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KAMAL J. RANADIVE, Ph.D.

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This attitude caused some of the extreme exponents of the science to set up the goal of the king's interest as the sole criterion of statecraft²⁴. He thinks that the arthashastra thought, compared to *dharmasutra* and Buddhist thinking traditions is strikingly original. They enjoy fearless freedom of thought though they have many of the defects of youth and inexperience²⁵. The *arthashastra* thinkers tried to separate theology from politics and succeeded in establishing the supremacy of the king in the sphere of state activities. They wanted the king to rescue people from the logic of fish and make the state strong, dynamic and developing. Hence pursuing the *Atharvaveda* tradition in letter and spirit, they asked the king to develop the sources of *vartta* and *artha* to ensure *yoga-kshema* of the people.

JAIN DOCTRINE OF KARMA

PROF. RAMESH M. DAVE

THE doctrine of karma is one of the common themes of discussion in Indian Philosophy. All schools, with the exception of Charayak, have dealt with the theory of karma. However, Jainism, deserves a special attention on this issue, for it presents totally a distinct and a novel approach to the problem.

Self-Determinism

Jainism firmly holds that, it is an individual-self who independently and exclusively shapes his own destiny. His fortune and life in this world is a product of his past karmas. He is solely responsible for his own pains and sufferings, pleasures and joys. He is neither compelled nor determined by forces external to him. He is self-determined, and accordingly, voluntarily chooses actions, as such. Hence, he is entirely responsible for his own fate. Thus Jainism is opposed to orthodox belief in blind fatalism. Jainism does not lapse into fatalism, for it regards a man as solely responsible for his karmas, and consequently, for his bondage.

Jainism grants the greatest degree of freedom to a human self in the matters of choice and performance of karma (action). A man's freedom is neither limited, nor restricted, neither curbed, nor determined by God, or any other being finite or infinite, beyond himself. Therefore, Jainism does not accept the popular Hindu conception of God, as Inner Propensator (*antaryamin*) and Moral Governor (*karma-phala-pradata*). Between a man and his intentional karmas, there is no third or extraneous agent, either human or Divine to intervene and interfere. No one, but a man himself determines his own actions and shapes his own destiny. This is a unique feature of Jaina doctrine of karma.

Materiality of Karma

For Jainism, karma does not simply mean action. Karma is very, subtle and imperceptible stock of finer material particles, described as karma-matter (*karma-pudgal*) in Jainism. Thus karma is matter, and hence, called karmic-matter.

24. Ghoshal, U. N., *Ibid.*, p. 100.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Matter is called 'pudgala', in Jainism. It is so called, because it is liable to combination and separation, integration and disintegration ('puryanti galanti cha'—Sarvadarshan—III). The particles of karma are material, infra-atomic and imperceptible. They infect the soul by their association with it and liberate the soul on their separation from it.

Jainism explains the materiality of karma by pointing out that, every effect resembles its cause. When the effect, viz. the human or animal body is material, then its cause too must be material. Therefore, karma, which is the cause of all these things, is material.

Self (Jiva)

As such a soul (jiva) is a pure, conscious being. Consciousness is the essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. A jiva is a conscious substance. However, the souls (Jivas) differ from one another in possession of nature (purity) and degree of consciousness, and hence, they can be arranged in a hierarchical order, right from stone and soil-particles to liberated souls. Thus Jainism advocates the theory of plurality of souls. Although a jiva does undergo change of state, it is eternal. A jiva is distinct from its body. It is co-extensive with body.

It is on account of the envelopment caused by karmic-matter, that the pure consciousness of the soul gets obscured, pure becomes impure, unlimited becomes limited. It is the infection of karmic-matter, that is the cause of the bondage and further involvement into the performance of action. The karmas done by the physical body and mind pollute the consciousness of jiva and make the inflow of the karmic-matter into the soul.

The influx of karmic-matter into soul depends on one's degree of involvement, his association, his desires and passions and his activities in this worldly life. All these determine his attachment in the world. Greater the attachment, stronger will be the bondage caused by karmic-matter. More intensely a person is attached and involved in the performance of actions, stronger will be the bondage created by the karmic-matter. Karmic-matter infects the soul, for it attracts the karmic-matter from without. The attraction of the karmic-matter on the soul is dependent on the intensity of desires, passions and actions of the soul.

As such, in its natural-original state, a jiva is perfect. It is capable of achieving infinite wisdom, faith, power and bliss. However, its perfection is obscured by its karmic-association. So, karmic-matter is the cause of its limitations, bondage and sufferings.

Embodiment of Jiva

Each jiva gets a body which it unconsciously craved for. The actions performed, whether psychical or physical, accumulate a stock of karmic-matter into the soul. Consequently, it gives rise to desires, passions and cravings. Accordingly, the particles of karmic-matter, enter into combinations, and get organized into a kind of body that, was craved for, and also infect the jiva. Accordingly, the body-structure, psychological nature and inclinations, colour and figure of body, life span, placement in a particular family and a society, of a soul takes place.

Thus, though the essential nature of a jiva is pure consciousness, its purity is infected by the particles of karmic-matter. The jiva, prior to karmic-infection undergoes certain modifications. These modifications are caused by the mental states of desire, aversion, attachment, etc. These changes occur in the psyche of the soul. They cause loss of resistance to the infection of karmic-matter. The soul becomes highly susceptible to influences of karmic-matter.

Ashrava

Ashrava means any action performed by a jiva through the instrumentality of speech or body. It covers within its range, every thought, every spoken word and every bodily action. These three-fold activities belong both to finite souls as well as the liberated ones, i.e. arhantas. Three-fold activities cover the manifestation of every psychical and physical behaviour, which causes the influx of karmic-matter.

Ashrava is of two kinds, viz., Bhavashrava and Dravyashrava.

Bhavashrava means subjective influx of karmic-matter. It is generated by the modification of jiva through sense-organs and mental states. It is the influx of karmic-matter on account of psychical dispositions. Bhavashrava consists of false belief, lack of control, inadvertence, passions and activities of thought, speech and action. As such, Bhavashrava is the root cause of the bondage.

Dravyashrava is a natural consequence of Bhavashrama. Dravyashrava means objective or physical influx of karmic-matter. Dravyashrava consists in actual inflow of eight-fold karmic-matter-particles, viz., knowledge-obscuring, perception-obscuring, feeling-obscuring, deluding, age-determining, character-determining, family-determining, and obstructing karmas.

Bandha

Ignorance causes passions and desires. Desires and passions are the causes of bondage. Anger (krodha), pride (maan), infatuations (maya) and greed (lobha) are the major passions known as kashayas. They are so called, because they make the karmic-matter stick to the jivas.

However, the genesis of bondage may be traced back into the thoughts. Thoughts give rise to desires and passions. Therefore, prima facie, a jiva has subjective bondage i.e. Bhavabandha. It is internal or psychical bondage arising on account of thoughts. Consequently, there arises objective bondage i.e. Dravyabandha. It is a bondage on account of actual infection of karmic-matter in jiva. Thus ignorance and lack of discrimination causes unhealthy psychic condition on account of which self and not-self are confused, and consequently, influx of karmic-matter remains chronic and continuous. The particles of karmic-matter infects and stick on jivas. just as dust-particles stick on to an oily surface.

Samvara

Samvara means putting an end to the influx of karmic-matter in jiva. Samvara is meant to prevent the pollution of jiva. The first requirement of samvara is the development of the sense of discrimination. This enables an aspirant to rightly distinguish between jiva (self) and a-jiva (not-self). It is the realization of the fact that the jiva essentially is pure consciousness bereft of all impurities. Thus right knowledge and sense of discrimination are the only means to get rid of ignorance and misapprehension; and thereby, attain liberation. In short, Samvara is inhibition or arrest of influx of karmic-matter.

Samvara is two-fold, viz., Bhavasamvara and Dravyasamvara. First of all, the susceptibility to influx of karmic-matter is totally brought under control. This process is called Bhavasamvara. Now,

when the cause is absent, the effect, namely the influx of karmic-matter becomes impossible. Such a cessation of influx of karmic-matter is called Dravyasamvara.

In other words, when all desires, passions, attachment, aversion and delusion are arrested voluntarily, it is called Bhavasamvara, i.e. subjective inhibition. On the other hand, when all activities, whether advantageous or otherwise, are arrested actually, it is called Dravyasamvara, i.e. objective inhibition. It actually stops the inflow of the atomic particles of karmic-matter. This becomes possible when one becomes indifferent both to pleasure and pain, and observes five vratas with all sincerity. The vratas consist of—(i) Ahimsa i.e. Non-violence, (ii) Satya, i.e. Truth (iii) Asteya i.e. Non-stealing, (iv) Brahmacharya i.e. celibacy and (v) Aparigraha i.e. Non-possession. These five vratas (vows) should be observed with all strictness, in thought, speech and action. They are the codes of conduct which develop a good moral character, purify jiva and help in the attainment of self-realization.

Nirjara

Nirjara literally means shedding karmas (karmic-particles). It is a process of total destruction of karmas. It is a process of undoing what the karmas have done. It is complete cessation of all activities. In the beginning partial shedding and later on complete shedding of karmic-matter takes place. Partial shedding is called Bhavanirjara, while complete shedding is called Dravyanirjara.

Thus nirjara is a process of wearing out the karmic-matter-particles. For Bhavanirjara, intense desire to wear out or destroy karma-particles is pre-requisite. Therefore, the affective state (disposition) to wear out karmic-particles follows as a continuous natural state of psyche; and the actual destruction or shedding of karmic-particles takes place. This is called Dravyanirjara.

Moksha

Bondage is caused by association of karmic-matter with jiva. Ignorance causes passions, which in turn causes bondage. So, liberation is attainable through the total dissociation of Jiva from karmic-matter. Since, knowledge alone is antithetical to ignorance, it can dispell ignorance and yield liberation. Liberation is attainable by the process of Samvara and Nirjara.

According to Jainism, right belief is the basis of right knowledge and right knowledge is the basis of right conduct. Jainism calls right knowledge (samyak jnana), right faith (samyak-darshan) and right conduct (samyak charitra) as the three gems (tri-ratna) illumining noble life. They are the right means to attain liberation.

Right knowledge consists in faithfully knowing jiva, a-jiva ashrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara and moksha. This knowledge is to be obtained from the preachings of the realized ones, i.e. tirthankaras. Right knowledge can be had and realized, provided there is right faith. Right faith consists in undivided fidelity and faith in jainism and the preachings of tirthankaras. Right knowledge and right faith must culminate into right conduct. The knowledge must translate itself into action for the purpose of realization. Right conduct consists in controlling desires, passions, attachment, aversion, senses, mind, thought, speech and action. It is sincere effort for the attainment of liberation.

An aspirant must remain totally detached while experiencing the world and performing unbinding actions. Such an attitude towards all that is a-jiva (non-self, wordly) enables him to exhaust the stock of karmas. In addition, penance and austerity (tapas) can make good deal of karmas non-effective and dead.

When all karmas are destroyed, one attains Summum Bonum, i.e. liberation, the Highest End. A liberated jiva realizes infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. A liberated jiva moves vertically in the transcendental abode, and rests there eternally in "Siddhasheela". This is the moksha, the attainment of the Final Goal.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF WERNER PELZ

J. V. FERREIRA

THE sociology of Werner Pelz has as its highlights the concepts of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, of *Verstehen* and *Besinnung*, of history, of dialectics, of hermeneutics, of phenomenology and of art. It is a sociology of life-abounding, but it is, to use Pelz's own words, 'in quest of no-one knows what'. The sociology of Werner Pelz brings together a number of currents in German thought.

But who is Werner Pelz? Werner Pelz was born in Berlin in 1921 of Jewish parents. When Hitler came into power in Germany, he emigrated to England where he eked out his existence by working on the land, on building sites and in factories, until such time as he was in a position to pursue his studies. After graduating as an external student at the University of London, he joined the Church of England and studied for the ministry at Lincoln. He thus became a clergyman and wrote a number of books on theology in which he tried to relate his religious insights to sociological, psychological and philosophical problems. Gradually and undramatically, however, he drifted out of the church; and was for several years a peripatetic lecturer, a journalist and a broadcaster. As a journalist he contributed a monthly column to the *Guardian* for many years and side by side did work for the B.B.C. and T.V. Throughout his life he has been keenly interested in many aspects of his cultural heritage and has read extensively in philosophy, German, English and Russian literature, psychoanalysis and other currents of contemporary thought.

Wishing to bring the various strands of his thought together, which had accumulated in his mind through the years of his wide reading, he returned somewhat late in life to university studies and undertook research in Bristol. In course of time his dissertation—*The Scope of Understanding in Sociology*—was accepted for the Ph.D. degree. He then condensed it into a book and offered the manuscript to Routledge and Kegan Paul who published it in 1974 under their celebrated series 'The International Library of Sociology' which was founded by Karl Mannheim and is now edited by Professor John Rex of the University of Warwick. The book is significantly sub-titled 'Towards a more radical reorientation in the social and humanistic sciences'.

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॥ जैन भवन ॥

As a matter of fact, the doctrine of 'naya' is of far reaching importance in the history of Indian logic. It is unfortunate that Jainas might not have fully followed the spirit of this doctrine in the realm of ontology and religion but that is not the fault of this doctrine. This is not only the sign of broadness and catholicity of Jainas' outlook. But this also shows that during that ancient time they made significant attempts towards precision and clarity so far judgements are concerned. This shows their analytic approach as well. In their own way, they made significant attempts in the direction of linguistic analysis and logical analysis. Prof. N. V. Banerjee has rightly remarked thus : "...the *Syādvāda* and the doctrine of seven fold judgement, despite the objections that have been raised against them by the rivals of Jainism, are of outstanding logical significance, opening up a vista as they do to the reorientation of the outlook on the logic of propositions."¹⁵

Concludingly, we may observe that the doctrine of *naya*, specially *syādvāda* and the doctrine of seven fold judgement, and also of *śabda-nayas* is immensely important and useful not only historically but also from the present point of view of analysis.

The Jaina Concept of Karma

J. C. SIKDAR

All forces of life and Nature are associated together in the principle of cause and effect—the central theme of studies of all branches of physical and psychical world governing the process of origination, continuity and decay of the substances—living and non-living, gross and fine, developed and undeveloped. The universal law of causation explains and interprets the psycho-physical actions and reactions of beings, which are manifested in the forms of thoughts, feeling and behaviour.

According to Jaina Philosophy, Soul is endowed with consciousness, infinite modes of knowledge, self-awareness, conduct, and of the attribute of neither heaviness nor lightness respectively from the stand-point of condition in its perfect eternal state. But the worldly souls are imperfect for their innate faculty is clouded by a very fine foreign element intangible to the sense, which is called *karma* and is an aggregate of material particles. This *karma-pudgala* (karmic matter), having entered into the mundane soul through the mental, vocal and bodily actions, causes certain conditions in it due to the modifications of consciousness comprising four passions, viz. anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed.

Nature of karma-pudgala (Karmic matter)

The common meaning of the word *karma* is action and this meaning is come across in the Vedic tradition from the Vedic Age up to the Brahmanic period. In this tradition *naimittika kriyās* (occasional ceremonies) of day-to-day life, such as, sacrifice, etc., have been called *karma*. It was admitted that the performance of these actions was made in order to please the gods so that they would fulfil the desire of the performer.¹ The meaning of *karma* as action is accepted in the Jaina tradition, but the Jainas do not admit only this meaning as it is pointed out. Each and every activity of the worldly beings or desire is in fact *karma*, but in the Jaina tradition it is called *bhāvākarma*. The non-living material substance which makes soul in bondage, having come into contact with it, due to that *bhāvākarma* (i.e. action of soul) is called *dravyākarma*.² It is *pudgala dravya* (material substance) ; its appellation of *karma* (*karma-*

¹⁵ *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, p. 188, by N. V. Banerjee (Arnold-Heinemann Publishers, New Delhi, 1974.)

¹ *Mīmamsa*, 2. 1. 5.

² *kammattanena ekkam dāyāva bhavetti hodi dūvhiham tu/poggalapindam dāyāva tassatti bhavakammam tu//—Sat.*, vol. 15.6.

saṃjñā) is analogical (*aupacārika*), for it is the activity of Soul or it is produced by its action, hence it is also called *karma*. Here *upacāra* (analogy) of the cause is made to be in the effect. That is, according to the Jaina definition, there are stated to be two kinds of *karma*, viz. *bhāvakarma* and *dravyakarma*.³ The activity of Soul is *bhāvakarma* and its effect is *dravyakarma*. There exists a relation of cause and effect between these two *karmas*; *bhāvakarma* is the cause and *dravyakarma* is the effect. But this cause-effect relation is similar to the cause-effect relation of the hen and its egg. Egg is produced from the hen, hence it is the cause and the egg is the effect. It is true, but the hen also is born of the egg.⁴ Therefore there is the cause-effect relation in both of them. But it cannot be said which is the first or prior. From the point of view of *santati* (continuity) their cause-effect relation is beginningless. Similarly, *dravyakarma* is produced from *bhāvakarma*, so *bhāvakarma* is accepted as the cause and *dravyakarma* as the effect. But the consumption (*nispatti*) of *bhāvakarma* does not take place in the absence of *dravyakarma*. Therefore, *dravyakarma* is the cause of *bhāvakarma* and *dravyakarma* exists like the relation between the hen and its egg from the point of view of continuity (*santati*). Although the cause-effect relation of *bhāvakarma* and *dravyakarma* is beginningless from the stand-point of continuity; nevertheless, it is known from individual consideration that the cause of some one *dravyakarma* will be some one *bhāvakarma*; therefore, the relation of priority and posteriority between them can be determined, for one *bhāvakarma* from which one particular *dravyakarma* is produced is the cause of this *dravyakarma* and this *dravyakarma* is the effect of that *bhāvakarma*, but not the cause. Similarly, it is to be admitted that even there being individually prior and posterior states, both of them are beginningless from the point of view of class because of there being the absence of *pūrvāparabhāva* (prior and posterior states).

It is evidently clear that *dravyakarma* is born of *bhāvakarma* because Soul becomes in bondage of *dravyakarma* only due to its transformations like attachment, aversion and delusion, i.e. it travels in the world without attaining liberation. The reason why has *dravyakarma* been accepted as the cause in the production of *bhāvakarma* is this that if the production of *bhāvakarma* is possible in the absence of *dravyakarma*, there will be the emergence of *bhāvakarma* in the liberated souls and again they will

³ Ibid.

⁴ *amdae paccha kukkudi puvvim kukkudi paccha amdae ? Roha ! se nam amdae kao ? Bhagavam ! kukkudio, se nam kukkudi kao ? Bhante ; amdayai. evameva Roha ! se ya amdae sa ya kukkudi, puvvimpete pacchapete duvete sasaya bhava, ananupuvvi esa Roha ! BhS., 1. 6. 53.*

have to come down to this human world. Moreover, there will be no difference between world and liberation. It will have to be accepted that there is the capacity in the liberated soul, to be in bondage just as it is the case with the worldly soul. In such a condition no man will strive for attaining liberation. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is no *bhāvakarma* in the liberated soul because of the absence of *dravyakarma* in it. And there takes place the emergence of *bhāvakarma* in the worldly soul on account of there being *dravyakarma*. In this way, the worldly life is beginningless for the soul owing to the cause of origination of *dravyakarma* from *bhāvakarma* and that of *bhāvakarma* from *dravyakarma* since the beginningless time.

The emergence of *dravyakarma* takes place from *bhāvakarma*; therefore, *dravyakarma* is the effect of *bhāvakarma*; such is the relation of cause and effect. Just as the lump of earth which changes into the form of a jar is the material cause, but it cannot become jar in the absence of potter, even though there is the capacity in it to become a jar, therefore, the potter is the efficient cause, just so there is the capacity in *pudgala* (matter) to undergo transformation into the form of *karma*, hence it is the material cause. But the material substance (*pudgala dravya*) cannot change into the form of *karma* until there is no existence of *bhāvakarma* in Soul. For this reason *bhāvakarma* is the efficient cause. Similarly, *dravyakarma* also is the efficient cause of *bhāvakarma*. That is to say, the cause-effect relation of *dravyakarma* and *bhāvakarma* is *ntmitta-naimittikarūpa* (occasion-occasioned like), for not becoming *upādāna-upādeyarūpa* (material cause and effect caused by it).

- For example, (1) A is the *upādāna-kāraṇa* of B.
 (2) B is the *upādeya* of A.
 (3) B is the *upādeya* of C.
 (4) C is the *upādeya* of B.

Three stages are involved in the process of matter which aggregates in the material world, e.g. water-*karma*, for similarly, the stages of mind are involved in the mental world (1) thought of being harmed (2) anger (3) thought of harming. If the earlier stages of mind causes a later stage of mind, the former is *upādāna* and the latter is *upādeya*. If the earlier stage of matter causes a later stage of matter, the former is *upādāna* and the latter is *upādeya*. e.g. water-particle, karma-particle, earth-particle. *Nimitta* : If a stage of mind causes state (stage) of matter or vice versa, then the cause is *nimitta* and the effect is *naimitika*, e.g. (1) Cause : anger (mental stage), effect : karma-particle, becoming earth particle (material stage). (2) Cause : Water-particle, becoming karma-particle (material happening).

Effect : anger (mental happening).

That is to say, when the *like* causes the *like*, it is *upādāna-upādeya*, when the *unlike* causes the *unlike*, it is *nimitta-naimittika*.

The *pravṛtti* (activity) of the worldly soul is called *bhāvakarma*; the four internal transformations of the soul, viz. anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed are called *bhāvakarma* on the internal transformations of it, viz. attachment, aversion and delusion are *bhāvakarma*. The worldly soul is constantly associated with the body, so its activity is not possible without the support (base) of mind, speech and body. The emergence of the internal transformations like the four passions, or attachment, aversion and delusion of the soul takes place by the activities of mind, speech and body. In other words, it can be said that the mental, vocal and bodily activities of the worldly soul which are also called *yoga* (activity) are tinged with the colour of attachment, aversion and delusion or four passions (*kaśāyas*). In fact, *pravṛtti* (activity) is one, but just as a piece of cloth and its colour are called different, just so there are also two names of this *pravṛtti* (activity) of soul, viz. *yoga* (activity) and *kaśāya* (passion). Just as a new piece of cloth devoid of colour is of one colour, just so the *pravṛtti* (activity) of mind, speech and body free from the colour of passion is of one colour. Just as the colour of a piece of cloth is sometimes light and sometimes deep, so this *bhāvakarma* is sometimes intense and sometimes mild in the presence of the colour of passion with the operation of activity (*yogavyāpāra*); just as a piece of cloth devoid of colour can be small or large, so the activity free from passion can also become more or less. But there becomes the absence of intensity or mildness (*mandata*) of luminosity, being the cause of colour. For this reason, the importance of colour-communicating passion is more with regard to activity. Therefore, only passion is called *bhāvakarma*. In the binding of *dravyakarma* both activity and passion⁵ have usually been accepted as the efficient cause, still this is the reason of accepting only passion as *bhāvakarma*. In a nutshell, the four passions (*kaśāyas*)—anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed or the faults—attachment, aversion and delusion⁶ are *bhāvakarma*. Soul becomes bound by receiving *dravyakarma* from them.

⁵ *joga payadipaesam thii anubhagam kasayau—Pancamakarmagrantha, Gatha, 96, Bhs. 9.33. 385.*

⁶ *rago ya doso vi ya kammabiyam, kammam ca mohappabhavam vayamti / kammam ca jaimaranassa mulam, dukkam ca jaimaranam vayamti // Uttara, 32.7. carittamohanam kammam, duvham tu viyahiyam / kasayamohanijjam tu, nokasayam taheva ya // Ibid., 33. 10 sakasyatvajjivah karmano yogyan pudgalanadatte, TS., VIII.2*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on Karma :

Other Indian systems of thought have admitted this doctrine of *karma* by different appellations. The Naiyayikas have accepted the three vices or faults, viz. *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion). The *pravṛtti* (activity) of mind, speech and body of beings takes place on receipt of the impulse from these three vices. Merit and demerit or virtue and vice (*dharma* and *adharma*) originate from this *pravṛtti*. *Dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit) have been called by the Naiyayikas as *saṅskāras* (forces).⁷

[To be continued

dohi thanehim aya ahe logam janai pasai, tam samohaenam ceva appahenam aya aho logam janai pasai asamohaenam ceva appanenam aya aho logam janai pasai adhoi samohaya samohaenam ceva appanenam aya aho logam janai pasai—Sthananga Sutra, 2.2.114.

micchattam puna duvham jivamajivam taheva annanam/aviradi jogo moho kodhadiya ime bhavet // 94, Samayasaram.

uvaogassa anai parinama timi mohajuttassa/micchattam annanam avirddi bhavo ya nadavvo // 96, Ibid.

jam bhavam suhamasuham karedi ada sa tassa khalu katta/tam tassa hodi kammam so tassa du vedaga appa // 109., Ibid.

cahuvihā aneyabheyam bamdhate nanadamsanagunehim/samaye samaye jamha tena avambhutti nani du // 177, Ibid.

mohena va ragenā va dosena va parinadassa jivassa/jayadi viviho bamdho tamha te samkhavaidavva // 1.84, Pravacanasara

jo moharagadose nihanadi uvaladbha jonhavmuvadesam/so savvadukkhamakham pavadi acirena kalena // 2, 1.88, Ibid.

⁷ BHga., 1.1.2; NS., 4.1.3, 17;

bvam ca kṣaṇabhangitvat samskaradvarikah sthitah/sa karmajanyasamskaro dharmadharmajirocyate // NN., p. 472

See also NM., pp. 471, 472, 500, etc; see pp Bha. about *pravṛtti*

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The Jaina Concept of Karma

[from the previous issue]

J. C. SIKDAR

These three faults—*rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion) as mentioned in the Nyaya are accepted by Jaina Philosophy as *bhāvākarma* by name. That which is called by the Naiyayikas as *pravṛtti* produced from *doṣa* is named as *yoga* (activity) in Jaina Metaphysics. The Naiyayikas have attributed the name '*samskāra*' (force) or *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen force) to *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit) born of *pravṛtti* (activity) ; that is the place of *pudgalika-karma* or *dravya-karma* in Jaina Philosophy. In the Nyaya view *samskāra* like *dharmā-dharma* is the quality of Soul. But it should be noted that only Soul is conscious because of there being the difference between quality and its substratum according to this view, its quality cannot be called conscious, for there is no inhering relation of consciousness in *samskāra* (force). The Jaina *dravyakarma* also is non-conscious, therefore, both *samskāra* and *dravya-karma*, as they may be called, are non-conscious. In both the views the difference is this much that according to the Naiyayikas, *samskāra* is a quality of Soul, while *dravyakarma* of the Jainas is *pudgaladravya* (material substance). On deep consideration this difference also appears to be negligible. The Jainas accept this proposition that *dravyakarma* originate from *bhāvākarma*, the Naiyayikas also admit the origination of *samskāra*. The real significance of the postulation that *bhāvākarma* has produced *dravyakarma* is this that *bhāvākarma* has made some such *samskāra* as a result of which *pudgaladravya* has been changed into the form of *karma*. Like this the particular *samskāra* which took place in *pudgala* (Matter) due to *bhāvākarma* is real *karma*, according to the Jaina view. This *samskāra* (impression or force) is non-different from *pudgaladravya* ; therefore, it is called *pudgala*. Under such condition there does not exist any particular difference between *samskāra* of the Naiyayikas and *dravyakarma* of the Jainas.

The Jainas accept the subtle body called '*kārmaṇaśarīra*' also over and above the gross body. There takes place the birth of the gross body because of this karmic body. The Naiyayikas call *kārmaṇaśarīra* '*avyaktaśarīra*' (unmanifest body).⁸ The Jainas accept it to be intangible to the sense ; for this reason, it is really unmanifest. It appears here that the thought on liberation came later on.

⁸ NV., 3.2.68.

The Vaisesika conception of *karma* is identical with that of the Nyaya. *Adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen force) is one of the twenty four qualities as propounded by Prasastapada. This quality is different⁹ from *samskāra-guṇa* (quality or force). It has been divided into two kinds, viz. *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit). It is known by this that Prasastapada has made mention of *dharma* and *adharma* by the word '*Adr̥ṣṭa*' instead of the word '*samskāra*'. From this fact only the difference of name should be understood, without having accepted the difference of postulation, for Prasastapada has accepted '*adr̥ṣṭa*' as the quality of Soul, as much as equal to '*samskāra*' of the Naiyayikas. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy this tradition of the origination of *samskāra* from *dosa* (fault), birth from *samskāra* (force), *dosa* (fault) from birth and again *samskāra* (force) from *dosa* (fault) has been regarded as beginningless like a seed and a sprout. This is just like the aforesaid beginningless tradition of *bhāvākarma* and *dravyakarma* of the Jainas.¹⁰

The Yoga-Samkhya view of Karma :

There is very much sameness of the doctrine of *Karma* of the Yoga Philosophy with the doctrine of *karma* of Jaina Metaphysics. According to the Yoga, *avidyā* (ignorance), *asmitā* (egoism), *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* (affection) are the five *kleśas* (afflictions).¹¹ Due to them there takes place (i.e. originates) the tenacity of mundane existence—the activity of mind (*vṛtti*) and from it there are produced *samskāras* (forces) like *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit) ; *kleśa* (affliction) can be equated with *bhāvākarma*, *vṛtti* with *yoga* and *samskāra* with *dravyakarma*.

In the Yoga Philosophy *samskāra* is called *vāsanā* (desire), *karma* (action), and *apūrva* (energy) also. Moreover, in this view the cause-effect relation of *kleśa* and *karma* has been accepted as beginningless¹² like a seed and its sprout as much equal to *bhāvākarma* and *dravyakarma* of Jaina Metaphysics.

⁹ *gunasca ruparasagandhasparsasamskhyaparimanaprthaktvasamyogavibhagaparatvaparatvabuddhisukhaduḥkheccadveṣaprayatnasceti kanthoktah saptadosa/ca sabdasamuccitasca gurutva-dravatvasnehasamskaradr̥ṣṭasabdah saptatvetyevam caturvimsati gunah/PPBha.*, p. 3, see also pp. 637, 643.

¹⁰ *nanvevamapyavidyaparikalpita'esa brahmajivatmavibhagah...kasyaisa dosa yadi canaditvamasya pariharo bijankuravadbhavisyati, bhavadbhirapi canyamana-direva samsaro abhyupagatah avidyaiva ca samsara ityucyate, NM.*, p. 513/95.

¹¹ *avidya asmitaragadvesa abhinivesah panca klesah, Yogasutra*, 2.3.

¹² *vṛttayah pancayyah klistā' aklīstah, Yoga*, 1.5 ; *Yogabhasya*, 1.5 ; *Ibid.*, 2.3 *tatra punyapunya-karmasayah kamalobhamahakrodhahprasavah...etc.*, *Ibid.*, 2.12. *satsu klesesu karmasayo vipakarambhi bhavati, nocchinnaklesasamulah . etc.*, *Ibid.*, 2.13. See also their *Tattvavaisaradi*, *Bhasvati*, etc., commentaries.

In regard to the doctrine of *karma* the difference between the Jaina and Yoga views is this that according to the latter, the relation of all these—*kleśas* (afflictions), *kliṣṭavṛtti* (afflicted activity) and *samskāra* (force) is not with the soul, but rather with *citta* (mind) or *antahkaraṇa* (internal sense-organ) and this *anatahkaraṇa* (internal sense-organ) is the modification of *Prakṛti*. According to the Jaina view, there is the relation of the material karmic body with soul due to the dispositions—*moha* (delusion), *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (aversion), since a beginningless time there exists a relation of cause-effect (*kārya-kāraṇa*) between *bhāvas* (dispositions) and the *kārmaṇaśarīra* (karmic body) like a seed and its sprout. In the origination of the one, the other exists as cause, nevertheless, both of them are in association with soul from a beginningless time. It is impossible to determine which is the first between them.

Similarly, in the Samkhya view, the subtle body (*lingaśarīra*) is in association with the *puruṣa* (self) from the beginningless time. The subtle body originates from the dispositions (*bhāva*) like *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion) and there is also a cause-effect relation between the dispositions and the subtle body like a seed and its sprout.¹³ Just as the Jainas accept the gross body as separate and distinct from the karmic body, so the Samkhya also accepts the subtle body as different from the gross body.¹⁴ In the Jaina view both the gross and fine bodies are material; in the Samkhya view also these two are prakṛtic (of primordial matter). The Jainas, having accepted both the bodies as the modifications of matter even, regard the classes of both as different. According to the Samkhya, the one is *tanmātrīc* (infra-atomic) and the other is born of parents. In the Jaina view, the gross body becomes separate at the time of death and a new body is produced at the time of birth. But the karmic body goes along with the soul from one place to another place of birth at the time of death and thus it exists. The Samkhya also postulates that the gross body born of parents does not remain with the self at the time of death and a new body is produced on the occasion of the next birth. But *lingaśarīra* exists as permanent and moves from one place to another.¹⁵ According to the Jaina system of thought the karmic body associated with the soul since a beginningless time ceases to be at the time of liberation. Similarly, it is maintained in the Samkhya that there takes place the cessation of *lingaśarīra*.¹⁶ In the

¹³ *Matharavṛtti*, 52; *Tattvakaumudī vyākhyā*, 52.

¹⁴ *sukṣma matapīṭṛjaḥ saha prabhūtaistridhā viśeṣaḥ syuh/sukṣmastesam niyata matapīṭṛja nivartante* || *Samkhyakarika*, 39.

¹⁵ *Māthara karika*, 44, 40; *Yogadarsana*, 2.13; *Bhāṣyātīkā's Commentary*; *Samkhyakarika*, 40.

¹⁶ *lingam prayakale pradhane layam gacchati iti lingam*, *Matharavṛtti*, 40.

Jaina view *kārmaṇaśarīra* (karmic body) and dispositions (*bhāvas*) like *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion), etc., remain with the soul from a beginningless time; without the one there is no existence of the other. Like this, in the Samkhya view *lingaśarīra* (subtle body) also does not exist without dispositions and vice versa.¹⁷ According to the Jaina view *kārmaṇaśarīra* is non-resisting (*aghāda*) or unimpeded; the Samkhya also maintains that *lingaśarīra* is endowed with unimpeded motion; it is to face any resistance.¹⁸ In the Jaina view there is no capacity of enjoyment in *kārmaṇaśarīra* but the gross body enjoys by the senses. Similarly, in the Samkhya view also *lingaśarīra* is devoid of the capacity of enjoyment.¹⁹

Although according to the Samkhya view, the dispositions like *rāga* (attachment), etc., are the modifications of *prakṛti* (Primordial Matter) *lingaśarīra* also is the modification of *prakṛti*, and the other material objects are as such, even then the Samkhya does not deny the categorical divisions existing in all these modifications. It accepts three kinds of *sarga* (creation), viz. *pratyaya sarga* (evolution of creation of intellect), *tanmātrīc sarga* (infra-atomic creation) and *bhautika sarga* (material evolution or creation).²⁰ The dispositions, such as, *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion), etc., are included in *pratyaya sarga*²¹ and the subtle body is in *tanmātrīc sarga* (infra-atomic creation or evolution of rudimentary elements).²² Similarly, in the Jaina view the dispositions like *rāga* (attachment), etc., are produced from matter; and so also is the case with the karmic body. But the basic difference between these two views is that the material cause of dispositions is the soul and the efficient cause of them is matter, while the material cause of the karmic body is matter and the efficient cause is the soul. In the Samkhya view, *Prakṛti*, even being non-sentient, behaves like the sentient principle due to its association with *Puruṣa* (Self).²³ Similarly, in the Jaina view *pudgaladravya* (material substances), even being non-living, behaves like the living

¹⁷ *citram yathasrayamṛte śhanvadibhyo yatha vīna chaya|tadvadvīna avisesaiḥ na tisthati nirasrayam lingam* || *Samkhyakarika*, 41.

¹⁸ *purvoṭpānmasaktam nityam mahadadisukṣmaparyantam|saṁsarati nirupabhogam bhavairadhivasitam lingam* || *Samkhyakarika*, 40.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Tattvakaumudī*, 52, 53.

²¹ *esa pratyayasargo viparyayasaktitustisiddhyakhyah|gunavaisamyavimarddiatasya bhedastu pancasat* || *Samkhyakarika*, 46.

²² *na vīna bhavairlingam, na vīna lingena bhavanirvṛtīh|lingakhyo bhavakhyastasmad dvividhah pravartate sargah* || *Samkhyakarika*, 52.
na vīna iti|“lingam” iti tanmatrasargamupalaksayati, “bhavaiḥ”, iti ca pratyaya-sargam || *Ibid* (comm.)

²³ *Matharavṛtti*, pp. 9, 14, 33.

principle, when it undergoes modification into the form of *karma* by its association with the soul. The Jainas have admitted the union of the worldly soul and the non-living objects, such as, body, etc., like the union of milk and water. In the same manner the Samkhya accepts the union of *Pnrusa* (Self) and the non-living objects, such as, body, senses, intellect, etc., like the union of milk and water.²⁴

Bhāvakarma of Jaina Philosophy compares well with *bhāva* (disposition)²⁵ of the Samkhya and *vr̥tti*²⁶ of the Yoga, *dravyakarma* or *kārmānāśarīra* with *lingāśarīra* of the Samkhya. Both the Jaina and Samkhya systems of thought do not admit any such cause as God in *karmaphala* (fruition of action) and *karmanispatti* (performance of action). According to Jaina Philosophy, Soul is not really the forms—man, animal, god, infernal being, etc., but the soul-supported karmic body, *having gone to different places of birth, builds up the forms of beings, such as, man, god, infernal being, etc.* In the Samkhya view also *lingāśarīra*, being soul-supported (*purusādhisṭhita*), makes *bhūta sarga* (material evolution or creation), such as, man, god, lower animals, etc.²⁷

[To be Continued]

A Note on the First Stone-built Jain Temple at Madras

There are about twenty-three Jain temples in and around Madras City. They are located in concrete made buildings and not built of stone. But the local Jain residents of T. Nagar have filled up this gap by raising a stone-built temple at G. N. Chetty Road, T. Nagar a suburb of the City. (see frontispiece)

Limestone and soft stone from Gujarat, marble from Rajasthan and building materials from many other parts of the country have all been brought together to build the City's newest temple, a 5-lakh rupee, 30-meters high masterpiece of northern architectural elegance—the Shree Shantinath Jain Mandir, stated to be the first of its kind in the South. It is a dazzling creation in white, so different from the towering multi-hued or rock-like *gopurams* of the South. And to reach its elevated sanctum, high above the ground, a magnificent flight of steps sweeps up from G. N. Chetty Road in T. Nagar.

The Pratistha Ceremony of this magnificent temple was performed by Acarya Vikram Suriswaraji Maharaj in accordance with tradition and scriptural injunctions.

—V. G. Nair

²⁴ *asti purusah|samghatapararthatvat, yatah samghatasca pararthah|tasmāt hetoh| iha loke ye samghataste pararthadr̥stah paryankarathasaranadayah|evam, gatranam mahadadinam samghatah samudaya parartha' eva|Matharavrtti, 17, p. 29.*

²⁵ *Samkhyakarika, 40.*

²⁶ *rupadisu (sabdadisū) pancanamalocanamatramisyate vr̥ttih|vacanadanavihara-notsarganandasca pancanam||28 ; svalaksanyam vr̥ttistrayasya saisa bhavatyasa-manyā|samanyakaranavrt̥tīh pranadya vayavah panca||29 ; yugapaccatustayasya tu vr̥ttih kramasca tasya nirdista|dr̥ste tatha' apyadr̥ste trayasya tat purvika vr̥ttih||30—Samkhyakarika.*

²⁷ *Matharakarika, 40, 44, 53.*

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(1) *Asiddha* (unproved)—That whose nature (inseparable connection with *sādhya*) is not determined is unproved. Indetermination of knowledge either through ignorance or through perversion is *asiddha*, e.g., 'This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus.' Here the reason, viz., the sky-lotus is unreal.

(2) *Viruddha* (opposed)—That reason is opposed, the invariable connection of which is known to be with opposite to the *sādhya* or in other words, which is inseparably connected not with the *sādhya*, but with its antithesis e.g., 'This is firey because it is a body of water.' Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) *Anaikāntika* (doubtful)—A reason, the invariable relationship of which (with the *sādhya*) is doubted, is doubtful or that whose consistency otherwise is doubted is doubtful. e.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is always audible.' Here the reason is uncertain because audibleness may or may not be proved of eternity.

An objection may be raised that if the Jainas believe that there is one and the only characteristic of *hetu* i.e., *anyathānupapannatva* or *avinābhāva*, the fallacy should also be only one, then why Siddhasena consider *hetvābhāsa* is of three kinds ?

As an answer to this objection, Siddhasena points out that the *anyathānupapannatva* or *avinābhāva* (necessary concomitance) can remain unknown either through indecision or through error or through doubt. (1) If it is through indecision, it is unproved (*asiddha*), (2) If it is through error, it is opposed (*viruddha*) and (3) If it is through doubt, it is doubted (*anaikāntika*).

But the later logician Akalanka says that in fact there is only one fallacy i.e., *akiñcitkara*, which is classified into three classes (1) *asiddha* (2) *viruddha* and (3) *anaikāntika*.

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The Jaina Concept of Karma

[from the previous issue]

J. C. SIKDAR

The Buddhist view on the nature of Karma

As in Jaina metaphysics, so in the Buddhist philosophy also it has been accepted that the multifariousness of beings is caused by *karma* (action).²⁸ Like the Jainas, the Buddhists also admit *lobha* (*rāga*) (greed, attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion) as the cause of the production of *karma* (action). The being, having been associated with attachment, aversion and delusion, makes mental, vocal and bodily activities and generates attachment, hatred and delusion respectively. Thus the wheel of the world is moving on.²⁹ There is no beginning time of this wheel ; it is beginningless.³⁰ In reply to the question of king Milinda on the location of the existence of *karma* (action) Acarya Nagasena has explained that it cannot be shown where does *karma* (action) exist.³¹ In the *Visuddhimagga* *karma* has been called *arūpi* (non-corporeal),³² but in the *Abhidharmakośa* as *avijñapti*, i.e. *kaṁma* has been described as *rūpa* (matter),³³ and this *rūpa* is *apratigha* (non-resisting or penetrable), but not *sapratigha* (resisting or impenetrable). In the Sautantrika view, *samāveśa* (inclusion) of *karma* is made in *arūpa* (non-matter) ; it does not accept *avijñapti* (unmanifested matter). From this it is known that like the Jainas, the Buddhists also admit *karma* as subtle (*sūkṣma*). Mental, vocal and physical activities also are called *karma*. But they are *vijñaptirūpa* (intimation like or perceptible). That is, here the meaning of *karma* is not only perceptible activity, but also is *samskāra* (force) born of perceptible action. In the Buddhist definition it is called *vāsanā* and *avijñapti*. *Samskāra-karma* produced by mental activity is called *vāsanā* (desire) and *samskāra-karma* produced by vocal and physical activities is *avijñapti* (unmanifested matter).

If compared, it can be said that the causative attachment, aversion and delusion of *karma* of the Buddhists are *bhāvakarma* of the Jainas. The perceptible action of mind, speech and body is *yoga* (activity) of the

²⁸ *Milindapanho*, 3, 2 ; *Abh. K.*, 4.1.

²⁹ *Anguttaranikaya*, *Tikanipata Sutra*, 33, 1 ; *Bhaga*, 1, p. 134.

³⁰ *Samyuttanikaya*, 15, 5, 6 ; *Bhaga*, 2, 181-2.

³¹ *na sakka maharaja tani kammani dassetum idha va idha iva tani kammani tithantiti*, *Milindapanho*, 3, 15, p. 75.

³² *Report of the Ninth Oriental Conference*, p. 620.

³³ *Abhidharmakosa*, K., 1, 11.

Jaina philosophy and *vāsanā* born of this perceptible action and *avijñapti* (unmanifested matter) are *dravyakarma*.

The Vijnanavadin Buddhists determine *karma* by the word *vāsanā*. Prajnākara opines that whatever *kāryas* (effects or actions) are there, all of them are born of *vāsanā* (desire).³⁴ It is the root of all these, whether you call it God or *Karma*, *Prakṛti* or anything else. If one accept just God, as the root of the varieties of the universe even then it would not do without admitting *vāsanā*. That is to say, the currents of all these rivers like God, *Prakṛti* and *Karma* become one by uniting into the sea of *vāsanā*.³⁵

In the view of the Sunyavadins the other name of *māyā* (illusion or *anāndi avidyā* (beginningless ignorance) is *vāsanā*.³⁶ In the Vedantic view also the cause of multifariousness of the universe is the beginningless ignorance or illusion.³⁷

The Mimansaka view on the nature of Karma

The Mimansakas admit the existence of an entity named *apūrva*³⁸ which is born of actions like sacrifices, etc. Their argument is this that

³⁴ *Abhidharmakosa*, 4 ; Keith's *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 203.

³⁵ *karyatvat sakalam karyam vasanabalasambhavam|
kumbhakaradikaryam va svapnadarsanakaryavat||
pradhanamisvarah karma yadanyadapi kalpyate|
vasanasangasammudhacetah prasyanda eva sah||
pradhananam pradhanam tad isvaranam tathesvaram|
sarvasya jagatah kartri devata vasana para||
asakyamanyatha kartumatra saktih kaihama mata|
vasanabalatah so'api tasmadevam pravartate||
iti pradhanesvarakartravadanadyah sada sigravahah pravrttah|
visantiya evadvayatam prayanti tadvasanameyasamudrameva||*
—Pramanavartikalankara, A.M.4, p. 75.

Vide also, *Nyayavataravartika-vṛtti*, pp. 177-8. Tippan.

³⁶ *sarvajnasyesvarasyatmabhute ivavidyakalpite namarupe tattvanyatvabhya-
manirvacaniye samsaraprapancabijabhute sarvajnasyesvarasyabhilapyete,
tabhyamanyah sarvajnah isvarah, SBha., 2. 1. 14.*

³⁷ *tadevam avidyatmakopadhiparicchedapeksamevesavarasyesvaratvam sarvajna-
tvam sarvasaktimattvam cam na paramarthato vidyapastasarpopadhisvarupe
atmansitritivayasarvajnatvadiyavahara upapadyate, SBha., 2. 1. 14.*

³⁸ *apurva punarasti yate arambhah sisyyate "svargakamo yajeteti" | itaratha hi vidha-
namanarthakam syat, bhangitvat yagasya| yadyanyadanutpadya yago vinasyet,
phalamasati nimitte na syat| tasmadutpadyatiti|, Sabara-Bhasya, 2.1.5.
phalaya vihitam karma ksanikam cirabhavine|
tatsiddhirnanyathetyevamapurvam pratigamyate||, Tantravartika, 2.1.5
evam yagaderapurvasvargadisadhanasaktikalpanamuhaniyam, Sastradipika, p.80.
Vide also *Nyayavataravartika-vṛtti*, p.179.*

whatever performance is made by man becomes momentary because of its being action-like. Hence there takes place the birth of an entity called *apūrva* out of that performance, which gives the fruit of actions like sacrifice, etc. Kumārila, while explaining this entity—*apūrva*, said that the meaning of *apūrva* is capacity. Both the actions, such as, sacrifice, etc., and *Puruṣa* are incapable of producing the heaven-like fruit until the performance of actions like sacrifice, etc., is not made. But after the performance there is born such a capacity by which the doer attains the heaven-like fruit. In this regard one should not be eager to know whether this capacity is of the *Puruṣa* or of the sacrifice ; it is sufficient to know that it is born.³⁹ That which is called by other philosophers as *samskāra* (force), capacity, capability and power is expressed by the Mimansakas with the application of the word '*apūrva*'. But they are emphatic that the emergence of *samskāra* (force) or *śakti* (capacity or power) which takes place from *karma* as laid down in the *Vedas* should be called *apūrva*. Any other *samskāra* born of other *karma*, is not *apūrva*.⁴⁰

The Mimansakas maintain⁴¹ also that the substratum (or abode) of *apūrva* (or power) is Soul and *apūrva* also is non-corporeal like Soul.⁴² This *apūrva* of the Mimansakas can be compared with *bhāvakarma* of the Jains from this point of view that both of them are non-corporeal.⁴³ *Bhāvakarma*, even being born of *dravyakarma*, is the character of Soul. Just as the Mimansakas have accepted action as non-different from Soul, so the Jains also have accepted *dravyakarma* somehow non-different. Just as the Mimansakas regard *apūrva* as being born of *karma* so the Jains also admit *bhāvakarma* as being born of *dravyakarma*. Just as the Mimansakas accept *apūrva* as capable of producing fruit, so the Jains accept *bhāvakarma* as the producer of particular fruit.⁴⁴

But, in fact, *apūrva* is in the place of *dravyakarma* of the Jains. The Mimansakas accept the following order : *Karma* (actions like sacrifices, etc.) is produced from *kāmanā* (desire) and *apūrva* is born of *pravṛtti* (action) such as, sacrifices, etc. Hence *kāmanā* or *trṣṇā* (thirst) can be

³⁹ *karmabhyah pragayogasya karmanah purusasya va|
yogyata sastragamyā ya para sa apurvamisyyate||, Tantravartika, 2.1.5*

⁴⁰ *yadi hi anahitasamskara eva yaga nasyeyuh, Tantravartika, p. 396.*

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 308 ; *kriyatmanoratyantabhedabhavat, Sastradipika*, p. 80
*yadi svasamavetaiva saktirisyyeta karmanam|tadvinaso tato na syat karttrstha
tu na nasyati|, Ibid.*

⁴² *Tantravartika*, p. 398.

⁴³ See *Nyayavataravartika*, Tippan, p. 781.

⁴⁴ *kriyatmanoratyantabhedabhavat, Sastradipika*, p. 80.

called *bhāvākarma*, *pravṛtti* (action) like sacrifice, etc., as *yoga* (activity) of the Jainas, and *apūrva* as *dravyākarma* respectively. Moreover, according to the Mimamsakas, *apūrva* is an independent entity. So it seems proper that *apūrva* should be accepted in the place of *dravyākarma*. Although *dravyākarma* is not non-corporeal ; nevertheless it is intangible to the sense just as *apūrva* is.

Kumarila also does not make any earnestness in regard to this *apūrva*. He has supported it in order to prove the fruit of sacrifice, but he himself has caused the production of the fruit of action without *apūrva*. He says that the fruit is produced by action as subtle power or capacity. The production of any effect does not take place all of a sudden. It becomes manifest as gross form, after becoming finest, finer and fine as power of capacity. Just as curd is not formed instantly on the mixture of acidic thing in milk, it becomes manifest clearly as curd at a particular time, having passed through the stages of many kinds of fine forms, just so the fruits of sacrificial actions, such as, heaven, etc., being born in subtle form, become manifest as gross form in the cooking (maturity) of time later on.⁴⁵

Acharya Sankara has refuted the conception of this *apūrva* of the Mimamsakas or the conception of subtle power or capacity and has proved that God gives the fruit according to action. He has supported the view that the attainment of fruit is not possible from action but from God.⁴⁶

The gist of the above discussion on the nature of *karma* is this that there is no objection of any philosopher in regard to *bhāvākarma*. In the opinion of all philosophers *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion) are *bhāvākarma* or they are the causes of *karma*. That which is called *dravyākarma* by the Jainas is called *karma* by other philosophers. *Samskāra* (force or impression), *vāsanā* (desire), *avijñapti* (unmanifested matter), *māyā* (illusion) and *apūrva* (energy) are the different names of it. It has been observed that there is no particular dispute with regard to an entity, although there is the difference of opinions of the philosophers on this point whether *karma* is material substance or quality or essential character (*dharma*) or any other independent substance.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *yagadeva phalam taddhi saktidvarena siddhyati|sukmasaktyatmakam va tat phalamevopajayate||—Tantravartika*, p.395, vide *Nyayavartavartikavritti*, p.118.

⁴⁶ *SBha.* on *BS.*, 3. 2. 38-41.

⁴⁷ See *Aptamimansa*, Sri Dalsukh Malvania, pp. 95-110.

Kinds of Karma :

The divisions of *karma* into *punya* and *pāpa* (virtue and vice), *kuśala* and *akuśala* (good and bad), *śubha* and *aśubha* (auspicious and inauspicious), *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit) are acceptable to all Indian systems of thought. At the initial stage of speculation on *karma* there appears to be two divisions of it. viz. *punya* and *pāpa* (virtue and vice) or *śubha* and *aśubha* (auspicious and inauspicious).⁴⁸ All Indian systems of thought have accepted these two kinds of *karma*: *punya* and *pāpa* (virtue and vice) as bondage and determined their respective objectives to be free from both. Therefore, conscientious man have admitted the favourable feeling (*vedanā*) produced from *karma* as only pain without having accepted it as pleasure.⁴⁹

The two divisions of *karma* into *punya* (virtue) and *pāpa* (vice) have been made from the points of view of experience or feeling. Besides, having kept in view for understanding *karma* as good and bad, four divisions of it have been made in the Buddhist and Yoga philosophies, viz. *kṛṣṇa* (black), *śukla* (white), *śukla-kṛṣṇa* (white and black) and *aśukla-kṛṣṇa* (non-white and non-black).⁵⁰ *Kṛṣṇa* (black) is *pāpa* (vice), *śukla* (white) is *punya* (virtue), *śukla-kṛṣṇa* (white and black) is the mixture of *punya* and *pāpa* (virtue and vice) *aśukla-kṛṣṇa* (non-white and non-black) is none of the two, because this *karma* is of only dispassionate persons, the fruit is neither pleasure nor pain. The reason is this that there do not take place *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (aversion) in it.⁵¹

Besides these, the division of *karma* has been made from the points of view of *kṛtya* (to be performed), *pākādāna* (ripening) and *pākaphala* (ripening fruit). In the Buddhist *Abhidharma* and *Visuddhimagga* equally⁵² *karma* has been divided into four kinds from the point of view of *kṛtya*, four from that of *pākādāna* and four from that of *pākaphala* i.e. in all twelve kinds of *karma*. But in the *Abhidharma* four more divisions of *karma* have been made from the point of view of *pākasthāna* (ripening place). On the basis of these views, in the *Yogadarśana* also⁵³

⁴⁸ *Brhadaranyaka*, 3. 2. 13 ; *Prasnopanisad*, 3. 7 ; *Pancamakaramgrantha* from 15 ; *TS.*, 8. 21 ; *Sankhyakarika* 44 ; *Visuddhimagga*, 17. 88 ; *Yogasutra*, 2. 14 ; *Yogabhasya*, 2. 12 ; *Nyayamānjari*, p. 472 ; *PPBs.*, p. 637, 643.

⁴⁹ *parinamatapasamskaraduhkhairgunavrttirodhacca duhkhameva sarvam vivekinah*, — *Yogasutra*, 2. 15.

⁵⁰ *Dighanikaya*, 3. 1. 2 ; *Buddhacarya*, p. 496 ; *Yogasutra*, IV. 7.

⁵¹ *Yogasutra*, 4. 7.

⁵² *Abhidhammattha Sangraha*, 5. 19 ; *Visuddhimagga*, 19. 14-16.

⁵³ *Yogasutra*, 2. 12-14.

a general discussion is made in regard to *karma* but the counting is different from that of the Buddhists.

In Jaina philosophy *karma* is studied from the four point of view, viz. its nature (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga*) and quantity (*pradeśa*).⁵⁴ According to its nature, it is classified into eight fundamental species (*mūlaprakṛtis*), viz. *jñānāvaraṇīya-karma* (knowledge obscuring *karma*), *darśanāvaraṇīya-karma* (intuition-obscuring *karma*), *vedanīya-karma* (feeling-producing *karma*), *mohanīya-karma* (deluding *karma* which obscures the right attitude of soul to faith and conduct), *āyus-karma* (longevity-determining *karma*), *nāma-karma* (body-making or personality-determining *karma* with its general and special qualities and faculties), *gotra-karma* (status-determining *karma*, e.g. family, clan, caste, nationality, social standing, etc.) and *antarāya-karma* (soul's energy-hindering *karma*). They are divided and sub-divided further into one hundred and fifty eight kinds of *karma* (i.e. *uttaraprakṛtis* of eight basic divisions of *karma*), with regard to various beings.

Study of Karma from Different Points of View

Karmas are produced or manifested by consciousness,⁵⁵ for they are transformed into bad position (*sthāna*), etc., like matters of beings accumulated as food and collected as physical structure, and there arise in one's mind fear and definite intention for killing a being and putting it to death. This *karma* is the cause of bondage of soul.

Karmas produce six kinds of state⁵⁶ in soul, viz. (1) *audāyika* (the state of soul caused by the unhindered realization of eight *karmaprakṛtis*, it consists of all accidental attributes of soul. (2) *aupaśamika* (the state is produced by the suppression of the *mohanīya-karma*, though it still continues to exist and may be overcome by proper efforts of self control), (3) *pārīṇāmika* (the essential state comprising the qualities attributed to the soul in itself—the qualities in which nothing is changed through *karma*), (4) *kṣāyika* (the state produced as a result of annihilation of *karma*, in this state liberation is attained), (5) *kṣāyopāśamika* (the mixed state in which some *karma* is still existing, but some is neutralized and some annihilated. So the existing *karma* does not realize itself and

⁵⁴ *Bhs.*, 1.4. 38 ; *Pannavana*, 1st *Uddesaka* and *Karmagrantha* 1-6 ; *Gommatasara*, *Karmakanda*.

⁵⁵ *ceyakada kamma kajjamti*, *Bhs.*, 16.2.57 ; *Ibid.*, 17.1594.

⁵⁶ *Bhs.*, 6.1.230 ; *jivaviryam bandhanakramanadinimittabhatam karmakaranam*, *Ibid.*, (Comm).

possesses no intensity), and (6) *sannipātikabhāva* (the state which consists in the coincidence of several states).

*Karmakaranas (Process of Karma)*⁵⁷

Karmic matter (*karma-pudgala*) becomes associated with Soul on account of its passions and activities and at certain states of it the passions are completely destroyed, but mental, vocal and bodily activities still continue in causing consequent influx and bondage of *karma*, which require some energy of soul for their origination. There are stated to be four kinds of *karaṇa* (process or organ of energy of soul). viz. *mana-*, *vāk-*, *kāya-* and *karma-karaṇas*. The *karma-karaṇa* is the process of energy by which the karmic-matter undergoes various processes as a result of different conditions of the activities. The processes of energy have been divided into eight kinds, viz. *bandhana* (the condition of energy responsible for bondage of soul), *sankramaṇa* (transformation of one *karma* into another—the condition of energy responsible for transformation), *udvartana* (increased realization of *karmas*—the condition of energy responsible for increased realization) *apavartana* (decreased realization of *karma*—the condition of energy responsible for decreased realization), *udīraṇa* (premature realization of *karma*—the condition of energy responsible for premature realization), *upaśamana* (subsidence—the condition of energy responsible for subsidence), *nidhatti* (the condition that is capable of making *karmas* incapable of all the processes (*karaṇas*) other than the increased realization and decreased realization, and *nikācanā* (the condition that is responsible for making *karmas* incapable of all the processes).⁵⁸

The process of energy (*karaṇa*) produces a corresponding karmic process and vice versa. Thus *karaṇa* is explained from the aspects of substance, space, time, life, condition, body, sense-organ, speech, mind, passion, expansion of soul (*samudghāta*), instinct, condition of soul (*leśyā*), attitude of mind, sex-passion, act of killing, matter and its colour, taste, smell, touch and figure (*samsthāna*),. Here *karaṇa* is the means of action "*kriyate anena iti karaṇam*".⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Vide *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Dr. Nathmal Tatia, p. 254.

⁵⁹ *Bhs.*, 19-9-661.

KARMA AND REBIRTH IN CLASSICAL INDIAN TRADITIONS

WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY

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or foundations; they present quite succinctly the soteriological dimension of karma that is, in essence, the womb where the Lord dwells: a dwelling of pure semen, pure blood, pure consciousness, and the principle source for the projection of absolute value. This is a metaphorical structure of oppositions that disclose an underlying fiction which, in turn, has an even deeper layer of science. The fiction is the conventional world of karma with its edifice of flesh, blood, semen, consciousness, and complex of emotions. The science is not only the observations and knowledge of this corporeal edifice but the manner in which it is incorporated in the dharmic rite which enables the Tantric Buddhist to experience the edifice as *śūnyatā*, purity, and the womb.

9

Karma and the Problem of Rebirth in Jainism

PADMANABH S. JAINI

Although nearly every religious or philosophical tradition of India has accepted the idea of karma as valid, a wide divergence exists in the extent to which various schools have developed this idea into a coherent system of doctrine. In terms of the level of interest shown in such development—a level best measured by the amount of sacred and scholastic works devoted to it—one tradition, that of the Jains, stands clearly apart from all others. In addition to the large number of *Karma-grantha* texts found among the Śvetāmbara scriptures, Digambaras possess some thirty-eight volumes of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, the *Kaṣāya-prābhṛta*, and their commentaries.¹ Portions of the latter

1. For a complete bibliography of the Śvetāmbara *Karma-grantha* literature, see Glasenapp, *The Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy* (Bombay, 1942), pp. xi–xx.

The *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* is said to have been composed by Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (circa A.D. 200). It comprises 6,000 aphorisms (*sūtras*) in Prakrit and is divided into six parts. The first five parts have a commentary called *Dhavalā* by Virasena (A.D. 816), which has been edited by Hiralal Jain and published in sixteen volumes by the Jaina Sahityoddhāraka Fund, Amaravati, 1939–59. The sixth part of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, called *Mahābandha*, is better known by the alternate title *Mahādhavalā*; it has been edited by Phool Chandra Sidhāntaśāstrī and published in seven volumes by the Bhāratiya Vidyāpīṭha (Benares, 1947–58). A second important scriptural work belonging to the same genre is the *Kaṣāyaprābhṛta* of Guṇabhadra (A.D. ca. 200). This text, together with its commentary *Jayadhavalā* by Virasena and his disciple Jinasena

are said to represent the only surviving examples of the ancient *Pūrva* texts, which Digambaras suggest may even predate Mahāvira himself. All of these materials deal in great detail with various problems relating to karma in its four aspects, namely, influx (*āsrava*), bondage (*bandha*), duration (*sthiti*), and fruition (*anubhāga*).²

Jainas seem to have been preoccupied with these problems from the earliest times; not only do their own scriptures pay a great deal of attention to such matters, but certain Buddhist writings in Pali attempt to discredit Jaina theories of karma, indicating that these theories were even then seen as fundamental to the overall Jaina world-view.³

We are not yet in a position to explain definitively the earlier and more intense interest in karma shown by Jaina thinkers (and, to a lesser extent, by those of the Buddhists) relative to their Brāhmaṇical counterparts. Perhaps the entire concept that a person's situation and experiences are in fact the results of deeds committed in various lives may be not of Āryan origin at all, but rather may have developed as part of the indigenous Gangetic tradition from which the various Śramaṇa movements arose. In any case, as we shall see, Jaina views on the process and possibilities of rebirth are distinctively non-Hindu; the social ramifications of these views, moreover, have been profound.

(A.D. ca. 800–870), has been edited by Phool Chandra Siddhāntaśāstri and published in fifteen volumes by the Bhāratiya Digambara Jaina Granthamālā (Mathura, 1942–75). All of these Digambara works, which are of epic proportions (comprising altogether some 172,000 “śloka” [1 śloka = 32 syllables]), have been brought to light only in the last thirty years and have not been fully studied even in India outside a small circle of Jaina scholars. Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* and Pūjyapāda's commentary thereon called *Sarvārthasiddhi* are the two most popular works studied in the Jaina schools. For a translation of the latter work, see S. A. Jain, *Reality* (Calcutta, 1960).

2. The fact that Jainas regard karma as material (*paudgalika*), in contrast to such relatively abstract concepts as *saṃskāra* of the Brāhmaṇical schools and *bija* of the Buddhists, is too well known to require discussion here. For a lucid presentation of the comprehensive Jaina teaching of the karmic process, see N. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* (Benares, 1951), pp. 220–260.

3. . . . evaṃ vutte . . . te Nigaṇṭhā mam etad avocum: “Nigaṇṭho, āvuso, Nātaputto sabbaññu sabbadassavī aparisesaṃ nānadassanaṃ paṭijānāti” . . . so evaṃ āha: “atthi kho vo, Nigaṇṭhā, pubbe pāpakammaṃ kataṃ, taṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya nijjiretha; yaṃ pan' ettha etarahi kāyena saṃvutā vācāya saṃvutā manasā saṃvutā taṃ āyatim pāpassa kammaṃsa akaraṇaṃ; iti purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā byantibhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā, āyatim anavassavo, āyatim anavassavā kammakkhayaṃ, kammakkhayaṃ dukkhakkhayaṃ, dukkhakkhayaṃ vedanākkhayaṃ, vedanākkhayaṃ sabbam dukkham nijjinnaṃ bhavissati ti . . .” (*Majjhimanikāya* I, p. 93 [PTS]).

A significant issue in Indian philosophy concerns the actual size of the soul. Virtually all the Vedic *darśanas* assert that the soul is *vibhu*, omnipresent; Rāmānuja's theory of an atomic, dimensionless soul stands as the only orthodox exception to this view. An all-pervasive soul would of course be free from spatial limitation by the body; indeed, the very idea of “dimensions” cannot be applied to such an entity at all. Jainas, however, have consistently rejected the *vibhu* theory, arguing that since a soul cannot experience the sorrow or happiness resulting from its karma except in the context of mind, senses, and body, any existence of the soul outside that context becomes incompatible with the function of the karmic mechanism. This line of thought leads directly to the basic Jaina doctrine that a soul is exactly coterminous with the body of its current state of bondage (*svadehāparimāṇa*).⁴ Even a fully liberated soul (*siddha*), having completely transcended contact with the material realm, is said by the Jainas to retain the shape and size of that body which it occupied at the time *mokṣa* was attained.⁵ This latter doctrine is certainly a rather unexpected one, since, even in Jaina terms, total freedom from karmic bonds eliminated the necessity for any limitation upon the extent of the soul. The liberated soul, in other words, could have been seen as *vibhu* without in any way contradicting the Jaina position of the interdependence of soul and body.⁶ One can only conclude that the idea of this interdependence so dominated the minds of Jaina thinkers that they were somehow reluctant to dispense with the body completely even in the case of *mokṣa*. Hence we have a doctrine in which the emancipated soul, though said to be forever free of former influences, seems to display through its shape a sort of shadowy association with the embodied state.

The Hindu doctrine of *vibhu*, as we have noted above, has some difficulty in explaining the limitation of a soul's experiences. That is, if the soul is in fact at all times everywhere, how does it come to

4. For a Jaina critique of the *vibhu* theory, see Malliṣeṇa's *Syādvādamāñjarī* edited by J. C. Jain (Bombay, 1970), pp. 67–75 (henceforth referred to as *SM*).

5. anākāratvān muktānām abhāva it cen na; atitānantarāśarīrākāratvāt. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, edited by Phool Chandra Siddhāntaśāstri (Benares, 1971), 9.4 (henceforth referred to as *SS*).

6. syān matam, yadi śarīrānuvadhāyī jīvaḥ, tad abhāvāt svābhāvikalokākāśapari-mānatvāt tāvad visarpaṇam prāpnotīti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. kutah? kāraṇābhāvāt. *SS* 9.4. The Jainas allow the possibility of a soul spreading throughout the *lokākāśa* (without abandoning its body) just prior to attaining *siddha*-hood. This is called *kevali-samudghāta*: yat punar aṣṭasamayasādhyakevalisamudghātadaśāyām ārhatānām api . . . lokavyāpitenātmanah sarvavyāpakatvam, tat kādācitkam (*SM*, p. 75).

undergo the experience of only one individual being at a time? This problem is dealt with by postulation of the so-called subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*), an entity said generally to be composed of eighteen⁷ subtle elements and to provide the link whereby a soul may—and must—be associated with a particular “gross” (i.e., manifest) state of embodiment. The subtle body is, in other words, a sort of “agent” for the soul; while the latter “stands still,” as it were, the subtle body inhabits one life-matrix (human, animal, or whatever) after another, in each case associating the soul with the experiences of that matrix. Now, since the soul can experience nothing *except* in this limited way, it might be asked why the Brāhmaṇical thinkers bothered to introduce the notion of *vibhu* in the first place; it is an attribute which certainly seems to have no practical effect upon the experiences of the soul.

The answer to this question lies in what is perhaps the most fundamental point of disagreement separating Brāhmaṇical and Jaina philosophies. For the Brāhmaṇical schools, that which is eternal (e.g., soul) cannot change, whereas for the Jainas, *all* existents, whether sentient (*jīva*) or insentient (*ajīva*), are eternal (as *dravya*, “substance”) and at the same time subject to change (as *paryāya*, “modes”) at every moment.⁸ Thus it is possible for a soul in the Jaina system to move, to expand or contract into various shapes, and so forth. How, then, can it be said to be eternal? Because, the Jainas suggest, every existent (*sat*) possesses a quality called *agurulaghutva* (“undergoing neither gain nor loss”), whereby its total number of space-points (*pradeśa*) remains unchanged regardless of the area into which these points must be accommodated. This is described as analogous to a piece of cloth, the total material of which is the same whether it is folded or spread out flat.

Bearing in mind the Brāhmaṇical and Jaina views on the nature of the soul, we are now ready to compare the actual mechanisms of rebirth that these traditions have proposed. The most widely accepted Brāhmaṇical description of this mechanism is strongly biological in tone. We are told that after severing its connection with the human

7. pūrvotpannam asaktam niyatam mahadādisūksmaparyantam/ saṃsaratī nirupabhogam bhāvair adhivāsitaṃ lingam// *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, 40.

8. sat dravyalakṣaṇam/ utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat/ tadbhāvavyayam nityam/ *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.29–31

body, the soul dwells for some twelve days in a transitional ghostly form (*preta*). Thereafter, freed from this limbo through ritual offerings (*śrāddha*) by the son of the deceased, it travels upward to the “realm of the father” (*pitṛ-loka*), there to remain for an indeterminate period. Eventually it is brought back to earth with the rain, enters the food chain through absorption by a plant, and finally becomes associated with the seed of a male who has eaten the fruit of that plant.⁹ The act of intercourse thus “introduces” this soul into the womb where its new body will grow, and the entire process begins once more. The force of karma operates here in determining which potential father will eat which plant, thus guaranteeing the soul a set of circumstances appropriate to its prior experiences.

Given their emphasis on the role of the body, we might have expected the Jainas to provide an account even more heavily oriented towards the physiological than the one given above. For some reason, however, this was not the case. To the contrary, Jaina texts make absolutely no mention whatsoever of how a soul actually enters the body of the mother-to-be. It is said only that the soul moves into a new embryo within a single moment (*samaya*) after the death of the previous body.¹⁰ Perhaps this doctrinal assertion of so brief a period between births precluded the detailed elaboration of what actually took place during that period. It is also possible that Jaina *ācāryas* may have simply been reluctant to include sexual references in their discussions. We are, however, only speculating here; all that can be said with certainty is that the issue of the soul’s physical entry into the womb is simply ignored. Indeed, Jainas even seem to have been unaware of the theories put forth by their rivals; no mention, much less any attempt at refutation, is made with regard either to the Brāhmaṇical notions already discussed or to the Vaibhāṣika theory that the transmigratory consciousness (referred to as *gandharva*)¹¹

9. For details, see Paul Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, New York, 1973, pp. 357–398.

10. ekasamayā ‘vighrahā’ (*Tattvārthasūtra* 2.29). See also note 29.

11. “trayāṇām sthānānām sammukhibhāvāt mātuḥ kuṅṣau garbhāyavakrāntirbhavati. mātā kalyāṇī bhavati, rtmātī ca. mātāpitarau raktāu sannipatitau ca. gandharvaś ca pratyupasthito bhavati” iti. antarābhavam hitvā ko’ nyo gandharvaḥ. . . . naiva cāntarābhavikaḥ kuṅṣim bhitvā praviśate, api tu mātur yonidvāreṇa. . . . tam deśam āśliṣya. . . . iti upaṇno bhavati (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. P. Pradhan [Patna, 1967], 3.12–15).

As the following quote suggests, there was no unanimity of opinion among Vaibhāṣika teachers as to the precise amount of time spent in the *gandharva* state; the tradition of seven days’ “search” for new parents has perhaps been most widely

enters the vagina at the moment of intercourse and is thus trapped therein. Their silence here is unfortunate, since critical discussions of others' views would have forced both the parties criticized and the Jainas themselves to develop their positions in a more rigorous manner. Even in the absence of such discussions, however, it is by no means impossible to infer, on doctrinal grounds, the sorts of objections that Jainas would have voiced had they chosen to do so. This may well prove to be an instructive exercise, since it will bring into focus certain of the beliefs most central to the Jaina conception of life in the universe.

Consider, for example, the Brāhmaṇical schema in which first rain, then plants, act as "vehicles" whereby a soul makes its way to its ultimate destination. For the Jainas, the realm of sentient existence is far too wide and diverse for such a thing to be possible; in their view *even the raindrops*, not to mention plant life, constitute examples of embodied souls. In this context it is possible for a soul to be *reborn* as a "water-body" (*āp-kāyika*) or as a plant (*vanaspati-kāyika*), but not for these latter entities to function simply as insentient props in the life of a soul on its way to a human existence. The general Brāhmaṇical explanation of the human rebirth process, therefore, would in Jaina terms entail at least two intermediate births in extremely low-level destinies (*gati*), a suggestion which violates Jaina rules pertaining to the operation of karma. To see how this is so, let us look in more detail at the various kinds of destinies in which the Jainas believe a soul may find itself.

In common with other Indian schools, Jainas affirm the birth-categories of gods, men, hell-beings, and *tiryāṅcas* ("those going horizontally," e.g., animals). Each of these categories is generally associated with a particular vertically ordered tier of the three-dimensional universe; men, for example, dwell in the centrally located *madhyaloka*, gods above them in the *devalokas*, and hell-beings below in the various infernal regions. (The case of the *tiryāṅcas* is somewhat more complex, as will be seen below.) The Jainas, however, have extended this system in two ways. On the one hand, they have postulated a class of emancipated souls, the "liberated ones" or

accepted: *kiyaṃtāṃ kalam avatiṣṭhate? nāsti niyama iti Bhadantaḥ . . . saptāhaṃ tiṣṭhatīti Bhadanta Vasumitraḥ . . . saptāhānitya apare . . . alpam kalam iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ*. Ibid. 3, 14. For an example of the belief in a seven-week period, see *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, edited by W. Y. Evans-Wentz (New York, 1960).

siddhas referred to earlier, who are said to have gone beyond *samsāra* altogether and remain forever at the very apex of the universe.¹² On the other hand, they have broken down the *tiryāṅca* into numerous carefully defined subcategories. While this latter move may at first glance seem to be a mere scholastic exercise, closer examination reveals that what we have here is a doctrinally significant analysis of the lower reaches of existence. The addition of this analysis, together with that of the *siddha* theory referred to above, transforms the standard "four destinies" model from a rather simplistic description of the range of life into what is, for the Jainas, a truly comprehensive statement of the possibilities available to the soul. As we shall see, moreover, there may well be implicit in the Jaina system what can only be called a theory of evolution. While the Jainas themselves subscribe to the notion of a cyclic, beginningless universe and so do not accept any such theory, their own texts seem to provide justification for such an inference. To make this point clear, let us consider more closely the specific manner in which the various *tiryāṅcas* have been described.

It should first be noted that "levels of existence," in the Jaina view, reflect a scale of "awareness" (*upayoga*) on the part of the soul; hence the liberated soul is omniscient (*sarvajña*), gods have a wider range of knowledge than do men, and so on. The same system of ordering obtains within the *tiryāṅca* category itself. At the top of this group stand those animals, such as the lion,¹³ which are said to possess five sense-faculties (*indriya*), plus a certain capacity for reflection (*saṃjñi*). Next are those which have five senses but *lack* the reflective capacity (*asaṃjñi*). Moving down the list, we are told of creatures with four, three, and two senses, respectively. Finally, and most important to the present discussion, are the *ekendriyas*, single-sense beings whose whole awareness is limited to the tactile mode. Whereas the higher *tiryāṅcas* are of a limited number and dwell in the *madhyaloka*, *ekendriyas* are too numerous to count and may be found in every part of the universe. They consist, moreover, of five distinct types: *prthvī-kāyika* ("earth-bodies"), *āp-kāyika* ("water-

12. See Appendix 1 to this chapter for a diagrammatic representation of the Jaina universe.

13. It is believed that *saṃjñi* animals are capable of receiving religious instruction and also that Mahāvīra himself was awakened to the spiritual life while existing as a lion. See Guṇabhadra's *Uttarapurāṇa*, 74.167–220, (Benares, 1968).

bodies"), *tejo-kāyika* ("fire-bodies"), *vāyu-kāyika* ("air-bodies"), and *vanaspati* ("vegetable life").¹⁴ As the names suggest, the first four of these are little more than single "molecules" of the various fundamental elements, each one a rudimentary body for some soul. The *vanaspati* are, again, of two kinds: those called *pratyeka*, which have an entire plant-body "to themselves" (i.e., one plant/one soul), and finally, the *sādhāraṇa*, or *nigoda*, those which are at so low a level that they do not even possess an individual body, but rather exist as part of a cluster or "ball" (*golaka*) of organisms of the same type. Souls in such clusters, moreover, must live and die as a group, supposedly attaining rebirth in the same state eighteen times within the space of a single human breath.¹⁵ Not only are the *nigodas* "colonial" (in the sense that this term is applied to algae, for example), but the clusters in which they dwell may in turn occupy the bodies of *other*, higher souls, thereby achieving an almost parasitic mode of existence. *Nigodas* are said to be found in virtually every corner of the universe; only the bodies of gods, hell-beings, and the "element bodies" referred to above do not harbor them. It is further believed that these tiny creatures tend to become especially concentrated in the flesh of human beings and animals as well as in certain roots and bulbs. Such likely "hosts" are therefore banned as food for the devout Jaina, since their consumption would involve the death of an unacceptably large number of souls.¹⁶

It may well be asked what sort of deeds (*karmas*) one must commit in order to deserve rebirth in a state so debased as that of the *nigodas*. In the only known reference to this problem we are told how Makkhali Gośāla, leader of the Ājīvika sect, doomed his soul to just such a fate by propounding what must have been for the Jainas the ultimate heresy, namely, that knowledge was in no way efficacious in terms of

14. *prthivyāptejovāyuvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ*! (*Tattvārthasūtra* 2.13).

15. *sāhāranodayeṇa nigodaśarīrā havanti sāmaṇṇā/*
te puṇa duviḥā jīvā bādarasuhumātti viṇṇeyā/
sāhāranamāhāro sāhāranamānapānagahaṇaṃ ca/
sāhāranajīvāṇaṃ sāhāraṇalakkhaṇaṃ bhaṇiyāṃ/
jattheḥka marai jivo tattha du maraṇaṃ have aṇaṃtāṇaṃ/
bakkamai jattha ekko bakkamaṇaṃ tattha 'ṇaṃtāṇaṃ/

Gommaṭasāra (Jivakāṇḍa) 191–193 (Agas, 1959)

16. The following plants are among those forbidden as food for a Jaina: turmeric, ginger, cardamom, garlic, bamboo, carrot, radish, beetroot, tamarind, banyan, margosa. For details, see R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga* (London, 1963), pp. 110–116.

the possibility of attaining *mokṣa*.¹⁷ (Buddhists seem to have been equally offended by Gośāla's views; their texts suggest that not only must he have gone to hell, but for such a person there could be no possibility of enlightenment even in the future.)¹⁸ It is clear, then, that only some shockingly evil act could send a soul to the *nigoda* realm. This idea seems to present no difficulties until we consider one further—and little-known—aspect of Jaina doctrine concerning the *nigodas*. This states that there are in fact two distinct types of souls in *nigoda*: those which have at some time been in higher states but have fallen back, as Gośāla did, and those which have *never yet* been out of *nigoda* existence. The souls in question are referred to as *itara-nigoda* and *nitya-nigoda* respectively. *Nitya* here had the sense not of "forever" but of "always up to now"; *itara* means simply "those other than" the members of the *nitya* class. These are Digambara terms; those employed by the Śvetāmbaras are very similar in meaning. The *nitya-nigoda* are, for example, called by them *avyāvahārika*, "not susceptible of specific designation," that is, having no individual forms, while the *itara-nigoda* receive, along with all higher beings, the label of *vyāvahārika*, "specifiable." Members of the *itara* group are of course also without individual bodies, but they have, at some time, at least entered the system wherein such bodies are obtained.¹⁹

Now, what can it mean to say that there are certain souls which have *always* been *nigodas*? If such were indeed the case, then the whole notion of placement within a given destiny on the basis of

17. See A. N. Upadhye, "Darśanasāra of Devasena: Critical text," in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 15, nos. 3–4, 198–206. Also my article, "The Jainas and the Western Scholar," in *Sambodhi* (Prof. A. N. Upadhye Commemoration Volume), L.D. Institute of Indology (Ahmedabad, July 1976), pp. 121–131.

18. "sakim nimuggo nimuggo va hoti ti" . . . etassa hi puna bhavato vuṭṭhāṇaṃ nāma natthi ti vadanti. Makkhali-gosālādayo viya heṭṭhā narakagginaṃ yeva āhārā honti ti. *Puggalapaññati-Atthakathā* 7.1. See my article, "On the Sautrāntika Theory of Bija," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* vol. 22, part 2, (London, 1959), p. 246, n. 2.

19. *atthi aṇaṃtā jīvā jehim na patto tasāṇa pariṇāmo/*
bhāvakalamkasupaurā nigodavāsaṃ na muñcanti/

Gommaṭasāra (Jivakāṇḍa), 197.
dvidividhā jīvā sāmvyāvahārikā asāmvyāvahārikāś ceti. tatra ye nigodāvasthātā udvṛtya prthivikāyikādibhedeṣu vartante te lokeṣu dṛṣṭipathamāgatāḥ santāḥ . . . vyāvahārikā ucyante. te ca yady api bhūyo 'pi nigodāvasthām upayānti tathāpi te sāmvyāvahārikā eva, sāmvyāvahāre paṭitvat. ye punar anādikālād ārabhya nigodāvasthām upagatā evāvatisthante te vyāvahārapathātītavād asāmvyāvahārikāḥ. (Quoted from the *Prajñāpanāṭikā* in *SM*, p. 259.)

previous deeds (*karmas*) would be undermined, since these beings would clearly have had no prior opportunity to perform any karmically meaningful actions whatsoever. The very term *avyāvahārika*, moreover, supports the suggestion that the *nitya-nigoda*s are in some sense beyond the operation of karma, just as are the *siddhas* at the opposite extreme. In fact, this apparent connection between the *high* and *low* points of existence is by no means accidental. Given that for Jainas the number of beings in the realm of *vyāvahāra* is finite (albeit "uncountable"), the question is raised as to how it is that the steady "departure" of souls through the attainment of *mokṣa* does not eventually deplete the universe of all sentient existence. The Jainas deal with this problem by means of the *nitya-nigoda*. These beings are, unlike those of any other category, said to be *infinite* (*anantānanta*) in number, and thus to provide an inexhaustible reservoir of souls; as we might suspect, the rate at which members of the *nitya-nigoda* class leave their dismal condition and enter higher states for the first time is either equal to or greater than that at which human beings in various parts of the universe attain *siddha*-hood. (Such an attainment is possible only from the human condition. At least one hundred and eight souls become emancipated in each period of six months and eight moments.)²⁰

This makes a convenient system, but it leaves the Jaina position open to the kind of interpretation referred to earlier, namely, that there is in fact a definite beginning and end to *saṃsāra*, and that a soul's progress from the former to the latter seems in many respects to mirror the very evolution of consciousness itself. The key point here is that no reasonable explanation has been given, in karmic terms, for the situation of the *nitya-nigoda*. Furthermore, while the Jainas have asserted that there exists a class of souls, the *abhavya*,²¹ that can never attain *mokṣa*, they have *not* suggested an analogous

20. *sijjhanti jattiyā khalu iha saṃvyavahārajīvarāṣiṃ /
enti anāivaṇassai rāsiṃ tattio tammi//*

iti vacanād yāvantāś ca yato muktiṃ gacchanti jīvās tāvanto 'nādinigoda-vanas-patirāśes tatrāgacchanti. na ca tāvatā tasya kācit parihāṇir nigoda-jīvānantyas-yākṣayatvāt (*SM*, p. 259).

Cf. *nanu aṣṭasamayādhikaṣaṇmāsābhyantare aṣṭottaraśatajīveṣu karmakṣayaṃ kṛtvā siddheṣu satsu . . .* (Quoted from the *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīvakāṇḍa*) *Keśava-varṇīṭikā* (196) in *SM*, p. 302.)

21. See my article, "Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva: A Jaina Doctrine of 'Pre-destination,'" in *Bhagawān Mahāvīra and His Teachings* (2500 *Nirvāṇa Anniversary Volume*), Bombay, 1977, pp. 95–111.

group whose members never dwelt within the *nitya-nigoda* realm. Given the Jaina admission that *some* souls begin their existence in this rather primordial and undifferentiated state, we may not be wrong in inferring that such could be the case for *all* souls. Adding to this the fact that every soul is said to exist along a virtual continuum of consciousness, from the minimal but ineradicable trace of awareness (*nitya-udghātita-jñāna*)²² possessed by the *nigoda* to the omniscience (*ananta*-, i.e., *kevalajñāna*) of the *siddha*, we have here a model which is both linear and evolutionary in its conception.

Neither the Jainas' doctrine that souls frequently regress to lower states, nor their assertion that the *abhavyas* can proceed no higher than the *devalokas*, is incompatible with this model. Even under the restrictions noted, it is clear that souls are *in general* imagined to make slow but definite progress from minimal to maximal awareness, from what might be called "*proto-saṃsāra*" to a state beyond *saṃsāra* altogether. We may find in this kind of speculation, moreover, a rather ingenuous but interesting parallel to the modern view that the highest forms of life on our planet are, ultimately, descended from primitive micro-organisms which inhabited the ancient seas.

As we have indicated previously, Jainas will reject out of hand any suggestion that a soul's progress in the universe is either linear or evolutionary. The former notion, of course, flies in the face of their cherished belief in cyclic, beginningless operation of karma. As for the latter, it seems to have been anticipated as a potential problem; hence we find certain Jaina stories claiming that groups of souls sometimes leave *nigoda* existence and proceed directly to the human destiny, from which, with no further rebirths, they attain to *siddha*-hood.²³ (This sort of "example" is not really useful to the Jaina argument here, since it denies only *gradual* evolution.) It should be asked, therefore, how it is that these very notions, which Jainas are at such pains to deny, are according to our analysis readily inferable from some of their oldest and most basic doctrinal materials. Is it possible that, for the Jainas, the doctrine of karma represents a relatively late (albeit prehistorical) accretion, a set of ideas imposed upon

22. For several scriptural passages on this point, see N. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 240.

23. *anādimithyādṛṣo 'pi trayaviṃśatyadhikanavaśataparimāṇas te ca nityanigodavāsinaḥ . . . Bharataputrā jātās te . . . tapo grhītvā . . . stokakālena mokṣaṃ gatāḥ.* (Quoted in Jinendra Varni's *Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa*, II, p. 318 [Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha Publications, Varanasi, 1971].)

what was already a well-developed theoretical framework describing the operation of the universe? This framework, of course, would have been the linear-evolutionary one to which we have referred, remnants of which are discernible even now as certain seeming "inconsistencies" within Jaina doctrine (e.g., the case of the *nitya-nigoda*). Evidence that such an ancient framework did in fact exist is to be found through examination of a tradition closely associated with Jainism, that of the Ājīvikas. It is well known that Gośāla, the most famous teacher of this school, was a contemporary of Mahāvīra. Basham and others have maintained, moreover, that these two *śramaṇa* sects interacted to a large extent; one scholar has even suggested (probably erroneously) that the Ājīvikas were ultimately absorbed into the Digambara Jaina community.²⁴ In any case, what few references to the Ājīvikas have survived indicate the school's belief in definite limits to *saṃsāra*, with each soul passing through exactly 8,400,000 *mahākalpas* ("great aeons") before reaching *mokṣa*.²⁵ That the Jainas may have originally subscribed to a similar doctrine is suggested not only by the evidence already set forth; but by the fact that the number 8,400,000 has been retained in their system to the present day, although in a significantly altered context. This number is, for Jainas, the sum total of conceivable birth-situations (*yoni*) (i.e., the four destinies divided into all their sub-categories, sub-sub-categories, etc.) in which souls may find themselves, again and again, as they circle through *saṃsāra*.²⁶ Again, we seem to have a fragmentary holdover from an earlier doctrine. This issue need not be pursued further here; the point has been made that certain apparent anomalies in Jaina thought on karma can perhaps be best understood if we consider the possibility of a common background with the Ājīvika tradition. The important thing, for our purposes, is that in Jainism the model of a karmically ordered universe, in which the soul's posi-

24. A. F. R. Hoernle, "Ājīvakas," in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, pp. 259–268; A. L. Basham's *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas* (London, 1951).

25. . . . cullāsiti mahākappuno sataśaṣṣāni, yāni bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā saṃsāritvā dukkhass' antaṃ karissanti (*Dīghanikāya*, 1.53–54 [PTS]). See Basham, *ibid.*, p. 14.

26. sacittaśītasamvṛtāḥ setarā miśrāś caikaśas tad yonayaḥ! (*Tattvārthasūtra* 2.32). tadbhedāś caturaśītiśatasahasrasaṃkhyā āgamato veditavyāḥ. uktaṃ ca:

niḥcidradhādu satta ya taru dasa viyalimḍiyesu chaceva/
surāṇirayatirīya cauro coddasa maṇue sadasaṣṣāḥ

SS 2.32

tion could be improved or worsened by action, did prevail over the kind of fatalistic determinism accepted by the Ājīvikas.

Our discussion of the *ekendriyas* has, it seems, led us rather far afield. The reader will recall the point that Jaina emphasis on the sentient nature of such simple beings makes it impossible for them to accept any notion of rebirth similar to that proposed by Brāhmaṇical schools. As for the Vaibhāṣika theory of the *gandharva* referred to above, this too stands in direct contradiction to a fundamental Jaina premise, namely, that the inter-birth period constitutes only a single moment in time. The fact that the *gandharva* state is said to persist for as long as seven weeks (see note 11) renders it, for Jainas, not a stage of transition at all but a whole separate destiny, in many ways reminiscent of the *preta-loka* (realm of spirits). Indeed, this same "too much time between births" objection could apply equally well to the idea of slow transmigration through rain and plants, even if this idea were not unacceptable for the quite different reasons that we have discussed. Why did the Jainas place so much emphasis on the doctrine of a momentary transition?²⁷ To answer this question, we must now examine their discussion of rebirth in some detail.

By conceiving of the soul as *vibhu*, Brāhmaṇical thinkers effec-

27. While Theravādin and Sautrāntika writings have set forth a doctrine of instantaneous rebirth analogous to the appearance of an image in a mirror (*bimba-pratibimba*), this doctrine seems never to have gained so wide an acceptance among Buddhists as did the *gandharva* theory. Even if it had become the standard Buddhist view, Jainas would have rejected it on the grounds that a thing which arises and perishes within the same moment cannot undergo motion. (Recall that in the Jaina system *three* moments are actually involved: those of death, movement of the soul, and rebirth, respectively.) Indeed, the Vaibhāṣikas' awareness of this problem very likely led them to the notion of an extended transition-state in the first place.

Certain Sāṅkhya and Yoga thinkers also proposed a rebirth process occurring instantaneously or in a very short period. It must be asked, however, whether such views ever had any meaningful impact on Hindu society; even in those cases where they might have been accepted in theory, we have no evidence that the practice of *śrāddha* (rendered meaningless within such a framework) was actually abandoned. Because only one instant (*samaya*) intervenes between death and the following rebirth, it is possible for a person dying in the act of copulation to be born as his own child. The idea that a man is in some sense identical with his son is well known to Hindu literature. Thus, for example, *Manusmṛti* defines a wife as follows: "The husband, entering into the wife, becoming an embryo, is born here. For that is why the wife is called wife (*jāyā*), because he is born (*jāyate*) again in her" (9.8). On the other hand, it is only in the Jaina literature that this belief is made literal. In fact, such an occurrence is attested to in a Jaina Purāṇa, the source of which I have unfortunately lost.

tively avoided the question of a soul's movement from one body to another. Such a soul of course pervades the physical space of all bodies and therefore need not "go to" one or another of them; only the mechanism of its experiential association with a particular body needs to be explained. In Jainism, however, the movement of the soul itself is fundamental to the operation of the rebirth process. We might first ask how it is that a soul, momentarily separated from a gross body, is able to undergo any motion at all. To this the Jaina will reply that movement is an *inherent property* of every soul. In its purest form, this movement proceeds directly upwards, like that of a flame; hence the *siddha*, free of all restraints, shoots like an arrow to the very top of the inhabited universe (*lokākāśa*).²⁸ When still under karmic influence, the soul will dart in a similar manner to its next embodiment. In both cases, the speed involved is so great that, according to the Jainas, the distance between any two points connectible by a straight line will be traversed in a single moment. (Given the multidimensional structure of the Jaina universe, certain circumstances of rebirth will require as many as two changes of direction before the appropriate *loka* and spot within it are reached. Motion along a curve is not admitted; therefore, as many as three moments may occasionally be necessary before the soul can enter its new state.)²⁹ It is important to recognize here that karma is not in any sense considered to *impel* the soul; it functions, rather, to channel or direct the motive force which is already present, much as a system of pipes might be used to "send" upwardly gushing water to a desired location.

Now, it should be clear that as a soul moves between two gross physical bodies, that is, during the state called *vigraha-gati*,³⁰ it cannot be accurately described as "totally free of embodiment"; if such were the case, it would simply fly upwards as the *siddha* does. For the system to work, in other words, the karmic "channel" must exist in

some manifest, if subtle, form in which the soul is contained. This is in fact exactly what the Jainas have claimed; the transmigrating soul is said to be housed by a "karmic body" (*kārmāṇa-śarīra*), as well as by a so-called luminous body (*taijasa-śarīra*).³¹ The former is composed of the sum total of one's karma at a given moment; the latter acts as a substratum for this karmic matter during the *vigraha-gati* and also functions to maintain body temperature during gross physical existence. Both of these invisible bodies are said to suffuse the gross and visible one during life; thus they not only "convey" the soul from one birth state to the next but constitute a real physical link between these states as well.

Committed as they were to the doctrine that the *vigraha-gati* typically occupies only a single moment, Jaina thinkers faced one major difficulty, namely, explaining how the "choice" of exactly appropriate circumstances for the next birth could possibly be made in so short a time. (Recall, in this connection, the *gandharva*'s lengthy "search" for a proper birth-environment.) They have dealt with this problem by positing the existence of a unique factor, the so-called *āyuh-* ("longevity") *karma*. To understand the function of this factor, we must first examine certain general points of Jaina doctrine concerning the types and modes of operation of karmic matter. In addition to the four major "vitiating" (*ghātiyā*) karmas,³² which effectively keep a soul in bondage, Jainas have delineated four minor categories said to be responsible for the mechanism of rebirth and embodiment. Among this latter group, known as *aghātiyā*, we find the following: (1) *nāma-karma*, a cover term for the collection of karmic material whose fruition determines some ninety-eight different aspects of the future body, for example, its destiny or class of existence (human, animal, etc.), its sex, color, number of senses, conformation of limbs, and the like;³³ (2) *gotra-karma*, controlling

28. tad anantaram ūrdhvaṃ gacchaty ā lokāntāt/ pūrvaprayogād asaṅgatvād bandhacchedāt tathāgatipariṇāmāc ca/ (*Tattvārthasūtra* 10.5–6).

... tathāgatipariṇāmāt. yathā ... pradīpaśikhā svabhāvād utpatati tathā muktātma 'pi nānāgativakāraṇakāraṇakarmānivarāṇe saty ūrdhvaṃ gatisvabhāvād ūrdhvaṃ evārohati (SS 10.7). Beyond this point there is said to be only empty space (*alokākāśa*), where matter and even the principles of motion, rest, and time are absent. See *Tattvārthasūtra* 10.8.

29. This takes place only when there is movement to or from those realms inhabited exclusively by *ekendriyas*. See S. A. Jain, *Reality*, p. 70, n. 1.

30. vīgraho dehaḥ. vīgrahārthā gatir vīgrahagatiḥ (SS 2.25).

31. yat tejonimittam tejasi vā bhavaṃ tat taijasam. karmaṇām kāryam karmaṇam ... ayahpiṇde tejo 'nupraveśavat taijasakarmaṇayor vajrapātālādīṣu ... lokāntāt sarvatra nāsti pratighātaḥ. ... nityasambandhiniḥ hi te ā samsāraḥ śayāt niraveśaśasya samsāriṇo jīvasya te dve api śarīre bhavata ity arthaḥ (SS 2.36–42).

32. The four *ghātiyā* karmas are (1) *mohaniya* (engendering "false views" and preventing "pure conduct"); (2) *jñānāvaraṇīya* ("knowledge-obscuring"); (3) *darśanāvaraṇīya* ("perception-obscuring"); (4) *antarāya* ("restrictor of the quality of energy (*virya*)").

33. gatijātiśarīrāṅgopāṅganirmānabandhanasamsthānasamhanana sparśarasagandhavarṇānupūrvyāgurulaghūpaghātātāpodyotocchvāsavihāyogatayaḥ pratyekaśarīratrasasubhagasusvaraśubhasūkṣmaparyāptisthirādeyayaśaḥkirttisetarāṇi tīrthakaratvaṃ ca/ (*Tattvārthasūtra* 8.11).

whether the environment into which one falls is or is not conducive to the leading of a spiritual life;³⁴ (3) *vedanīya-karma*, producing either pleasant or unpleasant feelings in response to the environment, hence the level of happiness or unhappiness which characterizes an individual; (4) *āyuh-karma*, whereby the exact duration of life (ostensibly measured, among human beings, by the number of breaths to be taken) is established.

While this classification appears at first to be a simple one, it is complicated by the fact that *āyuh-karma*, as we have indicated above, functions in a most unusual manner. *Every other sort of karma* in the Jaina system is said to be in a constant bondage (*bandha*) and fruition (*anubhāga*) relationship with the soul; some *nāma-karma*, for example, is at every moment being bound, to come to fruition at some future time, while another is at every moment producing its result and falling away (*nirjarā*) from the soul. *Āyuh-karma*, however, is bound *only once* in a given lifetime, and its fruition will apply only to the very next life.³⁵ This specificity of application effectively places *āyuh-karma* in a position of primacy relative to the other *aghātiyā* karmas, since these must "fall into place" in conformity with the life-period that has been fixed. Given an *āyus* of seventy years, for example, only those *nāma-karmas* generating rebirth in a destiny where such a life-span is appropriate could conceivably come into play. Thus it is that the "selection" of the particular *aghātiyā* karmas determinative of the next existence occurs *before the moment of death*. There need be no "search" during the *vigrahagati*, since all "choices" have already been made.³⁶

The peculiar characteristics attributed to *āyuh-karma* not only bring greater consistency to the Jaina theory of a momentary *vigraha-gati*, but have implications on the level of conduct as well.

34. This interpretation (supported by scripture) runs contrary to the popular Jaina understanding of *gotra* as "caste," etc. Jaina doctrine, of course, does not accept the notion of a caste status fixed by birth.

35. See *Jaina Jñānaśāstra* (in Marathi), Part 1, by Ajñāta (Aurangabad, 1972), p. 233 (*āyuh*).

36. Śvetāmbara texts (Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, Part 2, p. 225) contain the well-known story that the embryonic Mahāvira underwent a transference from the womb of a Brāhmaṇa woman to that of a Kṣatriya one, the latter becoming his actual "mother." Does this suggest some breakdown in the determinative process begun by the fixing of *āyuh karma*? If so, it may explain the Digambara refusal to accept any such tale as valid. Śvetāmbaras, for their part, have simply labeled this event as one of the inexplicable miracles which may occur in a given aeon of time (*aṇanteṇa kāleṇa*). See *Śthānāṅga sūtra*, #1074.

This second aspect relates particularly to prevailing ideas concerning when the *āyuh-karma* may be fixed. Jaina teachers have agreed that this event cannot take place until some moment during the final third of the present lifetime, and that indeed it will often not occur until death is very nearly at hand. The determination of one's *āyuh-karma*, moreover, is held to be extremely susceptible to the effects of one's recent volitional activities. Thus the devout Jaina is encouraged to pay ever more strict attention to his religious vows and duties as he grows older. Activities during the first two-thirds of life are not irrelevant in this context, however, since these will have created the habits which largely define a person's behavioral tendencies as the end of his life approaches. It must be emphasized here that one is not *aware* of the moment at which the *āyuh-karma* is fixed; thus it will behoove him to live until his last breath as if it were still possible to influence the specific outcome of this event. This orientation is most vividly expressed in the Jaina practice of *sallekhanā*,³⁷ in which a mendicant of advanced age may undertake a ritual fast ending only in death. It is hoped that he will thus be enabled to face his final moments in a state of absolute tranquillity, free of the fears, desires, or other strong volitions which characterize the consciousness of the average person at this time. The fixing of *āyuh-karma* under such controlled and peaceful conditions is held to be extremely auspicious; not only will rebirth in lower existences be effectively precluded in this way, but the individual in question is deemed likely to find himself in an environment conducive to rapid spiritual development.

Although emphasis on the religious significance of the last moments of life is by no means unique to the Jains (similar notions prevail among Hindus, Buddhists, and certain non-Indian communities as well), it might be said that the idea of *āyuh-karma*, on the basis of which Jains rationalize this emphasis, is unique. But this idea itself is not a fundamental one; it seems to function, as we have seen, mainly as an explanatory adjunct to the distinctive Jaina doctrine pertaining to rebirth, namely, the momentariness of *vigraha-gati*. The significance of this doctrine goes far beyond the context of mere scholastic dispute. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to say that the basic social distinction between Jains and their Hindu neighbors derives mainly from the disagreement of these communities over the period of time required for transmigration to occur. Whereas Jains

37. See Williams, *Jaina Yoga*, pp. 166–172.

have adopted many Hindu customs and ceremonies pertaining to such things as marriage, the coming of the new year, childbirth, and so forth, they have never taken up what is perhaps the most important of all rituals in Hindu society, namely, *śrāddha*, the offering of food by a son to the spirit of his dead parent. We have noted the belief that this offering is essential if the parent is to obtain a body suitable for entrance into the *pitr-loka*, and hence to gain the chance for eventual rebirth. It is further believed that failure of a son to perform this ritual will result in the loss of inheritance and in his wife's being rendered barren by the curse of the spirits thus stranded in the disembodied state. The *śrāddha* ritual not only represents a significant expression of the underlying parent-child tensions characteristic of the Indian family³⁸ but also provides perhaps the most important function of the Brahmanical castes. The latter point is made in reference to the Brahmins' monopolization of the role of intermediary between the donor and the departed; only if Brahmins consume the offerings can these be "converted" into the material from which the new body of the spirit is built up.

It will be apparent that for Jainas the very idea of *śrāddha* is doctrinally invalid; a soul which goes to its next body in one moment cannot be fed, propitiated, or dealt with in any other way by those left behind. For this and other more "common sense" reasons, we find such writers as the thirteenth-century commentator Malliṣeṇa making light of the entire *śrāddha* ritual:

Even through the performance of *śrāddha*, increase in posterity is in the case of most people not found; and . . . in the case of some, as in that of donkeys, pigs, goats, etc., even without performance thereof we see it still more. . . . And . . .

"If even to dead beings the *śrāddha* is
the cause of satisfaction,
'Then oil might increase the flame of an
extinguished lamp."

38. It is tempting to read Freudian symbolism into this belief system: the son, though perhaps desiring to "kill" his father (by preventing his rebirth), nevertheless performs his filial duty out of fear of "castration" (the loss of property and offspring). Perhaps more to the point, however, is the fact that in Indian society the parent seems fundamentally unwilling to relinquish his control over the son, to recognize the latter's adult status; through the institution of *śrāddha*, some semblance of parental control is maintained even in death. It would be interesting to investigate whether Jainas, lacking the institutionalization of filial responsibility that *śrāddha* represents, have created some substitute ritual or social form which functions in an analogous manner.

If it is said that "What is enjoyed by the Brahman accrues to them (i.e., the ancestors)," whoever is to agree to that? Since only in the Brahman do we see the fattened bellies; and transference of these into theirs (the ancestors') cannot be espied; and because only on the part of the Brahmins is satisfaction witnessed.³⁹

There is one other tenet of the Jaina system pertaining to rebirth which must be mentioned here, as it provides a further basis for the unacceptability of the practice of *śrāddha*. Whereas this practice clearly assumes that the actions of one person can affect the destiny of another, Jaina tradition has always held that an individual soul can experience results accruing only to actions which it has *itself* performed. The tenth century *ācārya* Amitagati has provided us with a forceful statement of the adamant position taken by Jainas on this matter:

Whatever karma a soul has acquired through its own prior deeds,
it will obtain the good and bad results thereof.
If one could obtain results from the deeds of others,
then surely his own deeds would be meaningless.

Except for karma earned for oneself by oneself,
no one gives anything to anyone.
Reflecting upon this fact, therefore,
let every person, unwaveringly,
abandon the perverse notion that
another being can provide him with anything at all.⁴⁰

This emphasis on reaping the fruits only of one's own karma was not restricted to the Jainas; both Hindu and Buddhist writers have produced doctrinal materials stressing the same point. Each of the latter traditions, however, developed practices in basic contradiction to such a belief. In addition to *śrāddha*, we find among the Hindus widespread adherence to the notion of divine intervention in one's fate, while Buddhists eventually came to propound such theories as

39. *SM XI* (tr. by F. W. Thomas, pp. 69–70).

40. svayaṃ kṛtaṃ karma yad ātmana purā
phalaṃ tadyaṃ labhate śubhāśubham/
pareṇa dattaṃ yadi labhyate sphuṭaṃ
svayaṃ kṛtaṃ karma nirarthakaṃ tadā//
nijārjitaṃ karma vihāya dehino
na ko 'pi kasyāpi dadāti kiñcana/
vicārayann evaṃ ananyamānaṣaḥ
paro dadāti vimuñcya śeṣmuṣim//

(*Dvātrīṃśikā*) *Nitya-naimittika-pāṭhāvalī*, Karanja, 1956, p. 22.

the boon-granting *bodhisattvas*, transfer of merit, and the like. Only the Jains have been absolutely unwilling to allow such ideas to penetrate their community, despite the fact that there must have been a tremendous amount of social pressure on them to do so.


In this discussion we have examined various aspects of the Jaina approach to rebirth. By way of conclusion, we might reiterate the important points raised thereby. The Jains, first of all, show a remarkable tendency to associate the soul with some sort of bodily influence, whether during ordinary existence, transmigration, or even after the attainment of *siddha*-hood. In spite of this tendency, however, no biological explanation of the mechanism whereby a soul enters its new environment has been offered. The description of the possible states of rebirth includes one category, the *nitya-nigoda*, the nature of which suggests a more primitive and possibly linear concept of existence underlying the set of beliefs now taken as orthodox. Jaina views on rebirth are unique in their emphasis on the single moment involved in movement of a soul from one embodiment to the next. This emphasis, together with the less unusual but very strictly applied belief in non-transference of karma, has been reflected in the complete absence from the Jaina community of certain ritual forms typical of Brāhmanical society. The deeper ramifications of these issues, particularly the final one, definitely require further exploration; it is to be hoped that future researches will move in these directions.*

Appendix 1

THE JAINA UNIVERSE (LOKĀKĀŚA)

The Jaina "universe" (*loka*) is a three-dimensional structure divided into five parts. (A) The Lower World consists of seven layers and is the abode of infernal beings (*nāraki*) as well as certain demigods (demons, titan, etc.). (B) The Middle, or Terrestrial, World consists of innumerable concentric island-continent with Jambudvīpa in the center. This is the abode of humans and animals. Human beings are not found beyond the third "continent" from the center. In (C), the Higher, or Celestial, World, are found the abodes of heavenly beings (*devas*). (D) Beyond the border of the Celestial

*I should like to acknowledge the assistance of Joseph Clack in the preparation of this paper.



World, marked by the crescent, is the permanent abode of the Liberated Souls (*siddhas*). This region is the apex of "World-space" (*loka-ākāśa*). (E) Contains abodes restricted to inhabitation by *ekendriyas*. (While these single-sense organisms occupy all parts of the *lokākāśa*, *trasas* [beings having two or more senses] are restricted to areas A-C; hence we find only *ekendriyas* here.) The area surrounding this entire structure is known as "Space without Worlds" (*aloka-ākāśa*), which is devoid of souls, matter, and time. It should be noted that there is no provision for a *pitṛ-loka* (World of Ancestors) in the Jaina cosmology.

Appendix 2

COMMUNICATION REGARDING THE PROCESS OF REBIRTH FROM SUBODH K. JAIN, PROFESSOR OF AGRONOMY AND RANGE SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

In the theory of rebirth we assume the *karmas* to be somehow transmitted with the soul from one life to the next after rebirth. This entity of life that is transmitted we shall call "Entity" for convenience. It should have at least three properties: (1) it travels very fast (instantaneously? or as mathematicians put it, in as short a time as you please, infinitesimally); (2) it has a specific destination, i.e., the place of birth (conception); and (3) it allows very specific individuality in that a person's *karmas* are specifically attached and transfuse with the zygote of the newborn (zygote is the first cell resulting from the union of two parental germ cells). Now, what known scientific elements could hypothetically possess these three properties?

First, consider the pheromones, the chemical compounds identified in the study of animal communications. These substances are known to be produced by ants, bees, and so forth, which leave odor trails by individuals to inform their social groups about their position, distance, path of travel, and so forth. Very small quantities are needed, the odor is very rapidly disseminated, and scientists think that the complexity of these compounds can allow many specific signals. Specificity, that is, the great amount of variation among individuals transmitted through an equal diversity of pheromones (one individual—one pheromone relationship), is quite feasible. (For a discussion of pheromones, see E. O. Wilson, *Sociobiology*, Harvard University Press, 1975.) Thus, conceivably, at least higher animals including men are capable of communicating during their lifetime or at the time of death very specific individualized signals, and provide some *entity* of transmission.

A second form of this *entity* could be in *radiowaves*, released as “energy” at the time of death, which would travel at high speed, have the capacity of being received by a specific destination, and carry a specific message (or *karmas*). Now, one could easily postulate within the realm of current ideas about the origin of mutation (in genetics) (see J. D. Watson, *The Molecular Biology of the Gene*, 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, 1975) that this “energy” received by the zygote could induce changes in DNA, the genetic code of life, which when decoded during the newborn’s lifetime would bring about predestined changes. Birth defects or inherited diseases, for instance, are now attributed to chance origin of mutations and expression in a suitable environment. With the present thesis, one could argue that their origin is due in part to parental genetic materials and in part to the “entity” received from the previous life.

Both of these ideas are speculative in large part, but are presented here in relation to some specific facts, which are not to be misconstrued as proofs but are merely suggestions of feasible, scientifically permissible theses. The most serious difficulty in formulating these ideas lies in our ignorance about the precise mechanism by which “destination” or “receiving station” is determined. How does a zygote receive its proper *karmas*? How do parents of a child provide for receiving it? How this entity is maintained in a zygote to unfold the consequences poses a second difficulty. Thus, at this time we are only speculating about the details of these theses. We need to understand the physical or metaphysical features of these processors of information.

Part III.

Philosophical Traditions