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*Cesalpinia sappan*. A rod-like plant such as the red willow would suit the several uses of it mentioned by Bābar. "*Tabalghū* has the same meaning as *tabarkhūn* or *tabarkhūn*. See Vullers, i, 420b, and Meninski, i, 1030, and ii, 3084, s.n., who quotes the *Lughat Ḥalīmī* and the *Lughat Nīmatu'l-lāh*. See, too, Rieu, *Turkī Cat.*, pp. 137, 142. It is the Hyrcanian willow" (H. Beveridge).

<sup>68</sup> Erskine (p. 6), "They also cut it into forked tops of arrows;" de Courteille (i, 9), "On la taille aussi en flèches." Steingass, s.n. *giz*, "a sort of arrow or dart without wing or point, the two ends being small, the middle thick," a description allowing the scraping (*tarāsh*) of the Turkī text. Bābar distinguishes the *tir-giz* from the *auq*.

<sup>69</sup> *Tabarruklūq bīla yurāq yīrlār kā itīlār*. Erskine (p. 6), "It is carried to a great distance as a rarity much in request;" de Courteille (i, 19), "On le transporte au loin, où il trouve un débit avantageux." The text allows the statement that the trees (*yīghāch*) are carried afar, and this would allow the word *yīghāch* to be translated all through the passage by "tree" instead of both by "tree" and "wood". But if the *tabalghū* were rod-like, a statement about its wood would slip easily into the plural form. The *Burhān-i qāṭi* includes the *tabarkhūn*, the uses of which suit the *tabalghū*.

<sup>70</sup> *Yabrūjū-ṣ-ṣannam*, "the mallow consecrated to idols" (Leyden). "The plant called mandragora or mandrake. See the *Ufjaz Udwtayeh* or *Materia Medica* of Nouredin Muh. Abdalla Shirazy, published with a translation by Gladwin, Calcutta, 1793. The name *aikoti* is derived from the Turkī "(qy. Arabic)" word *ayek*, vivacity, and (Turkī) *ot*, grass. *Meherghah* seems to be merely the Persian translation of the name, from *meher*, affection, and *ghah*, grass. It is, however, called *atikoti* or dog-grass, a name which comes from the way in which it is said to be gathered. They have a fancy that any person who plucks up this grass dies; on which account they are said to dig round its roots, and when these are sufficiently loosened, tie it to the neck of a dog, who, by his endeavours to get away, pulls it out of the earth. See D'Herbelot, art. *Abrousanam* and *Astefrenk*. The same story is still told."

The *mihr-giyāh* (*Mandragora officinarum*, love-apple) is mentioned in the *Ḥadiqatu'l-aqālim* of Murtaẓā Ḥusain Bilgrāmī (Pers. lit. ed., p. 426). Cf. *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, January and April, 1900, art. Garden of Climes, H. Beveridge. Worldwide superstitions have prevailed and still prevail about the mandrake; some are preserved in English villages. Cf. Genesis xxx, 14, and Song of Solomon vii, 13. De Courteille translates *iq-ōlī* by "l'herbe aux ours" and *mihr-giyāh* by "l'herbe d'amour" (i, 9).

<sup>71</sup> Seven Villages. Mr. Ney Elias has discussed the location of this place (T.R., p. 180 n.). He mentions that it is placed in Arrowsmith's map of 1878 as a district of Kurāma, in the elbow of the Sir. The *Bābar-nāma* narrative where Yitī Kint is mentioned allows of Arrowsmith's location. Other names of similar form suggest, like this one, that the numeral in them denotes so many villages served by the same water. Biskent which is in the neighbourhood assigned to Yitī Kint, may mean Five Villages.

## VI

## BUDDHIST NOTES

## VEDANTA AND BUDDHISM

By LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

THERE is much to support the opinion of Rāmānuja, Dr. Thibaut, and many others, that Śaṃkara's doctrine of "illusion" is a biased rendering of the old Vedānta, Bādarāyanik as well as Aupanishadic. If that be granted, it is by no means self-evident that Buddhism has been without influence on Śaṃkara's speculation; and the last writer on the subject, Vasudev Anant Sukhtānkar, a very able pupil of Professor Jacobi, does not conceal his opinion, or his surmise, that Śaṃkara is indebted to Nāgārjuna.<sup>1</sup> That may be true, but I would object that we really know little or nothing about the history of Vedānta, and that conclusions based on philosophical parallels are by no means definitive. Autonomous developments—autonomous if not absolutely independent—are admissible. Nāgārjuna (or his predecessors, the anonymous authors of the oldest Mahāyānasūtras), by the very fact that he proclaims "voidness" to be the real nature of things, was prepared to distinguish the relative truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and the absolute one (*pāramārthika*); and his nihilism coupled with "idealism" might lead to the Vijñānavāda: "existence of pure non-intelligent (?) intellect." On the other hand the Aupanishadas, from their main thesis (*tat tvam asi*, etc.),<sup>2</sup> could derive the distinction of the

<sup>1</sup> *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* (Inaugural Dissertation, Bonn, August 12, 1908; Wien, Druck von Adolf Holzhausen, 1908).

<sup>2</sup> I think that no unprejudiced reader will admit Rāmānuja's interpretation of the old pantheist or monist sayings of the Upanishads. Against Vasudev Anant Sukhtānkar (p. 13), I adhere to the opinion of Dr. Thibaut: "The fundamental doctrines of Śaṃkara's system are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the

two *brahmins*, of the two *vidyās*. Both developments are natural enough; the conception of the universal void (o) and the intuition of the infinite (∞) are convergent, in the end; but parallel and convergent as they are, these developments do not lose their primitive tinge. The *qualis ab incepto* is true of every evolution, political (as M. de Kérallain has proved<sup>1</sup>) or doctrinal: the *saṃvṛtisatya*, "erroneous truth," of Nāgārjuna is really "untruth"; the *vaiyavahārika satya*, "practical truth," of Śaṃkara is truth, provisory indeed, but truth *quand même*. Māyā is. Śaṃkara's "magic play" is caused by a magician, and this magician is a Lord. Nāgārjuna's *saṃvṛti*, the Buddhist counterpart of the Vedāntic *māyā*, is like the son of a barren woman: it is not, it cannot be. But the two systems bear *un air de famille*, which has been taken into account more than once and from both sides.

This problem is of paramount importance in the history of Indian thought. It would not be imprudent to say that as long as we have not ascertained the chronological relations between primitive Buddhism and the Aupaniśhadic-Śaṃkhyā theories, between the system of Nāgārjuna and that of Śaṃkara, between Dignāga and "orthodox Nyāya",<sup>2</sup> we cannot boast of even having traced the cardinal lines of the spiritual and intellectual history of India.

It is not my present object to discuss the claims of

Upanishads than those of other Vedantic systems" (S.B.E., xlv, p. cxxiv). The "essential teaching" of the Upanishads is not their spiritual undogmatic or polydogmatic enthusiasm (the chief part from the point of view of the history of religion), but their ontological surmises.

<sup>1</sup> M. de K. is the French translator of Sumner Maine, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir Alfred Lyall. One will find in the *Études sur les mœurs religieuses et sociales de l'Extrême Orient* (Paris, Fontemoing, 1908) a splendid translation of the *Asiatic Studies* of Sir Alfred, with many notes, illustrations, and appendices of no small interest.

<sup>2</sup> It is a pity that M. Th. de Stcherbatskoï is writing in Russian.

Śaṃkara or Rāmānuja to Aupaniśhadic orthodoxy, or to unravel the problem of the relations of Buddhism to Śaṃkara's monism, to specify the possible or probable loans on both sides. I only intend to give a few references, some of which are already well known.

## I

The common opinion of the Dvaitavādins or "dualists" (Śaṃkhyas, Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins) is that the Māyā-doctrine is not Vaidic, i.e. Aupaniśhadic: *māyāvādam avidikam*, says Śiva; *na . . . tad Vedāntamatam*, argues Vijñāna-bhikṣu. This doctrine is "Buddhism in disguise", a doctrine of "crypto-Bauddhas" (as says Dr. Thibaut)—

*māyāvādam asac chāstraṃ pracchannaṃ bauddham eva ca.*

The theologians who maintain the "Neo-illusionism" (*ādhūnika māyāvāda*) and style themselves Vedāntin (*Vedāntibruva*) are, in fact, Buddhists; more precisely, they belong to that branch of the Buddhist school which is named Vijñānavādins, "who maintain the sole existence of thought" (*bauddhaprabhedāḥ, Vijñānavādyekadeśitayā*). They assimilate the "data" of experience, merit, and demerit, etc., to the "data" of a dream, and, using the (Buddhist) phrase *saṃvṛtika* (erroneous) as the exact connotation of the "particular", they admit that the world, the whole of the "knowable" (*prapañca*) is produced by Ignorance. Therefore they ought to be styled *Nāstikas* (miscreants, or Buddhists). Thus Vijñānabhikṣu.<sup>1</sup>

Yamunācārya, too, the *guru* of the *guru* of Rāmānuja,

<sup>1</sup> See *Śaṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, edited and translated by Professor Richard Garbe, index *sub voc.* bauddha, pracchannabauddha, vijñānavāda. With I, 22 (p. 16, 6-7), compare the readings of *Padmapurāṇa* (xliii) apud Aufrecht, *Cat. Oxoniensis*, p. 14: "māyāvādam asac chāstraṃ pracchannaṃ bauddham ucyate, mayaiva kathitaṃ devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā . . . parātmajīvayor aikyaṃ mamātra pratipādyate, brāhmaṇo 'sya param rūpaṃ nirguṇaṃ vakṣyate mayā, sarvasya jagato 'py atra mohanāya kalau yuge."

clearly refers to Dharmakīrti in his *Siddhitrayam*,<sup>1</sup> when he compares a thesis of the "avowed Buddhists" (*prakatāḥ saugatāḥ*), with the formula of the "Buddhists in disguise".

The first say—

"Although the pure intelligence is free from differences, it is understood, by people whose view is troubled, as multiple: object of knowledge, subject of knowledge, knowledge."<sup>2</sup>

The second say—

"The pure reality is not the cause of the development [of names and forms, of the intellectual contingencies], because it ceases not to be [what it is, pure]: therefore it is Illusion who is the mother of this distinction, knower, knowable."

It is only just to say that Rāmānuja could hardly avoid the reproach of dualism, and may be styled "Sāṃkhya in disguise".

## II

Whilst Brahmin nihilists (*māyāvādins*) are charged with the crime of Buddhism, Buddhist monists (*viññānavādins*) have to apologize for their "Brahmic" speculations.<sup>3</sup>

As has been said in this Journal (1908, p. 889), Buddhists are aware of the close relation between Vedāntism and some of their systems. The Vijñānavāda, at least in some of its ontological principles, is very like

<sup>1</sup> Chowkhamba S.S. (No. 36), p. 19. For this reference I am indebted to Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, p. 19, who also refers to Rāmānuja, *Śrībhāṣya*, ii, 2. 27.

<sup>2</sup> This line occurs in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 16 (Bibl. Indica, 1858), and elsewhere; it is extracted from the *Pramāṇavinīścaya* of Dharmakīrti (see *Muséon*, 1902, and *Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, p. 34; add reference to *Suklavidarśanā*). It runs as follows: *avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaḥ, grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate* (or *kalpyate*). Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar understands *buddhyātmā*: the Buddhist attributes the false distinction . . . to *buddhi*, as the Pseudo-Buddhist attributes the same distinction to *māyā*. I prefer my translation.

<sup>3</sup> Śākyamuni has condemned Vijñānavāda-Vedānta, *Majjhima*, i, p. 329: *viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ*.

Vedāntism in disguise, or, to be more exact, it is likely to be understood in a Vedāntic sense: as Mahāmāti said to Buddha in so many words. We cannot forget that Vijñānavādins are divided into several schools, which are not without analogy with the schools of Vedānta. Some of them believe that the prime spirit or thought remains pure, untouched by the development of contingencies [*prapañca*, i.e. *manas*, *manovijñāna* (= *nāma*, *nāma-rūpa*)]: does not this resemble *vivartavāda*? Others will admit that the development is real: does not this resemble *viśiṣṭādvaita*?

I will not miss this opportunity of avowing that I have been perhaps unfair in my review of my friend Suzuki's book, *Outlines of Mahāyāna* (see Journal, 1908, p. 885). The claim of the Buddhists to be *sūnyatāvādins*, "doctors of the voidness," not *brahmavādins*, cannot be set aside: philosophers must be credited with the opinions they profess to cherish. And I have strong objections, as an historian, to the Buddhist modernism of the Japanese scholars, of P. L. Narasu, etc. But there may be some slight portion of truth in Modernisms (they may develop old, unconscious ideas: much that is believed to be modern is old),<sup>1</sup> and, as a matter of fact, *sūnyatā* turns out to

<sup>1</sup> I have just read a good book, written from the "intellectualist" point of view, but very "matter of fact", *Pragmatisme, Modernisme, Protestantisme* (Paris, Bloud, 1909; by A. Leclère, Dr. es-Lettres, Prof. agrégé à l'Université de Berne). The author says, p. 217, note—"Il vaudrait la peine, après avoir rapproché le modernisme catholique du Protestantisme libéral moderne ou modernisme protestant, d'étudier le modernisme israélite et le modernisme mahométan. On sait qu'il s'est récemment formé à Paris une association israélite en vue de mettre le Judaïsme, en le simplifiant, à la hauteur de la pensée contemporaine; ce mouvement a déjà une littérature; il s'est constitué par un minimisme assez analogue à ceux que nous avons signalés. D'autre part, le Babisme, si tangent chez ses meilleurs représentants avec la pure religion naturelle, et si bienveillant à l'égard de toutes les religions positives, qu'il prétend dépasser, modernise avec ardeur le vieil Islam. Autant de dissolutions des formes positives de la religion. L'écart est moins grand qu'on ne le pense généralement entre celles de ces dissolutions où on a l'illusion d'approfondir l'esprit de la doctrine qu'on

be very like *brahma*, and *nirvāṇa*, "translated" as it is by *bodhi* or \**buddhabhūya*, has the same religious import as *brahmabhūya*.

### III

One cannot read the Gaudapāḍakārikās without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings, and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in *double entendre*. As Gaudapāda is the spiritual grandfather of Śaṅkara, this fact is not insignificant.<sup>1</sup>

The fourth chapter bears a distinctly Buddhist tinge. It has been happily summarized by Professor A. A. Macdonell: "It is entitled *Alātaśānti*, or 'Extinction of the firebrand (circle)', so called from an ingenuous comparison made to explain how plurality and genesis seem to exist in the world. If a stick which is glowing at one end is waved about, fiery lines or circles are produced without anything being added to or issuing from the single burning point. The fiery line or circle exists only in the consciousness (*viñāna*). So, too, the many phenomena of the world are merely the vibrations of the consciousness, which is one."<sup>2</sup> One could add that, really, knowledge (*jñāna*) or *brahman* is free from the threefold determination; knower, knowable, and knowledge. If we are not to rest on syllables—*appamattakaṃ kho pan 'etaṃ yad idaṃ byañjanaṃ! mā āyasmanto appamattakehi vivādaṃ āpajjittha*<sup>3</sup>—

transforme [as it is apparently the case with Nāgārjuna, with Śaṅkara], et celles où l'on a conscience d'évoluer tout à fait en dehors de la tradition." (Neo-Buddhists ought to be aware that they are pouring new wines, and, alas! sophisticated alcohols, into old bottles.) A historical study of Neo-Buddhism would be very interesting, as an episode of the intellectual conquest of the East by the West and vice versa.

<sup>1</sup> The following notes are by no means exhaustive.

<sup>2</sup> *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> *Majjhima*, ii, p. 240. "Syllables are of little importance: do not, O monks, dispute on mere trifles."

this transcendent knowledge is like the absolute blank of the Vijñānavādins.

The simile of the firebrand circle occurs in *Maṭṭy-upaniṣad*, iv, 24: "He beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun . . .";<sup>1</sup> but it can also be traced in Buddhist books as one of the numerous symbols of unreality,<sup>2</sup> namely, in the *Laṅkāvatāra*<sup>3</sup>—

*tadyathā Mahāmate acakram alātacakram bālāis cakrabhāvena parikalpyate na paṇḍitair, evam eva Mahāmate kudrṣṭitīrthyāśayapatitā ekatvānyatvobhaya-tvānuḥhayatvaṃ parikalpayiṣyanti sarvabhāvotpattau:*

"The firebrand circle is not a circle, and is wrongly supposed by the ignorant, not by the wise, to be a circle. In the same way, heretics will suppose that beings originate from themselves, from others, from both, without both."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cowell's translation. *Alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavarṇam . . . brahma . . . apaśyat*. (Comm.: *tasya brahmana ātmābheda-tva-khyāpanāya puṁlingair viśeṣanair viśinasti*.) *Id est*, the unreal qualifications of *brahman*, "flashing like a firebrand circle," are in the masculine "to show the identity between the neuter *brahman* and the masculine soul", says Rāmātīrtha (and also to spare the undenotability and the unconcern of the Absolute). As a matter of fact, Brahman does not flash into unreal solar protuberances, but it appears, it appears to itself, to be flashing. Cf. vi, 17: *Brahma . . . eko 'nantaḥ*.

<sup>2</sup> *Mahāvīyutpatti*, § 139, 21.

<sup>3</sup> Buddhist Text Society, p. 95.

<sup>4</sup> The simile of the firebrand is also of use in the Sautrāntika school, to explain the *quomodo* of the "compound perceptions". See Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 284 (312): "The forms of the object penetrate one after the other into the understanding: the illusion of simultaneity is caused by the swiftness of this proceeding. Just so an arrow passes through the eight leaves of a flower, as it were, at the same time, and firebrand appears as a circle."

From another point of view it is evident that any compound perception (i.e. every perception) is "born from imagination", or subjective: "The notion of a cloth or a straw mat is gradually produced: therefore this notion has for real object the parts of the cloth or straw mat, and as such, as cloth or mat notion, it results from imagination. As in the case of a firebrand. The notion of a firebrand circle has for real object a firebrand which obtains successively different places owing to a rapid

Nevertheless, the title of the fourth chapter of the Kārikās cannot be said so far to be Buddhist (the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books); but the main idea that there is no birth, production, *jāti*, *utpāda*, that causation is impossible since the cause cannot be identical with, nor different from, the effect, since neither being, nor nonbeing, nor being + nonbeing, can originate, is thoroughly Madhyamaka. Gauḍapāda maintains *ajāti* (once *anutpatti*), and denies *uccheda*, with the same emphasis as Bhagavat in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* or in the *Laṅkāvatāra*; and he supports his thesis by Nāgārjuna's or Buddhapālita's favourite arguments:—

II, 32. *na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhanakā  
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā*

"There is no destruction, no birth, no bound, no endeavouring [for release], no desiring release, no released: such is the real truth."<sup>1</sup>

Or again—

IV, 59. *yathā māyāmayād bījaj jāyate tanmayo 'nikuraḥ  
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmesū yojanā*

"From a magical seed is born a magical sprout: this sprout is neither permanent nor perishing. Such are things, and for the same reason."

It is the *śūnyebhya eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharmebhyaḥ*, "from void things, void things are born," each

motion. Just so. Argument: cloth is not real, because the grasping of it depends on the grasping of its parts, as is the case with the fire-brand circle—"yasmāt krameṇa paṭabuddhiḥ kaṭabuddhir vā tasmād avayaveṣu eva paṭāvayaveṣu kaṭāvayaveṣu vā tadbuddhiḥ paṭabuddhiḥ paṭabuddhir vā vikalpavaśād bhavati. alātacakravat. yathālāte śīghra-saṃcārāt tatra tatropadāyāmāne 'lātacakrabuddhir bhavati, tadvat. sādhanam cātra: na dravyasat paṭo 'vayavagrahaṇasāpekṣagrahaṇatvād, alātacakravat (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, MS. Soc. As., fol. 267a).

<sup>1</sup> Quoted more than once by Vijñānabhikṣu; see Garbe's indexes. Madhyamaka, xvi, 5: *na badhyante na mucyante*.

according to its causes, for "illusion is manifold, being produced by manifold causes".<sup>1</sup>

As concerns the wording, let us compare—

1. Gauḍapāda, ii, 38<sup>2</sup>—

*tattvam ādhyātmikam drṣtvā tattvam drṣtvā tu bāhyataḥ  
tattvibhūto tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet.*

COMM. bāhyam prthivyādi tattvam ādhyātmikam ca dehādilakṣaṇam rajjusarpādivat svapnamāyādivad asat; ātmā ca sabāhyāntaro hy ajo . . . nirguṇo niṣkalo niṣkriyas tat satyam sa ātmā . . . evam tattvam drṣtvā . . .

Bhagavat (quoted *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 348)<sup>3</sup>—  
*śūnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgatam  
na vidyate so'pi kaś cid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām.*

2. Gauḍapāda, iv, 1—

*jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān  
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas tam vande dvipadām varam*

COMM. ayam eveśvaro yo Nārāyaṇākyas tam vande . . . dvipadām varam dvipadopalakṣitānām puruṣānām varam pradhānam puruṣottamam ity abhiprāyaḥ . . . jñānajñeyajñātrbhedarahitam paramārthatattvadarśanam . . .

It is probable that this śloka is a Buddhist one: the excellent biped is Śākyamuni.

3. Gauḍapāda, iv, 7—

*prakṛter anyathābhāvo na katham cid bhaviṣyati.*

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, xv, 8 (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 271)—

*prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate.*

4. Gauḍapāda, iv, 17, 18—

*aprasiddhaḥ katham hetuḥ phalam utpādayiṣyati?  
yadi hetoḥ phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ  
katarat pūrvanispānam yasya siddhir apekṣayā?*

<sup>1</sup> Sāpi nānāvidhā māyā nānāpratyaayasambharā, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Anandāśrama edition.

<sup>3</sup> Bibliotheca Buddhica.

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, x, 8 (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 207)—

*yadīndhanam apeksyāgnir apeksyāgnim yadīndhanam  
katarat pūrvanispānam yad apeksyāgnir indhanam?*

5. Gauḍapāda, iv, 19—

*evam hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā.*

COMM. *evam* hetuphalayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvanupapatter ajātiḥ sarva-  
vyānūtpattiḥ paridīpitā prakāṣitānyonyāpekṣadoṣaṃ bruvadbhir vādibhir  
buddhaiḥ paṇḍitair ity arthaḥ.

Laṅkāvatāra (p. 78)<sup>1</sup>—

*anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ.*

Satyadvayāvatārasūtra (quoted Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 375)—

*evam eva devaputra . . . saṃsāro' py paramārthato  
'tyantānutpādatā yāvan nirvāṇam api paramārthato  
'tyantānutpādatā.*

6. Gauḍapāda, iv, 22—

*svato vā parato vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate  
sad asat sadasat vāpi na kiṃ cid vastu jāyate.*

Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, i, 1 (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 12 ;  
cf. i, 6-7, p. 82)—

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutāḥ  
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana.*

7. Gauḍapāda, iv, 93—

*ādisāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ  
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajaṇi sāmyaṃ viśāradam.*

COMM. *ādisāntā* nityam eva śāntā . . . ajās ca prakṛtyaiva suṣṭhū-  
paratasvabhāvāḥ . . . sarve dharmāḥ samās cābhinnāś ca . . . ajaṇi  
sāmyaṃ viśāradam viśuddham ātmatattvaṃ yasmāt tasmāc chāntir  
mokṣo vā nāsti kartavya ity arthaḥ.

Mādhyamikas, too, maintain that *nirvāṇa* or *śānti* or  
*mokṣa* is not to be acquired, as says Bodhisattva Sarva-  
varaṇaviṣkambin in

<sup>1</sup> Buddhist Text Society.

Ratnameghasūtra (quoted Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 225)—  
*ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ  
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakra pravartane.*

8. Gauḍapāda, iv, 98—

*alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ  
ātau buddhās tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ.*

COMM. *alabdhā* aprāptam āvaraṇam avidyādinibandhanam yeśāṃ te  
dharmā alabdhāvaraṇā bandhanarahitā ity arthaḥ. *prakṛtinirmalāḥ*  
svabhāvasuddhā ātau buddhās tathā muktā yasmān nityasuddhabuddha-  
muktasvabhāvāḥ. *yady* evaṃ katham tarhi budhyanta ity ucyate.  
*nāyakāḥ* svāmināḥ samarthā boddhum bodhaśaktimatsvabhāvā ity  
arthaḥ. *yathā* nityaprakāśasvarūpo 'pi savitā prakāśata ity ucyate  
*yathā vā* nityanivṛttagatayo 'pi nityam eva śailās tiṣṭhantīty ucyate  
tadvat.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 104—

*sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ.*

Pañjikā ad ix, 108—

*sarvadharmāḥ . . . anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatvāc  
ca prakṛtiparinirvṛtā ādisāntā ity ucyante.*

Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 151—

*nirvṛtānirvṛtānām ca viśeṣo nāsti vastutaḥ.*

COMM. *nirvṛtā* ye sarvadharmāvaraṇaprahāṇād vinirmuktasarvaban-  
dhanāḥ. *anirvṛtā* ye rāgādikleṣapāśayattacittasamptatayaḥ saṃsāracāra-  
kāntargatāḥ. *teṣāṃ* ubhayeṣāṃ api viśeṣo bhedo nāsti na sambhavati  
. . . vastutaḥ paramārthataḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāvatayā prakṛti-  
parinirvṛtatvāt. *nirvṛtāḥ* svabhāvasūnyatvād utpādanirrodharahitāḥ.  
paramārthena paramārthasatyataḥ prakṛtinirvāṇatayā 'disāntatvāt.

Laṅkāvatāra (p. 80)—

*prakṛtiprabhāśvaraviśuddhyādiviśuddha . . . tathāga-  
tagarbha.*

Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā (p. 47)—

*ādisuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya.*

9. Gauḍapāda, iv, 99—

*kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ  
sarve dharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*

COMM. *yasmān* na hi kramate buddhasya paramārthadarśino jñānaṃ  
viśayāntareṣu dharmeṣu dharmaśamsthāṃ savitariva prabhā. *tāyinaḥ*,



tāyo 'syāstīti tāyī, saṃtāyavato<sup>1</sup> nirantarasyākāśakalpasyety arthaḥ, pūjāvato vā prajñāvato vā. sarve dharmā ātmāno 'pi tathā jñānavad evākāśakalpatvān na kramante kvacid apy arthāntara ity arthaḥ. yad ādāv upanyastam jñānenākāśakalpenetyādi<sup>2</sup> tad idam ākāśakalpasya tāyino buddhasya tadananyatvād ākāśakalpaṃ jñānaṃ na kramate kvacid apy arthāntare. tathā dharmā iti. ākāśam ivācalam avikriyaṃ niravayavaṃ nityam advitīyaṃ asaṅgaṃ adṛśyaṃ agrāhyaṃ aṇāyādyatitaṃ brahmātmataṭṭvam "na hi draṣṭur draṣṭar viparilopo vidyata" iti śruteḥ, jñānajñeyajñātrbhedarahitaṃ paramārthatattvam advayaṃ etan na buddhena bhāṣitaṃ. yady api bāhyārthanirākaraṇaṃ jñānamātrakalpanā cādvyavastusāmīpyam uktam, idam tu paramārthatattvam advaitam vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam ity arthaḥ.

"The knowledge of an Awakened (*Buddha*), *id est* of a seer of reality, does not bear on things, *id est* on any extraneous object; it resides on things itself, as does light in the sun. Awakened = *Tāyin*. The Awakened one is, indeed, homogeneous (*tāyin*), *id est* endowed with homogeneity, possessed of continuity, without interval or difference, space-like. *Tāyin* can also be understood in the meaning of Adorable or Sage. Such are all the things, *id est* all the souls; just as the knowledge [of a Buddha], they are space-like, and do not bear on anything outside themselves. What has been said at the beginning of this treatise (*Gauḍapāda*, iv, 1), 'by a space-like knowledge,' that space-like knowledge of a space-like homogeneous Awakened who is nothing else than this knowledge<sup>3</sup> does not bear on anything outside. Such are [also] things [whatever they are]. This [knowledge] space-like, immovable, unmodifiable, without parts, fast, sole, free, not to be seen, not to be grasped, beyond hunger and the like, essence of *Brahma-ātmā*, according to the Scripture 'there is not discontinuity of seeing to the seer' (*Bṛhat*. iv, 3. 23), free from the opposition knowledge-knowable-knower, reality, non-duality, has not been taught by (*Śākyamuni*) *Buddha*. When denying the existence of the external world and supposing the sole existence of knowledge, he came very near the essential non-duality: but this non-dual reality can only be learned in the *Upanishads*."

As a matter of fact, this knowledge, without "knowable-knower-knowledge", is the knowledge of a *Buddha*, according to the *Mahāyāna*. And a Buddhist may say *naitad buddhena bhāṣitaṃ*, "This doctrine has not been taught by *Buddha*," for *Buddha* does not teach anything.

<sup>1</sup> Editor has *tāpi(yi)naḥ tāpo(yo) saṃtānavato*; MSS. *tāpī, tāyī, tāpo, tāyo, saṃtāpavato*—see M.W.<sup>2</sup>; *tāy* = to spread, to proceed in a continuous stream or line, *Dhātup.*, xiv, 18. See *Mahāvīyutpatti*, I, 15; 96, 6; *Nāmasaṃgīti*, = *trātar*; *Burn.*, *Intr.*, p. 227; Kern, *ad Lotus*, i, 73, ii, 47 (mighty, able, clever), iv, 40 (strenuous); *Pān.* i, 3. 38, *kramate, tāyante*, ix, 4 (mighty saint); *Speyer, ad Divyāvadāna*, *Wien Z.* xvi, p. 349.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 137, No. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *tadananyatvāt* (?).

## MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS

### THE BESNAGAR INSCRIPTION A

In view of some remarks which have been made to me, it seems desirable to give a note, which did not seem necessary when I edited the record (this *Journal*, 1909. 1087), on the term *Kāsiputa*, which we have as the metronymic of king *Bhāgabhadra*.

Dr. Bloch, whose unexpected death has removed a promising worker in the field of Indian epigraphy, took the vowel of the first syllable as a damaged *ō*, and read *K[ō]sīputasa*, which he interpreted as meaning "of the son of a lady belonging to the *Kautsa gōtra*". To that, however, there is, even apart from the point that the reading is distinctly *Kāsīputasa*, the following substantial objection.

It is the case that there are various words in which *ts*, and the *chchh* which results from *t* + *ś*, become *ss*, and sometimes *s* with lengthening of a preceding short vowel; e.g., *ussagga* = *utsarga*, *ussukka* or *ussumka* = *uchchhulka*,<sup>1</sup> *vasantūsava* = *vasantōtsava*, *sūsāsa* = *sōchchhvāsa*: see *Pischel, Grammatik der Prākṛit-Sprachen*, § 327a. But that change takes place only in compounds, when *t* is the final letter of a syllable. That is not the case in *Kautsa*. And from the feminine *Kautsī* we could only have, with the usual change of *ts* to *chchh* (op. cit., § 327), *Kochchhī*, which in the *Besnagar* inscription would have been written *Kochhī*. This is, in fact, the established corruption: we have it in the instrumental, written *Kochhiye*, in the *Mathurā* inscription of the year

<sup>1</sup> The word *ussukka*, *ussumka*, 'free from customs', comes from the *Kalpasūtra*, ed. *Jacobi*, § 102. The same passage gives also *ukkara* = *utkara*, 'free from taxes'. This is worth noting in connexion with *ubalike* = *udbalika*, 'free from the *bali*', in the *Rummindē* inscription: see this *Journal*, 1909. 467, 760.



# JOURNAL

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EDITED BY

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was pronounced. Here we have the older form, the malediction,<sup>1</sup> and its successor, the oath, side by side in an important transaction.

As this historical inscription shows, being the only evidence of an oath prior to the dynasty of Ur, we have in these inscriptions the evidence not [of the growth of a religious idea, but that of a legal custom in commercial transactions. Long before the custom of recording an oath in a legal document arose, this historical inscription teaches us that the custom of oath-taking was known. The idea underlying an oath and perhaps also the custom of practically taking an oath is as old as religion itself. The foregoing study, however, demonstrates that the legal formula in contracts was the result of a long development.

<sup>1</sup> Although in very late literature the malediction became again the more prevalent.

*On Māyāvāda*, by HERMANN JACOBI, Professor in the University of Bonn, Germany.

In my last article<sup>1</sup> I have discussed the attitude taken up by the orthodox philosophers in India towards the epistemology of the Buddhists. In connection with this discussion I shall now treat the question about the nature of early Vedānta, and, as I hope, bring it nearer to a conclusion.

The arguments of the Buddhists of both the Nihilistic and Idealistic schools regarding the unreality of the objects of perception may thus be summarised. Our perceptions in dreams do not, in principle, differ from those in the waking state, and consequently the latter must be just as void and as independent of something existing beside them (their object) as the dream-impressions; further examples of impressions void of really existing objects are magic, *fata morgana*, and mirage. This view of the Illusionists is confuted much in the same way in the Nyāya and Brahma Sūtras; here we are concerned with the latter only. The discussion of Bādarāyaṇa (B. S. II, 2, 28—32) as illustrated by the passage from the ancient Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabarasvāmin in the Bhāṣya on M. S. I, 1, 5 (see above, 31. 23), leaves no doubt on the point at issue, viz. that, according to these ancient Vedānta authors, there is a generic difference between dream-impressions and waking impressions, and that therefore the latter are not independent of really existing objects.

The oldest work on Vedānta Philosophy besides Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma Sūtras, are the Karikā's<sup>2</sup> on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad

<sup>1</sup> The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmins; see JAOS. 31. 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Anandasrama Series, No. 10. An English translation of the text and Commentary has been issued in India; but the book has not been accessible to me.

by Gauḍapāda.<sup>1</sup> The chronological relation between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda will be discussed hereafter; for the present we have to deal with his philosophical opinions. Gauḍapāda is, as far as we know, the first author who formulated the Māyāvāda or the doctrine that everything except Brahma is an illusion; this doctrine was either originated by him, or by a school of thinkers of whom he became the head; the latter alternative would seem the more probable one.

Now Gauḍapāda has used the very same arguments as the Buddhists to prove the unreality (*vaitathyam* = *asatyatvam*) of the external objects of our perceptions; he states this argument in II 4 which is thus explained by his commentator, Śāṅkara<sup>2</sup>: "Things seen in the waking state are not true: this is the proposition (*pratijñā*); because they are seen: this is the reason (*hetu*); just like things seen in a dream: this is the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*); as things seen in dream are not true, so the property of being seen belongs in like manner (to things seen) in the waking state: this is the application of the reason (*hetūpanaya*); therefore things seen in the waking state are also untrue: this is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Things seen in a dream differ from those seen in waking in that the former are reduced in size because they are within (the body of the dreamer). But there is no difference in so far as both are 'seen' and are 'untrue'." — And in II 31 all unreal things are mentioned together: "As dreams or magic or fata morgana are regarded (as unreal by ordinary men), so this whole world is regarded by those versed in the Vedāntas".

The argument thus expounded by Gauḍapāda forms the basis of his doctrine of Māyāvāda, and it is, as we know, the same argument which the Buddhists employed to establish the

<sup>1</sup> I fully concur with Mr. Barnet in his review of Max Walleser, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des älteren Vedānta* (Heidelberg 1910) in JRAS 1910 that Gauḍapāda is the name of the author and that it has not wrongly been abstracted from the title Gauḍapādīya Kārikāḥ. Whether the author be the same as, or different from the Gauḍapāda the oldest commentator on the Sāṅkhyā Kārikās, in both cases there can be no doubt that Gauḍapāda was an actual name.

<sup>2</sup> I am inclined to think that this Śāṅkara is not the same as the author of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya. The latter would hardly have stated the argument in the form and the terms of an *anumāna* according to Nyāya principles.

Śūnyavāda. As that argument is strenuously confuted by Bādarāyaṇa, it is evident that he cannot have held the same opinion in this matter as Gauḍapāda, or, in other words, the Brahma Sūtras do not teach the Māyāvāda. This is one point which I wish to make.

The next question we must try to solve is whether Gauḍapāda is acquainted with the Śūnyavāda or the Vijñānavāda. The answer is furnished by kārīkās IV 24 ff. For in kārīkā 24 a Realist contends that ideas (*prajñapti*) and feelings would not arise if not caused by external things. The opponent, in kārīkās 25—27, shows the unreasonableness of assuming objects existing beside and independent of ideas (*prajñapti*, *citta*). This refutation is, as the commentator tells us, "the argument of the Buddhists of the Vijñānavādin school, who combat the opinion of the realists (*bāhyārthavādin*), and the Ācārya agrees with him thus far". That the statement of the commentator is right, is evident from the nature of the argument itself, and becomes still more so from the next verse (28), which furnishes the final decision of the Vedāntin: "Therefore the idea (*citta*) does not originate, nor does the object of the idea originate; those who pretend to recognise the originating of ideas, may as well recognise the trace (of birds) in the air". For here the fundamental doctrine of the Vijñānavādins, which admits only a continuous flow of momentary ideas, is clearly referred to and confuted. Since the Brahma Sūtras and the ancient Vṛtti refer to the Śūnyavāda only, as I hope to have established in my former article, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās which allude to the latest phase of Buddhist philosophy must be considerably younger than the Brahma Sūtras. This has always been the opinion of the Pandits. It has, however, lately been controverted by Dr. Walleser<sup>1</sup> on the ground that the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās only are quoted in ancient Buddhist books as an authority on Vedānta philosophy. Even in case this assertion should be confirmed by the progress of research, the alleged fact would not necessarily upset the above result. For the enigmatical character of the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa make them unfit for quotations, at least of an outsider, to illustrate a point of Vedānta philosophy. And besides the

<sup>1</sup> l. c. p. 23.

Buddhists may have ignored the old Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa as the Jains did so late as the ninth century A.D.<sup>1</sup>; but they could not well have ignored the Gauḍapādī, since that work taught a philosophy which resembled their own in many regards.

Our inquiry has established 1. the near relation, amounting almost to identity, between the epistemology of the Śūnya-vādins or Vijnānavādins on one side and of Gauḍapāda's Māyāvāda on the other; 2. the opposition of the latter to Bādarāyaṇa on this head; and 3. the posteriority of Gauḍapāda to Bādarāyaṇa. Now these facts admit, in my opinion, of a natural and probable construction, viz. that Gauḍapāda adapted the Illusionism of the Buddhists to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. This view is supported by the many coincidences between the Gauḍapadiya Kārikās and the Mādhyamika sūtras to which Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has lately drawn attention.<sup>2</sup> The theory, that the Māyāvāda is a Vedāntic adaptation of the Śūnyavāda, has been first put forward by V. A. Sukhtankar<sup>3</sup>; I may add that I perfectly agree with him.

The probable history of the Māyāvāda may be briefly described: originally the doctrine of some school of Aupaniṣadas, it became an orthodox philosophy, when it had successfully been made the basis of interpretation of the Brahma sūtras, already by earlier writers and finally by the great Śāṅkara. For the two Mimāṃsās are the preeminently orthodox systems; but we should never lose sight of the fact that they are originally and primarily systems of the Exegesis of the Revelation, the Pūrvā Mimāṃsā of the Revelation as far as it is concerned with sacrifice (*karmakāṇḍa*), and the Uttarā Mimāṃsā with regard to Brahma. These two schools of orthodox theologians developed philosophical doctrines of their own, but these are found in the Bhāṣyas and are scarcely alluded to in the sūtras themselves.

<sup>1</sup> Haribhadra, Śaṅkarāśāsanamuccaya v. 3; Siddharṣi, Upamitibhavaprapñcā Kathā p. 661 ff.; see above vol. 31, p. 6 note 3.

<sup>2</sup> JRAS 1910 p. 128 ff.

<sup>3</sup> WZKM vol. 22, p. 136 ff. see also above vol. 31, p. 8, note 1.

### *Sanskrit Kabāiras or Kubāiras and Greek Kabeiros.<sup>1</sup>—*

By E. W. HOPKINS, Professor in Yale University.

The phonetic equivalence of the Greek and earlier Sanskrit forms is patent and has already been noted by Professor Wackernagel (KZ. 41, p. 314 ff.), who explains the labialization in the later Sanskrit form as due to the proximity of the labial consonant. The difficulty in the identification has lain in the apparently incongruous character of the two spirits.

In preparing a manual of Hindu mythology I have recently been impressed with the fact that the incongruity is more apparent than real. The variant Ko-beiros, which Hesychius identifies with the kobalt or gobelinus ordinarily called Kobālos was originally one with the form Ka-beiros. That is to say, the house-spirit full of tricks was at first not differentiated from the gnome of the mountain-caves, *kybēla*. The chthonic mountain-mother abstracted from the caves is Kybēlē (Kybēlē). I shall give no analysis of the character of the Greek spirit. The tricky troll of the Athenian home, the mysterious gnome of the mountain caves, with his phallic characteristics, his affinity with the worker in iron and fire, the hoarder of treasure connected with the god of luck, finally the mystery and revelling of the Kabeiros—these need only to be mentioned to be recalled. But as for Kabāiras or Kubēras, who would think of him as capable of being interpreted in the same way, I venture to add even described with the same words?


The fact is, however, that Sanskrit scholars are obliged to depend in large part for their understanding of Hindu gods upon statements made in comparatively late literature, and when these statements are united in the current mythological handbooks with other data drawn at random from Vedic and

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the Meeting of the Oriental Congress—Athens. April, 1912.


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sophy to make a perceptual or a conceptual reconstruction of reality, urge all, irrespective of caste, sex and culture, earnestly to realize *Brahman* as known by a simple act of intuition or feelingly to adore the highest human manifestation of God in an *Avatāra*. They teach men to gain a direct perception of their highest spiritual existence within and without, to feel within themselves the bliss divine by the realization, conscious or unconscious, of the greatness, goodness, blessedness, grace, self-revealing power, etc., which belong to God alone. The predominance of faith which the *Sūtrakāra* has sought to establish is not in any way a departure from the conclusions of the teachers of old. The end of human activities is not mere knowledge which taken by itself is rather dry and barren, but joy divine attainable by an intense sympathy, intellectual or otherwise, with the whole of things. This is the sum and substance no doubt of "the Doctrine of Honey" (*Madhu-vidyā*) embodied in the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, and this is the conclusion of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which assigns unconditionally the highest place to the spiritual self (*ānandamaya ātmā*) rather than to the cognitive one (*viññānamaya*). Thus it can be shown that development of the Hindu theory of faith is just a process of specialization which proceeded side by side with the development of Indian literature itself. In other words, the gradual unfolding of religious consciousness of the Hindus can be traced by the gradual separation of the texts themselves.

## THE GAUDAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀ ON THE MĀNDŪKYA UPANIṢAD.

By VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA.

It was in July 1919 that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Viśvabhārati, Śāntiniketana, I had to read the *Upaniṣads* anew; and in doing so, when I began to study the *Gaudapāda-Kārikā* on the *Māndūkya* text, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this in a quite different light. I found there something new which I never thought of finding in it. And here I desire to present in part what I found in the following pages.

The *Māndūkya* is held to be one of the ten principal *Upaniṣads*. It is also popularly thought that the Ācārya Gaudapāda, the 'Paramaguru' of the great Vedantist Śaṅkarācārya, has commented upon it by his *Kārikās*, i.e. explanatory verses, the real name of which is *Āgamaśāstra*. This *Āgamaśāstra* is again believed to be a pure Vedantic work. Even renowned authors and teachers have taken it to be so. But all these views are to be either given up altogether or to be modified to a great extent. All these and similar other points have been thoroughly discussed in my main dissertation on these *Kārikās* which will, I hope, be shortly ready for the press under the name of "*The Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda*."

The *Āgamaśāstra* is divided into four *Prakaraṇas* or 'Books.' In the first Book there is nothing particular to comment upon, but as regards the other three, I can in no way admit that what is treated and established therein is pure *Vedānta*. If it were so, we shall be obliged to say that the *Vedānta* which Gaudapāda knew was quite different from that known to us until now. It is clear that in Books II and III the Ācārya has tried to bring *Vedānta* into harmony with Buddhism and has succeeded in doing so. I strongly believe that Buddhism did not spring up in the country all of a sudden. It must have been influenced by the *Upaniṣads* which preceded it. Consequently some of the Buddhist theories, such as the *Viññānavāda* of the *Yogācāras*, and the *Śūnyavāda* of the *Mādhyamikas*, can be traced back to, and explained to some extent, by the *Upaniṣadic* texts, which deserve to be interpreted quite independently without paying any heed to the existing schools of

interpretation. It is Gauḍapāda, and he alone, who discovered the true relation between the Vedāntic and Buddhist views. In Books II and III of his *Āgamaśāstra*, Gauḍapāda begins with *Vedānta* and concludes with Buddhism, showing thereby how the former leads to the latter. But he has devoted Book IV entirely to Buddhism, or, to be more particular, to *Yogācāra* and *Mādhyamika* schools. It is quite apparent from his *Āgamaśāstra* that he has freely used the principal Buddhist works, such as the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā* with the commentary by Candrakīrti, and Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*. Not only this. He has also employed identical words, even often quoting the same lines from different Buddhist works, though without mentioning his sources. From a perusal of the *Āgamaśāstra* it will also be evident that the real father of the present *Advaitavāda* is not the great Śaṅkarācārya, but Gauḍapāda, his *Paramaguru* who, on his own part, is again much indebted to the Buddhists. Details of all these things will be found in my forthcoming volume "*The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*" referred to. Here, however, I shall try to give only a short account of some of them confining myself to a very small number of *Kārikās*, contained mainly in Book IV.

I have already said that the fourth Book of the *Āgamaśāstra* is devoted entirely to Buddhist philosophy; nothing of *Vedānta* is to be found there, though it has been explained in Vedāntic light. This assertion can be proved from the very beginning of it. The first two *Kārikās* form what is known in Sanskrit literature as *Maṅgalācaraṇa*, 'Salutation' or 'Prayer for success,' etc. And the first of these two *Kārikās* runs as follows:—

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयमिदमेव समुद्रस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥

The author pays homage to द्विपदांवर 'the greatest of men,' the word द्विपद (or द्विपद) lit. 'biped' meaning 'a man.' But who is the greatest of men referred to here? He cannot be any other than the Buddha. For it is the Buddha, and he alone, who is addressed by that phrase, as is evident throughout Buddhist literature, either in Pāli or Sanskrit. द्विपदांवर when compounded becomes द्विपदुत्तम, which is tantamount to द्विपदोत्तम in Sanskrit, and द्विपदुत्तम in Pāli. And it is one of the synonyms for the Buddha,<sup>1</sup> and it is in.

<sup>1</sup> *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, Colombo, 1900, I: *Mahāsaddanūti*, Colombo, 1909; p. 60, l. 25.

frequent use in literature (*Suttanīṭā*, P. T. S. 83, 995, 998; *Samādhirāja*, B. T. S. p. 8). The word द्विपद-चप, too, for the Buddha occurs in the *Mahāvvyutpatti* (Memoir, Asiatic Society of Bengal, p. 235) in the following phrase:—

“बुद्धं शरणं गच्छामि द्विपदानामग्रम् ।”

According to the commentator, Śaṅkara,<sup>1</sup> द्विपदांवर means पुरुषोत्तम i.e. नारायण. Says he “धर्मान् यः समुद्रः समुद्रवान् इत्ययमेव नारायणाख्यः .. द्विपदांवरं पुरुषाणां वरं प्रधानं पुरुषोत्तमम् इत्यभिप्रायः ।”

But even पुरुषोत्तम does not necessarily mean नारायण for it is also a well-known name of the Buddha as will be found in the *Mahāvastu* (Senart, Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 232, 266; *Samādhirāja*, p. 3). The word नरोत्तम, too, is one of the name of the Buddha (*Ibid.*, p. 193; *Mahāvvyutpatti*, Vol. I, 39, p. 2; *Samādhirāja*, pp. 8, 17, 18). It is also to be noted here that nowhere in Brāhmaṇic Sanskrit literature the word द्विपदोत्तम or a similar word compounded with द्विपद is to be found to mean नारायण. In the *Mahābhārata* (Vana, 57. 42) द्विपदांवर is used as an adjective of Nala.

The other words of the *Kārikā* will strongly support the view that the author means here the Buddha. The literal import of the verse is this:—

“Who has perfectly understood the things (धर्म) which are like the sky (गगनोपम) through his knowledge (ज्ञान) which is not different from its object (ज्ञेयमिदम) and is also like the sky (आकाशकल्प), to him, to the greatest of men, I do homage.”

Here are two points. First, ज्ञान is here said to be आकाशकल्प 'like the sky,' and again it is ज्ञेयमिदम 'not different from ज्ञेय 'knowable,' the object of knowledge; second, the things (धर्म) are likewise गगनोपम 'like the sky.'

Now, who is that person to whom there is no difference between ज्ञान and the ज्ञेय, and ज्ञान is आकाशकल्प? And what is really implied by the word धर्म which is also described as गगनोपम?

It is not a new thing to one knowing the Indian systems of philosophy that according to the Buddhists, or more particularly, according to one special sect or school of theirs, viz. the *Yogācāras*, there

<sup>1</sup> In my opinion, as I have shown elsewhere, (*Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume*) this Śaṅkara cannot be identified with the great Śaṅkarācārya, the founder of the *Advaita* school of the *Vedānta* philosophy. See also Hermann Jacobi, *J.A.O.S.*, XXXIII, p. 52, note 2.



is no difference whatever between ज्ञान (चित्त) and ज्ञेय, the ज्ञेय being nothing but ज्ञान, as there is no existence of external reality (बाह्यार्थ) just like in one's dream (स्वप्न).<sup>1</sup> This is a common point of controversy between the Buddhist and the Non-Buddhist philosophers in our country. This theory, the *Vijñānavāda*, has been discussed under the heading of '*Nirālambanavāda*' and attacked and refuted by Śābarasvāmin<sup>2</sup> and Kumārila.<sup>3</sup> It is needless to say that this *Vijñānavāda* of the *Yogācāras* originated, as the members of this sect would maintain, with the Buddha himself, who is saluted here in the first *Kārikā*.<sup>4</sup>

The word धर्म in the sense of a 'thing' or the 'object of knowledge'<sup>5</sup> is very well known in Buddhist literature, both in Pāli and in Sanskrit.<sup>6</sup> And evidently it is employed here in that meaning. But in the commentary which is wrongly ascribed to Śāṅkara, the word धर्म in this and several other *Kārikās* has been taken to mean आत्मान्. But this meaning is forced and far-fetched and thus cannot be accepted. In the whole range of Upaniṣadic literature धर्म is nowhere used in this sense; nor even in any of the *Kārikās* of the first three Books of the present work can one meet with that meaning. To imply आत्मान् the Ācārya in every case has used आत्मान् or जीव, and why should he all of a sudden in the last Book begin to employ the word धर्म to mean it? The word धर्म is used in the last Book not less than twenty times and every time it conveys the sense of a 'thing.' And though the commentator has tried his best to explain it as meaning 'soul' (आत्मान्), he has utterly failed in some cases where he has been compelled to accept the meaning of a 'thing.' For instance, in the commentary on the *Kārikā* IV. 54

<sup>1</sup> For the detailed discussion see the *Sarvadarśana-Saṃgraha*, Bib. Ind. 1858, pp. 15-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Mīmāṃsādarśana* with Śābara's commentary, Bib. Ind. p. 8, l. 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Slokavārtika*, Chaukhamba S. Series. pp. 217ff.

<sup>4</sup> I hope to show in a subsequent paper that the *Vijñānavāda* can be traced back to the *Upaniṣads*.

<sup>5</sup> That is, ज्ञेय, Pāli ज्ञेय (*Abhidhānappa*. 784) or in the words of the *Naiyāyikas* 'प्रमेय'. There are five *Nēya-dhammas* in which everything of the world is included, viz., *Sāṃkhāra*, *Vikāra*, *Lakkhaṇa*, *Paññatti*, and *Nibbāna*.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, "सर्वधर्मा अपि देवपुत्रा मायोपमाः स्वप्नोपमाः"—*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Pra.* p. 39; "पुनरपरं सुभूते तथागतेन सर्वधर्मा अकृता अकृता इत्यभिस्मृदाः," सर्वधर्मेण ज्ञानं प्रवृत्तम्"—*Ibid.*, p. 275; see also pp. 278-279. Its use in that sense in Brahmanic literature is very rare. See *Kaṭha Up.* I. 1. 21.

("एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चित्तं वापि न धर्मजम्") धर्माः is explained not as आत्मानः, but बाह्यधर्माः i.e. बाह्यविषयाः 'external things.' And again in the *Kārikā* IV. 41, he interprets धर्मान् by saying clearly हस्यादीन् 'the elephants, etc.' See also the commentary IV. 99. Sometimes he does not explain the word at all, probably being unable to be consistent with his own fanciful meaning, i.e. आत्मान् (See commentary IV. 21, 33).<sup>1</sup> When the *Kārikā* IV. 6 is compared with *Kārikā* III. 20,<sup>2</sup> the reader will be convinced that the author, Gauḍapāda, has himself expressed in his own words that धर्म in this case is used only in the sense of a 'thing.' In explaining धर्म the commentator is so bewildered that he has once (III. 1) taken it to mean even a साधक 'one striving for success or final emancipation.'

Now, it is stated in the *Kārikā* that the *dharma*s are गगनोपमा 'like the sky.' This is clearly the Buddhist view. For according to them everything is like the sky. So it is stated in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā* (p. 297): "एवमेव सुभूते सर्वधर्मा .. आकाशसमाः।" So in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX. 155 :—

"सर्वमाकाशसङ्काशं परिगृह्णन्तु मद्भिधाः।"<sup>3</sup>

One of the grounds<sup>4</sup> on which this theory is based is that the things are निःस्वभाव, i.e. without their *own* nature or condition or state of

<sup>1</sup> Evidently धर्म here means nothing but 'a thing.'

<sup>2</sup> The *Kārikās* run :—

"अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः।

अजातो ह्यसृज्यते धर्मो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ IV. 6.

अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः।

अजातो ह्यसृज्यते भावो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ III. 20.

Here as regards the meanings, the words धर्म in the first *Kārikā* and भाव in the last are apparently one and the same, and we need not explain that भाव means here 'a thing.'

<sup>3</sup> And it is explained in its great *Tikā Pañjikā* (Bib. Ind.) p. 592, by Prajñā-karamati as follows :—

"आकाशसङ्काशं समारोपिततत्त्वशून्यत्वात् आकाशकल्पम्."

Mark here in this line the word आकाशकल्पम् and आकाशकल्पेन in this *Kārikā*.

<sup>4</sup> See *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, pp. 278-279. In the commentary on the *Kārikā* IV. 96, it is said in reference to the opening *Kārikā* (IV, 1) of this Book that ज्ञान is आकाशकल्प because it is असङ्ग 'having no relation (with the object)' there being nothing external. See the *Kārikā* IV. 72 with commentary. Cf. "एवं चतुष्कोटि-विनिर्मुक्तम् आकाशवद् असङ्गम् अनास्यदम् (according to Tibetan) विश्वम् उत्पद्यमानः।"—*Bodhicaryā. Pañj.* p. 359.

being (स्वभाव).<sup>1</sup> And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (आकाश, शून्य).<sup>2</sup>

In the above *Kārikā* ज्ञान, too, is said to be like the sky (आकाशकल्प), and in fact it is so, for it is included in *dharma*s which are, as we have already seen, like the sky. This sky-likeness of things has again been propounded in the *Kārikā* IV. 91: “प्रकृत्याकाशवज् ज्ञेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः।”

The second *Kārikā* of the *Māṅgalācārāṇa* (IV. 2) runs:—

“अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः।

अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥”

‘I salute him who has taught the अस्पर्शयोग which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition.’

But what is that अस्पर्शयोग and by whom has it been taught?<sup>3</sup> There is no mention of it in the *Upaṇiṣads*—though the commentator says that it is well-known in them (“प्रसिद्धमुपनिषत्सु,” III. 39);<sup>4</sup> nor can it be found in any of the Brāhmaṇic works, so far as I can now ascertain, which can be placed before the advent of the Buddha.

At first sight one may be tempted to refer it to what is said in the following *śloka* in Āryadeva's (2nd century A.D.) *Caṭuṣṣatikā* (Memoirs, A.S.B., Vol. III, p. 507, *Sloka* 308):—

“न ह्यस्पर्शवतो नाम योगः स्पर्शवता सह।

रूपादीनामतो योगः सर्वथापि न युज्यते ॥”

But in fact it cannot be so, अस्पर्शयोग and अस्पर्शवद्-योग are not the same. This *śloka* only says that the contact (योग) of a tangible thing (स्पर्शवत्) with an intangible one (अस्पर्शवत्) is not reasonable;

<sup>1</sup> To this point (स्वभाव) a whole chapter has been devoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti* XV, pp. 259-279.

<sup>2</sup> “अतोऽभिनिष्कृष्यमाणो निःस्वभावतया आकाशं शून्यमेव।”—*Bodhicaryā. Panj.*, p. 503. See also “एवं करादयोऽपि विचारतो निःस्वभावा द्रष्टव्या इति। ततः कायोऽपि न परमाद्यंतःकश्चिदस्ति। .. अयं कायः पादपादाङ्गुलि ... शिरःकपालमात्रसमूहः। ... तत् कोऽत्र कायः। तस्य प्रत्यवेक्षमाणस्य भवति—आकाशसमोऽयं कायः। स आकाशवत् काये स्मृतिमुत्पादयति सर्वमेतद् आकाशमिति पश्यति। एवं विचार्यमाणो वस्तुतः शून्यस्वभावतया आकाशसङ्काशः कायः।” pp. 504-505.

<sup>3</sup> I construe the *Kārikā* taking येन as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator who says that it is अस्पर्शयोग that is saluted here.

<sup>4</sup> This also shows that the commentator cannot be identified with the great Śaṅkara, for he cannot say so.

while the word अस्पर्शयोग conveys a particular kind of meditation or concentration as is evident also from the *Kārikā* III. 39:

“अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः।

योगिनो विभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥”

In the *Kārikā* III, 37, too, it has clearly been stated as समाधि ‘concentration.’ This concentration of mind is, I think, nothing but the ninth or the last of nine *dhyānas* or meditations called अनुपूर्वविचार, Pāli अनुपुब्बविचार ‘successive states (of *dhyāna*)’ which the Blessed One taught and which are found frequently in Buddhist texts.<sup>1</sup> These successive states are enumerated as follow:—

I. Four *Rūpa dhyānas*, i.e. the meditations the object of which is *rūpa* ‘matter.’

- (1) The first stage of meditation (प्रथम ध्यान).
- (2) The second stage of meditation (द्वितीय ध्यान).
- (3) The third stage of meditation (तृतीय ध्यान).
- (4) The fourth stage of meditation (चतुर्थ ध्यान).

II. The Four *Arūpa dhyānas* termed—

- (5) The place of infinity of space (आकाशानन्त्यायतन, P. आकाशानन्त्यायतन).
- (6) The place of infinity of clear consciousness (विज्ञानानन्त्यायतन, P. विज्ञानानन्त्यायतन).
- (7) The place of nothingness (आकिञ्चन्यायतन, P. आकिञ्चज्जायतन).
- (8) The place neither of consciousness, nor of unconsciousness (नेवसंज्ञानासंज्ञायतन, P. नेवसंज्ञानासंज्ञायतन).
- (9) And the cessation or complete restriction of consciousness and sensation (संज्ञावेदयितनिरोध, P. संज्ञावेदयितनिरोध).

As, in this last stage of meditation or योग, not only sensation or consciousness but also all the mental properties (चेतसिका धर्मा) headed by contact (फस्स, skt. स्पर्श)<sup>2</sup> together with the mind (चित्त) itself are restricted or suppressed, it is called अस्पर्शयोग, i.e. the योग in which there is no स्पर्श. The word स्पर्श used here implies also the other mental properties of which स्पर्श is the first. The cessation of वेदन is possible, only when स्पर्श ceases, as has been clearly shown in the *Samyutta-Nikāya*, P. T. S. Vol. IV, p. 220 (= XXXVI. 15. 4):

<sup>1</sup> “नव धिमे भिक्खवे अनुपुब्बविचारो।... नव धिमे भिक्खवे अनुपुब्ब विचारसमापत्तियो हेसिस्सामि. तं सुनाय।”—*Anguttaranikāya*, Vol. IV, pp. 410-448.

<sup>2</sup> “फस्सो वेदना संज्ञा चेतना.. चेतसिका सम्बचित्तसाधारणा नाम।”—*Abhidhammattha saṅgaha*, II, I, ff. (Colombo, 1898, p. 27, 41).

“फस्ससमुदया वेदनासमुदयो, फस्सनिरोधा वेदनानिरोधो।” *स्यर्श* is the cause of वेदना, so when there is *स्यर्श* there is वेदना, and there is no वेदना where there is no *स्यर्श*.

The fact that in this state of निरोध, mind and its properties (चित्त and चेतसिक धम्मस) completely cease to work is mentioned by Buddhaghōṣa very clearly in his *Visuddhimagga*, (Saddharmaparakāśaka Press, Ceylon, 1914), p. 552.<sup>1</sup>

In the present *Kārikā* (IV, 2) this योग is described as conducing to happiness (सर्वसच्चसुख). So it is said also in the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, Vol. IV, p. 228 (=XXXVI, 19, 20), that the highest bliss or pleasure is felt in the *Saññāvedayitanirodha* (or the *Sammāvedayitanirodha* of the Chinese Version).<sup>2</sup>

That this is very difficult to realize (दुर्दर्श) as is said in the *Kārikā* III. 39, does not require any comment. In fact, in Buddhist works, too, this योग or निरोध is described by the same word, दुर्दर्श, Pali दुदस.<sup>3</sup>

It is further stated in the present *Kārikā*, that *Yogins*, or rather untrained ones, shrink back from it, magnifying fear where in reality there is no fear:—“योगिनो बिभ्यन्ति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः।” But what is the cause of their fear here? The commentator has rightly explained it saying:—“आत्मनाशरूपमिदं योगं मन्यमाना भयं कुर्वन्ति,”—the so-called *Yogins* think that it will annihilate the very self of which they are so fond, and so they are frightened. Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a *Yogin* in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped.<sup>4</sup> So when the Blessed One entered this state, i.e. *Saññāvedayitanirodha* before his *parinibbāna*, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable

<sup>1</sup> It says “का निरोधसमापत्तीति? या अनुपुब्बनिरोधवसेन चित्तचेतमिकानं धम्मानं अप्यवन्ति।” See also “सञ्जावेदयितनिरोधं समापन्नस्स सञ्जा च वेदना च निरुद्धा होन्ति। खीणासवस्स भिक्खुनो रागो निरुद्धो होति दोसो निरुद्धो होति मोहो निरुद्धो होति।”—*Saṃyutta-nikāya*, P. T. S. Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI, 11, 5).

<sup>2</sup> “इधानन्दं भिक्खुं सञ्चसो नेवसञ्जानासञ्जायतनं समतिक्रम्य सञ्जावेदयितनिरोधं उपसम्यज्जि विहरति। इदं खो आनन्द एतन्हा सुखा अज्जं सुखं अभिक्कन्ततरं च पणोततरं च।” See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cf. *Anguttara-Nikāya* P. T. S. Vol. IV, pp. 414-418 (=XXXIV, 2-3): किं पनेत्य (i.e. in निब्बान) आवुसो सारिपुत्त सुखं यदेत्य नत्थि वेदयितन्ति। एतदेव ह्वेत्य आवुसो सुखं यदेत्य नत्थि वेदयितं।”

<sup>3</sup> *Majjhima-Nikāya*, P. T. S. Vol. I, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> From the fourth *dhyāna* respiration of a *Yogin* stops. See *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI. II. 5, etc.).

Anuruddha Thera said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed One only having entered the stage of the *dhyāna*, called *Saññāvedayitanirodha*. After a short time, however, He passed away.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, quite natural that an untrained *Yogin* should be afraid of it, as of death.

Yet, there is a real difference between death and अस्यर्शयोग or सञ्जावेदयितनिरोध, and Buddhaghōṣa has explained it in his *Visuddhimagga* (p. 558) by quoting a passage from the *Suttapiṭaka*. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same, excepting that in the latter the heat of the body is not extinguished, that life does not come to an end, and that the organs of sense are not destroyed, while in the former all these are annihilated.

As we have already seen, this योग has been taught by the Buddha. It cannot be denied that up to the eighth of these successive states of *dhyāna* (अनुपुब्बविहार), viz. ‘neither consciousness nor unconsciousness’ (*Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*) there is nothing particularly Buddhistic. For, it is evident from Buddhist literature, both Pāli and Sanskrit, that the Buddha’s teacher, Ālāra Kālāma (Kālāpa), a *Brāhmaṇa*, taught him the seventh stage, ‘the state of nothingness’; and then the other teacher, also a *Brāhmaṇa*, Uddaka (Skt., Rudraka) Rāmaputta, taught him the eighth stage, the state of ‘neither consciousness-nor-unconsciousness’ (*Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*).<sup>2</sup> The Buddha was, however, not satisfied with what he had from those teachers, and he started thereupon to seek after a still higher state and succeeded in realizing it. It is this state which is called सञ्जावेदयितनिरोध or briefly निरोध. निरोध is almost the same as निब्बान, the difference between them being very little. It seems that in the words of Brāhmaṇic philosophy निरोध is जीवन्मुक्ति while निब्बान is विदेह मुक्ति.

This निरोध also appears to be what is called असम्यज्ञान समाधि in the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali (1, 2, 18, 51 with the Scholiast Vyāsa). But this mere fact cannot be advanced as a proof of its Brāhmaṇic origin; for as recent researches<sup>3</sup> show, the date of the *Yogasūtras*

<sup>1</sup> *Mahāparinibbānasutta* VI, 8-9 (=Dīgha., P. T. S. p. 158).

<sup>2</sup> *Majjhima*, Vol. I, pp. 165-166 (*Ariyapari-yesanasutta*, I. 3. 6); *Lalitavistara*, Lefmann, Vol. I, pp. 238-239, 243-244; *Buddhacarita*, Cowell, XIII, 63, 83; Kern’s *Manual of Buddhism*, 1896, p. 55. [Were they Brahmins? Ed.]

<sup>3</sup> J. H. Woods: *Yoga-System of Patañjali*, Harvard Oriental Series 17, Introduction, p. xvii.

in its present form being placed between 300 A.D. and 500 A.D., it is in no way impossible that the Brāhmanic school of *Yoga* might have adopted it from the Buddhists. And again, if the author of the *Kārikā*, Gauḍapāda, had only meant here the असम्प्रज्ञात समाधि as is described in the *Yogasūtras*, he would have certainly used this word itself and not असंशययोग which is nowhere found in any Brāhmanic work. On the other hand, references from Buddhist works have already been given with regard to the use of the word असंशययोग. Moreover, there is no mention whatever in the *Yogasūtras* or in any other work as to the author of the असम्प्रज्ञात समाधि to whom Gauḍapāda would pay his homage, while, as has been seen above, the असंशययोग was taught by the Buddha.

There is one thing more which suggests that the असंशययोग is not originally taught in the Brāhmanic system of *Yoga*. It is said in the *Kārikā* (IV. 2) that this *Yoga* is अविवाद 'not disputed' and अविरुद्ध 'not opposed.'<sup>1</sup> It is implied from these two words that, in acceptance of the असंशययोग by the Vedāntins among whom the author himself is included, there cannot be raised any dispute, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view.

Thus it is perfectly clear from what we have seen above in regard to the second *Kārikā* that the real instructor of the असंशययोग who is saluted here by Gauḍapāda is no other than the Buddha.

By using not less than six times the word *Buddha* in this Book of his *Kārikās* Gauḍapāda tells us in the clearest possible terms that the doctrine propounded by him is of the Buddha, 'the Enlightened One.' Let us quote here a few lines :—

“एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्धैरजातिः परिदीपिता ।” IV. 19.

“जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेस्सप्ततां सदा ।” IV. 42.<sup>2</sup>

The word सम्बुद्ध in the first *Kārikā* deserves to be mentioned here, and the Appendix giving a list of the words, apparently Buddhistic and used here in Book IV exactly in the same sense may also be consulted in regard thereto.

So far the first two *Kārikās* are thus discussed. Let us now see

<sup>1</sup> Cf. IV. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See also: “विषयः स हि बुद्धानाम्,” IV. 80; “सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम्,” IV. 88; “क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानम्,” “नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम्,” IV. 99. The word बुद्ध has been used twice over (IV. 92, 98), but in different sense; it does not affect the main contention.

what the Ācārya says in his last two *Kārikās*, the first of which runs as follows :—

“क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।

सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥” IV. 99.

It means that according to *tāyin* Buddha, ज्ञान 'knowledge' does not approach things (धर्म), i.e. it does not relate itself to its object (see IV. 72, 96); for things and knowledge—these have not been told by the Buddha.

As has already been shown in the very beginning (IV. 1) both ज्ञान and ज्ञेय 'knowledge and knowable' are like the sky (आकाशकल्प) and there cannot be any relation between them. Moreover, according to the *Mādhyamikas*, with regard to the supreme truth (परमार्थ) the Buddha has said nothing, not uttered a single syllable. He has thus not said anything of धर्म and ज्ञान. Nāgārjuna says :—

“सर्वोपलम्भोपशमः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवः ।

न कश्चित् कस्यचित् कश्चिद् धर्मे बुद्धेन देशितः ॥”

*Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā*, XX. 25.

Candrakīrti, the commentator, quotes here from the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* :—

“यां च रात्रिं शान्तमते तथागतोऽनुत्तरां सम्यक् सम्बोधिमभिमम्बुद्धो यां च रात्रि-  
मुपादाय परिनिर्वास्यति अत्रान्तरे तथागतेन एकमण्यक्षरं नोदाहृतं न व्याहृतं नापि  
प्रत्याह्वरति नापि प्रत्याह्वरिष्यति ।”

Here, too, the name of the Enlightened One 'Buddha' is clearly stated. And it is to be noted that though the commentator, Śāṅkara, has all along tried his utmost to take the word to mean a ब्रह्मविद् 'Knower of Brahman,' and to explain the whole thing in the Vedāntic light, he seems compelled to admit that there is here a reference to the 'Enlightened One' and the Buddhistic views. He says—

“ज्ञान-ज्ञेय-ज्ञातृ-रहितं परमार्थतत्त्वम् अद्वयम्; एतन्न बुद्धेन भाषितं यद्यपि बाह्यार्थ-  
निराकारणं ज्ञानमात्रकल्पना च अद्वयवस्तुसामीप्यमुक्तम् ।”

It is to be observed here that as a matter of fact the supreme reality according to the *Mādhyamikas* is free from ज्ञान-ज्ञेय-ज्ञातृ 'Knowledge—Knowable—Knower.'<sup>1</sup>

The word तायिन् in the *Kārikā* deserves to be noticed here special-

<sup>1</sup> Lois de la Vallée Poussin : *J.R.A.S.* 1920, p. 140.

ly. It is a non-Brāhmanic word being frequently found in Buddhist and Jain works,<sup>1</sup> chiefly in the former.<sup>2</sup>

In the last *Kārikā* of his work the *Ācārya* pays homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e. to *Nirvāṇa* :—

“दुर्दर्शनमिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।

बुद्धा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥”

IV. 100.

<sup>1</sup> For instance, (A) in Buddhist Sanskrit :

“वर्तितं विरजं चक्रं लोकनाथेन तायिना ।”

*Lalitavistara*, Lefmann, p. 421.

“अनुमोदे च तायिनाम् ।”

*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, III. 2.

“सा कथं पूर्वतायिनाम् ।”

*Ibid.* V. 9.

See also *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, Bib. Buddh. pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.

(B) In Jain Works :

(1) Sanskrit: Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*, Bib. Ind., Vol. I, pp. 1, 47.

(2) Prakrit: *Daśavaikālika* (Devachand Lalbhai Jain Pustakodhāra, No. 47), p. 115.

It is to be noted that Vācaspatimīśra has used the word just at the beginning of his *Tātparyatīkā* (“अच्छपादाय तायिने”).

<sup>2</sup> For the meaning of this word see Poussin's Foot-notes, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* *Pañjikā*, Bib. Ind. p. 75, and *J.R.A.S.* 1920, p. 140, where the discussion on it by the various scholars have been referred to. See also Morris, *J.P.T.S.*, 1891-1893, p. 53. The following lines deserve to be added hereto in this connection :—

(a) “पूर्वतायिनाम् पूर्वमभिसम्बुद्धानां भगवताम् (= बुद्धानाम्) ।”

*Bodhicar. Pañjikā*, p. 100.

(β) “तायिनाम् इति स्वाधिगतमार्गदेशकानाम् । यदुक्तम्—तायः स्वदृष्टमार्गोक्तिरिति । तद् विद्यते येषामिति । अथवा तायः सन्तानार्थः, आसंसारम् अप्रतिष्ठितनिर्वाणतया अवस्थायिनाम् ।”

(γ) “तायौ सकलसुरासुरमनुजतिरश्वां पालकः ।”

Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*, Bib. Ind., p. 2.

(δ) “तायन्ते आत्मानं परमुभयं चेति वातारः ।”

Haribhadra's *Daśavaikālika* already alluded to.

It is evident that Burnouf is supported by the Jain writers, too, in his explanation of the word as तायिन् which is given as one of the names of the Buddha in the *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, *A.S.B.*, I. 14. Cf. also the word तायक in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra-Sūtra*, ed. Sylvain Lévi, XVII. 31, p. 124. Here it is an adjective of धर्म. Professor Sylvain Lévi notes that in the Chinese Version in the verse and the commentary as well it is omitted. But he remarks later on in his translation (p. 214) that the Tibetan version ‘*gduñ-byed*’ (གདུང་བྱེད) clearly shows here the reading to be तायक and so he translates it by ‘Qui

‘Having understood that पद (condition) which is difficult to be seen, very deep, even, clear, and free from variety, we salute it to the best of our power (बल).’

That the author salutes here निर्वाण and not ब्रह्मन् can easily be known from some of the words, employed in the stanza, which in Buddhist literature have a special significance.

The word पद is a name for निर्वाण in Buddhist works (*Abhidhān-padāpikā*, 8, 819). But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature (for in Brāhmanic literature, too, the word is used in the same sense, i.e. सुक्ति, see *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 3. 7-9; *Gītā*, 2. 51, 15. 4),<sup>1</sup> its two epithets दुर्दर्श and अतिगम्भीर incline us to assign to it the meaning of निर्वाण. In Buddhist literature सुदुर्दर्श, Pali सुदुद्दस is an epithet of or a synonym for निर्वाण (*Abhidhānap.* p. 7); while in the *Upaniṣads* we do not come across such an use of the word, excepting once in the *Kaṭha* 2. 12 (“तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टम्..”). Even there the word दुर्दर्श is not an adjective of निर्वाण or मोक्ष but of आत्मन् of which nothing is said in the last Book of the *Kārikās*. On the other hand, both the words गम्भीर and दुर्दर्श (Pali दुद्दस), दुर्दर्श being simply a different form of the latter, are two adjectives of धर्म or निर्वाण found frequently used in Buddhist works, in Sanskrit and in Pali (*Lalitavistara*, Lemann, pp. 392, 395, 397 : “गम्भीरो दुर्दर्शो मम,” 436; *Mahāvagga* I. 5, 2, 8 : “अयं धम्मो गम्भीरो दुद्दसो”; *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 341 : “निर्वाणस्य विगमस्य एतदधिवचनं यदुत गम्भीरमिति”).

The word बल, too, in the compound does not seem to refer to one's ordinary power or energy, for it would not then serve any useful purpose and as such would become superfluous. So it means here the five *balas* enumerated in Buddhism, viz. यद्वाबल, वीर्यं, स्मृतिः, समाधिः and प्रज्ञाः, faith, energy, recollection, contemplation, and

éclaire' 'which gives light.' Compare here the other reading of the *Kārikā* (IV. 99) तापिन्. The commentary runs here : “तापि(य)नः तापोऽ(तापोऽ)स्तीति तापी(यौ) सन्तानवतो निरन्तरस्याकाशकल्पस्येत्यर्थः पूजयतः, प्रज्ञावतो वा ।” It implies that the commentator himself was not certain of the meaning. His first meaning (i.e. सन्तानवान्) corresponds to one of those (अथवा तायः सन्तानार्थः) given in *Bodhi. Pañjikā* quoted above. It follows from what we learn in the Tibetan text that the Sanskrit तायिन् and Pali तादि are quite different words and cannot be connected with each other. The true rendering into Tibetan of तायिन् is, however, ‘*Skyob. pa*’ (སྐྱོབ་པ་) the Sanskrit equivalent of which is nothing but तायिन् (*Journal Asiatique*, 1912, p. 243).

<sup>1</sup> See *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* I. 15; IV. 78, 85, 100.

wisdom, respectively (*Dharma-Saṃgraha* XLVIII. p. 46). And so it is implied here that the author intends to realize निर्वाण by the exercise of five-fold power without which there is no hope of success.

We have considered the beginning and the end of the fourth Book of Gauḍapāda's *Āgamaśāstra*; and now we shall try to see as briefly as possible what the author has said in the main body of this writing.

The main subject of this Book is the theory of अजाति 'absence of birth or production'; in other words, there is nothing about which it can be said that it has taken its birth or that it is produced. At the very outset of the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which is based on the *Upaniṣads*, it is stated (1, I. 2) that everything is produced from *Brahman*. And in order to support this view, it is needless to quote here anything from the *Upaniṣads* which are full of such expressions. For instance, "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जातानि..तद् ब्रह्म." *Taitti. Up.*, III. 1, 1. The authors of the different schools of Indian philosophy are also of the opinion that things are 'born,' i.e. produced and they have their cause (हेतु), they themselves being effect (फल) thereof. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different point of view emphatically denying the 'birth' (जाति) of anything in the world. The first word of Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlmadhyamaka-Kārikā* begins with "अनिरोधमनुत्यादम्" 'there is neither उत्पाद<sup>1</sup> nor निरोध.' And this अनुत्याद or अजाति has been thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let us quote here only a few lines from the above book together with Candrakīrti's commentary (*Madhy. I. p. 12*).

"इदानीम्..उत्पादप्रतिषेधेन निरोधप्रतिषेधसौकर्यं मन्यमानः आचार्यः प्रथममेव उत्पादप्रतिषेधमारभते।

उत्पादो हि परैः कल्पमानः स्वतो वा परिकल्प्यत, परतः उभयतः अहेतुतो वा परिकल्प्यते। सर्वथा च नोपपद्यत इति निश्चित्याह—

“न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः।

उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः कचन केचन॥”

<sup>1</sup> For the order of these two words see Candrakīrti (Bib. Bud. p. 12): “अच च निरोधस्य पूर्वं प्रतिषेधः उत्पादननिरोधयोः पौर्वापर्यावस्थायाः सिद्धभावं द्योतयितुम्। वक्ष्यति हि ‘पूर्वं जातिर्यदि भवेज्जराभरणमुत्तरम्..’” (XI. 3, p. 221). Our author Gauḍapāda, too, has followed the same order in his well-known *Kārikā* III. 32: “न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः” etc. on which there is much to be said.

“Now the *Ācārya* thinking the facility in refuting *nirodha* after *utpāda* is refuted begins first with the refutation of the latter.

*Utpāda* of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself (स्व) or something other than it (पर) or from both (उभय), or again, from one which is no cause at all (अहेतु). But in neither way it can be justified. So he (the *Ācārya*) says:—

“Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves or from some other things or from both, or from what is no cause at all.”

Gauḍapāda has done the same thing using mostly the same arguments, even the same words and sometimes even quoting the same verses from different Buddhist works without mentioning the sources. Compare here the following line of Gauḍapāda IV. 22 with the above *Kārikā* (“न स्वतो नापि परतः..”) Nāgārjuna: “स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु जायते।” See also Nāgārjuna (*Madhy. XXI. 13, p. 421*): “न स्वतो जायते भावः परतो नैव जायते..।”

The *Ācārya* begins the discussion as follows:—

“भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि।

अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम्॥” IV. 3.

There are two classes of teachers, one<sup>1</sup> holding the सत्कार्यवाद or ‘the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause’ and the other<sup>2</sup> असत्कार्यवाद or ‘the doctrine of the actual non-existence of an effect in its cause.’ These two views are here referred to. And so it is said that there are some disputants who desire ‘production’ (जाति) of that which is already existent (भूत) while others hold it to be of that which is non-existent (अभूत); and thus both the parties dispute with each other.

Then he proceeds in the next *Kārikā* to tell us the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of the above two views asserting absolute ‘Non-becoming’ (अजाति) of things:—

“भूतं न जायते किञ्चिद् अभूतं नैव जायते।

विवदन्तोऽद्वया द्योवमजातिं व्यापयन्ति ते॥” IV. 4.

‘That which is already existent (भूत) does not become (जायते), and that which is non-existent (अभूत) does not also become; dis-

<sup>1</sup> Viz. the followers of the systems of *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*. See *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* IX with Gauḍapāda and *Vācaspati* and *Vedāntasūtras* III, I. 16-8 with Śaṅkara.

<sup>2</sup> The *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas*.

puting (or discussing) thus, the followers of *Advaya Vāda* assert the doctrine of "absolute Non-becoming."

In the second half of the above *Kārikā* विवदन्तो द्वयाः is taken as विवदन्तः + द्वयाः by the commentators Śāṅkara and others. But truly speaking, it must be explained as विवदन्तः + अद्वयाः. That the former explanation is utterly wrong will be perfectly clear to any one, when one sees that the two classes of the teachers alluded hereto by the word द्वय do not assert अज्ञानि, but, on the contrary, strongly hold the theory of ज्ञानि as is evident in the preceding *Kārikā* (IV. 3).<sup>1</sup>

The real fact is that having referred to the two doctrines of some teachers in the *Kārikā*, IV. 3, the author mentions here the views of some other teachers whom he designates as अद्वयाः, i.e. those who do not hold the doctrine of द्वय 'two.'

As regards the wording of the last portion of this *Kārikā* (IV. 4): "अभूतं नैव जायते," compare "नाभूतो नाम जायते," *Catuṣṣatikā* XV. 349 (Memoirs A.S.B. Vol. III, No. 8, p. 513). It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of अज्ञानि has fully been discussed by the author Āryadeva, and the commentator, Candrakīrti, as well.

In the next *Kārikā* (IV. 5) quoted below, the author accepts the अज्ञानि doctrine propounded by them, saying that he expresses his approval of it, for he does not see any use of disputing them and invites all to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed:

“खायमानाज्ञानि तैरनुमोदामहे वयम् ।  
विवदामो न तैः सार्धमविवादं निबोधत ॥”

Now, here the question is: who are these *Advayas* or *Advayavādins* who propounded the doctrine of अज्ञानि? Obviously the Advaitins or Vedantists of Śāṅkara's school are not meant here, for as has already been said, they do not hold the अज्ञानिवाद. The *Upaniṣads* avowedly declare the origin or ज्ञानि of the world to have proceeded from *Brahman* which Śāṅkara does not deny.<sup>2</sup> So the teachers referred hereto can nowise be other than the Buddhists. It is well known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit that *Advayavādin* is one of the names of the Buddha (*Amara*, I, I. 14: *Mahāvvyutpatti*,

<sup>1</sup> Śāṅkarācārya, the great commentator of *Brahma-Sūtras* can never explain the verse in that way, and so he cannot be identified with Śāṅkara, the author of the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya* and its *Kārikās*.

<sup>2</sup> In Supreme Truth (परमार्थ सत्य), however, it is denied to exist. But in this respect Śāṅkara merely subscribes to Buddhist views just as Gauḍapāda does.

Memoirs, A.S.B. p. 2), and so we see in the *Divyāvadāna* (Cowell and Neil, p. 95)<sup>1</sup>:—बुद्धानां भगवतां महाकारुणिकानाम्..अद्वयवादिनाम् ।”

But why are the Buddhas and consequently their followers called *Advayavādins*? The answer is to be found in Buddhist works. As regards the nature of a thing there are two extreme views, some holding, 'it is' (अस्ति) and others 'it is not' (नास्ति). The Buddha however, did not subscribe to either of them and hence he is called *Advayavādin*. This is supported by a number of passages in both Sanskrit and Pāli works on Buddhism.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the *Ācārya*, Gauḍapāda, introducing his readers to the doctrine of अज्ञानि proceeds until the end of his book to offer various arguments in support, which have thoroughly been dealt with in my

<sup>1</sup> In the *Index of Words*, p. 672, the word *Advaitavādin* as an epithet of Buddha has been misprinted. As the facts go to show, there is a marked difference between the terms अद्वैतवाद and अद्वयवाद. अद्वैतवाद literally means 'Non-two-ness' (Non-difference, i.e. Non-difference between or identity of *Jiva* and *Brahman*), while अद्वय implies 'Non-two,' i.e. neither of two extreme views as described in the following paragraph. अद्वयवादिन् the Tibetan equivalent of which is *gñes. su. med. pa. gsun. ba* (གཤེས་སུ་མེད་པ་གསུང་བ་), and Chinese *pu-erh-yü*

(不二語) is misunderstood in the *Sanskrit-Tibetan-English-Vocabulary* (Memoir, A.S.B. p. 2), for the word cannot mean "not doubtful in his command" as it is explained there.

<sup>2</sup> Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā* (Bib. Bud.) XV. 7, p. 269:

(i) “कात्यायनाववादे चास्तीति नास्तीति चोभयम् ।

प्रतिविध्यं भगवता भावाभावविभाविना ॥”

(ii) यद् भूयसा कात्यायनाय लोकोऽस्तितां वाभिनिविष्टो नास्तितां च तेन न परिसुच्यते ।

—*Ārya Kātyāyannāvavāda*, *Ibid.*, p. 269.

(iii) द्वयनिस्सितो ष्वायं कच्चान लोको येभ्येन अत्यन्तं च नत्यन्तं च ।” *Samyutta-nikāya*, XII. 15. 4-5, P.T.S., Vol. II, p. 17.

See *Laṅkāvatāra*, B.T.S., p. 56; *Samādhirāja*, B.T.S., p. 30. For a detailed discussion readers are referred to *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, p. 267.

*En passant* it may be observed here that the origin of the name, *Mādhyamika*, for this doctrine is that the Buddha rejecting both the paths or views, existence and non-existence adopted a middle one. So it is said in *Samyutta-nikāya* XII. 15, 7 (P.T.S. Part II, p. 17) “सच्चं अत्योति खो कच्चायन अयं एको अन्तो नत्योति अयं दुतियो अन्तो । एते ते कच्चायन उभो अन्ते अनुपगम्य मज्जेन तथागतो धम्मं देसेति ।”

Candrakīrti, *Mādhyā*. p. 276: “भावाभावदर्शनद्वयप्रसङ्गो यावत् तावत् संसार इत्यवेत्य सुसुचुभिरेतद्दर्शनद्वयनिरासेन सद्भिः मध्यमा प्रतिपदु भावनीया ॥” See the whole of the *Prakaraṇa* XV. As the *Mādhyamikas* followed this मध्यमा प्रतिपदु 'middle



main treatise, *Gauḍapāda's Āgamaśāstra*. I may, however, only say here that these arguments are purely Buddhistic.

Poussin's paper (*J.R.A.S.* 1910, pp. 134-140) dealing with the wording of the *Kārikās* will also convince the reader to a great extent about their Buddhistic character. Those who regard the fourth Book of the *Āgamaśāstra* as a Vedāntic treatise will be surprised to learn that none will be able to find out in it even once the use of such important words in Vedantism as ब्रह्मन् and आत्मन्.

Now, we shall try to see how the author of the *Āgamaśāstra* has tried to bring about the reconciliation of the views of the Vedāntists and the Buddhists.

According to our author there are four states of चित्त 'mind' which are looked upon as impediments to the attainment of योग or समाधि. They are as follows: लय 'that which causes mental inactivity, corresponding to the मूढ 'infatuated' state of mind in *Yoga* philosophy (Vyāsa on *Yogasūtra* I, I.); विक्षेप 'distraction,' corresponding to विचित्र 'distracted' state. (*Ibid*); कषाय 'attachment to worldly objects' and रसास्वाद 'perception of pleasure in practising योग or समाधि.'<sup>1</sup> When all these defects are avoided, the wavering चित्त

path' rejecting both the extreme views, existence and non-existence, they were called *Mādhyamikas*. Therefore, the following statement of Mādhavācārya (*Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, Bib. Ind. p. 15) regarding their name is not satisfactory and appears to be fanciful or imaginary: "गुरुत्तस्याङ्गीकरणाद् उत्तमाः पर्यनुयोगस्याकरणात् अधमाश्च। अतस्तेषां माध्यमिका इति प्रसिद्धिः।" 'These are excellent in assenting to that which the religious teacher announces, and defective in interrogative, whence their conventional designation of *Mādhyamikas*.'—Cowell. See Waddell's *Buddhism in Tibet*, pp. 11, 125.

<sup>1</sup> See III. 44, 45. For the full explanation of these terms see the commentary as well as the *Vedāntasūtra* with *Tīkāś*, Jacob, *Nirṇayasāgara*, 1894, 32, pp. 60-62. In passing one thing is to be noted here. On this point Gauḍapāda's first *Kārikā* (III. 44) runs thus:—

“ लये सम्बोधयेच्चित्तं विचित्रं शमयेत् पुनः ।  
सकषायं विजानीयात् समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥ ”

Compare it with the following two lines of Asaṅga quoted from his *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra*, XV. 9-10:—

“ लीनं चित्तस्य गृहीयाद् उद्धतं शमयेत् पुनः । ”  
“ शमप्राप्तमुपेक्षेत् तस्मिन्नालम्बने पुनः ॥ ”

Mark the wording and specially “विचित्रं शमयेत् पुनः” of the first and “उद्धतं शमयेत् पुनः” of the second; also समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् of the first, and शमप्राप्तमुपेक्षेत् of the second. The reading समप्राप्तम् of Gauḍapāda here is found actually to be शमप्राप्तम् in the *Vedāntasūtra* referred to above (Jacob, p. 62) where the entire

becomes firm, and it should be then so fixed that in that stage it remains absolutely one in itself, there being no relation whatever between it and its object. Now in regard to this state of the चित्त, the Ācārya proceeds to say:—

“ यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।

अनिद्वन्द्वमभासं सम्यग्रं ब्रह्म तत् तदा ॥ ” III. 46.

‘When the चित्त does not fall into a state of oblivion,<sup>1</sup> nor again is distracted, nor is unsteady, nor has any sense-image (आभास),<sup>2</sup> then that चित्त becomes ब्रह्मन्.’

Again,

“ लीयते हि सुषुप्ते तत् निगृहीतं न लीयते ।

तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ॥ ” III. 35.

‘It (i.e. the चित्त or मनस्)<sup>3</sup> falls into oblivion in deep sleep, but it does not do so when it is suppressed (निगृहीतं = निरुद्ध), and verily this (suppressed चित्त) is ब्रह्मन्, in which there is no fear, and which is made completely manifest by knowledge.’<sup>4</sup>

It is perfectly clear that Gauḍapāda's ब्रह्मन् is nothing but the चित्त or मनस् in its certain state, i.e. when it is completely suppressed; while according to the Vedāntists ब्रह्मन् is something above, and other than the चित्त or मनस्. The *Upaniṣads* say:—

“ एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥ ”

*Mundaka*, II. 1. 3.

‘From this (*Brahman*) are produced breath, mind and all the organs.’

“ यन्मनसा न मनूते येनाहुर्मनो मतम् ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥ ” *Ibid*. I. 5.

*Kārikā* is quoted. The second half of the *Kārikā* is read there as “सकषायं विजानीच्छमप्राप्तं (= न नीयात् + शमप्राप्तं) न चालयेत् ॥”

<sup>1</sup> That is, when it is not in the state called मूढ ‘infatuated,’ or in other words, when it is free from sleep and dream as well. See III. 36: “अनिद्रम्,” and “अस्वप्नम्।”

<sup>2</sup> On this word see *Bodhisaryāvatāra*, Bib. Ind. V. 36: “आभासमात्रं दृष्ट्वा च” the *Pañjikā* explains: “प्रतिच्छायासमात्रं गृहीत्वा।” *Sikṣāsamuccaya*, Bib. Budh. p. 129: “सन्ध्याभासगताः सत्त्वा ये सम चक्षुष आभासं नारच्छन्ति।”

<sup>3</sup> तत् in the text refers to मनस् in the preceding *Kārikā*.

<sup>4</sup> This state of the चित्त has again been stated later on as the object to be realized by Buddhas (IV. 80).

'Know that which does not think by मनस्, but by which, as they say, the मनस् is thought, as ब्रह्मन् and not this which they worship.'

It goes without saying that in these and such other Upaniṣadic passages ब्रह्मन् is quite different from the मनस् and thus they can in no way be identified with each other.

In regard to this, the following line of the commentator deserves to be quoted:—"चित्तस्य निश्चला चलनवर्जिता ब्रह्मस्वरूपैव तदा स्थितिः ॥" IV. 80 See also the comm. on IV. 29, 77.

That ब्रह्मन् is exactly चित्त in a particular state is also met with at least in one place in Buddhist literature and it is this:—

"सहापि वाक्करीराभ्यां मन्दवृत्तेन तत्फलम् ।  
यत् पटोरेकस्यापि चित्तस्य ब्रह्मतादिकम् ॥"

*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, V. 15.

'A slowly moving one, in spite of his having speech and body, cannot succeed so well as the clever चित्त, in spite of being alone does in attaining the state of ब्रह्मन्, etc.'

It is to be noted in the above verse that the manner in which the ब्रह्मता of the चित्त is here stated clearly suggests that this view was generally known amongst the Buddhist teachers at least not later than the seventh century A.D.

That the अमनोभाव of मनस् (II. 31), 'the state of becoming non-mind of mind' i.e. the state of mind having no perception whatever' is ब्रह्म or मोक्ष is found frequently in later *Upaniṣads*.<sup>2</sup> The verse quoted below is from the *Maitrī Up.* 6. 34. (Bib. Ind. p. 179):

"लयविक्षेपरहितं मनः कृत्वा सुनिश्चितम् ।  
यदा यात्यमनोभावं तदा तत् परमं पदम् ॥  
तावन्मनो निरोद्धव्यं हृदि यावत् क्षयं गतम् ।  
एतज् ज्ञानं च मोक्षं च शेषान्ये ग्रन्थविस्तराः ॥"

'Having made the mind perfectly motionless and free from sleep and agitation,—when he passes into state where the mind itself vanishes, then that is the highest place.'

'So long is the mind to be suppressed until it becomes lost in the

<sup>1</sup> Prajñākaramati explains it thus:—"वचनकायसहितस्यापि चित्तस्य कुशलपक्षे मन्त्रप्रचारस्य न तादृशं फलमुपजायते यादृशं ध्यानदिविषये पटुप्रवृत्तेरेकाकिनोऽपि चित्तस्य फलं ब्रह्मभूयादिकम् ।"

<sup>2</sup> See *Laṅkāvatāra*, B.T.S. p. 125: "विकल्पकस्य मनोविज्ञानस्य व्यावृत्तिर्निर्वाणम् ।" Against this see Śaṅkara's Comm. *Bṛhad. Up.* 4. 3. 7 (Ānandāśrama 1st. ed. pp. 549 ff.).

heart; this is knowledge and this is liberation; all the rest is but book-prolixity.'—Cowell. See *Brahmabindu Up.* 1-8; *Nāḍabindu Up.* 47.<sup>1</sup>

The *Yogavāsīṣṭha* has an unique place in Vedāntic literature. But truly speaking, it does not present a pure Vedāntic view, for it will occur to a careful reader that there is strong admixture of the *Vijñānavāda* of the *Yogācāras* and the *Vedāntavāda* of the *Advaitins*, sometimes the former predominating much more than the latter. According to the author of this work just like the *Yogācāras* everything owes its existence to the स्पन्द 'vibration' of the mind (चित्त) and the creation (सृष्टि) of the Universe is nothing but the vibrations of the mind. स्पन्द 'vibration' means the activity of the mind to represent its object. And so when there is no vibration of mind, when it is completely free of vibration of any kind (निःस्पन्द) then, 'flashes or shines from it the eternal Brahman.'<sup>2</sup>

जीव,<sup>3</sup> चित्, आत्मन्, ब्रह्मन्, शून्य, नैरात्म्य<sup>4</sup> etc. are only different names of चित्त. They are imagined by the authors of *Śāstras* only in order to supply some technical expressions required by them.<sup>5</sup> The author of the *Yogavāsīṣṭha* says further that ब्रह्म is identical with निर्वाण or

<sup>1</sup> "यन्मनस्त्रिजगत्सृष्टिस्थितियसनकर्मकृत् ।  
तन्मनो विलयं याति तद् विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥"

*Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇopaniṣad*, Bib. Sans. Mysore, 1900, p. 12.

The following from *Kaṭha Up.* (II. 3. 10) points to that state of mind:—

"यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।  
बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टते तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥"

So the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* II. I. 19:

"मनो निर्विषयं युक्ता ततः किञ्चन न स्मरेत् ।  
पदं तत् परमं विष्णोर्मनो यत्र प्रसीदति ॥"

"युक्ता सामाधाय," "प्रसीदति उपशम्यति,"—Śrīdhara.

<sup>2</sup> "स्पन्दास्पन्दस्वभावं हि चिन्मात्रमिह विद्यते ।  
खे वात इव, तत्स्पन्दात् सोऽज्ञासं शान्तमन्यथा ॥  
चित्तं (चित्तं ?) चित्तं भावितं सत् स्पन्द इत्युच्यते बुधैः ।  
दृश्यत्वाभावितं चैतदस्पन्दमिति स्मृतम् ॥  
स्पन्दात् स्फुरति चित्सर्गो निःस्पन्दाद् ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ॥"

*Yogavāsīṣṭha*, Nirṇayasāgara, III. 67. 6-8.

<sup>3</sup> Vide *Ibid.*, III, 96, 56, 66, 73; 64, 31; 65. 3; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* III. 66. 14.

<sup>5</sup> "शास्त्रं संयवहाराय तस्यास्य वितताकृतेः ।

चिदुद्ब्रह्मास्तेति नामानि कल्पितानि कृतात्मभिः ॥" *Ibid.* III. 122. 35.

सुक्ति (III. 9. 25)<sup>1</sup> and this निर्वाण or सुक्ति is मनोविलय (III. 97. 10.) 'disappearance or destruction of mind,' in other words, the असनीभाव of मनस् described above. So it follows that in the opinion of the author of the *Yogavāsistha*, too, ब्रह्मन् is identical with चित्त when it is destroyed, i.e. completely suppressed.<sup>2</sup>

This identification of ब्रह्मन् with चित्त is the reconciliation of *Vedānta* and *Vijñānavāda* which has played a great part in later Vedāntism and which is found in different Brāhmanic works including the *Purāṇas*.<sup>3</sup>

### APPENDIX

Buddhist Words in the *Agamaśāstra*, Book IV.

(The figures refer to the *Kārikās*).

1. अग्रयाण or अग्रयान, 90. It means सहायान्. See *Saddharmapundarikā*, III. 1, V. 61; *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 83; *Samādhirāja*, Rajendralal Mitra's *Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal*, p. 229; *Lalitavistara*, Lefmann, p. 438. The commentator has wrongly explained it as 'प्रथमतः' 'first.'

<sup>1</sup> मनःपरिहृत्य (III. 116. 10), मनोनाश (III. 95. 35-36), and मनःप्रशसन (III. 122, 27) are its different expressions.

<sup>2</sup> It appears from the *Yogavāsistha* that what is dealt with in it is not pure आर्ष 'derived from *Rṣis*, but पौरुष 'derived from men.' Yet, the author says, that it deserves to be accepted, for what is reasonable is to be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected though it might be uttered by *Brahman*, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well, thinking only that it belongs to his father:—

“अपि पौरुषमादेयं शास्त्रं चेदु युक्तिबोधकम् ।  
अन्यत् त्वार्थमपि त्याज्यं भाव्यं न्यायैकसेविना ॥  
युक्तियुक्तमुपादेयं वचनं बालकादपि ।  
अन्यत् त्वणमिव त्याज्यमप्युक्तं पद्मशोभिना ॥  
योऽस्मत्तानस्य कूपोऽयमिति कौपं पिबत्यपः ।  
त्यक्त्वा गात्रं पुरस्थं तं को न शास्त्रनिगर्हितम् ॥”

*Yogavāsistha*, II. 18. 2-4.

<sup>3</sup> See *Viṣṇupurāṇa* II. 12, 37-45. The 42nd *śloka* runs thus:—

“तस्मान् न विज्ञानमृतेऽसि किञ्चित्  
कचित् कदाचिद् द्विज वस्तुजातम् ॥  
विज्ञानमेकं निजकर्मभेद  
विभिन्नचित्तैर्बहुधाभ्युपेतम् ॥”

The secret is that this *Vijñāna* of the *Yogācūras* is, in the *Purāṇas*, *Vāsudeva*, or Supreme God, or in other words, *Brahman* of the Vedantists.

2. अध्वन्<sup>1</sup> 'time,' 27.
3. देशित<sup>2</sup> 'instructed' or 'preached,' 2, 42.
4. निर्मितक<sup>3</sup> 'created by one's supernatural power,' 70.
5. परमार्थ (सत्य)<sup>4</sup> 'transcendental truth,' 73, 74.
6. परिदीपक<sup>5</sup> 'one that illustrates or explains,' 21; परिदीपित 'explained' 19.
7. प्रज्ञप्ति 'Manifestation or making known,' 24, 25.
8. भेदनिम्न<sup>6</sup> 'descending to difference,' 4.
9. लौकिक 'worldly,' 87.
10. लोकोत्तर 'transcending the world,' 88.
11. संवृति 'Empirical (truth),' 57, 74.

Besides, द्विपद्वर, धर्म, बुद्ध, तायिन्, and सम्बद्ध have already been discussed.

<sup>1</sup> This word in the sense of 'time' is also found in the *Yogasūtra*, IV. 12: but it seems to have been borrowed from the Buddhists.

<sup>2</sup> In Brāhmanic literature we have (उप-) दिष्ट. In later works, however, the word is again used.

<sup>3</sup> निर्मितक or निर्मितकजीव is often quoted in Buddhist works. See *Āryagaganagañjasūtra*, quoted in the *Sikṣūsamuccaya*, p. 270; *Āryaratnakūṭasūtra*, quoted in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, p. 338; *Āryasamādhirāja*, *Ibid.*, p. 33; Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā* XVII. 31, 32. Cf. निर्माणकाय, निर्माण and निर्माणकाय are also found in the *Yogasūtra* and the *Tīkā* of its commentary by Vyāsa (IV. 4). The use of निर् + √मा in this particular sense can, however, be traced back to Upaniṣadic texts: “स्वयं विदत्य स्वयं निर्माय.” *Bṛhad. Up.* 4. 3. 9; “कामं कामं . . . निर्मिमाणः,” *Kaṭha Up.* 5. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the two truths held by them, viz. परमार्थ and संवृति.

<sup>5</sup> In Brāhmanic literature they are प्रकाशक and प्रकाशित respectively.

<sup>6</sup> The words निम्न, प्रवण, and प्राग्भार (Pali निम्न, पोण, and पम्भार respectively) as the second member of a compound are generally met with in Buddhist literature, though it cannot be denied that they are found also in the *Yogasūtras* and its commentary (IV. 21, 6).

P. S. I am glad to note here that the words विवदन्तोदया (*Ānandāśrama* ed.) in IV. 4 referred to above (pp. 453-454) are actually explained as विवदन्तः + अदयाः in the commentary as edited by Maheśachandra Pāla in Bengali Character (Calcutta). अदयाः is also interpreted there as अद्वैतिनः. The MS. *Ka* of *Ānandāśrama* ed. has the same reading.

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गुणदोषौ बुधो गृह्णन्निन्दस्तेषां विवेचनः ।  
शिरसा श्लाघते पूर्वं परं कण्ठे नियच्छति ॥

The desire for knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it.—*Laurence Sterne.*

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## ŚĀṆKARA'S COMMENTARIES ON THE UPANIṢADS.

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The object of the present paper is to show that the great Śāṅkarācārya cannot be held to be the author of all the commentaries of the Upaniṣads that carry his name. It is popularly believed that Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and other ācāryas in their attempt to explain the प्रस्थानत्रय, 'the Three Ways' (leading to the common destination, viz. ब्रह्मन्), i.e. तृप्ति, क्षुप्ति, and सूत्र, have written commentaries on the ten principal Upaniṣads which are included in the तृप्ति. But this is contrary to the facts. For there are no commentaries by all the ācāryas on the Upaniṣads. The tradition may, however, be explained by saying that though there are no separate commentaries by all the ācāryas on the Upaniṣads a large number of passages or sentences of the latter have been quoted and dealt with by all of them in the course of their commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras*. But whatever may be the case we have strong reasons to believe that some of the commentaries of the Upaniṣads which are said to be the works of the great Śāṅkara are really not so, as will be evident in the course of this paper.

There are two commentaries on the *Kena Upaniṣad* called पदभाष्य 'Word Commentary,' and वाक्यभाष्य 'Sentence Commentary,' both said to be the productions of Śāṅkara. But nobody seems to have any explanation to offer as to why one of them should be called 'Word Commentary' and the other 'Sentence Commentary.' Both the works bear the same author's name, and as it is absurd to believe that one and the same person should indulge in the pleasure of writing two commentaries on the same work, an explanation has been sought for in vain in the assumption that it was owing to the desire of the author for dealing with the text in two different ways. But the internal evidence is strongly against it, for not only is the language in the two commentaries different but also the argument. Even the great Śāṅkara's well-known views are misrepresented in the 'Sentence Commentary.' We ask our readers to compare the two commentaries on

the *Kena*, IV. 7 (32), and they will be surprised to find how diametrically opposite they are to each other. The text of the Upaniṣad runs as follows :—

उपनिषदं भो ब्रूहीति ।

उक्ता त उपनिषद् । ब्राह्मी वाव त उपनिषदम् अब्रूमेति । ३२ । ४ . ७ ।

The *Padabhāṣya* explains it thus :—

उपनिषदं रहस्यं यच्चिन्त्यं भो भगवन् ब्रूहीति । एवमुक्तवति शिष्ये आह आचार्यः—  
उक्ता अभिहिता ते तव उपनिषद् । का पुनः सेत्याह ब्राह्मी ब्रह्मणः परमात्मन इयं तां...  
उपनिषदम् अब्रूम इति । उक्तामेव परमात्मविद्याम् उपनिषदम् अब्रूमेत्यवधारय-  
त्युत्तरार्थम् ।

But it is explained in the *Vākyabhāṣya* as follows :—

उपनिषदं भो ब्रूहीत्युक्तायामप्युपनिषदि शिष्येणोक्त आचार्य आह— उक्ता ते  
तुभ्यम् उपनिषद् आत्मोपासनं च । अधुना ब्राह्मी वाव ते तुभ्यं ब्रह्मणो ब्राह्मणजातिरुपनि-  
षदम् अब्रूम वक्ष्याम इत्यर्थः । वक्ष्यति हि । ब्राह्मी नोक्ता उक्ता त्वात्मोपनिषद् । तस्मान्न  
भूताभिप्रयोज्यते इति शब्दः ।

The contradictory nature of these two explanations will be evident if the reader takes note of the different treatment of the words अब्रूम and ब्राह्मी in these different works. It will also be noticed that the explanation in the former is evidently correct and far better than in the latter.

Other evidences<sup>1</sup> bearing on the point are easy for any careful reader to come across if he will try to compare these two commentaries.<sup>2</sup>

I have also reason to believe that Śāṅkara was not the author of the commentary on the *Śvetāśvatara*. The style and the mode of interpretation are far different from and inferior to these in the commentary of the *Brahmasūtras*. The long extracts from the *Purāṇas* with which the *Śvetāśvatara* commentary is filled are never to be found in any commentary of Śāṅkara the authorship of which is beyond dispute.

<sup>1</sup> Such as divergent explanations (*Kena*, II. 1. 2), different readings of the text (thus in II. 2, the *Padabhāṣya* reads नाहं while the *Vākyabhāṣya* has नाह), etc.

<sup>2</sup> It will be found in the "Proceedings of the first Oriental Conference" held at Poona (Nov. 1919), p. xcix, that Pandit Śrīdhara Śāstrī Pāṭhaka has arrived at the same conclusion showing further that the 'Pada Commentary' is written by the celebrated Śāṅkara while the 'Sentence Commentary' is by one Vidyāśāṅkara who ascended the seat of the former.

The author of the commentary on the *Śvetāśvatara*<sup>3</sup> quotes a couplet from Gaudapāda's *Kārikās* (III. 5) introducing it with the words तथाच शुक्रशिष्यो गौडपादाचार्यः. It is well known that Gaudapādācārya was the परमगुरु of Śāṅkara being the direct spiritual guide of Govinda Bhagavatpāda, whose disciple was our Śāṅkara. So it is expected that Śāṅkara would designate his spiritual ancestor by some honorific epithet such as भगवत् as he has actually done on the occasion of quoting Vyāsa<sup>4</sup> the गुरु of Śuka. Or possibly he would quote from him without the mention of his name as he has done twice in the commentary of the *Brahmasūtras*.<sup>5</sup>

Now as regards the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which also bears the name of Śāṅkara, it will appear from the following facts that it, too, is not a work of the great Śāṅkarācārya. The commentary begins with two verses of such inferior quality that they could never have been composed by Śāṅkara. These verses are in the form of मङ्गलाचरण generally seen in comparatively modern works. And this book ends also with three verses of the same kind and quality, the last of which even contains grammatical inaccuracies.<sup>6</sup> The second of the opening verses is defective in its metre.<sup>7</sup> There is no salutatory verse in any of the authentic commentaries of Śāṅkara with the single exception<sup>8</sup> of the commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which has three such *śloka*s, but these, too, can hardly be considered as genuine. Following the example of ancient teachers Śāṅkara generally plunges at once into his subject without making salutation to any deity, not

<sup>3</sup> I. 8 (Ānandāśrama Press, 3rd ed., p. 30).

<sup>4</sup> तथाच स्मरणमनुगीतास्तु भगवतो व्यासस्य ।—Comm. on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, I. 4. 10 (Ānandāśrama Press, 1891, p. 167); निश्चितमुक्तं व्यासेन वेदाचार्येण भगवता ।—Comm. on *Iśa Up.*, 2 (Ānandāśrama Press, 1912, p. 7).

<sup>5</sup> तथाच समुदायविदो वदन्ति, *Brahmasūtra*, I. 4. 14; अत्रोक्तं । वेदान्तार्थसमुदायवि-  
द्विराचार्यः. Ibid., II. 1. 9.

<sup>6</sup> The reading मञ्जोमञ्जव cannot be defended. One may read here मञ्जुदुमञ्जव, but in that case the metre breaks down. मञ्जमञ्जव may, however, be right. But the use of नमस्य is grammatically not admissible the correct form being नमस्यानि.

<sup>7</sup> The first three lines of the stanza are in *Mandākrāntā* metre while the last one is in *Sragdharā*. Such mixture is not allowable.

<sup>8</sup> *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and other minor works which are generally ascribed to Śāṅkara are not here taken into consideration. For they have not yet been critically examined and it has not been conclusively proved that Śāṅkara was the author of them all. Nor can it be ascertained that he is the author of the commentary on the *Vieṇṇasahasranāma* or *Sanatsujātiya*, or at any rate of the salutatory verses in the beginning of these.

even to Brahman or Paramātman. The commentaries of the *Bṛhad-āranyaka* and *Kaṭha* are opened with salutation to the ancient teachers or Ṛṣis by whom the *Brahmaṇḍya* has been handed down, but even these have the appearance of being interpolations. The printed books or the manuscripts which bear these texts cannot be fully relied upon. When compared with the other colophons of Śaṅkara's works it will at once become evident that these could not be from his hand. He himself would never inscribe his name in his own work as परमहंस परिव्राजका-चार्यशङ्करभगवतः कृतौ. These colophons were certainly added to the genuine ones by later hands, as for instance, in the commentaries of the *Bṛhad-āranyaka* and *Chāndogya*.

It must also be taken into serious consideration that Śaṅkara has nowhere quoted *Māṇḍūkya*, even where it could serve his purpose, as for instance, in connection with the commentary on the passage, ओङ्कार एवेदं सर्वम् in the *Chāndogya*, II. 23. 3 which entirely corresponds to सर्वमोङ्कार एव of the *Māṇḍūkya* I. Had Śaṅkara been the real author of the present commentary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* he could not have helped referring to it in his *Chāndogya* commentary.

The first *Adhyāya* of the *Chāndogya* is professedly an explanation (उपव्याख्यानम्) of ओङ्कार. Had there been before Śaṅkara any other text dealing with the same subject<sup>9</sup> he would naturally have made use of it. But in all probability the *Māṇḍūkya* itself was not written before or even in the time of Śaṅkara. This point has further been discussed in my forthcoming volume on the *Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*.

In the introductory part of the commentary of the *Māṇḍūkya* there occurs a line as follows: रोगातस्त्वेव रोगनिवृत्तौ स्वप्नता तथा<sup>10</sup> दुःखात्कस्म्य आत्मानो द्वैतप्रपञ्चोपभवे स्वप्नता. In Vedānta and specially in Śaṅkara's philosophy आत्मा is अनन्दमय or आनन्दस्वरूप and never दुःखात्मा. Śaṅkara would certainly have expressed the same thought by some other word. Similarly the explanation of the word सर्वदुःखानाम् in the *Kārikā* I. 10, as

<sup>9</sup> For, it is well known that *Māṇḍūkya* deals with ओङ्कार, beginning with अस्मित्येत-दक्षरमिदं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं . . . and ending in एवमोङ्कार आत्मैव मविशत्यात्मानात्मानं य एवं वेद, य एवं वेद.

<sup>10</sup> This तथा (or तथैव with MSS. घ, ङ, ज, ट of the Ānandāśrama ed. 1911) is superfluous and cannot have been used by Śaṅkara. But in justice to its author it should be stated that the word तथा is actually not to be found in the original reading of the passage which has been entirely quoted in the commentary of the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīya Upaniṣad* ascribed also to Śaṅkara. See p. 3, Ānandāśrama ed.

प्राज्ञैर्जमविश्रुतलक्षणानाम् as given in the commentary could never emanate from Śaṅkara. And, again, it is utterly strange for Śaṅkara to define his परमार्थतत्त्व as beyond the four points, viz. सत् 'existant,' असत् 'non-existent,' सद्सत् 'existant and non-existent,' and असदसत् 'neither existent nor non-existent.' The *Māṇḍūkya* commentary (i.e. the commentary on both the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and the *Kārikās* on it by Gauḍapāda) betrays such crudeness of thought and expression in its author that he could never be identified with the great Śaṅkarācārya. Detailed discussion will be found in my *Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda* referred to above. The mere fact of Śaṅkara's name being in the colophons of different works must not lead us to assume their common authorship. For certainly there were more than one Śaṅkarācārya who were writers of Vedantic works. It appears to me to be certain that the author of the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary is different not only from the celebrated commentator of the *Brahmasūtras* but also from the commentator of the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīya Upaniṣad*. The following are some of the reasons for this assertion.

There are numerous passages<sup>11</sup> common to both these works without any acknowledgement of debt in either of them. And yet it is not at all difficult to discover that it was the commentator of the *Nṛsiṃha* who quoted from that of the *Māṇḍūkya* and not vice versa. The grounds hereof are given below.

The introduction<sup>12</sup> contained in these two commentaries, almost identical in both of them, appears to be more relevant to the *Māṇḍūkya* than to the *Nṛsiṃha*. Certainly any attempt at explanation was needless such as was offered by the commentator of the *Nṛsiṃha* for stating first the सम्बन्ध 'relation,' अभिधेय 'subject,' and प्रयोजन 'object' of no

<sup>11</sup> (i) कथं पुनरोङ्कारनिर्णयः . . . पठ्यत इति कर्मसाधन पादशब्दः—*Māṇḍ.*, pp. 9-14 = *Nṛ.*, pp. 44-45 (Ānandāśrama ed. 1900 and 1896 respectively).

(ii) य ए हि स्वरूपावस्थाः . . . भूतानामेव एव ।—*Māṇḍ.*, p. 24 = *Nṛ.*, p. 48.

(iii) सर्वेषु कारणेषु अभिधेयेषु . . . प्राणव्ययनं हि मोक्ष्य मन इति युतेः ।—*Māṇḍ.*, pp. 27-30 = *Nṛ.*, pp. 48-49.

See also the beginnings of both the commentaries.

<sup>12</sup> वेदान्तसारसंग्रहभूतमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयं . . . अत एव न प्रथक् सम्बन्धमभिधेयप्रयोजनानि वक्तव्यानि । यन्मेव तु वेदान्तो सम्बन्धमभिधेयप्रयोजनानि तान्येवेह भवितुमर्हन्ति । तथापि प्रकरणव्याचिख्यासुना संक्षेपतो वक्तव्यानि ॥ *Māṇḍ.*, p. 5.

And अतएव प्रथक्सम्बन्धमभिधेयप्रयोजनानि न वक्तव्यानि । यान्येव तु उपनिषद्व्याचिख्यासुना संक्षेपतो वक्तव्यानि । *Nṛ.*, p. 3.



other work but the Upaniṣad under discussion. Nor is the author's use of the word संक्षेपतः 'briefly' at all appropriate; while, on the contrary, in the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary it really serves some important purpose. The *Māṇḍūkya* commentary nowhere mentions the name of the *Nṛsimha*, but on the other hand, the *Nṛsimha* commentary not only makes mention<sup>13</sup> of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* but also attempts to harmonise<sup>14</sup> its own views with those expressed in its commentary. Sometimes it gives a meaning quite different from that given in the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary and offers the reason thereof.<sup>15</sup> If both the commentaries had been by the same author, the *Nṛsimha* or its commentary would also have been referred to in the commentary of the *Māṇḍūkya*. But the fact is otherwise.

Moreover, it appears from the commentary of the *Nṛsimha* that its author has taken the *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda as a part of the original text of the *Māṇḍūkya* and not as a separate work based on the latter as it is generally known. In this it differs in all appearance from the author of the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary. The following lines from the commentary of the *Nṛsimha* (p. 48) in the course of discussing some readings of both the Upaniṣads deserve to be quoted in this connexion :

अत उर्ध्वं माण्डूक्य उक्त एवार्थे श्लोकान् पठित्वा तृतीयः पादः, एतस्मिंस्तपनीये तु तान् विहाय तृतीयः पादः ।

'After this in the *Māṇḍūkya* on the very subject mentioned above, first some *ślokas* are read and then the तृतीय पादः; but here in the *Tāpanīya* the तृतीय पादः is read omitting them (i.e. the *ślokas*).'

These *ślokas* are nothing but Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* beginning with बहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वः . . . (1), etc. It seems that the short sentences अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति, 'on this (subject) here are these (following) *ślokas* (*Māṇḍ.*, pp. 25, 46, 57, 61) introducing the *Kārikās* are wrongly taken by the author of the *Nṛsimha* commentary as forming the parts of the original Upaniṣad.<sup>16</sup> But it can easily be proved that the introductory sentences alluded to are really composed by the author of the *Kārikās*,

<sup>13</sup> *Nṛ. comm.*, p. 46, four times; p. 48, once.

<sup>14</sup> *Nṛ. comm.*, p. 46: नन्वेवं सप्रान्यङ्गानि . . . माण्डूक्योपनिषत्प्रणवविद्यायां व्याख्यातम् । and ननु यथा माण्डूक्ये त्रैयानरशब्दसामर्थ्यात् . . . व्याख्यातम् । See also the matter dealt with below.

<sup>15</sup> See the explanation of the words सप्रान्ङ्ग and एकोनविंशतिमुख, *Māṇḍ.*, p. 14; *Nṛ.*, p. 45.

<sup>16</sup> This question has been discussed more elaborately in my forthcoming work on the *Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*.

i.e. Gauḍapāda or by some other person. It may be noted here that some of the MSS.<sup>17</sup> of the commentary or its *tīkā* introduce the sentences saying अथ वार्तिककारोक्तं वाक्यम्. The *Vārtikakāra* mentioned here is no other than Gauḍapāda.

The *Nṛsimha* belongs to later *Upaniṣads* and is a Tāntric one mixed with Vedantic views. The author of its commentary is also the author of a Tantric book, *Prapañcāgamaśāstra*, or *Prapañcasāra*, as he himself styles it in quoting it frequently in the former work, where he clearly states that it is his own writing.<sup>18</sup> This *Prapañcasāra* is still extant and its different editions are also available. Not less than six verses of this work have been quoted in the *Nṛsimha* commentary and they have all been traced and found in the former.<sup>19</sup> The *Nṛsimha* commentary has a strong flavour of Tantricism in it which is never found in the commentary of the *Māṇḍūkya*.

I shall show later on how defective is the commentator of the *Nṛsimha* in his knowledge of grammar, though the commentator of the *Māṇḍūkya* is not very far removed from him in this respect. But yet in the depth of ignorance in grammar the commentator of the *Nṛsimha* easily takes the first place. For not only he makes mistakes himself, but he also fails to detect them in others. As an instance, the following line which occurs in both the commentaries under review,<sup>20</sup> may be quoted: आत्मा परमार्थः सन् प्राणादि विकल्पस्यास्यः । The word आस्यः is neuter and can never be used in the masculine. The commentator of the *Nṛsimha* has blindly quoted it and, as I am going to show, this is not unusual with him.

In language and in style the two commentaries are different and by far the superior one in this respect is the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary. In the commentary of the *Nṛsimha* the interpretations of the passages

<sup>17</sup> Viz. ख, ग, ठ of the Ānandāśrama ed.

<sup>18</sup> See *Nṛ.*, pp. 30, 33, 35, 37, 51 and 61.

<sup>19</sup> (i) *Nṛ.*, p. 30. हृदयं बुद्धिगम्यत्वात् . . . = *Prapa.*, (*Vāṇīvilās Press*) p. 64, VI. 7.

(ii) *Nṛ.*, p. 33. तृणाद्यन्विरोद्धस्य . . . = *Prapa.*, p. 64, VI. 8.

(iii) *Nṛ.*, p. 35. शिखा तेजः समुद्रिष्टम् . . . = *Prapa.*, 64, VI. 9.

(iv) *Nṛ.*, p. 37. कवचग्रह इत्यस्माद् . . . = *Prapa.*, 64, VI. 10.

(v) *Nṛ.*, p. 51. भूपदान् आहृतयः . . . = *Prapa.*, p. 417, XXVIII. 7. 9.

(vi) *Nṛ.*, p. 61. असुत्रामादिकौ धातू . . . = *Prapa.*, p. 64, VI. 12.

It is to be noted that as regards readings there is some difference between the works.

<sup>20</sup> *Māṇḍ.* p. 9, and *Nṛ.* p. 9.

common to both the *Upaniṣads* are too forced and far-fetched while in the former they are not so.

I have already alluded to the defective grammar in the commentary of the *Nṛsiṃha Upaniṣad*, to prove which let me give a list of words used by the author which are grammatically wrong. These words are taken from the *Prapañcasāra*, another work by the author of the *Nṛsiṃha* commentary, as we have seen above.

- (1) ऊनेत् (for ऊज्यात् which, too, is used, XVIII. 6) VII. 62, 66; XVII. 5; XVIII. 5, 19.<sup>21</sup>
- (2) प्रोक्ता (for प्रोच्य) XVII. 11, 12; XIX. 10, 11.
- (3) वीप्सयित्वा (for वीप्स्य, XVII. 14) XVII. 13.
- (4) संगच्छेत् (for संगच्छेत्) XVII. 30.
- (5) अथोऽधोमध्य (for अथो अधो) XVII. 33.
- (6) लभेत् (for लभेत) XVII. 38.
- (7) कमलज ते (for कमलज तव) XXXIII. 62.
- (8) विद्योतद् (for विद्योतमान) XVIII. 4.
- (9) द्युतद् (for द्योतमान) XX. 46.
- (10) विभ्राजत् (for विभ्राजमान) X. 8.
- (11) लिहताम् (for लौढ or लौढाम्) VII. 14.
- (12) जप्यात् (for जपेत्) VIII. 20.
- (13) जनित्रौम् (for जनयित्रौम्) II. 5.
- (14) मन्त्राणि<sup>22</sup> (for मन्त्रान्) I. 20.
- (15) लोण<sup>23</sup> (for लवण) VII. 64, 65.
- (16) अच्युतकामिनि (for 'कामिनी) XX. 44.
- (17) सूक्ष्मरस्वति (for 'स्वती) XX. 144.

As regards efficiency in the use of metres the author of the *Prapañcasāra* cannot be commended. He can hardly manipulate caesura or pause (यति) in his metres, especially in longer ones, such as *Śārdūlavikṛīḍita*, *Śtagdharā*, etc. His *Āryās* are also often defective going against the rules laid down for them.<sup>24</sup>

Thus it may be safely concluded that the great Śaṅkara must not be held responsible for the *Nṛsiṃha Upaniṣad* commentary and the

<sup>21</sup> This word which shows a Prākṛitism is found employed also in many Tantric works.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. आस्यद् (for आस्यद्म्) referred to above.

<sup>23</sup> Indicating Prākṛitic influence

<sup>24</sup> See IV. 68, 69, 72; VII 79, 83.

*Prapañcāgamaśāstra* or *Prapañcasāra*. It has also been shown that the commentators of the *Māṇḍūkya* and *Nṛsiṃha Upaniṣads* are different persons and the commentator of the *Māṇḍūkya* cannot be our Śaṅkaracārya.

In support of the view that the commentaries on the *Māṇḍūkya* and *Nṛsiṃha Upaniṣads* were written by the same person, the following lines may be quoted from the *Nṛsiṃha* commentary :—

- (i) नन्वेवं... वाक्यद्वयं माण्डूक्योपनिषत्प्रणवविद्यायां (*Māṇḍ.*, p. 14)

याख्यातम्, तथात्रापि कस्मान्न व्याख्यायते । *Nr.*, p. 46.

- (ii) ननु यथा... माण्डूक्ये (pp. 17-18)... व्याख्यातम्, तथात्रापि व्याख्यातम् । *Ibid.*

Here it may be argued that the subject of both the verbs व्याख्यातम् and व्याख्यायते in the first extract, and व्याख्यातम् and व्याख्यायताम् in the second is one and the same, and it refers to the commentator himself; thus proving that the authors of the two commentaries are identical. But at the same time it presents no difficulty whatever in construing the verbs व्याख्यातम् and व्याख्यायते (or व्याख्यायताम् as in the second passage) also with different nominatives or subjects. And in that case the sense of the sentence becomes as follows: "Why do you not explain the passage in the way in which it has been explained by one (i.e. the commentator of the *Māṇḍūkya*) in the *Māṇḍūkya*?" In face of the evidence against the identity of the two authors no other interpretation of the passages can reasonably be accepted.

The sentence, तन्मित्रपि कियान् पाठभेदस्तदुयाख्यानावसरे दर्शित एव (*Nr.*, p. 48), cannot refer to the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary where there is no variation of readings, but it must refer to the *Nṛsiṃha* commentary where we actually see the various readings only a few pages earlier (p. 46).

It follows, therefore, from what we have stated above that there are at least three different authors of the *Upaniṣad* commentaries who are all known by the name of Śaṅkara: first and foremost, the commentator of the *Brahmasūtras*, *Chāndogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Gīta*, etc., second, the author of the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary, and the third, the commentator of the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatīpiniya Upaniṣad*.

Though it has been proved that the authors of the *Vākyaśāstra* of the *Kena Upaniṣad* and the commentary of the *Śvetāśvatara* are different from the great Śaṅkara, I am not yet in a position to say whether

they are one person or whether they may be identified with either of the commentators of the *Māṇḍūkya* or *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpaniṣya Upaniṣads*.

## INTRODUCTION OF THE ALPHABET INTO TIBET.

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The Tibetan alphabet consists of thirty letters as follows :—

ཀ	ཁ	ག	ང
ka	kha	ga	ña
ཅ	ཆ	ཇ	ཉ
cha	chha	ja	nya
ཏ	ཐ	ད	ན
ta	tha	da	na
པ	ཕ	བ	མ
pa	pha	ba	ma
ཅ	ཆ	ཇ	ཉ
tsha	tsha	dsa	wa
ཞ	ཟ	འ	ཡ
zha	za	ha	ya
ར	ལ	ཤ	ས
ra	la	sha	sa
	ཧ	ཨ	
	h'a	á	

These letters are traditionally known to have been introduced into Tibet by Sroñ-btsan-sgam-po, from Magadha, in the 7th century A.D. But some scholars doubt

(1) that India could have been the place of origin of the Tibetan alphabet ; and

<sup>1</sup> This was probably the last article written by the talented author, about a fortnight before his lamented and unexpected death in April 1920.—I.J.S.T.