

THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN

VOLS. XXXI - XXXII, 1967-68

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FELICITATION VOLUME

THE ADYAR LIBRARY AND RESEARCH CENTRE
ADYAR, MADRAS 20, INDIA

*puruṣārthakriyārthino bahirarthānurūpāṇi pravṛttinivṛttyavadhāraṇāni bhavanti.*¹

Our conclusions, then, are as follows: With Dharmakīrti *arthakriyā* meant epistemologically 'the fulfilment of a human purpose' and ontologically 'causal power'. Post-Dharmakīrti writers were well aware of both senses. While the former was the principal meaning for Dharmakīrti, the shift in emphasis of the main referent from the nature and function of a valid knowledge to that of what is real or existent led certain writers to place more significance on the latter.

We may conclude this paper by quoting a line from Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, in which the double meaning of the term *arthakriyā* is clearly revealed:

*avisamvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpaṇaśaktikatvam.*²

¹ *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, op. cit., p. 130.

² *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntaraksita, ed. together with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* by E. Krishnamacharya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. 30, 31 (Baroda, 1926), vol. I, p. 392.

SENGAKU MAYEDA

ON THE AUTHOR OF THE *MĀṆDŪKYO-PANIṢAD*- AND THE *GAUḌAPĀDIYĀ-BHĀṢYA* *

THE *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* is a very short work which consists of only twelve prose sentences. In printed editions and manuscripts, the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* is interspersed among the twenty-nine stanzas of the first *prakaraṇa* of the *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* which comprises four *prakaraṇa*-s and explains the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*.¹ The *Gauḍapādiyakārikā*,

* This paper was read at the 27th International Congress of Orientalists which was held at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, on 17 August 1967. My gratitude is due to Dr. W. Norman Brown, Emeritus Professor of Sanskrit, University of Pennsylvania, who has kindly taken the trouble to improve and correct my English.

The following abbreviations are used:

BSBh = Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (Bombay, Nirṇaya-sāgar Press, 1934).

Eigen = P. Hacker, 'Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 100 (1950), pp. 246-86.

GK = The *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* (see *GKBh*).

GKBh = Śaṅkara's *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 10, 1900).

MU = The *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* (see *GKBh*).

MUBh = Śaṅkara's *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya* (see *GKBh*).

Upad = Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* (Swami Jagadananda, *Upadeśasāhasrī of Śrī Sankarāchārya*. Madras, Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1949).

¹ V. Bhattacharya rejected the tradition that the *GK* explains the *MU* and asserted that the *MU*, being based upon the *GK*, came into existence after the *GK*. See V. Bhattacharya, 'Māṇḍūkyā Upaniṣad and the Gauḍapāda Kārikā', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1 (1925), pp. 119-25; ditto, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda* (University of Calcutta, 1952), pp. 46-52; R. D.

which is also called *Āgamaśāstra* or *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*,¹ is the oldest extant work that was composed before Śaṃkara (A.D. 700-50) and stands in the line of the Advaita philosophy. It is traditionally said that Śaṃkara, commenting on both the texts, wrote the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya* and the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*.²

In 1913 H. Jacobi expressed his suspicion of the identity of the commentator of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* with Śaṃkara, the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.³ Since then, the authenticity of the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya* and the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* has long been called into question by able scholars.⁴ I would also like to

Karmarkar, *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* (Government Oriental Series, Class B, No. 9, Poona, 1953), pp. xxxi-xxxiii; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten* (=The Development of the Vedānta Philosophy) (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1955), pp. 557-65. Problems concerning the *MU* and the *GK* will not be discussed in this paper.

¹ Cf. H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 520-3.

² The *GKBh* is also called *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*, *Gauḍapādīyāgamaśāstrabhāṣya* and *Gauḍapādīyāgamaśāstravivaraṇa* according to the edition of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series.

³ H. Jacobi, 'On Māyāvāda', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 33 (1913), p. 52, n. 2. His evidence is that the author of the *GKBh* states an argument in the form and terms of an *anumāna* according to Nyāya principles. This is not acceptable. See T. R. Chintamani, 'Śaṃkara—The Commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās', *Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference* (Madras, 1924), pp. 419-21; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 527-8.

⁴ Cf. V. Bhattacharya, 'Śaṃkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads', *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume*, vol. III, pt. 2 (Calcutta, 1925), pp. 103-10; ditto, 'The Gauḍapāda-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad', *Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*, p. 441, n. 1; p. 442; p. 444, n. 4; p. 454, n. 1; ditto, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, op. cit., p. xxxiii, n. 3; S. K. Belvalkar, *Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy*, pt. 1 (Poona, 1929), p. 218; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 527-34; N. K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to*

take up this problem here in this paper. When the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* is referred to in the following pages, the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya* is also implied at the same time¹ unless it is specifically mentioned.

In order to test the authenticity of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* I have compared it with the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* with regard to the usage and concepts of eight terms, which are *avidyā*, *nāmarūpa*, *māyā*, *īśvara*, *ānanda*, *vivarta*, *śiva*, and *Vyāsa*, since Śaṃkara shows his peculiarities in those terms to such an extent that Śaṃkara's genuine works can be distinguished from even those of his direct disciples with considerable certainty.² As a result of my comparison it has been found that the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* is in complete agreement with the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* in the usage and concepts of the above eight terms. Among the points of agreement the following should be especially emphasized:

1. The compound *avidyāviśaya*, which occurs three times in the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*,³ is used only

Śaṃkara's Theory of Knowledge (Varanasi, 1962), pp. 38-42. T. R. Chintamani may be the only scholar who has so far seriously tried to defend the tradition by answering various objections. But he could not show any strong positive evidence. See his article, 'Śaṃkara—The Commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās', op. cit.

¹ It is generally taken for granted that the two works were commented upon by a single hand. As far as I have found, there is no evidence for denying or doubting this aspect of the tradition.

² See Eigen.

³ *Sarvo 'yaṃ laukiko vaidikaś ca vyavahāro 'vidyāviśaya eveti, GKBh* II. 32, p. 91; 'saṃvṛtyā' saṃvaraṇaṃ saṃvṛttir avidyāviśayo laukiko vyavahāras tayā 'saṃvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ' 'tena' avidyāviśaye 'śāśvataṃ' nityaṃ 'nāsti', *GKBh* IV. 57, p. 195.

- in the sense of 'the sphere of *avidyā*' and not in the sense of 'the object of *avidyā*'.¹
2. The relationship between *avidyā* and its effects is not expressed by *upādāna*(-*kāraṇa*) or *prakṛti* but by such terms as: *pratyupasthāpita*, -*adhyāropita*, -*parikalpita*, -*viṣṇubhita* and -*krta*.² The word *pratyupasthāpita* is especially significant.³
 3. The term *māyā* is neither used in the sense of 'the primary material of the universe' nor synonymously with *avidyā*.⁴

¹ *Avidyāśraya* as well as *avidyāviśaya* is not discussed. This fact is additional evidence. Cf. Eigen, p. 250 and pp. 254-6; S. Mayeda, 'Śaṅkara's Authorship of the Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya', *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 10 (1967), no. 1, pp. 41-2 and p. 51.

² -*adhyasta*, *GKBh* II. 32, p. 93; -*adhyāropita*, *GKBh* II. 32, p. 94; III. 5, p. 111 (twice); III. 25, p. 134; -*udbhūta*, *GKBh* III. 25, p. 134; IV. 55, p. 194; -*krta*, *GKBh*, Introduction, p. 6; *MUBh* 3, p. 14; *GKBh* I. 6, p. 33; p. 34; *MUBh* 7, p. 40; *GKBh* III. 2, p. 105 (twice); III. 5, p. 111; III. 6, p. 112; III. 10, p. 115; III. 35, p. 144; -*kalpita*, *GKBh* II. 20-8, p. 88; -*kalpanāmātra*, *GKBh* IV. 90, p. 214; -*nimitta*, *GKBh* III. 36, p. 144; -*parikalpita*, *GKBh* III. 45, p. 152; IV. 76, p. 204; IV. 94, p. 216; -*pratyupasthāpita*, *GKBh* III. 10, p. 115; III. 25, p. 134; -*lakṣaṇa*, *GKBh* III. 36, p. 145 (twice); -*viṣṇubhita*, *GKBh* III. 43, p. 151. Cf. Eigen, pp. 250-4; S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Upadeśasāhasri Ascribed to Śaṅkara', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 85 (1965), no. 2, pp. 180-1.

³ See Eigen, p. 254, n. 1.

⁴ See Eigen, pp. 272-6; S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya Ascribed to Śaṅkara', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, vol. 9 (1965), pp. 178-83. The term *māyā* is used in the following meanings in the *GKBh*: [I] Magic (*GKBh* I. 7, p. 35; I. 27, p. 62; III. 27, p. 137; IV. 44, p. 188; IV. 68-70, p. 200), [II] (Magical) illusion as an object of comparison (*GKBh* I. 6, p. 33; I. 7, p. 35; I. 7, p. 36; I. 17, p. 52; I. 18, p. 53; II. 19, p. 83; II. 31, p. 90; II. 38, p. 101; III. 1, p. 108; III. 11, p. 116; IV. 58, p. 196; IV. 59, p. 196), and [III] The miraculous power of god (*GKBh*, *maṅgalācaraṇa* I, p. 1; I. 6, pp. 33-4; I. 6, p. 34; I. 16, p. 50; II. 12, p. 75; II. 19, p. 83; III. 15, p. 121; III. 19, p. 128; III. 23, p. 130; III. 27, p. 137;

4. There is no occurrence of *sac-cid-ānanda* as a positive character of *brahman-ātman*.¹ The term *ānanda* occurs in the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* only when the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* and the *Gauḍapādīyākārikā* require the commentator to mention it in one way or other.²

These four points³ clearly show the difference of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* from works of even Śaṅkara's direct

III. 28, p. 139; III. 29, p. 139; III. 36, p. 145). Cf. Eigen, pp. 268-72; S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Upadeśasāhasri', op. cit., pp. 184-5. However, *avidyā* and *māyā* are very akin to, but not identical with, each other in the following instances: (i) *dr̥ṣṭam ca rajjūsarpādīnām avidyākṛtamāyābījotpannānām rajjvādyaṭmanā sattvam*, *GKBh* I. 6, p. 34; (ii) *māyānirmīṭasyaiva jīvasya avidyayā pratyupasthāpitasya avidyānāśe svabhāvarūpatvāt paramārthataḥ*, *GKBh* III. 25, p. 134; and (iii) *avidyālakṣaṇānādir māyā nidrā*, *GKBh* III. 36, p. 145. In this context it is suggestive to see how the commentator interprets a quotation 'indro māyābhiḥ' (*Brhadāraṇyaka Up.* II. 5. 19) which occurs in *GK* III. 24. He says: 'indro māyābhiḥ' ity abhūtārthapratipādakena māyāśabdena vyapadeśāt. nanu prajñāvacano māyāśabdaḥ. satyam. indriyaprajñāyā avidyāmayatvena māyāvābhyupagamād adosaḥ. māyābhir indriyaprajñābhir avidyārūpābhir ity arthaḥ. Compare Śaṅkara on *Brhadāraṇyaka Up.* II. 5. 19: 'indrah' paramaśvaro 'māyābhiḥ' prajñābhir nāmarūpabhūtakṛtamithyābhīmānair vā na tu paramārthataḥ 'pururūpo' bahurūpa 'īyate' gamyata ekarūpa eva prajñāghanah sann avidyāprajñābhiḥ (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 15, p. 384).

¹ See Eigen, p. 276; S. Mayeda, 'Śaṅkara's Authorship of the Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya', op. cit., pp. 50-1.

² *Ānanda*, *MUBh* 5, p. 21 (twice); *ānandamaya*, *MUBh* 5, p. 21; *ānandaprāya*, *MUBh* 5, p. 21; *ānandabhuj*, *MUBh* 5, p. 21 (twice); *sthūlapraviviktānandākhya*, *GKBh* I. 5, p. 33. One of those cases occurs in a sentence (*eso 'sya parama ānandaḥ*) which is quoted from *Brhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV. 3. 32.

³ The following points of agreement may be added here:

i. The compound *avidyā-kāma-karman* is used in *GKBh* I. 4, p. 19 and *doṣa* is a wider concept to which *avidyā* belongs in the instance: *avidyātr̥ṣṇādidoṣa*, *MUBh* 7, p. 39.

ii. See footnote 1 on p. 76, above.

iii. The nature of *avidyā* is not analyzed in the *GKBh*. Nowhere in the *GKBh* is *anirvacanīya* used as an attribute of *avidyā*.

disciples and contemporaries such as Sureśvara, Padma-pāda and Maṇḍanamiśra, and they support the identity

iv. *Avidyā* in the *GKBh* lacks the following traditional attributes: (a) *jaḍa*, (b) *bhāvarūpa*, (c) *āvaraṇasakti* and (d) *vikṣepasakti*.
v. *Māyāmaya* in *GKBh* IV. 59, p. 196 (twice) and IV. 68-70, p. 200 does not mean 'made of *māyā* (=a kind of material)' but 'consisting of *māyā*', i.e. illusory.

vi. The relationship between *nāmarūpa* and *avidyā* is denoted by *-kṛta* in the instances: (a) *avidyākṛtanāmarūpamāyāsvarūpa*, *GKBh* I. 6, p. 33 and (b) *aprabodha (=avidyā)-kṛte . . . nāmarūpe*, *GKBh* III. 36, p. 145. Instance (a) parallels *avidyāpratyupasthāpitanāmarūpamāyāveśavaśa*, *BSBh* II. 2. 2, p. 419-20. For an instance of *aprabodha* as a synonym of *avidyā*, see *BSBh* IV. 1. 3, p. 833.

vii. The term *īśvara*, which is used six times in the *GKBh*, may twice point to its interchangeability with *ātman* (*GKBh* I. 28, p. 63; II. 13, p. 76).

viii. No use of the term *vivarta* is made in the *GKBh*.

ix. The term *śiva* is used only as an adjective (*MUBh* 7, p. 45; 12, p. 60; *GKBh* II. 33, p. 95 (twice); II. 34, p. 75 (twice); III. 1, p. 103). See *Upad* II. 8. 3; 10. 11; 13. 20. Cf. P. Hacker, 'Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiṣṇavism', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, vol. 9 (1965), p. 148. Such usage of *śiva* is also found in Buddhist texts such as *Prasannapadā* (Bibliotheca Buddhica 4), p. 4, line 1; p. 11, line 10; p. 538, line 3. In his above article Hacker has pointed out that '*paramaśivabhāva*' in Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* (Madras Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Series no. 4, p. 159, line 10) inevitably suggests the typically Śaiva notion.

x. The name Vyāsa in the *GKBh* (II. 13, p. 118), though not clear, probably denotes the author of *smṛti-s* and not Bādarāyaṇa to whom the *Brahmasūtra* is traditionally attributed. Ānandajñāna interprets it as 'Vyāsa-Parāśarādi' and quotes *Bhagavadgītā*, VI. 19 and *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, I. 22. 87. The other instance of Vyāsa is not simple. The *GKBh* quotes a stanza from the *Vyāsa-smṛti* (*GKBh* II. 31, p. 90). The law book entitled *Vyāsa-smṛti*, though not quoted in the *BSBh*, may be chronologically quoted by Śaṅkara, since according to P. V. Kane, Vyāsa flourished between 2nd and 5th century A.D. (see *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. I, p. 238). However, the *Vyāsa-smṛti* text in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series (vol. 48, pp. 357-71) does not contain that particular stanza. It is, therefore, likely that the *Vyāsa-smṛti* is not the law book but may mean 'the *smṛti-s* of Vyāsa'. A further investigation is necessary to determine the source of that quotation.

of the author of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* with Śaṅkara, the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

In this connection it is not out of place to refer to the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* which is also traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara. It is surprising to see that the introductory portion of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* and *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya* 1-6 are quoted in the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* with little change and without any acknowledgement of debt.¹ It is very probable that the author of the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* tried to make his commentary look like Śaṅkara's, but he failed to do so in using the terms *sac-cid-ānanda*² and *vivarta*³ and in interpreting *śiva* as Śaṅkara.⁴ The author of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* does not reveal any such un-Śaṅkaran characteristics. This is true of Śaṅkara's other works such as the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* and the *Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya*, the authenticity of which I have tried to establish elsewhere by applying the same comparative method.⁵

For a detailed discussion about the above points, see Eigen; S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Upadeśasāhasrī', op. cit.; ditto, 'The Authenticity of the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya', op. cit.; ditto, 'On Śaṅkara's Authorship of the Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya', op. cit.

¹ Cf. V. Bhattacharya, 'Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads', op. cit., pp. 105-9.

² *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* (Śrīśaṅkaragranthāvali 4, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, no date), p. 259 and p. 260. See this paper, p. 77 above.

³ *ibid.*, p. 273. See footnote 3 on p. 77 above.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 314. See footnote 3 on p. 77 above.

⁵ S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Upadeśasāhasrī', op. cit.; 'The Authenticity of the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya', op. cit.; 'On Śaṅkara's Authorship of the Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya', op. cit.

In addition to the above terms I have also compared the quotations in the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* with those in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. This comparison has also resulted in confirmation of the identity of the authors of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* and the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, who commonly pay the highest regard to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* and quote most frequently the *Bhagavadgītā* among the non-Vedic texts.¹ There is

¹ In each *prakaraṇa* of the *GKBh* the following sources are quoted in the following frequency:

Sources	I	II	III	IV	Total
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.	22	18	17	5	62
Chāndogya Up.	14	5	17	1	37
GK	3	1	7	8	19
Muṇḍaka Up.	5	2	6	1	14
Taittirīya Up.	4	0	5	1	10
Bhagavadgītā	4	2	0	1	7
Kaṭha Up.	1	1	3	0	5
Īśa Up.	1	0	2	1	4
Kena Up.	1	0	2	0	3
Praśna Up.	3	0	0	0	3
Rg-veda	1	0	1	0	2
MU	2	0	0	0	2
Mahānārāyaṇa Up.	1	0	0	0	1
Manusmṛti	0	1	0	0	1
Śvetāśvatara Up.	1	0	0	0	1
Mahābhārata	0	0	0	1	1
Yajurveda (= Taittirīya Ā.)	0	0	1	0	1
Dravidācārya (?)	0	0	1	0	1
Undetermined	3	3	0	0	6
Total	66	33	62	19	180

For a detailed discussion about quotations, see S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the Upadeśasāhasrī', op. cit., p. 187-8.

no quotation from a source which Śaṅkara is not supposed to cite in his generally accepted works.¹

It is to be noted here that Śaṅkara does not quote the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* at all nor even refer to it in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and other works.² But Sureśvara

¹ The sources of the two quotations, (i) *sarvabhūtāni cātmani* (*GKBh* I. 3, p. 16) and (ii) *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati* (*GKBh* III. 13, p. 118) may be taken as *Kaivalya Up.* 10 and *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya Up.* 8 which Śaṅkara never quotes in his *BSBh*. But *Kaivalya Up.* 10 agrees with *Manusmṛti* XII. 91 and with *Bhagavadgītā* VI. 29. In the table of footnote 1 on p. 80 above, I have treated it as a quotation from the *Bhagavadgītā*. As for the second quotation, it can be regarded as quoted from *Kaṭha Up.* IV. 10. A problem of this kind is a quotation as found in *GKBh* II. 32, p. 91: *brahmaivedaṃ sarvam*. As far as I have investigated the same sentence occurs only in the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya Up.* (VII. 3). But I would think that this is quoted from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* This quotation must have originally been *brahmedaṃ sarvam* which occurs in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* II. 5. 1, since all the five other quotations that are put together to establish the unreality of the dual come from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* or the *Chāndogya Up.* Furthermore, there is a possibility that *brahmedaṃ sarvam* was assimilated to *ātmaivedaṃ sarvam* (*Chāndogya Up.* VII. 25. 2) which occurs right before the quotation in question. A similar case of assimilation can be pointed out in the previous page (*GKBh* II. 31, p. 90). Here *ātmaivedaṃ agra āsīt* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* I. 4. 1 or 17) comes just before *brahmaivedaṃ agra āsīt* which should be *brahma vā idam agra āsīt* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* I. 4. 10 or 11). As for the *Vyāsaśmṛti*, see footnote 3 on p. 77 above.

² Cf. A. Venkatasubbiah, 'The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and Gauḍapāda', *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 62 (1933), pt. DCCLXXII, pp. 185-6. From the fact that Śaṅkara has nowhere quoted the *MU*, even where it could serve his purpose, for example, in commenting on *Chāndogya Up.* II. 23. 3, V. Bhattacharya infers that the *MU* itself was not written before or even in the time of

quotes *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 6 as a ' *Māṇḍūkeyaśrutivacas* ' in his work.¹ The author of the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, which I have mentioned as not authentic, quotes from, and refers to, the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*.² Ānandajñāna, the commentator on the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*, regards the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* as *śruti*.³ If silence about the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* may be taken as a criterion of authenticity, the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* may be said to be supported by this criterion as well. It is strange but true that the commentator of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* keeps totally silent about the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, even while commenting on its twelve prose sentences. Of course he has to cite it to interpret it, but he does so as if it were a part of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*. In the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* he calls himself *prakaraṇavyācīkhyāsu* or 'he who wishes to explain the *prakaraṇa*' and describes the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* as opening with the prose sentence which forms the first sentence of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*.⁴

Śaṅkara. See his article, 'Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads', op. cit., p. 104. This theory has been rejected by H. Nakamura in his *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 536-9. See footnote 1 on p. 73 above.

¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 16), III. 8. 26, p. 1294.

² *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 308 and p. 309.

³ He calls the text ' *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* ' (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 10, p. 2) and ' *śruti* ' (ibid., p. 12, etc.).

⁴ *Vedāntārthasārasaṃgrahabhūtam idaṃ prakaraṇacatuṣṭayāṃ om ity etad akṣaram ityādy ārabhyate. ata eva na prthak saṃbandhābhidheya-prayojanāni vaktavyāni. . . . tathāpi prakaraṇavyācīkhyāsuṇā saṃkṣepato*

As far as the terms and quotations are concerned, no evidence against the authorship of Śaṅkara has been discovered in the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*. The above examination has resulted in affirming that the author of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* is identical with Śaṅkara, the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. However, the evidence to the contrary which has so far been pointed out by other scholars must also be considered.

As far as I have seen, the following four points seem to form the ground of all arguments against the authenticity of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*:

1. In his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* Śaṅkara shows adequate knowledge of Buddhism whereas the author of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* does not seem

vaktavyāni, GKBh, Introduction, p. 5. In the BSBh Śaṅkara quotes twice the GK as the words of *saṃpradāyavid* (BSBh I. 4. 14, p. 320) or *vedāntārthasaṃpradāyavid ācārya* (BSBh II. 1. 9, p. 365) without mentioning its author's name directly. In the GKBh the commentator regards the work as *vedāntārthasārasaṃgraha* (see the above quotation) but he does not refer to its author at all. In one of the *maṅgalācaraṇa-s* (p. 223) the commentator salutes *paramaguru* without explaining who he is and whether or not he is the author of the GK. It may be safely said that his attitude towards the GK and its author is very similar to that of Śaṅkara. But Sureśvara attributes it to Gauḍapāda. See *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*, op. cit., I. 4. 389, p. 510; *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, IV. 44. Ānandajñāna, commentator of the GKBh, also attributes it to Gauḍapāda (p. 2) whereas Ānandajñāna who wrote a commentary on Sureśvara's above-mentioned *Vārttika* considers the first *prakaraṇa* of the GK to be *śruti* (I.4. 615, p. 556; I.4. 744, p. 582). It is of interest that the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (405) which is traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara quotes GK I.7. as *śruti*. The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*

to know Buddhism so well, since he often interprets many Buddhist terms in the *Gauḍapādīya-kārikā* pointlessly and inadequately.¹

2. In order to express important Vedānta concepts, the author of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* uses Buddhist technical terms which are used neither in the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* nor in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. For example, the highest *ātman* is called *viññapti*, the nature of *ātman* is described as *viññaptimātra*, and *brahman* is identified with *jñaptimātra* in the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*. Moreover, instead of the Vedāntic term *advaita* the commentator uses *advaya* which is originally a Buddhist term.²
3. There are several cases of interpretation which do not look like Śaṅkara's.³ For example,

cannot be regarded as authentic for several reasons. See H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., p. 549; S. Mayeda, 'Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī: Its Present Form', *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, vol. 15, Baroda (1966), no. 3-4, p. 252, n. 3. Rāmānuja and Madhva also regard the first *prakaraṇa* of the *GK* as *śruti*. See H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 534 ff.

¹ H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 528-9.

² H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 529-30. *Viññapti*, *GKBh* III. 29, p. 139; *viññaptimātra*, *GKBh* II. 17, p. 81; IV. 60, p. 196; *jñaptimātra*, *GKBh* III. 33, p. 141; *advaya*, *GKBh*, Introduction, p. 9; II. 33, p. 95; II. 34, p. 97; II. 36, p. 99; III. 1, p. 103; III. 11, p. 115; III. 17, p. 125; III. 19, p. 128; III. 27, p. 137; III. 30, p. 140; III. 35, p. 144; etc.

³ The instances which have so far been noticed by scholars are as follows:

asparśayoga is not mentioned at all in the Upaniṣad-s. Nevertheless the commentator of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* asserts that *asparśayoga* is well known in the Upaniṣad-s. Śaṅkara who

i. The commentator reads *GK* IV. 4c as *vivadanto dvayā hy*, interpreting *dvayāḥ* as *dvaitinaḥ*. V. Bhattacharya who adopts the reading *vivadanto 'dvayā hy* maintains that Śaṅkara 'can never explain the verse in that way and so he cannot be identified with' the commentator of the *MU* and the *GK* (see 'The Gauḍapāda-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad', op. cit., p. 454, n. 1). It seems to me that the commentator's reading is better than Bhattacharya's. The stanza means that, while disputing among themselves, Dvaitin-s tend to establish *ajāti* unknowingly. This is the reason why 'we (*vayam*) do not quarrel with' those Dvaitin-s (*GK* IV. 5). See H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 419-20 and pp. 682-8; Nikhilānanda, *The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary* (Mysore, Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955), pp. 217-19 and p. 219, n. 1.

ii. According to V. Bhattacharya, *rogārtasyeva roganivṛttau svasthatā, tathā duḥkhātmakasyātmano dvaitaprapaṇcōpaśame svasthatā; advaitabhāvaḥ prayojanam* (*GKBh*, Introduction, p. 6) cannot be regarded as Śaṅkara's words, since in Vedānta, especially in Śaṅkara's philosophy *ātman* is *ānandamaya* or *ānandasvarūpa* and never *duḥkhātmaka* (see 'Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads', op. cit., p. 104). This is not acceptable. If the commentator says *ānandamayasya* (or *ānandasvarūpasya*) *ātmanaḥ* here, it is not like Śaṅkara's expression. See this paper, p. 77 above and footnotes 1 and 2. Furthermore, the commentator does not say here that the *svasthatā* of *ātman* is *duḥkha* but that it is *advaitabhāva*.

iii. Without giving any reasons Bhattacharya says that 'the explanation of the word *sarvaduḥkhānām* in the Kārikā I. 10 as *prājñataiḥ saṁśayakṣaṇānām* in the commentary would never emanate from Śaṅkara' (ibid., pp. 104-5) and that 'it is utterly strange for Śaṅkara to define his *paramārthatattva* as beyond the four points, viz. "sat, asat, and sadasat"' (ibid., p. 105). Neither

was versed in the Upaniṣad-s could not have said so.¹

4. The *Gauḍapāḍīyabhāṣya* begins and ends with benedictory stanzas, although benedictory stanzas are generally seen in comparatively modern works. Furthermore, one of the benedictory stanzas is defective in its metre and another contains grammatical inaccuracies.²

of them is acceptable. See *Upad* X; XV. 20-33; XVI. 18; XVII. 24; 25; 65; and *Upad* XIII. 20; XVI. 32-5; XIX. 13-25.

iv. Bhattacharya considers the commentator's explanations of *GK* II. 37 and III. 25 to be impossible for Śaṅkara (see *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, op. cit., p. xxxiii, n. 3), but I do not see any un-Śaṅkaran characteristics here.

v. Bhattacharya points out the difference of the commentator from the author of the *Īsopaniṣadbhāṣya* in interpretation of *sambhūti* (*GKBh* III. 25 and *Īsopaniṣadbhāṣya* 12) (see *ibid.*). We know that Śaṅkara is comparatively flexible in interpretation and that the *Padabhāṣya* and the *Vākyabhāṣya* which are both authentic show clearly difference in interpretation on one and the same text (see S. Mayeda, 'On Śaṅkara's Authorship of the *Kenopaniṣadbhāṣya*', op. cit., pp. 34-5). As T. R. Chintamani said, the commentator must have explained it as understood and set forth by the author of the *GK* (see 'Śaṅkara—The Commentator on the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikās*', op. cit., p. 424) or he must have followed a tradition of interpretation of the *GK*. Exegetical difference cannot be regarded as a strong evidence but doctrinal or philosophical difference should be seriously taken into consideration.

¹ V. Bhattacharya, 'The *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*', op. cit., p. 444, n. 4.

² V. Bhattacharya, 'Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Upaniṣads*', op. cit., p. 103. Chintamani tried to defend in his article (op. cit., pp. 423-4).

If the *Gauḍapāḍīyabhāṣya* be viewed as an authentic work of Śaṅkara, how can these points be explained? It seems to me that the first three problems are closely related with one another, since they are all concerned with the commentator's philosophical standpoint and his principle of interpretation based upon it.

Modern scholarship has revealed the fact that the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* is a work greatly influenced by Buddhism; each succeeding *prakaraṇa* of the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* is more Buddhistic than that preceding it.¹ It seems to me that the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* and the four *prakaraṇa-s* of the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* represent five stages of increasing Buddhist influence upon the Vedānta tradition. The fourth *prakaraṇa*, which constitutes nearly half of the whole text, may well be regarded as a Buddhist text.² However, the author of the *Gauḍapāḍīyabhāṣya* regards the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* as a compendium of the essence of the purport of the Upaniṣad-s (*vedāntārthasārasaṃgraha*).³ According to him the objective of the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* is the realization of the state of non-duality (*advaitabhāva*), i.e. the realization of the natural state of *ātman* (*svasthātā*) and the *Gauḍapāḍīyakārikā* was meant to reveal the knowledge of *brahman*.⁴ In other words the author intends to interpret it consistently from the Advaita point of view.

¹ H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 562-89.

² *ibid.*, p. 587.

³ See footnote 4 on p. 82 above.

⁴ *GKBh*, Introduction, p. 6.

What he had to do here was to give to the *Gauḍapādiya-kārikā*, an extremely Buddhistic text, an Advaitic character. The composition of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* may have been an epoch-making event in the history of the Vedānta. It may be said that the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* stood at a turning point in the Vedānta tradition which until then had been becoming more and more Buddhistic.

It is not easy to judge how far the author of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya* was acquainted with Buddhism but he appears to have had a comparatively profound knowledge of it. Let us take one instance. The term *dharma* in the *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* IV is no doubt used in a Buddhist sense, i.e. 'a thing' or 'an object of knowledge'.¹ However, the commentator explains it as *ātman*.² He sometimes does not interpret it.³ This fact probably does not indicate ignorance of the Buddhist usage of the term, but rather an intentional misinterpretation by the author so as to give the text an Advaitic character. This understanding of the text seems to be supported by the fact that the author fails to interpret the text in that way in some cases where the context compels him to accept the Buddhist meaning

¹ V. Bhattacharya, 'The Gauḍapāda-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad', op. cit., p. 442 and H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 507-8.

² *GKBh* IV. 1, p. 156; 10, p. 162; 46, p. 189; 53, p. 193; 81, p. 207; 91, p. 215; 92, p. 215; 96, p. 218; 99, p. 220. The commentator interprets *dharma* as *sādhaka* in *GKBh* III. 1, p. 103.

³ *GKBh* IV. 6; 8; 21; 33; 98.

of the term *dharma*.¹ For example, when he comments on *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* IV. 21, he interprets *dharmān* as *hastyādīn dharmān*. He again interprets *dharma* in *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* IV. 54 and IV. 82 as *bāhyadharmā* and *dvayavastu* respectively. It is of interest that when he comments on the term *dharma* in stanza *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* IV. 99, where it occurs twice, he interprets the first occurrence as meaning *viśayāntara* and the second as *ātman* in the plural. Here he takes the first one in the Buddhist sense and the second in his own peculiar sense. By doing so and at the same time by giving a similar intentional misinterpretation to the Buddhist term *buddha*, which also occurs twice in the same stanza, he managed to interpret the whole stanza *Gauḍapādiyakārikā* IV. 99 as refuting Buddhism, although in fact this concluding stanza simply states Buddhistic thought.² It is significant that the term *dharma* in *Kaṭha Up.* I. 21 and IV. 14 is also interpreted as *ātman* in Śaṅkara's commentary on it. It is said that the *Kaṭha Up.* is more or less influenced by Buddhism and the term here is to be understood in the Buddhist sense.³ Further, it is certain that Śaṅkara knew the Buddhist

¹ Cf. V. Bhattacharya, 'The Gauḍapāda-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad', op. cit., p. 442; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., p. 508.

² As for the interpretation of this stanza, see V. Bhattacharya, 'Gauḍapāda', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 14 (1938), pp. 392-7; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta Tetsugaku no Hatten*, op. cit., pp. 499-503.

³ H. Nakamura, *Shōki no Vedānta Tetsugaku* (=Early Vedānta Philosophy) (Tokyo, Iwanami, 1950), pp. 25-37.

concept of *dharma*, for in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* he uses it in the Buddhist sense when he wishes to refute a Buddhist tenet.¹ There are additional instances of such intentional misinterpretation in the *Gauḍapādīya-bhāṣya*.² It seems to me that the commentator's knowledge of Buddhism enabled him to carry out his intention of giving the text an Advaitic character.

In the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* Śaṅkara's knowledge of Buddhism is openly utilized to attack Buddhist doctrines since the *Brahmasūtra* itself presents them as something to be refuted.³ His effort in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is not to make Buddhist doctrines Advaita doctrines, but to give the Vedānta doctrine of the *Brahmasūtra*, which is in the line of *bhedābheda-vāda*,⁴ an Advaita character. Consequently, in comparison with the commentaries of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara's commentary is far removed from the original meaning of the *Brahmasūtra* especially in his interpretation of *sūtra*-s which are concerned with the relationship between *brahman* and *ātman*.⁵ On the other hand, in

¹ *kṣaṇikam hi tad atyarthaṃ dharmamātram nīrantaram |*

sādhyaḥ dīpavat taddhis tacchāntiḥ puruṣārthatā || Upad II. 16. 23.

Rāmatīrtha, a commentator of the *Upad*, interprets *dharmamātra* as *vastumātra*.

² See, for example, the commentator's interpretation of *sambuddha* (GK IV. 1), *dvīpadām vara* (GK IV. 1), *citta* (GK IV. 72), *bhagavat* (GK IV. 82 and 84) and *agrayāṇa* (GK IV. 90).

³ *Brahmasūtra*, II. 2. 18-32.

⁴ H. Nakamura, *Brahmasūtra no Tetsugaku* (=Philosophy of the *Brahmasūtra*) (Tokyo, Iwanami, 1951), pp. 447-51.

⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 381-94.

the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*, the commentator's knowledge of Buddhism is tacitly used to transmute Buddhist doctrine into Advaitism; for Buddhist doctrines in the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* are not points to be refuted but constitute an essential part of the text and at least in the case of the fourth *prakaraṇa* almost the whole of it, and therefore the commentator himself has to admit similarity between Buddhism and the Advaitism of the *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*.¹ The tendency to give the original text an Advaita character appears also in Śaṅkara's *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* especially when he 'advaitinizes', i.e. illusionizes, realistic Sāṃkhyan elements in the *Bhagavadgītā*.² The commentator's inclination to give non-Advaitic ideas an Advaitic character, which appears frequently in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*-s, has possibly led some modern scholars to criticize the author of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* as explaining away obvious references to Buddhism³ or as lacking knowledge of Buddhism comparable to that which the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* had.⁴

¹ *Jñānājñeyajñātrbhedarahitam paramārthatattvam advāyam etan na buddheṇa bhāṣitam. yady api bāhyārthanirākaraṇam jñānamātrakalpanā cādvayavastusāmīpyam uktam. idam tu paramārthatattvam advaitam vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam ity arthaḥ, GKBh IV. 99, p. 220.*

² Cf. S. Mayeda, 'The Authenticity of the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*', *op. cit.*, pp. 178-83 and pp. 194-7.

³ See S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II (New York, Macmillan, 1958), p. 465, n. 2; S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 424, n. 1.

⁴ See footnote 1 on p. 84 above.

However, anyone strict in the usage of words would hardly make such an attempt to give an Advaitic character to non-Advaitic concepts. Besides his tendency to 'advaitinize' ideas and his familiarity with Buddhism, the author, like Śaṅkara, was flexible in usage of terms, and so he used some Buddhist technical terms such as *viññapti*, *viññaptimātra* and *jñaptimātra* in the Advaita sense. It should be noted here that in one place in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* Śaṅkara uses the term *jñapti* in the Advaita sense, i.e. *caitanya* or *ātman*, and in the Buddhist sense in another place, and in another place he asserts that the term *jñapti* is not applicable to *ātman*¹; in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* he also uses the originally Buddhist term *advaya* far more frequently than *advaita*.²

'Advaitinization' manifests itself not only in intentional misinterpretation of Buddhist and other non-Advaitic tenets but also in ascribing authority for such misinterpretations to the *śruti*-s, especially the Upaniṣad-s. The commentator quotes the Upaniṣad-s several times in support of his interpretation of the

¹ In *Upad* II. 15. 15 Śaṅkara uses *jñapti* in the sense of *caitanya* or *ātman* (*kham iṣaikaśā jñaptir avibhaktājarāmālā*). But when he attacks the Bāhyārthavādin-s, he seems to use the term in a Buddhist sense and to treat it as a synonym of *dhi*, i.e. *buddhi* in *Upad* II. 16. 25. Furthermore, in *Upad* II. 18. 55 Śaṅkara asserts that the term *jñapti* is not applicable to *ātman*, since it indicates 'becoming' (*bhāva*).

² The term *advaita* is used only twice (*Upad* II. 16. 33; *advaitabhāva*, *Upad* I. 2. 109) whereas *advaya* occurs 35 times (*Upad* II. 9. 3; 10. 1; 10. 3; 10. 7; 10. 8; 10. 9; 10. 11; 10. 12; etc.).

fourth *prakaraṇa* of the *Gauḍapādiyakārikā*, a text which has hardly anything to do with the Upaniṣad-s. The above-mentioned instance of *asparśayoga*, which the commentator interprets as *advaitadarśanayoga*, which is of the nature of *brahman* (*brahmasvabhāva*),¹ may be a case of falsely finding authority in the Upaniṣad-s. An instance of such false ascription of authority appears in another work by Śaṅkara: in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* Śaṅkara asserts that the idea of *ābhāsa* or 'reflection' of *ātman* is supported by the *śruti*-s and so on, although it is in fact not mentioned at all in the *śruti*-s.

As for the existence of benedictory stanzas in the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya*, it may suffice to say that the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* and the *Upadeśasāhasrī* also have benedictory stanzas. As for the metrical and grammatical defects, these have been pointed out only in two of the five benedictory stanzas and none in the text itself. There is no critical edition of the *Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya*. My experience in editing the *Upadeśasāhasrī* tells me that defects of this kind cannot be strong

¹ *adhunādvaitadarśanayogasya namaskāras tatstutaye. sparśanam sparśaḥ sambandho na vidyate yasya yogasya kenacid kadācid api so 'asparśayogo' brahmasvabhāva eva 'vai nāma' iti brahmadevān asparśayoga ity evaṃ prasiddha ityarthah, GKBh* IV. 2, p. 158. It may be of interest to note that *asparśayoga* is similar to *parisaṃkhyāna* which is described in *Upad* I. 3. Chintamani takes *asparśayoga* as a non-technical term. According to him, the commentator wishes to say that 'the idea conveyed by the phrase *asparśayoga* is to be often met with in the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā*' (see 'Śaṅkara—The Commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās', op. cit., pp. 421-2).

evidence, since manuscripts of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* have revealed a good number of variant readings and structural differences; one group of manuscripts lacks one of the benedictory stanzas.¹

No convincing testimony has so far been discovered to defend the authenticity of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*. This has been the weakest point on the side of scholars who support Śaṅkara's authorship of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*. But we now have positive evidence obtained from comparing the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* with the *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya* in regard to certain critical terms and quotations. And the evidence against Śaṅkara's authorship which I have discussed above seems capable of being explained. At the present stage of research we may be allowed to conclude that the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* including the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣadbhāṣya* is one of Śaṅkara's genuine works.

¹ Cf. Variant readings given in *The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkarācārya, Critically Edited with Introduction* (University of Pennsylvania dissertation) (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1961) pp. 244-93. For example, the manuscripts of the *Upad* accompanied by Bodhanidhi's commentary lack stanzas XVIII. 230-3, the last of which is a benedictory stanza.

D. MACKENZIE BROWN

SOME MODERN VIEWS OF THE *MANUSAMHITĀ*

THE Code of Manu epitomizes Indian classical tradition. It embraces substantially all aspects of human life and society: Government, Economics, Sociology, Religion, Ethics, Penology, Cosmology. The laws were sacred. Individual behaviour was imbued with a transcendent character, an existential purposiveness related to an underlying religious scheme. In modern times, the Code has been questioned, denounced, praised or reinterpreted in different historical contexts and by individuals with divergent interests, viewpoints and prejudices. These opinions are significant indicators of modern reaction to the traditional values of Hindu civilization and constitute one aspect of the intricate intellectual struggle arising out of the contact between European and Indian cultures.

We may note three basic reactions. 1. Missionaries and some officials tended to be shocked at the 'idolatry' and Brahmanism and despotism expressed in the Code and considered India an unparalleled opportunity for improving the souls, morals and living standards of native peoples. 2. Certain Orientalists and Hinduphiles saw in Manu and Indian religion and society the answer to a decadent Christianity and a materialistic Europe. 3. Among Western educated Indians, various democratizers and reformers accepted

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
Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Volumes XLVIII & XLIX 1968

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IX. 3-4). Sporadic references are found also in other Vedic texts.¹ Suffice it to mention here the relevant passages in the Gṛhyasūtras : Kauśika-S. 93-136 : W. p. 344-413; Āśvalāyana-GS. III. 6. 5-7, III. 7. 7, III. 10. 9-10; Śaṅkhāyana-GS. V. 5. 1-13, V. 8. 1-6, V. 10. 1-4, V. 11. 1-2; Baudhāyana-GS. III. 6, III. 8. 5-6, III. 9. 2-3, IV. 2. 6-3. 9; Bhāradvāja-GS. II. 30-32; Āpastamba-GS. VIII. 23. 9-10; Hiranyakeśi-GS. I. 16. 2-17. 6; Āgniveśya-GS. II. 5 : p. 79. 1-6 (: Baudh.-GS. III. 6), II. 8; Mānava-GS. II. 15, II. 17 (: Kāthaka-GS. LVI. 1-3); Pāraskara-GS. III. 15. 17-20; Gobhila-GS. III. 3. 32-36 (34-36 : Khādīra-GS. II. 5. 35-37 or Drāhyāyana-GS. II. 5. 42-44); Jaimini-GS. II. 7.

Further I should like to point out the fact that some of the adbhutas are reckoned as grounds for stopping Vedic studies.² The following are the chief passages prescribing the anadhyāya in the Smārta-Sūtras : Āśv. -GS. IV. 4. 17-27; Śaṅkh. -GS. IV. 7, VI. 1. 3-2. 2, cf. IV. 5. 17; Mān. -GS. I. 4. 6, 10-18; Vārāha-GS. VIII. 6, VIII. 9-11; Kāth. -GS. IX. 5-9; Pār. GS. II. 11. 1-9, cf. II. 10. 23, II. 12. 4; Gobh. -GS. III. 3. 9-29; Khād. -GS. III. 2. 23-31 or Drāh. -GS. III. 2. 21-29; Jaim. -GS. I. 14. p. 14. 16-17; Baudh. -DhS. I. 21. 4-22; Āp. -DhS. I. 9. 6-11. 38, I. 12. 3-13; Vaikhānasa-DhS. II. 11 : p. 129. 2-8, 12 : p. 129. 9-14; Vāsiṣṭha-DhS. XIII. 8-40, XVIII. 12-13, XXIII. 36; Gautama-DhS. I. 58-61, XVI. 5-49; cf. also Manu-Smṛti IV. 99, 101-127; Yājñavalkya-Sm. I. 144-151; Viṣṇu-Sm. XXX. 4-31; etc. So it is evident that Vedic scholars too cannot be indifferent to the problem of adbhutas.

GAUḌAPĀDA AND ŚAṆKARA:

(A Study in Contrast)*

BY

A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER

The author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* has been respectfully referred to, twice,¹ by the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* as *saṃpradāyavidāḥ*, and *Vedāntārthasaṃpradāyavidāḥ ācāryāḥ*. This simple fact may set up a presumption that, in fact, both these celebrated masters of Advaita have taught the same kind of Advaita. Indeed, several modern exponents of Advaita have said as much in so many words. For instance Prof. T. R. V. MURTI affirms :² "Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara revolutionized the Vedānta thought by establishing nondualism dialectically; they characterize phenomena as false appearance (*māyā*) and formulate the doctrine of three truths and two texts." Again, elsewhere,³ he notes : "It was left to Gauḍapāda and his illustrious successor Śaṅkara to revolutionize Vedānta by introducing the theory of appearance (*vivarta*)." In a similar vein, Dr. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN also has recorded his conviction that both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are advocates of the same type of Advaita.⁴ I propose in this paper to contrast, in one important respect, the philosophical system adumbrated in the *GPK* with that elaborated by Śaṅkara and show that the differences between the two have far-reaching consequences. Gauḍapāda is mainly interested in delineating the nature of the real and, therefore, consistently with it, shows little concern for the life of man in the world. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, develops a system of thought whose immense sweep and flexible structure provide for the development of all enlightened human interests.

The most vital philosophical difference between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is that whereas the former affirms only the immutable Absolute rejecting all else as illusory,⁵ the latter has, with a more penetrating and compre-

* The List of Abbreviations is given at the end.

1. *BSB*, I. 4. 14; 2. I. 9. 2. *HPEW*, i. p. 213. 3. *CPB*, p. 56.

4. G. p. 240; Śrī SACCHIDĀNANDASARASVATĪ, the author of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*; Mysore, 1958, advances arguments to show that the authors of the *BSB* and *GPK* are one; pp. 6 ff.

5. Some writers do not distinguish between the illusory and the phenomenal. For instance, Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN says on p. 273 of *HPEW*, i, that the Vaitathya-prakāraṇa in *GPK* explains the phenomenal nature of the world; on the same page he also notes as Gauḍapāda's view that the multiplicity of the world is like the illusion of a circle of fire when a firebrand is whirled quickly. Similarly in *STK*, Dr. DEVARAJA refers to the world as illusory or phenomenal, and in *AV* Sri Venkatarama IYER, too, does the same (p. 48). In this paper, illusory is used to denote the *prātibhāsika*, empirical to denote *vyāvahārika*, and the transphenomenal to denote *pāramārthika*.

1. For details see my annotated Japanese translation of the AdB., Annual of the Suzuki Res. Found. No. 1 (1965), p. 40-45.

2. Cf. HILLEBRANDT, *Ritualliteratur*, p. 59-60; P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, II. 1 (1941), p. 393-402; see also K. p. 11, p. 32 : earthquake, p. 49 : meteor, p. 57 : thunder, lightning, p. 62 end : whirlwind, p. 76 end : halo of the sun or moon, p. 82 : various cries and sounds, p. 102 : landslide.

hensive awareness of the complex problems of life, distinguished three orders or degrees of reality, viz., the illusory, the empirical, and the transphenomenal. Dr. MAHADEVAN seeks to minimise¹ the importance of these distinctions arguing that "there is only one truth, the *pāramārthika*, of which the *vyāvahārika* is a semblance or appearance." He proceeds to observe that a section of the same, i. e., the relative experience as a whole, having a "less degree of reality than the so-called normal waking life is the *prātibhāsika*." At the moment we may note that Gauḍapāda does not make even these rather fragile distinctions; but dismisses, instead, the totality of life, the sky and stars and the entire furniture of the mind, as so much dream stuff. He contends that there is total identity between dream cognitions and those of wakeful life—*svapnajāgaritasthāne hyekamāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ*.² His arguments in favour of this thesis have been exhibited as follows by JACOBI:³ Things seen in the waking state are not true—this is the *pratijñā*; because they are seen—this is the *hetu*; as things seen in a dream are not true, so the property of being seen belongs, in like manner, to things seen in the waking state—this is the *hetūpanaya*; therefore things seen in the waking state also are not true—this is the *nigamana*. The world exists only in the mind of man.⁴ It is not as though Gauḍapāda is unaware of any distinction between dream and waking experiences. For instance, he points out that the dream objects exist only so long as they are perceived, that their *esse* is *percipi*; whereas the objects cognized in the wakeful state are *dvayakāla*, or mutually determined.⁵ Nevertheless, he lumps both dream and waking objects together on the ground that they are all imagined alike—*kalpitāḥ eva te sarve*. This is dogmatic, if anything is, and is strongly reminiscent of the mentalism of the *Vijñānavādi* Buddhists.⁶

It may be remarked in passing that the crucial objection against the equation between waking and dream is based on the fact that the laws of waking life are so different from the lawlessness of dreams, and that man's ethical endeavour and religious values are bound up with his waking life. To this it is no answer to urge that "when the delusion of duality is dispelled the

1. G. p. 207 f. On the other hand, cf. pp. 48 ff of *AV*, and p. 118 of *MK*, and pp. 566 ff of *AS*.

2. *GPK*, 2. 5.

3. *JAOS*, xxxiii Part 1, April 1913.

4. *GPK*, 4. 47.

5. *GPK*, 2. 14. 'Mutually determined' means that the object and the subject, *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, refer to each other. Cf. *AS*, p. 24. But the commentator of *GPK* explains the phrase differently—*parasparaparicchedyaparicchedakatvaṃ bāhyānām bhedānām*.

6. *Sarvam cittadrśyamavastukam* — *GPK*, 4. 36.

so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be illusory;"¹ for the dispelling of the delusion in question is impossible without endowing waking life with more reality than that associated with dreams. Of course, religious *sādhana* is bound up with wakeful life; discrimination, purity, holiness² are values incapable of realization except through prolonged and systematic efforts³ in wakeful life. Therefore, obviously, it is illogical to take for granted a position as yet unrealized and dismiss wakeful life and dream as equally illusory. This point may be made in yet another way. The relevant resemblance between wakeful life and dream is just in respect of their difference from *paramārtha*. This cannot make them equal any more than the common difference, say, from the buffalo, makes a horse and bull equal in all respects. "The empirical difference between waking and dream is not denied by Gauḍapāda," urges Dr. MAHADEVAN,⁴ but the affirmation '*svapnajāgarite.. ekam*'⁵ clearly proves the contrary. Indeed, the entire second chapter entitled *vaitathya* establishes the fact that for Gauḍapāda dream and phenomena of wakeful life are equally false. This unmistakable penchant of Gauḍapāda for blurring the vital distinctions between dream and waking has correctly led several thinkers to dub him a subjectivist.⁶

In sharp contrast Śaṅkara repudiates the contention that the waking experiences are on a par with those of the dream state. "There⁷ are", he maintains, "external objects apart from their ideas in the mind of the percipient, because such objects are experienced. Denial of the objects of cognitions is inadmissible. A man while enjoying a hearty dinner may as well deny both the act and the satisfaction born of it." The contention that a cognition has no objective correlate⁸ provokes Śaṅkara to retort, *bādhamevaṃ bravīṣi niramkuṣatvāt te tuṇḍasya*.⁹ Common sense rightly distinguishes between a solid wall outside and the idea thereof within the mind; one is the object of the other. Were the experience of externality wholly baseless, how could the mentalist even talk of an apparent externality, *bahirvad*?¹⁰ "None compares

1. G, p. 124.

2. Cf. Śaṅkara's discussion of *Sādhana* in his comment on *BS*, I.1.1.

3. *YS*, I. 14 — *sa tu dīrghakālanairantaryasatkārāsevito dṛḍhabhūmiḥ*.

4. G. p. 125.

5. *GPK*, 2. 5.

6. Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN in *IP*, ii, p. 456; J. SINHA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 446.

7. *BSB*, II. 2. 28.

8. As GP asserts in *GPK*, 2. 9 — *dṛṣṭam vaitathyametaayoḥ*.

9. 'Indeed you speak thus as you have an unbridled tongue' — *BSB*, II. 2. 28.

10. *yāntarjñeyarūpāntadbahirvadavabhāsate / so'rtho vijñānarūpatvāt tatpratyayatayāpica //*

Diñnāga, *Ālambanaparīkṣā*,

Viṣnumitra to the son of a barren woman ! Philosophers, then, must build their systems of thought on the terra firma of human experience. They must needs concede the existence of objects presented in their respective cognitions. Thus is established the fact of the existence of external objects. To start, on the other hand, from the presumption of its impossibility is irrational." And, so on.¹

Now, this spirited assertion of the empirical reality of waking experiences is by no means an impulsive act on Śaṅkara's part; nor has it been dictated by the exigencies of dialectical controversy with the Bauddhas. It is the logical consequence of his deliberate philosophical construction, of the theory of *adhyāsa* or superimposition, with whose classical formulation his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* begins. Here we shall stress the following points :

(i) The starting point of Śaṅkara's philosophy is the recognition of *lokavyavahāra* or the sphere of empirical facts, and not its dismissal as mere dream stuff.

(ii) This implies that while, on the one hand, the superimposed rope-snake may be dismissed as illusory, the empirical world cannot be so treated.

(iii) Śaṅkara is, epistemologically, a realist. Even the rope-snake is not a mere idea in the mind of the percipient. It is presented to him, out there, as an inexplicable, *anirvacanīya*, object, and may be sublated only through the cognition of its empirically stable substrate, the rope.

(iv) Incomparably greater than the reality of the illusory snake is that of the empirical world whose stability is coterminous with the percipient's life in that world whose substrate is Brahman. Thus from an analysis of *adhyāsa*, as Śaṅkara has formulated² it, emerges his theory of the three-fold reality, the illusory, the empirical, and the transphenomenal.³ Whereas the illusory nature of the rope-snake is detected and sublated in the sphere of the empirical reality, the falsity or *mithyātva* of the world grounded in Brahman is, normally,⁴ not. It is this circumstance that makes ethical and religious life both possible and necessary with a view to realizing the non-dual world-ground, and the cancellation of the empirical manifold. Such a

1. BSB, 2.2.28 & 29.

2. The *adhyāsa* in BSB.

3. The threefold reality in Śaṅkara's Philosophy may be distinguished from the three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas* of a thing, viz : *parikalpita*, *paratantra*, and *pariṇiṣpanna*, as worked out in the Mahāyāna. These refer to the way one chooses to regard any given object, either as purely imagined by the mind or imagined with reference to its imaginary causes, too, or as totally devoid of all characteristics, as 'śūnya.' Cf. AS, pp. 176, 177, and 178.

4. BG, VII. 3.

procedure implies that the criterion of reality in Advaita is *abādhyatā* or unsublatability.¹ The illusory situation or *adhyāsa* provides² the key to unlock the mystery of life. We arrive at the insight that as the illusory reality of the rope-snake is to the empirical reality of the rope, so is the empirical reality of the entire world to the transphenomenal reality of its ground or Brahman; that the empirical reality is a mean proportional between the illusory reality and the transphenomenal reality.³ Once this insight is securely held and acted upon, there unfold vistas of purposeful life as varied in its activities as rich in its contents. The most formidable objection against Gauḍapāda's philosophy is that such a possibility is altogether excluded by its dogmatic identification of wakeful life and dream.

Dr. RADHAKRISHNAN states the objection to Gauḍapāda forcefully, thus : " The caustic critic may observe that a theory which has nothing better to say than that an unreal soul is trying to escape from an unreal bondage in an unreal world to accomplish an unreal supreme good may itself be an unreality." ⁴ Swami NIKHILANANDA makes an ineffectual protest⁵ against this criticism pleading that the distinction Śaṅkara makes between the waking and dream states is from the empirical standpoint. Of course, this is the case. Once the Advaitic Absolute is realized, i. e., from the transphenomenal point of view, no distinction is possible or necessary. Then one is *kṛtakṛtya*. Life as we know it is lived mainly on the empirical level, and its problems, ethical and religious, are to be tackled and solved there. The objection, irrefutable as we see it, against Gauḍapāda is that, due to his refusal to draw a line between waking and dream, he rules out the very possibility of purposeful life. In its exclusive preoccupation with the transphenomenal reality, his Advaita ceases to cater to the life of man here below, a life that he dismisses as no better than a dream.

A later Advaitic sage has, with remarkable perspicacity, observed that the world-illusion or *māyā*, whence emancipation is sought, may be viewed from three points of view :—

tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavi cetyasau tridhā |
*māyā jñeyā tribhirbodhaiḥ śrautayauktikalaukikaiḥ ||*⁶

The process of lifting the last mentioned awareness, *bodha*, for which the world of plurality or *māyā* alone is real, to the level of the first, where it

1. AS, p. 50 : *trikālābādhyatvarūpaṃ sattvam*.

2. P. T. RAJU, *Idealist Thought of India*, pp. 100 ff.

3. *ekameva hi paramārthasatyam brahma : vyavahāraviśayaṃ āpekṣikam satyam mṛgatṛṣṇikādyanṛtāpekṣayodakādi satyamuchyate*. TUB, 2. 6.

4. IP, ii, p. 463 ; GPK, II. 32.

5. The *MāU* with GPK and Śaṅkara's Commentary, pp. xxvii ff (Mysore, 1944).

6. PD, VI, 130.

vanishes altogether and transphenomenal Real alone abides, has to be accomplished in time, in the sphere of empirical reality. Dubbing life a dream hardly helps.¹ As a philosopher, Śaṅkara's achievement is that he furnished, through his scheme of three-fold reality, a wide framework for living a full life with Self-realization as its goal.² Thus fall into their proper perspective and order the Yogas, *karma*, *bhakti* and *jñāna*, which the aspirants, variously gifted, may pursue for their self-fulfilment. Only in the system of Śaṅkara will the words, *uttiṣṭhata*, *jāgrata*, *prāpya varānnibodhata*,³ make sense, "Arise from the dream, the blind wanderings that constitute the major part of worldly life, the life of the blind led by the blind."⁴ Having arisen, as Śaṅkara points⁵ out, one has to seek out competent guides from whom to learn. These activities, of course, fall within the sphere of empirical reality and not in that of dream. For, the Śruti proceeds to describe the path of the sādḥaka as "*kṣurasya dhārā...durgam pathas...*"⁶ Whereas Gauḍapāda declares with an air of finality:

*svapnamāye yathā dr̥ṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā /
tathā viśvamidam dr̥ṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ ||*⁷

Śaṅkara's world is one in which a vital distinction has to be made between the floating appearances of dream and the sterner stuff of wakeful life, whose sphere embraces arts and sciences, ethics and religion. In his commentary on *BSI*, 1. 4,⁸ Śaṅkara quotes with approval the idea that so long as man is embodied, the world in which he lives must be taken seriously and objectively.⁹ His world is an ordered whole endowed with a stable, knowable nature. This is proved by the fact that instead of treating it as a private illusory entity superimposed on Brahman, Śaṅkara makes Īśvara both the *nimitam* and *Upādānam* of the world.¹⁰ Further, this objective status of the world in Śaṅkara's philosophy makes it a potent means for reaching life's supreme goal. Being sustained by its divine ground, and transphenomenally

1. GP's distinctions regarding *adhikāra*, made in *GPK*, 3. 16, demand a three-fold reality that Śaṅkara's system provides.

2. Cf. *Yadi hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā asyātmano prajñānaghanāḥkhyam nirupādhiḥ rūpaṁ na pratikhyāyeta*; *BUB*, 2. 5. 19; *MK*, pp. 67, 68.

3. *KU*, 1. 3. 14.

4. *KU*, 1. 2. 5.

5. *KUB*, 1. 3. 14.

6. *KU*, 1. 3. 14.

7. *GPK*, II. 31.

8. *tattu samanvayāt*.

9. *pramāṇam tvātmanīśayāt*.

10. *BS*, I. 1. 2; I. 4. 23. Dr. MAHADEVAN's suggestion that GP contemplates an Īśvaraśr̥ṣṭivāda seems to have no basis in fact. How, in that case, could he have written Chapters II and IV of *GPK*?

non-different from it,¹ the world may reveal to the *sādhaka* a kingdom of ends which, eventually, culminate in the eternal values of truth, beauty, and goodness. The distance Śaṅkara has travelled in this respect from Gauḍapāda's position may be briefly indicated. From *GPK* we learn that the world is the erroneous construction of the divine *ātmā* through his own *māyā*; this suggests a *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda*² approach to the problem of reality. In Śaṅkara's philosophy, on the contrary, this is replaced by a *sr̥ṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi-vāda*, since the material and efficient cause of the world is Īśvara, as stressed earlier. Without such an objective status for the world, life in it must needs prove futile.

That the line of thought indicated above is no idle fancy, but a logical development of Śaṅkara's Advaita, built on the foundation of his three-fold reality, may be illustrated with reference to certain inspiring utterances of Swami VIVEKANANDA, the founder of the school of neo-Vedānta. He had occasion to make a typical affirmation like the following:³ "The great idea of the real and basic solidarity of the whole universe has frightened many even in this country... I tell you, nevertheless, that it is the one great life-giving idea which the whole world wants from us today and which the mute masses of India want for their uplifting; for none can regenerate this land of ours without the practical application and effective operation of this ideal of the oneness of things. One who should see God in every being; one whose heart would weep for the poor, for the weak, for the outcast, for the down-trodden, for everyone in this world, inside India or outside..." Empirical expression, in conduct, of the ethical force implicit in the idea and realization of spiritual unity is inconceivable without investing the world with a higher order of reality than dreams may claim.

In the light of the facts set forth above it is difficult to agree with the judgement that "doctrinally, there is no difference whatsoever between what is taught by Gauḍapāda in the *Kārikā* and what is expounded by Śaṅkara in his extensive works."⁴ No doubt these Ācāryas are at one in maintaining that the immutable Ātman is the supreme reality.⁵ On the other hand, the most outstanding difference between the two is the foundation of Śaṅkara's Advaita, viz., the *sattātrayavāda*, or the doctrine of three-fold reality, which is conspicuous by its absence in *GPK*. To hold, therefore, that Gauḍapāda was the model philosopher⁶ whom Śaṅkara set out to follow and that the

1. *BS*, II. 1. 14.

2. Cf. G. R. MALKANI, *MAV*, pp. 209 ff. for an account of *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda*.

3. *Complete Works*, III, pp. 188, 189, 267.

4. *G*, p. 240.

5. Cf. *GPK*, IV. 71: *etattaduttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiṁcinna jāyate ||*

6. *G*, p. 240.

two, together, revolutionized Vedāntic thought are not borne out by the facts. By virtue of his insights and genius, Śaṅkara constructed his philosophy on the foundation of the *sattātrayavāda* implicit in the major upaniṣads. An adequate consideration of the relevant facts makes this conclusion inescapable and irrefutable.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AS *The Agama Śāstra of GP. Ed. etc. by V. BHATTACHARYA.*
Calcutta, 1943.
- AS *Advaitasiddhi.* Bombay, 1937.
- AV *Advaita Vedānta.* M. K. Venkatarama IYER, Bombay, 1964.
- BG *Bhagavad-Gītā.*
- BS *Brahmasūtras.*
- BSB *Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam.*
- CPB *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.* T. R. V. MURTI.
London, 1960.
- G *Gauḍapāda, a study in Early Advaita.* T. M. P. MAHADEVAN.
Madras, 1960.
- GP *Gauḍapāda.*
- GPK *Gauḍapādakārikā.*
- GPKB *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* by Śaṅkara.
- HPEW. i. *History of Philosophy, Eastern & Western.* Vol. I.
London, 1957.
- IP. ii *Indian Philosophy.* Vol. II. S. RADHAKRISHNAN. London, 1962.
- JAOS *Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
- KU *Kāthopaniṣad.*
- KUB *Śaṅkara's comment on KU.*
- MāU *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad.*
- MAV *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta.* G. R. MALKANI.
Amalner, 1961.
- MK *Methods of Knowledge.* Swami SATPRAKASANANDA. London, 1965.
- PD *Pañcadaśī.*
- STK *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge.*
N. K. DEVARAJ. Banaras, 1962.
- TUB *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyam* of Śaṅkara.
- YS *Yogasūtras.*

A FORGOTTEN EPISODE IN THE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF BENGAL

BY

R. C. MAJUMDAR

I propose to discuss briefly a highly significant event that took place in Bengal between A. D. 1415 and 1418, but is generally unknown to, or ignored by, students of history. It is unnecessary to describe the various isolated data which were brought to our notice by different scholars over a period of more than forty years and have gradually been pieced together to form an authentic, fairly complete, and intelligible episode which throws very interesting light on the medieval history not only of Bengal but also of the whole of India.

The incident concerns a *zamindar* in Bengal who became very powerful during the Muslim rule and occupied the throne. It is a unique event and a reference is made to it in some Muslim chronicles of later date, like the history of Firishta and *Riyaz-us-Salatin*, composed, respectively, in the first decade of the 17th and the last decade of the 18th century. Firishta devotes only a few lines to this episode and simply says that a "*Zamindar* of the name of Kans made head against the Mahomedan power and succeeded in placing himself on the throne of Bengal and died after a reign of seven years."¹ We find a more circumstantial narrative in the *Riyaz-us-Salatin*,² which may be summed up as follows : After ascending the throne Rājā Kans, the Hindu *Zamindar*, planned to "extirpate Islam from his dominions" and "slew many of their learned and holy men." Thereupon the saint Nur Qutub-Alam invited Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi of Jaunpur to save Islam by removing Kans. A highly respected saint of the Jaunpur court also urged Sharqi to invade Bengal, and the latter thereupon marched with his army. Kans, being afraid, fell at the feet of the saint Nur Qutub-Alam, and asking for his forgiveness requested him to persuade Sharqi to retreat. The saint said : "so long as thou dost not embrace the Musalman religion, I cannot intercede for thee." Kans thereupon brought his son Jadu, 12 years old, to the saint, who then and there converted the latter to Islam, gave him the name Jalāl-ud-din, and declared him king. He then requested Sharqi Sultan to go back to Jaunpur, but the latter did not readily agree to do so. The saint thereupon 'cast angry glance towards the Sultan' and cursed him : "Before

1. BRIGGS, English Translation, IV, p. 336.

2. English Translation by Abdus SALAM, pp. 113 ff.

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Published by :

Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad
Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Hazratganj
Phone 23962

LUCKNOW (INDIA)

Printed by

Industrial Printing Works
273, Raniganj
Phone 26410

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JOURNAL
OF

Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad

Volume I

JULY 1969

No. 1



Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Hazratganj,
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GAUḌAPĀDA'S RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN BUDDHISM AND VEDĀNTA

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The Date and Works of Gauḍapāda.

One of the most important philosophical texts written in ancient India is the Āgamaśāstra,¹ often called Gauḍapādakārikā or Māṇḍūkyakārikā. It is attributed to Gauḍapāda, traditionally supposed to be the grand-teacher of Śaṅkarācārya (cir. 800 A. D.). It is possible that Gauḍapāda hailed from Bengal (Gauḍa), and the name seems to be an epithet rather than a personal name². Opinion is divided with regard to his date. The tradition, which makes him a grand-guru of the Advaita teacher Śaṅkara, would place him in cir. 800 A. D. as the latter is supposed to have been born in cir. 788 A. D.³ On the other hand, it has been pointed out that since some extracts resembling the verses of the Āgamaśāstra have been quoted in the Tibetan translation of the Tarkajvālā of Bhāvacviveka usually placed in cir. 500 A. D., Gauḍapāda can also be placed in the same century⁴. It may be pointed out here that Bhavya or Bhāvacviveka, the noted Svātantrika-Mādhyaṃika teacher, seems to have flourished in cir. 600 A. D. and was a contemporary of the Vijñānavāda teacher Dharmapāla (cir. 550-610 A. D.) of Nālandā⁵. We may place Gauḍapāda in the middle of the 6th century A. D. But we cannot be certain about the tradition that Śaṅkara was his direct pupil. To Gauḍapāda are ascribed, apart from the Āgamaśāstra, the following three works : Śaṅkhyakārikā-bhāṣya, Uttaragītā and the Subhagodayastuti. The authorship of these works, however, seems to be doubtful.

The text of the Āgamaśāstra is divided into four chapters (prakaraṇas) and consists of 215 memorial verses (kārikās). The work starts as a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad but assumes the form of an original treatise. Its first chapter elucidates the text of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad ; the second discusses the falsity (Vaitathya) of the phenomenal experience; the third chapter is on non-duality, while the fourth is captioned Alātaśānti, literally 'the extinction of the burning coal' or 'the quiescence of the fire-brand-circle', a well-known simile signifying the unreality of phenomenal diversity.

2. Different Theories of Interpretation of the Āgamaśāstra.

Dr. Walleser had pointed out that the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda bears considerable Mahāyāna Buddhist influence; Dr. V. Bhattacharya had discussed, with remarkable thoroughness, the Mahāyāna Buddhist contents in this text, and therefore in the classical Advaita Vedānta. But he was of the view that the IVth chapter, the Alātaśānti prakaraṇa, cannot be regarded as an integral part of the Āgamaśāstra. He even held that the four chapters of it "are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of Āgamaśāstra." The opinion is shared by Dr. T. R. V. Murti who remarks that the first three chapters are the works of "a keen Vedāntin" while the fourth chapter was "written most probably by a Buddhist"⁹. Dr. R. D. Karmakar seems to have taken great pains to show that all the four chapters of the treatise are from the pen of Gauḍapāda, and that there is no Buddhist influence in its contents, except the Buddhist phraseology⁹. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, however, held that "there is sufficient evidence in his kārīkās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha"¹⁰. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinatha Kavirāja seems to recognise the fact that Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamakaśāstra had influenced the thought of the Gauḍapādakārīkās¹¹.

In our humble opinion, there is no cogent reason to doubt that the 215 verses of the Āgamaśāstra are from the pen of a single author. If we assume that the fourth chapter is not an integral part of the Āgamaśāstra or that the four chapters are four independent texts from the pen of four different authors, we have to confront with such questions: Who is the author of the Alātaśānti prakaraṇa? Who are those authors of four independent treatises? Who put together the four chapters into one volume and why? These problems, says Dr. T. R. V. Murti, are "a matter of conjecture."¹² It is difficult to accept such a view. It is all the more difficult to appreciate those attempts that exclude the possibility of doctrinal borrowings from Buddhist thought by classical Vedāntists like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. "It is our contention", Dr. Murti asserts, "that there could not be acceptance of any doctrinal content by either side from the other as each had a totally different background of tradition and conception of reality". Realising, however, that "there is no difference between the Absolute of Vedānta and that of the Mādhyamika or Vijnānavāda," he is constrained to admit that "there has been borrowing of technique and not of tenets."¹³ This assertion cannot be maintained.

Hinduism borrowed freely from Buddhism, just as Mahāyānism borrowed from Paurāṇic Brahmanism. Vedic religion did not favour ascetic way of life, it exalted the household life;¹⁴ the greatest of Brahmanical teachers before Buddha, namely, Yājñavalkya, was a householder and had two wives. In the time of the Buddha, the Śramaṇas or ascetics were denounced as 'outcastes' (Vasalak) in Brahmanical circles¹⁵. One Brahmanical law-giver even attributed the introduction of the institution of monastic ordination (pravrajyā) to a demon (asura)¹⁶. These examples show the Brahmanical dislike for Śramaṇic or ascetic culture in early Buddhist and pre-Buddhist days. Subsequently, however, when Jainism and Buddhism gained popularity and became forces to be reckoned with, the Brahmanical teachers and authors of Brahmanical law-books began to assimilate the elements of Śramaṇic culture, and even evolved elaborate rules for the life of a Sannyāsin. Nobody can deny the fact that the earliest ascetics or Sannyāsins known to Indian history were the Buddhist and Jaina bhikṣus and Śramaṇas, and that, in course of time, Brahmanism also accepted this originally non-Brahmanical tradition of monasticism. The same is true of the tenet of Ahimsā, which was borrowed by Brahmanism from Jainism and Buddhism. Then, the followers of Buddhism and Brahmanism had totally different traditions and concepts of reality. Yet we find the Brahmanical priests and religious teachers of Paurāṇic Hinduism accepting Buddha Śākyamuni as an Incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu, the supreme deity¹⁷. These examples from India's religious history prove that Dr. Murti's view is untenable.

It is impossible to rule out the strong possibility of doctrinal borrowing and acceptance of doctrinal contents by the Vedāntists from the Buddhists. It would be historically correct to say that the Advaita Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara has been influenced by the tenets and techniques of the systems of Nāgārjuna (100 B. C.-100 A. D.) and Maitreya-nātha (300 A. D.). The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda is a document of rapprochement between Buddhism and Vedānta, and points out the hybrid origin of Advaita doctrine of Vedānta.

3. Vedānta and Buddhism before Gauḍapāda

The Vedāntasūtras or the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are theistic rather than monistic in content. Before Gauḍapāda they were being commented upon by avowed dualists¹⁸. No Brahmanical author or thinker before Gauḍapāda is known to have expounded monistic (advaita) doctrine¹⁹. The scattered seeds of monism in the Upaniṣads²⁰ were developed

for the first time by Gauḍapāda (cir. 600 A. D.) and perfected by Śaṅkara (cir. 800 A. D.) who established the classical form of Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself seems to prove that no one before Gauḍapāda had taught the monistic Vedānta when he credits his grand-guru with the discovery of the advaita doctrine, which, according to his belief, lay hidden deep in the Vedas²¹. This statement of Śaṅkara also demolishes the modern myth about the originality of monistic absolutism of classical Vedānta.

It is admitted that pre-Gauḍapāda Vedānta is neither systematic nor monistic, and, that Gauḍapāda flourished and wrote his Āgamaśāstra after all the important Vijñānavāda and Mādhyaṃika philosophers had lived and diffused the idealistic, absolutistic and monistic tenets of Buddhist philosophy. It stands to reason, therefore, that the Advaita turn in Vedānta in and after Gauḍapāda, was due to Buddhist influence in both its tenets and techniques.

It is well-known that the doctrine of two truths, Vyāvahārika (phenomenal) and pāramārthika (transcendental), was first expounded by Nāgārjuna (cir. 100 B. C.-100 A. D.) in his Mādhyaṃakāśāstra and was subsequently propagated by Āryadeva (100 A. D.-200 A. D.), Bhāvaviveka (600 A. D.), Candrakīrti (560-620 A. D.) and Śāntideva (cir. 700 A. D.)²². But the seeds of this doctrine are traceable in the Pāli canon, while a whole Mahāyāna Sūtra, now lost in Sanskrit but extant in Tibetan translation, extracts from which are quoted by Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati (cir. 800 A. D.), was devoted to the exposition of this double-truth theory. This text is called the Āryasatyadvayavātārasūtra.²³ It is legitimate to suppose that the classical Vedāntists took over this theory from the Buddhists. Nāgārjuna, who cannot be placed after 130 A. D.²⁴ was the father of the kārikā style in Sanskrit literature. After him many other Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophical texts were composed in the same style, e. g. the Abhisamayālaṅkārikā, the Sāṃkhyakārikā and the Gauḍapādakārikā, etc. The doctrine that this phenomenal world is void of truth (vitatha, false) and its appearance is due to illusion (viparyāsa) born of ignorance (avidyā) is well known to the oldest Buddhists. The world is often called void (*Suññā loko ti vuccati*) and is compared to a house set on fire²⁵. The goal of nirvāṇa is often understood to mean the extinction of this fire. The method of affirming the transcendental truth by a system of relentless denial of the reality of phenomenal world was evolved first in Buddhist quarters by Nāgārjuna. This Buddhist philosopher may well be regarded as the father of Indian

system of dialectics, and he was the first author to give a prominent and systematic exposition of the method of fourfold description (Catuḥkoṭi), though the method is already repeatedly employed in the Pāli Nikāyas²⁶. It has been rightly said that the description of the Pratītyasamutpāda in negative terms in the school of Nāgārjuna, and the Buddhist theory of phenomenality (saṃvṛti) have furnished the foundations of the māyāvāda doctrine of Śaṅkara's system²⁷.

The doctrine of non-dual idealistic Absolute was developed first by the Buddhists in the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and it received its classical form at the hands of Maitreya-nātha (300 A. D.), Asaṅga (400 A. D.) and Vasubandhu (500 A. D.)²⁸; Diṇṇāga (480-540 A. D.) had declared that "the Supreme Gnosis is the same as the non-dual Absolute."

The central teaching of all the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, the earliest of which dates from cir. 200 B. C., is that this phenomenal world is illusory (māyopama) and the ultimate truth is transcendental, beyond the reach of thought and words²⁹. The entities, the elements of mind and matter, are known as 'dharma's' exclusively in Buddhist philosophy³⁰. The word 'vitatha' as a technical philosophical term occurs first in Buddhist literature; the same is true of the phrase 'prapañcopaśamam'. The characteristic illustrations, employed to explain the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, which became current among the later Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers, had been used first in the early Mahāyānasūtras as also in the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva³¹.

4. Correspondence between Āgamaśāstra and Mahāyāna Śāstras

The age of Gauḍapāda was one of philosophical controversies and almost warlike activities of theologians espousing different creeds. But it was also an age when rapprochement between Brahmanical theology and Mahāyāna Buddhism was nearly completed: an age when Parama-Sauggatas like Emperor Harṣa worshipped Brahmanical gods; Bodhisattvas like Avalokiteśvara assumed the form of Maheśvara; Brahmanical images were being enshrined in Buddhist temples; Buddhist logicians like Śaṅkara-rānanda were being quoted as authorities on Pratyabhijñā-śāstra by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha; an age, when the historical Buddha was being relegated to the realm of Vaiṣṇava mythology by being transformed into an Avatāra of the supreme God³². In such an age it is neither curious

nor surprising to see Gauḍapāda endeavouring to harmonise the basic principles of Buddhist and Brāhmanical philosophies. He, therefore, commented on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad on the one hand, and paid devout homage to Buddha, on the other. He was true to the spirit of his age. Buddhist contents in the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda are already well known to scholars. Some have acknowledged while others have explained them away. In the following paragraphs we propose to review the correspondence and rapprochement between the Āgamaśāstra (abbreviated as AŚ) and some early Buddhist sources in Sanskrit.

AŚ, I.7. refers to those who view creation as being of the nature of dream and illusion: *Svapna-māyā-sarūpeti sṛṣṭiranyair vikalpitā*. This obviously refers to the Buddhist view of the world; e. g. *māyādi-svapna-saḍṛśam vipaśyanto vimucyante*. (Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, X.251; X.279; X.291 etc.,) and *māyā ca sattvās ca advayam etadadvaidhikāram ; iti te svapnaś ca sattvāśca advayam etadadvaidhikāram; sarvadharmā api devaputrā, māyopamā svapnopamā*. Aṣṭa-Sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ed. BST-4) p. 20.

The Buddhist philosophical terms occur in the very first chapter, e. g., Vikalpa, AŚ, I. 18; prapañca; AŚ, I. 17, and Upaśamah Śivah, AŚ, I.29. The idea expressed in AŚ, I.22. corresponds to the Buddha's perception of the triple world; *triṣu dhāmasu* is the same as Buddhist *tridhātu*; the great ascetic (Mahāmuni) referred to here is no other than Buddha Śākyamuni also called Mahāśramaṇa.

In AŚ, II.1, Gauḍapāda, like Vasubandhu. says that "as in dream, so in waking, the objects seen are unreal" ., cp. Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi Viṃśatikā, verses 1-2. "The wisemen (who) speak of the sameness of dream and waking state", AŚ, II.5, are clearly the Idealistic (Vijñānavādin) Buddhist thinkers, who are also referred to as "the knowers of the mind" at AŚ, II. 25.

The first line of AŚ, II.31:

Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā, repeats the first line of MŚ, VII.34 :

Yathā māyā yathā svapne gandharvanagaram yathā.

The thought contained in these two verses is absolutely identical, namely, that the world of sense is unreal like illusion, dream and gandharvanagara. The negative conception of the ultimate truth (paramārtha) expressed in AŚ, II.32, recalls so many verses of the Mādhyamakaśāstra

(MŚ), e.g., MŚ, opening lines, and MŚ, chapter XXV. Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (BST-4) p. 177—*Sarvakalpa-vikalpa-prahīno hi tathāgataḥ*;

Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā (Ed. Conze) Chap. 14,—*Sarva Samjñā apagatā te Buddhā Bhagavantaḥ* and Mādhyamakaśāstra, XVIII. 9.—

Aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam|

Nirvikalpam anānārtham etattattvasya lakṣaṇam||

have manifestly supplied the thought and words for the AŚ, II.35.

Vitarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ|

Nirvikalpo hyayaṃ dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ||

Dr. S.N. Das Gupta is right when he says that the Buddhists were the first to use the words *prapañcopaśamaṃ Śivam*.

The technical Buddhist term 'Vitatha' occurs for the first time in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (cir. 200 B.C.), and also in the Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā (cir. 300 A. D.)³⁴. The third chapter of the AŚ is captioned Vaitathya, 'on falsity'.

The use of the word 'Saṃghāta' (composite, aggregate) in AŚ, III. 3, for objective bodies is a Buddhist usage, and gives the same meaning as is given by such Buddhist technical terms as 'Sanskrit' (composed, compounded) and 'Skandha' (aggregate, group). The statement that 'all aggregates are like a dream' (*Samghātāḥ svapnavat sarve*) is in perfect accord with such Buddhist Scriptural statement as, for instance, are reproduced below :

*'Svapnagatikā hi subhute sarvadharmāḥ;*³⁵

*'Supinam vidyud abhram ca evaṃ dṛṣṭavyam ;*³⁶

Yathaiva gandharvapuraṃ marīcikā,

Yathaiva māyā supinam yathaiva|

Svalhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā,

*Tathopamān jānatha sarvadharmān||*³⁷

The arguments for the theory of non-origination (ajātivāda) of things or entities advanced at AŚ, III, 20; 28, seem to bear an unmistakable influence of the Mādhyamakaśāstra.³⁸ In AŚ, III.29; 30, however, Gauḍapāda seems to give a very faithful expression to the Vijñānavāda tenet; two

nearest parallels are the two verses of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (III.65 and 121). The essence of these verses in both the works is that the non-dual (*citta*, *mana*) appears as dual in the forms of the perceiver and the perceptible, and that its manifestations in dream and waking states are alike³⁹. It should be observed that in AŚ, III. 33, the first line seems to be eminently *Vijñānavādin*, while the second line equally clearly *Upaniṣadic*; here, then, we find a perfect combination of two thought-currents. The view that "knowledge and the object of knowledge are identical" (*jñānajñeya—bhinnam—AŚ, III.33*) is peculiarly a *Vijñānavāda* view repeatedly taught by Vasubandhu and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*⁴⁰.

Gauḍapāda's description of the ultimate state of spiritual perfection in the three successive verses, i. e. AŚ, III.37-39, is strongly reminiscent of numerous passages in early *Mahāyāna-sūtras* describing the nature of *Tathāgata* or *Nirvāṇa*⁴¹. The mention of 'intangible yoga' (*asparśa yoga*) at AŚ, III.39, is most likely an allusion to *Nirvāṇa*. The adjectives used for *Nirvāṇa* at AŚ, III. 47, are in full agreement with Buddhist description of the final state of Freedom⁴². We have seen that the hypothesis of the IVth chapter of AŚ, entitled '*Alātaśānti*', being an independent treatise is not well-grounded; the course of thought in the AŚ reaches its logical conclusion in its fourth chapter. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* uses the words '*alātacakra*'⁴³; Āryadeva has also used this illustration in his work⁴⁴. Both these authorities are older than the *Āgamaśāstra*. The use of the word '*dharma*' at AŚ, IV.1, in the sense of an entity is "peculiarly Buddhistic". The opening verse of this chapter adores the Supremely English tended one (*Sambuddha*) who is the best among men (*dvipadām varam*), who, with knowledge infinite like the sky realised the dharmas (lofty and deep) like the Space, and who is identical with the object of wisdom. In Buddhism, the supreme knowable is the law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and it is often identified with Buddha so that latter is the goal of the highest wisdom (*jñeyābhinna*)⁴⁵. Likewise, AŚ, IV. 2, repeats the salutation to Him, who being the benefactor of all living creatures (*Sarva-sattva-sukho hitaḥ*), taught the intangible-contemplation (*asparśa Yoga*, probably *asamprajñāta samādhi*), and a doctrine which can neither be disputed nor contradicted⁴⁶. Commenting on this verse, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says that "the *kārikā* is an attempt to combine in one whole the negative logic of the *Mādhyamikas* with the positive idealism of the *Upaniṣads*"⁴⁷. Eminent scholars including M. Walleser, H. Jacobi, La Vallee Poussin, V. Bhattacharya, S. N. Dasgupta, V. Sukhtankar and others have already discussed in detail the Buddhist influence in the last chapter of the *Āgamaśāstra*. There is no need to repeat what has already been acknowledged

by others. In order to complete my survey, I wish to add the following notes to this paper. AŚ. IV, 3ff. expound the theory of non-origination of dharmas, a theory characteristically peculiar to the *Mādhyamikas*. AŚ, IV. 22-23 are comparable to *Mādhyamakāśāstra*, I.1, 7 and XXI.7,13, which deny causation and origination. Words such as '*prajñapti*' (cognition), '*citta*' (consciousness), and '*viparyāsa*' (illusion or false appearance), AŚ, IV. 25-27, are all technical Buddhist words known to older texts of Buddhism. AŚ, IV. 33 is thoroughly Buddhistic both in thought and words; the statement "all dharmas are unreal" (*Sarve dharmā mṛṣā*) is comparable to Nāgārjuna's statement 'all dharmas are void' (*Sarve dharmāḥ śūnyāḥ*). AŚ, IV. 36 have numerous parallels in *Vijñānavāda* texts and the *Laṅkāvatāra* (chapter X); AŚ. IV. 42, seems to speak in the vein of early *Mahāyāna-sūtras* like the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, which explain away the realistic teachings. AŚ. IV. 57 is comparable to *Mādhyamakāśāstra*, XXIV. 8-10; while AŚ, IV. 58-59 recall *Catuhśataka*, X. 14, and so many passages in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the *Vajracchedikā*. AŚ, IV. 61-62 are practically similar to *Laṅkāvatāra*, III. 65,121. AŚ, IV. 68-70 seem to paraphrase a few verses of the *Samādhirājasūtra* (Ed. BST-2, pp. XXXIX. 13-18) and the *Laṅkāvatāra* (X. 24, 37). Mention of '*Agrayāna*' at AŚ, IV. 90, obviously refers to *Buddhayāna*; the expressions like '*Sarve dharmā anādayah*', AŚ, IV. 91; '*Ādibuddhāḥ*,' AŚ, IV. 92, and '*Ādiśāntāḥ*,' AŚ, IV. 93, etc. have manifest Buddhist flavour around them.

References

1. The following two editions have been used in this paper: The *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda, edited with an Introduction and translation into English and Sanskrit by Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya; University of Calcutta, 1943, 1950; *Gauḍapādakārikā*, edited with an Introduction and English translation by R. D. Karmarkar, BORI, POONA, 1953.
2. M. Walleser held that Gauḍapāda's theories represented the tenets of a Bengal School of thought, and he placed the text of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*s in 550 A. D. A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, HOS, Vol. 32, 1925, p. 503, note 1.
3. S. N. Dasgupta (*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1926, p. 423), held that "in order to be able to teach Śamkara, Gauḍapāda must have been living till at least 800 A. D."
4. Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya, (Ed.) *Āgamaśāstra*, (1950), pp. 43 ff. R. D. Karmarkar, (Ed.) *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, pp. III-IV. The present writer cannot categorically say that the *Tarkajvālā* an auto-commentary on *Mādhyamakahrdayakārikā* of

Bhāvaviveka, actually quotes passages from the work of Gauḍapāda. For brief notices of the Sanskrit mss. of this work of Bhāvaviveka see Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana in J. B. O. R. S. Vol., XXIII, Pt. I. The ms. itself is preserved in the K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.

5. The contemporaneity of Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla is attested by Hsuan Tsang; Cf. Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (Delhi reprint 1961), vol. II, pp. 215 ff.; E. Obermiller, Bu-Ston's History of Buddhism Part II, Heidelberg, 1932, pp. 134-36. S. Radhakrishnan (Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 452, note) seems to assign Gauḍapāda to 7th century A. D. but he also inclines towards M. Walleiser's view quoted above.
6. Der altere Vedānta, pp. 5 f. as quoted in A. B. Keith, loc. cit.
7. Āgamaśāstra (Ed.) pp. IV, LVII.
8. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 1955, pp. 14-15.
9. Gauḍapādakārikā (Ed.), pp. XXX-XLI.
10. History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, p. 423.
11. Bhāratiya Saṃskṛti Aur Sādhanā, Pt. I, Patna, 1962, pp. 132-133.
12. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, loc. cit. note. 5.
13. Ibid, pp. 116-117.
14. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. II pt. I, BORI, 1941, p. 420 note 998.
15. Suttanipāta, Vasala Sutta (Khud. Nik., Vol. I. Nālandā Ed., 1959) p. 287.
16. Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra, II. 6.30.
17. Varāha Purāṇa, IV. 2; Matsya Purāṇa, 285. 6-7, Agni Purāṇa, 49. 8.
18. Cf. The Brahmasūtras edited and translated by S. Radhakrishnan, London, 1959, Introduction.
19. S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., 422; S. Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil. II, P. 452.
20. A. B. Keith, op. cit., II, pp. 516 f.
21. Śamkara's Commentary on the Gauḍapādakārikā, (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series Ed.) p. 214; S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 422-423.
22. Mādhyamakaśāstra, (Ed. in BST No. 10, Darbhanga, 1960) XXIV. 8-10; Catuḥśataka (V. Bhattacharya's restoration, Viśvabhāratī. 1931) VIII.8; Madhyamārthasamgraha (L. M. Joshi's Edition, Dharmadūta. Vol. 29 NOS. 3-4, 1964); Madhyamakāvatāra (No. A. Śāstrī's restoration JOR, vol. IV-VI) VI. 23-28; Bodhicaryāvatāra (Ed. in BST No. 12) IX. 2.
23. Vide Samyuttanikāya, vol. I (Nālandā Edition) Arhantasutta, p. 15-Loke samannan kusalo Veditvā, Vohāramattena so vohareyyāi Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra Quoted in Prasauṇapadā (BST-10) p. 159 and in Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjikā (BST-12) p. 177 Tibetan

version is listed in A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, ed. by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T. Tada, Tohoku Imperial University, Sendai, 1934. NOS. 3902, 4467.

24. See my article in Maha Bodhi Journal, Vol. 73 NOS. 1-2 (1965).
25. Cf. Mahāvagga (Nālandā Ed.) pp. 13-15, 34 ff.; Majjhima Nikāya, Vol. I (Nālandā Ed.) pp. 3-10; Samyutta Nikāya, Vol. I (Nālandā Ed.), p. 4; Ibid; vol. III, pp. 50-51; Dīgha Nikāya. vol. I (Nālandā Ed.), p. 17; Ibid., vol. III, p. 30; Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā, Ed. by E. Conze (SOR, XIII, Rome) p. 62; Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ed. BST), p. 20.
26. Dīgha Nikāya, vol. I, pp. 51-52; Mādhyamakaśāstra, XV. 10; Vighrahavyāvartanī, 29.
27. Mādhyamakaśāstra (Ed. BST-10), P. L. Vaidya's Introduction, p. XI
28. Cf. Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Ed. by E. Lamotte, Louvain, 1935; Laṅkāvatrasūtra, Ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1963; Deux Traites de Vasubandhu, ed. pas. Levi, Paris, 1925; Go Tucci, Doctrines of Maitreya and Asaṅga, Calcutta, 1930.
29. Prajñāpāramitā-Piṇḍarātha ed. in BST NO. 4, p. 263; cf. p. 20.
30. Cf. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism.
31. Vide Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra (Ed. BST-4) p. 20; Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra (Ed. BST-6) Chapter III; Vajracchedikā (Ed. Conze) pp 35, 42, 62; Mādhyamaka-Śāstra, VII. 34; Catuḥśataka, XIII. 25; Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, II. 166.
32. See author's Studies in the Buddhist Culture of India (During 7th and 8th centuries A. D.), Delhi, 1966, Chapters II, X and XII.
33. S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit p. 425 note.
34. Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Ed. BST-4, p. 53; Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Ed. Conze p. 42.
35. Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ed. BST.4), p. 149.
36. Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ed. Conze), p. 62. Cf. Mādhyamakaśāstra, VII. 34; Catuḥśataka, XIII. 25.
37. Samādhirājasūtra (Ed. Vaidya, BST-2, 1961), IX.11.
38. See. e. g., MŚ. Chapter I.
39. Compare, e. g. AŚ—III. 29-

Yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah|

Tathā jāgraddvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah||

With Laṅkāvatārasūtra, III. 65—

Cittamātram na dṛṣyo'sti dvidhā cittam hi dṛśyate|

Grāhyagrāhakabhāvena śāśvatoccheda-varjitam||

Cf. V. Bhattachārya in Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. X, 1934, pp.5-6.

40. Cf. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi vimśatikā, verse 1; Deux Traités de Vasubandhu, ed. Vasubandhu, ed. S. Lévi, verse 17, p. 35; Laṅkāvatārasūtra, X. 58

41. AŚ, III. 37—X. 112 etc.

Sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamutthitāḥ|

Supraśāntaḥ sakṛjjyotiḥ samādhiracalābhayaḥ||

Compare with Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Ed. BST-4) p. 177—

Sarvakūḷpa-vikalpa-prāhino hi tathāgataḥ|

ibid. p. 96—*Acintyā Bhagavān prajñāpāramitā|*

tathā hi Subhūte Prajñāpāramitā na cittaena jñātavā na cittaḥ gamanīyā|

Vajracchedikā. (Ed. Conze) p. 46—*acintyo ayam dharmaparyāyas tathāgatena bhāṣitah Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (Ed. BST-6) p. 27—atarko atarkāvacarastathāgata vijñeyah Śāriputra Saddharmaḥ|*

Samādhirājasūtra (Ed. BST-2) p. 190—

Yo asau dharmasvabhāvaḥ jñānī supraśāntam|

42. Laṅkāvatāra, X. 174; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra (BST-6) p. 84-85; Dhammapada, verses 203-204; Mādhyamakāśāstra, XVIII. 9; *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*—"Tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati| Sarvakalpavikalpajālvāsanāpṛapañca vigato hi Śāntamate tathāgatāḥ," Quoted in Prasannapadā (Ed. BST-10) p. 236.

43. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, X.173.

44. Catuḥśataka. XIII 5.

45. AŚ, IV. 1:—*Jñānenākāśakalpeṇa, dharmān yo gaganopamān|*

Jñeyābhinnena Sambuddhastam vande dvīpadām varam||

Cp. Lalitavistara (Ed. BST-1) Chapter I, verses 1-2; Samyuttanikāya vol. II, p. 340-341. The ipse dixit of Buddha—*yo pratītyasamutpādam paśyati, sa Buddham paśyati*—is well known in Pāli as well as Sanskrit Buddhist texts.

46. Cf. V. Bhattacharya, Āgamaśāstra (Ed.), p. 92-98

47. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 465; note 2.

THE VARIOUS NAMES FOR THE FAMOUS VAIŚEṢIKA WORK OF PRAŚASTAPĀDA

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Utrecht

The identification of the names of some of the ancient Indian thinkers, as is well known, has raised much controversy or at least differences of opinion among scholars. The names of Patañjali, Vasubandhu, Sureśvara, Praśastapāda are but a few instances in point. Praśastapāda, the first systematiser of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, has been referred to by authors in no less than ten different ways, even though the variations in the name are often very minute and the word *praśasta* is found at the beginning of all these variations.¹

As in the case of the authors, works too have sometimes been mentioned under different names². In this paper we shall consider the names under which the only work of Praśastapāda that has come down to us³ has been referred to by authors.

The work of Praśastapāda is often referred to by scholars as *Praśastapāda bhāṣyam*. This is a name conferred on the work after the name of its author, just as one refers to the Mīmāṃsāsūtra-bhāṣyam as Śābarabhāṣyam or to the Yogasūtra-bhāṣyam as Pātañjala-bhāṣyam or to the Nyāyabhāṣyam as Vātsyāyanabhāṣyam. Most probably Praśastapāda himself named it *Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha* as suggested in the introductory verse of this work :

praṇāmya hetum īśvaram munim kaṇādam anvataḥ |

padārthadharmaśaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodayaḥ ||

Modern scholars taking cognizance of this fact prefer to call Praśastapāda's work *Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha* rather than *Praśastapāda-bhāṣyam*⁴. However, we find that this work has also been quoted under different names in Indian philosophical texts.


Kamalaśīla, the author of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*⁵ mentions the work of Praśastapāda, as far as I know, only once in his work and then refers to it under the name of *Padārthapraveśaka*. Thus we read in *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* p., 192,26-27⁶: *tathā hi padārtha praveśake*

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF ORIENTALISTS

NEW DELHI
January 4-10, 1964

VOLUME III

PART I



BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
POONA-4, INDIA

1969

This is a science, a most practical science, and beauty and wonders of this science can be realised only through practice. What a grand science is it ? Not only that it promises realisation of oneness with infinity and absolute freedom but it teaches also a supreme way of life which can bring about fuller development of individuals, of nations and can bring peace, contentment, happiness all around.

D. G. JOSHI, AHMEDNAGAR

REFUTATION OF THE MADHVAMATA BY APPAYYA DĪKṢITA

This paper intends to give a general review of the objections raised by Appayya Dīkṣita against the general principles of Madhva's *siddhānta*, especially with reference to Madhva's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Anuvyākhyāna*, a work in which Madhva has put forth his last efforts at interpretation and criticism, in his composition known as the *Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana* (MM), with his own commentary on it.

Appayya Dīkṣita has chosen first five topics from the commentary of Madhva on the *Brahmasūtras* for his criticism on Madhva's principles. In each topic, he has criticised the *prima facie* view and lastly the conclusive view of Madhva with suitable illustrations from Madhva's, as well as other works. In course of discussion, he has pointed out some minor defects also, like partial applications of some rules only, or not recognising those works, which are traditionally accepted as authoritative. In his first verse, he had made it clear that he is criticising Madhva not because he is a Vaiṣṇava but because of the defective nature of his principles and system.

The reason why he has chosen only the first five topics of Madhva's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is that this commentary forms the base of his system. When this base is shown as defective, naturally, the whole system can be called defective. He has done all this with great care and restraint without marring the beauty of his style which is free from taunts and pinches.

Lastly Appayya Dīkṣita has expressed his noble-minded nature by pointing out some of the good features of Madhva's commentary. This indicates his impartial and unprejudiced view towards the Vaiṣṇavite cult.

T. G. MAINKAR, POONA

GAUḌAPĀDA : HIS LIFE

The *Guruparaṃparācaritam* of Rāmakṛṣṇa Somayājīn gives very interesting information about Gauḍapāda, the celebrated Vedānta teacher about whom very little is known. We are informed that Gauḍapāda was the son of Viṣṇudeva and Guṇavatī, a brahmin couple who lived in affluent circumstances in the town Bhūpāla. The couple did not have a child for a pretty long time and Gauḍapāda was born to them as a result of boon from Śuka, residing in the hermitage near by, to Viṣṇudeva who propitiated him by Penance. The boy was, therefore, named Śukadatta. At the age of five he had learnt everything from his father, repaired to the hermitage of Śuka and practised penance. Śuka from his cave directed him to go to Jīṣṇudeva in Gauḍa country. Śukadatta walked the entire long distance on foot (*pāda*) and hence was named Gauḍapāda by Jīṣṇudeva who accepted him as a disciple and taught him the Vedānta doctrine. Śukadatta *alias* Gauḍapāda became a great Yogin and wrote two works, the *Yogagītā* and the *Vārtika* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. He taught the Vedānta doctrine to Govinda Muni, the teacher of Śaṅkarācārya.

Bhupālagada, the town in this account, the hermitage of Śuka and the cave from which Śuka granted the boon to Viṣṇudeva, and also advised Śukadatta to go to the Gauḍa country to meet Jīṣṇudeva are still shown to a visitor to the locality in the Satara District of Maharashtra. There is a tradition in the locality that connects Gauḍapāda with it. All this information throws a new light on the life of Gauḍapāda and needs corroboration from other sources. It must be noted that the work *Guruparamparācaritam* has a restricted historical reliability as its accounts of others would indicate.

P. M. MODI, BARODA

THE METHOD OF INTERPRETING THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

It is well known that the *Gītā* is interpreted in a variety of ways leading to different conclusions as regards its Central Teaching. An effort is made here to discuss the method of interpreting the *Gītā*. About 12 critical suggestions are given in this paper for consideration by the learned. It is argued that each word in the इतिश्री of the *Gītā*, e.g. उपनिषद्, the word गीता as adj. to the work, the word उपनिषद् and the word योग and the words कर्मयोग, ज्ञानयोग, etc., the title श्रीकृष्णार्जुनसंवाद, should be well considered in the interpretation of *Gītā*. Also words like सांख्य, योग, कृष्ण, etc. should be studied from the verses where they occur in the *Gītā*.

By applying this method we conclude that the *Gītā* means only समत्व of the mind in the success or failure of one's undertakings; कर्मयोग etc. mean समत्व through action, etc., that each Adhyāya gives one aspect of *Yoga* or Disinterested Action, that there are many ज्ञान theories of Creation, *Mokṣa*, Relation of the soul to God, etc., that they are all subordinate to the *Yoga*, that the combinations of such things are not rigidly formed, as in the *sampradāyas* of the ācāryas.

SITA KRISHNA NAMBIAR, DELHI,

A FRESH APPROACH TO THE GĪTĀ

Perhaps no other sacred text in Sanskrit has so often and so searchingly been subjected to systematic exposition as the *Gītā*. The result has been a truly bewildering array of commentaries setting forth apparently inconsistent doctrines. It was made the vehicle of Advaitic, Viśiṣṭādvaitic and Dvaitic teachings in the past, not to mention the subtler distinctions which have still further broken up these three main approaches.

The new point of departure is the seminal conception of the *Puruṣottama* set forth in the XV Chapter of the *Gītā*. Śrīkṛṣṇa who speaks in the first person throughout the *Gītā* has to be identified with the *Puruṣottama* and there will be found a concept far transcending in its religious and philosophic import, the Advaitic *Brahman*, Viśiṣṭādvaitic *Saguṇa Brahman* and the Dvaitic *Īśvara*. The relevant passages for consideration are the 16th, 17th and 18th verses of the 15th Chapter. The whole panorama of Phenomena as well as the noumenon is brought within their scope. The *Kṣara Puruṣa* is the 'Divine Being' sharing in the flux of phenomena which are not illusory, but a real manifestation of his *Aparā Prakṛti*. Above this fluctuating status is the *Akṣara Puruṣa*, the static aspect of the Lord Kūṭastha. Lifted above the *Kṣara* and *Akṣara Puruṣa* is the *Puruṣottama* synonymous with the *Paramātman*.

The *Puruṣottama* concept vastly enlarges the scope of religious life and philosophy, in its turn achieves a deeper vision of reality. Beyond the narrow limits of personality is the supramental status of quiescence and non-activity and impersonality. It is attainable for the individual, but there he does not stop, if he would follow the suggestion of the *Gītā*. Beyond it and above the *Sādhaka* gets the vision of the master of both the calm and storm, *Kṣara* and *Akṣara*, the *Puruṣottama*.