


22
7/15
1971

The Bulletin of Tibetology seeks to serve the specialist as well as the general reader with an interest in this field of study. The main objective of the Bulletin is to disseminate the knowledge of the past and present of Tibet.

EDITORS

CHANDRO DORJE NAMGYAL
TIBETAN GYALTSEN
JEWEL C. BUNDA

Bulletin of Tibetology



Vol. VIII

No. 1

26 FEBRUARY 1971
NAMGYAL INSTITUTE OF TIBETOLOGY
GANGTOK, SIKKIM

04044

12. Ibid p. 186. 13. Ibid p. 52. 14. Ibid p. 13. 15. Ibid p. 206.
16. Ibid. Introduction cl iii
17. National Archives of India, New Delhi. Foreign political 12 Dec-1833 No 76. Memorandum on the conversation with Cheetyreenkaff sent on deputation to Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier.
18. Rennie, Surgeon *Bhutan and the story of the Duar War*, London, 1866 p. 160. Fn. Quoting from *Calcutta Englishman*.
19. Markham C.R. Op. Cit. pp. 37-41; 20. Ibid p. 36. 21. Ibid p. 57.
22. Cammans. Op. Cit. p. 38.
23. Bell, Charles, *Tibet Past & Present*, Oxford, 1968 p. 106.
24. Markham C.R. Op. Cit Introduction pp. lxx.
25. Turner Samuel; *Account of an Embassy to the Court of Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, London, 1800. p. 363.
26. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* LIX. Part I 189 pp. 78-79.
27. Turner Samuel, Op Cit. p 374. 28. Ibid p 376.
29. State Archives, Government of West Bengal, Bhutan Political Proceedings, Oct 1865. p. 2.
30. Ghosal, Sarat Chandra, *A History of Cooch Behar* (Translated from original Bengali) State Press, Cooch Behar, 1942 p. 420.
31. Nirmal Chandra Chaudhuri. *Bharatvarsha* (Bengali Monthly), Calcutta Agrahayan 1376 B.S.
32. Younghusband F. Op. Cit. p. 30.
33. Sarkar, Susobhan Chandra : Some Notes on the Intercourse of Bengal with the Northern Countries in the second half of the Eighteenth Century. *Bengal Past & Present*. Vol XLI, Jan-June 1931.
34. Shakabpa Tsepon W.D. *Tibet: A Political History* p. 169.
35. National Archives of India, P.C. Jun 1836 No 52.
36. Pemberton R.B. *Report on Bhutan*, Calcutta, 1839: Indian Studies 1961, p. 98.

A NEW APPROACH TO GAUDAPADAKARIKA

— N. Aiyaswami Sastri

Gaudapada's work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhistic in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (v.V. Bhattacharya's edition of the Karika). It is mysterious indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Sveta.up. bhasya ad I,8, and a grandpreceptor of Sri Sankara through Govindabha-gavatpada (v.R.D. Karmarkar's edn. of the Karika, Introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gauda country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in those days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya and R.D. Karmarkar). I shall confine myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 29 verses explaining the Mandukyopanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as Visva, Taijasa, Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvadrk, perceiver of

the whole. The first three stages are represented in the following states in order: Waking (Jagarita), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart respectively. The mystic syllable 'Om' while considered to be consisting of three parts: a, u and m represents the first three states of Brahman. While considered as partless and one unit it represents the fourth Advaita state of Brahman (Karika, 29). Gaudapada points out the distinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is under the influence of avidya, nescience and sleep, while in the fourth Atman is relieved of both (K.19). He says further that the living being who is caught in the slumber of immemorial Maya (Illusion) gets awakened, then he realizes Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep (K.16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute Cittamatratna for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhistic maxim. This chapter is rightly styled as Omkaraprakarana, an exposition of the Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmakar, Introduction, X.f.

The second chapter named Vaitathya-prakarana consists of 38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external world and its futility on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of both the Vedantic and the Yogacara Buddhist and the dream analogy is also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to Vasubandhu's Vimsatika, verse 1 with bhasya. Another common example for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent on the Rope in the twilight. Gauda says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of Jiva-atman imposed on the Brahman. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent disappears; likewise one atman is discriminated as diverse through the influence of Maya and when the true character of atman's oneness is ascertained the discrimination disappears (KK. 16-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who assume erroneously as the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath, elements, Guna etc. Gauda does not omit to mention in the list the ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, manas, citta (K.25). Here the absence of Jnana, Vijnana or Prajnana is noteworthy because it is charac-

teristic of Atman, Brahman stated in the Upanisads. It has been in fine remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered person nor aspirer of truth and no desirous of release nor released (K.32). This utterance of Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagarjuna's characteristic Nihilism. If the stanza is detached from the context one could hardly think that this utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagarjuna because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world and for one absolute Whole. They, however, differ in their approach to the ultimate truth. Naga. would designate it Sunyata, or the highest perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman, an embodiment of the highest knowledge. cfr. Sveta. up. bhasya, Gitapress, p.46, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-dualism is auspicious (अद्वयता शिवा, K.33) and the same as Advaita or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of plurality and of the mind's constructive states has been revealed by the Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K.35). The Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayanic Buddhists. It is probably for this reason that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in Sankara's bhasya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaya in relation to Brahman.

It is to be noted here that Amarasinha, the Sanskrit Lexicographer has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine probably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea of middle path, Madhyama-pratipad whereas for the Yogacara it signifies the absence of subject and object ग्राह्यग्राहकाभाव. Though Gauda and Sankara characterize Brahman as advaya they probably intend to convey the idea of advitiya, "without the second", i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48 verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in

succession after establishing the futility of the diverse world in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakarana as the author starts in the second stanza as अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यम् "I shall elucidate unpitiableness". In the first stanza Gauda has stated that the worship, upasana, is related to the Karya-Brahman, Hiranya-garbha etc. The worshipper being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiable state, krpana. In fact every body is Aja, unborn, ie. Brahman prior to an illusory creation. For this reason, says Gauda—I shall elucidate Akarpanya, unpitiableness which is a quality of Brahmic state अजातिसमतां गतम्. It appears therefore that Akarpanya may fittingly be equated to the Advaitic state. Brah.Up.mentions krpana as opposed to Brahmana, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immortal, how could it be reduced to mortality? (K.20) No Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.48).

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghata-akasa); that is to say the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3-4). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghata-akasa is neither a product nor a part of Akasa. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one's own illusion, maya and similar to those in dream (K.10). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much extolled in the scripture Upanishads and their differentiation is severely censured there—which position is quite rational (K.13). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnudharmottara cited in Sveta.Up.bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upanishads the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a device for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.15,24-25).

4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, मनोद्वयमिदं द्वैतम् when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amanibhava) dualism vanishes (K.31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K.32). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk.34,38,40. In deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk.35,46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and flashing up once only (K.36, cp.Kk.37-40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K.43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified; being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attained to the state of equilibrium it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk.44-46).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauda can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajativada is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The space-example is also found in a Mahayana sutra cited in M. vrtti, p. 375 which insists on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तद्यथापि नाम देवपुत्र यश्च मृद्भाजनस्यान्तरमाकाशं यश्च रत्नभाजनस्यान्तरमाकाशं आकाशधातुरेवैषः । तत्परमार्थतो न किञ्चित् नानाकरणम् ।.....

3) Gauda says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a device for some ultimate purpose (K. 15); this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu's explanation of Buddha's utterances about skandha, ayatana and dhatu (V. Vasubandhu's Vimsatika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya-kusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyasiddhi, ch. 1.p.5,n.3). It is likely therefore that

Gauda was conversed in and convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the sayings contradictory to their favourite conclusions.

4) "This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind" मनोदृश्य-मिदं द्वैतम् (K.31), this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Treatise by Gauda (cp. K.30 also). According to the Upanishads it is the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dream, cp e.g. Prasna: up. IV, 5: अन्तैष देव; (=मजः) स्वप्ने महिमानमनुभवति..... since the same axiom is applicable to the waking state the above expression "manodrśyam" has perhaps been coined. The Vedantin would otherwise express it as मायाकल्पितं or मायाविजृम्भितम् etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also plead that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would repeat the idea as मनोदृश्यमिदं सर्वं using 'sarvam' instead of "dvaitam". The above statement would also result authentically into another axiom: मनसो निग्रहायत्तं/ दुःखक्षयः the end of misery is brought about by the mind's control (K. 40).

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gauda have some parallels in the Vishnudharma (in the group of six chapters) as follows:—

अविद्या च क्रियाः सर्वा विद्या ज्ञानं प्रचक्षते ।
कर्मणा जायते जन्तुविद्यया च विमुच्यते ॥
अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्विन्नं च्यते ।
अज्ञानमेतद्वैताख्यं अद्वैतं श्रूयतां परम् ॥
मम त्वहमिति प्रज्ञावियुक्तं अविकल्पकम् ।
अविकार्यमनारूपेयमद्वैतमनुभूयते ।
मनोवृत्तिमयं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥
मनसो वृत्तयः तस्मात् धर्माधर्मनिमित्तजाः ।
निरोद्धव्याः तन्निरोधे द्वैतं नैवोपपद्यते ॥
मनोदृश्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्चित्सचराचरम् ।
मनसो ह्यमनीभावेऽद्वैतभावं तदाप्नुयात् ॥
कर्मभावनया तुल्यं विज्ञानमुपजायते ।
तादृक् भवति तिजप्तिर्यादृशी खलु भावना ।
क्षये तस्याः परं ब्रह्म स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ॥

"All actions are (the result of) nescience, (avidya) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion "I" and "mine" arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unspeakable, Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amanibhava) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-vasana, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth, Brahman shines forth of its own accord" (cited in the Svet. bhashya, pp 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijnana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind's activities Truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 1,2: तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् । cp. Sankara bhashya on Gita, XVIII, 50: नामरूपमनात्माधारोपनिवृत्तिः कार्या ।

K.35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.46) looks like the Yogacara's favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism ग्राह्यग्राहकभाव turns out into Dharmadhatu, i.e. Tathagata (v. Trimsika, ver.28 with bhashya). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: Mind (manas) is Brahman because the latter is the inner core of the former तत्प्रत्यगात्मरूपत्वात् Kena. Up bhashya II, 2,4. The Vedantin's definition of Jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedantaparihasha.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakasa becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakrt-vibhatam, flashing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakrt-jyotis found in chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayamjyotis in Br.Up.

IV, 3, 14. Gauda made it svayam-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahasanghika Buddhist have also characterised their original mind as Prakrti-prabhasvaram. The Sakrt-vibhatam may be considered in relation with some Buddhists' theory of Eka-kshana-abhisambodha, one moment's intuition of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Madhyamikas and also in the Satya-siddhi (ch.26-27) as against the Vaibhashikas' theory of gradual intuition of the four Truths (anupurvabhisamaya). The one moment's intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is only one, viz. Cessation-Truth, Nirodha-satya. May we guess now that there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedantin and the Buddhist? Sankara perhaps refers to this one moment's intuition theory while commenting on the Kena. Up. II, 2,4: प्रतिबोधवित्त as सकृद्विज्ञानं प्रतिबोध इत्यपरे "according to some pratibodha implies one moment's consciousness". We may also take note here of the Br. Up. II, 3,6:यथा सकृद्विज्ञानं सकृद्विज्ञानेव इवा अस्य श्रीभवंति य एवं वेद and Sankara's bhashya thereon.

K. 44. Gauda's prescription of cure for the mind's concentration-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gauda says that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the sensuous pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gauda advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Buddhists mind's stubbornness and low-spirits are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn one should cultivate calmness, concentration and equanimity because through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analytical thinking, exertion and joy because through these factors the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyutta V, 12 ff). The S. Siddhi discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the act of controlling should be applied; when it is too subdued the act of slackening should be applied. The goldsmith, thus melts the gold, heats it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heated it becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept on it becomes expanded Likewise is the yogin's mind (ch. 156). The tamed horse also may be compared here (Ibid).

The Yogasutra refers to about nine factors of distraction and their satellites about five in all (I, 30-32). In order to check them an exercise

of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may again be appeased by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri, love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upeksha, indifference (I, 33), or by some such other means (I, 34). The Yogasutra speaks nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist sources or Gauda describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauda was acquainted with the Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in his own fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind's distraction (=stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensuous pleasure should be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miserable, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K.43). Gauda says in the same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see anything as born. But the link between the first and the second statement is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali's opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth (Yogasutra I, 32). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret "aja" unborn as Brahman and "jata" born as illusory things. Cfr. our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with Gauda's instructive remark on the mind and its ultimate reality. He states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns out into Brahman—which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses a Buddhistic idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justified from the Advaita Vedantin's standpoint of view that has been made clear previously v. comment on K. 35.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Alatasanti prakarana consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from the previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was truly an Advaita Vedantin. Hence the chapter is interesting to us in more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of Jati-vada, theory of origination. The origination-theorists are all dualistic thinkers, viz, Sankhya, Vaisheshika, the Buddhists

with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: a) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, b) others plead for the origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author ridicules the theory of origination, Jativada as it does not stand a moment's scrutiny; hence Ajativada, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (Kk 3-23, 71). The important factor that brightens ajati, non-origination is the non-recognition of the order of sequence between the cause and the effect (K.21); it becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originates whether it is existent or non-existent etc. (K.22). cp. Nagarjuna's maxim न स्वतो नापि परतो Madh. Sastra.

Likewise the non-existent is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent. How can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (K.40). This looks like Nagarjuna's dialectic. The origination, however, has been preached by the enlightened sages, Buddhas for those who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as they experience their activities (K.43); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (K.54).

2. *Prajñapti*. The Empirical experience, prajñapti is conditioned by its cause; if it is not so, dualism or diversity (that is experienced by us) would be destroyed. Because the defilement is operative its causal production (paratantra) is accepted (in the empirical field of dualism). Prajñapti (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (nimitta) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (nimitta) becomes non-cause (animitta) from the viewpoint of Truth (Kk. 24-25).

3. *Dream*. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to things experienced in the waking state (Kk.32-37, 39, 61-68). Waking experience is applied to dream state in K. 41. Just as one experiences the unthinkable objects (acintya) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perversion (viparyaya) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. *Maya and Nirmittaka*. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external

things (K.44). Buddha (-Gautama) preached: "Things are originated on account of causes and conditions"; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K.58). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (die) (K.69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmittaka, created being (K.70).

5. *Alata*, firebrand, whirling of the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unborn state. While the firebrand is whirling the appearance of wheel does not come from the outside and enters into the fire brand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the fire brand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. The appearance is always unthinkable (acintya) because no law of causation between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (Kk.47-52).

6. *Citta and artha*. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind touches no cause (nimitta) in all three times-Perversion is causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind's vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the foot-print in the sky (K.26-28). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (k.46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind's vibration, citta-spandita. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, *asanga* (K.72) cp. k. 96.

7. *Samsara and Moksha*. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for Release, *moksha* which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (k.30). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect so long he will have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K.55-56).

8. *Kshanti*. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal

due to their wrong conception (K.10). All entities are beginning-less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who has perseverance to this effect will become worthy of immortality (Kk.91-92).

9. *Sasvata-uccheda-drshti*. Everything is born in the empirical plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is unborn as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K.57). From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter is neither permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect of all entities (K.59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words) are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can be applied thereto (K.60).

10. *Advaya*, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, unmoving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth movement and object (k.45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a vision of our mind. The mind being causeless, its non-birth, anutpatti is invariably non-dual (k.77). The mind being retreated and inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened sages (k.80).

11. *Kalpita and Paratantra*. What exists in the imaginary sphere of existence (*samvrti*) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation, that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence. *Kalpita-samvrti*, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the view point of empirical law of causation (kk.73-74).

12. *Abhinivesa*. There is adherence to a false idea of dualism, but that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes no birth as he has no cause for the birth (k.75). The mind on account of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently similar object (e.g. the idea of silver on the nacre) but when one realises the absence of the mistaken object he retreats himself from it and becomes detached from it (K.79).

13. *Catuskoti*. By apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompasses Him in four attributes; Ens, non-Ens, both Ens and non-Ens and neither Ens nor non-Ens, which attributes signify four ideas in order: "unsteady", "steady", "and" the absence of both". These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (Kk.,82-84).

14. *Laukika, Suddha-laukika and Lokottara-jnana*. The empirical knowledge (*laukika-jnana*) is what consists of two: object and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (*lokottara*) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Buddhas have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (*Jnana, Jneya*) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (Kk.87-89). Those whoever are convinced in respect of birthlessness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delve (K.95).

15. *Agrayana*. What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what is to be acquired and what is to be matured are all to be understood from the Agrayana, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the cognizable-Turya state (K.90).

16. *Brahmanya*. Having reached to the complete omniscience, Brahmanhood, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more than this one may yearn for? This discipline of Brahman is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as *dama* because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise knowing thiswise should acquire the calm state (Kk.85-86).

17. *Vaisaradya*. Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K.78). All entities are calm from the beginning, unborn, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (*samya*) is unborn (i.e. Brahman) and fearless, *visarada*. Those who walk in things' differentiation have no fearlessness. All

different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they are pitiable (Kk. 93-94). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unborn, undifferentiation, fearless and freed from diversity, we salute our preceptor to the best of our ability (K.100).

18. *Avarana*. If there is even a subtle notion of diversity of things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment. What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of nescience? All dharmas (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset-thus understand our teachers (Kk.97-98).

19. *Jnanam na kramata*. Buddha's knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge—this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K.99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relation-free (K.96 cp.72 under the head 6).

20. *Asparsa-yoga*. I salute to him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasant and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K.2), cp. III, 39: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any meditator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment. 1. *Ajativada*. This is the most characteristic feature of Gauda's philosophy. Nagarjuna (hereafter referred as Naga) too has made use of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapons to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, *Sunyavada*. Though Gauda and Naga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauda by declaring the separate non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Atman or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Naga aims at an absolute voidness, sunyata. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as one and the same neither Gauda would say that he aims at voidness, nor would Naga say so at the Upanishadic Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauda cites on several occasions instances from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that

he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false; e.g. Aitareya. Up. 1,1,1:

आत्मा वा इदमग्र आसीत् नान्यत् किञ्चन मिषत्।

Br.Up III,5,1: तेन ईदृश एव अतोऽन्यत् आतम्। When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind's illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notion of the serpent disappears on a close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Sveta. Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable.

There is nothing other than this Brahman realizable.

The enjoyer, enjoyable and commander:

All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. I.12.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmas) are *adi-santa*, *adi-buddha* and *adi-mukta* (serene, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is *aja*, *ajata* 'unborn'. Upanishads always prefer the expression: *aja*, *ajata*, *na jayate*, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as *aja*, *ajata*, *ajati*, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gauda's *ajati-vada* has been worked out.

In the case of Naga's *ajati* or *anutpattivada* non-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Asvajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this stanza:

ये धर्मा हेतुप्रभवा हेतुं तेषां तथागतो ह्याह।

"Tathagata (-Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes" (v. Salistamba sutra, p.26, note on p. 31 more particulars about the stanza).

It is called there as *Pratitya-samutpada-gatha* implying thereby a formula

of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve members such as *Avidya*, *Samskara*, *Vijnana* and others arranged in a progressive order to the effect that the first member causes the second, the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its embryonic stage to a full grown up stage. In other words it makes plain how the truth of origin of misery, *Samudaya-satya* operates. The same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, *nirodha-satya* by a cessation process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of causation, *Pratitya-samutpada*, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes Mahayanic form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Madhyamikas headed by Naga and a large number of Mahayana Sutras credited no more Buddha to be the discoverer of the law of causation in its early form. The doctrine of *Pratitya-samutpada* implies for Naga the reverse of origination, i.e. non-origination and non-cessation. Note the first stanza of this Madhyamaka Sastra:

अनिरोधमनुत्पादं यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं ।
देशयामास सम्बुद्धः तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayanic scripture: यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति स ह्यजातः । "What is originated through causes is not originated in fact" (cited in the Madh. vrtti, p. 239, from the Anavatapta Sutra). The reversal of origination into non-origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Madhyamikas' outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. Now the *Pratityasamutpada* gatha has no more its original value, it has been since then relegated to an obsolete position. Gauda has also noticed this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (v.IV, 58).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background offered Naga a great opportunity to wield his critical acumen and demolish the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, Abhidharmikas, Sarvastivadins and Vaibhasika. His polemics against these schools are met with in his Madhyamaka sastra and Dvadasamukha etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern

of his critique would not have but served as model to the monistic thinkers like Gauda. Though Gauda and Naga plead for non-origination theory we should not however, over look their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed Naga upholds Sunyavada whereas Gauda advocates Advaita-vada. The latter's criticism of origination is directed against the Sankhyas in the main (Kk. 3-22). cp. भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति = *Satkaryavada*; the Vaiseshikas' *asatkaryavada* is discussed only in one or two places (K.3 c-d, etc). Law of Causation *Karana-karya-vada* is the central theme of all dualists and has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6,7: citta, etc and samsara, etc). The origination theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the *Pratitya-samutpada-gatha* has been referred to and ridiculed, read IV, 58: धर्मा य इति जायन्ते ते न तत्त्वतः । with the gatha: ये धर्मा हेतुप्रभवा हेतुं तेषां तथागतो हृषाह ।

As previously remarked Naga's target of attack in upholding the non-origination theory is in the main the early Buddhist who followed the *Pratitya-samutpada-gatha* closely in letter. His criticism against the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas can be found in the Dvadasa-mukha (my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Madhyamikas profess no proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents' propositions cfr. *Vigrahavyavartani*, ver. 29, and Madh. vrtti, p.16 with Aryadeva's citation. To the question whether Sunyavada, Nihilism is adhered to Naga replies an emphatic no. He declares eloquently:

शून्यमिति न वक्तव्यमशून्यमिति वा भवेत् ।

उभयं नोभयञ्चेति प्रकृत्यर्थं तु कथ्यते ॥

"It is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stated as both or non-both; it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding"

M. Sastra, XXII, II.

Likewise an exclusive *ajati* or *anutpada* theory is not acceptable to Naga, cfr. this point in his Dvadasamukha, ch. I. later portion. Gauda on the other hand sticks to the non-origination doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometime that *ajati* or *ajata* stands for Brahman or Atman. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common expression between Gauda and Naga. Read e.g. Gauda's verse.

स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिदस्तु जायते ।

सदसत्सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिदस्तु जायते ॥

with Naga's न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः ।
उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः कचन केचन ॥

M. Sastra I, 1. and

न सन् नासन् न सदसन् घर्मो निर्वन्ते यदा ।
कथं निर्वन्तको हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ॥

Ibid, I, 7.

2. *Prajnapti* and *Paratantra*. Our reading of these verses may not be very satisfactory as they are shrouded in unfamiliar expressions which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Gauda has employed here apparently some Buddhist expressions like *Prajnapti* and *Paratantra*. Though the latter term can be traced in the treatises of the Sankhya and Sankara the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical literature. It appears therefore that Gauda adopted it from the Buddhist sources and made it of his own. The Buddhists employ the term *prajnapti* in the sense of ordinary talk or philosophically an empirical realm of existence, V. Satya-siddhi, ch, on this topic and cp. also *Pudgala-prajnapti*, *Loka-jnapti*, etc, which are some of the titles in Buddhist literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is *Samvrti-satya*, empirical truth.

Paratantra is also Buddhist expression conveying the idea of origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogacara Buddhism the term conveys the sense "the mind and mental states dependent on causes and conditions". In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in contrast with which is independent, *Svatantra*. For example, the evolutes in Sankhya system are *paratantra* because they are evolved from *Prakrti* which is *svatantra* because it does not evolve from anything else (v. Sankhyakarika, 10). Sri Sankara also employs *paratantra* in connection with our body, *karya-karana-sanghata* "the aggregates of effects and senses". So Gauda's sense is quite obvious, viz. *paratantra*, causal product i.e., the samsaric process continues and persists until *samklesa*, defiling forces are present. It is an established fact in every system of thought that the defiling forces necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., samsaric life an empirical existence.

In the next verse the author speaks of *Yukti-darsana* and *bhuta-darsana*. The first is concerned with the empirical experiences and their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. *Bhuta-darsana*, an insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning

factors into non-factors. The term *bhuta-darsanam* looks like a Buddhist expression, note Asvaghosha's stanza:

भूतञ्च भूततो दृष्ट्वा भूतदर्शी विमुच्यते ॥

"Perceiver of Truth, perceiving the Truth as Truth becomes released" cited in Naga's *Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya*, *Bulletion of Tibetology* Vol.V:2. from the Saundarananda.

3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch.II (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is *acintya*, "un-thinkable". This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K.47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, topic no.5.

4. *Maya*, etc. *Maya* example is common to both Buddhism and Vedanta. *Nirmitaka* example is most likely a Buddhist one. Sankara however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: यथा मायावी निरुपादान आत्मानमेव..... आकाशेन गच्छन्निव निमिमीते । (Aitareya. Up.bhashya, Gita Press, p.37). The important verse to be noted here in this section is Gauda's refutation of Buddha's renowned Gatha on *Pratityasamutpada* doctrine. Gauda says that Buddha's teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on *jati-vada* for more details.

5. Fire-brand. This is a well-known example in Indian philosophical literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, *acintya*, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel-appearance is unthinkable, because it is not a substance, i.e. it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness कार्यकारणतायोगात्. It seems that Gauda expounds the Vedantic idea in the Yogacara Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K.44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of

perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (bhuta), etc. Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gauda, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an imposed appearance on Brahman like the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahman but it is unthinkable (acintya): magic or false. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahman because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacara Buddhists. The Ratnagotra, thus refers to four unthinkable acintya: Samala Tathata, Nirmala Tathata, Vimala Buddhaguna and Jina-kriya. Here *acintya* appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Satya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as *acintya-karmabalarupa* of the four great elements. It is *acintya* because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Dignaga the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherent in the Alaya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as *anirdesya-rupa*, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. my *Alambanapariksha*, ver. 7-8).

The Madhyamika's doctrine of voidness which may be posited as a parallel of Vedantin's doctrine of Illusion, *mayavada* appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculation about things in their indescribable character. The Madhyamikas affirm that the phenomenal world is indescribable because it does not stand their logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika analysis was not started with Naga but it must have been initiated from the early period of the Mahayana scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bhavasankrantisutra says: The consciousness of next new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their own and are void of their self substance (pp. 4, 15). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness not be specified in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (*na samkramati*). The same position is confirmed in the Salistamba-Sutra dealing with the Pratitya-samutpada doctrine, p. 6, *Na Samkrantitah* .. The Madh. vrtti (p. 121) cites a Mahayanic sutra bearing on this topic:

विज्ञाननिरोधसंभवं विज्ञान उपादायवयं विपश्यति ।
न कर्हिचि गतं न च आगतं शून्यमायोपम योगि पश्यति ॥

The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:—

प्रतीत्य यद्यत्भवति नहि तावत्तदेव तत् ।
न चान्यदपि तत् तस्मात् नोच्छिन्नं नापि शाश्वतम् ॥

M. Sastra XVIII, 10

Cp. M. vrtti, p. 239 citation from the Anavatapta Sutra:

यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति स ह्यजातो
नो तस्य उत्पादु स्वभावतोऽस्ति ।
यः प्रत्ययाधीनु स शून्य उक्तो
यः शून्यतां जानति सोऽप्रमत्तः ॥

This topic will continue in the comment on *Sasvata*, etc. No. 9.

6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap, III. on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which concurs Gauda's contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavasankranti-Sutra:

न चक्षुः प्रेक्षते रूपं मनो धर्मान् न वेत्ति च ।
एतत्तु परमं सत्यं यत्र लोको न गाहते ॥

Cited in M. vrtti, p. 120.

Gauda's statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Madh. vrtti p. 90: शून्यविद्य नहि विद्यते क्वचि अन्तरिक्षि शकुनस्य वा पदम् । (Ratnakarasutra) cp. also आकासेव सकुन्तानं पदं तस्य दुरन्नयति । Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: स नूनं स्वमपि चर्चवत् वेद्ययितुमिच्छति । सोपानमिव च पद्भ्यामारोढुं जले खे च मीनानां वायसां च दिदृक्षति ।

Aitareya bhashya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press). Here Gauda might have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.

Citta-spandita (ver. 72). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in III, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the minds nodding as resulting in false assumption. Buddha says: I notion is the mind's nodding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 202-3 cited also in S. Siddhi, ch, 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vrtti p. 540 l.12: निर्वाणमिति भगवन् यः प्रशमः सर्वनिमित्तानामुपरतिः सर्वेच्चित्तसमिच्चित्तानाम् ॥ "Nirvana is a pacification and stoppage of all causing factors and of all distraction and shaking". This idea may quite possibly tally with Gauda's conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind.

7. *Samsara* and *Moksha*. Gauda makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samsara as Naga. and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being bogged down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyamika declares that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, sunya. Gauda and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or *acintya*. Things are *acintya* unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily agreeable to our reasoning. Gauda has as a specimen, shown how absurd is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-brand and its wheel like appearance (v. Comm. No.5). Naga. has on the side of Mahayana Buddhism done the same task throughout his Madh. Sastra.

8. *Kshanti*. This concept is much favoured by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, cp. *Jnana-kshanti* in Buddhism. Gauda seems to have generalized the term in a border sense of perseverance. How the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Ajativada No. 1. Their comparison with sky is also common to the Buddhists. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Madhyamikas. For the Mahayanic idea of kshanti read the Samadhiraja Sutra:

The Bodhisattva does not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dharma; this is the description of the first kshanti.

He understands all things as comparable with maya and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kshanti. (v. Buddhagama-sangha, p. 238).

9. *Sasvata* and *Uccheda*. Buddha's doctrine is based on the middle path, *madhyamapratipad* avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta, III, 155 cited in S. Siddhi, ch. 26. No. 315). The Mahavastu equated *bhava-drsti* (भावदृष्टि) with *Sasvata* and *vibhavadrsti* (विभवदृष्टि) with *uccheda* (v. Poussin, M. vrtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p. 372, 5). Naga then declared that Buddha's doctrine freed from eternalism and Nihilism (*Sasvatocheda-drsti* in his Madh. sastra XVIII, II-Buddha introduced Pratitya-samutpada, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutra: "The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (*Samudaya-satya*) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, *Nirodha-satya*" (Samyutta, III, 134 cited in S. Siddhi ch. 190). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither identical with nor different from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Salistamba Sutra states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five aspects, the first two of which are: *na sasvata* and *na uccheda* and explains them in the same fashion as Naga does v. verse cited about). The Lalitavistara also expresses similar view: बीजस्य सतो यथाङ्कुरो न च यो बीजु सचैव अङ्कुरो । न च अन्यु ततो न चैव तत् एवमनुच्छेद अशाश्वतधर्मता ॥ "For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent" (cited in M. vrtti p. 377).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Ibid, p. 376).

Being enamoured of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws.

So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmanic state, they are eternal. Gauda's statement: "In regard to unborn things no talk is possible of 'eternal' or 'noneternal' (K.60) may be compared with Naga's verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 22). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former "things are unborn" and for the latter "things are void".

Gauda next says (60 e-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is *anakshara*, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga's idea: *Anaksharam Tattvam*. Discrimination is rooted in letters= words; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the latter is the source of the former, विकल्पयोनयः शब्दा विकल्पाः शब्दयोनयः।

Gauda's expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenals things (K.59) is comparable with Naga's verse: void things arise from the void things: शून्येभ्य एव हि शून्या धर्माः प्रभवन्ति धर्मभ्यः। Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya, ver. 4.

10. *Advaya*. Gauda seems to speak of the individual Atman by vijñana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakīrti's saying.: अविभागो हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्ययसितदर्शनः। ग्राह्यग्राहकमवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते। Pra.var.3.354

Gauda says (K. 77) that the mind's non-birth *anutpatti*, is *advaya* and that the non-birth state is possible when there is no nimitta, mind's activating cause, *pravṛtti-nimitta*. At this state the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brahmi-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK.35, 46 above and Yogasutra I, 1, 2). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion (K. 80), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual position is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha's highest knowledge. Here "Buddha" is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage. v. our remark on *advaya* in ch. II, end).

11. *Kalpita* and *Paratantra*. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms *Kalpita* and *Paratantra* are the yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic

ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of *samvrti* : *Tathya* and *Mithya-samvrti*. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is supplanted in the next moment on a close observation. Here the sight of water is *Mithya-samvrti*. and the observation of the mirage is *Tathya-samvrti* (v. my paper: *Madhyamakārtha Samgraha in JORM, IX, p. 353*). Gauda's *kalpita samvrti* corresponds to *Mithya-samvrti* (cfr. *Ibid*, ver. 9) and *Paratantra* to *Tathya. Sam* i.e. *Lokasamvrti* or *satya*. *Kalpita-sam*. is the imagined water in the mirage and the *Paratantra-sam* is the experience of the worldly objects which are products of causation law. For the yogacara Buddhists *kalpita* aspect is non-existent and false and the *paratantra* aspect i.e. the mind and the mental state is existent and real. For the *Madhyamikas* it is also unreal and void.

Now we can very well understand what Gauda means to convey in these two verses. In *kalpita-samvrti* i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the *Tathyasamvrti-Loka-vyavahara* which Gauda calls *Paratantra* and which has a bit of reality (*paramartha*). The objective universe may be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, *Paratantra-Sam-Loke-sam* but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K.73). The next must be understood thus: so-called ultimate principle, *Pradhana*, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of *Kalpita-sam* imaginary experience (*Kalpita-sam-Mithya-sam*), but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc from the viewpoint of *Paratantra-sam-Tathya-sam*. *Paratantra-sam* is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakīrti too in his *Madh. avatara* illustrates *Mithya-sam* by quoting the *Sankhya* and others and their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper: *Madh. sangraha op. cit.* p. 45). It is strange that the *Bhashya* on the verse attributed to Sankara interprets *paratantra* into *parasatya* (v. comm. No. 2. more about *paratantra*). In the light of above finding R.D. Karmarkar's much laboured explanation and note are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 130-33).

12. *Abhinivesa*. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the *Madhyanta-vibhaga* of Maitreya ch. I, 1. ver, 1 a-b: अमृताभिनिशोऽस्ति द्वयं तल्लन विद्यते। *Sthiramati* comments: there is a foundation i.e. *Paratantra*-mind mental state and on it *kalpita*, false ideas is imposed in which (*paratantra*) exists no dual, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand

Gauda in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong adherence) for *abhuta-dvaita*, dualism but there is no dualism in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be saved? The K. 79 makes plain that Gauda does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 a-b because he says in this verse that on account of *abhinivesa* for false idea of dualism, *abhuta* a man engages himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb '*vinivartate*' is '*sah*' a person, not the mind.

13. *Catuskoti*. This is the most characteristic feature of the Madhyamika philosophy. Naga eloquently proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any attribute: existence or non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from Buddha's discourse to Aggivaccha about the Tathagata's status after death which (status) has been described as '*hoti, na hoti*' *hoti ca na ca hoti, naiva na hoti na hoti*'. Then Buddha gives out his opinion about the point thus: Tathagata in Nirvana is immeasurable like the great ocean (Majhimanikaya, No. 72). It is therefore appropriate for the Madhyamikas to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc; but could it be justified on the part of Gauda who is an Advaita Vedantin and whose ultimate truth is Brahman and essentially *sat*, existence in character? For this reason probably Gauda states that the four attributes signify in order: unsteady, steady etc. Thus Gauda appears to refer by *astivada*, existence-thesis to the multiple principles of the dualists like the Sankhya, Vaisesika and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (*nastika*) the highest principle being nil the non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of *ubhaya* and *ubhayabhava* may be understood appropriately in relation to other thesis in order.

14. *Laukika-jnana* etc. The varieties of knowledge, *laukika*, etc. are quite common to the yogacara Buddhists though their interpretations are somewhat different. No difference can be noticed with reference to the first variety, viz. *Laukika* and its meaning because it is concerned with the ordinary waking experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, ie. *Suddha-laukika*. For the Buddhists (i.e. yogacara) it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the *prastha-labdha-jnana*, ie. a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration *Samadhi* and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, *paratantra*-aspect. The Yogin alone would perceive the *paratantra*-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the *samadhi*, *Lokottara*, the highest transcendental knowledge

known as *Asrayaparavrtti*, i.e. state when Alaya-consciousness is turned into Tathata, or Dharmadhatu, etc (v. Trimsika, ver. 28-30).

It appears that Gauda employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the *Suddhalaukika* and *Lokottara* as dream state and deep sleep consciousness respectively. In the dream state the mind alone experiences unreal things; so it is without objects there are experiences-*avastu sopalambha*. In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be deprived of both, objects and their experiences.

The Lankavatara Sutra speaks of the three kinds: *Laukika*, *Lokottara* and *Lokottaratama* and describes them as three stages of development. The first is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerned with all *sravakas* and *pratyeka-Buddhas*' knowledge and the third with *Buddhas* and *Bodhisattva*'s developed knowledge (v. the text cited by Karmarkar in his notes, p. 138).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The Bhashya of Sankara comments: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable; cognizable, *vijneya* is known as the fourth state (*turiyakhyam*), the Absolute Truth.... This interpretation appears to be somewhat uncertain in the next verse. 89 which does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (*jneya*) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the Bhashya, *Sarvajnata*, 'omniscience' stands for the fourth state (v. the text cited in the notes, p. 140). So apparently there is no incongruity on the part of Bhashya, so Karmarkar's criticism of Bhashya seems to be unfair.

15. *Agrayana*. This term is also a Buddhistic expression meaning Mahayana, generally understood as great vehicle. According to the Upanishads *yana* means "path" in the expressions like *Devayana* and *Pitryana* etc. In Buddhism there are three *yanas*: Hinayana, *Pratyeka Buddha-yana* and Mahayana also called *Agrayana* sometime. On the Brahmanical side two *yanas* are well known, viz, *Pitryana* and *Devayana* (v. Br. Up. VI, 2, 2, Prasna. I, 9 and Mundaka III, 1, 6) which are concerned with the field of *karman*, Vedic rites and the worship of lower Brahman (*upasana*). It is most likely that Gauda accepted here as elsewhere the Buddhist expression, *agrayana* to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest Upanishadic path. The Buddhists call Mahayana sometimes

Buddhayana. As its counterpart the Vedantin may also call his path as Brahma-yana like Brahma-nirvana of the Gita, V, 24-26, II, 72).

Now we have to explain the *Heya* etc on the basis of the Upanishads. *Heya*, 'to be abandoned' is *apara vidya*, knowledge of the lower Brahman (cfr. Sankara's bhashya on Mundaka, I, 21). The knowable is *paravidya*, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahman-realization (v. *ibid*). Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 58 (v. comment on it above). *Apya*, 'to be acquired' is the fruit effected by Karman, *Samsaraphala* (v. Bhashya on Mundaka I, 2, 2: *Sarvam Karana-karyam utpadyam, apyam, samskaryam vikaryam va*). *Pakyam*, 'to be matured' is the realisation of Atman and its identity with Brahman on the maturation of one's intellect (v. Sankara's Bhashya on Taaitti, I, 11, p. 90 Gita Press; cp. the expression, *pakya* in Sveta. Up. V, 5 and Sankara's Aparokshanubhuti, ver. येषां वृत्तिः समावृद्धा परिपक्वा च सा पुनः ।

ते वै सद्ब्रह्मतां प्राप्ता..... ॥ 133 ॥

Here *vrtti* is Brahma-*vrtti*, thinking of Brahman.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, *Laukika*, etc. (K. 88) except in the fourth *vijnaya* state. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauda's description of the third state, deep sleep as devoid of objects and their experiences.

16. *Brahman.va* Gauda calls the Upanishadic omniscience a non-dual Brahmanhood (*Brahmanya*) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The *Brhadaranyaka* describes who is *Brahmana* and who is *Krpana*: यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यं विदित्वा अस्मात् लोकात् प्रैति स कृपणः अथ य एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यं विदित्वा अस्मात् लोकात्प्रैति स ब्राह्मणः । (III, 8, 10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their faith alone leads to Brahmanhood, cfr. *Dhammapada*, *Brahmanavagga*. 26. and my paper, *Message of Buddha* and reference on pp. 5-8, *Prabudhabharata*, 1950, May.

17. *Vaisaradya*. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like *Dasabala* etc. The *Satyasiddhi* state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious leaders in respect of his sublime qualities like *Vaisaradya*, etc. (ch. 3 and my paper on this subject in *Sino Indian Studies*, vol. I, pt. 3). Now Gauda appears to have generalized the expression

and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Atman may also deserve to be characterized as '*Visarada*' just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. *Avarana*. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most characteristic feature of *avarana*, veil acceptable to the Vedantin and the Buddhist is *avidya*, nescience which is amplified into *Raga*, *dvesha* and *moha*, 'lust, indignation and infatuation'. Gauda here speaks of no *avidya* or *maya* but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity. Things, in fact, are free from veil, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on *Ajati* no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha's epithet '*Nayaka*' has been claimed by Gauda, cp. *Amarasimha*'s synonyms of Buddha '*Nayaka*' and '*Vinayaka*'.

19. *Jnanam na kramate*. Gauda state why knowledge does not cross over into entities in K. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are unborn, '*aja*' and essentially of identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relata. Gauda has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the latter is unreal (K. 72). He now speaks aloud that this point has not been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: In me a knowledge arose in respect of dharma, entities: धर्मेषु ज्ञानमुदपादि विद्या उदपादि; etc which claim has been challenged by Gauda in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about Gauda and his professed faith.

20. *Asparsa-yoga*. This seems to be absolutely a new expression coined by Gauda. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining, *yoga* in the absence of contact, *sparsa*. What does it signify? The classical definition of *yoga* in Buddhism is to concentrate one's mind on a particular object. This is definitely a *sparsa-yoga*. The Buddhists admit nine grades of *dhyana*: four *rupa-dhyanas*: four *arupa-dhyanas* and the last: *Nirodha-samapatti* which is literally a *sparsa-yoga*. For in the previous 8 *dhyanas* the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last *samadhi* the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into contact with the object, *kayena sprstva viharati* कायेन स्पृष्ट्वा विहरति this is called *sparsa vihara* (Pali; *phassa-vihara*). This fact makes clear that Gauda's *Asparsa-yoga* is unknown to the Buddhists.

The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five sensuous knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (gati). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauda has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed "*Asparsa-yoga*". Sankara's remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: तामीदृशीं तदवस्थां योगमिति मन्यन्ते वियोगमेव सन्तम् । सर्वानर्थयोगवियोगलक्षणा हीयमवस्था योगिनः । (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 160)

"That suchwise state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (viyoga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, saint is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil affairs". This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly *Asparsa-yoga* of Gauda.

Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic. The following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle:

बाह्यस्पर्शेषु असक्तात्मा बिन्दत्यात्मनि यत् सुखम् ।
स ब्रह्मयोगयुक्तात्मा सुखमक्षयमश्नुते ॥

"The yogin who being detached from the external touchables obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahma-yoga and experiences the inexhaustible happiness".

This stanza amply demonstrates that Gauda's *Asparsa-yoga* is no other than *Brahma-yoga* of the Gita. The expression, *Asparsa-yoga* with reference to *Brahma-yoga* is the most appropriate, since Brahman being identical with the yogin's Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

21. *Avivada* and *Aviruddha*. Buddha has stated on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Samyutta, III, 138, Majh. I. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 12).

Gauda likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, *ajativada* which results from the quarrelsome dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about *satkarya* and *asatkarya* etc (IV, 5). Naga would not concur with Gauda in this respect because the former

could not have any dogma of his own as a settled fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Sankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaitin's attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

अतस्तन्मतमनाहत्य वेदान्तार्थतत्त्वमेकत्वदर्शनं प्रति आह्वयन्तो मुमुक्षवः स्युरिति तार्किकमतदोषमदर्शनं किञ्चिदुच्यते अस्माभिः न तु तार्किकवत् तत्तात्पर्येण । तथैतदलोक्तम्—विवदस्त्वेव निक्षिप्य विरोधोद्भवकारणम् ।

तैः संरक्षितसद्बुद्धिः सुखं निर्वाति वेदवित् ॥

"Therefore the person desirous of Release, discarding the logician's system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman-Brahman. For this reason, we shall disclose some lapses in their systems but not being entangled in the systems. The following has been stated in this context: The Vedantin placing the entire burden of points of disputes, their origin and causes upon the disputants and being protected by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passes on peacefully and happily". (Prasna-Bhashya VI, 3, Gita Press p. 111)

Note on the last verse. Gauda pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Upanishads, e.g. Prasna. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah. Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundarananda where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga's homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sastra keeps the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on *Dvipadam vara*. Gauda's paying homage to *Dvipadam vara* in ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauda refers there to Buddha while others on the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gauda adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as "the Superiormost teacher of all men and gods" (शास्ता देवमनुष्याणाम्) but not *Dvi-*

padam vara, "best of all men". Naga accordingly pays homage to Buddha as *Vadatam vara*, 'best of all speakers or teachers' (v. the first stanza of his Sastra.... तं वन्दे वदतां वरम्). Gauda's object of reverence is the best of bipeds, i.e. Purushottama, 'best of all persons' which obviously refers to Good, Visnum, ref Gita: उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वयः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः Ch. XV, 17, 'the Supreme Person is different (from the lower Brahman) and known as the Supreme Self' which passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of existence (*loka-traya*). We should not confuse between '*Dvipadam varam*' and '*Vadatam varam*' which two terms signify two distinct theological concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauda adopted a great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Monism *Advaita darsana*.

GILGIT (AND SWAT)

—NIRMAL C. SINHA

The previous issue (Vol VII, No 3) of *Bulletin of Tibetology* has a learned paper entitled "Gilgit in Ancient Times". This study, as stated in its concluding paragraph, "shows how important Baltistan and Gilgit have been in the political, diplomatic and military history of Tibet, China, Kashgharia, Tukharistan, Kapisa, Gandhara, Kashmir and North India in ancient times". Tibet heads the list of countries enumerated here. The reason for this is to be found in the cultural history as recorded in Tibetan tradition and not in the political history as narrated in Chinese *Annals* or in Sanskrit *River of Kings*. I thus propose to present the cultural relations of Gilgit (and Swat) with Tibet in ancient times.

Gilgit as a strategic summit is a comparatively modern affair and may be traced from 1860s when Britain and Russia were nearing each other in Inner Asia. I have no on-the-ground knowledge of Gilgit or Swat; the nearest point I have been towards Gilgit is Leh; the nearest point I have been towards Swat is Taxila. For geographical data of Gilgit and Swat I depend on the observations of explorers and scholars like Alexander Cunningham, Frederic Drew, Reginald Schomberg, Clarmont Skrine, Olaf Caroe, KPS Menon and above all Aurel Stein. Inferences drawn are mine. For cultural history of Gilgit (and Swat), I add my own observations to the findings of authorities like SCHLAGINTWET, FRANCKE, THOMAS, TUCCI, DUTT and STEIN.

GILGIT LOCATION & AREA

Gilgit township is on the river Gilgit near northern latitude 35.55 and eastern longitude 74.15; Gilgit river joins Indus thirty miles down SE. A much larger area than the township has from time to time been known as Gilgit. Ever since the occupation of Gilgit by Pakistan raiders (1947-48), few scholars have been permitted to Gilgit. Arnold Toynbee visited in 1960. Vide *Between Oxus and Jumna* (Oxford 1961) pp 131-4. Toynbee however is not a specialist in Inner Asia or Buddhism. In 1965 summer, a specialist scholar of Tibeto-Burman languages, Richard Keith Sprigg was issued permit for Gilgit-Baltistan but eventually returned from Rawalpindi. That was on the eve of Pakistan's War on India.

INDIA MAIOR

CONGRATULATORY VOLUME PRESENTED TO

J. GONDA

EDITED BY

Honorary Committee

L. Alsdorf, Hamburg; W. Norman Brown, Pennsylvania;
R. N. Dandekar, Poona; M. Leumann, Zürich; V. Raghavan, Madras;
E. Słuszkiewicz, Toruń; J. Varenne, Aix-en-Provence

J. ENSINK AND P. GAEFFKE



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1972

is usually condemned to suffer, is actually mentioned in unequivocal contrast with *yamarājya*,¹ where, on the other hand, every wish of the giver is fulfilled. Where this *nāraka loka* is located is, however, not indicated. Another Atharvavedic passage (XII.5.64) refers to *pāpalokas* which are far away (*parāvataḥ*) and which are contrasted with *yamasādāna*, "Yama's abode". One point needs to be noted in connection with this reference, namely, that the Atharvaveda seems to believe in a plurality of *pāpalokas* or infernal regions even as it does in a plurality of *puṇyalokas* or heavens.

Poona.

¹ This reminds one of *svarga*. See above.

P. HACKER

NOTES ON THE MĀṆḌŪKYOPANIṢAD AND ŚĀṆKARA'S ĀGAMAŚĀSTRAVIVARAṆA

The bulk of those works that are doubtless Śāṅkarabhagavat's¹ consist of commentaries. The texts Śāṅkara (Ś) commented upon were for him all authoritative scriptures, *śruti* or *smṛti*. This precluded any criticism or rejection of ideas expressed in them. But lack of criticism does not of itself imply positive affirmation. It is important that we should note this distinction when dealing with individual commentaries, when grappling with the problem of the authenticity of the works ascribed to Ś and, eventually, when trying to arrive at a comprehensive assessment of Ś's thought. When analyzing individual commentaries, we have to distinguish between mere paraphrases of a text and *utsūtra* passages, i.e. passages in which Ś sets forth views not indicated in the text. It is mainly the latter which we have to utilize if we wish to assess Ś's own philosophical achievement. In his paraphrases we have to reckon with his practising a supple adaptation indicative at once of his respect for the authority of a text and of his reserve towards individual opinions stated in it. It may be noted in passing that proper attention to the reverential flexibility of Ś's mind does not allow us to deny his authorship simply on the ground that a text he commented upon includes ideas which he did not uphold when speaking independently of an authoritative text.

But even the treatment of a doctrine in an *utsūtra* passage does not as such imply that the doctrine is essential or central to Ś's own system of thought. Such passages may include elements of tradition which Ś thought useful or necessary to assimilate. A case of such assimilation seems to be traceable in some cosmological views in the initial part of Ś's Āgamaśāstravivarāṇa (ĀŚV)² where

¹ For the distinction between Śāṅkarācārya and Śāṅkarabhagavat-(pāda) see my article in *NIA* 9, nos. 5-6 (1947). Since this article was printed without proof-reading, it contains many errors, some of which even distort the sense. Regarding the point in question, however, these errors are of no great relevance.

² The question whether Śāṅkarabhagavat was really the author of the ĀŚV has been answered in the affirmative by Dr. T. Vetter (in *Festschrift*

he comments on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad (MU) and the first verses of Gauḍapāda's (G's) *kārikās* which are known as the Āgamaśāstra (ĀŚ). Most of the ideas Ś sets forth here do not seem to be intended

für E. Frauwallner, WZKSO 12/13 (1968), pp. 407ff). To the positive marks of authenticity noted by Dr. Vetter some negative ones might be added. Some terms that are very common in other Advaita works but are never used by Śaṅkarabhagavat, do not occur in the ĀŚV, notably *vivarta* (although the subject matter would have called for this term if the author had accepted it as an expression of his illusionism), *sphūrti* or *sphurana* (although these terms would have excellently fitted into the author's idealism), and *jaḍa* (in the sense of *acetana*). Furthermore, in the ĀŚV just as in other genuine works of Ś, we notice the author's reserve towards an unqualified characterization of Brahman as *sat* and *ānanda*. As for *sat*, we will revert to this term below. Dr. Vetter's penetrating study has confirmed some of my own findings and hypotheses, even though he viewed Ś's work from quite a different angle than I did. I would note in this connexion, (1) Dr. Vetter's solution of the problem of the authenticity of the ĀŚV, (2) his hypothesis that the ĀŚV can be understood as representing an earlier stage of the thought of the same author who composed the Śaṅkara-Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (3) his observation that in the time between the composition of the two works Ś came to know, or studied more thoroughly, (a) the Mīmāṃsā of Kumārila, (b) Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika.—Dr. Vetter's differentiation of two meanings of the word *avidyā* in Ś's works is useful but should not be understood as implying that Ś somehow *intended* this duality. Like Dr. Vetter, I am of the opinion that what he calls the second meaning of *avidyā* is not a result of philosophic reflexion and has hardly any philosophical relevance. Still, Dr. Vetter's characterization of this second meaning as "garbage disposal of problems" (*loc. cit.*, p. 421) seems to me to be besides the point. We can not only infer from Ś's reasonings (as I did in: *Die Welt des Orients* 3, Wuppertal 1948, pp. 248f and in ZDMG 100 (1950), pp. 255f), there is even plain textual evidence to show, that Ś, far from attempting to reason away certain problems connected with the concept of *avidyā*, simply refused to enter into them. For instance, in his Gītābhāṣya he says tersely, *avidyā kasya dṛśyate, iti praśno nīvarthakaḥ*, "It does not make sense to ask, 'Whose is Nescience?'" (13, 2). He was certainly right in so far as the problem, doubtless discussed by Vedāntists already at his time, of the locus or substratum of metaphysical nescience is really a pseudo-problem. I think it would be more adequate to interpret what Dr. Vetter calls the second meaning of *avidyā* as the assimilation of an element of tradition. It is one of the aims of the present article to show that Ś assimilated some elements of tradition even though these did not perfectly tally with the central ideas of his own system. We have reasons to assume that Ś's monism and illusionism was suspected of being an illegitimate novelty by many Aupaniṣadas of his time. This suspicion must have stirred him to emphasize that his teachings were in perfect accord with the tradition of Vedāntism. Actually, in all his writings he not only voiced his respect for the Vedānta tradition and his scorn for outsiders with suspicious frequency and vigour, but he also incorporated into his system some ideas whose inconsistency with other ideas of his leads us to the conclusion that he took them from an earlier form of Vedāntism, less radically monistic and less illusionistic than his own system. The drastic imagery of Dr. Vetter's

by the Upaniṣad nor are they indicated in G's work. I have elsewhere¹ proposed the hypothesis that Ś was first an adherent of the Yoga system and became an Advaitist when a teacher explained to him G's ĀŚ whose initial part is an interpretation of the MU. If this hypothesis is correct, we may assume that the cosmological views of Ś's commentary on the ĀŚ partly reflect what he learned from his teacher. In the present article I will, with some digressions, attempt an analysis of some cosmological views expressed in the initial part of Ś's ĀŚV. This is meant as a contribution to an inventory of Ś's teachings. Certain inconsistencies in Ś's exposition will allow us to discern elements of tradition and some ideas that he had conceived but not yet thought out. An examination of a few relevant passages from some other commentaries composed by Ś will further illustrate his view of the problems involved.

In the present paper I use the word "cosmology" to denote metaphysical theories that claim to explain the relation of the world, and of man within the world, to the Absolute. Such theories naturally also include ideas that we may classify as epistemological, ontological, and theological. Cosmogony is one aspect of cosmology. Another aspect is concerned with the existence and subsistence of the world.

The MU, utilizing materials from several earlier Upaniṣads, teaches an equation of the syllable *om* with the human person. The human person, according to the MU, has four "quarters". The "places", i.e. the spheres, of the first three quarters are the states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. These are in turn equated with the three phonetic elements *a*, *u* and *m* whose amalgamation makes up the syllable *om*. In addition to these, there is supposed to exist a fourth, soundless quarter of *om*. This is identified with the fourth (*turiya*) quarter of the human self which is described chiefly by negations. We would say, it corresponds to mystical experience. Moreover, the Upaniṣad identifies *om* with the three times, the past, the present and the future. In this respect, the

"refuse disposal" would be quite to the point if Ś had been a solitary thinker of the kind that arose in the West about the time of Descartes. In India, however, what recommended a thinker's achievement was not novelty but conformity with tradition. Moreover, we have to keep in mind the strongly positive orientation of Ś's thinking. This deterred him from paying to an essentially negative concept like *avidyā* more attention than was absolutely required in view of the practical goal of his teaching.

¹ In *Festschrift für E. Frauwallner*, WZKSO 12/13 (1968), pp. 119ff.

soundless quarter is "beyond the three times" (*trikālātīta*). The human person (*ātman*) is also identical with Brahman, and Brahman, like *om*, is "all this", *sarvam etat*, that is, the Universe. The cosmic aspect of these monistic equations is indicated in some enigmatic expressions but not fully elaborated in the Upaniṣad.

All this seems very strange to us. To understand the Upaniṣad, we have to recall, first of all, that Upaniṣads do not primarily intend to convey what we call theoretical knowledge. Rather, their aim is practical. They are meant to give to ascetics guidelines for meditative concentration. After *adhyayana* and *śravaṇa*, that is, after learning the sacred text from his teacher and having its meaning explained by him, the ascetic practises *svādhyāya*, which consists in his muttering the text again and again with a view to realizing its content. This realization is *bhāvanā*. The English word "to realize" seems singularly appropriate to describe the meaning of this *bhāvanā* which is a *sādhana*. If we can manage to effect a coalescence of two meanings of the verb "to realize"—(1) to bring into being, (2) to conceive as real—, then we arrive at what is signified by *bhāvanā*. From ancient times there has been in India the conviction that mental representations, if reaching a high degree of intensity, are capable of bringing about a reality not only on the psychological level but even in the domain of material things.¹

In passing it may be noted that this belief and the corresponding practice are originally grounded in the insight that the psyche and matter are not separated by a boundary that cannot be crossed but there are continuous passages between the two domains. On the one hand, the doctrine, common to Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedānta, that the mind consists of subtle matter, is a systematization of this belief. On the other hand, it is fairly certain that the idea of psycho-physical unity, and in particular the conviction that man's thinking can directly influence or even bring about external things and events, was one of the presuppositions for the rise of monism and epistemological idealism in Hinduism as well as in Buddhism.

The teaching of the MU makes sense only on the supposition that there are continuous passages between matter, psyche and spirit, or, to put it more exactly, between man's physico-psycho-spiritual substance and the phenomena of the Universe. A third domain,

¹ This subject would deserve a special monograph. I confine myself here to referring the reader to the index, s.v. "Gedankenrealismus", of my book, *Prakṛāda*, Wiesbaden, 1959/60.

which the Upaniṣad adds to man's interior and the outward world, is the spiritual sphere of the Veda. In a condensed form this sphere is present in the mysterious syllable *om* which is generally taken to contain the essence of the whole Veda and is identified with Brahman.

The MU employs two patterns of thought, both very common in Upaniṣads and later scriptures. The first pattern consists in the establishing of a *parallelism* between man, the Universe and the Veda, and this parallelism tends to solidify into an identity. Secondly, a *gradation* is discovered in the nature of man and the "realization" of this gradation is expected to lead the ascetic up to the highest truth which is the supreme goal. Both these patterns of thought, especially in their tendency to identification and realization, presuppose the abovementioned belief in the possibility of a passage from the psychic to the domain of matter on the one hand and to the spirit on the other.

According to the MU, it is profitable for a man to realize the equations of each "quarter" of his self in turn. This act of realization is expressed by the present perfect *veda*. Of particular interest are the third and fourth quarters. The third quarter is called "the Lord of all, the Knower of All, the Inner Controller, the womb of all, that from which all things originate and in which they are merged" (*eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām*, MU 6). It is the thought-pattern of latency and manifestation which is at the bottom of this description. Its explicit formulation is the Sāṅkhya doctrine of material causality, the *satkāryavāda*. We shall meet with it again when analyzing Ś's commentary. When one thing disappears and another thing, contiguous or related to it, remains manifest, then the disappearing thing is believed to have slipped into that which remains. The state of latency is the causal state, for from that into which a thing is merged it can emerge again. Thus the remaining thing is the material cause of the thing that emerges from it and disappears into it. In anthropology, this principle finds an application in the theory of the three states of the human self. In dreamless sleep all functions of sentiency have ceased. No objects are perceived. Hence the self in dreamless sleep is the cause of the two quarters of the self whose spheres are the waking state and dream. The cosmic aspect of the state of latency is "the Lord of all". This designation suggests the idea of a personal God, but this God is at the same time the material

cause of all things. The Upaniṣad not only affirms a parallelism between this Lord and the third quarter of the human self but identifies both in a perfect monism.

The goal of the realization of the equations is the fourth quarter, the *turiya*. Here the Universe is, as it were, evaporated. If there is still an identification, it is between the ineffable fourth quarter of the human self and the soundless fourth quarter of *om*. The descriptions of these two quarters (given respectively in MU 7 and 12) include partly the same words. Both are described as “not susceptible of being dealt with, in language or otherwise” (*avyavahārya*), as “auspicious” (*śiva*), as “the extinction of the expansion” (*prapañcōpaśama*), as “the Self” (*ātman*), and as “non-duality” or “the absence of a second entity” (*advaita*).¹ The characterization of the *turiya* as the *ātman* without any qualification seems to imply that the division, given in the foregoing sections, of the human self into four quarters is intended only as a preliminary approximation. The Upaniṣad seems to intimate that, after successively realizing the equations of the first three quarters, the adept arrives at a state which is not, properly speaking, a quarter but the whole. This whole is the Self itself, and “he who realizes this is merged with his self in the Self” (*saṃviśaty ātmanā 'tmānam ya evaṃ veda*, MU 12). Realization and reality, experience and that which is experienced, have become one, in a non-entitative entity which is at the same time a consciousnessless consciousness.

The description of this indescribable paradox exhibits a striking blend of terms of Buddhistic and Brahminical origin. *prapañcōpaśama*, in juxtaposition with *śiva*, describes the *nirvāṇa* in the Mādhyamaka system (see *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, ed., transl. and annotated by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharyya, Calcutta 1943, p. 44). A similar term, *sarvaprapañcavikalpōpaśāntatva*, occurs in a text of the Tathāgatagarbha school, namely in the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (*The Ratnagotravibhāga* . . . , ed. by E. H. Johnston, Patna 1950, p. 8, line 9 and p. 9, line 14). I need not enter here into a discussion of the Buddhistic meaning of *prapañca*. In translating *prapañcōpaśama* by “the extinction of the expansion” I would leave open four ways of interpreting *prapañca*: this word may denote either (1) an expansion of words, the use of words to describe a multiplicity of things, or (2) the growth of ideas, that is,

¹ For the meaning of *advaita* see p. 128, footnote 21 of the article mentioned in footnote 1 on p. 117 of the present study.

the formation of a variety of ideas, or (3) a display of activity, or (4) a display of things, that is, the manifestation of objective phenomena (for details see Lambert Schmithausen: *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī* . . . , Wien 1969 [Österreichische Akademie d. Wiss.], pp. 137-142). We cannot decide which of these meanings of *prapañca* is intended by the Upaniṣad. In any case, the fact of Buddhist influence is beyond any doubt. Gauḍapāda, then, was not the first to amalgamate Buddhist ideas and Upaniṣadism. In the first chapter of his *kārikās*, he interpreted an Upaniṣad which was itself already influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharyya held that the twelve sections which are generally regarded as making up the MU were composed later than G's ĀŚ (*op.cit.*, Introd., pp. xxxviii-xlvi). He writes: “The MU is mainly based on the *kārikās*, and not *vice versa*” (p. xlvi). His arguments do not, however, seem convincing. G does not claim to give a full explanation of the MU. He uses this Upaniṣad as a starting point to develop ideas that go far beyond the parallelisms or identifications of the MU. We may assume that the MU, though of late origin, had won recognition as *śruti* in certain circles and Gauḍapāda linked his own work to this Upaniṣad in the hope that its authority would redound to the prestige of his novel version of Vedāntism.

Realization of the *turiya* naturally transcends the realm of cosmology. The three other quarters of the human self, however, have their cosmic equivalents. In the case of the third quarter the equivalence is intensified into an identity. As we have already mentioned, the quarter of the human self whose sphere is dreamless sleep is identical with the “Lord of all”. In the case of the first two quarters, the Upaniṣad indicates equivalences by metaphors and numbers, unintelligible in themselves. Ś's commentary provides flesh to these bare bones.

The MU calls the waking-state quarter of the self *vaiśvānara* and describes it as “having seven limbs” (*saptāṅga*). Ś explains this enigmatic expression by a reference to Chāndogya-Up. 5,18,2 where the *ātmā vaiśvānaraḥ* is said to consist of elements of the Universe. He says that the seven limbs are the sky, the sun, the air, ether, water, the earth, and one of the sacrificial fires. He underscores the cosmic meaning by explaining that the Upaniṣad, by dividing the human self into four parts, intends to bring out that the whole Universe is likewise fourfold (*sarvasya prapañcasya sādhidāivikasyā*

'nenā 'tmanā catuṣpāttvasya vivakṣitatvāt, p. 16).¹ The individual, bodily self is called *ādhyātmikah piṇḍātmā*, the cosmic material self is *ādhidāiviko virāḍātmā*, and both are identical (*eka*). Just as the *ātmā vaiśvānaraḥ* (called *viśva* in G's *kārikā*) is identical with the *virāḍātmā* or *virāj*, so the self in the dreaming state (the second quarter, called *taijasa*) is identical with the cosmic Hiraṇyagarbha, and the self in dreamless sleep (the third quarter, called *prājña* in the MU) is identical with "the Unmanifested Self" or "the Self of the Unmanifested" (*avyākṛtātmā*; pp. 14-19, comm. on MU 3).

To demonstrate the equation of *taijasa* with Hiraṇyagarbha, Ś quotes two passages from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up. (2, 5, 1 and 5, 6, 1): "There is in this earth a Person who consists of glow and of deathless substance, and there is in the human self [a bodily Person consisting of glow and of deathless substance. He is this one (i.e., both Persons are identical); he is this self, he is deathless substance, he is Brahman, he is the Universe"] (*yaś cā 'yam asyām pṛthivyām tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣaḥ, yaś cā 'yam adhyātmam śārīras tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣaḥ, ayam eva sa yo 'yam ātmā, idam amṛtam, idam brahma, idam sarvam*; p. 18, comm. on MU 3) and: "This Person consists of mind, [his truth is brightness, he is here within the heart like a grain of rice or barley"] (*manomayo 'yam puruṣaḥ, bhāṣatyas tasminn antaḥkhyādaya yathā vṛhiḥ vā yavo vā*; p. 28, comm. on ĀŚ 1,2).² Ś can cite these two passages with a view to elucidating the equations of the MU because he interprets *puruṣa* ("man", "person") in certain Upaniṣad texts as a synonym of Hiraṇyagarbha. Moreover, both passages describe a *puruṣa* as glowing and shining. Both heat and radiance are signified by the word *tejas*.³

¹ Page numbers after quotations refer to the following edition of the MU with the ĀŚ and the ĀŚV: *Sa-Gauḍapādīya-kārikā-'tharvavedīya-Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣat* ... Puṇyākhyapattane ... Ānandāśrama-mudraṇālaye ... prakāśitam. Śaṣṭhī 'yam aṅkanāvṛttiḥ. Khristābdāḥ 1936 (Ānandāśrama-saṃskṛta-granthāvaliḥ, granthāṅkaḥ 10).—The reading *-ātmanā* (instead of *-ātmanas*) is attested by Ānandajñāna's subcommentary.

² The two quotations are given here at greater length than in Ś's commentary. This seemed necessary for understanding the context. Since Ś presupposes that his readers or hearers know the scriptures by heart, he very often contents himself with indicating passages from them by a few initial words, without quoting all that is relevant to the context of his exposition. In my translation I have included in square brackets words not expressly cited by Ś.

³ *Tejas* stands for a very important notion in ancient and mediaeval Indian thought. See my book, *Prahlāda*, Sanskrit index s.v. *tejas* and *tapas*, German index s.v. *Glut*.

This demonstration looks much like an application of the exegetical principle, *scriptura sui ipsius interpres*. It is an attempt, probably not of Ś's own invention, to systematize cosmological statements of late Vedic texts and interpret them in accordance with and in support of views of a later time. The interesting terms *hiraṇyagarbha* and *virāj* first emerged in two hymns of the Ṛgveda (10, 121, 1 and 10, 90, 5). Before these terms took on the meaning they have in Ś's ĀŚV the ideas of the two Vedic hymns had gone through a long and rich history of interpretation and reinterpretation—which would deserve a monograph.

The identity of the Unmanifested and the deep-sleep self is, says Ś, "self-evident because there is no difference between them" (*susūptā- 'vyākṛtayos tv ekatvam siddham eva nirviśeṣatvāt*, p. 18).—The equation of the *vaiśvānara* with the cosmic self is further elaborated in Ś's commentary on G's *kārikā* 1,2 (p.26). G here describes the *viśva* as "him who is in the right eye, which is his opening" (*dakṣiṇā- 'kṣi-mukhe*). To explain this, Ś first refers to Brh.Ār.Up. 4, 2, 2: *indho ha vai nāmai 'sa yo 'yam dakṣiṇe 'kṣan puruṣaḥ*, "There is in the right eye that Person (i.e., that little man) whose name is Indha." Ś goes on to comment: "Indha is the *vaiśvānara*. His distinctive quality is effulgence (*dīpti-guṇa*). The *vairāja ātmā* who is within the sun, and the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) in the eye are one and the same (*eka*)." An opponent urges that there is a difference between Hiraṇyagarbha or Kṣetrajña and the seer in the eye who is "the lord of the body" (*dehasvāmin*). Ś rejects this objection, pointing to Śvet. Up. 6, 11 (*eko devaḥ sarva-bhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ*) and to two passages from the Bhag.Gītā (*kṣetrajñam cā 'pi māṃ viddhi sarva-kṣetreṣu Bhārata*, 13,2; *avibhaktam ca bhūteṣu vibhaktam iva ca sthitam*, 13, 16). The objection seems to imply that there is no difference between Hiraṇyagarbha (or Kṣetrajña) and *vairāja ātmā* (or *virāj*). In fact Ś himself states presently that *viśva*, *taijasa* and *prājña* are identical (p.27), and this equation in the anthropological domain would entail an equation at the cosmic level. He did not, however, assert the identity of *Vairāja ātmā*, Hiraṇyagarbha and *Avyākṛta ātmā*. He used the terms *Virāj* (or *Vairāja ātmā*) and Hiraṇyagarbha in a sense which we may assume they had in a tradition whose monism was not so radical as that of G. This tradition continued to be handed down even in the school of extreme monism. About 800 years after Ś's lifetime we find its survival attested in the Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda.

Another term which Ś in his commentary on the MU uses in delineating a cosmology is *prāṇa*. In the framework of the fourfold division taught by the MU *prāṇa* stands for a stage that is higher than *viśva* and *taijasa* and which the Upaniṣad calls *prājñā*. Ś's ocmmentary, however, uses *prāṇa* in a much wider sense than the one which *prājñā* has in the MU. *prāṇa* accounts for the origin or structure of the whole of the Universe—much as the terms *Virāj* and *Hiraṇyagarbha* also do, quite independently of the schema of the MU.

The way in which Ś uses the term *prāṇa* recalls the Kauṣītaki-Up. whose third and fourth Adhyāyas teach that *prāṇa* and *prajñātman* are identical.¹ But Ś does not expressly refer to that Upaniṣad. He introduces the term *prāṇa* in commenting on MU 6. This section describes a cosmic aspect of the third “quarter” of the human person, the quarter whose sphere is dreamless sleep and which is called *prājñā* in Section 5. Section 6 states that this is “the Lord of the Universe, the Omniscient, the Inner Controller, the womb of all, that from which the beings originate and into which they merge” (*eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavā-ḥ pyayau hi bhūtānām*). Commenting on these words, Ś first makes out that this Lord “is not, as others hold, of a different kind from this” (i.e., from this world—or, more probably: from this individual soul; p.24). Then he gives a quotation, somewhat surprising in this context, from Chāndogya-Up. 6, 8, 2: “The mind . . . is fastened to the *prāṇa*” (*prāṇa-bandhanam . . . manaḥ*). *prāṇa* here seems to be a synonym of *īśvara*. He has an individual as well as a cosmic aspect. In the human individual *Prāṇa* is the Inner Controller, in the Universe he² is “he from whom the beings originate and in which they merge”. Both aspects, however, are identical. The “Lord of the Universe” is also the “Inner Controller”. This is why Ś can quote, as a support of his monism, the Upaniṣad words that the mind is linked up with the *Prāṇa*. The mind is of course individual. But the *Prāṇa* or Life Breath to whom each man's mind is tied is the Lord of the Universe.—A little later, in commenting on G's *kārikā* 1,2, Ś first refers to the individual aspect of the

¹ The terms *prajñā* and *prajñāna* are characteristic of the R̥gveda schools. Most of the occurrences of *prajñā* and related words recorded in Jacob's *Concordance* from the earlier Upaniṣads are from the Aitareya-Up. and the Kauṣītaki-Up. Another occurrence is in Aitareyāranyaka 2, 3, 2.

² *Prāṇa* is sometimes regarded as a person. In such cases we use the pronouns *he* and *who* to refer to *Prāṇa*.

Prāṇa. Using G's term “vibration”, he says that in deep sleep the mind's vibrations, which are perception and remembrance, have ceased. In this state the same spiritual entity that is called *viśva* in the waking state and *taijasa* in dream, stays undifferentiated in the heart in the form of the *Prāṇa* (*darśana-smaraṇe eva hi manaḥ-spandite tad-abhāve hṛdy eva 'viśeṣeṇa prāṇā-'tmanā 'vasthānam*, p.27). To support this idea, Ś quotes Chānd.Up. 4, 3, 3, “The *Prāṇa* absorbs (*saṃvṛṇkte*) all these.” Shortly afterwards, however, in meeting an opponent's objection, he tries to demonstrate that the *Prāṇa* is *avyākṛta*, i.e. unmanifest or unevolved, because in it all faculties are merged when they cease to operate. We have already noted that at the bottom of this view there is the thought pattern of latency and manifestation, with latency being at the same time the potentiality of material causation. Primarily, the term *avyākṛta* has a cosmic meaning. In this sense Ś used it before, in the triad *Virāj*—*Hiraṇyagarbha*—*Avyākṛta ātmā*. In treating of the *Prāṇa*, he identifies the *Prāṇa*, who is *avyākṛta*, with *sat*, which is the *ens primum* of Chānd.Up. VI, and with Brahman in so far as this is *sat*. He claims that the *Prāṇa* to whom, according to Chānd.Up. 6, 8, 2, “the mind is tied”, is none other than the *Sat*. *Sat*, “the Existent”, is not the pure Brahman but that aspect of Brahman in which it is “associated with a seed” (*saḥijā*). That is to say, the word *prāṇa* denotes the *ens primum* or Brahman as the material cause of all that which is. A different aspect of Brahman is the one in which it is “devoid of a seed” (*nirbīja*) and which the Upaniṣads describe by negative expressions, e.g., as “that from which words turn back” (Taitt.Up. 2, 4, 1; 2, 9, 1) or as that which is “other than the known and also [above] the unknown” (*anyad eva tad veditād atho aviditād [adhi]*, Kena-Up. 1, 3. Both passages are quoted by Ś, p. 30).

The terms used previously, *Virāj* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*, imply a parallelism of the cosmic and the anthropological aspects of reality, and only by way of an identification is this parallelism turned into monism. The term *prāṇa*, however, as used by Ś, brings out monism more emphatically. It comprehends both the anthropological and the cosmic aspects, the first being denoted by the word *prāṇa* (life breath, vital force, biomotor force),¹ the second by the term *sat*

¹ The terms “vital force” and “biomotor force” are pertinent translations suggested by S. N. Dasgupta. See his *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, index, s.v. *prāṇa*; vol. 2, index, s.v. *biomotor force*.

(*ens primum*) which stands for Brahman in so far as this is the material cause of all. However, this *prāṇa* monism is not necessarily associated with an illusionism. True, beyond the *sabijam Brahman* there is the *nirbijam Brahman*, but this does not of itself imply that the “seed” with which Brahman can be combined or intertwined, and the product of this seed, are illusory or not fully real. Once we have noticed this, we must conclude that the doctrine of *prāṇa* in the initial part of the *ĀŚV* originally belonged to a Vedānta school that was certainly monistic but whose illusionism was not so extreme as that of G or even Ś.

It would seem that G refers to this school in *kārikā* 1, 6: *Prabhavaḥ sarva-bhāvānām satām iti viniścayaḥ | sarvaṃ janayati prāṇaś ceto-’ṃsūn puruṣaḥ pṛthak*. Deviating from Ś’s commentary, I would translate this as follows: “There is a position which holds that all states of being originate as existent. The Prāṇa generates all things. The Spirit [generates] the rays of intelligence as separate [from the products of the Prāṇa].” Since the subsequent verses (7-9b) report the onto-cosmological positions of alien schools, it seems probable that in v. 6 also G is not stating his own opinion but that of a group with which he did not or not fully agree. Just as *viniścitaḥ* in v. 8 does not imply that G was convinced that the opinion reported there was true, so *viniścayaḥ* in v. 6 need not signify that this verse states G’s own position. There are more than one passage in the *ĀŚ* which Ś has evidently or probably misunderstood.¹

Ś—erroneously—takes *ĀŚ* 1,6 as expressing the author’s own view. This entails a somewhat strained interpretation. Commenting on G’s verse, Ś writes, “All states of being, which fall into the domains of *viśva*, *taijasa*, and *prājñā*, originate, i.e. arise, as being, i.e. existent, in their respective illusory nature which is name and form, made by Nescience” (*satām vidyamānānām svenā ’vidyā-kṛta-nāmarūpa-māyā-svarūpeṇa sarva-bhāvānām viśva-taijasa-prājñā-bhedānām prabhava utpattiḥ*, p. 33). Thus he introduces his illusionism, which he states in a form that is characteristically his own as is borne out by similar formulations in all his works and the absence of such formulas in the known works of other Advaitists.² Ś then goes on to say that nothing can originate as

inexistent. An illusion arises from the “nescience-made illusion-seed” (*avidyā-kṛta-māyā-bīja*) and has its existence (*sattva*) by virtue of the real thing underlying it. There is no illusion or illusory thing without a real substratum (*āspada*) and the existence of an illusory thing is that of its substratum. “Thus all states of being before their origination had their existence in the form of their seed, which is the Prāṇa” (*evaṃ sarva-bhāvānām utpattēḥ prāk prāṇa-bījā-’tmanai ’va sattvam*, p.34).

This illusionistic cosmology is neither indicated in the verse whose content it is meant to elucidate, nor does it completely agree with G’s position. Ś emphasizes that an illusory thing cannot have its illusory existence without a real substratum underlying it. By this doctrine he intends to ward off the negativism of the Madhyamakas who contended that every thing is a mere void with no reality underlying it. G, on the other hand, without controverting negativism, teaches, “The God who is the Self imagines (or: fictitiously creates) himself through himself by virtue of his own delusive power” (*kalpayaty ātmanā ’tmānam ātmā devaḥ sva-māyayā*, *ĀŚ* 2,12). Other Advaitists, however, shrank from describing the Self as the direct producer of the appearance of fictitious things. They explained the non-relational relationship between the Self and the illusory things with the aid of spatial imagery. They taught that the Self is the locus or substratum (*āśraya*) of Nescience which is the material cause of illusory things. Ś neither repeated G’s doctrine nor did he enter into the thorny problem of the substratum of Nescience. To be sure, he regarded all things and all mental processes as ultimately unreal and he utilized the concept of nescience to account for this unreality. But he did not deem it worth while to reflect on what was the substratum of nescience. This would have entailed focusing attention on a purely negative concept. Instead, he preferred to envisage positive entities only, Brahman, which is the absolute reality, and things, which we treat as real in *vyavahāra*. Thus, discarding the problem of the substratum of nescience, he determined the relationship between existents and the Existent in stating that Brahman is the basis (*āspada*) of all things, processes, and ideas. Regarding cognition and memory, he sets forth this doctrine in his commentary on *ĀŚ* 2,12: *nā ’nyo ’sti jñāna-smṛty-āśrayaḥ. na ca nirāspade eva jñānasmyṛti vaināśikānām iva*—“There is no other substratum of cognition and memory [besides the Self]. Nor are cognition and memory devoid of a substratum as the Negativists hold” (p. 75).

¹ This has also been noted by Dr. Vetter in his study cited above, footnote 2, p. 115.

² See my article in *ZDMG* 100 (1950), pp. 248-256.

The "seed" of illusory or fictitious things is the Prāṇa which is itself (or: who is himself) ultimately "non-existent" (*asat*, Ś's comm. on ĀŚ 1,9; p. 38). Elsewhere Ś calls this seed "name and form".¹ The same term (*nāmarūpa*) occurs in his ĀŚV to denote the "nature" (*svarūpa*) of illusory things (comm. on ĀŚ 1, 6; p. 33). Now "seed" is a metaphor to express the notion of material cause. It is the theory of *satkāryavāda*, and by implication the thought pattern of latency and manifestation, which makes it possible to describe the material and the nature or essence of a thing by one and the same term.

There is a certain confusion in Ś's use of the terms *bīja* and *āspada*. In his commentary on ĀŚ 1,6 he states that illusory things, like the snake which through delusion is seen instead of a rope, are never perceived unless they have a real substratum (*na nirāspadā upalabhyante*, p. 34). Then he goes on to say, "Just as the snake, before it arose, was existent in the rope as the rope itself, in the same way all states of being are, before they arise, existent as their seed itself, which is the Prāṇa" (*yathā rajjvām prāk sarpo-'tpatte rajju-ātmanā sarpaḥ sann evā 'sīt, evaṃ sarva-bhāvānām utpatteḥ prāk prāṇa-bījā-'tmanai 'va sattvam*; p. 34). The next sentence supports the foregoing statement by quoting the Upaniṣad passages, *Brahmai 've 'dam* (Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 11) and, *ātmai 've 'dam agra āsīt* (Brh. Ār. 1, 4, 1)—"This [Universe] is Brahman"; "In the beginning this [Universe] was only the Self." This implies that in Ś's view Brahman or Ātman, in so far as these terms denote the first principle of the world's origin and existence, are identical with Prāṇa. Moreover, the sequence of his statements and the interpretation which the quotations receive from their context suggest that *bīja* or material cause and *āspada* or substratum are ultimately identical. The rope is the substratum of the illusory snake, and in the same way Prāṇa or Brahman or Ātman is the substratum of the world-appearance, but Prāṇa or Brahman or Ātman is also the cause of the world's origin and subsistence. Cosmogony, cosmology and epistemology seem to be fused. In addition, we learn from some passages that the first principle of the world-appearance or the substratum is itself not ultimately real. We have already noted Ś's discrimination of the *sabījaṃ Brahma* from the *nirbījaṃ Brahma* and his sweeping statement that the Prāṇa is unreal. Since Prāṇa and *sabījaṃ Brahma* are identical, even Brahman in its *sabīja* aspect is unreal. Ultimately,

¹ See the article mentioned in footnote 2, p. 126.

only the *turiya*, which is of course the same as *nirbījaṃ Brahma*, is the substratum of all appearances (*sarva-vikalpā-'spada*, introd. to MU 7; p. 38), and "those who think of the highest truth are not interested in cosmogony" (*na tu paramārtha-cintakānām syṣṭāv ādaraḥ*, comm. on ĀŚ 1, 7; p. 35). This lack of regard in some measure certainly accounts for the inconsistency of Ś's argumentation, but at the logical level there remains a confusion. In one place Prāṇa, which is the *sabījaṃ Brahma*, appears to be the substratum of the world, but after a few lines Prāṇa turns out to be unreal. Thus an unreal entity would be the substratum of an unreal world, and Ś's position would virtually coincide with that of the Negativists to whom he offers such strenuous opposition. An opponent states that the *turiya*, which is the *nirbījaṃ Brahma*, is the substratum of all appearances, including the Prāṇa (*prāṇā-'di-sarva-vikalpā-'spadatvāt turīyasya*, p. 38). Ś does not explicitly reject this view, but he remarks, "There is no relationship between the existent and the non-existent" (*na sad-asatoḥ sambandhaḥ*). Thus the question as to the real substratum of the illusory world would be ultimately meaningless. But if it is so, why, then, does Ś combat the position of the Negativists with such passionate vigour?

The only possible explanation of the inconsistency and confusion of Ś's argumentation is the hypothesis that he tried his level best, but failed, to unite into a consistent whole elements of different traditions and some ideas of his own. This hypothesis accords very well with the assumption that the ĀŚV was the first work that Ś wrote after he had been introduced into Vedāntic monism and illusionism. In his other commentaries the same confusion does not appear again. If he could not solve unsolvable problems, he in other works at least avoided a rash radicalism that could not but entangle him in logical contradictions.

The logical inconsistencies are not, however, the gravest defect which mars the cosmology of the ĀŚV. A critic who would like to see all levels of reality treated with equal attention is disappointed at finding that Ś includes being or existence in the domain of the unreal. Prāṇa, the Biomotor Force, is Brahman "associated with a seed", that is, Brahman in so far as it is the material cause of all that is. Ś, however, expressly qualifies this Biomotor Force as "unreal". On the other hand, Brahman is "existent" (*sat*) precisely in that aspect in which it is "associated with a seed". Thus the conclusion is inevitable that the Existent *par excellence* is inexistent,

which implies that existence itself is ultimately nothingness or non-existence. Consequently, the inadequacy of his argumentation landed Ś in that very nihilism which he made such valiant efforts to combat. The weapons he used—G's idealism in combination with traditions he had learned from his teacher—proved miserably ineffective. If a philosopher describes the substratum of all illusory appearances as being itself ultimately *unreal*, what point can there be in his emphasizing that even an illusory thing cannot appear unless there is a *real* substratum underlying it? In opposition to the Buddhist negativism, Śaṅkara, referring to the Upaniṣads, affirmed that there is "a Supreme Reality, non-dual and devoid of the division into process, object and subject of knowledge", "the Reality of the Brahman-Self", whose "vision is never interrupted", that is, whose spiritual nature is permanently manifest and never latent (... *brahmātma-tattvam*. 'na hi draṣṭur draṣṭer vipariloṣo vidyate' iti śruteḥ [Brh. Ār. Up. 4, 3, 23]. *jñāna-jñeya-jñātr-bheda-rahitaṃ paramārtha-tattvam advayam etan na buddhena bhāṣitam*. ĀŚV 4, 99, p. 220). But what is the use of thus emphasizing the subsisting spiritual nature of the Supreme Self, if this Self in its pure essence lacks *existence*? To be sure, even in his other—probably later—works Ś never succeeded in facing the overwhelming fact of existence. None the less, he eventually did succeed in penetrating and harmonizing elements from different traditions in a way that bears the stamp of genius.

On the other hand, it is precisely the confusions and inconsistencies of the ĀŚV that make this work an attractive object for historical studies, promising the thrill of most interesting discoveries.

We have traced in the ĀŚV two elements of a pre-illusionistic Vedānta tradition. One is the idea of the cosmic entities Virāj and Hiraṇyagarbha as corresponding to the body and the soul in man; the other is the doctrine of the Prāṇa as a cosmic and at the same time an anthropological entity. It would seem that the two doctrines belong to two different traditions. In other works of his Ś also refers to them. We cannot however study here all relevant passages. This would exceed the limits accorded to this article. There are certain divergences, possibly indicative of different traditions, between the several statements, and these would entail special discussion. I confine myself to noting one or two occurrences. According to Ś's commentary on the Praśna-Upaniṣad, Hiraṇyagarbha is the collectivity of all individual souls (*jīva-ghana*; 5, 5) and the supporter of

man's faculties of sentience and action (*sarva-karaṇā-dhāra*; 6, 4). Ś's commentary on the Aitareya-Up. gives an interesting explanation of the difference between Īśvara and Hiraṇyagarbha. Īśvara is here described as the Knower of All, who is the Absolute in conjunction with pure *prajñā*. Īśvara is also the Inner Controller of all beings. He is thus very much like the Prāṇa of the ĀŚV. Unlike the Prāṇa of the ĀŚV, however, he is not qualified as "unreal". Moreover, while in the ĀŚV the Prāṇa is himself the seed of the world, the Īśvara of the Aitareya commentary "makes grow" the seed of the Universe, which here seems to be conceived as the *avyākṛte nāmarūpe*. Hiraṇyagarbha, on the other hand, is the Absolute in so far as this "imagines its self to be the [cosmic] intellect; he is the evolved seed of the Universe". Virāj in the Aitareya commentary is another name of Prajāpati. He was born from the primeval Cosmic Egg as the first corporeal being (*tad [brahma] atyanta-viśuddha-prajño-pādhi-saṃbandhena sarvajñam īśvaram sarva-sādhāraṇā-vyākṛta-jagadbīja-pravartakaṃ niyantṛtvād antaryāmi-saṃjñam bhavati. tad eva vyākṛta-jagadbīja-bhūta-buddhy-ātmā-bhimāna-lakṣaṇa-hiraṇyagarbha-saṃjñam bhavati. tad eva 'ntar-aṇḍo-dbhuta-prathama-śarīro-pādhimad virāt-prajāpati-saṃjñam bhavati*. Ait.Up.Bhāṣya, at the end). The Aitareya commentary can however also use *prāṇa*, *prajñātman*, and *Aparam Brahma* as synonyms of Hiraṇyagarbha (17 lines before the passage quoted above). There seem to have existed several traditions, and Ś was not interested in a unified terminology.

Ś's concept of *āspada*, on the other hand, appears to be a contribution of his own. He seems to have devised it to replace the theory, useless to his mind, of the substratum of nescience. But his concept of *āspada* was not really a new idea. The impact of the *satkāryavāda* on his mind was so strong that he could not help moulding the new concept on the pattern of the Sāṅkhya theory of material causation. Thus *āspada* with him became virtually a synonym of *bīja*. Moreover, in the practice of applying the new concept Ś did not succeed in upholding the very principle it stood for. The basic idea of *āspada* is that no illusory thing can appear without a real thing underlying it. Yet Ś's metaphysical *āspada* ultimately turns out to be unreal itself. Both the failure of Ś's attempt to devise a really new concept and the inconsistency in his applying it are easily explainable on the assumption that a first attempt at establishing a new theory is not always a full success.

We cannot follow up here Ś's use of the term *āspada* through all his works. We single out one of them, the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya. Regarding this commentary I have elsewhere¹ proposed the hypothesis that Ś composed it not long after the ĀŚV. The main basis for my hypothesis was the occurrence in the Taittirīya commentary of some terms which are not so frequent in other works of Ś except for the ĀŚV and one or two *prakaraṇas* of the Upadeśasāhasrī. Now in cosmology also the terminology of the Taitt. Bhāṣya is close to that of the ĀŚV. The virtual identification of *āspada* and *bīja* recurs in the Taitt. Bhāṣya. Commenting on the initial words of Taitt.Up. 2, 6 Ś says that Brahman can be affirmed to exist (*asti Brahma*) in so far as it, "though destitute of all specific properties, is the substratum of all illusory manifestations and the seed of all events" (*sarva-vikalpā-spadaṃ sarva-pravṛtti-bījaṃ sarva-viśeṣa-pratyastamitam api* (p. 70 of the Ānandāśrama ed. of 1929). If we examine this statement in its context, we find that Ś avoids here the rigid discrimination of the "seedless" Brahman or the Brahman without specific properties from the Brahman which, as "the Knower of All", is the cause of the world. In this way the inconsistency or confusion which we noticed in the ĀŚV does not appear. It seems that, after the radicalism of Ś's early period had abated, he became more inclined to stress the essential identity of, than the difference between, the pure Brahman and the Brahman in so far as it is the cause or existential substratum of the world. The passage from the Aitareya commentary to which we referred above is significant in this connection. There Ś says that the same Brahman which in itself is beyond the scope of words and concepts (*sarva-śabda-pratyayā-gocara*) receives the designations of Īśvara, Hiraṇyagarbha and Virāj when associated with the respective adjuncts (*upādhi*). This is the view that makes Ś's concept of Īśvara so difficult to describe.²

Münster.

¹ See my article mentioned on p. 117 footnote 1, pp. 125; 127; 129f.

² See my article in ZDMG 100, pp. 276-286.

C. HOOYKAAS

KĀLA IN JAVA AND BALI

When I received the invitation—which I much appreciated—to contribute to this Congratulatory Volume, I was still under the fresh impression made on me by Gonda's *Śiva in Indonesien* (WZKSO 14 (1970), pp. 1-31) and I intended to reciprocate in kind by writing on "Viṣṇu in Bali". My main difficulty in realizing this project was the abundance of material, hitherto unpublished—unfortunately the rule with Indonesian studies—so that one had to ask either for disproportionate space or to spread the material "thin on the ground". On second thoughts Kāla seemed, therefore, to be a more suitable subject. He should appeal to Gonda as an Indologist, as a historian of religion and as a scholar in the Indonesian field.

Kāla plays an important role in both Bali and Java as far as the shadow play is concerned,¹ a role that has already been documented to some extent and discussed to a great extent as regards Java²

¹ Jeanne Cuisinier, *Le Théâtre d'Ombres à Kelantan*, preface de Jean Filliozat, Gallimard, Paris, 1957. Front cover: Bētara Kāla. P. L. Sweeney, in his Ph. D. thesis *The Rāma Tree*, London 1970 (as yet unpublished), Ch. 12., pp. 378-97, though mainly dealing with his Kelantanese material, on pp. 392-94 makes a comparison with those known to him from Java and Bali.

² 1903 Hazeu, G. A. J., *Een Ngruwat-voorstelling, Album Kern*, Leiden, 325-32.
1906 Mayer, L. Th., *Het Ngruwat en het Wayangverhaal Moerwa Kala*, Weltevreden, 1-28. Cf. LOr 6431a and 6431b in Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, *Literature of Java*, II, The Hague 1968, p. 375.
1923 Schrieke, B. J. O., *References to a talk on ngruwat*, TBG 62, 282-4.
1923 Kats, L., *Het Javaansche Toneel*, I. Wajang Poerwa, Weltevreden, esp. pp. 172-77.
1923 Inggis, *Het Roewatanfeest in de desa Karangdjati in Bagalen*, Djawa 3, 1923, pp. 45-50.
1924 Pigeaud, Th. G. Th., *De Tantu Panggelaran*, Ph. D. thesis Leiden, Den Haag, esp. pp. 76-78, 103-104.
1925 Rassers, W. H., *Over den zin van het Javaansche drama*, BKI 81, 311-381, esp. III 361-75 (cf. 1959).
1927 *Serat Paḍalaran Ringit Purwa*, Balé Pustaka 443, Weltevreden (Murva Kala pp. 14-23).
1932 Pigeaud, Th. G. Th., *Aanteekeningen betreffende den Javaanschen Oost-hoek*, TBG 72, pp. 284-85.