

Proceedings and Transactions  
All-India OF THE  
Third Oriental Conference.

MADRAS

December 22nd to 24th, 1924



MADRAS

PRINTED AT THE LAW PRINTING HOUSE, MOUNT ROAD

1925

## ŚAṆKARA—THE COMMENTATOR ON THE MĀṆḌŪKYA KĀRIKĀS

BY

MR. T. R. CHINTĀMAṆI, B.A. (HONS.), MADRAS.

One of the traditions amongst Vedāntic scholars is that Śaṅkara, the author of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya has also commented upon the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās of Gauḍapāda. Certain orientalists, like Prof. Jacobi a few years ago <sup>1</sup>, and Mr. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya of the Viśvabhāratī, recently <sup>2</sup> have seriously disputed Śaṅkara's authorship of the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās. The object of this paper is to show that the authority of tradition on this point is genuine and cannot be easily set aside. The arguments they advance <sup>3</sup> and those that may be anticipated to make us doubt Śaṅkara's authorship may be very convincingly answered,

Prof. Jacobi's argument runs as follows :—

In the commentary on the Kārikā

अन्तःस्थानात् भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् ।

यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृत्तत्वेन भिद्यते ॥ <sup>4</sup>

we find a reference to the various members of an *anumāna* explained in the terms of Naiyāyika principles. On this point Prof. Jacobi remarks, "I am inclined to think that this Śaṅkara is not the same as the author of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya. The latter would hardly have stated the argument in the form and terms of an *anumāna* according to Nyāya principles." <sup>5</sup>

Mr. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya's argument is based on the word अस्पर्शयोग occurring in the Kārikā

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्धर्षः सर्वयोगिभिः ।

योगिनो बिभ्यति ह्यस्मात् अभये भयदर्शिनः ॥ <sup>6</sup>

and its commentary which runs as follows :—

अस्पर्शयोगो नाम वै स्मर्यते प्रसिद्धं उपनिषत्सु । <sup>7</sup>

1. Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. XXXIII, p. 52 foot note.

2. Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference.

3. Mr. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya's paper (Sir Asutosh Mukerjee Silver Jubilee volume) wherein he claims to have proved that Śaṅkara is not the commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās has not been available for reference.

4. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā II-4.

5. J. A. O. S. Vol. XXXIII, p. 52 foot-note.

6. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā III-39.

7. Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās p. 148 of the Ānandāsrama Edition.

It has not been possible he says, to find out any reference to the अस्पर्शयोग in the early Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara whose knowledge of the Upaniṣads was very minute and comprehensive would not have been bold enough to say प्रसिद्धं उपनिषत्सु when as a matter of fact it is actually not the case. So Śaṅkara could not have commented on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās.

The following arguments may be anticipated in addition :—1. That the commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās has composed two benedictory verses at the beginning of the commentary.<sup>1</sup> It was not usually so with Śaṅkara, the great Advaitic master and thinker. So, the author of the Śāriraka Bhāṣya and the author of the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās cannot be identical.

2. That in the second<sup>2</sup> of the two verses there is a metrical slip. Śaṅkara is a master poet and it is impossible for us to believe that he would have committed this slip.

3. Lastly, that the commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās differs from Śaṅkara in the interpretation of a passage that is extracted from the Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad and commented upon in the Kārikā Bhāṣya.<sup>3</sup> The passage runs thus :—

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये (S)? संभूतिमुपासते ।<sup>4</sup>

Śaṅkara here takes the word to be असंभूति in his commentary on the Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad in consonance with what follows in the next half of the verse. The commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās takes the word to be संभूति and comments upon it. There is also another difference of opinion between them regarding the explanation of

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।<sup>5</sup>

Śaṅkara says<sup>4</sup> that two kinds of upāsanās are described in the context, that of विद्या and अविद्या together and that of संभूति and असंभूति together whereas the commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās is of opinion

1. Ānandaśrama edition, of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, pp. 1 & 3.

2. यो विश्वात्मा विधिजविषयान् प्राश्य भोगान्स्थविष्ठान्  
पश्चाच्चान्यान् स्वमतिविभवान् ज्योतिषा स्वेन सूक्ष्मान् ।  
सर्वानेतान्पुनरपि स्वात्मनि स्थापयित्वा  
हित्वा सर्वान्विशेषान् विगतगुणगणः पात्वसौनस्तुरीयः ॥

3. Refer to the Bhāṣya on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās III, 25—p. 133 of the Ānandaśrama Edition.

4. Īśāvāsyā Upaniṣad, Ānandaśrama Edition.

5. Ibid.

that only one kind of upāsanā, of विद्या, अविद्या, संभूति and असंभूति, (all together) and not two. In virtue of this inconsistency the authors of the Śāriraka Bhāṣya and the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās cannot be equated with each other.

Prof. Jacobi's argument that Śaṅkara would hardly refer to an anumāna in the form and terms of Nyāya principles cannot stand. Prof. Jacobi could not have meant that Śaṅkara was unaware of the Naiyāyika terminology and ideas, for they had been developed long before his days. If he had meant that Śaṅkara as a staunch upholder of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā-thought would not have countenanced the five-membered-syllogism of the Naiyāyikas, since a valid syllogism in the opinion of the Vedāntins following the view of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas should consist of only three members, then, he is right to some extent. But we should note that Śaṅkara and most of the Advaitins after him do not set their faces against the five-membered-syllogism. True it is that among the Advaitins there is this current saying व्यवहोर भट्टनयः but there is no hard and fast rule binding the Advaitins to this view. They have not made it a principle that they should argue only according to Mīmāṃsaka logic. In many places in his Śāriraka Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara refers to all the five members though he does not specify the names of each of them.<sup>1</sup> In fact he favourably looks upon their terminology as is evident from his remarks in the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad Bhāṣya.

From these it follows that Śaṅkara was not against the five membered syllogism of the Naiyāyikas. If so, the mere fact that we find the five members of a syllogism explained in the commentary or the Kārikās cannot lead us to conclude that Śaṅkara could not have been its author. Apart from this it is to be noted that he is commenting on a passage wherein the five members are plainly set forth. In explaining them Śaṅkara candidly refers to what the author of the passage could have kept in view. If he faithfully interprets the words before him it is not his fault.

Let us now examine the argument based upon the word अस्पर्शयोग and its commentary प्रसिद्धं उपनिषत्सु. It should be noted that the word अस्पर्शयोग

1. परमाणूनां अणुत्वनित्यत्वविपर्ययः प्रसज्येत ।

कुत एवं? लोके दृष्टत्वात् ।

यद्धि लोके रूपादिमद्वस्तु तत् स्वकारणापेक्षया स्थूलं अनित्यं च दृष्टम् यथा पटः  
तन्तूनपेक्ष्य स्थूलः अनित्यश्च भवति ।

तथाचामी परमाणवः रूपादिमन्तः ।

तस्मात्तस्यैव कारणवन्तः स्थूला अनित्याश्च प्राप्नुवन्ति ॥ Brashmasūtra Bhāṣya  
(page. 514 Nirṇaya Sāgara Edition of 1917.

is no technical term. In other words, it is not a रूढशब्द. It is only यौगिक. This word occurs in the Kārikās twice <sup>1</sup>. And in both these places we find it to be only यौगिक. And it has been so explained also. When the commentator wrote प्रसिद्धं उपनिषत्सु he could have had only the derivative sense in view. In other words, the commentator wishes to indicate that the idea conveyed by the phrase अस्पर्शयोग is to be often met with in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. And a careful and thorough searching of the Upaniṣads shows how the idea is hinted at in passages like.

न लिप्यते कमर्णा पापकेन ॥<sup>2</sup>

न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः ॥<sup>3</sup>

मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णसुखदुःखदाः ।

आगमापायिनो नित्याः तान् तितिक्षस्व भारत ॥ <sup>4</sup>

The meaning of अस्पर्शयोग is:—

स्पर्शनं स्पर्शः संबन्धः । न विद्यते यस्य योगस्य

कदाचित् केनचिदपि सः अस्पर्शयोगः ॥ <sup>5</sup>

The very same idea is conveyed by the extracts given above. So, प्रसिद्धं उपनिषत्सु is not wrong. We cannot deny Śaṅkara's authorship of the commentary on the Kārikās because he refers to an idea of the Upaniṣads as found in them.

The first objection anticipated refers to the benedictory verses. It needs only to be pointed out that it is the practice with Śaṅkara to begin his work with a benedictory verse at times and without at other times. To the Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā (which is doubtless Śaṅkara's) is attached a benedictory verse. Śaṅkara has intentionally put that verse there. Again there are three such verses at the beginning of the Taittirīya Bhāṣya; and they are undoubtedly his composition. Śaṅkara's authorship of them is objected to by some. Their objection seems to be based on the word तैत्तिरीयकसार in the verse.

तैत्तिरीयकसारस्य मयाचार्यप्रसादतः ।

विस्पष्टार्थरुचीनां हि व्याख्येयं संप्रणीयते ॥ <sup>6</sup>

1. Māṇḍūkya Kārikās III, 39 & IV, 2.

2. Kāthaka Brāhmaṇa III, ix, 8.

3. Kāthaka Upaniṣad II, ii, 11.

4. Bhagavadgītā II, 14.

5. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya p. 148, Ānandāśrama Edition.

6. Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya—p. 1 (Ānandāśrama Edition.)

The word तैत्तिरीयकसार is taken by some to refer to the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad. It is consequently argued that the verses were probably composed by a commentator on the Bhāṣya and were later incorporated into the body of the text. But the fact remains that the word तैत्तिरीयकसार does not at all refer to the Bhāṣya. So far, it has not been possible to find out any reference to the Taittirīya Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara as Taittirīyaka sūtra in which case alone even the possibility of such an opinion may be tenable. It is the practice among the Śāstraic authors to refer to the Upaniṣads as शिरस्, शिखा etc. of the vedas. सार 1 is one such term and the phrase here simply means तैत्तिरीयकोपनिषद्. If there be any misgivings regarding this explanation we are at perfect liberty to take the natural meaning, 'The essence of Taittirīyaka.' The evidence of Ānandagiri, a Vedāntin of the thirteenth century is on our side. He comments on the verses with the firm conviction that they were genuine compositions of Śaṅkara.

Thus it may be established that the mere fact of the existence of the benedictory verses need not disprove Śaṅkara's authorship. If it is true that Śaṅkara does not usually begin with a benedictory verse as some say, then too there can be some reason for doubting Śaṅkara's authorship of the verses alone and not of Śaṅkara's authorship of the whole Bhāṣya.

The fault in the form of the metrical slip has to be answered. The last quarter of the second verse<sup>2</sup>

हित्वा सर्वान् विशेषान् विगतगुणगणः पात्वसौ न स्तुरीयः

has indeed four letters in excess when compared with the other quarters of the same verse. It is true that Śaṅkara is a very great poet. When we do find this fault, we have only three courses to pursue. We should be prepared to say that it is no fault; or it should be said that the fault crept in unwittingly; or failing either we have to adopt the last course and say that the composition is to be seriously doubted whether it belongs to Śaṅkara. Ānandagiri adopts the first course and defends Śaṅkara saying,

न च द्वितीयश्लोके चतुर्थपादे वृत्तलक्षणाभावात् असाङ्गत्यमाशङ्कनीयं  
गाथा लक्षणस्य तत्र सुसंपादत्वादिति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

The field of gāthā is very wide and we can bring under it any number of metres. Moreover even if the गāthā लक्षण cannot be applicable to the

1. Compare.

सर्वोपनिषदां मध्ये सारं अष्टोत्तरं शतम् ।

Muktikopaniṣad I, 44 where the word Sāra means upaniṣad.

2. Ānandagiri's comments on p. 4 (Ānandāśrama Edition of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad).

present case we can argue thus. Definitions are based on the existing facts and not vice-versa. When we find verses written by great poets we have to find out a definition which will be applicable to the instance under question. If so, we can find out a definition for the present instance also. It is not also wrong to suppose that great men commit certain faults unknowingly. Or we may allow even the last alternative. In any case there is no room to suspect Śāṅkara's authorship of the Bhāṣya. The verse might or might not have been written by him.<sup>1</sup> But the commentary is surely his.

Now to the difference in the interpretation of the same passage between the author of the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās and the author of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya, Śāṅkara himself interprets particular passages of the Upaniṣads in one way in the Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas themselves and differently in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya. Of such there are many instances but a few may be noted here. Moreover the nature of vedic passages is such that they lend themselves to a variety of explanations. Many of the vedic mantras occur in a number of places and when we read them we understand them in a particular way. In the Brāhmaṇas we find them explained in one way, in a certain context and differently in another. While Śāṅkara attempted to comment upon such passages he had perforce to explain in all possible ways and hence the inconsistency in explanation. The Mantra

चत्वारिंशद्वा तयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्तहस्तासो अस्य ।  
त्रिधा वद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्या, आविवेश ॥

has been interpreted in more than four or five ways. The Mantra

ऋतं पिबन्तौ.....

has been explained in three different lights; similarly the Mantra,

हंसः शुचिषद्वसुरन्तरिक्षसत् होता वेदिषदतिथिर्दुरीणसत्.

So also in the present case the difference in interpretation is due to the fact that Śāṅkara was at liberty to comment as he liked, when he was dealing with the verse in the Īśāvāsyā-Upaniṣad. But in the Kārikās he had to explain them as understood and set forth by Gauḍapāda. The latter takes the word to be संभूति in "अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये संभूतिमुपासते" । as we find in संभूतेरपवादाच्चसंभवः प्रतिषिद्धयते ॥<sup>2</sup> and hence Śāṅkara thus comments. But Īśāvāsyā refers to संभूति apart and so he takes this to be असंभूति. For the difference in the meanings Gauḍapāda alone is responsible.

1. The possibility of a corrupted text is the most probable under the circumstances.


2. Māṇḍūkyakārikās, III, 25 (Ānandaśrama Edition.)

After thus answering the objections we may note the evidences that prove the identity of the authors of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya and the commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās. There is a long and uninterrupted tradition. It is kept up by traditional scholars. The commentary does not lack the fine touches which are characteristically Śāṅkara's. The language of the Māṇḍūkya kārīkā Bhāṣya compares well with the rest of his Bhāṣya. Śāṅkara is the student of Govinda Bhagavatpāda who in turn is a student of Gauḍapāda. To Gauḍapāda, Śāṅkara had a great respect and regard as the leading exponent of Advaitic thought. He was his Guru; and if we say that Śāṅkara did not comment on a masterly treatise produced by one to whom he had an innate respect and reverence and who was considered by him as by the rest of the world to be the leading exponent of a system of philosophic thought it would argue presumption on the part of Śāṅkara. Why should we, without reason, then discredit Śāṅkara by saying that he did not comment on his master's work?

THE  
INDIAN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY  
NARENDRA NATH LAW

Vol. I



CALCUTTA

1925

19. pūrvadeśavihārair yugapradhānāśrī JinacandraSūriśiṣya śrī  
Samayarājopadhyāya śiṣya bā° Abhayasundara Ga-

20. ṇi vineya śrī Kamalalābhopādhyāyair śiṣya paṇi° Labdhakīrti  
gaṇi paṇi° Rājahamṣa gaṇi Devavijaya ga-

21. ṇi Thirakumāra Caraṇakumāra Meghakumāra Jivarāja, Sāṃ-  
kara Jasavaṃta Mahājalādi śiṣyasamṭati saparivāryair/ Śrīh/

PURAN CHAND NAHAR

### The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Gauḍapāda Kārikās

It is generally known that the *Māṇḍūkya* forms one of the ten principal Upaniṣads, and Gauḍapāda has explained it by his Kārikās or the explanatory verses, and these Kārikās together with the original Upaniṣad have again been commented upon by Śaṅkarācārya, the great commentator of the *Brahma-sūtras*. This popular view must be either abandoned or modified to a great extent.

For the sake of convenience we shall first take up a question regarding the real extent of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad. In the present day we all know that it comprises only the prose passages, twelve in number<sup>1</sup>, and the kārikās of Gauḍapāda<sup>2</sup> are mere explanation of the former, and thus these two works are different from each other. But this fact is not admitted on all hands. It is maintained by some that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the prose passages referred to but also of the first book (*prakaraṇa*) of the of the kārikās. This view dates back at least from the time of Madhvācārya, the founder of the Dvaita school of the Vedānta philosophy (1199-1278). According to him and

<sup>1</sup> Beginning with "om ityetaḍakṣara" and ending in "ātmānaṃ ya evaṃ veda".

<sup>2</sup> From "bahisprajño vibhurvīśvaḥ" to "durdarśam iti" I, 1—IV, 100.

his followers, viz., Vyāsātīrtha and Śrīnivāsa, both the prose passages and the kārīkās included in the first book have been handed down by Varuṇa in the form of a *maṇḍuka* "a frog"<sup>1</sup>, the kārīkās, however, being regarded as *mantras* which are said to have been seen by Brahman, the creator<sup>2</sup>, as the *Rṣi*. I have already pointed out elsewhere<sup>3</sup> that the commentator of *Nṛsimhapūrvatāpanīya* Upaniṣad who is also known by the name of Śaṅkarācārya and identical with the author of the *Prapañcasāra*, a tāntrik work, is also of the same opinion, though he does not give any particular as to whether the *Rṣi* or the seer of the whole Upaniṣad is Varuṇa or whether the kārīkās are seen as *mantras* by Brahman, the creator. Kūranārāyaṇa, another commentator of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad belonging to the Rāmānuja school of Vedānta maintains<sup>4</sup> the same view taking the kārīkās of the first book as *mantras*, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upaniṣad. Appaya Dikṣita<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* by Madhvācārya with *Śrīnivāsiya*, Kumbhakonam, pp. 2-3. In support of this he quotes the following :—

"Dhyāyan Nārāyaṇaṁ devaṁ praṇavena samāhitāḥ

Maṇḍūkarūpi Varuṇas tuṣṭāva Harim avayam." *Padmapurāṇa*.

"Iti Maṇḍūkarūpi san dadarśa Varuṇaḥ śrutim". *Harivaṁśa*.

These two ślokas are not found in the printed editions. See also (*Ibid.*, p. 2 "maṇḍūkarūpiṇā Varuṇena catūrūpo Nārāyaṇo'tra stūyate".

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 8 :—

"Brahmadṛṣṭān ato mantran pramāṇaṁ salileśvaraḥ,

Atra ślokā bhavanti cakāraināṁ prthak prthak."

This, too, is not found in the printed editions. It is to be noted that the *Vyāsātīrtha-tīkā*, too, introduces the kārīkās under the name of mantra.

<sup>3</sup> My paper entitled "Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣadas in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume.

<sup>4</sup> Ānandāśrama ed. 1910, p. 199 "Upaniṣat svayaṁ pramāṇaṁ api dārḍhyāya svokter mantrān udāharati".

<sup>5</sup> A different person from the renowned author of the *Siddhānta-leśasaṅgraha*.

a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upaniṣads seems to subscribe to the same view, for his commentary on this Upaniṣad extends only to the prose passages and the kārīkās of the first book<sup>1</sup>. A large number of Mss. of this Upaniṣad in different libraries contains only these prose passages and the kārīkās of the first book<sup>2</sup>.

Thus it is perfectly clear from the above that by a considerable number of writers the first book of the kārīkās in their present form was taken as a part of the original Upaniṣad. Not only this, on the evidence of a large number of Mss., each of the four books of the kārīkās is also regarded as a separate Upaniṣad<sup>3</sup>.

Be it as it may. It is however evident from what is said above that according to those authorities the last three books of the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkās* form quite a different book or books with which the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad has not any connection. It cannot be said that these three last books were not known to them or in their times, for their priority to those authors can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Śaṅkara who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (1. 4. 14) a kārīkā from the third book (III. 15). Here a question may be put as to why they did not explain the last three books of the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkās* which they had before them. The answer might be twofold. First, it might be their honest belief that those books had no connection with the original *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad which, according to them, comprises only the twelve prose passages and the first book of the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkās*. And secondly, it might be said that they could not explain

<sup>1</sup> & <sup>2</sup> See *Sanskrit Manuscripts* (The Adyar Library), Vol. I, Upaniṣads, pp. 116, 287-288.

<sup>3</sup> Weber, *History of Indian Literature*, 1895, p. 161; Jacobi, *Concordance to Principal Upaniṣadas*, Preface, p. 8. For *Advaita-prakarāṇa Up.* and *Alātāśānti-prakarāṇa* see the Mss labelled ZZE of the Bombay Branch R. A. S.



them, for, the dominant thoughts therein, viz. absolute 'monism' (*advaitavāda*) and idealism (*ejñānavāda*) would go against their own views, viz. dualism (*dvaitavāda*) or qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*). The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three books were really included in or connected with the original Upaniṣad they would have undoubtedly explained them, as has been done by Puruṣottama, the grandson of Vallabha (1479-1531 A. D.) the great teacher of the pure monism (*Śuddhādvaita*) school<sup>1</sup>.

That the first book of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* was not regarded as an Upaniṣad or a part of it in the time of Śaṅkara can be safely asserted, for as we have just now seen in the preceding foot-note, he quotes a *kārikā* from this book (I. 16), too, in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (II. 1. 9), and in doing so he does not say it to be a *śruti*, as he clearly states that it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of Vedānta<sup>2</sup>. On another occasion in quoting from this work he uses almost the same words<sup>3</sup>. From such statements of Śaṅkara it is quite clear that the *kārikās* are composed by a great teacher (*ācārya*), and thus they cannot be regarded as an Upaniṣad nor can they partly or wholly form a portion of it.

We shall now try here to examine as clearly as possible the true relation between the prose passages and the first book of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*.

As Madhvācārya says<sup>4</sup>, the twelve prose passages of

1 In the same work (II. 1. 9) he has cited one *kārikā* more from the first book (I. 16). In the *Vivekaśūlamanī* (Vani Vilas Press, p. 109) a work assigned to him, one *kārikā* from the second book (II. 32) has also been quoted though without mention of doing so.

2 "atroktaṃ Vedāntasampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ".

3 "tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti" Com. *Brahmasūtra* I. 4. 14. The *kārikā* referred to here is III. 15.

4 Com. on *Māṇḍūkya Up. Śrīnivāsārthīyavivṛtti*, p. 8.

the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts<sup>1</sup>. Just after each of them<sup>2</sup> there is a line, viz. "*Atraite ślokā bhavanti*" 'here are the ślokas'. These introductory lines compared with similar sentences<sup>3</sup> in the different Upaniṣads strongly suggest that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what is being discussed. And we have already seen that Madhvācārya and others, and specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or *kārikās* were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

A question may, however, arise here as to whether these introductory lines ("*Atraite ślokā bhavanti*") are in fact included in the Upaniṣad. In some of the Mss.<sup>4</sup> used for the preparation of the second and third edition (1900 and 1910 respectively) of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad with the *kārikās* and the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and *Tīkā* of Ānandagiri in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, there is a short line apparently in the *bhāṣya* just at the beginning of "*Atraite ślokā bhavanti*" (p. 25) which introduces it saying "Now, here is the sentence of the author of the *Vārtika* (i. e. the *kārikās*)."<sup>5</sup> This shows that the introductory lines are not included in the original Upaniṣad. This view is supported by

1 Part I, passages 1-6 ; Part II, passage 7 ; Part III, passages 8-11 ; Part IV, passage 12.

2 I. e. before *kārikās* I, 10, 19, 24.

3 "tadete ślokā bhavanti", Bṛhad. Up. 4. 3 ; II, 4. 4. 8 ; "tadeṣa śloko bhavati", Bṛhad. Up. 2. 2. 3, etc. ; "tadeṣa ślokaḥ", Ch. Up. 2. 11. 3 ; 3. 11. 1 ; etc. ; "tadapyeṣa śloko bhavati", Taitti. Up. 2. 1. 1 ; cf. "tadetad ṛcābhyuktam". Ch. Up. 3. 12. 5, Bṛhad. Up. 4. 4. 23 ; Praśna Up. I. 7 ; Māṇḍūkya. Up. 3. 2. 19, etc.

4 Viz., kha ga 3.

5 "atha vārtikakāroktam vākyaṃ." That the *kārikās* were known to some as a *Vārtika* is evident also from at least other two Mss., viz., 'gha' and 'ña' : "iti Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadam vārtikaḥ" p. 155, note 1 (2nd ed.). We shall come to this point later on. The *Vārtikakāra* is therefore here Gauḍapāda himself.

the following lines of Ānandagiri : 'The teacher (i.e. Gauḍapāda) having read the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad (up to that portion) introduces the śloka which is its exposition by the words beginning with 'Here.' And the author of the bhāṣya (i.e. Śaṅkara) explains it, quoting it by the word 'Here'<sup>1</sup>. Thus according to Ānandagiri, too, these introductory lines do not constitute the original Upaniṣad.

But this can hardly be accepted on the following grounds : First, we have already seen that among those who hold that the kārīkās of the first book are included in the original Upaniṣad, Madhvācārya is the foremost. He expressly says that the introductory lines in question are also the parts of the Upaniṣad. For he writes in his commentary (pp. 7-8) :

"Brahmadṛṣṭānato mantrāṇ pramāṇaṃ salileśvaraḥ  
Atra śloka bhavanti cākāraivaṃ punaḥ punaḥ".

"Therefore, Varuṇa took the *mantras* as authority quoting them separately with the words 'Here are the ślokas'." Madhvācārya says this couplet is in the *Garuḍa-purāṇa*<sup>2</sup>. If it is so, it would follow from it that this fact was known to the people long before him.

Secondly, as has already been shown, the manner in which these lines are introduced if compared with that in similar cases in the Upaniṣads and other works, would strongly indicate that the introductory lines are included in the main work.

Thirdly, it is found in Sanskrit works that whenever an introductory phrase, such as "atrāyaṃ ślokaḥ" etc., is used, only two things are possible there : (1) either the whole work including both the phrase and the śloka is by the same author,<sup>3</sup> or (ii) the śloka introduced by the phrase

1 "ācāryair Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadam paṭhitvā tadvyākhyānaśloka-vatāraṇam atretyādinā kṛtam. Tad atretyanupya bhāṣyakārau vyākaroti", p. 25.

2 Not found in the printed edition.

3 For instance, let us take Sāyaṇa's commentary on the *Rgveda*

are by one and the other portion of the work by another<sup>1</sup>. In the first case the whole of the first book including both the prose passages and the kārīkās should be accepted as written by one, i.e. the teacher, Ācārya Gauḍapāda ; but Ānandagiri would not admit it. And in the second, the introductory phrases must be included in the main Upaniṣad as is the case with other Upaniṣads, but this would also not be admitted by him.

Fourthly and finally, as we shall presently see that the twelve prose passages of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad are based on the Gauḍapāda-kārīkās in the first book and not the latter on the former, it is quite certain that the former should have the introductory line and the quoted kārīkās referred to by them, as the case is with other Upaniṣads.

(To be continued)

VIDHUSHEKHAR BHATTACHARYA

(Max Müller's 2nd ed. Vol. I, p. 6 ; see also pp. 10-11) where he introduces two śloka saying "Tatra saṅgraha śatakan". 'Here are two collecting verses', and then quotes them and these are his own and taken from his *Taiminīyanyāyamālā* (1. 2. 4.).

1. See the passages of the Upaniṣads referred to in the foot-note no. 3, p. 123.

be the psychological moment for the issue of such a work? Undoubtedly the moment when the Guru was preparing to take upon himself the role of a teacher of men. Secondly, it may as well be pointed out here that in the *Vicitra Nāṭak* we breathe a distinctly pre-Khālsā atmosphere. The account given by the Guru of his previous life and the circumstances which led to his birth reads like an episode from the *Purāṇas*, and all its details are saturated with the spirit of Hindu mythology<sup>1</sup>. The *Vicitra Nāṭak* presents a striking family resemblance to such other translations and abridged versions of mythological texts like the *Candī Caritra* or the *Rām Avatār*, the latter of which, according to the Guru's own statement, was completed on the fourteenth day of June, 1698, 'at the base of the lofty Nainā Devī on the margin of the Sutlej waters'<sup>2</sup>. As far as we are aware, Sikh tradition places the composition of the *Vicitra Nāṭak* as well, near about that time<sup>3</sup>. Thus while, on the one hand, there is hardly any evidence in support of the views of Cunningham and Narang, circumstances as well as tradition point to an earlier date. We have already stated that Macauliffe's date seems to be a bit too early and, therefore, we are inclined to place the composition of the *Vicitra Nāṭak* somewhere between 1696 and 1698.

INDUBHUSAN BANERJEE

1 Narang, Appendix I, p. vii.

2 Macauliffe, vol. v, p. 67.

3 Glossary of Punjab Tribes and Castes, vol. i, p. 690, f. n. 2; Malcolm's Sketch of the Sikhs, p. 186; Sikkhan de Rāj di Bikhā, Court's Translation, p. 43.

## The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Gauḍapāda Kārikās

### II

Now, in discussing as to how the prose passages are based on the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* and not the latter on the former let us now first examine whether the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* can be regarded as a *vārtika* 'explanatory work' on or a *vyākhyāna* 'exposition' of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* as is generally held and supported by Ānandagiri and others<sup>1</sup>. That it cannot be regarded as a *vārtika* is evident from the simple fact that it has no characteristics of a *vārtika*. A *vārtika* is an explanatory work in which there is discussion on what is said, what is not said, and what is said badly in the original book<sup>2</sup>. And there is nothing of it in the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*. If one compares them with the works known by the name of *vārtika*<sup>3</sup> one will at once understand that the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* cannot be classed with them<sup>4</sup>.

1 See I. H. Q., I, p. 124, f. n. I.

2 Says Rājaśekhara (*Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, GOS., 1916, p. 1): "uktānuk-taduruktacintā-vārtikam."

3 Such as Kātyāyana's *Vārtika* on Pāṇini, Kumārila's *Śloka*-and *Tantra-vārtikas* on Śabaravāmin's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras*, Sureśvarācārya's *Vārtika* on the commentary on the *Bṛhad. Up.* by Śaṅkara.

4 It may also be noted *en passant* that according to Ānandagiri (p. 5, l. 22) the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* are also regarded as a *Prakaraṇa*. A *Prakaraṇa* is a kind of work which is connected with a particular part of a śāstra and deals with a thing or things which are not discussed in the main śāstra:

"Śāstraikadeśasambaddham śāstrakāryāntare sthitam,  
Prāhuḥ prakaraṇam nāma granthabhedam vipaścitaḥ."

Quoted by Rāmātīrtha in his *Ṭikā* on the *Vedāntasūtra* (ed. Jacob), p. 81.

This view of Ānandagiri can hardly be accepted when he himself says that the *kārikās* are mere *vyākhyā* of the *Up.* For a *Prakaraṇa*

Supposing the kārīkās to be an explanation of the prose passages of the Up. as they are held to be, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it is quite natural that in an explanatory work the same words of the original are quoted and explained so far as possible and reasonable. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original; but it does not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. If these facts are considered it will be evident that it is rather the kārīkās than the prose passages that should be regarded as original.

According to the general view, kārīkās 3-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-4, and 5. Now, *saptāṅga* 'one with seven limbs' and *ekonavimsatimukha* 'one with nineteen mouths' are the two most difficult words in the passages 2 and 3 which are differently explained by different commentators<sup>1</sup>, but not even the slightest mention of them has been made in the kārīkās. Why should the kārīkās which are supposed to have been written to explain the text omit these two important words?

And again, in the Upaniṣad (3, 9) we have the word *vaiśvānara* and not *viśva*, while in the kārīkās (I, 4; II, 19) there is only *viśva* and never *vaiśvānara*. Here the author of the kārīkās which are held to be an exposition of the Up. should have quoted or written the actual word, *vaiśvānara*, employed

cannot be regarded as a *vyākhyā*. And if the word *vyākhyā* is taken in a still wider sense then any work on Vedānta, which has already been written or would be written in future, would be regarded as a *vyākhyā* of the Ups. But nobody can subscribe to this view. The word *prakaraṇa* is, however, used in the *bhāṣya* (p. 5, l. 9) in the sense of 'treatment' 'discussion' or 'chapter' as the different *prakaraṇas* of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

1 See Śaṅkara here and on *Nṛsp. Up.*, 4, Madhva, Kūrānārāyaṇa, Puruṣottama, Vidyāranya on *Nṛsu. Up.*, I. and Nārāyaṇa on *Rāmot. Up.* 3.

in the text. For a commentator is only to explain what is actually found in the text and he cannot take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words, *viśva* and *vaiśvānara*, identical or synonymous. Why has he then altered the original word using for it *viśva* so many times? That it is owing to the metre is out of the question.

The same is the case with *prajñānaghana* in the Up. (5) for which the kārīkā (I) has *jñānaghana*. In this connection there are three words more, which should have been mentioned here in the kārīkās viz., (i) *jāgaritasthāna*, (ii) *svapnasthāna*, and (iii) *susuptasthāna*; but they are entirely omitted in them. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for to understand the main thought of the passages there, those three stages, wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, must be borne in mind.

The fact is that the kārīkās are the older work from which as from the others the Up. is compiled<sup>1</sup>, and in doing so some of the thoughts in those works as well as in the kārīkās are simplified, modified, or explained, adding also something more to the Up. Thus in the present case the author of the Up. having found the word *viśva* in its special sense nowhere in the Ups.<sup>2</sup> appears to have substituted it for *vaiśvānara* used in such great Ups. as the *Chāndogya* (V, 11, 12) and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (V, 9, 1). Now, the author of the *Nṛsiṃhottaratāpaniṣya Up.* I, where the whole of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* is quoted with some different readings<sup>3</sup>, seeing both the words, *viśva* in the kārīkās and *vaiśvānara* in the Up., has adopted both of them<sup>4</sup> and simplified the text to some

1 See infra and P. Deussen's *Upanishads des Veda*, 1921, p. 574.

2 Excepting perhaps *Maitrī. Up.*, 6, 7, whose origin is also later.

3 The *Māṇḍūkya Up.* is almost entirely quoted also in the *Nṛsp. Up.*, I.

4 Sthūlabhuk caturātmā viśvo vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādaḥ.

I. H. Q., JUNE, 1925

extent<sup>1</sup>. And why these two terms are taken together and what might be their special significance is clearly shown by Vidyāranya in his *Tīkā* on the *Nṛsu. Up.* and *Pañcadāśī*, I, 28-29,<sup>2</sup> adding some new colour. In the same way though without any authority the three states *jāgarita*, *svapna* and *suṣupta* (*Up.*, 3, 4) are later additions for a clearer exposition of the terms *bahisprajña*, *antahprajña*, and *ghanaprajña* (*Kā.*, I).

The words *saptāṅga* and *ekonaviṃśatimukha* referred to above are also mere later additions though without any particular importance. As regards *ghanaprajña* (*Kā.*, I) the author of the *Up.* (5) has adopted the original word *prajñānaghana* from the *Bṛhad. Up.*, IV, 5, 13. on which, too, the former is undoubtedly based, for we see that the author of the *kārikās* profusely quotes from it.

That the *Up.* itself has borrowed from the *kārikās* (as well as from others) will be evident also from the comparison of both the texts. In the *kārikā* we have simply *ghanaprajña* (1) and *ānandabhuj* (3) or *ānanda* (4) while the *Up.* (5) reads as follows :—

“Yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate, na kañcana svapnam paśyati (*Bṛhad. Up.*, IV, 3, 19) tat suṣuptam. Suṣuptasthāna ekibhūtaḥ<sup>3</sup> ‘prajñānaghana’ (*Bṛhad. Up.*, IV, 5, 13) eva ‘ānandamayo’ (*Tait. Up.*, II, 5, 1) hyānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prajñāstrītyaḥ pādah”.

Which of these two, the *kārikās* and the *Up.*, is original and which is the exposition can now easily be inferred. The word *ghanaprajña* in the *kārikā* is no doubt

<sup>1</sup> This is also with the *Nṛp. Up.* For example, *sūkṣma* is substituted in the *Nṛsu. Up.*, I for *pravivikta* in *kārikās*, 3, 4. Here *sūkṣma* is undoubtedly more simple than *pravivikta*. For details the reader is referred to that *Up.*

<sup>2</sup> See also *Vedāntasāra*, 17.

<sup>3</sup> See *Bṛhad. Up.*, IV, 12; *Praśna*, IV, 2; *Mund.*, 3, 2, 7; also *Nṛsp.*, 4; *Nṛsu.*, I; *Rāmota*, 3.

identical with *prajñānaghana* though in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the *Up.* has introduced the word *ekibhūta* found in the form of *ekibhavati* in so many *Ups.*<sup>1</sup> Similarly *ānandabhuj* (*kārikā*, 3) is explained by *ānandamaya* taken from the *Tait. Up.* (*loc. cit.*).

The *Kārikā* I, 19 runs as follows :—

“Viśvasyātvaivakṣāyām ādisāmānyam utkaṭam,  
Mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca.”

And the corresponding passage (9) of the *Up.* is this :—

“Jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro’kāraḥ prathamā mātrāpte-  
rādimatvād vā, āpnoti sarvān kāmān ādis ca bhavati ya evam  
veda.”

“*Vaiśvānara* whose sphere is waking state is the first *mātrā* ‘measure’ *a*, on account of its all-pervasiveness (*āpti*) or on account of its being first (*ādimatva*). One who so knows has all his desires satisfied and becomes the first (of all)’.

Now, if these two texts are compared, it will at once be evident that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*. Here is one point more. In the first extract the reason is advanced as to why *Viśva* (= *Vaiśvānara* of the *Up.*) is to be regarded as *a*. And the reason is similarity (*sāmānya*)—similarity between *Viśva* and *a-kāra*. And this similarity is the ‘beginning’ (*ādi*) and ‘pervasion’ (*āpti*). According to the order of *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*, *Viśva* is in the beginning or first (*ādi*); just so is in the beginning or first *a-kāra* of *a*, *u*, and *m* of which *Oṃkāra* is composed. Owing to this similarity *Viśva* is said to be identical with *a-kāra*. The second similarity which is *āpti* is explained thus: As *Viśva* pervades all the visible world so does *a-kāra* all the speech. On account of this similarity, too, *Viśva* is to be regarded as *a-kāra*. The passage of the *Up.* under discussion, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity. For the *kārikā*

<sup>1</sup> See the previous note.

says that owing to *both* the similarities of *ādi* and *āpti* they are identical, while the Up. clearly says that it is owing to *either* of them "*āpter ādimattvād vā*." All these seem to be later developments.

The case is invariably the same with the kārīkās I, 20, 21 and the corresponding passages, 10, 11 of the Up. which for want of space I refrain from quoting and explaining here. As regards the passage 10 there is a curious point to be noted. The author says that *Taijasa* is *u-kāra* because of *utkarṣa* 'superiority' or *ubhayatva* 'state of being in both or in the middle'. He then explains the first term<sup>1</sup> only leaving out the second entirely. And this seems to be due to oversight on his part. Besides what is already said there is one thing to be noticed as regards the kārīkā I. 21 and the corresponding passage (11) of the Up. In the former one of the two similarities is *māna* measure from *√mā*, while in the latter the word is not *māna* but *miti* from *√mi*. The difference between the modes of expression of the same thought here and elsewhere as noticed will also show that these two texts, though they deal with the same subject and are closely connected, are independent, both of them having such a freedom as is hardly found in a text and its commentary.

The conception of *ātman* as having four quarters (*catuṣ-pāda*)<sup>2</sup> is not quite explicit in words in the kārīkās, though it may be inferred from some of them<sup>3</sup>. It is, however, fully developed in the Up. (2) from the beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the kārīkās to the Up.

The distinction between *turya* or *turiya* 'fourth' and the other three, *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*, as made in the kārīkās (I, 10-14), is not at all to be found in the Up. but its nature which is described in a kārīkā (I, 29) simply by

1 "Utkarṣati ha vai jñānasantatiṃ samānaś ca bhavati".

2 Up. 2 : "So'yamātmā catuṣpat".

3 I, 10-15 (where the fourth state is described), and 24 and 29 (where *Ōṅkāra* is described with and without *mātrā* respectively).

two words, *śiva* 'blissful' and *dvaita-upaśama* 'cessation of duality', is thus delineated in the following two passages of the Up. (7, 12) :

(i) *nāntaḥprajñam na vahiṣprajñam nobhayataprajñam na prajñānaghanam naprajñam nāprajñam. Adṛṣṭam avyavahāriyam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasāram prapañcopaśamam śāntam śivam advaitam caturtham manyante. Sa ātmā sa vijñeya.*

(ii) *Amātraścaturtho'vyavahārya prapancopaśamaḥ sivo dvaita evam'ōṅkāra ātmaiva.*

These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārīkā (I, 29) and consequently are to be regarded as later developments.

Compare the kārīkā I, 24 with the passage (8) of the Up. and it will be perfectly clear that the former is explained in the latter in details.

The kārīkā I, 6 opening the discussion about the origin or creation (*prabhava*) of things may be connected with the last part of the passage (6) : "*prabhavāpyau hi bhūtānām.*" *Prabhava* is described in the kārīkās (I, 6-9) at some length but *apyaya* 'disappearance' or 'vanishing' is not even touched. This would hardly be likely if the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkās* were meant to explain the Up.

All these considerations coupled with the views of Madhvācārya and others strongly lead us to the conclusion that (i) the *Gauḍapāda-kārīkās* are not the exposition (*vyākhyāna*) of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*, (ii) the latter is mainly based on the former, and (iii) as such, is later than it.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, there is no evidence whatever for assigning it a date before the great Śāṅkarācārya. Nowhere does he or any of his predecessors quote it, nor has he made any

1 Here *prabhavāpyayau* is undoubtedly taken from *Kaṭha Up.*, 2, 2."

2 Cf. Max Walleiser : *Der altere Vedānta*, 1910, p. 5, where he says that the kārīkās do not show that the Up. was before them.

mention of it even in the case where he could or should have done it<sup>1</sup>. That he never feels tired of quoting *śrutis* is well-known and so his silence about the Up. naturally gives rise to grave doubt as to whether it existed before him or in his time. That some of the minor Ups. were before Śaṅkara cannot be denied, for instance, the *Brahma* or *Amṛta-bindu Up.*, which is a minor and later Up. This Up. existed prior to Śaṅkara as he himself has quoted it as one of the *Mokṣasūtras* though not as an Up. (*Brahmasūtras*, III, 2, 18). But as regards the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* there is no such evidence.

One may say here that in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* (I, 1, 9) there is a line which runs as follows:—“prabhavāpyayāvityut pattiṣratyayayoḥ prayogadarśanāt”. Here the word *Prabhavāpyayau* is evidently quoted from some work and that work is the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* in which (6) one reads the words in the following line “eṣo'ntaryāmi eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām”. It is therefore not true that Śaṅkara does not quote the Up. But this cannot be accepted conclusively, for there is a passage in the *Kaṭha Up.* (IV, 11), too, where the same word occurs in the same way “yogo hi prabhavāpyayau” and as one sees Śaṅkara quote so much from this Up. one naturally inclines to think that the quotation might also be from it and not from the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* At least there is nothing to prove that the passage invariably refers to the latter, and so the citation referred to from the commentary of the *Brahmasūtras* does not serve any purpose here.

VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACARYA

<sup>1</sup> *Ch. Up.*, II, 23, 3. See my paper *Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upaniṣads* in *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume*, III, ii, p. 104.

## Bengal School of Art

### II

#### *Art-culture under the Sena kings of Bengal*

In Varendra kingdom Vijayasena Deva claiming descent from a Kṣatriya clan of Karnāṭa in Southern India snatched away the government from the hands of the Pālas. His son and successor Ballāla Sena was too deeply engaged in the extension of territories and consolidation of his conquests and too much interested in social reforms and foundation of Kulinism in Bengal to leave any marked trace of his patronage of art and religion. Ballāla's son Lakṣmaṇa Sena during the earlier part of his long tenure of sovereignty annexed the whole region from the Sunderbans to Benares and established peace and order, under the shade of which poetry and fine arts flourished with great splendour. Many copper-plates and stone-inscriptions of these three kings have been discovered and correctly deciphered. Vijayapura in the Rajshahi District seems to have been the capital of Vijayasena and the record of his dedication of the temple of *Pradyumneśvara* in the vicinity is now-known as the Devapara inscription. Some of the Pāla kings had established their seat of government in Gauḍ, a part of which has been suggested to have been the city of Rāmavati, founded by Rāmapāla. Ballāla Sena took that city and had one of his capitals in its neighbourhood, now identified as Ballālabāḍī. Lakṣmaṇa Sena erected his fort of Gauḍ on a branch of the Bhāgīrathī and the extensive city of Gauḍ is still marked by many large tanks, glorious monuments of Lakṣmaṇa Sena, even after all the attempts of the Pathan lords of Gauḍ to demolish the traces of the Hindu rule. In Gauḍ and Pandua, both in the District of Maldah are seen many buildings, ruined temples, broken or unbroken images, misplaced pillars and carved plates, with distinct marks of the art-culture under the patronage of king Lakṣmaṇa Sena.

THE  
INDIAN HISTORICAL  
QUARTERLY

Edited by  
NARENDRA NATH LAW

Vol. II



CALCUTTA

1926



Sāhityadarpaṇa, Daśarūpa and other Sanskrit works on dramaturgy, is *ten*, and the list is as follows :—

(1) Nāṭaka, (2) Prakaraṇa, (3) Bhāṇa, 4) Vyāyoga, (5) Samavakāra, (6) Dima, (7) Ihāmṛga, (8) Aṅka, (9) Vithi, and (10) Prahasana.

This is a point on which oriental scholars have, up till now, found no ground to differ.

But recent discoveries in the field of Sanskrit dramatic literature have brought us face to face with a very singular exception as regards the enumeration of the Rūpakas.

Bhagavadajjukīyam—a Prahasana, which differs remarkably on many points from all other plays of the same type, gives a list of no less than *twelve* Rūpakas in its Prastāvanā. "The list of ten Rūpakas in all our Nāṭyaśāstras includes the Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa, while our author mentions ten kinds of plays sprung from Nāṭaka and Prakaraṇa, and mentions, besides Ihāmṛga and other kinds of Rūpakas found also in the usual lists, Vāra as the first and Sallāpa as the seventh. Sallāpa, i.e. Saṃlāpaka or discourse, appears as a type of drama elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> but Vāra seems to be otherwise quite unknown".<sup>3</sup>

Among the Prahasanas hitherto published Bhagavadajjukīyam holds a very unique position. It differs from Mattavilāsa inasmuch as it purports to be a "comedy proper" rather than "a real farce and satire" as Mattavilāsa claims to be. But on that account it is in no way inferior to Mahendravikrama's play.

Nothing definite can be said about the age of the play. Like the thirteen dramas attributed to Bhāsa, it also omits to mention the names of both the work and the author in the prologue. But the names are found in the colophon and in the opening verse of the old commentary published with it. But this does not go towards solving the much-vexed problem of its age. All that we can gather after a careful perusal of the work is that it was written at a period when Buddhism was on the decline in South India ; but even then the condition of the Buddhist society had not become so corrupt as it was at the time when Mattavilāsa was composed. Thus the play seems to go back to a very early period—earlier perhaps than that of Mattavilāsa. For obvious reasons, it cannot be called a compilation as Pandit Krishna Pisharoti

1 नाटकप्रकरणौद्भवसु बरिहस्यमडिमसमवकारव्यायोगभाषसत्तापवीथ्युत्पटिकाङ्गप्रहसनादिषु दशनातिषु नाट्यरसेषु हास्यमेव प्रधानम्—भगवदज्जूकीयम्, प्रस्तावना ।

2 An Uparūpaka is also of the same name.

3 Winternitz—Preface to Bhagavadajjukīyam.

has tried to show in his paper on Bhāsa. Neither can its author Bodhāyana be possibly identified with the great Vṛttikāra of the Brahmasūtras as Prof. Winternitz has suggested.

Thus we see that many a new problem has been raised by the publication of the play. At present the materials that may lead to the solution of these problems are quite scanty and consequently insufficient. We hear that three works connected with acting in Kerala—Āṭṭaparakāra, Kramadīpikā and Kūtiāṭṭakrama<sup>1</sup>—have been recently discovered. May we not venture to hope that these valuable discoveries of Tamila-Malayalam works on dramaturgy would throw some light on questions that still remain open.

ASHOKANATH BHATTACHARYA

### The First commentary on the Mahābhāṣya

In connection with the date of a certain Vedantic writer I had recently to consult the list of the *gurus* who occupied the pontifical throne at the *Advaita Maṭha* of Conjeeveram and for this purpose referred to the *Guru-ratna-mālā*, one of the five works published in the volume styled *Vedānta-pañca-prakaraṇī*, printed at the Śrī Vidyā Press, of Kumbhakonam and I was more than surprised to find in it the following stanza:—

अभियुक्तदयाच्यं पूज्यपादानपलोत्थादिनिषाकसिद्धनेतृन् ।

अथ गौडपदाफणीशभाष्यप्रथमाचार्यकपण्डितान् प्रपद्ये ॥<sup>2</sup>

It may be translated as follows :—'I seek the help of Gauḍapāda who first spread a knowledge of the *Bhāṣya* of Patañjali,<sup>3</sup> whose feet were adored by Ayārcya, once his opponent and who was the preceptor of *Niṣāka* mystics<sup>4</sup> like Apolonya.' The references here are obviously to Apollonius of Tyana and to king Iarchas mentioned in his 'Travels'.<sup>5</sup> This work, *Guru-ratna-mālā*, is ascribed—with what authority it is not known—to Sadāśivendra whose Vedantic works like the *Ātma-vidyā-vilāsa* are well-known in the south. There is a commentary by one Ātmabodha on the work which also is printed in the same volume.

1 Vide the Introduction to the play by the Editor.

2 p. 20. 3 For the allusion here, see *Patañjali-carita* of Rāma-bhadra Dikṣita (Nirnaya Sagara Press).

4 *JRAS.*, vol. 17 (1860), p. 90.

5 *Ibid.*

It introduces in explaining the stanza the name of Damis,<sup>1</sup> a fellow-traveller and friend of Apollonius and Prāvr̥ti, a Śaka chief of Takṣaśilā<sup>2</sup> and states that Ayārcya was a Buddhist. These are remarkable statements and, if authentic, would be of great importance in determining the date of Gauḍapāda and deciding the question whether Apollonius of Tyana visited India or not. The work, though published long ago is, I think, not yet widely known.

M. HIRIVANNA

### A Short note on Mr. Jayaswal's interpretation of a Mahābhāṣya passage in his 'Hindu Polity' (p. 122)

In the above book, at the close of the chapter on 'Franchise and Citizenship,' the author concludes thus :

"The cause of Patañjali's perplexity seems to be a confusion which arose by treating a Vārttika of Kātyāyana, viz. गोवचन्याख्येभ्यो बहुलं वृज् as a Sūtra of Pāṇini. As a matter of fact, गोवचन्याख्येभ्यो बहुलं वृज् is given as a Vārttika (No. 18) to Pāṇini, IV. 2. 104 (Kielhorn, p. 296). The same rule could not be both a Vārttika of Kātyāyana and a Sūtra of Pāṇini. It has already come as a Vārttika, and by treating it as a Vārttika the sense becomes clear. Kātyāyana completes Pāṇini by giving a general rule on allegiance owed to well-known Kṣatriya rulers."

At the outset, our sense of admiration seems as it were to be awakened from its torpor by the author's originality in discovering and pointing out the perplexity of Patañjali. With due deference to the author, we are inclined to be more sympathetic towards Patañjali for the very reason that no commentator after him has doubted his sanity in taking the rule under discussion to belong to Pāṇini, and not to Kātyāyana as Mr. Jayaswal would have it. To do justice to Patañjali, we should recognise the fact that he had not the advantage of a critical edition of the Vārttikas, as Mr. Jayaswal and ourselves are privileged to have. On the textual side, we are not prepared to believe that Mr. Jayaswal would have consciously committed himself to the statement that the rule concerned should be taken to be a Vārttika of Kātyāyana, and not a Sūtra of Pāṇini. Verily, the rule in question, comes from the mouth of Kātyāyana, and our thanks are due to the

illustrious editor of the Mahābhāṣya, Dr. Kielhorn, for having so printed it. But we have to draw the attention of Mr. Jayaswal to a technique in Śāstric treatises, called अनुवाद . It is a verbatim quotation of a certain statement or statements, for the purpose of discussion with reference to a particular point under consideration. To make our point clear, it is necessary to refer to the particular discussion in brief. In this particular instance, Kātyāyana is dealing with the Sūtra IV.2.104 (अव्ययान्ताप) which enjoins the addition of a suffix 'tyap' after indeclinables, so that we get the forms like अन्ताप etc. There is a similar rule (IV.2.114—ह्रस्वाच्) which enjoins the addition of the suffix 'cha' to words beginning with a Vṛddhi vowel. The word अन्ताप is an indeclinable having a Vṛddhi vowel for its first letter. Therefore it comes under the operation of the two Sūtras, IV.2.104 & 114. Kātyāyana, by his second Vārttika under the rule IV.2.104, says that the rule I.4.2 (विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्) operates, and we should have the suffix 'cha' added to it and not 'tyap'. Then he proceeds as a contextual sequence to discuss the scope of the rule IV.2.114, in its turn, and from the Vārttika No. 7 onwards, he enumerates the rules of Pāṇini which supersede IV.2.114. Some of these rules he refers to in his own words and some he literally quotes. For instance, the Vārttika No. 11 वर्गान्ताच्चायस्ये यत्खी (Kiel., vol. II, p. 295) refers to the two rules of Pāṇini IV.3.64 & 65. This is of the former type. An instance of the latter type would be the Vārttika No. 20. (पञ्चपूर्वाद्च्) which is a rule (IV.3.122) of Pāṇini. In fact, two succeeding Vārttikas (Nos. 21 & 22) also happen to be verbatim quotations of the Sūtras IV.3.125 & 126 of Pāṇini. Consistently with what Mr. Jayaswal has stated with regard to the rule (Vārttika No. 18), we should perforce consider the rules (Vārttikas Nos. 21 & 22) to be the only Vārttikas ; and as no rule could be both a Vārttika of Kātyāyana and a Sūtra of Pāṇini, we are constrained to request Mr. Jayaswal to discover the person or persons who are under confusion and perplexity with regard to these rules. Unless and until he complies with our request, the alleged confusion and perplexity attributed to Patañjali only deserve to be classed with optical illusions like mirage.

We are further at a loss to understand how according to Mr. Jayaswal, the taking of the rule under consideration to be a Vārttika of Kātyāyana would make the sense clear. If it is taken at all as a Vārttika, it is read under rule IV.2.104, and not under IV.3.98, as he seems to imagine. And even supposing that the rule embodied in the Vārttika applies to IV.3.98, there is no need to accept what Mr. Jayaswal says, if

I. II. Q. JUNE, 1926

1 JRAS., vol. 17 (1860), p. 70.

2 Ibid., p. 76.

## Dedication

*This Fortyninth Number of the  
Darshana International  
is respectfully dedicated to the memory of late  
Shri Chakravarty Rajagopalachari,  
the stalwart thinker of modern India, who has contributed  
a good deal to the freedom movement of India and to  
the free thinking on political and cultural issues  
before the country. He was a great lover of  
Indian culture and has written several  
easily intelligible books on Vedanta  
and Hinduism. May his works  
continue to spread the spirit of  
Indian Civilization and Culture.*

**J. P. Atreya**  
*Managing Editor*


# DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

A N  
International Quarterly  
O F  
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical  
Research, Religion, Mysticism &  
Sociology

VOLUME XIII JANUARY 1973 NUMBER 1

## CONTENTS

I	Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha A Comparative Survey of their Philosophy	B. L. Atreya	1
II	The Experience of Space, a Metapsychologic and Psychoanalytic Approach	M. Lietaert Peerbolte	11
III	Self-disclosure An Index of Healthy Personality	V. Sinha	24
IV	Why ?	Dennis A. Rohatyn	28
V	The Immaculate Concept of Man : An Imaginative Trip into Personality	Christopher B. Hills	31
VI	A Theoretical Framework for Psychical Interactions	R. W. Lowrie	37
VII	An Introduction to Hatha Yoga	S. P. Atreya	44
VIII	A Study of Ethical Scepticism	D. Pathak	57
IX	Philosophy and Our Times	Stefen Angelov & Deyan Pavlov	65
X	Analysis of Sociometric Perception of Post-graduate Agriculture Students	Rajendra	71
XI	The Indian Concept of Liberation	G. C. Baruah	75
XII	Book-Reviews		82



# DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

## BOARD OF EDITORS

GENERAL EDITOR  
B. L. ATREYA [India]

### MEMBERS

Paul A. Schilpp [U. S. A.]	Oliver L. Reiser [U. S. A.]
John O. Nelson [U. S. A.]	Robert C. Whittmore [U. S. A.]
Henry Winthrop [U. S. A.]	Gardner Murphy [U. S. A.]
A. C. Ewing [U. K.]	H. D. Lewis [U. K.]
G. Migliorino [Italy]	Uriel G. Foa [Israel]
Ludo Rocher [Belgium]	J. Nuttin [Belgium]
R. S. Hartman [Mexico]	Miguel Reale [Brazil]
Louis Lachance O. P. [Canada]	Pierce-Maxime Schuhl [France]
Charles K. Bliss [Australia]	Winfield E. Nagley [U. S. A.]
Panos D. Bardis [U. S. A.]	Christopher B. Hills [W. I.]
Archie J. Bahm [U. S. A.]	M. Leitert Peerbolte [Holland]
W. Metzger [Germany]	Hans Thomae [Germany]
	Hiroshi Motoyama [Japan]

Managing Editor

J. P. ATREYA

### ASSISTANT EDITORS

Prakash Atreya

S. P. Atreya

H. C. Barthwal

## Gaudapada and Vasistha A comparative survey of their philosophy

B. L. Atreya

Gaudapāda, the author of the famous *Kārikās* on the *Māndūkya-paniśād*, is quite well-known to the world of Indian Philosophy. He is considered by the Oriental scholars to be the first exponent of the Advaita Vedānta after the *Upaniśads*. This view stands unchallenged only so long as the work known as the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* has not been studied, and its date definitely determined. It is really strange why Oriental scholars have not yet turned their attention to this important work which when studied thoroughly will perhaps be found not to be a post-Śāṅkara work, as it is generally believed to be. In the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* we find almost every view held by Gaudapāda, and there can be found lines in the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* parallel to almost every line of the II, III, and IV chapters of the *Kārikās* which represent the philosophical position of Gaudapāda, yet it is strange that there is hardly any line, except one or two borrowed perhaps from some common source too well-known at that time, which is literally identical in the two. Leaving the question which work is the earlier of the two to the historians, we shall here attempt a brief survey of the opinions shared equally by both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha, the philosopher in the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, under four main heads, namely, *Idealism* (Kalpanā-vāda), *Illusionism* (Māyā-vāda), *Acosmism* (Ajāta-vāda), and the *Method of Self-realisation* (Yoga).

### 1. Idealism (Kalpanā-vāda).

It has been sometimes maintained by the students of Hindu philosophy that "Hindu thinkers have been and are (in the epistemological sense) not only Realists but Realists of a thorough-going type. There is no trace of Subjectivism which may be found in the Buddhist schools".

Now whatever might be said of other Hindu thinkers including perhaps Śāṅkara also, Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha at any rate were thorough-going Idealists. Both of them hold that the reality of the world-experience consists in its being imagined by mind. Here is what Gauḍapāda says :— "The external as well as the internal objects are all imagined (K. II. 14). Those objects that are in the subtle condition within as well as those that are manifest without, are all the work of imagination, the difference between them lying only in the means of their cognition (K. II. 15). The whole experience consisting of perceiver and perceived is merely imagination of mind (K. IV. 72). The whole duality, of whatever kind, is merely a phenomenon of mind (K. III. 31). As movement makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, etc., so activity makes thought appear as perceiver and perceived (K. IV. 47). As are dreams, magical creations and castles-in-the-air, so declare the scholars of the *Upaniṣads*, this cosmos to be (K. II. 31). All entities are like dream-objects sent forth by creative power of the Self (K. II. 5).

In the same way declares Vasiṣṭha:—

"Everything in the world-experience is the work of imagination only (YV. VIb. 2 10. 11). All this world-experience is a wonderful working out of consciousness in itself like the rising and falling of the city of dream (YV. VIb. 42. 16). All the three worlds are the creation of the activity of mind alone (YV. IV. 11. 13). This universe is considered to be the overflow of mind (YV. IV. 47. 48). Everything is constructed by the imagination of the self as in dream (YV. III. 10. 35). The world-experience comes out the heart of consciousness as a tree comes out of a seed (YV. VIb. 51, 8). The world-experience is like a castle-in-the air (YV. VIa. 33, 45). "And so on,

Do they give reasons like Berkeley for holding this startling position in philosophy? Yes they do give some, though not in a systematic way. Gauḍapāda is very brief in his statements. His arguments for Idealism may be gathered from the following : "(1) A thing is said to be real because it is experienced and on account of its being the cause of an action. But are the objects of our illusory knowledge which are mere ideas of the mind not such? There is no difference between the two in these respects. Therefore the so-called real things are also thought-creations as the illusory ones are (K. IV. 44). (ii) We all know that mind assumes a duality of the objects and the subject in dream by its own power, so there is no reason why in the waking experience we should not think that it acts in the same manner through the same cause (K. III. 30). (iii) The duality (of the perceiver and the perceived) is a work of the mind because when the mind is annihilated, i. e., expanded into the Infinite Self (as in the case of Samādhi) the duality is not at all experienced (K. III. 31),

The arguments of Vasiṣṭha for Idealism may be gathered as the following :—

"(i) The phenomenon of knowledge cannot be explained if the subject and object are two things quite different and opposed in their nature, for no relation can exist between two heterogeneous things (YV. III. 121. 37, 42). That which comes into consciousness cannot but be a mode of consciousness for nothing of a different nature could have entered consciousness (YV. VIb. 25. 12). If the object were something of a different nature from the knowing mind, it will ever remain unknown, and there would then be no proof even of its existence (YV. VIb. 25. 15). (ii) The whole world-experience, with its cities and mountains, etc., can be duplicated in dreams. We all know that the dream objects are only modes of consciousness. There is no reason why the objects of the waking experience should not be taken to be so. (iii) The world-experience and its objects do not exist for the consciousness of the Yogi (who has learnt to put a stop to the activity of his mind) (YV. III. 60. 27). When the mind is lost in the Infinite consciousness (as in the case of Nirvāṇa) there is no experience of any duality (YV. VIa. 93. 44). All these considerations show that the mind is the nave of the wheel of the world (YV. V. 49. 40)."

But then, is there any difference between dreams and the waking experience if the latter is just like the former which, of course, we all know to be a play of ideas in our mind? Both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha think that there is hardly any difference between the contents of the two. Thus says Gauḍapāda : "The wise regard the waking and the dream states as one because of the similarity of the objective experiences in them (K. II. 6). The mind, though one, appears dual (subject and object) in dream, so also in the waking state, it, though one, appears dual through its creative power (K. III. 30), etc." In the same way Vasiṣṭha holds that "There is no difference between waking and dream experiences except that one is more stable than the other. The contents of both are similar in entirety, always and everywhere (YV. IV. 19. 11). The waking experience is just like that of dream (YV. III. 57. 50), etc., (YV. VIb. 23, 24, 29, 42). Dream also appear as waking states so long as they last, and the waking state looks like a dream when the objects of perception are not stable and lasting (YV. IV. 20. 12). From the standpoint of the permanent Self there is absolutely no difference between the contents of dream and waking state (YV. VIb. 161. 24). Although the waking man never apprehends his waking state to be a dream, the dead man rising again to experience a new life thinks his past life to have been a dream-like existence (YV. VIb. 161. 25). As a man may recollect the many sleep-dreams he has experienced throughout his life, so the Perfect Sages can remember the waking dreams they have experienced in their long history of transmigration (YV. VIb. 161. 30)."

Now, if the world-experience is a work of imagination, who is the author of it? Gauḍapāda raises this question in I. II. 11 and answers it thus : "The Ātman, all light, imagines these objects by himself through

his own power; he alone cognises the objects so sent forth. This is the last word of the Vedānta on the subject (K. II. 12). The Lord brings about the variety of subjective experience as well as that of objective experience (K. II. 13). The first result of ideation is Jīva from which the various entities subjective and objective come forth (K. II. 16).” Thus according to Gauḍapāda, the first product of the Creative imagination in the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, is Jīva (a finite entity) which imagines the subjects of its experience. Vasiṣṭha calls the Subject of world-experience by many names one of which is also Jīva, but the names most often used are *Manas* and *Brahma*. “The world experience,” Thus says Vasiṣṭha, “is spread out by Brahma manifesting himself in the form of *Manas* (YV. III. 3. 29).” How Brahma arises in the Absolute Reality is explained thus : “*Manas* comes out of the Absolute Reality like a sprout. The Creative power of the Absolute Reality (which is always inherent in it as its inseparable nature) by its own free-will, in a mere sportful overflow, comes to self-consciousness at a particular point, which in reality is forgetfulness of its being one with the whole reality, and on account of intensity there, begins to vibrate in the form of imagining activity (“consciring”) and assumes a separate and distinct existence for itself apart from the Whole whose one aspect it is in reality (YV. IV. 44. 4; III. 96. 3; IV. 42. 4, 5; VIa. 114, 15, 16; VIa. 33. 30; III. 2. 56; etc; etc.).”

Thus we see that Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha have the same Idealistic standpoint. Gauḍapāda, however, does not raise the problem, which is very important metaphysically, whether it is the individual or the Cosmic Jīva which imagines the world-experience including that of every individual. On the answer of this question will depend whether he is a Subjective or an Objective Idealist. Vasiṣṭha raises the problem and answers it in a satisfactory way reconciling the claims of both Solipsism and Realism, which does not concern us here.

## II. Illusionism (Māyā vāda).

Having established the ideality or the imaginary nature of the world-experience, both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha proceed to point out another very important feature of the objects of experience, namely, their temporary appearance in the field of consciousness. We have seen that the objects of the waking life are similar to those of dream state. But we generally regard the contents of a dream to be unreal because they do not persist for a long time, but come into consciousness for a short while and vanish. Similarly in the waking experience we regard some objects as unreal appearances when they are perceived for a short while but vanish soon from the view. But is not the experience of everything in this world of a similar nature for the eternally existent Self, before whose vision numberless objects have come and gone? The Eternal Self has experienced the beginning and end of innumerable objects. Every object of experience has in the consciousness of was not and will not be. But can

that which is real ever cease to be? If it is real it must ever exist. A temporary appearance cannot be said to be real. This is how both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha argue. The real, according to Vasiṣṭha, is “that which never comes to an end (YV. III. 4. 62), and that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real in any way, for real is only that which has neither a beginning nor an end (YV. IV. 5. 9).” Gauḍapāda also repeats the same line literally in K. II. 6 and in K. IV. 31 which has been translated as “That which is naught at the beginning and is so also at the end, does necessarily not exist in the middle”. “On this logic of reality the objects of experience cannot be said to be real at all (K. II. 32).” But do they not appear to be so? So do illusions and dream-objects appear, but we all know them to be unreal. All things seen in dream, says Gauḍapāda, “are unreal, being seen within the body for in so small; space how could objects exist and be seen”. So on and so forth (K. IV. 3, 34, 35, 36, 39; II. 1, 2, 3). “Objects therefore are illusory appearances though they appear to be real (K. II. 6). That they serve some purpose (and so should be regarded as real in opposition to the illusory appearances which do not serve any purpose) comes to naught in dream, hence (on the previous above mentioned principle) they are illusory appearances (K. II. 7). Even in dream we make the usual distinction of unreal, calling the subjective imagination within the dream unreal and the objectively existent things as real, as we do in the waking experience. Yet in fact both are illusory appearances (K. II. 9, 10).” So, as Vasiṣṭha says, all objects of experience should be viewed as “illusory appearances, visions of ignorance, mere *mayā* (literally that which does not exist), delusions of consciousness and dream-like appearances (YV. III. 57, 54); like illusory water in a desert (YV. IV. 1.7); like an unsubstantial rainbow (YV. IV. 1. 23); like the appearance of a snake in a rope (YV. 100, 58); like an unreal city in the sky (YV. VIb. 190. 13); like a second moon in the vision of a diseased eye (YV. III. 66. 7); and like the movement of trees in the vision of an intoxicated fellow (YV. III. 8);” etc., etc.

In this connection, it will be interesting to note in the *Kārikās* as well as in the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* the connotation of the term *Māyā* which has played a very conspicuous part in the subsequent philosophy of India, and has very often been misunderstood both by the followers of *Māyāvāda* and its opponents; specially because Gauḍapāda is generally believed to be the father of *Māyāvādā* in Vedānta. The word *Māyā* occurs in some eight *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda: (II. 12; III. 19; 27, 28; IV. 58, 59, 61, 69). A careful consideration of the significance of the word will bring one to the conclusion that by Gauḍapāda *Māyā* is used in the sense of a peculiar power which enables its possessor to create some forms which do not exist in the sense of the really existent, yet give the appearance of their being so, and also enables him to multiply or change himself into any number of forms, without, however, himself undergoing the slightest

modification. The products of such power were characterised as *Māyā-maya* and sometimes as *māyā* even. An illustration of such a peculiar capacity was, in old times when people did not know well the secret of the so-called magic found in the activity of a magician. Śankara very often uses this illustration to make people understand *Māyā*. But a careful study of the stories of Lavana (YV. III) and Gadhi (YV. V Book) given by Vasiṣṭha in illustration of *Māyā* will convince us that *Māyā* is not like the power of a magician so much as like that of a Hypnotist, in the best possible sense, who by his thought-power can produce, and was able to produce in ancient India, before the vision of others, or even of himself, things and scenes which do not exist in reality, but appear to exist. *Māyā* is thus, according to Vasiṣṭha, a power or capacity, of the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, to think out or "conceive" forms which come to exist when thus thought out or imagined (YV. VIb. 70. 18). "It is the Creative Power of the Ultimate Reality and it can imagine the world-appearance as the thought-power of an ordinary man can build his world of imagination (YV. VIb. 78. 6). It is called by the names of Prakṛti, Divine Will, Creative Force, and the World *Māyā* (YV. VIb. 85. 14)."

So there is nothing very peculiar about the word *Māyā* which has been very much misunderstood in the later philosophy of India. The reason why it has been so misunderstood is perhaps the sense of illusoriness accompanying the word. If the conception of the real and the unreal of Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha stated above that 'all that has a beginning and an end is unreal' is accepted, it will be quite clear that except Consciousness which experiences the beginning and end of all objects everything is unreal, however long it may appear in the field of consciousness. In this sense all the products of *Māyā* are unreal, for they have a beginning and an end. The activity of the Divine Will itself having a beginning and an end is unreal. And Will has no meaning when not active; it, being merged in and became one with the Infinite and Absolute Consciousness then, is also called unreal both by Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha (K. IV. 58; YV. VIb. 82. 2, 3, 26, 27).

### III. Acosmism (Ajāta-vāda).

Just as *Kalpanā-vāda* paves a way for *māyā-vāda* so does the latter do for *ajāta-vāda* or acosmism. Acosmism is the doctrine which denies the existence of the world of plurality and change in and before the truly real. It shuns a compromise between real and unreal, being and non-being, perfection and imperfection, logic and life. It is rigorously logical, and pursues logic to its furthest flight, caring little for the consequences and ridicule from the man in the street, for the opinion of whom the Pragmatists care much. For it truth is truth and should not stand in need of respecting the so-called demands of life. Parmenides and Spinoza,

Vasiṣṭha, Gauḍapāda and Śankara have been the greatest acosmistic thinkers of the world.

In philosophy even, Acosmism is the least understood doctrine. It is often talked of only to be criticised and ridiculed, and seldom to be sympathetically understood. Yet Gauḍapāda asserts twice in his *Kārikās* (III. 48; IV. 71) that "It is the highest truth." So also does Vasiṣṭha say that "It is the most victorious doctrine of the Spiritual Science that in reality there is neither ignorance nor illusion but only Brahman resting peaceful in its own glory (YV. VIa. 125-1)."

We have no time here to go through all the arguments which Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha give in favour of Acosmism. We shall therefore be content only to notice a few points in this connection. It is not difficult to grasp the logic of Acosmism only if we raise our vision a little higher than the usual and be strictly logical apart from the consequences. Gauḍapāda names his view *Ajāta-vāda* (non-production) and argues for it thus: "That which is cannot be produced (for it is already there), and that which is not cannot also be produced (for it will be something coming out of nothing which is quite absurd) (K. IV. 5)." "It is inconceivable that the unborn and the immortal which ever exists can ever become mortal (IV. 6)," for as we have seen beginning and end imply unreality and the real is always real. Moreover, change is an illogical conception for it implies the transformation of a thing into something else. But how can anything change into what it is not? If it is something, it must ever remain what it is. "The real can never become unreal, for the one is and the other is not (K. IV. 79)."

These statements are not mere quibbles; behind them lies a great truth which must not be ignored. The Principle of Identity in formal logic requires in the judgment 'S is P' the presence of some identical X which persists unchanged both in S and P, to make the judgment possible. If we look deep into this problem, we shall discover that from the point of view of X there is neither S nor P for X always subsists as X unchanged in spite of its changes of form from another point of view. This is made clear by Vasiṣṭha through a number of illustrations. Think of a gold ornament, a bracelet or a ring. From our points of view bracelet and ring are realities for they, as bracelet and ring, have a peculiar value for us which mere gold has not. But if we look at them from the point of view of gold as such bracelet and ring have no existence in and for gold. Gold is gold and nothing other than itself. In the same way Brahman ever remains Brahman in itself and never experiences or undergoes change (YV. III. 11, 8, 33). Take another illustration. We say that water can be changed into several forms, solid, liquid and gaseous, etc. But if there is anything like water which can equally stand as the subject of all these forms, does it actually undergo any change in any one of those forms? If it did it will not be water everywhere water, therefore, exists as the immutable X behind all these forms quite untouched by the change. So is the Absolute Reality



untouched by any change of forms that we perceive, no matter if they appear to be real from our point of view; for our limited point of view itself is non-being from the point of view of the Absolute Reality (K. II. 32, YV. III. 42, 4; YV. III. 100, 39).

Both Vasiṣṭha and Gauḍapāda severely examine the category of Causality and the analogy of the seed and tree, and show in the interest of Acosmism that both are fictions in relation to the Absolute Reality. The conception of cause and effect, says Vasiṣṭha, can hold true of the forms where one form precedes the other, but that which underlies all forms and so does not proceed or follow anything, for it is present always and everywhere, cannot be related to any form as its cause or effect (YV. VIb. 96, 26; 28; VIb. 53, 17; etc., etc.). Even on the Sāṅkhya conception of causality which means the transformation of something into another. Brahman cannot be said to be the cause of the world-appearance, for, how can that which is transformed into something else be real, and how can that which admits even of partial change be called permanent (K. IV. II; YV. VIa., 49, 2-4, 8, 9).

As regards the 'Seed-and tree' analogy, that too cannot be applicable to Brahman and the world. For, Gauḍapāda says, "the illustration of seed-and tree being itself a part of what requires to be proved cannot be taken as a proving illustration (K. IV. 20). "How can that," argues Vasiṣṭha, "which is so subtle in its nature as to be even beyond mind, be the seed of the gross physical objects having visible forms, etc., etc. (YV. IV. 1, 21, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33)." A seed, moreover, cannot begin to germinate unless there are some external favourable circumstances to help germination, nothing like which is present in the Absolute Brahman (YV. VIb. 54, 21). Again, a seed ceases to be itself and perishes altogether in giving rise to a tree, but Brahman cannot be said to perish like this (YV. IV. 18, 24)." The only way therefore, if any, in which we can relate these forms to the reality is the analogy of dream (YV. VIb. 176, 5, VIb. 195, 44), although in reality they are as unreal as the son of a barren woman (K. III. 28). "They, in fact, neither exist apart from the perception of the particular consciousness of the experiencer, nor involve any change in the being of the reality (YV. III. 5, 6). Like their production the production of the world is false; like their growth the growth of this world is false; like their enjoyment the enjoyment of this world is false; like their destruction the destruction of the world is false (YV. III. 67, 73)."

Both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha thus conclude that from the highest point of view, i. e., in truth nothing is ever produced and that the truth of philosophy is *Ajāti-vāda* (K. IV. 3) or *Ajātu-vāda* (YV. III. 13, 4) which Vasiṣṭha enunciates thus: "There is nothing like the world in reality, not even in name; Brahman alone is real, and every thing is in reality Brahman (YV. IV. 40, 30; III. 4, 67)." This is the boldest truth ever declared by Philosophy, which will ever assert itself in spite of

the fact that much has been said against it and much can be said against it.

#### IV. The Method of Self-realisation (Yoga).

Philosophy in India has never been merely an intellectual pursuit: and truth was never meant only to be discovered and appreciated. Philosophy was to be lived and truth to be realised. "Having known the truth within and without," urges Gauḍapāda, "one should become the truth, should ever rest in it, and should be firm in it (K. II. 38)." Vasiṣṭha divides thinkers into two classes, namely, the wise (jñānī) and those to whom knowledge is a helping friend in the world, (jñāna-vandhu), and prefers the ignorant to the latter (YV. VIb. 21, 1). A wise man according to him is "one who having come to know the truth bring it into practice (YV. VIb. 22, 2)." This is why almost every system of Indian Philosophy devotes a portion of it to Yoga or the method of practical realisation of the truth discovered by the system. Let us now briefly find out the Yoga of Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha.

The truth according to both is the One Absolute Reality without a second by its side, resting in its own blissful essence without the slightest touch of change or multiplicity in it. It is the essence of myself as well as of the universe. This is the ideal before us as long as it is not a living experience with us. To be anything other than that is the bondage and suffering we are experiencing. But what is that which binds and limits us? Both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha think that it is the *mind* which by its conscurring activity creates limitation and bonds for us. It has the power to imagine any thing which it creates by its own power (K. II. 18-29 and YV. III. 91, 16; III. 60, 16). It imagines the world of change and multiplicity, and causes its own bondage and freedom. If the conscurring activity of the mind be somehow stopped, the whole trouble will be over (YV. IV. 4, 5). "The whole duality, of whatever form, is simply a creation of the mind, and it is never experienced when mind is naught (K. III. 31)." In the same way Vasiṣṭha says, "Mind is the nave of the wheel of the world-experience, and if it could be stopped from movement the whole trouble would be over (YV. V. 49, 40). If through intelligent effort the conscurring activity of the mind is stopped, the world-experience will vanish (YV. V. 50, 7), etc., etc."

Now how to bring the activity of the mind under control and stop it? In answer to this question Gauḍapāda tells us: "When mind ceases from imagining, by a knowledge of the truth of the Ātman, it remains at rest for want of things to cognise (K. III. 32)." Vasiṣṭha deals with the subject very thoroughly and gives us a very detailed scheme of mind control which we can review here in bare outlines only. According to him there are three chief methods of controlling the mind, any one or all of which might be practised. They are: I. *Brahma-bhāvanā*, i. e., imagining oneself to be identical with the Absolute Reality (YV. VIa. 69, 49,



52) with its negative accompaniment of *Abhāvabhāvanā*, i. e., imagining the non-existence of finite things (YV. III. 21, 7); II. *Prāṇa-spandana nirodha*, i. e., the control of the movement of the vital airs, which is said to be very intimately connected with the movement of the mind (YV. VIa. 78. 15, 16; V. 13, 83); III. *Vasanātyāga*, i. e., giving up all desires, for desire is said to be the motive power of the mind which comes to naught without desire (YV. VIa. 95. 5). There are also other minor methods suggested by Vasiṣṭha for the control of mind, a bare mention of which will not be out of place here. They are :— 1. Becoming convinced of the unreality of the mind itself (YV. IV. 11, 27); 2. Giving up imagining activity, i. e., samkalpa (V. 13, 20); 3. Having a disregard for the objects of enjoyment (IV. 35, 1); 4. Control of the senses (III. 144, 41); 5. Annihilation of the egoistic tendencies (VIa. 94, 13); 6. Attempt to realise cosmic consciousness (VIa. 128); 7. Practice of disinterestedness (Vib. 28, 23); 8. Realisation of equanimity in all states (V. 13, 21); 9. Giving up the sense of being an agent of actions (III. 95, 35); 10. Mental renunciation of everything (V. 58, 44); 11. Practice of always being merged in the idea of the Self (III. 1. 36); etc., etc.

These details need not confuse an aspirant. All these methods ultimately are only the so many optional, but at the root identical, ways of breaking the limitations that we have gathered around us and consequently have surrounded as with a false, yet hard to crack, shell of individuality, which acts as an obstruction to the flood of Divine Light and Bliss which are ever ours, but from which we have disinherited ourselves by being satisfied with the glow of smaller lights, which, however, we now and then discover, are not sufficient for the craving of our heart and for the satisfaction of our intellect both of which ever yearn for the Infinite.

This is in short what Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha teach us in common. There is no doubt that much can be said against this kind of philosophy, yet before we stand up to criticise them, it is our duty to understand them sympathetically and honestly, so that we may not in the haste of judging them add to the already existing lot of blunders.



## The Experience of Space, a metapsychologic and Psychoanalytic approach

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

### Introduction

The central point of this metapsychology is formed by the libidinous experience of space. Though the Freudian point of view that libido means love, has a dynamic aspect and is connected with lust, is not abandoned at all, these three facets of the psychoanalytical notion of libido do not explain its spatial character. Starting with the sexual experience one can discern three components. One is connected with a getting rid of an urge which otherwise becomes a source of tension and unlust. In the second component sexuality becomes a means of experiencing something together with a partner. This experience-together can aim at getting rid of an urge, at forming a family, some other such end.

One of these aims of experiencing-together can be the search for distinct feelings of love. Sexuality then becomes a way of expressing feelings. If these feelings are deep, the experience-together will certainly become an experience of space and this is the third component of sexual experience.

In my book *Prenatal Dynamics* ; chpt. XV, I have already pointed to this libidinous experience and I can quote this : "though the real orgasmic experience is rather rare" to be found in practice and even according to my impression it is rather rare "to be found in mankind—, the few data I have met suggest that this experience can be called an experience of space. In a typical form with a religious character I found it years ago in the case of a man who described his orgasmic experience as follows : "suddenly it was as if my consciousness became extremely clear. I cannot" say that "I" became so clear ; my "I" was watching and recording my clear consciousness. The "I" recorded that my consciousness was praying. At the same time my "I" recorded the physical orgasmus. My "I"