characteristic, where the defining characteristic is inferred by (perceiving) that which has the defining characteristic. For example, seeing a mendicant, (one infers that) this triple staff is his.
“Trustworthy testimony is (that of) trustworthy teachers and revealed scriptures”: Trustworthy teachers (āpta) are the teachers Brahmā and the rest. Revealed scriptures are the Vedas. Trustworthy teachers and revealed scriptures (form the compound) trustworthy teachers and revealed scriptures (āpta-śruti). They are (what is) called trustworthy testimony (āpta-vacana).
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 5, Grammatical Analysis
without sandhi:prativiṣaya-adhyavasāyaḥ dṛṣṭam tri-vidham anumānam ākhyātam |
tat liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam āpta-śrutiḥ āpta-vacanam ca || 5 ||prativiṣaya-adhyavasāyaḥ (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; masculine nominative or 1st case singular) = the ascertainment (adhyavasāyaḥ) [by the senses] of their respective sense-objects (prativiṣaya). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for prativiṣaya (prativiṣayasya, "of their respective sense-objects").dṛṣṭam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = perception [is].tri-vidham (bahuvrīhi compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [of] three kinds. This bahuvrīhi or possessive compound is analyzed as, "that whose kinds are three."anumānam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = inference.ākhyātam (past passive participle; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = is said [to be].tat (pronoun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = it [is].liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam (can be analyzed as an adverb/indeclinable, or as an adjective, a bahuvrīhi compound; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = preceded by (pūrvakam) [knowledge of] the defining characteristic (liṅga) and that which has the defining characteristic (liṅgin). The first two words taken together, liṅga and liṅgi, form a dvandva or conjunctive compound; an "and" must be supplied between them. Then as a bahuvrīhi compound it can be taken in its entirety as, "that which is preceded by [knowledge of] the liṅga and liṅgi."āpta-śrutiḥ (dvandva* compound; noun; feminine nominative or 1st case singular) = [that of] trustworthy teachers (āpta) and revealed scriptures (śrutiḥ). In this dvandva or conjunctive compound, an "and" is supplied between its two members. Here āpta is used as a noun, "trustworthy teachers," unlike in the following compound, āpta-vacanam, where āpta is used as an adjective.*Taking this compound as a dvandva follows the analysis of it given in Gauḍapāda's commentary: āptāś ca śrutiś ca āpta-śrutiḥ. However, any such dvandva should be declined in the dual, not in the singular as we have here. Therefore, Vācaspati-miśra in his commentary has analyzed this compound as a karmadhāraya rather than as a dvanda: āptā cāsau śrutiś ceti āptaśrutiḥ.āpta-vacanam (karmadhāraya compound; noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = trustworthy (āpta) testimony (vacanam) [is]. This is a karmadhāraya or adjective compound in which the first member (āpta) is an adjective that modifies the second member (vacanam), which is a noun.ca (indeclinable) = and [not used in this translation; would precede the last sentence].
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 6:
sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇāṃ prasiddhir anumānāt |
tasmād api câsiddhaṃ parokṣam āptâgamāt siddham || 6 ||
[without sandhi:sāmānyataḥ tu dṛṣṭāt atīndriyāṇām prasiddhiḥ anumānāt |
tasmāt api ca asiddham parokṣam āpta-āgamāt siddham || 6 || ]
6. The establishment (or ascertainment) of things beyond the reach of the senses (is brought about) by the inference (that is based on) perception from a universal; and what is not established by this (inference), the imperceptible, is established by trustworthy testimony.sāmānyataḥ (from a universal) tu (for meter) dṛṣṭāt (that is [based on] perception) atīndriyāṇām (of [things] beyond [the reach of] the senses) prasiddhiḥ (the establishment [or ascertainment]) [is brought about] anumānāt (by the inference);tasmāt (by this [inference]) api ca (and) asiddham ([what is] not established) parokṣam (the imperceptible) āpta- (trustworthy) āgamāt (by/ testimony) siddham [is] (established).Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 6, with commentary:Thus the three means of valid knowledge have been stated (verse 5). In regard to these, what is to be established by which means of valid knowledge is (now) stated (verse 6):6. The establishment (or ascertainment) of things beyond the reach of the senses (is brought about) by the inference (that is based on) perception from a universal; and what is not established by this (inference), the imperceptible, is established by trustworthy testimony.
“By the inference (that is based on) perception from a universal,” (is brought about) “the establishment (or ascertainment) of things beyond the reach of the senses,” i.e., of existing things, gone beyond the senses. Primary substance and spirit, which are beyond the reach of the senses, are established by the inference (that is based on) perception from a universal. For, the Great (principle) and the rest, are the defining characteristic, having the three qualities. What has these three qualities as its effect is primary substance. Also, since unconscious (substance) appears as if conscious, (it must) therefore (have) another as superintendent, i.e., (conscious) spirit. The manifest is to be established by perception.
“And what is not established by this (inference), the imperceptible, is established by trustworthy testimony.” For example, Indra, king of the gods, or the northern Kurus, or the nymphs in heaven, are imperceptible, (so are) established by trustworthy testimony.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 6, Grammatical Analysis
without sandhi:sāmānyataḥ tu dṛṣṭāt atīndriyāṇām prasiddhiḥ anumānāt |
tasmāt api ca asiddham parokṣam āpta-āgamāt siddham || 6 ||sāmānyataḥ (indeclinable, "frozen" ablative) = from a universal; from a general [observation]. The indeclinable ending -taḥ, indicating the ablative or 5th case, "from," has been added to sāmānya.tu (indeclinable) = verse filler used for meter, or in this context can be understood as a weak emphatic, "indeed" (elsewhere it often means "but").dṛṣṭāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = (that is) based on perception.atīndriyāṇām (noun; neuter genitive or 6th case plural) = of [things] beyond (ati-) [the reach of] the senses (indriya). Here we have the upasarga (prefix) "ati" added to the noun indriya.prasiddhiḥ (noun; feminine nominative or 1st case singular) = the establishment (or ascertainment) [is brought about]. Note: There is a variant reading here in the text as commented on by Vācaspati-miśra: pratītiḥ (knowledge) has been used in place of prasiddhiḥ.anumānāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = by the inference.tasmāt (pronoun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = by this [inference].api ca (indeclinables) = and; literally, and (ca) also (api).asiddham (past passive participle; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [what] is not established.parokṣam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = the imperceptible.āpta-āgamāt (karmadhāraya compound; noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = by trustworthy (āpta) testimony (āgama). This is a karmadhāraya or adjective compound in which the first member (āpta) is an adjective that modifies the second member (āgamāt), which is a noun. In our commentary here, Gauḍapāda glosses āpta-āgamāt as āpta-vacanāt, which we saw earlier in verses 4 and 5.siddham (past passive participle; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = is established.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 7:
atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriya-ghātān mano-’navasthānāt |
saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhibhavāt samānâbhihārāc ca || 7 ||
[without sandhi:atidūrāt sāmīpyāt indriya-ghātāt manaḥ-anavasthānāt |
saukṣmyāt vyavadhānāt abhibhavāt samāna-abhihārāt ca || 7 || ]
7. Due to excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, injury to the senses, inattention of the mind, subtlety, obstruction, suppression, and intermixture with like things, (things, even though existing, are not perceived).atidūrāt (due to excessive distance) sāmīpyāt (due to [excessive] proximity) indriya- (to the senses) ghātāt (due to injury) manaḥ- (of the mind) anavasthānāt (due to inattention) saukṣmyāt (due to subtlety) vyavadhānāt (due to obstruction) abhibhavāt (due to suppression) samāna- (with like things) abhihārāt (due to intermixture) ca (and) [things, even though existing, are not perceived].Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 7, with commentary:Here someone says: Neither primary substance nor spirit are perceived. That which is not perceived in the world does not exist. Therefore these two do not exist, like a second head, or a third arm (of a person). To this it is said: Here (in this world), there is non-perception of things, even though existing, in eight ways. These are as follows (verse 7):7. Due to excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, injury to the senses, inattention of the mind, subtlety, obstruction, suppression, and intermixture with like things, (things, even though existing, are not perceived).
Here, “Due to excessive distance,” the non-perception of things, even though existing, is seen (to be the case). For example, (the non-perception) of Caitra, Maitra, and Viṣṇumitra living in another country.
“Due to (excessive) proximity”: for example, the non-perception of eye ointment by the eye.“Due to injury to the senses”: for example, the non-perception of sound and form by the deaf and the blind.
“Due to inattention of the mind”: for example, one whose mind is distracted does not comprehend even what is well-spoken.“Due to subtlety”: for example, atoms of smoke, heat, water, and frost found in the atmosphere are not perceived.“Due to obstruction”: for example, an object concealed by a wall is not perceived.“Due to suppression”: for example, the planets, asterisms, stars, etc., suppressed by the light of the sun, are not perceived.“Due to intermixture with like things”: for example, a bean cast in a heap of beans, a water lily or a myrobalan fruit cast among water lilies or myrobalan fruits, or a pigeon among pigeons, is not perceived, due to being mixed among like things. Thus, in eight ways non-perception of things existing here (in this world) is seen (to be the case).
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 7, Grammatical Analysis
without sandhi:atidūrāt sāmīpyāt indriya-ghātāt manaḥ-anavasthānāt |
saukṣmyāt vyavadhānāt abhibhavāt samāna-abhihārāt ca || 7 ||
atidūrāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = due to excessive (ati-) distance (dūra). The upasarga (prefix) "ati" has been added to the noun dūra.sāmīpyāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = due to [excessive] proximity.indriya-ghātāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = due to injury (ghāta) to the senses (indriya). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, a case ending must be supplied for indriya. Here, this has been translated as "to the senses."manaḥ-anavasthānāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = due to inattention (anavasthāna) of the mind (manaḥ). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, a case ending must be supplied for manaḥ. Here, this has been translated as "of the mind."saukṣmyāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = due to subtlety.vyavadhānāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = due to obstruction.abhibhavāt (noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = due to suppression.samāna-abhihārāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = due to intermixture (abhihāra) with like [things] (samāna). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, a case ending must be supplied for samāna. Here, this has been translated as "with like [things]."ca (indeclinable) = and.[things, even though existing, are not perceived] = this phrase is implied.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 8
saukṣmyāt tad-anupalabdhir nâbhāvāt kāryatas tad-upalabdhiḥ |
mahad-ādi tac ca kāryaṃ prakṛti-virūpaṃ sarūpaṃ ca || 8 ||
[without sandhi:saukṣmyāt tat-anupalabdhiḥ na abhāvāt kāryataḥ tat-upalabdhiḥ |
mahat-ādi tat ca kāryam prakṛti-virūpam sarūpam ca || 8 || ]
8. The non-perception of that (i.e., of primary substance) is due to (its) subtlety, not to (its) non-existence. Perception of it is through (its) effect (or product), and that effect is the Great (principle) and the rest, (which are) unlike substance and like (substance).Grammatical Analysissaukṣmyāt (noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = [is] due to [its] subtlety.tat-anupalabdhiḥ (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; feminine nominative or 1st case singular) = the non-perception of that [i.e., of primary substance]. In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for tat (tasya, "of that").na (indeclinable) = not.abhāvāt (noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = due to [its] non-existence.kāryataḥ (indeclinable, "frozen ablative") = [is] through [its] effect [or product]. The indeclinable ending -taḥ, indicating the ablative or 5th case, "from" or "through," has been added to kārya.tat-upalabdhiḥ (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; feminine nominative or 1st case singular) = perception (upalabdhi) of it (tat). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for tat (tasya, "of that," or "of it").mahat-ādi (bahuvrīhi compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [is] the Great (mahat) [principle] and the rest (ādi). This bahuvrīhi or possessive compound is analzed as, "that whose first (ādi) is mahat," or "beginning with mahat"; and more idiomatically as "mahat and the rest."tat (pronoun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = that.ca (indeclinable) = and.kāryam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = effect.prakṛti-virūpam (tatpuruṣa compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = unlike (virūpa) substance (prakṛti), dissimilar (virūpa) to substance (prakṛti). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," here "to," must be supplied for prakṛti (prakṛter, "of substance," "to substance"). This may be translated as, "dissimilar to substance," or simply "unlike substance."sarūpam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = like [substance].ca (indeclinable) = and.Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 8, with commentary:
And so it is (that things, even though existing, may not be perceived). What is (to be) understood (by this)? (Answer:) For what reason there is no perception of these two, primary substance and/or spirit, and how there is perception (of them), is (now) stated (verse 8):8. The non-perception of that (i.e., of primary substance) is due to (its) subtlety, not to (its) non-existence. Perception of it is through (its) effect (or product), and that effect is the Great (principle) and the rest, (which are) unlike substance and like (substance).
“The non-perception of that is due to (its) subtlety”: (The non-perception) of primary substance; this is the meaning. Primary substance is not perceived because of (its) subtlety; as atoms of smoke, heat, water, and frost in the atmosphere, even though existing, are not perceived. How, then, is there perception of it?
“Perception of it is through (its) effect”: Having seen the effect, the cause is inferred. Primary substance exists, as the cause, of which this is the effect. The (principle of) intelligence, the (principle of) self-consciousness, the five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, and the five great elements are its effect (or product).
“And that effect is . . . unlike substance”: Substance (prakṛti) is primary substance (pradhāna); unlike that, i.e., dissimilar to substance.
“And like (substance)”: And similar to (substance); as, even in this world, a son is the same as (his) father and also not the same. For what reason it is the same and not the same, we will explain further on.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 9
asad-akaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃbhavâbhāvāt |
śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca sat kāryam || 9 ||
[without sandhi:
asat-akaraṇāt upādāna-grahaṇāt sarva-saṃbhava-abhāvāt |
śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt kāraṇa-bhāvāt ca sat kāryam || 9 || ]
9. The effect is existent (in its cause), because (there can be) no production of something non-existent, because of (the effect) taking a material cause, because the arising of any (possible effect from any possible cause) does not occur, because for that which has the power (to produce something) (there can only be) the production of what is possible (and therefore existent), and because of (the effect having) the nature of the cause.
Grammatical Analysis
asat-akaraṇāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = because of no production (akaraṇa) of something non-existent (asat); because [there can be] no production (akaraṇa) of something non-existent (asat). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for asat (asataḥ, "of something non-existent").upādāna-grahaṇāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = because of the taking (grahaṇa) of a material cause (upādāna); because of [the effect] taking (grahaṇa) a material cause (upādāna). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for upādāna (upādānasya, "of a material cause").sarva-saṃbhava-abhāvāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = because of the absence (abhāva) of the arising (saṃbhava) of all (sarva); because the arising (saṃbhava) of any (sarva) [possible effect from any possible cause] does not occur (abhāva). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for sarva (sarvasya, "of all") and for saṃbhava (saṃbhavasya, "of the arising").
śaktasya (noun; masculine genitive or 6th case singular) = for that which has the power [to produce something]; literally, of a potent thing.
śakya-karaṇāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; neuter ablative or 5th case singular) = because of the production (karaṇa) of what is possible (śakya); because [there can only be] the production (karaṇa) of what is possible (śakya) [and therefore existent]. In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for śakya (śakyasya, "of the possible").
kāraṇa-bhāvāt (tatpuruṣa compound; noun; masculine ablative or 5th case singular) = because of the nature (bhāva) of the cause (kāraṇa); because of [the effect having] the nature (bhāva) of the cause (kāraṇa). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, the genitive or 6th case ending, "of," must be supplied for kāraṇa (kāraṇasya, "of the cause").
ca (indeclinable) = and.
sat (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [is] existent [in its cause]. In form, this word is the present participle, "existing," from the root "as," meaning "is."kāryam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = the effect.Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 9, with commentary:
Is this effect, the Great (principle) and the rest, existent or non-existent in primary substance (i.e., in its cause)? Due to disagreement among teachers, (there is) this doubt. For, here in the Sāṃkhya system, the effect is existent (in its cause); for Buddhists and others, the effect is non-existent (in its cause). If it is existent, it cannot be non-existent; but if it is non-existent, it cannot be existent. This is a contradiction. In regard to this, (the text) says (verse 9):
9. The effect is existent (in its cause), because (there can be) no production of something non-existent, because of (the effect) taking a material cause, because the arising of any (possible effect from any possible cause) does not occur, because for that which has the power (to produce something) (there can only be) the production of what is possible (and therefore existent), and because of (the effect having) the nature of the cause.
“Because (there can be) no production of something non-existent”: Not existing is (the meaning of) non-existent. (There can be) no production of something non-existent. Therefore, the effect (or product) is existent. Here in this world there is no production of something non-existent, as the arising of sesame oil from sand (wherein sesame oil is non-existent). So, because (there can only be) production of something existent, the manifest exists in primary substance prior to (its) arising. Therefore, the effect is existent (in its cause).
Moreover, “because of (the effect) taking a material cause”: Material cause (upādāna), i.e., cause (kāraṇa); because of taking that. Here in this world, one who desires a certain object takes the material cause of that (object). One who desires curds (takes) milk, but not water. Therefore, the effect is existent (in its cause).
Also due to this: “because the arising of any (possible effect from any possible cause) does not occur.” The arising of any (possible effect), anywhere, is not the case; for example, (the arising) of gold in silver, etc., in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, because the arising of any (possible effect from any possible cause) does not occur (which it would if the effect did not really exist), the effect is existent.
Also due to this: “because for that which has the power (to produce something) (there can only be) the production of what is possible (and therefore existent).” Here, that which has the power (to produce something), e.g., a potter, or the instruments of production, such as clay, a (turning-)stick, a wheel, rags, rope, water, etc., generate from a lump of clay, only what is possible, (namely,) a pot. Therefore, the effect is existent.
Also due to this: “and because of (the effect having) the nature of the cause, the effect is existent (in its cause).” Whatever are the defining characteristics of the cause, those same are the defining characteristics of the effect, also. For example, from barley, barley (is produced), and from rice, rice. If the effect were non-existent, then from coarse grain, fine rice could be (produced). But it is not. Therefore, the effect is existent.
Thus for five reasons, the Great (principle) and the rest, those which are subject to dissolution, exist in primary substance. Therefore, (there is only) the arising of the existent, not of the non-existent.
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Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 10
hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritaṃ liṅgam |
sāvayavaṃ para-tantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītam avyaktam || 10 ||
[without sandhi:hetumat anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritam liṅgam |
sāvayavam para-tantram vyaktam viparītam avyaktam || 10 || ]10. The manifest is caused, impermanent, not (all-)pervading, active (as opposed to passive), manifold, supported, subject to dissolution, composite, and dependent on another. The unmanifest is the reverse (of these).
Grammatical Analysishetumat (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [is] caused. Literally, possessing (-mat) a cause (hetu).anityam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = impermanent.avyāpi (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = not [all-]pervading.sakriyam (bahuvrīhi compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = active [as opposed to passive]; literally, with (sa-, saha) activity (kriyā), or having action.anekam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = manifold; literally, not (an-) one (eka).āśritam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = supported.liṅgam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = subject to dissolution. This meaning follows Gauḍapāda's gloss: laya-yuktam.sāvayavaṃ (bahuvrīhi compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = composite; literally with (sa-, saha) parts (avayava), or having parts.para-tantram (tatpuruṣa compound; adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [and] dependent (tantra) on another (para). In this tatpuruṣa or case relation compound, a case ending must be supplied for para. Here, it has been translated as "on another."vyaktam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = the manifest.viparītam (adjective; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = [is] the reverse [of these].
avyaktam (noun; neuter nominative or 1st case singular) = the unmanifest.
Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, verse 10, with commentary:
It was said (verse 8), (that the Great principle and the rest are) “unlike and like substance.” How that is (so) is (now) stated (verse 10):
10. The manifest is caused, impermanent, not (all-)pervading, active (as opposed to passive), manifold, supported, subject to dissolution, composite, and dependent on another. The unmanifest is the reverse (of these).
“The manifest,” i.e., the Great (principle) and the rest, the effect, is “caused.” Caused means that which has a cause. Material (or constituent) cause (upādāna), cause (hetu), cause (kāraṇa), and efficient (or instrumental) cause (nimitta) are synonyms. Primary substance is the cause of the manifest. Therefore, the (entire) manifest extending all the way to the (five great) elements, is caused. The principle of intelligence is caused by primary substance. The (principle of) self-consciousness is caused by the (principle of) intelligence. The five subtle elements and the eleven faculties are caused by the (principle of) self-consciousness. Ether is caused by the subtle element of sound. Air is caused by the subtle element of touch. Fire is caused by the subtle element of form. Water is caused by the subtle element of taste. Earth is caused by the subtle element of smell. Thus, the (entire) manifest extending all the way to the (five great) elements is caused.
Moreover, it is “impermanent,” because it originates from another. For example, a pot originates from a lump of clay, and it is impermanent.Further, it is “not (all-)pervading”: not omnipresent; this is the meaning. For example, primary substance and spirit are omnipresent; not so the manifest.
Moreover, it is “active”: It transmigrates at the time of transmigratory existence. Endowed with the thirteenfold instrument, supporting the subtle body, it transmigrates. Therefore, it is active.
Moreover, it is “manifold,” (consisting of) the (principle of) intelligence, the (principle of) self-consciousness, the five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, and the five great elements.Moreover, it is “supported”: It is supported by (or depends on) its cause. The (principle of) intelligence is supported by primary substance. The (principle of) self-consciousness is supported by the (principle of) intelligence. The eleven faculties and the five subtle elements are supported by the (principle of) self-consciousness. The five great elements are supported by the five subtle elements.
Further, it is “subject to dissolution”: i.e., endowed with (the capacity of) dissolving (or dissolution). At the time of dissolution, the five great elements dissolve into the (five) subtle elements. These, together with the eleven faculties, (dissolve) into the (principle of) self-consciousness; this into the (principle of) intelligence; and this dissolves into primary substance.Also, it is “composite” (lit., having parts): Its parts are sound, touch, taste, form, and smell; having these.
Further, it is “dependent on another”: It does not have power over itself (i.e., does not exist under its own power). As, the (principle of) intelligence is dependent on primary substance; the (principle of) self-consciousness is dependent on the (principle of) intelligence; the (five) subtle elements and the (eleven) faculties are dependent on the (principle of) self-consciousness; and the five great elements are dependent on the (five) subtle elements. Thus, it is dependent (tantra) on (or subordinate to) another, i.e., dependent (āyatta) on (or resting on) another. The manifest has been explained.
Now we will explain the unmanifest. “The unmanifest is the reverse”: The unmanifest is the reverse of these same qualities just stated. The manifest was said to be caused. There is nothing higher than primary substance, because of the non-origination of primary substance. Therefore the unmanifest is uncaused.Also, the manifest is impermanent; the unmanifest is permanent (or eternal), because of not originating. It does not originate from anything, like the (great) elements. Thus, primary substance is permanent.Further, the manifest is not (all-)pervading; primary substance is (all-)pervading, because of being omnipresent.
The manifest is active; the unmanifest is inactive (or passive), also because of being omnipresent.
Also, the manifest is manifold; primary substance is one, because of being the cause. Primary substance is the single cause of the (entire) three worlds. Therefore, primary substance is one.Also, the manifest is supported; the unmanifest is unsupported, because of not being an effect (or product). There is nothing higher than primary substance, of which primary substance could be an effect.
Also, the manifest is subject to dissolution; the unmanifest is not subject to dissolution, because of being permanent (or eternal). The Great (principle) and the rest, which are subject to dissolution, dissolve one into the other at the time of dissolution. Not so primary substance. Therefore, primary substance is not subject to dissolution.Also, the manifest is composite; the unmanifest is non-composite (lit., without parts). Sound, touch, taste, form (or color), and smell do not exist in primary substance.
Also, the manifest is dependent on another; the unmanifest is dependent on itself, has power over itself (i.e., exists under its own power).
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