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
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THE PROBLEM OF THE UPANIṢADIC THEORY OF THE ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA OF GAUḌAPĀDA.

(DR. B. N. K. SHARMA, M.A., Ph. D., Ruparel College, Bombay)

It was in 1931, that I first raised this problem in the *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Poona. Since the publication of my papers on this subject (three in the *RPR* going into the evidence and two in the *Poona Orientalist*, in reply to my two critics between 1931-37), three learned works on Gauḍapāda have appeared. They are the 'Āgama Śāstra of Gauḍapāda' by Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya (1943), 'Gauḍapāda—A Study in Early Advaita' by Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan (1952) and 'Gauḍapāda Kārikā' edited by R. D. Karmarkar (1953). With the publication of these new works, the problem of the status of the Kārikās of the Āgama Prakaraṇa has come to be reopened. It is again a live issue.

The first two authors have recognised the importance of the problem and devoted some space in their works to an assessment of the evidence set forth by me for the first time, in anything like a comprehensive treatment of the issue. But the third one has curtly dismissed the entire problem.

Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Dr. Mahadevan have not let in any new evidence of their own on the subject. They have simply emphasised one point that Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi*, have attributed certain Kārikās from the Āgama Prakaraṇa to Gauḍapāda and that this quashes the evidence cited by me, of all the eminent Advaitins who came after these two, down to Upaniṣad Brahma Yogin and the evidence of the prominent writers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita schools also. They have also adopted the same position as my two former critics that works like the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and the *Viṣṇusahasranāma Bhāṣya*, attributed to Śaṅkara, from which also I had cited evidence in favor of the Upaniṣadic theory, are not the genuine works of Śaṅkara and cannot therefore be accepted as evidence on behalf of Śaṅkara the original.

The scope of the controversy has thus come to be narrowed down to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and the *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* of Sureśvara. If the supposed counter-evidence to the Upaniṣadic theory from these two works is satisfactorily explained and shown to be consistent with the Upaniṣadic theory, there could be no further impediment to its unreserved acceptance.

I shall, therefore, discuss here this main point and two others already raised by me regarding the structural and doctrinal difficulties involved in treating the Kārikās of the Āgama Prakaraṇa as a composition of Gauḍapāda.

Let us now turn to Śaṅkara's statement in his B.S.B. (II, 1, 9)

मायामात्रं ह्येतद्यत्परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासत्, रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिभावेन; इति अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्भिर्भाराचार्यैः—

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥ इति

It is the trump card of those who hold the AP. to be Gauḍapāda's own. It is curious, however, that none of my critics, old or new, should have paused to consider one very significant point about the verse: अनादिमायया सुप्तः quoted here and its interpretation according to Śaṅkara in his B.S.B. It is this that Rāmānuja, in his B.S.B. (i, 1, 1) should have cited the very same line (G.K.i, 16) as a *Śruti text and challenged Śaṅkara's interpretation of it* in terms of his *Brahmājñānavāda* and affirmed his own Theistic interpretation of it:

जीवस्यैव हि मायया निरोधः श्रूयते —

'तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः' (Śvet. Up. iv. 9) इति ।

'अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते' इति च ॥ (G.K.i, 16)

This point, if probed into more deeply, would give the clue to the solution of the problem of the AP.

It is accepted without demur both by Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Dr. Mahadevan that Rāmānuja accepts the text: अनादिमायया as a *Śruti*. Karmarkar, on the other hand, has chosen to observe a complete silence on Rāmānuja's citation of G.K.i, 16 as a *Śruti* and mentions Kūranārāyaṇa "a follower of Rāmānuja" and Madhva as the only sponsors of the Upaniṣadic theory. He has maintained an equally sphinx-like attitude to the fact of several of the Kārikās of the AP having been cited by many celebrated Advaitins who came after Rāmānuja and Madhva, as forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* Their evidence is surely entitled to some weight and cannot be dismissed as a "loose" use of the term *Śruti*! Anyway, to ignore them all, could hardly be regarded as conducive to a frank discussion of the problem.

The fact of both Śamkara and Rāmānuja citing the same passage: अनादिमायया सुप्तः and disagreeing on its interpretation, could hardly be justified unless both had accepted the same status for the text in question, as an authority binding on both equally. It would not be open to R. to question the interpretation that Ś. might choose to put on a Kārikā of G. Ś. would be perfectly within his rights in interpreting G. in any way consistent with the Advaita theory. R. would have no right to question such interpretation of his own Ācārya by Ś.

It could hardly be maintained that R. had no knowledge of Ś's B.S.B. or the terms in which Ś. had introduced अनादिमायया सुप्तः therein. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that R. had understood the terms in which Ś. had referred to the passage in question, as in any way involving the *necessary assumption* of G's authorship of it. In that case, he would have left it severely alone and confined his attention to the *Śvetāśvatara* verse alone, as a common text sufficient to prove his point. Had the view that अनादिमायया ... was not a Śruti but only a Kārikā of G., been known to or held within the school of Ś., in R's time, he would, before citing it, in his B.S.B. in support of his theistic theory of bondage, have certainly expressed his dissent to such a notion, clearly and strongly. And he would not, in the circumstances, have cited it taking it for granted that it was accepted as a Śruti on all hands, particularly, in the face of Ś's own (supposed) citation of it as a G. K. in his B.S.B.

Thus, the impropriety in R's challenging Ś's interpretation of "अनादिमायया सुप्तो" and putting forward, in its place, his own Theistic interpretation of that text as a Śruti, in the face of the latter's express statement ascribing it to G. and claiming that it embodies the Advaitin's pet-theory of Brahmājñānavāda, puts the whole problem in a new light.

It shows that in the eyes of R., there was nothing in the terms in which Ś. had introduced "अनादिमायया" which involved the *necessary assumption* of G's authorship of that verse. This is the crux of the problem. It is not possible to hold that R. had not read his Śamkarabhāṣya carefully! It is not possible also to hold that the Kārikās of the AP suddenly attained the status of Śruti just after Ś. and immediately before R. In any event, it could not certainly have been to the interests of R. or his Viśiṣṭādvaitin predecessors to have raised such Kārikās as मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः (i, 17 cd), to spurious eminence as Śruti and got into needless difficulty in having to reinterpret them theistically. This should dispose of the facile supposition of scholars like Dr. Mahadevan that "the earliest to advo-

cate the view which includes the twenty-nine Kārikās in the Up., could not have been Advaitins" (op. cit. p. 44).

As a matter of fact, notwithstanding Ś's supposed ascription of i, 16 (and others) to G., many celebrated Advaitins like Vimuktātman, Anandagiri, Advaitānanda, Sāyaṇa and Appayya Dikṣita have actually cited some of them as Śrutis and as forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*, and Sureśvara himself, in his *Bṛhadvārtika*, has cited one of them as "वेदान्तोक्ति". There is a good deal of difference between courtesy-references to works accepted by all as authorities, such as the *Gītā*, as an "Upaniṣad" or the *Mahābhārata* as a "Veda" and the specific quotation of texts as Śrutis for purposes of settling "Śāstrārtha", in authoritative commentaries. The two are not on a par. We have therefore to wonder very much, if it is not the modern scholars like Bhattacharya, Mahadevan, Karmarkar, and others who have really "missed their bus" and misunderstood Ś. and his followers, about the true position of the Kārikās of the AP.

Leaving aside the views of R. and Madhva and their followers on this question, it cannot be gainsaid that the evidence for the acceptance of the Upaniṣadic theory, set forth by me from the works of eminent Advaitins like Advaitānanda and Appayya Dikṣita, is overwhelmingly in favour of the Upaniṣadic theory. As against this, the only instances of supposed acceptance of G's authorship of the AP are in the citations from Ś's B.S.B. on ii, 1, 9 and in Sureśvara's NS. How could it be supposed that such distinguished followers of Ś. and S., as Vimuktātman, Advaitānanda, Anandagiri and Appayya Dikṣita, had not the capacity to understand or remember the position of their original Ācārya, with regard to the status of the Kārikās in question and joined hands with R. and M. in regarding them as "Śrutis" of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* and in a "loose sense"? These were not third-rate writers who were अज्ञप्रदायक or persons ignorant of the "recognised view of Advaitins regarding the AP".¹ In the face of this uniform testimony of so many of these leading writers of the Ś. school, how could it be maintained that the view that the Kārikās of the AP being the compositions of G. is "the recognised view of the Advaitins"? What is the good of calling it a "recognised view", when it is not recognised by the majority of eminent Advaitins (or by any one) in point of fact? Did these leading lights of the Advaita Sampradāya attach so little importance to Ś's own words and indulge in "loose" thinking of their own?

All this will not do. We have, therefore, to admit frankly that the passage from Ś's B.S.B., should be construed properly so as not to militate against the accepted tradition of Advaitins recognis-

1. Dr. Mahadevan, Op. cit., p. 31.

ing the Kārikās of the AP as “revealed” to G. by Nārāyaṇa.² This tradition is itself a clear admission of the fact that they were *not* regarded as the actual composition of G. Ānandagiri, in his gloss on the AP clearly refers to this tradition and makes a clear-cut distinction between the two groups of Kārikās figuring in G’s work,—one explanatory of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* (माण्डूक्योपनिषदर्थविष्करणपरान्) which G. “received” (प्रतिपन्नान्) from Nārāyaṇa thro’ His grace (नारायण-प्रसादतः) and (अपि) another group of ślokaś (श्लोकान्) (comprising Prakaraṇas ii-iv) composed by him (आचार्यप्रणीतान्). This tradition is corroborated by Upaniṣad Brahma Yogin, another celebrated Advaitic commentator on the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* and the Kārikās,³ as pointed out by me, long ago. In the face of this clear and pointed statement of Ānandagiri, Dr. Mahadevan’s plea that Ā.’s words “only mean that the entire work consisting of ślokaś, was written by G. thro’ the Lord’s grace” (op. cit. p. 39) could not be accepted by any Sanskrit scholar, as a correct or faithful interpretation of Ā.’s words. The terms “प्रतिपन्न” and “प्रणीत” can by no stretch of the imagination be deemed synonymous. They are clearly distinguished and the conjunction “अपि” in the sense of “समुच्चय” clearly shows the composite nature of the work. Had Ā. wanted to support Dr. Mahadevan’s view, he would have written: श्रीगौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रणीतान्माण्डूक्योपनिषदर्थ-विष्करणपरानन्यानपि श्लोकान् व्याचिरूयासुः × × × × × × × × without beating about the bush. But the fact remains that he has taken special pains to distinguish between two groups of verses in the body of G.’s work, one “received” (directly) from Nārāyaṇa and another “composed” by G. This is plain as a pike staff and there is no need for Dr. Mahadevan, therefore, to distinguish this Ā. from the glossator on the *Bṛhadvārtika*, who is expressly in favor of the Upaniṣadic theory. So long as it is tacitly admitted that G. is *not* the “author” of the AP, it matters little whether its source is Nārāyaṇa (as Advaita tradition claims) or Brahmadeva (as Kūra-nārāyaṇa and Madhva say).

The view that the AP was a part of G’s work might have gained currency on account of formal similarity and other considerations such as its having the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* as its basis and being studied side by side with the rest of G’s work, in Advaitic circles. But, we should not forget that there is no sanction for this idea in the writings of leading Advaitins. Karmarkar’s contention that in several mss. of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*, only Mantras (prose) are given and not also the 29 Kārikās “as is clear from the Nirṇayasagar Edn. of the *Up.*”, proves nothing more than that the Mss. used were of a particular school in which the theory of G’s authorship had

2. Ed. Adyar Library, Madras.

3. Cf. Karmarkar, p. 11.

already gained some currency. Mss. of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* preserved in the other schools would show a different state of affairs. But we cannot accept his contention that “it is only the commentators on the *Up.* and the Kārikās together, who seem to regard the two as forming part of one complete whole”. The evidence of eminent writers like Vimuktātman, Advaitānanda, and Appayya Dikṣita who had not actually commented on the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*, shows that the Mss. of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* known to them should have contained the AP also as part of the *Up.* R. did not comment on the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* Nevertheless, he must have found the verse अनादिमायया in the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* used by him, as there were no printed editions of the Nirṇayasagar Press, in his days!

EVIDENCE FROM Ś’s B.S.B. EXAMINED

Examining the passage from Ś’s B.S.B. मायामात्रं ह्येतत्, यत् परमात्मनोज्वल्यथात्मनावभासनं रज्ज्वा इव सर्वादिभावेनेत्यत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्भिर्नाराचार्यैः—

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥ इति ॥

we find the first sentence ending with an “इति”. There is another “इति” at the end of the passage quoted as authority for the view expressed in the first sentence. These show that the two sentences are to be read in unison. The proposition मायामात्रं ह्येतत् यत् परमात्मनोज्वल्यथात्मनावभासनं रज्ज्वा इव सर्वादिभावेनेति is to be viewed as a logical deduction from G’s interpretation of the true Vedantic tradition embodied in the text अनादिमायया सुप्तः and expounded by him in his own work based on it. The words मायामात्रं ह्येतत् यत् परमात्मनो..... भावेनेति represent G’s thesis and Ś. is trying to show that this thesis is not just a fanciful idea of G. but a reasoned view, deduced from sound textual authority of अनादिमायया which G. as a “knower of the correct tradition of Vedāntic interpretation” (वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्) has faithfully brought out in his exposition of the subject based on the said verse. It would be clear from the “इति” at the end of Ś’s words भावेनेति that he is attributing that opinion to G. and is not taking the sole responsibility for it on himself. He does not also stop with the mere assertion मायामात्रं ह्येतत् यत् परमात्मनो xxx भावेनेति but backs it with a citation अनादिमायया. This citation and the “इति” added to it to mark the close of the quotation, point clearly to the very same doctrine which G. has propounded for the first time in the history of the Advaita school with the telling analogy of the snake in the rope, which has become its stock-in-trade, since:

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता ।

सर्पधारादिभिर्भाविः तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥

(G.K. ii, 17).

Ś's "सर्पादिभावेन" is a direct reference to G's

सर्पधारादिभिर्भाविः (ii, 17)

Now, the text: अनादिमायया cited in this connection (1) embodies no such analogy and (2) it does not say explicitly that the Paramātmā illusorily becomes subject to the three states. On the contrary, it speaks of the "Jīva" as being subjected to the three states of experience by Māyā,⁴ in the first half and in the second half it says that when the Jīva wakes up from this magic spell, he realises the Advaita (Supreme) who is *not* subject to birth, dream and sleep.

Ś's interpretation apart, it will have to be conceded that this verse as it stands worded, has no support to give to the theory of Brahmājñānavāda that is sought to be read into it by him (and by G). The contrast between the Jīva and Advaita (Brahman) drawn in the two halves of the verse, is quite glaring. It is only by a forced and far-fetched interpretation of it that it could be made to support the doctrines of जीवब्रह्मेक्य and ब्रह्मज्ञानवाद. The natural sense of the verse is decidedly in favour of a Theistic interpretation, such as has been given by R. and M.

Neither the thesis of Brahmājñānavāda nor the illustration of रज्जुमर्ष is thus to be found in the verse अनादिमायया as it stands. These are found elsewhere in G's interpretation or exposition of the teaching of this and other verses of the AP., in his Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. Ś. should therefore be taken to refer to such an interpretation of this verse by G. in ii, 17 ff, in support of Brahmājñānavāda. That is why he uses the epithet वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायवित् to G. here, instead of merely saying: तदुक्तं गोडपादाचार्यैः to emphasise the point that G's interpretation of this Vedāntic text (अनादिमायया) in terms of Brahmājñānavāda: मायामात्रं ह्येतत्परमात्मनोज्ज्वलायात्मनावभासनम् is unimpeachable as he knows the correct tradition of interpreting the Upaniṣads,⁵ and ergo, his interpretation of the present Upaniṣadic passage: अनादिमायया in terms of Brahmājñānavāda (in ii, 17 ff.,) should be implicitly accepted.

This would show that the significance of Ś's words introducing अनादिमायया सुतः is *not* that the verse is G's own, but that its inter-

4. The idea of i, 16 may be compared with = पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततः तेनामृतत्वमेति (Śvet. Up. i. 6).

5. Ś. uses "Vedānta" as equivalent to "Upaniṣads". See B.S.B. iii, 3.1.

pretation, according to the line of thought embodied in G.K. ii, 17 ff., is to be accepted as the correct Vedāntic view, on the point at issue. This takes the wind out of the sails of those who would stake their all on this reference in Ś's B.S.B. for establishing G's authorship of the AP. The actual wording of this verse and the difficulty created by R's reference to it as a Śruti and the "इति" at the end of the first sentence in Ś's bhāṣya, all point to the fact that the passage from Ś's B.S.B. does not necessarily establish G's authorship of "अनादिमायया सुतः ।"

THE IDENTIFICATION OF ĀPTAKAMA-ŚRUTI

This conclusion is supported by another reference in Ś's B.S.B. on ii, 1, 33, where he makes a reference to the आप्तकामश्रुति on the strength of which he repudiates the suggestion that any motive or purpose could be ascribed to God's creation of the world. He upholds the Sūtrakāra's view that creation is just a sportive overflow of divine nature.

The question is which is the आप्तकामश्रुति meant here? The passage: देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा from the AP fits in most appropriately with the context. I have already made it clear, in my reply to my two earlier critics, that there is no other Upaniṣadic passage which satisfies the contextual requirement and propriety. The context in B.S. ii, 1, 33, is that of creation by Īvara (सृष्टिचिन्ता as in G.K. i. 6-9). The two other Śrutis referred to by Ś. in the same connection: सृष्टिश्रुति and सर्वज्ञश्रुति have also reference to the same topic of Creation by God:

'स इदं सर्वमसृजत'

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ।

तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नामरूपमन्नं च जायते ॥'

Consistency requires that the आप्तकामश्रुति also should be one that is intimately and expressly connected with the creation of the world by Īvara. And there is no other text save देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा? of the AP that satisfies this requirement. It must therefore be admitted that Ś. recognised the Kārikā G. K. i, 9 as a Śruti, on a par with the other two. It can hardly be that he too had fallen a prey to the uncritical practice of using the word "Śruti loosely", in a broad sense and nothing more.⁶ In the latter case, it would be a poor compliment to Ś. from his own followers. Ś's reference to Āptakāma-Śruti, therefore, conclusively shows that "so far as we can trace" he was himself "the earliest" to advocate the "the view which includes the twenty-nine Kārikās in the Māṇḍūkya

6. Karmarkar, op. cit. XXX.

Up.”⁷ There seems thus to be no one left among Advaitins from Ś. down to Upaniṣad Brahma Yogin who did not, in reality, recognise the AP. Kārikās as Śruti.⁸

This is, no doubt, an unpalatable conclusion to Dr. Mahadevan and others who mistakenly believe that the Upaniṣadic theory of the AP. is a wrong and untraditional view. It is not therefore surprising that they should have tried to get out of the tight corner in which they find themselves placed by Ś’s reference to G.K. i, 9 as the Śruti which lays down that Īśvara is Āptakāma. They have naturally tried to establish that it is not G.K. i, 9 that is meant, but some other well-known Śruti text. They hold that it is *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iv, 3, 21, in which the term “Āptakāma” occurs, that is actually meant by Ś. I have already shown in my reply to my earlier critics that it would be impossible to identify the Āptakāma Śruti with *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iv, 3, 21 or any other in that Up., for the simple reason that *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 21, has nothing to do with the subject-matter of creation of the world. It relates to the nature of the individual soul which has attained spiritual realisation and is exempted from *Utkrānti* (iv, 4, 6). The Upaniṣadic passage describes this soul and eulogises it as having realised its life’s purpose (आप्तकाम), self-centred (आत्मकाम) and hence exempt from *Utkrānti* involving transmigration. There is nothing in this passage to connect it with the सृष्टिप्रकरण in which Ś’s bhāṣya cites an आप्तकामश्रुति establishing that God as आप्तकाम cannot be conceived as having any motive or purpose in engaging in the creation of the world. It is pure sophistry to bring in the plea of the identity of Ātman and Brahman to bolster up the identification of the आप्तकामश्रुति cited by Ś in ii, 1, 33 with *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iv, 3, 21 which is a description of the enlightened soul. Creation, according to Advaitic theory, falls within the jurisdiction of Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman, whereas the enlightened soul, exempt from *utkrānti*, merges in the Absolute (Nirguṇa). In any case, there is no merger or identification of the enlightened self with the Creator God (Īśvara) according to strict Advaita theory. The whole thing is thus nothing more than a special pleading of misplaced ingenuity. No unprejudiced scholar can therefore accept the proposed identification of the आप्तकामश्रुति cited by Ś. under B.S. ii, 1, 33, with *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iv, 3, 21.

That the actual reference is to G.K. i, 9 and to no other passage is further corroborated by the interesting side-light thrown in this connection by no less a person than Appayya Dikṣita. In his gloss

7. Dr. Mahadevan, *op. cit.*, p.

8. Cf. सार्थादिपि तस्करा बहवः !

on the very same Sūtra (ii, 1, 33), the Dikṣita himself raises a question whether there is any inherent contradiction between the view of creation as a sport of God (क्रीडापक्ष) adopted by the *Svetāśvatara Up.* (vi, 1) and that of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* viz. देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयम् (G.K. i, 9) which regards Creation as an expression of the ‘nature’ of God. Appayya quotes both the passages (from the *Svetāśvatara Up.* and the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*). The passage quoted from “the *Māṇḍūkya Up.*” is no other than: देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा (G.K. i, 9). He discusses the point raised by him and shows that there is no essential contradiction between the views of the two Śrutis, in connection with the problem of creation of the world by God.⁹ This clear evidence from the *Parimala* of Appayya Dikṣita should suffice to convince all doubting Thomases that all accredited commentators on Ś’s B.S.B. under ii, 1, 33, have taken their stand on texts pertaining to the subject-matter of creation by God, such as those from the *Svetāśvatara Up.*, *Māṇḍūkya Up.* and so on and not at all upon texts like *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iv, 3, 21, which are not even remotely connected with the theme of Creation of the world. Hence, it would be doing gross violence to the authentic interpretational traditions of Ś’s Bhāṣyapraśāna, to look for the आप्तकामश्रुति outside G.K. i, 9, which has been pointedly cited by Appayya himself in focussing the issue of the motive behind creation. Appayya Dikṣita was a ruthless critic of Madhva who would miss no vulnerable point for criticism in the latter. That such a sworn critic of M. should himself have agreed with him in citing G.K. i, 9, as a Śruti of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* under B.S. ii, 1, 33, should suffice to establish that such a veteran Advaitin as he found nothing inconsistent with the tradition of his school in recognising the Kārikās of the AP as *Māṇḍūkya Up.* proper (as did R. and M.) and saw no palpable contradiction in so doing with the terms in which Ś. in his B.S.B. ii, 1, 9, had quoted one of the Kārikās of the AP. This makes it utterly improbable that G’s authorship of the AP was “the recognised view of Advaitins”.

THE EVIDENCE OF SUREŚVARA

There remains only Sureśvara’s reference to two Kārikās from the AP (and one from Ś’s *Upadeśasāhasrī*) followed by the remark: एवं गोडैर्दाविडैः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः ॥ in his NS on which my critics

9. क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥ इति माण्डूक्योपनिषदि तात्कालिकानन्दप्रयोजन-लीलात्वमेव ‘क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्य’ इत्यनेनाभिमतं प्रदर्शितं; न तु हासगानादितुल्यप्रयोजनोद्देशरहितं लीलात्वम् । ‘स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथा’न्ये परिमुह्यमानाः । देवस्यैव महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मवक्त्रम् ॥ इति श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि सृष्टेः सृज्य-वस्तुस्वभावतैवानभिमतत्वेन प्रदर्शिता न तु सृष्टस्वभावता । अतो लीलास्वभावपक्षयोर्न श्रुतिविरोधः (Appayya, *Parimala*, B.S. II, 1.33.)

have relied, to discredit the Upaniṣadic theory of the AP. But here again, it is the appearance that is misleading. There are some significant points in the manner of citation, here also, which have either been overlooked by the critics or have not been properly understood by them. The passage from S. runs:

अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम् —

कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विद्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्यो न सिद्धयतः ।
अन्यथागृह्यतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।
विषयसि तयोः क्षीणं तुरीयं पदमश्नुते ॥

तथा भगवत्पादीयमुदाहरणम् —

सुषुप्ताख्यं तमोज्ञानं बीजं स्वप्नावबोधयोः ।
आत्मबोधप्रदग्धं स्यात् बीजं दग्धं यथाभवम् ।
एवं गोडैर्द्राविडैर्नः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः
अज्ञानमात्रोपाधिः सन् अहमादिदुर्गीश्वरः ॥

(ii, 44).

Now, if एवं गोडैर्द्राविडैर्नः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः has been intended to refer to the same sources from which the two sets of verses had been cited before, the initial statement of introduction: अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम् and तथा भगवत्पादीयमुदाहरणम् would both be unnecessary and redundant. It is doubtful if an expression like प्रभाषितः could legitimately be applied to a minor work like the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*. There is greater probability that the reference in द्रविडैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः is to the B.S.B. of the Bhagavatpāda (§) or to a Bhāṣya of his on one of the Upaniṣads. That the term “अयमर्थः in एवं गोडैः has reference to what follows rather than what has gone before, is clear from the second half:

अज्ञानमात्रोपाधिः सन् अहमादिदुर्गीश्वरः ।

It is therefore decidedly better to take:

एवं गोडैर्द्राविडैर्नः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः ॥

as referring to some new sources other than those previously mentioned. In other words, the works cited earlier could not be the same as those now referred to under: गोडैर्द्राविडैः प्रभाषितः. It would not necessarily follow, either, that a work of G. had been quoted before. For, in the case of Ś. there is clear indication that he has been quoted earlier: तथा भगवत्पादीयमुदाहरणम् which refers to him under the title of भगवत्पाद. But the verses: कार्यकारणबद्धौ etc. have not been introduced with any such specific attribute. They are simply a quotation for giving “weighty support” to the doctrine already established by the author: अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम् and their author is not mentioned; because, the quotation is not obvi-

ously, from a human author but from a Scriptural source! This is the correct and proper inference to be arrived at from the following considerations. (1) There is no reason why S. should not have named G. as the author of the two verses in question, if he had really believed them to be his, just as he has frankly and expressly mentioned the Bhagavatpāda as the author of the other verse cited. Why this nebulousness surrounding the first *udāharaṇam*? (2) Apart from the glaring omission of the name of the author in the first case, (for which no convincing reason could be given, on the assumption of G's authorship of them), the mode of reference also, differs in the two cases: अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने and तथा उदाहरणम्.

This shows that the purpose of the उदाहरण is also different in the two cases, one for “giving weight to the doctrine” in question, and the other, just a reference from a work of the Bhagavatpāda. This does not mean any disrespect to the Bhagavatpāda. As one well acquainted with the शास्त्रमर्यादा, S. does his business correctly, meticulously. He has discussed and established a particular doctrine. It requires sanction or binding force of authority, to be admitted by all. Such authority could vest only in the words of Scripture and not in the words of a human author, however eminent and authoritative he might be considered to be in the estimation of his own school. Once such superhuman authority and sanction has been shown to exist in respect of the doctrine, other and lesser authorities from the writings of other respected individuals could be cited for driving home the point. But, in the first instance, the seal of a self-sufficient authority must be set upon the doctrine. Such an authority would undoubtedly be a Scriptural passage, in the first place, according to Vaidika tradition. Hence, S's quotation in the first place from an impersonal source: अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम्. Nothing could have stood in the way of his naming G. as the author of the verses he was quoting if they had been really his—just as he had named the author of the subsequent passage. Why had he not done so? Surely, it could not have been because he dared not mention G. by name on account of excessive regard. In fact, he has named G. in his *Brhadvārtika*: स्फुटार्थं गोडपादीयं वचोऽयं नैव गीयते ।

The only sensible inference from this fact would be that S. did not regard them as of human authorship. I have made it clear that the line: एवं गोडैर्द्राविडैः could not be taken to refer to the verses going before. Hence, एवं गोडैः therein could not be connected backwardly with the first citation. The matter of the two citations having been closed, by the very terms of the reference under which they had been separately introduced (अस्यार्थस्य द्रढिम्ने उदाहरणम् । तथा भगवत्पादीयमुदाहरणम् ॥) no second reference to them, over again, in metrical

form, could be called for. Hence एवं गौडद्रादिभिः should be taken to refer to a fresh idea: that the doctrine (अयमर्थः) under notice¹⁰ has also been expounded by G and Ś. in their *magnum opus* (viz. Kārikā ii-iv and B.S.B.). There is, thus, nothing prejudicial to the acceptance of the Upaniṣadic theory of the AP in the passage from the NS. This obviates the necessity to explain away S's explicit reference to certain Kārikās of the AP in his *Bṛhadvārtika* as वेदान्तोक्ति and आगमशासनम् as "loose" references.

ii

The Kārikās of the AP are arranged in four groups at the end of Mantras 6, 7, 11 and 12 and introduced every time with the words: अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति. This sort of introduction bears a family resemblance to the practice followed in other Upaniṣads also. Hence, it would appear to be a legitimate ground for taking the verses so introduced to be earlier or contemporary ones, cited by the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* itself. But, on the assumption of G's authorship of them, it is difficult to see any justification for any such introduction at all, irrespective of whether the AP is the usual type of commentary explaining the original or a "rearranged exposition of the concepts of the Upaniṣad, in a more logical manner".¹¹ Even supposing that G "expounded" the teaching of the Upaniṣad "dividing the text into four convenient sections," (Op. cit. p. 42), there is still no necessity for him to have used so "docile and timid" a phrase as अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति when, he could as well have started the exposition straightway. As the prose passages of the original and his own metrical exposition would stand clearly distinguished in form, there would be no fear or possibility of any confusion between the original and the exposition. Dr. Mahadevan and Karmarkar argue that such an introductory phrase is to be found in works of human authors also. What if? The contention is not that such phrases are not to be found in works other than Upaniṣads; but that verses so quoted are normally from other sources and not those of the authors themselves, unless otherwise stated. The analogy of Kauṭilya *Arthaśāstra* etc., is clearly misleading. Even supposing that the verses quoted in these works under the caption अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति are their own compositions, there would be unity of authorship between the original text and the interspersed verses. But the position here, is different. Unless G. is held to be the author of the prose passages of the Upaniṣad also, it would not have been proper for him to have introduced his own verses with a mere अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति. He should clearly have stated that he was going to write an exposition

10. viz.: अज्ञानमात्रोपाधिः सन्नहमादिदृशीश्वरः ।

11. Dr. Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 49.

of the Vedānta, starting with an exposition of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* Surely, one who feels bound to pay respects to his teacher (?) at the beginning of the IV chapter in two verses, could as well have been more communicative, in the beginning also.

The AP may not be "the usual type of commentary explaining the words of the original". But there is no commentary of the usual or unusual type which is known to begin its "exposition" of a given original or a more or less independent one, with a mere अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति. Such a phrase could come with propriety from the author of the prose passages themselves; but not from a commentator or expositor, for the very simple reason that it is not the recognised way of beginning a commentary or an exposition, particularly so learned and weighty a one as we have from G. In any case, there would be no need for such a tame and pointless statement, which looks so funny and insignificant by the side of such an erudite performance that follows.

iii

In discussing the status of the Kārikās of the AP., I had drawn attention to certain doctrinal inconsistencies and misfits which render the hypothesis of G's authorship of them, untenable. Dr. Mahadevan has tried to meet these objections. Other critics of the Upaniṣadic theory have completely ignored this point. It is, nevertheless, a very important test in deciding the issue and cannot therefore be lightly dismissed. I shall, therefore, examine Dr. Mahadevan's arguments in defence of G's authorship and notice some new points which have been brought up in this connection, including certain arguments and novel interpretations of some kārīkās, attempted by Karmarkar, in his edition.

The general impression among modern scholars that the kārīkās of the AP are the composition of G. seems to rest on circumstantial evidences such as that of (1) the formal resemblance between the Kārikās of the AP and those of the other three; (2) the apparent Advaitic tenor of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* and the AP and (3) the misconstruction of the two citations from the AP made in Ś's B.S.B. and in S's NS. These have clouded their judgment to such an extent that they have failed to see the absurdity and the irony of their claiming to know the mind of Ś and his Sampradāya on this point better than the accredited leaders and interpreters of the Advaita school who came after Ś and S and whose testimony has been decidedly and predominantly in favor of the Upaniṣadic theory. Similarly, Dr. Chandradhar Sharma's contention that "there is no

reason why we should believe M as against Ś and S"¹² fails entirely to take note of the fact that the view of M. is shared by R and has been accepted by many eminent Advaitins themselves like Advaitānanda and Appayya Dikṣita, who were, by no means, friendly to M and his views!

The correspondence in form between the verses of the AP and the other three Prakaraṇas is not, by itself, a proof of their unity of authorship. G. was an expert versifier. He could compose exquisite Kārikās *à la* Nāgārjuna. He has imitated the metre and rhythm of the AP. so well that some have been misled into taking the entire work including the AP as his own composition.

We should, therefore, rely upon (1) the mutual consistency of thought between the Upaniṣadic text on the one hand and the AP viewed as a composition of G and (2) the inner consistency of thought of the AP with the principles and doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, in the light of the arguments and wording of the Kārikās themselves, as they stand, to decide the issue.

The *Māṇḍūkya Up.* is taken to be the operational base of G's philosophical flights. It is assumed that this Upaniṣad contains key passages of Non-dualism and Acosmism and an analysis of the triple streams of experience of the ātman, in order to prove the illusoriness of these changing states and the ultimacy of the Turiya.

We might therefore examine the Upaniṣadic text and the Kārikās of the AP as they stand, irrespective of how they have been interpreted by the Advaita school. This would apply to the rival interpretations of R. and M. also.

The fact that both Ś. and R. have quoted the same Kārikā (i, 16) in their B.S.B. and disagreed about its interpretation and philosophical significance, must open our eyes to one inescapable fact that these Kārikās should have been the common property of Advaitins, Dvaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins, as *Śruti*. There are scores of 'monistic' texts and contexts, in the Upaniṣads, which are similarly the common property of all these philosophers and over whose interpretation the great system-builders have differed. One more Upaniṣad like the *Māṇḍūkya* and even some twenty-nine Kārikās added to it, would not tilt the balance in favor of any one or bring down the skies over the heads of Indologists.

The Advaitic tradition would be at liberty to interpret the Śrutis in its own way. In the present case, its interpretation of

12. *Dialectic in Buddhism and Advaita*, p. 119.

the Kārikās as *Śruti* may be right or wrong, consistent or not with the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* That is neither here nor there.

But once the Kārikās of the AP are held to be *not* *Śruti* but the composition of G. the problem would assume a different complexion. It would then become incumbent upon those who hold such a view, to show that as the work of a renowned Advaitin of great logical penetration and insight into Tarkasāstra, these Kārikās contain nothing that is inconsistent with or damaging to Advaitic thought and principles. This would be the acid test of the problem. The theory of G's authorship of the AP would thus stand or fall by that test.

iv

The case for the Theistic interpretation of the Upaniṣad and the AP. indeed, deserves as much attention as the Monistic one. Karmarkar has sought to summarily dismiss the theistic interpretation of the Up. and the AP given by Kūranārāyaṇa and M., without even going into their details. His *reasons* are: "Kūranārāyaṇa tries his best to show that Hari with his four forms, is the object of Upāsanā described in the I Prakaraṇa. Madhva also follows the same line. It is *unnecessary* to take the interpretations of K. and M. *seriously*" (*Op. cit.* p. 70) [*Italics mine*]! But, *why* not? I have already drawn attention to R's theistic interpretation of G.K. i, 16 as *Śruti*, which Karmarkar, quite comfortably, wants to forget and wants others also to forget! R's reference to and interpretation of this text raises a most interesting and important problem regarding the possibility and probability of a comprehensive Theistic interpretation of the entire *Māṇḍūkya Up.* and the AP. It is from the general standpoint of the Theistic tradition of Upaniṣadic interpretation, which is *not foreign to the Aupaniṣada tradition*,¹³ that this question has to be viewed. It cannot, therefore, be so curtly or contemptuously dismissed, as Karmarkar thinks it could be.

We may therefore go into this aspect a little closely. There is no need to feel upset at the mention of "Hari" and his "four forms", in this connection. The real point of the Theistic interpretation of R. and M. is that the Brahman (called 'Hari'—which is after all a name of the Supreme Being) is the ultimate subject-matter of Upaniṣadic philosophy.¹⁴ The whole of this cosmos and cosmic life is the operational field of the Brahman.¹⁵ The cosmos represents but a fraction, अंश, or पद of the Brahman.¹⁶

13. Keith, *Rel. and Phil. of the Vedas*, p. 595.

14. B.S. i, 1, 3-4.

15. *Gītā*, xiii, 2.

16. Cf. पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि (Chān. up. iii, 12, 5). *Gītā*, x, 42. B.S. i, 1, 26.

The *Māṇḍūkya Up.* itself begins with the declaration that this Ātman has four aspects. It is too late in the day to dispute the position that the term Ātman is used in the Upaniṣads in the highest sense of the Brahman (See Ś. B.S.B. युष्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात्—i, 3, 1).¹⁷ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* clearly endorses this highest signification and usage of the term Ātman as applied to the “Antaryāmi” in the self (*ātmā*) as well as in the cosmos. The whole of the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* is, in fact, the most conclusive proof of the claim of Theistic commentators on the Upaniṣads that the highest truth of the Vedānta is the knowledge of the Antaryāmi and His realisation. The individual self popularly known as ātman, is clearly distinguished from the genuine Ātman who is the Antaryāmi of the *ātmans* themselves, in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* iii, 7, 22. This is the corner-stone of theistic philosophy in the Upaniṣads.

Consistent then, with this position that the Upaniṣads are concerned with the realisation of the Antaryāmi-Brahman by the individual ātman or transmigrating self, it would not be difficult to show that the meditation on Om as a means of such realisation could very properly be connected with the Antaryāmin rather than with the transmigrating ātman implicated in the three states of experience and without making this experience itself unreal. As the four “pādas” of the Ātman (Antaryāmi) are correlated to the four parts of “OM” (three *mātrās* and the *nāda* aspect of Om) it would naturally mean that the four pādas represent the four aspects of the Antaryāmi controlling the four states of experience (of the self). The Upaniṣad dwells on the three states (*sthānas*) not as mere experiences of the ego but as experiences taking place under the direct and immediate control of the Antaryāmi. This certainly conduces to the “Upāsanā” of OM underlying the thesis of Brahman to be meditated upon as चतुष्पात्.

That this must have been the original significance of this symbolism of the चतुष्पात् of Brahman, is clearly revealed by certain significant contexts in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* and elsewhere, describing (esoterically) the dream and *Suṣupti* states of the individual (शरीर आत्मा), as taking place under the complete control of the Inner Ruler (Antaryāmi):

17. आत्मशब्दश्च परमात्मपरिग्रहे सम्यगवकल्पते, नार्थान्तरपरिग्रहे ॥ (ŚBSB. 1.3.1) एष तेऽत्मान्तर्ग्रह्यमृतः इति च आत्मत्वामृतत्वे मुख्ये परमात्मन उपपद्यते ॥ (BSB 1, 2, 18).

स्वप्नेन शरीरमभिप्रहृत्यामुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ।
शुक्रमादाय पुनरेति स्थानं हिरण्यमयः पुरुष एक हंसः ॥

(Brh. Up. iv, 3, 11).

तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्
एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्

(Brh. Up. iv, 3, 21).

तद्यथाज्ञः सुसमाहितमृत्सर्जयायात्, एवमेवायं शरीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वाहृद उत्सर्जन् याति (iv, 3, 35).

Here is striking evidence of the authentic use of the term “prājña” in the genuine Upaniṣadic tradition, in the sense of the Antaryāmi alone, as distinguished from the transmigrating self (शरीर आत्मा),¹⁸ that is subject to limitations of *Svapna*, *Nidrā* etc. or ‘वोजनिशायुत’. The B. S. सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन (i, 3, 42) clinches the matter in favour of Theism that in both *Suṣupti* and *utkrānti*, the शरीर आत्मा stands sharply distinguished from the प्राज्ञः, *Paramātmā* (Antaryāmi). Śaṅkara himself, in his commentary on this Sūtra, admits that the Jiva and *Prājña* are distinct and different in *Suṣupti* and *Utkrānti*. This shows that the two must be different beings and not one and the same or even ‘aspects’ of the same being.¹⁹ Otherwise, the emphasis on their difference (भेदेन) in the Sūtra would lose its point.

The evidence of the Upaniṣadic texts cited above is clearly against the identification of the *Prājña* with the ego in any one of his states. But according to G and Ś (following him) the *Prājña* is but a “conditioned” state of the ātman in *Suṣupti*. But according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* and the B. S. the *Prājña* is other than the शरीर आत्मा implicated in the *Suṣupti* state. This shows clearly that the identification of the “*Prājña*” with the Antaryāmi of the *Suṣupti* state, by K. and M. is more in accord with the Upaniṣadic and Sautra tradition than its identification with a conditioned state of the ātman as in G. and Ś. The *Māṇḍūkya Up.* 6, describing the *Prājña* as सर्वेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः अन्तर्यामी, योनिः प्रभवाण्ययी भूतानाम् adds further weight to the position of R. and M. that the *Prājña* described in these words, is necessarily the Antaryāmin (Brahman) and not the ego implicated in the state of *Suṣupti*.

On the basis of this indisputable finding, we can legitimately

18. Ś. unconvincingly seeks to interpret “शरीरं” as शरीरम् (body)! (Brh. up. Bhāṣya):
19. Cf. नच प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मनो जीवाद्भेदेन संकीर्तनं, सति संभवे ‘राहोः शिर इतिवदौपचारिकं युक्तम् । नच प्राज्ञशब्दः प्राज्ञाप्रकर्षशालिनि रूढवृत्तिः कथंचिदज्ञविषयो व्याख्यातुमुचितः । नच प्राज्ञाप्रकर्षोऽसंकुचद्वृत्तिः विदितसमस्तवेदितव्यात् सर्वविदोऽज्यत्र संभवति । न चेत्यंभूतो जीवात्मा (Bhāmata, 1, 3, 42).

argue backwards and infer that "Viśva" and "Taijasa" similarly are 'esoteric' designations of the Antaryāmi in the Jāgrat and Svapna states of the transmigrating self, controlling his waking and dream-experiences. The Brahman as विश्वन्तर्यामि must naturally be the all-controller and not merely the controller of the Suṣupti state alone. Hence the appellations Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are applied to Him as the Antaryāmi of the Jīva in these three states. It would be seen that the identification of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña as the names of the controlling aspects of the Brhman, of the respective states of experience of the embodied selves, is the corollary of the thesis of निखिलान्तर्गतत्व of Brahman taught in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Brhadāraṇyaka, which brings the entire Cosmos of sentient and insentient reality under the control of the Antaryāmi (B.S. i, 2, 18 and cf. M. thereon).

It is equally in accord with the idea of the Antaryāmi that texts in the Upaniṣads and Gītā refer to the Brahman qua Antaryāmi, as the Partaker ऋतं पिबन्तो (Kaṭha i, 3, 1) and "Bhoktā"²⁰ (enjoyer) of the acts of individuals. This is echoed in the expressions स्थलभुक् and प्रविविक्तभुक् applied to the Viśva and Taijasa aspects of the Antaryāmi in the Māṇḍūkya Up. and the AP. The Gītā tells us that the subtle activities and operations of the Antaryāmin are ceaselessly going on in the life of the microcosm and the macrocosm and that the wise see this while the ignorant fail to see or understand it.²¹

मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते (x. 8).

मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च (xv. 15).

शरीरं यदवाप्नोति यच्चाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः ।

गृहीत्वैतानि संयाति वायुर्गन्धानिवाशयात् (xv. 8).

उत्क्रामन्तं स्थितं वापि भुजानं वा गुणान्वितम् ।

विमूढा नानुपश्यन्ति पश्यन्ति ज्ञानचक्षुरः (xv. 10).

यतन्तो योगिनश्चैनं पश्यन्त्यात्मन्यवस्थितम् (xv. 11).

and xv, 13-14.

The theistic interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Up. and the AP. in terms of the Antaryāmin vis a vis the ego implicated in the three states of experience, is thus, quite in accordance with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. R. and M. have accordingly, interpreted the teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Up. in terms of this basic idea. It is philosophical immaturity to dismiss the theistic line of interpreta-

20. Cf. अधियज्ञोऽहमेवात्र देहे (Gītā, viii, 4).

अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च (Gītā, ix. 24).

21. Cf. शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तु पुनः सर्वत्रेश्वरापेक्षत्वमापाद्यमानं न परानुद्यते; (Ś. B.S.B. ii, 2, 3).

tion of the Māṇḍūkya Up. sponsored by them as not worthy of serious consideration.

The Kārikās also find a more cogent explanation in terms of a general Theistic interpretation of the Upaniṣad. We have seen that the natural sense of Māṇḍūkya Up. 6, is in favor of a realistic view of creation and dissolution of the world, by the Antaryāmi. Kārikā i, 6, which is a paraphrase of the prose text, has no trace of a Pūrvapakṣa unlike i, 7. In view of the propriety of taking the terms Viśva etc., in terms of the Antaryāmi, expressions like कारण-बद्धः have to be understood also in the sense of exercising control over the respective states.²²

Kārikā i, 17, implies that the bondage of Māyā to which the Jīvas are said to be subject, in i, 16, is real and beginningless, but terminable. The root of bondage is the misplaced notion of its own independence, by the ego. The experiences of embodied existence typified by the three states, are controlled by the mysterious power of the Lord (अनादिमायया). They take place at His will (मायामात्रम्). Their termination would naturally depend on realising their true nature as existing and taking place under the control of the Lord. The meditation on the Brahman as denoted by OM is to be carried out as a meditation on the three aspects of the Antaryāmin holding sway over the three states of experience. Thus the whole Up. and th AP admit of quite a plausible and consistent Theistic interpretation on the basis of the doctrine of Antaryāmi.

v

Ajātivāda Vs. Creation Theories

Ajātivāda or No-Origination is the pivot of Gauḍapāda's philosophy. Not only origination, but every other bhāvavikāra is rejected by him as illusory. But the Upaniṣad and the AP describe जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति as actual states experienced by the ego. That the next Prakaraṇa establishes their 'unreality' by the anvaya-vyatireka method, is beside the point, as the unity of authorship between the I Prakaraṇa and the others is not accepted by all.

Karmarkar holds that as a staunch Ajātivādin, the author of the Kārikās condemns all creation theories in Kārikās i, 6-9. This is begging the question. The evidence of the Kārikās of the AP as they stand, is decidedly against this assumption that they stand committed to Ajātivāda. It is only by a forced and tortuous inter-

22. Cf. सर्वास्वेव प्रवृत्तिषु ईश्वरो हेतुर्करोति श्रुतेरवसीयते तथाहि श्रुतिर्भवति-एष ह्येव साधकमं x x य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमवति (Ś. B.S.B. II, 3, 41).

pretation that such a conclusion could be drawn. But it would be clearly against the spirit and letter of not only the prose text एष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवोऽप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् admitting clearly the evolution and dissolution of phenomena; but of Kārikā 6 which has the clear ring of a Siddhānta: प्रभवः सर्वभादानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः followed by the mention of "other" views. Karmarkar seeks to change the natural syntactic connection of सतां with विनिश्चयः and to connect it with सर्वभादानाम्। This is clumsy and roundabout. There can't be 'non-existent entities' as distinguished from 'existent entities'. The term "विनिश्चयः" would also hang loose and would have to be supplied with a new correlative such as केषांचित् whereas (अयमात्मा) सर्वभादानां प्रभवः इति सतां विनिश्चयः would be the most natural and straight way of interpreting the line. Karmarkar concedes that "Prāṇa" in the B.S. is taken in the sense of Brahman. Why could it not have the same sense here?

Kārikā i, 7: स्वप्नमायासरूपोति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता is a pointed repudiation of the Advaitic theory that creation is a myth and an illusion like dreams and magic.²³ Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya has frankly admitted that such (स्वप्नमायासरूपा सृष्टिः) is the view of the "Mādhya-mika and Yogācāra Buddhists and some Vedāntins, including our teacher (Gauḍapāda)".²⁴

This would give the deathblow to Gauḍapāda's authorship of this Kārikā (and ergo of the AP). Dr. Mahadevan and Karmarkar have therefore tried to avert it by a specious plea that स्वप्नमायासरूपा सृष्टिः refers to a realistic view of creation! According to the latter, the reference is to "some passages in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, where स्वप्न and माया are used together".²⁵ Dr. Mahadevan thinks that "the author of the Kārikās distinguishes between certain views which characterise creation as स्वप्नमायासरूपा and his own view that it is मायामात्रम् (Op. cit. p. 43). All this is mere wishful thinking. Neither the addition of one more illustration to स्वप्न nor of the suffix सारूप to them, could change the proposition: स्वप्नमाया-सरूपा सृष्टिः from an idealistic one into a contrary one in support of Realism. Indeed, Gauḍapāda himself uses the very same examples of Svapna and Māyā in ii, 31:

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।
तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥

23. G. K. ii, 31. Cf. also: सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव, स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक् प्रबोधात्, प्राक्-ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानास्तत्त्वोपपत्तेः. S. B.S.B. II. 1, 14). 'स्वप्नविद्येव ते विद्या नाविद्यां हन्ति सा यतः (Iṣṭasiddhi).

24. Op. cit., p. 3.

25. In G.K. ii, 31. also, the two examples are used together representing his own Siddhānta!

in support of his thesis that the world-appearance is *unreal*. The only difference between the two passages is that in i, 7 cd we have a compound word (स्वप्नमायासरूपा) while ii, 31, uses separate words to denote the Upamāna and the similitude (उपमावाचक). This difference in phrasing could make no difference to the meaning of the proposition as such. It is to evade this that Karmarkar argues (after Anandagiri) that "those who believe Sṛṣṭi to be like Svapna and Māyā, do believe in the reality of the creative process". This again is disingenuous. When dreams and Māyā are themselves unreal, there can be no talk of their causal process being *real* (Cf. G. K. iv, 58.). Karmarkar argues further that according to R. creation in dreams is real (Op. cit. p. 61). This is a perversion and abuse of R's position. If the purpose of the comparison of Sṛṣṭi with Svapna and Māyā, in i, 7 cd is to establish its 'reality', it would be a very unusual way of establishing Realism, indeed! We have idealistic philosophers who have attempted to establish the *unreality* of world-experience (and of waking experience) on the analogy of dreams and illusions.²⁶ But, we have not heard of any Realistic philosophers with any reputation to lose, trying to establish the reality of world-experience (and waking experiences) by resorting to the analogy of dreams and illusions! In fact, dreams could not be established as "realities" unless the 'reality' of waking-experiences is accepted first! Otherwise, there would be no दृष्टान्त for the *anumāna*. It would then be needless to resort to an inference to demonstrate the reality of Waking experience thro' dreams! It is preposterous to bring in R's name to support such an absurd interpretation of स्वप्नमायासरूपा सृष्टिः as a Realistic view of creation.

On the other hand, the theory that all creation is like a dream and a magic is avowedly the pet-child of Advaita.²⁷ That being so, why should any one indulge in roundabout fancies and wild guesses as to who is meant in i, 7 cd, or try to find some scapegoat? The cap fits G. correctly:

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः (ii, 31).

It is but right then, that he should be made to wear it, not R or any other. The result would be a palpable self-contradiction between i, 7 cd and ii, 31, which could only be overcome by admitting that i, 7 and the AP in which it occurs, are not a composition of G. It is no use quibbling over this point.

26. B.S. ii, 2, 29. and S. यदुक्तं बाह्यार्थापलापिना स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवत् जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया विनैव बाह्यार्थेन भवेयुः । प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषादिति ॥

27. G.K. iv, 39; iv, 37; iv, 31.

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः (i, 8 ab)

reiterates the Siddhānta view of the author of the AP (i, 6) that creation is real, by asserting that it is just an act of will of God (Prabhoh). The purpose of such reiteration is to drive home the point that it is neither a Parināma of Brahman (विभूति) i, 7 ab) nor a superimposition (स्वप्नमायास्वरूपा i, 7 cd) as Pantheists and Acosmists would have it.

Kārikā i, 9, takes up the next important point regarding world-creation, viz., its possible motive or purpose. After mentioning two Pūrvapakṣa views:

भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यग्रे क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे (i, 9 ab)

it concludes with a clinching affirmation of its own view:

'देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयम्' (9 cd)

that it is the nature of the Divine Lord (देव) to create. This conclusion is also backed by a sound reason: आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा (9 cd) challenging the possibility of any personal desire or motive, for the act of creation, on the part of God. It is the purpose or personal motive behind creation that is sought to be negated, not the act of creation itself.

If creation were not a fact according to the author of the AP, no question of its motive or purpose could legitimately arise or be discussed by him in all seriousness. It stands to reason therefore, that the author of the AP could not have been an Ajātivādin. His words: देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा? have the ring of a solemn Theist who believes in the reality of God's creation as being the result of a spontaneous act of His Will. It is a sheer monistic bias that forces Dr. Mahadevan to argue that "since creation is *unintelligible*, we can only say that it is the *nature of the Lord*" (Op cit. p. 43) [Italics mine]. There is no word in the text characterising creation as *unintelligible*. And no reason has been given in the AP to warrant such a conclusion. That such reasons are given in Prakaraṇa II, and the subsequent ones, is irrelevant, so long as the unity of authorship between the first Prakaraṇa and the others is yet unproved. If i, 9 cd means anything, it is this that Creation is perfectly consistent with an Aptakāma-God. It is His *nature* to create and nature according to G. himself, is neither "*unintelligible*" nor subject to change (iv, 9) nor could be unreal (iii, 21). Ś's interpretation of स्वभाव here as "Avidyā", is therefore out of place, as Avidyā can hardly be the "Svabhāva" of the Ātman. Karmarkar's comment in this connection that in the Ajātivāda of G there is no scope for a creation, even thro' Avidyā (Op. cit. p. 62), tho' in itself quite true, is not helpful in the present context, where

creation is accepted as a fact and a reality (i. 6; 8 cd; 9 cd), and Ajātivāda itself is repudiated by Māṇḍūkya 6: प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् There is therefore no use in bringing up Ajātivāda here. Karmarkar should also explain how Kārikā 10 could speak of the "cessation of all miseries: निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानाम् (ईशानः प्रभुरव्ययः) when neither origination nor dissolution is an actual fact according to G.K. ii, 32. If the "all-pervading Turiya is capable of controlling the cessation of all miseries", such miseries of bondage (viz. jāgrat, svapna etc.) must naturally be caused and controlled by Him. How then could they be "unreal"?

It is not possible to draw any conclusion about the unreality of phenomena from the passages: (10 cd) either:

अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभुः स्मृतः ।

as it gives quite a natural Theistic sense:

सर्वभावानां, विभुस्तुर्यो देव अद्वैतः स्मृतः ।

'The Lord Turiya has been proclaimed to be pre-eminent of all the creatures and their Ruler (Īśāna) and Master (Prabhu).²⁸

Kārikās 17 and 18 deserve the greatest attention. They employ the 'Tarka method' of argument, at which G. is said to be particularly clever.²⁹ I have pointed out in the RPR that these two Kārikās, as they stand worded, involve serious contradiction with Advaitic theory and principles and that they tend to establish a realistic view of word-experience, by the very terms of the Tarka mode of argument (*reductio ad absurdum*) employed by them. Dr. Mahadevan has tried to show that these two Kārikās are quite consistent with the Advaitic position and do not contain anything that militates, in the least, against the theory of G's authorship of the AP. This is however unsustainable.

He admits (p. 86) that Kārikās 17-18 employ the Tarka method of argument. But he contends that in i, 17 "the antecedent of the

28. Cf. "सर्वभावानां" इत्यनेन विनैव, 'देवोऽद्वैत' इत्येतावता विवक्षितार्थमिद्वे: तस्य प्रयोजनशून्यत्वं स्फुटमेव । सर्वभावानां इति निर्धारणे ह्येषा षष्ठी । लक्षणान्तरामभवात् । तथा च 'कृष्णा गवां संपन्नक्षीरतमा' इत्युक्ते, यथा कृष्णायाः एव संपन्नक्षीरतमत्वमन्यासां तदभाव इत्युक्तं स्यात्तथा सर्वभावानां मध्ये तस्यैवाद्वैतत्वमित्युक्ते एकस्यैवाद्वैतीयत्वमन्येषां सर्वभावानां सद्वितीयत्वमुक्तं भवति ॥ न च तद्युक्तं । तस्याद्वैतत्वज्ज्यभावा एव न सन्ति । केषां सद्वितीयत्वं स्यात् ? ततोऽद्वैतशब्दः समाधिकवाचीत्यङ्गीकार्यम् । तथाच, तस्यैकस्य समाधिकराहित्यमन्येषां तत्साहित्यं चोक्तं भवेत् । तच्चाद्वैतमतविरुद्धमिति ॥ (Jayatirtha, VTN, p. 258, Bangalore, 55).

29. Dr. Mahadeva, op. cit., p. 86 and f.n.

proposition 'there is no removal', would be *not* because the world exists, but 'because it does not exist in reality' (p. 42). Even so, the proposition that 'there is no removal' would conflict with i, 10, where the removal of wordly bondage is accepted as a *fact*.

Even conceding that the world and its sublation are both equally illusory,³⁰ there would still persist another difficulty already pointed out by me, in the hypothetical form of the argument in i, 17 *ab*: प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत, निवर्तते। According to Dr. Mahadevan, this means "If the Universe did really exist, it would be removed, no doubt" (Op. cit. p. 42). But then, such a 'tarka' would have to rest on a sound concomitance (vyāpti) between "whatever exists in reality", and its "removal" (sublation or *bādha*). Could G, with his "deep insight into Tarkaśāstra" (Op. cit. p. 86) successfully maintain a flawless Vyāpti between what *exists in reality* and its sublation? Would not such a *vyāpti* be suicidal to the Advaitin and recoil on his Brahman or Ātman and make them both "unreal"? How could G. have admitted such a Vyāpti and pressed it when it would have come down upon him like a boomerang? Evidently, Dr. Mahadevan has not realised the grave danger to Monism that is implicit in this vyāpti behind the 'tarka' used in i, 17 *ab*.

For reasons totally unconnected with this difficulty, which he seems hardly to have realised, either, Karmarkar proposes *suo motto* a novel interpretation of his own of Kārikā i. 17 *ab*: "If the (projected) creation were really existing, it would definitely continue to exist" (Op. cit. p. 6 and Notes p. 64). He takes "निवर्तते" to mean, *not* "sublated", but "definitely continue to exist" (निः = निरा + वर्तते) Such an interpretation of "*nivarteta*", is, to say least, quite against the accepted interpretation of the term "*nivṛtti*" and its radical forms, in Advaitic metaphysics. Moreover, the same term is used in G.K. i, 18 and ii, 18 also, where Karmarkar himself renders it differently as "liable to be turned away" (sublated). This shows that "*nivarteta*" in i, 17 and "*vi-nivarteta*" in i, 18, are synonymous and could not be assigned two opposite meanings, in successive verses. If निवर्तते is understood as sublation, then, the Ātman himself would be open to sublation, as a really existing entity. Such a contingency could hardly be welcome to the Monist. In the absence of such a Vyāpti (यद् विद्यते तन्न निवर्तते) the 'tarka' argument could not be pressed to any valid conclusion by way of *Viparyaya-paryavasāna*.

Kārikā i, 18 *qua* G's would be equally disastrous to Advaita. That this objection of mine is really a "formidable" one and is not

only seemingly so, and has *gone home*, is clear from the way in which Dr. Mahadevan has sought to *mistranslate* the line: विक्ल्पो विनिवर्तते कल्पितो यदि केनचित् as "the world of plurality (Vikalpa) would cease, if any one had *created* it" (कल्पितः) [Italics mine]. I want to know if "*created*" is the correct translation of "कल्पितः" here? Is not "कल्पितः" *imagined*? Why this camouflage? In Vedantic works, "कल्पित" has a definite meaning of phantom or phantasy. It is not an isolated term occurring in this Prakaraṇa only. It is used by G. himself in ii, 9, in the clear sense of "imagined", which is its technical sense in Advaita philosophy. See also G.K. ii, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and iii, 33. विक्ल्पित also, carries the same sense in G.K. ii, 11, 17, 18 and 19.

Karmarkar, on the other hand, honestly sticks to the correct and accepted meaning of "कल्पित" as "*imagined*" in i, 18. But his mistake lies in his not seeing or following up the *reductio ad absurdum* employed in ii, 18 *ab* to its logical terminus:

विकल्पः (भेदः) यदि कल्पितः (तर्हि) निवर्तते। न निवर्तते।

तस्मात्, न विकल्पः कल्पितः ॥ i.e. पारमार्थिक एव।

But, Karmarkar's failure to do so by denying the consequent and then the antecedent, as expected in a 'tarka argument', is no reason why others should *not* do so. If we do so, as indeed we *must*, we have to draw the conclusion that the world of duality is not at all कल्पित (imaginary) but a *very real one*!

Thus, Kārikās i, 17 and 18, as they stand worded, involve a serious logical contradiction of Advaita doctrine. It is therefore impossible to hold that they could have emanated from G.

Internal and external evidences thus compel us to reject G's authorship of the AP and treat it as a part of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* itself, instead.

30. See *Advaita Siddhi*.

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August 1958

No. 5

ચૂનીલાલ ગાંધી વિદ્યાભવન વાર્ષિક

સાર્વજનિક એજ્યુકેશન સોસાયટી, સુરત

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the metres and it is Gāyatrī which is selected. In the original R̥g-vedic tradition it is the real celestial bird which brings Soma and this bird is represented in the sacrificial manipulations of the Brāhmaṇas as the Gāyatrī. Still, even here the old kernel of the story, viz. the fetching of Soma, by a bird is perceptible. If any metre that deserves to be credited with the feat of fetching Soma for Indra, the most prominent of the drinker of Soma among the gods, it should be Trīṣṭubh alone which is the most favourite of Indra. The selection of Gāyatrī probably seems to have originated with the Sāmavedins whose most usual and favourite metre used for the sāmāns is the Gāyatrī. Also in M.S. we get: "Sāmadevatyo Vai Somah". It is also noteworthy that more than half of the hymns of the ninth Maṇḍala are in the Gāyatrī metre (67+47). In M.S. we get the reason why Gāyatrī must be selected. There Gāyatrī is identified with S'yena and in the R̥g-veda the hawk plays a prominent part in the fetching of Soma. Thus, in M.S. III. 7.9. we have "S'yenāya tvā Somabhṛte. Gāyatrī vai somabhṛt S'yenah."

In passing we digress a little. In the conflict between the gods and the demons for nectar Indra transforming into a bird steals it off. Thus, at K.S. XXVII. 5. we have "Indrah S'yeno bhūtvā amṛtam niramusṇāt." In the later literature Garuḍa is concerned with the task of fetching nectar. There is a myth of the nectar-bringing eagle for Zeus. The metamorphosis of Odin as an eagle to carry off the mead is roughly similar to the Soma-bringing hawk for Indra.

A. D. Shastri

Gauḍap da-Kārikā-IV-1-An Interpretation

The first verse of the fourth chapter, Alāta-S'ānti, in the Gauḍapāda-Kārikā runs :

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयामिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदाम् वरम् ॥

This verse has been differently interpreted¹ and according to some scholars² it can be used as an argument to prove that the fourth chapter is a separate work altogether and that Gauḍapāda or whoever may be the author of that chapter owes much to Buddhism if he is not a Buddhist himself. Without entering into a discussion of the arguments and counter-arguments,³ an attempt has been made below to explain the verse as the one occurring in the fourth chapter of the work as per the well-known dictum 'Sthitasya gatis' cintanīyā'.

The verse can be translated as—'I bow to the best of the bipeds who, with the knowledge similar to the space, and non-different from that which is to be known, knew the objects comparable to the sky.' For understanding the real purport of this verse we shall have to find out what Gauḍapāda intends by the terms 'ākāśa' and 'gagana.' The term 'dharma' does not appear to mean 'ātman' or the soul but an 'object'. But for 'ākāśa' and 'gagana', shall we take them to be completely synonymous or shall we think that there is some distinction between the two ?

The space-analogy has been used by Gauḍapāda himself in the third chapter of his Kārikās to show that just as space when limited by a pot is called *ghaṭākāśa*, though in fact there is no such distinction, even so the supreme spirit is limited and known to be individual souls, although no such difference actually exists.⁴ When these pots and the like are destroyed the *ghaṭākāśa* is also merged in the space; similarly the individual soul merges in this supreme spirit.⁵ Thus though there

1. The commentary, ascribed to S'āṅkara; 'Āgamas'āstra of Gauḍapāda' — Vidhus'ekhara Bhaṭṭācharya; 'Gauḍapāda' T. M. P. Mahādevan; 'Gauḍapāda-kārikās and Buddhism', N. B. Purohit, All India Oriental Conference (vol. VIII.)
2. Vidhus'ekhara Bhaṭṭācharya — 'Āgama-s'āstra of Gauḍapāda' — intro. pp. Iv. and p. 83-93.
3. 'Gauḍapāda' — T. M. P. Mahādevan pp. 213-4, and 'G. K. and Buddhism' — N. B. Purohit.
4. G. K. III. 3.
5. G. K. III. 4.

may be the distinction of forms, functions or names, there is no difference in the space, and the same is true of the individual souls.¹ Just as the ghatākāśa is neither a part nor a modification of the space, similarly the individual soul is neither a part nor a modification of the supreme soul.² To those who are ignorant the sky appears defiled by impurity; equally defiled appears the supreme spirit to those who do not know.³ Thus Gaudapāda begins his chapter on the 'advaita' by giving expression to what was later known as 'avacchedavāda' in the Kevalādvaita-school of Śaṅkara. In the verse III.8 he uses the word 'gagana' to mean 'sky' while everywhere else he uses the word ākāśa. After thus beginning the chapter, Gaudapāda proves the famous 'ajāti-vāda' on scriptural and other grounds and teaches the 'aspars'ayoga' the yoga without external contact.⁴ Here also Gaudapāda, while speaking of the Brahman, says: the *jñāna* is *jñeyābhinna* — non-different from the *jñeya* which is the Brahman.⁵

In the light of Gaudapāda's discussion on the space-analogy, we shall be able to understand the verse in question. He says that the *jñāna* or knowledge is similar to the *ākāśa* or space and is non-different from the *jñeya* or that which is to be known which as said before is the Brahman. The Vedānta of Gaudapāda as explained and developed by the great Śaṅkara believes that *Knowledge*—it may be called *jñāna* or *sanvit* or any such word can be used—is the same as the Brahman. This is the highest *knowledge* in which everything is merged in one—the knower, the known and the knowledge alike. The distinction between the knower and the known subsists only on the empirical level of our experience. When however one transcends that level and leaps into the esoteric level of experience, the distinction between the subject and the object vanishes. For one who knows this, the objects of the world including the individual souls are just like 'gagana'—sky which appears defiled and dirty to the ignorant but which in reality is 'ākāśa'—space. He knows this thoroughly (*samyak buddhaḥ iti sambuddhaḥ*) and he thereupon eschews all contacts with the world (*aspars'ayoga*). It is to a man who has realised this that Gaudapāda pays his homage. He is the best of men.

1. G. K. III. 6.

2. G. K. III. 7.

3. G. K. III. 8.

4. G. K. III. 39—46.

5. G. K. III. 33.

It is not necessary therefore to go to the Buddhistic works and try to find out how the *jñāna* is comparable to *ākāśa*, the *dharma*s to *gagana* and how the *jñeya* is non-different from *jñāna*.¹ On the other hand by using the terms 'gagana' and 'ākāśa', Gaudapāda suggests something else. When we take into account the verse III.8, where the term 'gagana' is used it becomes clear to us that 'gagana' in IV.1. is wrongly understood as meaning mere void. The Buddhists on the other hand say that the *dharma*s are *niḥsvabhāva* and are like the son of a barren woman.² In that case they cannot be compared to 'gagana', as understood by Gaudapāda. Again by comparing the knowledge with 'ākāśa', Gaudapāda also makes it clear that his conception of knowledge is not that of a stream of transient *viññāna*s but is eternal real knowledge. Thus Gaudapāda's theory is different from both the *viññānavāda* and the *sūnyavāda*.

The phrase '*dvipadām varām*' does not mean *Nārāyaṇa* as has been made out by the commentator; for *Nārāyaṇa* is the highest god and naturally Gaudapāda would not call *Nārāyaṇa* 'the best of bipeds'. It is not necessary also to say that the reference is to the Buddha³. Gaudapāda has referred to the Buddha only twice in one verse⁴ where he uses the word in singular; everywhere else⁵ he uses the word in plural and there it means 'the wise'. On the other hand Gaudapāda here pays homage to whoever has attained to that state of perfection; for surely he is the best of men.⁶

It appears that this verse is something like a resume' of what has already been discussed and a suggestion of what is going to be discussed. By pointing out the theory of oneness and the space-analogy Gaudapāda refers to what has been taught by him in chapter III, viz. the theory of 'ajāti' and 'Kevalādvaita.' Gaudapāda again suggests how he differs from the Buddhistic doctrines. Chapter IV is meant for this; it shows how Gaudapāda goes a step forward from the Buddhistic position of idealism. Gaudapāda himself asserts at the end of the chapter: 'This has not been told by the Buddha'.⁷

1. Vidhus'ekhara Bhattacharya — 'Āgamas'āstra of Gaudapāda' — pp. 83-93.

2. V. Bhattacharya in 'Āgamas'āstra of Gaudapāda' pp. 87.

3. V. Bhattacharya — 'Āgamas'āstra of Gaudapāda' pp. 83-4.

4. IV. 99.

5. IV. 19, 42, 80, 83, 98.

6. T. M. P. Mahadevan — 'Gaudapāda' pp. 214. Mahadevan sees no harm even in understanding the *dvipadām varām* as *Nārāyaṇa*.

7. नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् । — IV. 99.

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CONTENTS

	Page
Spiritual Talks of Swami Shivananda .. [.] [.] ..	201
Religions and Moral Instruction— <i>Editorial</i> .. [.] [.] ..	205
Gaudapāda on Māyā and Avidyā— <i>By Professor Surendranath Bhattacharya</i> ..	210

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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

SPIRITUAL TALKS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

January 17, 1930

When asked whether he had read the article on the Master by Romain Rolland in the *Asia* magazine, Mahapurushji replied: 'I have not read the whole of it, but his presentation seems to be excellent—though from the human point of view rather than that of an incarnation. He might have been under the belief that to think of him as divine brings in the idea of superhuman power, which creates some distance. But why should any idea of distance come? All powers and other glories become harmonized in him, so that the awe arising from superhuman glory etc. shrinks back. Is any one afraid of one's father even if he should be a millionaire ?

'But in the relation that we had with the Master, there was not the slightest touch of awe. Speaking for ourselves, we did not look upon the Master like that, and the Master also liked it that way. He would be offended if any one called him an incarnation of God. That really seems to undermine the intimacy one hopes to gain through love. A relation of love and faith is engendered by thinking of a person

as one's mother, father, brother, friend, and so on. Do you not remember the story of Guhaka Caṇḍāla in the *Rāmāyaṇa*?'

January 19, 1930

When a *brahmacārīn* prayed for *sannyāsa*, Mahapurushji remarked, addressing all of us: 'The Master gave each one of us a piece of ochre cloth to be worn at the time of meditation. That is a good idea, and anyone can adopt it. Then Swamiji (Swami Vivekananda) secured the *mantras* for the formal vow of monasticism and made us all take orders. An ochre robe helps one in begging for food, for otherwise one has to introduce oneself to all and sundry as a monk at the time of begging. God is our inner Ruler, the Soul of our souls—of all and of myself too. It is enough if one has love, devotion, and faith in Him. One should strive to have these. But instead of that, one would perform *homa* (offering oblations in fire) and take up the monastic life, and there it ends! It has become a fashion, and I have no liking for such a farce. If one does not strive to realize Truth even after coming here, then all is in vain. Which

What can bring them that knowledge are these traditional methods of religious and moral instruction. And therefore is the need for intensifying and spreading these popular methods of disseminating spiritual ideas among our people.

Thus we see that man needs religious and moral instruction at all stages of his life. It is not enough if such instruction is confined to the home or the school alone; every sphere of

life has a function to perform, which must be done in all faith and with a sense of duty. The home sows the seed and provides nourishment; the school provides air and light and strengthens the plant; and personal striving in tune with lofty spiritual ideals puts forth the blossom from which emanates the soul-elevating fragrance of a perfect character, which is the true end and aim of all religious and moral instruction.

GAUDAPĀDA ON MĀYĀ AND AVIDYĀ

BY PROFESSOR SURENDRANATH BHATTACHARYA

Some Upaniṣads suggest that the subject alone is real. The Buddhists proceed negatively and try to prove the unreality of objects (the extremists denying even the subject). Gauḍapāda (end of the seventh century or beginning of the eighth century A.D.), upon whom the Buddhistic influence is so palpable that some scholars doubt his Brahmanism, establishes the Upaniṣadic doctrine with Buddhistic dialectic. The second *prakaraṇa* of his *Kārikā* has the avowed object of proving the unreality of objects. He says that the waking experiences are as much unreal as the dream experiences.¹ Moreover, a thing which is non-existent in the past and in future must also be so at present, though it might appear to be existent now.² This characteristic applies to all experiences, and they must therefore be held to be unreal. Although Gauḍapāda proves the unreality of all objects, yet he is not a nihilist. He says that, though both the waking objects and the dream objects are alike false, there must be something to cognize them, to imagine them.³ This substratum, he says, is Ātman or Brahman. The Ātman (the permanent Subject) regards Himself as so many objects. And as there

cannot be any actual transformation of the subject into the object, the phenomenon is effected by the Ātman's own Māyā;⁴ in other words, the entire world of experience is brought into existence by an inscrutable something, called Māyā. Here Gauḍapāda evidently takes Māyā to mean the inexplicability of the relation between the only really existent Ātman and the world of experience. Again, the absolute oneness of the Ātman would preclude Māyā as a separate entity. Hence Gauḍapāda says that Māyā is in the nature of the Ātman.⁵

Gauḍapāda examines the different theories of creation and concludes that creation can be nothing but the Ātman's nature.⁶ He, however, attaches no importance to the problem of creation, which, according to him, is not worth investigating; for Reality-in-itself has nothing to do with creation.⁷ The problem is discussed only for the benefit of the student and to help him in realizing the transcendental Truth.⁸ And when discussed for a practical need, it is found that creation is inexplicable and, as such, it should best be characterized as Māyā.

¹ *Ibid.*, II.12.

² *Ibid.*, 1.9; also note the word '*svamāyayā*' in II.12.

³ *Ibid.*, I.7-9; see also Śaṅkara's commentary on these verses.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II.32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I.18.

¹ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, II.4, 5, 31.

² *Ibid.*, II.6

³ *Ibid.*, II.11.

Gauḍapāda argues that it is impossible that the world should originate from Brahman; for (i) Brahman can have no necessity for it;⁹ (ii) to say that the world originates from Brahman is to say that Brahman is born as the world, but Brahman is unborn (*aja*), and therefore It cannot take birth in any shape, unless it forgoes its own nature.¹⁰ To say that the Sat (the ever-existent Ātman) is actually born is to commit the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. In fact, nothing can be said to be born of itself or of another.¹¹ To speak of a thing as self-born is meaningless, for, if the thing is already existing, the term 'birth' would be inapplicable to it. Similarly, to speak of one thing being born of another would be equally meaningless and fallacious, for, unless the thing is there, it cannot come into sudden existence,¹² nor does one pot produce another, or one pot another cloth. To speak of the production of a pot out of clay, or the birth of a son of a mother, is but conventional. Thus the very idea of creation or production is fallacious. So it is impossible that Brahman should modify Itself into the world.¹³ The illustrations in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* of earth, iron, sparks of fire, etc. are given only to begin the discourse and not to preach the real modification of Brahman. Hence, whenever the world is said to originate from Brahman, it is to be understood to do so only through Māyā.¹⁴ The only reasonable reconciliation of the statements of Śruti which deny differences of all kinds (*neha nānāsti kiñcana* etc.) and those that speak of the origination of the world of diver-

sity out of the only one Sat is to take this origination as purely illusory. And such texts as '*Indro māyābhiḥ pururūṣamiyate*' etc. clearly lay down the theory.¹⁵ The world of diversity is therefore nothing but Māyā.¹⁶

Thus we see that Gauḍapāda takes Māyā to mean:

- (i) The nature or power of the Ātman by virtue of which He (though unchangeable) appears as the manifold world.
- (ii) The inexplicability of the relation between the Ātman and the world.
- (iii) The apparent dreamlike condition of the world.

To describe the relation of the world and the individual Ātman (*jīva*) with the unchangeable Ātman, Gauḍapāda adopted the theory of Māyā. He examines the three states of consciousness (*jāgrat*, *svapna*, and *suṣupti*) and the so-called law of cause and effect in the objective and subjective fields and concludes that the states are mere appearances superimposed on the pure Cīṭ (*śuddha-caitanya*, pure Consciousness), which alone is real (existing unconditionally). But how this superimposition takes place, nobody can explain, yet it is undeniable. Similarly, the relation between cause and effect, and that between subject and object, admits no satisfactory explanation. This impossibility of reasonable explanation of phenomena and, none the less, their perceptibility are what Gauḍapāda would call Māyā or Avidyā. We shall present later how this fundamental idea was further developed by Śaṅkara and his followers.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I.9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, III.20-22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, IV.22.

¹² cf. Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya.

¹³ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, IV.7-8; cf. *Brahma-Sūtra*, II.3.9.

¹⁴ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, III.19.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, III.24, 27; also see III.48, IV.6-8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I.17; also see II.19, 31.


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Ryojun Ueda, Asst. Prof. of Seizan College.....	306
Zonkaku Shonin's Admonition against Popular Faiths	
Tesshin Sasaki, Prof. of Kyoto Women University	311
A Study on Buddhist Syncretism with Popular Faiths	
Kenju Wada, Member of the R. S. R. I. of Komazawa Univ.	315
Why was Tibet Invaded by the Sin-dynasty?	
Shoken Yazaki, Lecturer of Rissho University.....	319
Emperor Yung-chêng's Admonition against the Buddhist Order	
Shunko Tsukamoto, Lecturer of Gifu University.....	323
A Philosophical Attitude of Communist China to Buddhism	
Mitsuo Akasaka, Prof. of Nihon University.....	327
Bodhisattva's Original Vow as Reviewed from Pure Love	
Kunitoshi Oka, Prof. of Soai Women College.....	331
Foreign Academic Circles	
Hajime Nakamura, Prof. of Tokyo University.	335
A Study on Tamili Stops	
Norihiko Uchida, Asst. of Osaka Gaigo Univ.....	357
The Difference between Simile and Metaphor as Observed in the	
<i>Kavya-prakāśa</i>	
Nobuhiko Kobayashi, Graduate Student of Kyoto Univ.....	361
Zen and Nembutsu in the case of Suzuki Shōsan	
Jikai Fujiyoshi, Assistant of Kyoto University	365
The Avayavinirākaraṇa of Paṇḍita Aśoka	
Yuichi Kajiyama, Lecturer of Kyoto University.....	371
The Ascertainment of Truth of Knowledge in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	
Atsushi Uno, Assistant of Kyoto University	377
The Development of the Thought of Tathāgatagarbha from India	
to China	
Koshiro Tamaki, Asst. Prof. of Tokyo University.....	386
Zen and Depth Psychology	
Reiho Masunaga, Prof. of Komazawa University.....	394
On the <i>Pseudo-Fa-kiu-king</i>	
Kogen Mizuno, Prof. of Tokyo University	402
Fundamental Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies	
Kumataro Kawada, Prof. of Komazawa University	410

Fundamental Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies

Kumataro Kawada

I Introduction

The comparative study of Buddhistic and Vedāntic philosophies covers a very wide range, because their histories are long and each presents too numerous major problems, which in their turn contain so many minor problems to be solved, that we are at a loss from where to begin. Here I will treat one which is important from both the historical and the systematic point of view: What is the fundamental difference between the two? Gauḍapada's Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā will be a substantial clue, because it, being the starting point of the Vedāntic philosophy, establishes its fundamental principle and says, in contradistinction to the Buddhistic philosophy, that this is not the view of the Buddha. And in saying so, he has in view the Mahāyāna of early and middle periods, which formed itself in India and has achieved a remarkable development later on in eastern regions of Asia, where we are born and living. This is why I endeavour to solve the problem in connection with Gauḍapada's Kārikā.

II Naitad Buddhena Bhāṣitam

¹⁾
He says: —

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānam dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ /
sarve dharmās tathā jñānam naitad buddhena bhāṣitam //

"The knowledge of the Buddha does not cross over into the entities; all entities likewise not into the knowledge. This is not the view of the Buddha." The second half of the second line of the verse is the axis of the problem.
(1) What is not the view of the Buddha and on the contrary what has been

declared by him to be essential point of his own teaching? (2) What is "this" (etad)? (3) Is the Buddha in the first and second line of the verse identical or not?

First, as to the Buddha. Vidhushekhara²⁾ says that the Buddha in the first and second line is identical. Śaṅkara³⁾ says the Buddha in the first line is Nārāyaṇa, and that in the second line is Gautama Buddha who taught the vijñānamātram.⁴⁾ T. M. P. Mahadevan is in the main of the same opinion with Śaṅkara.⁵⁾ Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar sides with Śaṅkara. Now, indeed it may seem maladroit to understand the Buddha in the first and second line to be different. So far the interpretation of Vidhushekhara is clear. But if one interpretes it so, one is forced to admit that the whole Chapter IV of the Kārikā is the exposition of the Buddhistic philosophy. And this is his opinion.⁶⁾ Moreover, all the expression "Buddha" in the whole four chapters of the Kārikā should be taken to mean Gautama Buddha. And it results therefrom that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin and at the same time a Bauddha, or that the Vedāntic and Buddhistic philosophies coexisted peacefully in his own one mind. This introduces a subject of grave consequence into the history of Indian philosophy. Presumably this is why the studies of Mahadevan and Karmarkar have appeared against Vidhushekhara. Now it is incongruous to take the Buddha in the two lines to be identical, because the meaning of the half line, "this is not the view of the Buddha," does not approve it. Certainly "this" (etad) was not taught by Gautama Buddha, because "this" means Ātman, i. e. Brahman, and because here "avacanam buddhavacanam" is too far fetched. As to the second reason one should carefully study the passage of the Laṅkāvatāra,⁷⁾ p. 142—144, where it is said that it means the pauraṇasthitidharmatā and pratyātma-dharmatā. The former means the everlastingness of the Law, and the latter reminds us of the nirvikalpajñānam and the tatprṣṭhalabdhajñānam which can be expressed in words.⁸⁾ Thus "na bhāṣitam" does not mean "avacanam buddhavacanam". Therefore I am of the opinion that the Buddha in the first line and that of the second line is different, though this parsing may indeed seem clumsy. But in the case of a Kārikā one

cannot avoid such an interpretation, because a Kārikā does resort sometimes to such a laconic mode of expression. The Buddha in the first line means one who has awakened to the Truth which is Brahman, and that in the second line means Gautama Buddha. Thus I agree in substance with Śaṅkara, Mahadevan and Karmarkar. And why?

Now the second point. "This" (etad) means doubtless: "The knowledge of the Buddha does not cross over into the entities; all entities likewise not into the knowledge". And this not-crossing-over-into-one-another sums up in its own way the contention of the whole four chapters of our Kārikā and in the following half line it is contrasted with and distinguished from the vijñānavāda of Gautama Buddha. If in that case, what is summed up in these words is his ajātivāda, theory of non-origination. Gauḍapāda says: "No creature whatever is born; no origination of it exists. This is that highest truth where nothing whatever is born".⁹⁾ The origination is merely the product of Māyā, the Nescience. It is like a serpent in a rope. And thus one gets to the vivartavāda of Śaṅkara. Now, is the theory of non-origination of his a unique one? No! The Buddhistic philosophers assert the "anutpāda", non-origination. The author of Daśabhūmīśvara says: It is his (of the bodhisattvas) perfection of knowledge (prajñāpāramitā) to accept and acknowledge the truth of non-origination of all things by their own nature, when it comes into his sight.¹⁰⁾ Here we have the non-origination which is prakṛtyanutpāda. The subject matter of Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna is the dependent origination, which has eight characteristics of non-corruption, non-origination, etc. Here also we have non-origination which is "anutpāda."¹¹⁾ Are the ajāti and the anutpāda identical or not? If they are identical, either Gauḍapāda is doubtless a Bauddha or Gautama Buddha a Vedāntin. As to this point Gauḍapāda's position is clear enough, because his ajāti is that of Ātman which is Brahman. He says: all entities by nature itself are well ascertained as enlightened ones from the very beginning; one who accepts and acknowledges this truth, is fit for immortality.¹²⁾ The "entities" (dharmāḥ) here are individual men (jīvaḥ; sarva ātmanāḥ).¹³⁾ Though here, IV. 92, the "entities" takes the form of plural number, they are in reality only one

(4) Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies (K. Kawada)

single being, as it is clear from the preceding verse, IV. 91, which says: All entities should be known as by nature beginningless like the sky. They have no multiplicity indeed of any kind and anywhere. Thus the entities are only one single being. And it is Ātman which is Brahman, as Yājñavalkya declares it: This is that great unborn Self who is undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless Brahman.¹⁴⁾ This is the gist of all Upanishadas, as Śaṅkara puts it. And the Ātman which is Brahman is only one Being without a second.¹⁶⁾ And it is relatively lower Brahman and transcendentally higher or supreme Brahman.¹⁷⁾ And the Brahman is intelligence or consciousness (prajñā, prajñānam).¹⁸⁾ If one will understand the Brahman, take the pair of the seer and the seen.¹⁹⁾ The seen is Brahman covered with adjuncts. Now, wipe away the seen at a stroke! And one has the seer only. This is Brahman which is sākṣin, the witness. Therefore the Brahman is a pure seer or it is a seer who is seer no more. This seer is pure intelligence or consciousness. This point is strongly advocated by Brahmasūtra, which says: “āha ca tanmātram,” i. e. “And the scripture declares that Brahman is that only.” This is the 16th sūtra in Section II of Chapter III, and it is a sūtra of Topic V, which contains 11 sūtras (11—21) and shows clearly the nature of the supreme Brahman. “The Scripture” means BU. 4. 5. 13, where the Self is taught as follows: “As a lump of salt —, even so is the Self without interior or exterior, entire and Pure Intelligence.” This sūtra leads us immediately to the BS. IV. 4. 6.: “Cititanmātreṇa tadātmakatvād ity Auḍulomiḥ.” Thus we may say that if one wipes off all the upādhis and destroys the Nescience and realizes the supreme Brahman, one becomes the supreme Brahman.²⁰⁾ At this moment one is in the asparśayoga (the non-touch-yoga).²¹⁾ This is what Gauḍapāda expounds and distinguishes from and compares with the teaching of Gautama Buddha. It is caitanyamātram (consciousness only) and prajñānaghanam (lump of intelligence).²³⁾

Now, what is the anutpāda of Buddhistic philosophy? This is the third and last point in question. It is, in a word, the non-origination of the Pratītyasamutpāda. And it does not mean directly the non-origination of the pure consciousness or intelligence itself. He who dares to draw conclusions

Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies (K. Kawada) (5)

starting from the “Mind Only” of Daśabhūmīśvara,²⁴⁾ the pureness of mind by its own nature of Aṣṭasāhasrikā,²⁵⁾ etc. might get to such an unwarranted conclusion. And the purification of one’s own mind (sacittapariyodapanam)²⁶⁾ is the essence of moral precept common to all Buddhas. Thus indeed the philosophy of Buddha does not only repudiate pure or purified mind or consciousness, but also demands and appraises it highly. But what matters is different. The difference may be said to consist in “nitya” (eternal) and “dhruva” (enduring).²⁷⁾ This is the view of Vidhushekhara. If one sticks to the vijñānam and tries to distinguish it from that of Vedāntin, this might be the best way to formulate the difference. But, I think, the too much sticking to the vijñānam is somewhat misleading as regards the point in question and Buddhistic philosophy itself. It is said in the Laṅkāvatāra that the real nature of the Law is everlasting whether Buddhas appear in the world or not; everlasting indeed is the essential law of beings, the fixity of law and the fixedness of law, just as the road leading to the old city.²⁸⁾ This is the combined gist of the 20th and 65th sūtras in SN. XII. The everlastingness of the Law which is so much emphasized by these sūtras is another expression of the pratītyasamutpāda which is in substance identical with the Holy Fourfold Truth. This is the Truth or the real nature of the Law (dharmadhātu)²⁹⁾ which is common to Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. This is Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Lotus of Good Law. This is the prototype of all the historical types of Buddhism. Thus what the Buddhistic philosophy stresses is rather the real nature of the Law, the fixity and fixedness of the law and the essential law of beings, than the pure consciousness or mind. It is the essential law of mind. It is the Law and Truth. It is everlasting whether Buddhas appear in the world or not. Therefore it is of non-origination (anutpāda). This is the first meaning of the anutpāda. The second meaning consists in this; beings which are generated and corrupted according to the law of causality do not do so either in the sense of satkāryavāda or in that of asatkāryavāda, but in the sense of Madhyamakavāda. And it is this anutpāda which is advocated by Daśabhūmīśvara, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, etc. Thus it is the non-origination

(6) Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies (K. Kawada)

in the two senses of the *pratītyasamutpāda* which the Buddhistic philosophy advocates as its fundamental truth, however paradoxical it may seem. And Gauḍapāda's contention³⁰⁾ consists in this, that he negates the causality of Brahman in order to establish the *ajāti* of it, the Pure Intelligence. And he says that this is the highest truth. Therefore with a sense of security he could conclude his *Kārikā* with the words: this is not the view of the Buddha. Otherwise, how could the Buddha in the *Laṅkāvatāra* distinguish his teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* from the *Ātmavāda*. Indeed it is right that the *pratītyasamutpāda* rests on the mind.³¹⁾ But we must not lay too much stress on the mind and loose sight of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. What matters in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* of Asaṅga is not the *ālayavijñānam* which is the *vijñeyāśraya*, but rather the fundamental truth of three *svabhāvas*, i. e. *pratītyasamutpāda* which is the *vijñeya* (that which is to be known). Therefore the *Laṅkāvatāra* says that the *tathāgatagarbha* is the womb of the two non-egos of *Tathāgata*.

With the consideration hitherto, I think, the fundamental difference between the Buddhistic and Vedāntic philosophies is clearly demonstrated. Gautama Buddha advocates the everlasting real nature of the Law. Gauḍapāda advocates the Pure Intelligence Only which is beyond the sphere of the law of causality. The one contends the metethical Law of phenomena, the other the transcendental reality of the pure consciousness. Gautama Buddha rejected this philosophy by his experience (*anubhava*) and reasoning (*yukti*) and did not accept the authority of *Veda*. Thus the view of the Vedāntins was not, as, Gauḍapāda says, the view of the Buddha. Śaṅkara, as commentator of Gauḍapāda says: the highest truth is to be found in the *Upanishadas* only,³³⁾ the authority of which Gautama Buddha did not acknowledge.

III Objection and Answer

Here one might raise objections against my view and say among others: isn't the highest truth of Gautama Buddha the Consciousness Only, because the *Trīṃśikā* declares it so? My answer is no. Read carefully the following

Difference between Buddhistic and Vedāntic Philosophies (K. Kawada) (7)

verses! And you will find out that the Non-mind (*acittam*) or Non-consciousness is the highest truth. The Consciousness Only is a half-way house, where one should not dwell forever. It should be left behind in order to arrive at the highest truth. And this is the real nature of the Law (*dharma-dhātu*) which is identical with the knowledge of no false imagination (*nirvikalpajñānam*), and which may be expressed by the knowledge won after it (*tatprṣṭhalabdhajñānam*). This point is clear not only from the *Trīṃśikā*, 26-30, but also from a passage of *Mahāyānasamgraha*, where Asaṅga expounds the genuine realization of the Consciousness Only.³⁵⁾ What Gautama Buddha advocates is not Consciousness Only or Mind Only as such, but it is the everlasting law of the consciousness or mind. By this contention he is clearly distinguished from Vedāntins, to say nothing as to other differences.

IV Conclusion

It is doubtless that the *Upanishadas* had much influence upon Buddhism and vice versa. This is the reason why Vidhushekhara's interpretation of Gauḍapāda has appeared and Śaṅkara is sometimes reproached for his being a *pracchanna bauddha*. And both philosophies are products of the Indian Reason and Humanity. Therefore the question is whether the two philosophies are identical in reality and differ from each other only in appearance or not. This question has not merely to do with the influences upon each other, but seeks to find out the identity or difference of the real nature of the two. From this point of view, the contention of Gauḍapāda that this is not the view of the Buddha hits unerringly the mark of difference between the two. And if there is a fundamental difference, one should not overlook it. On the contrary one should make it clear, even though the undertaking would be a hard work. And at the same time one should be careful, because of the difference, not to neglect the common ground of the two, the Indian Reason and Humanity. But in so doing one should not be subjected, even unawares, to the domain of syncretism. This is why one should take utmost care in interpreting the Buddhistic philosophy, because otherwise one would

transform it into Vedāntic philosophy just as in the reversed way the latter into the former.

Documentation: —

- 1) Kārikā, IV. 99. Cf. Karmarkar, R. D.: Gauḍapāda-Kārikā, text p. 56. Poona, 1953. Nikhilānanda: The Maṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapada's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary, p. 330. Mysore, 1949. 2) Vidhushekhara Bhattacarya: The Āgama-Śāstra of Gauḍapāda, pp. 212 sqq; cxliv, ll. 5 sqq. University of Calcutta, 1943. 3) Works of Shankaracharya, in original Sanskrit, ed. by Hari Raghunath Bhagavat, 2nd edition, I—II, pp. 471; 496. Poona, 1927. 4) Mahadevan: Gauḍapāda, pp. 214–217. University of Madras. First edition. 1952, second edition 1954. 5) Karmakar: op. cit., Notes, pp. 145–146; Introduction, pp. xxii, xxvi. 6) Vidhushekhara: op. cit., p. cxliv. 7) The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. by Bunyiu Nanjio. Kyoto, 1918, 1956. 8) Cf. Sūtrālamkāra of Asaṅga, éd. et. publ. par S. Lévi, p. 62; verse 31. Paris, 1907. 9) Gauḍapāda: Kārikā, III, 48. 10) Daśabhūmīśvara (Daśabhūmika), ed. by R. Kondo, p. 117. Tokyo, 1936. 11) Madhyamakavṛttiḥ, publ. par L. de la Vallée Poussin, p. 3. 12) Kārikā, IV. 92. 13) Śaṅkara, op. cit., I—II, p. 494. 14) BU. 4. 4. 25. 15) Śaṅkara, Works, do., II—II, p. 306. 16) ChU. 6. 2. 1–2. 17) Praśna, 5. 2; 6. 7. 18) Ait. U. 3. 3.(5. 3.) 19) Viveka-cūḍā-maṇi, 20. Ātmabodha, 25. Dṛgdrśya-viveka, 4. 20) MU. III. 2. 9. 21) Gauḍapāda-Kārikā, IV. 2. 22) Brahmasūtra-Shankarabhāṣyam, publ. by Pāṇḍulang Jāwāji, p. 643. Bombay, 1934. 23) Do., p. 644. 24) Daśabhūmīśvara, do., p. 98. 25) Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. by Rājendralāla Mitra. p. 5. Calcutta, 1888. 26) Makoto Nagai: 戒律の根本 (Bhikkhu Pātimokkha), p. 90. Tokyo, 1929. 27) Vidhushekhara: op. cit., p. cxl. 28) The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, do. pp. 143–144. 29) Abhisamayālamkāra, ed. by Obermiller, I. 39. 30) Gauḍapāda's Kārikā: IV. 42, 43; 51, 52; 55, 56; 71; 76; 78. 31) Laṅkāvatāra, do., pp. 77–79. 32) Daśabhūmīśvara, do., p. 98. 33) Śaṅkara: Works, do., I—II. p. 496. 34) Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, éd. par S. Lévi, p. 14, verse 25. 35) 攝大乘論 (Mahāyānasamgraha), ed. by H. Ui, pp. 64–66. Cf. Taisho, vol. XXXI, p. 123, b.

On the *Pseudo-Fa-kiu-king*

Kogen Mizuno

I The kinds and quality of pseudo-scriptures

In China, pseudo-scriptures, which were not the translations from the original scriptures but were produced in China, came into use soon after the introduction of Buddhism into that country. The number of those scriptures gradually increased in the course of time. I will trace the process by surveying the representative catalogues of the sacred scriptures. In the first place, 道安錄 the *Tao-an-lou* (A. D. 374 T. vol. 55 p. 38 b) lists 26 books in 30 vols. as sham scriptures and 出三藏記集 the *Tch'ou-san-tsang-ki-tsi* (A. D. 515 c. T. vol. 55 p. 38 c ff.) catalogues 88 books in addition to the foregoing 26. It can be inferred from this that about 114 scriptures of unauthentic kind were known in the early sixth century. Next comes 仁壽錄 the *Jen-shou-lou* (A. D. 602 T. vol. 55 p. 172 b ff.), which adding both the sham scriptures and the doubtful ones lists 209 books in 491 vols. 開元釋教錄 The *Kai-yuan-che-kiao-lou* (A. D. 730 T. vol. 55 p. 72 a f.), which appeared 128 years later, registers 392 books in 1005 vols. This shows how vast was the number of false scriptures. Though this amount was but a third or fifth part of the whole collection of sacred scriptures, the influence these false scriptures had over the believing public must have been far from trifling, for they were produced to meet the practical needs of the times.

What were, then, the motives of the production of these sham scriptures? The motives were as follows:

1 To relate Buddhism with the traditional folk-cults of the Chinese people and, applying Buddhism to various folk-beliefs, attribute their origin to the Buddha.

2 To conciliate Buddhism with the native thought such as Taoism or to interpret Buddhist thought in the light of Taoist ideas. As orthodox