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CONCEPTION OF MATTER
ACCORDING TO
NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

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CHAPTER V

MATTER AND MOTION

I

NECESSITY OF MOTION FOR THE PSYCHIC AND NON-PSYCHIC CHANGES

BOTH for the production and the destruction of the phenomenal world the existence of motion is necessary. *Paramāṇus* out of which the non-eternal objects of the universe are produced, alone cannot do anything. During the dissolution period (*pralaya*) these *paramāṇus* remain separate,[1] and in order that they may combine together so as to form products, such as, *dvyaṇuka* and the rest, we must have motion produced in them. As the world is without any beginning,we cannot be sure whether the production of the universe precedes its destruction or follows it; so that, even when the cosmic order is in existence we must have motion to destroy the produced things and ultimately, the world itself. In any case, without motion there can be neither production nor destruction of the material world. Not only for the cosmic order but even for the objective aspect of the psychic world, the existence of motion is indespensable. It is a fact that the various psychic products, namely, pleasure, pain, desire, consciousness etc., are mainly due to the contact of the *Manas* with the *Ātman*, which contact is possible through the motion of the former alone. Therefore, whether it be the psychic production or the extramental one, presence of motion is necessary.

[1] PPbhā, p. 48.

II

RELATION OF MOTION WITH MATTER

As regards the relation of motion with matter it may be said that these are two distinct categories. But motion is not independent like matter. Matter can exist even without motion, while the latter must have a substance to inhere in. Matter is the very substratum of motion.[2] It is through matter alone that the existence of motion is known. But for the products of matter we have to depend upon motion also. It is the motion which brings about the conjunctions between *paramāṇus* and the various later products of the world.

As to the question whether motion is intrinsic or extrinsic in matter, it may be said, in reply, that there are two kinds of motions: one which brings about the conjunctions between *paramāṇus* so as to form various products, and ultimately, the world itself; and the other which only marks the time-limit during the dissolution period and does not produce any conjunction or disjunction. In both the cases, the motion is not intrinsic in matter. It comes from without. As regards the latter kind of motion we know that before an object is destroyed a kind of shock (*saṅkṣobha*) is given to that object and then the object is destroyed. The same shock produces velocity (*vega*) in the *paramāṇus* of that object through the production of motion (*karman*) in them. Hence, even when the object is destroyed there follows a series of motions in the *paramāṇus*, which motions possess degrees in the form of slow (*manda*), more slow (*mandatara*), and most slow (*mandatama*). Thus, during the dissolution period there are both the velocity and the motion.[3]

By the way, it may be asked: if there is a sort of

[2] VS., 1. i. 17.
[3] Bodhanī, p. 91; Setu, p. 286.

motion during the Cosmic Rest, the mutual conjunction of the *paramāṇus* should not be denied; and accordingly, there should be the production of *dvyaṇuka* and the rest, and ultimately, of the cosmic order itself.

To this it is said that although there is a motion, yet that motion does not produce that conjunction which brings about the desired effects, namely, *dvyaṇuka* and the rest. In other words, the motion at that time produces the conjunction called *pracaya* (grouping-conjunction) and not productive-conjunction; so that, the motion can utmost group the *paramāṇus* into different classes, but is unable to produce conjunctions productive of effects.

Again, it may be asked here: if the motion is non-productive, then what is the use of believing in its existence? In reply, it is said that the only need of such a motion at that time is to mark the time-limit; that is, to show that the Cosmic Rest exists for such and such period.[4] To explain the above point a counter-question may be put here: What is the use of the series of breaths when a man has fallen in sound sleep; for, no activity befitting a living man is produced at that time? The only answer that is given to this query is that the series of breaths of that time are to mark that so much time of the sleeping man's span of life has been exhausted in sleeping and so much is now left to be experienced. In other words, the vibration of the life at that time is only to keep an accurate account of the span of a man's period of life.[5]

Under such circumstances, it is just necessary to have some such motion which will lead to the productive-conjunctions between the *paramāṇus* after the the Cosmic Rest is over. This is the former kind of motion referred to above. This also comes from without according to *Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika*. Motion, according to this joint system, can be had only through the agency of a conscious being; so that, when the world is produced, for all the worldly purposes, we do get a conscious agent to produce motion, but how can a motion be had just after the Cosmic Rest is over to produce *dvyaṇuka* etc.? No human being is present at that time. *Jīvas* are, no doubt, present even there, but as they are insensate at that time, no motion can be produced by them. Hence, under the circumstances, we have to believe in the causality of a superhuman power and also the cumulative *adṛṣṭa* of the *Jīvas* to produce motion in the *paramāṇus*; so that, during the Cosmic Rest, just when the time for fructification of the past deeds is reached, through the help of the Divine Will and the *adṛṣṭa* of the *Jīvas*, a sort of motion is produced in the *paramāṇus*. This motion, in its turn, brings about the necessary conjuctions for the production of the universe.

Such is the necessity of motion in relation to matter. Accordingly, motion is defined as that which is the non-material cause of the conjunctions and disjunctions without depending upon anything else; which does not possess any quality and which has only one substance for its substratum.[6]

[4] KP, Vol. I, p. 333.
[5] Bodhanī, pp. 91-92.

III

CHARACTERISTICS OF MOTION

There is only one kind of motion at a time in one substance.[7] If there inhere two different and contrary motions simultaneously in one substance, then those two motions, being mutually contraries, will counteract each other and will not produce either conjunction or disjunction in any definite direction; so that, the

[6] VS. I. i. 17.
[7] VU, II. ii. 21; VS., I. i. 17; PPBhā, p. 290 along with Kandalī; KR, p. 152.

very definition of motion (*karman*), namely, the character of being the independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions, will be frustrated. If, on the other hand, these two actions be not mutually contraries, then, as only one of the two motions would be sufficient to produce a particular conjunction and disjunction in any definite direction, there would be no need for believing in the other motion at all. Similarly, one and the same motion cannot remain in more than one substance; for, when one substance moves through the agency of one motion that very motion cannot make other substance move as well[8].

Motion exists only for a few moments. So, when it is produced in a finite (*mūrta*) substance,[9] then there is the disjunction followed by the destruction of the previous conjunctions; then there is the subsequent conjunction; and then there is the destruction of the motion itself.[10]

It belongs only to such substances as have limited forms.[11] It does not possess any quality.[12] It is destroyed by its own effect, namely, conjunction, but not by disjunction; for, in that case, there would not be any subsequent conjunction.[13] It produces effects, namely, conjunctions and disjunctions inherent in its own substratum and also in the substratum of others.[14]

It does not produce effects of its own class. That is, a motion never produces another motion.[15] If motion were to produce another motion, then it would

[8] KR, p. 153; Kandalī, p. 290; PSAH, Ch. II, pp. 129-130, where Dr. Seal wrongly attributes the above explanation to Praçastapāda.

[9] VU, II. i. 21.

[10] NK, p. 205 (third edition).

[11] PPBhā, p. 290; VU, II. i. 21.

[12] VS, I. i. 17; PPBhā, p. 290.

[13] VS, I. i. 14; PPBhā, p. 290 along with Kandalī.

[14] PPBhā, p. 290.

[15] VS, I. i. 11; PPBhā, p. 290.

do so just after its own production, like sound; so that, the previous motion alone have had produced disjunctions with all the combined substances, then with whom the second motion will produce disjunction; for, a disjunction is always preceded by a conjunction and there is no possibility of there being another conjunction; and if no disjunction is produced, then the very definition of motion is falsified. We cannot, in order to get over the above difficulty, hold that it would produce motion at a later time; for, there should be no delay in the production of the effect if the thing which is to produce the effect has capability to do so; for, there is nothing to depend upon, which alone can delay the production. If it be held that the production takes place simultaneously with the destruction of the previous conjunction, even then there remains the impossibility of producing the disjunction. The same will hold good in the case of the production at the moment when the subsequent conjunction takes place. There is no possibility of the production after the production of the subsequent production; for, then the very motion is destroyed. Hence, no motion can produce another motion.[16]

Again, if a motion produces another motion, then when a man moves there should not be the stoppage of his motion; for, every motion will go on producing another motion of its own type *ad infinitum*. If it be held that the movement of the man would come to an end when the desire to move further and the effort to that effect are stopped, then we should say that the cause of the subsequent motions is the desire and the effort and not the motion itself.[17]

It does not produce any substance. That is, although a motion produces conjunctions which, in their turn, produce a substance, so that, indirectly a motion

[16] VU, I. i. 11.

[17] Kandalī, p. 291.

does produce a substance, yet a motion is never regarded to be the cause of a substance.[18] The reason is that at the time of the production of a substance motion does not exist. It disappears just after the production of the subsequent conjunction.[19]

It always produces an effect marking a particular direction.[20] It is perceived through two external sense-organs, namely, organs of sight and touch, except in the case of *Manas* where it is only inferred.[21]

It possesses the attributes of *Sattā* (the summum genus); non-eternity; the character of having a substance as its material cause; the character of being an effect and a cause; generality and quiddity in common with a substance and an attribute.[22] It has a quality as its non-material cause in common with a substance and a quality.[23] It is a cause of velocity[24] as well as that of elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*).[25] A single motion for instance, going upward, is a product of several causes, namely, weight, effort, and conjunction.

IV

VARIETIES OF MOTION

It has been said above that motion produces effects marking a particular direction. The same thing is explained through the help of its various divisions, namely, upward motion (*utkṣepaṇa*), downward motion (*apakṣepaṇa*), contraction (*ākuñcana*), expansion (*prasāraṇa*), and motion in general (*gamana*). Now, these divisions can be easily classed under two broad

[18] VS, I. i. 21; VU. on ibid.; PPBhā, p. 290.
[19] Kandalī, p. 291.
[20] PPBhā, p. 290.
[21] KR, p. 152.
[22] VS, I. i. 8, 18.
[23] VS, I. i. 19.
[24] VS, I. i. 20.
[25] VU, I. i. 20.

heads: (1) motion in one particular definite direction, and (2) motion in uncertain different directions. Under the former head, we may have *utkṣepaṇa*, *apakṣepaṇa*, *ākuñcana* (motion towards one particular direction by contracting an extended thing), and *prasāraṇa* (motion towards one particular direction by expanding a contracted object). Under the latter head, we can have only one, namely, *gamana*. This includes all other sorts of motions not included under the aforesaid four varieties. In order to make the sense of these terms quite clear I would like to explain each of them here in detail. Thus:—

1. Upward motion (*utkṣepaṇa*) is that kind of motion which brings about the conjunction of the constituent parts of an organism, for instance, hand and the rest, and things connected with the organism, as for instance, *musala* (a particular kind of very thick stick generally used for removing husks from grains) with parts above and disjunction of these with the parts below. This is due to weight, effort, and conjunctions.[26]

2. Downward motion (*apakṣepaṇa*) is that kind of motion which produces conjunction of the parts of an organism and things connected with them with parts below and disjunction with parts above.[27]

3. Contraction (*ākuñcana*) is that kind of motion by which the upper parts of an extended substance are disjoined with those parts with which they were connected before and are combined with the parts at the bottom; so that, the substance becomes curved.[28]

4. Expansion (*prasāraṇa*) is that kind of motion by which the upper parts of a substance become disjoined with the parts of the same substance at the bottom and become connected with the upper parts with which they were disconnected before; so that, the object

[26] PPBhā, p. 291 along with Kandalī.
[27] PPBhā, p. 291.
[28] PPBhā, p. 291.

becomes straight.[29]

Under the second broad head, namely, *gamana*, meaning 'motion' in general, which is the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions between parts of different uncertain directions, they include revolving (*bhramaṇa*), purging (*recana*), fluidity (*syanda*), vibration (*spanda*), upward flaming (*ūrdhvajvalana*), and oblique or transversal motion (*tiryaggamana*). In all these cases of motions, we find that there is no certainty of any one definite direction. We may include other similar forms of motions under this head.

As to the question: when the term '*gamana*' is a synonym for motion in general, what is the use of having a separate heading under *gamana*? it is said that if *gamana* be not used separately, then under motion (*gamana*) only those particular kinds of motions mentioned above would have been included. But in reality, we find that *bhramaṇa*, *recana*, and the rest are also used in the sense of *gamana*, which would have been otherwise. That is, the use of the term *gamana* would have gone against the worldly usage in that case. Hence, in order to keep up the harmony between the motions and the actual reality, the term *gamana* has been separately used as a distinct head.[30]

V

CAUSES OF MOTION

Motion is produced by weight (*gurutva*), effort (*prayatna*), and conjunction (*saṃyoga*).[31] Praçastapāda adds fluidity (*dravatva*) to the above.[32] Motion due to conjunction is produced by forcible contact[33] or by

[29] PPBhā, p. 292.
[30] PPBhā, p. 366, Kandalī, p. 297.
[31] VS, I. i. 29.
[32] P. 290.
[33] VS, V. i. 3.

impulsion (*nodana*).[34] *Adṛṣṭa* is also considered to be its cause.[35] *Saṃskāra* also produces motion.[36]

An effort is made here to show how each of the above mentioned causes operates so as to produce motion in substances having limited forms:

1. Weight (*gurutva*)--one of the causes of motion, is defined as the cause of the falling motion (*patana-karman*) of water and earth. It is inferred through the falling motion, as it is supersensuous. Vallabha holds that it is perceived while operating downwards.[37] It is neutralised by conjunction, effort, and *saṃskāra*.

As it belongs to water and earth,[38] it will cause motion only in these. Its influence is neutralised by conjunction, effort, and *saṃskāra*. Hence, in the case of watery and earthly objects, when none of the counteracting forces, namely, conjunction, effort, and *saṃskāra*, is operating its influence over weight, then weight causes downward motion in these. This is called the falling motion of the object. As for instance, in the case of *musala*, in the absence of the hand-contact which is the counter-acting agency of the weight, the downward motion is due to weight. In the same way, in the case of an organism in the absence of effort which counteracts the influence of weight, the falling down is due to weight. In the like manner, in the case of an arrow when thrown out, it falls down in the way without reaching the goal, in the absence of velocity (one of the *saṃskāras*), the falling is due to weight alone.[39] This applies to all the cases of falling down.[40] Now, in all these cases, motion in the *musala*, body and the arrow is due to

[34] VS, V. i. 10.
[35] VS, V. i. 15.
[36] VS, V. i. 17.
[37] NLV, p. 69; PD, p. 14; VU, IV. i. 10.
[38] PPBhā, p. 263.
[39] VS, V. i. 7.
[40] VU, on ibid.

weight alone.

It should be noted down here that the first initiative falling motion is due to weight alone, while the second and the subsequent falling motions are joint products of weight and velocity (*vega*). The first motion towards falling down is produced by weight, but later on, it gives rise to velocity; so that, in subsequent motions, both velocity and weight are found. Here, we have the joint causality, but in other places, each of these two has been found to be productive of motion separately and independently.[41]

It is clear from the above statement that weight causes motion only when there is no velocity, which is one of the counteracting forces for the operation of weight in producing first motion in a substance which, in its turn, leads to its fall. In this case, no doubt, weight is the cause of motion, but only that of the first falling motion (*ādyapatanakarman*). This motion produces velocity which helps the weight to produce joint effects in the form of the subsequent motions, till the falling object reaches the ground.

Now, it may be urged here: velocity being one of the counteracting forces of weight, how can there be any joint effect at all? According to the rule, as soon as velocity appears it should counteract the operation of weight. This may be further explained with the help of two instances. Thus, when an arrow is thrown into the air towards any direction it is accompanied by velocity which really is its conveyance, but there is also weight in it. Now, it is also certain that the independent operation of weight causes falling motion (*patanakarman*); so that, in the case of a flying arrow we will have to infer that although the weight is present there, yet it has not got its independent operation. That is, its influence is counteracted by velocity which alone is causing motion in the

[41] PPBhā, pp. 304-305, along with Kandalī.

arrow. This velocity when exhausted, the weight predominates and causes the downfall of the arrow. This is how velocity is counteracting the operation of weight and does not help the production of a joint effect.

Again, in the case of an object or an organism where there is no velocity and the rest to counteract the operations of its weight, it is really the weight alone which causes the falling motion there. But this weight is the cause only so far as the first falling motion is concerned; because, in the subsequent falling motions the weight is helped by velocity which was produced by the first falling motion itself; so that, here also, we find velocity helping the weight, instead of, as a rule, counteracting it, of course, in the cause. This is a clear case of mutual help with a view to produce a joint effect. Even in the second instance itself, we find apparently contradictory statements. We stick to the rule that there should not be velocity etc. in the case of the first falling motion, although they may be present in the subsequent falling motions.

How to reconcile these two apparently contradictory views? The facts are as stated above. Praçastapāda is quite clear. But Çrīdhara appears to have felt some difficulty; hence, he has tried to give reasons to defend Praçastapāda. But his reasons do not give us ample satisfaction; for, although both weight (*gurutva*) and velocity (*vega*) are found productive of motion elsewhere separately, yet one may counteract the other. When they are independent and separate both produce motion; but when found in one place, velocity counteracts the force of weight and performs its function alone. There is no difficulty in this and perhaps almost all the later writers hold weight as the cause of the first falling motion alone, while velocity that of the subsequent motions alone.[42] There

[42] TR, p. 146; TD on TS, p. 20; Viçvakarman's com. on TBhā, p. 136.

is nothing in the Vaiçeṣika sutra itself to support the view of Praçastapāda.

Dr. B.N. Seal, on the other hand, says—"Praçastapāda seems to have thought that some *saṃskāras* (e.g. the *vega* of an arrow or other projectile) suspend the action of gravity; other *saṃskāras* (e.g. in the case of a falling body) coalesce with gravity to produce a single resultant motion. The later commentators from Çridhara downwards certainly interpret the Vaiçeṣika sūtras in this sense."[43]

2. Effort (*prayatna*) is also a cause of motion. It is of two kinds—one which proceeds from life (*jīvana*) and the other that proceeds from desire and hatred. Of these, the former, namely, that which proceeds from life is that which is the cause of the movement of the vital-airs, namely, *prāṇa* and *apāna*, while a man is sleeping, and which leads the internal sense-organ to come in contact with the external sense-organs at the time of awakening.[44] In other words, the activities of vital-airs, in a sleeping man, are due to effort. This effort cannot be caused by desire and hatred. It is only due to the life present in a man. Life, on the other hand, has been explained as the contact of the *Ātman* with the *Manas* and an organism depending upon merit and demerit; so that, effort proceeding from life is produced from the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact depending upon merit and demerit.[45] The other is the cause of the activities which are capable of leading to the desired and of removing the undesired. This also keeps up the body steady. That the body being heavy does not fall down is due to our effort proceeding from desire. This second kind of effort is produced from the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact helped by the desire or by hatred.[46]

[43] PSAH, p. 142.
[44] PPBhā, p. 263.
[45] Kandalī, p. 263.
[46] PPBhā, p. 263 along with Kandalī.

Such an effort produces motion. When a man, desirous of performing such acts as sacrifice, study, giving, cultivation of land etc., wants to throw up his hand, or throw it down, then an effort is produced in the *Ātman* limited by the part of the body called hand, and then from the *Ātman* and the hand contact helped by that effort and weight motion is produced in the hand; and also in the like manner, in all other parts of the body, such as, leg and the rest and consequently, in the body itself.[47] This motion has got the parts of the body or the body itself as its material cause, the *Ātman* (possessing effort) and the hand contact as the non-material cause, while the effort itself as the instrumental cause.[48] We should remember that effort alone without the aid of weight cannot produce either the upward or the downward motion; so that, we have to admit here the causality of weight as well.

Again, in the same manner, effort produces motion in things connected with the parts of the body, or the body itself. Thus, when a man, having a *musala* in his hand, desires to throw up the *musala* with the help of the hand, an effort is produced in the *Ātman*. With the help of that effort as the instrumental cause and the *Ātman* and the hand contact as the non-material cause, an upward motion is produced in the hand and simultaneously with the help of the same effort, from the hand and the *musala* contact, a motion is produced even in the *musala* itself.[49]

Similarly, we have downward motion of hand and *musala*. Thus, when the *musala* has been thrown up, the desire to throw it up ceases, and another desire to throw it down is produced followed by an

[47] VS, V. i. I., PPBhā, p. 297.
[48] VU, V. i. I. This motion is called *ceṣṭā*, as it is said—"*Ātmajanyā bhavedicchā icchajānyā bhavetkṛtiḥ; kṛtijanyā bhavececeṣṭā tajjanyaiva kriyā bhavet*"—Quoted in VV, v. i. I.
[49] PPBhā, pp. 297-298.

effort. With the help of this effort as the instrumental cause and the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact as well as the hand and *musala* contact as the respective non-material causes, there are simultaneously downward motions in hand as well as in the *musala*.[50]

The motion of the *musala* produces forcible conjunction between a wooden mortar (*ulūkhala*) and the *musala*, which, in its turn, is the cause of the upward motion of the *musala* with the help of the velocity belonging to it, without being preceded by any effort. Here, the velocity is the instrumental cause and the *musala* is the material cause.

This upward motion of the *musala*, in its turn, with the help of the forcible contact produces velocity in the *musala*. With the help of this velocity, again, the *musala* and the hand contact, without depending upon any effort, produces an upward motion in the hand also.

As to the question—that the previous velocity produced in the *musala* by the downward motion being now destroyed by the forcible contact, how can the upward motion of the *musala*, without depending upon any effort, produce another velocity as explained above?[51] it is said that although the previous velocity is destroyed, yet the *musala* and the mortar contact is capable of producing a forcible (*paṭu*) motion productive of velocity.[52] Here, the upward motion in the hand and the *musala* is successive. It appears simultaneous only because of the swiftness of the two motions.[53] It may also be possible to regard the previous velocity itself so strong that even by the forcible contact it may not be destroyed and there would be then no need of having another velocity. Thus, simultaneously with the

[50] PPBhā, p. 298.
[51] Kandalī, p. 290.
[52] PPBhā, p. 298.
[53] Kandalī, p. 300.

production of the upward motion in the *musala*, by the forcible contact with the help of the velocity, without depending upon effort, another motion is produced, even in the hand with the help of the same velocity, from the *musala* and the hand contact without depending upon an effort.[54] Here is the simultaneity of production in the case of the upward motion.[55]

It is clear from the above that the upward motion is produced both by the presence and the absence of an effort.

3. Conjunction (*Saṃyoga*)—As regards conjunction as the cause of motion we know that it depends upon something else than its own substratum to produce it.[56] This produces motion either through forcible contact or impulsion, the two forms of conjunction. The former produces sound when two things between which conjunction takes place come together; while the latter does not produce any sound at all. Impulsion is a form of conjunction, because, it is the cause of that motion which produces the non-disjunction of the impeller from the impelled; and it is only by means of the conjunction in the form of impulsion (*nodana*) that the impeller impels the impelled.[57]

This impulsion is helped by weight, fluidity, velocity and effort operating either collectively or individually. It produces motion in all the four *mahābhūtas*.[58] As for example, we find that in the case of muddy earth when a small piece of stone is gently put upon mud, it gradually sinks down together with the mud. Here, in this case, the contact of the piece of stone with the mud brought about by the weight of the stone is of

[54] PPBhā, p. 298.
[55] Kandalī, p. 300.
[56] PPBhā, p. 139.
[57] PPBhā, pp. 303-304 along with Kandalī.
[58] Ibid.

the type of impulsion (*nodana*). When again, the piece of stone strikes against the mud with effort from a distance, then also the conjunction between the piece of stone and the mud is of the type of impulsion brought about by weight, effort and velocity. Again, when the mud is struck by water, then the conjunction which is of the type of impulsion is brought about by all together, namely, weight, fluidity, effort and velocity.[59]

The forcible contact (*abhighāta*), in the like manner, is that type of conjunction which is brought about by velocity and which is the cause of motion which causes disjunction.[60] In other words, it is the cause of that motion which causes disjunction between that object which strikes against another object and *vice versa*.[61] This also produces motion in all the four *mahābhūtas*. As for instance, when a stone or similar another object falls upon a hard substance, it produces motion which is due to *abhighāta*; so that, when the muddy earth is either impelled or struck by the feet, the conjunction thus produced is known as *saṃyukta-saṃyoga* depending upon impulsion or forcible contact, individually or collectively. It also produces motion in earth etc. which are neither impelled, nor struck.[62]

4. Fluidity (*dravatva*)—Coming to the fluidity as the cause of motion we find that it is the cause of the motion of flowing.[63] It belongs to earth, water and fire. It is natural in water alone, while it is extrinsic to earth and fire. There should be no doubt about the natural fluidity belonging to water; for, in the case of solidified water, like snow, ice, hailstone, etc., the fluidity belonging to the watery *paramāṇus* constituting these solids is counteracted by the mutual

[59] Kandalī, p. 304.
[60] PPBhā, p. 304.
[61] Kandalī, p. 305.
[62] PPBhā, p. 304.
[63] VS, V. i. 4.

conjunction of the *paramāṇus* of water brought about by non-physical fire (*divyena tejasā*).[64] This we infer from the counteraction of the fluidity of salt by the contact of the non-physical fire. That these solids, like salt etc., are watery substances is known from the fact of their melting on other occasions. The melting of ice, snow, etc. is due to the contact of the earthly (e.g. physical) *tejas*, as it is in the case of gold.[65]

The extrinsic fluidity belonging to earth and *tejas* is produced by the contact of *tejas*. For instance, in the case of butter, lac, honey, and the rest, a motion is produced by the contact of the *tejas* helped by velocity in the *paramāṇus* which constitute them. This motion produces disjunction after destroying the conjunction productive of the substance; so that, the effect being destroyed, fluidity is produced in the *paramāṇus* alone through the help of the conjunction of the *tejas*. Then again, through the instrumentality of the *adṛṣṭa* of persons concerned and the conjunction of the *Ātman* and the *paramāṇus*, a motion is produced in those very *paramāṇus* which brings about the effect through the process of *dvyaṇuka* and the rest. Then fluidity is also produced in the effects along with other qualities.[66]

The downward flowing of water in the form of current from a certain place is also due to fluidity. Sometimes, the fluidity of water and some of its constituents is checked by their contact with barriers, such as, high banks, on all sides; and that of those constituents which are not in direct touch with the banks is checked by the *saṃyukta-saṃyoga*. When that check is even very slightly destroyed, then although the fluidity of water as a whole does not operate, being kept in check from all sides of the bank, yet the fluidity of the constituent parts which are in direct

[64] PPBhā, pp. 264-265.
[65] Kandalī, p. 266.
[66] PPBhā, p. 265.

touch with the bank as well as that of the other parts consequently, begin to operate as there is no check now.[67] As the opening is very small, the fluidity of the constituent parts in direct touch alone first operates and subsequently, that of other parts. But even when they move out one after another, they come out conjoined together. Though while moving, these parts do not appear to have moved from their respective places, yet they do so in such a manner as to remain in contact with one another. But this does not mean that they have their previous contacts undisturbed; for, we find that the collocation has changed.[68] Thus, the previous substance being destroyed on account of the destruction of the previous combinations, the collocated particles produce a substance having a long dimension. In that product the fluidity is also produced. So, when the constituent parts move out in close adherence to one another, a sort of motion is also produced in the whole which is known as *flowing*. In this way, through the fluidity of the constituent parts motion is produced in the whole.[69] The same thing may be said regarding the drops of water falling from the clouds and combining together so as to form one connected elongated substance. The flowing of such a substance is due to fluidity.[70]

5. Impression (*saṃskāra*)—is also a cause of motion. Although it is of three kinds, yet only two, namely, *vega* and *sthitisthāpaka* (elasticity), are required here. The former is produced by motion with the help of impulsion, forcible contact and other causes, in all the five kinds of substances possessing limited forms, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and *Manas*.[71] Motion alone cannot produce velocity, as is

[67] Ibid., pp. 305-306.
[68] Kandalī, p. 307.
[69] PPBhā, p. 306.
[70] VU, V. ii. 4.
[71] Kandalī, p. 267.

clear from the fact that velocity is not found in slow motion where there is neither implusion nor forcible contact.

It is the cause of series of motions in one particular direction. It is counteracted by a particular kind of conjunction of a tangible substance. It is, sometimes, preceded by a similar attribute belonging to the constituent parts of the substance.[72] In other words, generally velocity is produced by motion, but sometimes it is also produced by the velocity itself belonging to the constituent parts of the substance in which it is found; as for instance, the velocity found in water as a whole is due to the velocity found in the cause of water, that is, the constituent parts of water which produce water.[73]

Regarding *sthitisthāpaka* (elasticity) we know that it exists in tangible substances of which the constituent parts are very closely combined together. It brings back the substance—its own substratum—to its original position, if that substance had changed its position otherwise, on some other occasion. We find its effects in bow, branch of a tree, horn, tooth, bone, thread, cloth and the rest, all of which are products of some animate and inanimate objects which are subject to contraction and expansion.[74]

The best example of motion produced by impression (*saṃskāra*) is found in the discharge of an arrow and the movement of a wheel etc. In the case of the discharge of an arrow the process is as follows: The man who is strong and has got regular practice in the art of archery, firmly takes up the bow with his left hand; and then taking the arrow with his right hand and applying it to the string of the bow, holds the string along with the arrow with his fist and desires to

[72] PPBhā, pp. 266-267.
[73] Kandalī, p. 268.
[74] PPBhā, p. 267.

stretch the bow along with the string and the arrow. This is followed by an effort on his part. Through the *Ātman* and the hand contact aided by the effort a motion, in the form of drawing, is produced in the hand; simultaneously with that motion another motion is produced in the arrow as well as in the string of the bow from the hand, string of the bow and arrow contact aided by the very effort; and simultaneously with this, again, through the hand, string of the bow and arrow-contact qualified by the said effort two motions are produced in the two ends of the bow from the contact of the string of the bow and the ends of the bow.[75] In this way, the bow being stretched as far as the ear, there springs up an idea within the man who is stringing the bow that the string cannot be stretched further than this. This idea destroys the effort which had been put forth for stretching the bow. Then there, again, appears a desire to leave the arrow as well as the string. Then follows an effort. Aided by this effort through the contact of the *Ātman* and the fingers, a motion is produced in the fingers which produces disjunction between string of the bow and the finger.[76] From this disjunction is produced the destruction of the conjunction between arrow, string and finger. This being destroyed, there being no obstacle, the *saṃskāra* of the type of elasticity, present in the bow, brings the bow, which had been turned into a circular shape, to its original form. Then aided by this very elasticity through the contact of the bow and the string a motion is produced in the string as well as the arrow. This motion through the instrumentality of its own cause, namely, the contact of the bow and the string, produces velocity in the string. Aided by the velocity, the arrow and the string contact produces impulsion on account of the combined movement of the arrow which

[75] PPBhā, p. 301.
[76] Kandalī, p. 303.

is impelled and the string which is the impeller.[77] From this impulsion there is the first motion in the arrow, which aided by impulsion produces velocity in it (e.g. arrow). From that velocity through the help of that impulsion follow series of motions which continue to appear until the arrow is disconnected with the string. The disjunction thus caused leads to the stoppage of the impulsion. Then there appear series of motions due to the velocity present in the arrow, which continue until the arrow falls down to the ground. This fall of the arrow is due to the exhaustion of the velocity which has counteracted the operation of weight; so that, after the disappearance of the velocity, the weight begins to operate and causes the downfall of the arrow.[78]

A question is raised here: Since the moment the arrow is disconnected with the string and till it falls down to the ground there appears several motions, one after the other; but how does a man come to know of it? Why is not a single motion assumed to accomplish it?[79]

The answer to this is that the existence of several motions is assumed as there are several conjunctions since the arrow is disconnected with the string and till it falls down to the ground. During this interval, namely, between the impulsion and the falling down of the arrow on the ground there is only one *saṃskāra*;[80] and it is only when a motion is aided by impulsion or by forcible contact, that it produces a *saṃskāra*, and never by itself alone; for, there is no velocity. During the interval, on the other hand, there is neither impulsion, nor forcible contact; so that, there is only one *saṃskāra* which is produced by the motion of the arrow aided by the arrow and the string contact; and it is this

[77] Kandalī, p. 303.
[78] PPBhā, p. 302; NBhā, III. ii. 42.
[79] Kandalī, p. 303.
[80] PPBhā, p. 302.

saṃskāra alone which accompanies the arrow till the latter falls down; and as the efficiency of the *saṃskāra* to produce further effects is diminishing, the consequent effects become weaker and weaker.[81]

It is to be noted here that the above view is held mainly by the Vaiçeṣikas. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, consider that like the series of motions there are also the series of *saṃskāras*.[82] This view is rejected by the Vaiçeṣikas on the single ground of *gaurava*.[83] Although this view is not found in the Nyāyabhāṣya where only a series of motions is mentioned,[84] yet it is found in the Nyāya-Vārtika.[85] Accepting the Nyāya-view, Dr. B. N. Seal says—"it will be seen that the Nyāya view is adequate to explain acceleration, which it logically implies."[86]

Similarly, in the case of a pot-maker's wheel, we know that the first motion is produced in the wheel as a whole due to the contact of the stick, and the subsequent motions are produced from the motion which is due to either impulsion or forcible contact and also due to *saṃskāra*. Thus, the first motion in the part of the wheel which is in contact with the stick proceeds from velocity through the contact of the stick with other parts of the wheel; the subsequent motions of the part which is in contact with a stick are due to *saṃskāra* and impulsion; while motions of other parts are due to *saṃskāra* and *saṃyukta-saṃyoga*; and when the stick is removed, the motion found in the wheel as well as in its parts is due to *saṃskāra* alone.[87]

6. *Adṛṣṭa*. Lastly, we come to *adṛṣṭa* which is also one of the causes of motion. But what is

[81] Kandalī, p. 303.
[82] VU., v. i. 17.
[83] Ibid.
[84] NS, III. ii. 42.
[85] PSAH, p. 137.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Kandalī, p. 307.

adṛṣṭa itself? Literally, it means that which is not seen. That is, it is an unseen force which is mainly due to the deeds performed by a man. These deeds may be due to merit, or demerit, or both. It is even identified with *dharma* and *adharma*. However, such motions which cannot be explained through ordinary causes mentioned above are attributed to this *adṛṣṭa*. Hence, we find that the causality of *adṛṣṭa* is assumed in producing motion in the following cases:

(*a*) The motion found in jewels, needle etc.[88] Thus, when anything is stolen away and the thief is not caught, the man, learned in the art of catching thief, performs some rites in a vessel or a pot, made of some jewel or metal, filled with water. The vessel then is placed on the ground and some one is asked to hold the top of the vessel firmly with his right hand. The artist then repeats some *mantras*, through the force of which the vessel held by the third person, moves towards the direction in which the stolen property is kept. When the vessel reaches the exact place where the property is lying, it stops. Now, in this case, the motion of the vessel is not due to any effort. It is assumed to be either due to the good luck of the real master of the property or the misfortune of the thief. Here, the vessel is the material cause of the motion, the contact of the vessel with the *Ātman* of the thief having *adṛṣṭa* as the non-material cause, and the demerit of the thief as the instrumental cause.[89]

Similarly, the case of the motion of the needle or any piece of iron towards the magnet is also attributed to *adṛṣṭa*. Again, the motion found in grass while moving towards the grass-magnet (*tṛṇakānta*) is also attributed to *adṛṣṭa*. In these cases, needle and grass are the material causes, the conjunction with the *Ātman* of the person possessing *adṛṣṭa* and is affected

[88] VS., v. i. 15; PPBhā, p. 309; Kandalī, p. 311.
[89] VU. and VV., V. i. 15.

for good or for bad by that motion of the needle, the grass etc. are the non-material causes, and his very *adṛṣṭa* is the instrumental cause.[90]

(*b*) Earthquake etc., which are neither caused by impulsion, nor by forcible striking, are said to be caused by *adṛṣṭa*.[91] So, it is said that if a motion in earth alone be of some particular consequence as in the case of earthquake, then it is caused by *adṛṣṭa*; so that, the earth is the material cause, the conjunction of the *Ātman* possessing *adṛṣṭa* of a person whose pleasure or pain is produced by the earthquake is the non-material cause, while *adṛṣṭa* is the instrumental cause. This is true of all the motions found under the earth and which are not due to impulsion and forcible contact.[92]

(*c*) Again, the motion of water within the trees is also attributed to *adṛṣṭa*.[93] Thus, when water is poured into the basin round a tree and it moves into the tree through the roots, the motion is not caused by impulsion, or by forcible contact, or by the sun's rays. Hence, it is attributed to *adṛṣṭa* alone. Here also, water is the material cause, the conjunction of the *Ātman*, possessing *adṛṣṭa* of persons who are to get pleasure or pain from the growth of the leaves, branches, flowers etc., of the tree, is the non-material cause, while *adṛṣṭa* itself is the instrumental cause. This motion of water causes the growth of the tree.[94]

(*d*) Other cases where *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of motion are found in the first upward flaming of fire, the first oblique or transversal movement of air, the first motion imparted to the *paramāṇus* after the Cosmic Rest and the first motion imparted to the *Manas*.[95]

[90] VU. and VV., v. i.15.
[91] VS., V. ii. 2.
[92] VU, on ibid.; Candrakānta explains *adṛṣṭaiḥ* as *ābhyantar-airvastubhiçcaladbhiḥ*.
[93] VS, V. ii. 7.
[94] VU, V. ii. 7.
[95] VS, V. ii. 13.

(*c*) Again, we find that *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of the two well-known motions of the *Manas*, namely, *apasarpaṇa* and *upasarpaṇa*. Conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk and conjunctions of other effects are also attributed to this *adṛṣṭa*.[96]

The *apasarpaṇa* and the *upasarpaṇa* are produced by the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact helped by *adṛṣṭa*. The process is as follows: When the merit and the demerit, helping the existence of the body in the living state, become exhausted and do not produce any more effect due to the experience (*bhoga*) or to their mutual predominance, or to their mutual counteraction, the effort proceeding from the living also having ceased to exist; the functioning of the vital-airs having also stopped, the present body falls down as dead. Then, again, another set of merits and demerits through which the particular *Jivātaman* is to experience pleasure and pain in the next body, comes to function. In other words, the particular set of merits and demerits meant for the experience of pleasure and pain in another body, being checked to function in this body by the set of merits and demerits meant for the experience of pleasure and pain in this very body, finding the present body dead and the set of its merits and demerits exhausted, becomes operative; for, there is nothing to counteract its force now. Then, this fresh set of merits and demerits, aided by the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact, produces a motion called *apasarpaṇa* which causes the disjunction between the dead body and the *Manas*. Here, the *Ātman* and the *Manas* contact is the non-material cause, the *Manas* is the material cause and the fresh set of merits and demerits which is now operative is the instrumental cause.

Then, this *Manas*, which has left the dead body and has come out, becomes connected with another subtler body called *ātivāhikaçarīra* which has been formed

[96] VS, V. ii. 17.

by the non-operating fresh set of merits and demerits.

The *Manas* thus connected with the subtler body goes either to heaven or to hell. After going there the *Manas* leaves this *ātivāhika* body and enters into another body which is formed in accordance with the past deeds of the person whose *Manas* is moving. This body is meant for the experience of pleasure and pain according to the past deeds either in heaven or in hell. To come in contact with this body the *Manas* must have a motion. Such a motion is known as *apasarpaṇa*.

As to the necessity of having an organism, however subtle it may be, it is said that while moving from place to place *Manas* must have an organism; for, there can be no motion in the *Manas* which is not in any organism, except during the state that immediately follows the Universal Destruction (*mahāpralaya*); so that, it is necessary to assume the existence of an organism, which remains quite close to the dead body. It is produced out of *paramāṇus* and *dvyaṇukas* etc. moved by the *adṛṣṭa*. This body is very subtle and supersensuous. As it leads the *Manas* to heaven and hell, it is known as the *ātivāhikaçarīra*.[97]

The motion of the *Manas*, to enter the fresh body produced either in heaven or in hell for the experience of pleasure and pain, is known as *upasarpaṇa*.[98]

Similarly, the motion found in the *Manas* on other occasions is also due to *adṛṣṭa*. Thus, the motion of the *Manas* of the *yogins* with the help of which the *Manas* goes out of the body to its destination and comes back to its own organism and so on, is due to *adṛṣṭa* alone.[99]

As regards the motion due to *adṛṣṭa*, it should be pointed out that the systems of Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika, following very closely the common-sense view, have

[97] Kandalī, p. 310.
[98] Ibid., p. 311.
[99] PPBhā, p. 309 along with Kandalī, p. 311.

to confine themselves within certain limitations. Hence, sometimes, even in such cases, where one can easily, with a little insight, find out some definite cause of the motion, as for instance, in earthquake etc., these systems pretend to remain ignorant of the reality and attribute the causality to some unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*).

Besides these, there are certain other kinds of motions which are attributed to one of these causes. Thus, for instance, the cloud in the sky is a collection of water-drops moved towards the sky through the rays of the sun helped by the contact of air.[100]

Now, these causes sometimes operate separately, independent of any other cause and sometimes, they join together to produce one joint effect.

[100] VS, V. ii. 5-6 along with VU.

VII

CLASSIFICATION OF SṚṢṬI

The entire creation may be divided into two broad heads: *yonija* and *ayonija*. The former includes such living beings as are produced out of the fusion of the male and the female. The latter may be, again, subdivided into *Mānasika* and non-*Mānasika*. Under the former, we include the *Mānasika* sons of *Brahmā*, and under the latter, we have the production of the other worldly living beings and food, drink, and so forth suited to them. These productions also are due to the influence of *adṛṣṭa*.

VIII

THE LAW OF KARMAN AND ITS FUNCTIONING

We have heard enough of the *Law of Karman*. Now, it may be asked: what does it mean and how is it regulated? In answer to this, it may be said that the law means that our activities (*karmans*) are performed according to certain regular laws and not haphazardly. All our activities, both psychic and physical, are performed with certain end in view. For each and every action, there is enough responsibility. Almost all of them are predetermined. These activities may be good or bad. Those which are good, that is, which tend towards the realisation of the highest good, are called meritorious (*dhārmika*), and those which are bad are called demeritorious (*adhārmika*); so that, when they are performed, they leave behind some impressions which remain unseen and are known as *adṛṣṭa*, or *dharmādharma*, or *puṇyapāpa*, or *apūrva*, and so on. After this, whenever these impressions get anything to arouse them, they appear, again, in some form or other, not necessarily, in their previous forms, and are experienced then as the result of the previous deeds or thoughts.

This sort of fructification of the impressions of the past deeds may be possible in a year's time or more, and may extend to several lives even. Hence, the impressions of the deeds of one life may continue for several lives. Now, it may be asked: Are we to experience the result of all our activities? But, before giving a direct answer to this question, it is better to know more about our activities with a view to find out whether it is essential to experience the result of all our activities or not.

Nescience (*avidya*)[25] is considered to be without any beginning. The *Law of Karman* is the manifestation of this very nescience. Under its influence due to the effects of the meritorious and the demeritorious deeds, the *Jīvātman*[26], passing through various births and deaths, imposes upon itself the qualities of *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva*. In fact, it is due to these very attributes that there appear to be two *Ātmans*; so that, the chains of births and deaths, the experience of the dualistic nature of the self, the distinction between name and form, all these continue until the *avidyā* or its manifestation, namely, the *Law of Karman* is entirely annihilated.

It is all due to the differences of *karman* under the influence of the three *guṇas*, namely, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, that there are obvious differences in the result. Thus, the *Jīvātman* under the influence of the *Tamas* aspect of the *avidyā* enters the body of lower creatures, such as, birds, deer, elephants etc. (*adhovṛtti*), and acts according to the nature of the organism into which it takes its abode, and finally, attains such *loka* where suffering alone prevails. If the *Rajas* prevails, then the *Jīvātman* enters such organisms

[25] It is of the nature of the harmonious state of the three *guṇas*. It manifests itself in the form of subtle and gross bodies and is the same as *ajñāna*.

[26] The *pratibimba* of the *Paramātman* falling upon the *Prakṛti* is called the *Jivātman*.

as occupy the intermediate stage, namely, the organisms of *vidyādhara*, *yakṣa*, *rākṣasa*, *manuṣya* etc. (*madhyavṛtti*), and finally, goes to the *loka* where both pleasure and pain are found in equal proportion. If, on the other hand, the *Sattva* predominates, then the *Jīvātman* enters the organism of *ṛṣis*, gods etc. (*ūrdhvavṛtti*), and thereby, obtains the *svargaloka* and the *maharloka*[27]. The difference in *karman* not only produces difference in the organism, but also in the *Jīvātmans* themselves; otherwise, there is no difference between one *Jīvātman* and the other.

Although there is only one kind of *karman*, yet due to the difference in the time of the experience of it, it is divided into *Sañcita*, *Sañcīyamāna*, or *Kriyamāṇa* and *Prārabdha*. By *Sañcita* we mean that kind of *karman* which is still kept in store and whose fructification (*bhoga*) has not yet begun. By *Sañcīyamāna* we mean that kind of *karman* which is being done every day in the course of the experiencing of the deeds of the *Prārabdha-karman*. And by *Prārabdha* is meant that *karman* for the experience of whose fruit the particular organism has been assumed at the present time and is being regulated.

One must exhaust the *bhoga* of these three kinds of *karmans* before the highest aim is attained. About the order of *bhoga*, it is held that it takes place in the order in which its experience has begun, or in which each action has taken place, or according to the force (*bala*) of each activity. In other words, the *Prārabdha-karman*, for the experience of which the particular organism is assumed, is experienced first, and then comes the turn of the *Sañcitakarman*, at the end of which, the *bhoga* of the third form of *karman* begins. All these may be just possible in one or more births. Sometimes the *Prārabdha* itself occupies more than one birth. It is also quite possible that after the *bhoga* of the

[27] Also *vide* BG., XIV. 18-19.

Prārabdha is exhausted, the *Sañcita-karmans* come up for being experienced in the order in which they had been performed. It is also quite possible that the order of *Sañcita-karmans* may be overlooked, and in accordance with the strength of the *Sañcita*, the *bhoga* may take place. That is, the *karman* which is very forcible and vivid will come up first for being experienced, and then the less forcible, and so on. Some are of opinion that this sort of change in the order of *bhoga* is possible even in the *Prārabdha-karman*; so that, although usually the deeds of the previous births bear fruit in this birth and those of this birth in the next, yet if the deeds are very forcible, then they will bear fruit in this very life by changing the order of the experiencing of the *Prārabdha-karman*. Whatever may be the order, it is a fact that the *bhoga* of each and every kind of *karman* must be exhausted before the highest aim is realised.

Of these three kinds of *karmans*, the *Sañcita* and the *Sañcīyamāna* can be exhausted either by their actual experience, or even without it[28], in which case, these can be exhausted by the *tattvajñāna* also[29].

This is how our activities are exhausted, partly, by *bhoga* and partly, by the true knowledge. It is also clear from the above that only for the sake of exhausting the *bhoga* of our own desires and deeds, we have to take birth after birth which necessitates the existence of *Saṃsāra* till final emancipation is attained.

[28] Vyom., p. 644.

[29] *Vide-Jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt kurute tathā*—BG. IV. 37.