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
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Gauḍapāda Ādi Śeṣa and Vasīṣṭha

BY

DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN, M.A., PH.D.

While attempting to fix the date of Gauḍapāda, the present writer was led to compare the *Gauḍapādakārikā* with two other works on Vedānta, viz., the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādi Śeṣa and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* of sage Vasīṣṭha. Much the same thoughts are found in the three texts; and there is a great identity in the terminology used. We shall examine the points of resemblance and see if anything could be deduced regarding the sequence of the three works.

The *Paramārthasāra* is attributed to the authorship of Bhagavān Ādi Śeṣa. But who the author was and when he lived are questions which have not been finally settled. What can be asserted beyond doubt is that he must have lived before Abhinavagupta (11th century A.D.) who adapted and expanded Ādi Śeṣa's work to form a handbook of the Pratyabhijñā system, and gave it the same name. Between the *Paramārthasāra* and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* there are some significant points of resemblance. Neither quotes *verbatim* from the other. This is probably because of the difference in metre. But the similarity in doctrines between the two works is unmistakable. The following doctrinal identities may be noted: (1) The three forms of self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, belonging to the three stages, waking, dream and sleep, are but phenomenal. The fourth which transcends them, viz., Turiya, is alone the real.¹ (2) Māyā is the power (śakti) or energy (vibhūti) of the Lord. It constitutes his nature (svabhāva). By Māyā the Lord appears to delude himself as it were. The endless diverse forms such as prāṇa are illusorily posited.² (3) In truth, however, there is neither origination nor destruction, neither bondage nor release.³ (4) The one who has realised the truth is free to live as he wills. The ethical standards do not apply to him, because he has transcended the realm of morals. In this respect he is comparable to non-conscious beings or ignoramuses.⁴ (5) With no

system of thought is Advaita in conflict. The different schools contradict one another. But they are not inconsistent with Advaita, since all of them proclaim the self of all.⁵ Besides these doctrinal similarities, one who reads the two works closely will notice that many of the key terms and phrases are the same in both and that both make use of rope-snake, shell-silver and the other analogies.

On the ground of the points of resemblances set forth above, can any suggestion be made regarding the sequence of the two works? Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri has suggested that the *Paramārthasāra* may well be considered to be the original which was drawn upon by Gauḍapāda.⁶ The reasons given by Professor Sastri for his suggestion are as follows: (1) Ādi Śeṣa seems undecided as to the unity or plurality of *jīvas*, whereas Gauḍapāda seems more definitely against plurality. Hence it is that the latter characterises analogies like those of clay and its products, fire and its sparks, as being purportful only as introducing the doctrine of non-difference, not as teaching difference.⁷ Since Gauḍapāda is more definitely inclined towards *eka-jīva-vāda*, the probability is that he came after Ādi Śeṣa. (2) In Kārikā III, 15, Gauḍapāda juxtaposes the illustrations of clay and fire. The first illustration occurs in the *Chāndogya*, and the second in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Muṇḍaka*. The juxtaposition of these two illustrations in one kārikā is not by itself unintelligible. But it would be more plausible if conceived as referring to and rejecting a similar juxtaposition elsewhere. This is just what we find in the *Paramārthasāra*, where in one verse (46) there is reference to the clay analogy, and in the very next (47) there is the illustration of the sparks issuing from the fire in a piece of heated metal. Probably Gauḍapāda had these two verses before him, when he juxtaposed the two illustrations only to refute them.

These reasons by themselves, we submit, cannot make plausible the suggestion that Gauḍapāda borrowed from Śeṣa's work. (1) In the first place, Gauḍapāda does not seem to uphold *eka-jīva-vāda*. As Professor Sastri himself admits Gauḍapāda does offer an explanation for the empirical plurality of *jīvas* on the analogy of defilement of a single pot of ether not affecting the ether in the other pots; and this is identical with the explanation given

1. Gk, I, 11; PS, 31.

2. Gk, I, 9; II, 12, 19; PS, 30, 32, 33, 56.

3. Gk, II, 32; PS, 69.

4. Gk, II, 36-37; PS, 76-79.

5. Gk, III, 17; IV, 5; PS, 65.

6. *The Paramārthasāra of Ādi Śeṣa*, Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay (1941), p. ix. See also JORM, Vol. xiii, pp. 99-100, *Some observations on the Māṇḍūkya kārikās*.

7. Gk, III, 15.

by Śeṣa.⁸ What Gauḍapāda is concerned to maintain is *ekā-atma-vāda*; and this is the backbone of all forms of Advaita. In Kārikā III, 3, for instance, the plural *jīvaiḥ* is used, and it is said that the Ātman appears in the forms of the jīvas. (2) In Kārikā III, 15, there is a reference not only to two illustrations but to three which are explicitly mentioned and to all other such illustrations which are implied by the words *et cetera*. The examples of clay (*mṛt*) and metal (*lōha*) appear in the *Chāndogya* (VI, i, 4-5); and the illustrations of sparks issuing from fire occurs in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II, i, 20), the *Muṇḍaka* (II, i, 1) and the *Maitrī* (vi, 26) Upaniṣads. Taking these illustrations as specimens, Gauḍapāda observes that Scripture has non-difference for purport even when it teaches creation. It is but natural that he should have chosen his examples from different Upaniṣads in order to show that all of them have the same support. There is no refutation of the illustrations, as Professor Sastri suggests. What Gauḍapāda does is only to bring out the implication of the illustrations. And it is possible for one who would like to place Ādi Śeṣa after Gauḍapāda to argue as follows: Śeṣa cites the analogy of clay and its products along with another (the body and its limbs) in verse 46, and says in the spirit of the *Chāndogya* and the *Kārikā* that the non-dual self appears as if different in the phenomenal manifold (*advaitam dvaitavad bhāti*). In the next verse (47) there is a jumble of the two analogies into one, and the sparks are pictured as issuing out of a heated metal. In none of the three Upaniṣads (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Maitrī*) where the fire sparks illustration is found is there a mention of metal.⁹ Probably, Śeṣa had before him the kārīkā of Gauḍapāda and understood the words *lōha-visphuliṅga* to mean *lōha-gatād dahanāt visphuliṅga-gaṇāḥ iva*. The interpretation though not unintelligible, is a little ingenious. Abhinavagupta has only one verse in his *Paramārthasāra* corresponding to the two of Śeṣa's work, and he omits the analogy of clay, and instead of heated metal and sparks, gives the illustration of a radiant thing and its modes.¹⁰ (3) The view that Gauḍapāda was earlier than Śeṣa may be sought to be strength-

8. Op. cit., p. ix; Gk: III, 5; PS, 36.

9. *Brh*: agneḥ; *Muṇḍ*: sudīptāt pāvakāt; *Maitrī*: vahneḥ.

10. v. 49.

aham eva viśvarūpaḥ kara-caraṇādi-svabhāva iva dehaḥ,
sarvasmin aham eva sphurāmi bhāveṣu bhāsvārūpam iva.

It is I who take form as the universe, like a single body composed of hands, feet, etc., In the whole it is I who am revealed as a radiant thing in its modes.

(L. D. Barnett's translation). See JRAS, 1910, p. 734.

ened by comparing the verses in the two works that deal with the three forms of the self. In verse 31 Śeṣa refers to Viśva, Taijasa and Prāṇa and says that they veil the fourth, viz., Turiya. If we look at the verses that precede and succeed verse 31, we will notice that there is some casualness about the verse. Verse 30 speaks of Vāsudeva who, as if desiring to sport, spreads himself out in endless diverse forms. Verse 32 says that the *dēva* deludes himself, as it were, through his own Māyā, and again realises the self, as it were. There is thus a natural connection between these two verses. The interposition of verse 31, referring as it does to the Turiya in the neuter gender, appears rather out of place. The discussion of the three states of waking dream and sleep and of the three forms of self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prāṇa and the exposition of the nature of the Turiya as the reality underlying them are all in place in the *Gauḍapādakārikā*. The kārīkā of the first *prakaraṇa* constitute, in fact, an explanation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, and so could not have been modelled after a single verse of the *Paramārthasāra*. It would appear, therefore, that Śeṣa or whoever was the author of the verse in question should be considered the borrower in this case. Either on his own authority or on the ground of some tradition, Śeṣa adds the phrase *ādi-madhya-nidhana* (beginning, middle and end) in apposition with viśva-taijasa-prāṇa. And Abhinavagupta paraphrases it as *sr̥ṣṭi-sthiti-samhārāḥ* (origination, sustentation and destruction).¹¹ (4) Professor V. Bhattacharya thinks that Śeṣa must be dated even later than Bhāskara (9th century A.D.), one of the post-Śaṅkara commentators of the *Vedāntasūtra*, for he seems to be acquainted with the theory of creation held by Bhāskara.¹² Śeṣa effects a synthesis of the Śāṅkhya and the Vedānta doctrines of creation and finds a place also for the theory of *aṇḍa* or cosmic germ which is found, for instance, in the *Manusamhitā* (I, 8 ff) and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (I, 2, 58 ff). In his commentary on *Manu* I, 8, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa observes that the view of the Śāṅkhyas as regards the evolution of the non-intelligent Prakṛti is not acceptable to Manu, and that in his view is reflected the doctrine of *tridandī-vedānta*, viz., that Brahmin itself is the cause of the world through *avyakta* which is its power.¹³ That the world is a transformation of Brahman through *avyakta* is the view of Bhāskara.¹⁴ Śeṣa seems to be aware

11. Op. cit., v. 34.

12. The School of Bhāskara.

13. See *Manusmṛti* with Kullūkahbhaṭṭ's *Manvartha-muktāvalī* (Kasi Sanskrit Series), p. 6.

14. See Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Bibliotheca Indica, Part I) p. 332. *brahma pariṇater iti bhāskara-gotre yujyate*.

of this view when he says that by Upendra (Viṣṇu) the world is created because of his own primal nature (*mūla-prakṛti*). He makes this statement, as it is but proper, under the seal of Advaita, viz., that the world is non-real and appears as if real.¹⁵

Though the view sketched above seems to be attractive, there are difficulties in accepting it as plausible. In the *Paramārthasāra* the terminology of Advaita is not fixed and defined. The work appears to mark a stage in the development of Advaita doctrine earlier than the one effected by Śaṅkara. So far as definiteness and fixity go, the *Paramārthasāra* is not even so advanced as the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*. It would appear that Śeṣa's aim was to provide Vedānta with a short manual on the model of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. The approach to Advaita he makes is also through the *Sāṅkhya*. The style and language he employs bear the stamp of antiquity.¹⁶ Though it cannot be proved from internal evidence, which alone is available to us, that the *Paramārthasāra* was earlier than the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, it can be said with a fair measure of certitude that it has come down to us from an age when the Advaita-Vedānta had not attained its character as a well-defined system—a character which it acquired at the deft hands of Śaṅkara.

We may now turn to the other work, viz., the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. As to the identity of the author of this extensive work consisting of over twenty-three thousand verses¹⁷ we know next to nothing. The mythical Vasiṣṭha is the spokesman of the author and the epic Rāma is made the recipient of the teaching. Whether there was a short poem as the original to which additions were later on made we do not know. But the need for abridgement was felt quite early, and there are now available several summaries of the work.

Between the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* there is much in common in thought and terminology, though there are to be found only a few identical lines word for word in the two works.¹⁸ The view that the ultimate reality is non-dual consciousness is common to both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha. The supreme

15. V. 9 See *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. ii—xxxv.

16. For this suggestion I am indebted to Dr. V. Raghavan.

17. The YV says that it is a composition of thirty-two thousand verses (II, 17, 6); actually there are 23,734 verses to be found in the text.

18. For instance,

(1) ādāvante ca yan nāsti vartamānepti tat tathā—Gk, II, 6; IV, 31; YV, IV, 45, 45.

(2) upadeśād ayam vādo jñāte devaitam na vidyate—Gk, I, 18; YV, III, 84, 27. The same appears in YV, III, 84, 25, with *avibodhāt* instead of *upadeśāt*.

self is immutable, since it does not suffer modifications. Both the thinkers characterise the world as an appearance, comparable to the imaginary world of dreams or the *fata morgana*. From the standpoint of the supreme truth there is no difference between the dream world and the universe of waking life. For both Gauḍapāda and Viṣiṣṭha the world is *māya-mātra*, an illusion, or fabrication. In reality, there is no creation whatever, none in bondage, none released or to-be-released. The very concept of causality is unintelligible. Ajāti is the truth. Both the authors believe in release as the nature of the self. When the truth is known non-duality alone remains. The path of *yōga* is sketched in both the works, as the one leading to the goal; only the treatment is elaborate in the *Vāsiṣṭha* and not so extensive in the *Kārikā*. That liberation need not wait for the decease of the body is a view held by both the philosophers. Both appear well-acquainted with the Bauddha views and make use of their terminology.

The close affinity in thought and language between Gauḍapāda and Viṣiṣṭha is only natural, since both of them teach Advaita. But, from this affinity can anything definite be said as regards the relation of the two teachers in time? Who was indebted to whom? Or was there a common original from which both of them drew material for their philosophical constructions?

Dr. B. L. Atreya has attempted to show that Viṣiṣṭha¹⁹ was the earlier of the two philosophers, and that Gauḍapāda was inspired greatly in his composition of the *Kārikā* by the teachings of the *Vasiṣṭha*. His argument is based on the following grounds:

(1) *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* was not written as an independent work, as it was offered only as a sort of commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Gauḍapāda does not claim originality for his views. He refers to previous thinkers by such terms as 'vedāntēṣu vicakṣaṇāḥ', 'tattva-vidāḥ', 'nāyakāḥ' and 'buddhāḥ'. The views attributed to these thinkers and approved by Gauḍapāda are found in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. (2) Unlike Gauḍapāda, Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from Brahmā and to have realised their truth in his own experience. (3) The *Kārikā* must be taken to represent a later phase of the philosophy of Advaita, for there is found in it a tendency to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought. The *Yōgavāsiṣṭha*, on the contrary, is free from polemics and looks at the rival schools from a higher point of view wherein all contradictions are harmonised.²⁰

19. By Vasiṣṭha is meant here the author of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

20. See *The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha*, pp. 17-19.

The reasons given by Dr. Atreya do not appear to prove his case or even make it probable. (1) The *Kārikā* is not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* in the literal sense of the word, thought in the first prakaraṇa it seeks to explain the mantras of the *Māṇḍūkya*. It is a prakaraṇa treatise and not a bhāṣya. Even granting that it is a commentary, it does not follow that it must be dated later than the independent work on Advaita of another author. Gauḍapāda's reference to earlier Vedāntins does not mean that among them should necessarily be included Vasiṣṭha. The *Vāsiṣṭha* cannot be credited with originality for all its views, for the seeds of most of them could be traced in the Upaniṣads. Surely, there was not a philosophical vacuum between the age of the Upaniṣads and the times of Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha: There must have passed several generations of Upaniṣadic scholars. It is to some of these that Gauḍapāda refers. Vasiṣṭha also cites the views of earlier Vedāntins.²¹ There is a possibility, therefore, of both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha having drawn from a common source. (2) That Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from Brahmā is no proof to establish the priority of the *Vāsiṣṭha* to the *Kārikā*. It must be remembered that, like Plato who makes Socrates his spokesman in the Dialogues, the author of the *Vasiṣṭha* puts his views into the mouth of the sage Vasiṣṭha. The sage having learnt his philosophy from Brahmā is but a philosophical fiction; and it is true only in the sense that all truth is divinely inspired. In this connection, we may also point out that there is a similar tradition concerning Gauḍapāda, viz., that he received his teaching through the grace of Nārāyaṇa in Badarikāśrama. (3) It is not correct to say that the *Kārikā* has a tendency to become critical, hostile, and polemical towards other schools of thought. There are in his work criticisms of categories like the concept of cause. But there is not any hostility to other systems. On the contrary, Gauḍapāda expressly declares that Advaita is opposed to no school of thought.²² As for the reference to other views which are contradictory to one another and mutually conflicting that is found in the *Yōgavāsiṣṭha* too.²³ Hence the reasons offered by Dr. Atreya are not conclusive to show that the *Vāsiṣṭha* was the earlier work and that it was composed probably before Bhartṛhari and after Kālidāsa. As against his view, it has been pointed out that the

21. E.g., IV, 21, 26; *vedāntināḥ*.

22. III, 17; *tān ayam na virudhyate*.

IV, 5: *vivadāmo na taiḥ sārddham avivādam, nibodhata*.

23. E.g. III, 62, 10-11; 84, 22-27. *Vivadanto hy asambuddhah sivikalpa vijṛmbhitaiḥ* (cited by Prof. V. Bhattacharya: Op. cit., p. xxxvii).

Yogavāsiṣṭha quotes not only from Kālidāsa but also from the works of many other poets and writers who came long after Śaṅkara.²⁴

Another consideration which contributes to placing the *Vāsiṣṭha* after Śaṅkara is that the terms *jīvanmukti* and *jīvanmukta* which are used in that work are not found in the *Kārikā*, nor in Śaṅkara's works. The doctrine of *jīvanmukti* is important for Advaita. Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara explain it as an essential part of their philosophy, but without employing the term. If the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* had been composed before the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, the chances are that they would not have ignored the term *jīvanmukti* used in that work, but would have adopted it themselves to make their theory of liberation while being embodied known by that term.²⁵ So considering the evidence that is available, there seems to be no case for assigning to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* a date earlier than the *Gauḍapādakārikā*.

A comparison of the three works, then, leads us to conclude that, while the *Gauḍapādakārikā* and the *Paramārthasāra* belong probably to the same era before Śaṅkara, the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is a post-Śaṅkara composition.

24. See the date of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* by Dr. V. Raghavan (JORM, Vol. XIII, pp. 110-128). Dr. Raghavan places the YV between the 11th and the middle of the 13th century. He cites passages of the YV which show that the author had a knowledge of Śaṅkara's works, as e.g., the verse which contains the expression *sāsmadyusmad*. For parallels between the YV and the works of other writers, see the article in JORM.

25. Of the Upaniṣads only later *Muktikā Upaniṣad* uses the term *jīvanmukta*. See Das Gupta: HJP, Vol. II, pp. 245 f.

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l'homme aux sollicitations de l'existence, phase culminante du règne de l'agent entré dans sa période décisive d'organisation mentale. Avant la religion de la Grâce, avant la religion de la Providence, s'est exercé un régime du Destin, et par celui-ci s'est ouverte l'histoire de la personne humaine.

En effet, religion hautement civilisée, en d'autres termes inséparable d'une civilisation pourvue d'un souverain prestige, la religion du Destin ne pouvait se retourner contre celle-ci pour la juguler ou la renier. Au travers des textes perce la conscience de la *valeur de l'homme par l'action*: dès une lointaine antiquité, par conséquent, tend à s'affirmer la *valeur* à côté de la *puissance*, l'être agissant n'étant encore que pensée en action, non sujet ou personne connaissante.

Les recherches porteront non seulement sur la description de la religion du Destin d'une part, et de la société civile d'autre part (y compris l'extraordinaire essor des techniques en Babylonie), mais sur la relation générale *agent-objet*, et la notion de *convention*, attitude nouvelle et supérieure de l'agent lorsque celui-ci, portant à son comble l'action différée et complexe, commence à faire usage de l'*écriture*. Phénomène spirituel autant que matériel, l'écriture représente le quasi-définitif perfectionnement des relations unissant l'homme à l'ensemble de l'univers, le régime du Destin n'étant encore que l'un des aspects du „régime de l'écrit”: disposer des „tablettes du Destin” revient en effet à disposer de l'ordre universel, la légitimité de cette possession présentant d'ailleurs une importance extrême.

Il est, croyons-nous, possible de pénétrer dans l'intimité de la première notion précise de relation, unifiée et étendue dans sa force, à tout l'univers, par une attentive étude du terme *kēnu*, et de toutes expressions apparentées, termes et expressions communs à la fois au vocabulaire de la vie pratique et du Droit, et au vocabulaire du Destin. Nous proposons de développer ces considérations dans des publications ultérieures (comme suite à nos travaux récemment parus dans *Rev. Philosoph.*, *Rev. de l'hist. des relig.*, *Rev. des études sémit.*, etc.), nous terminerons en posant ici par avance que, de l'„ordre *kēnu*”, sorte de cadre à base de temps et d'écriture, se sont détachées pour se développer en diverses directions, maintes notions fondamentales pour le droit, la morale, la science, etc., notions dont le dénombrement est à faire. Il semble dès à présent possible et nécessaire de déceler, (sous l'apparent contraste de la rigidité, interne et externe, et du libre jaillissement des inventions), en quoi se relie et s'unissent les aspects multiples de la civilisation considérée: l'interprétation par la relation *agent-objet* nous semble, étant donné l'identité profonde de ses applications variées, la seule acceptable.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN (Madras)

THE PLACE OF REASON AND REVELATION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF AN EARLY ADVAITIN

I

A unique feature about the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* is that its author, Gauḍapāda, while keeping scripture in the background as the final court of appeal, makes a rational approach to Vedānta. In quoting passages from the Upaniṣads he is judicious, and mostly selects such of those texts where *śruti* itself gives reasons. After explaining the import of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* in the first prakaraṇa ¹⁾, he sets forth in the rest of his work the philosophy of Advaita through various arguments. According to S'ankara, in the second prakaraṇa the illusoriness of the world of duality is explained through reasoning (*hetutaḥ*); in the third the non-illusoriness of non-duality is established on rational grounds (*yuktitaḥ*); and in the fourth pluralistic views are shown to be mutually contradictory through several modes of argumentation (*upapattibhiḥ*).

II

The prominent role assigned to reason in philosophical inquiry by such an early thinker as Gauḍapāda gives the lie direct to the unfounded criticism that philosophy in India is dogmatic and uncritical. It is true that scripture is appealed to as the ultimate authority in matters spiritual by the teachers of Vedānta. But the appeal itself is for a reason; and reason comes in as an aid at every stage in the process of selection and interpretation of scriptural passages.

The reason for appealing to Scripture is reasoning's inability to comprehend the ultimate reality. Thought must needs create division where there is unity in order that it may function. If a distinction is not made between the 'that' and the 'what', existence and content, subject and predicate, there can be no judgment. What thought does is to sunder the 'what' from the 'that' and re-unite it therewith by a sort of homeopathic treatment. But in this attempt at unification discursive thinking can never wholly succeed; for it has to grow on differentiation. It must distinguish; otherwise it will find its occupation gone. It cannot, therefore, be a competent instrument for the comprehension of the plenary reality which is distinctionless.

¹⁾ The work consists of four chapters, each of which is called a prakaraṇa.

Moreover, thought or reason is but a secondary means of knowledge, as indubitable certitude cannot result therefrom alone. The knowledge that reason gives is mediate; and mediate knowledge is that which depends for its validation on the validity of some other knowledge which is its ground. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we shall be led on to a *regressus ad infinitum* without arriving at certitude. So, the proper ground of rational knowledge is immediate experience. That is why the Western Idealists like Bosanquet say that the mind comes into contact with reality through a peep-hole in sense-perception, and then constructs its thought-system.²⁾ The Indian theory of Inference also recognises the perceptual basis of *anumāna*. If one had not *seen* the co-presence of smoke and fire in a place like the hearth, one would not be able to infer the presence of fire on the hill from the perceived presence of smoke thereon. It is true that in an ordinary knowledge the pure perceptual element cannot be separated from the element of thought. That is because even perception can be called immediate knowledge only by sufference. In so far as perceptual knowledge depends on sense-activity, it cannot be independent knowledge nor indubitable. The detected illusions in perception are too many to be ignored. If perception is known to betray us in some cases, the spectre of a doubt that it may betray everywhere can never be exercised. The immediacy of perception, therefore, is not true immediacy; and the reasoning which relies on perception cannot rise to certitude.

The only knowledge which is immediate and indubitable is self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of, or more properly, knowledge which *is* the self. For lack of a better term we shall call this intuitive experience, *ātma-sākṣātkāra* or *anubhūti*. It is experience which is not split up into experiencer, experienced object and experiencing. It is consciousness *per se* which is the sole reality, according to Advaita. A glimpse of this we do have in rare moments of introspection and exaltation of spirit. Without our own knowing, we pass into it in sleep. But to realise it in eternity is the aim of Vedānta. The Upaniṣads which are the *end* of Veda (*vedānta*) or the crown of *śruti* (*śruti-śīras*) contain the discoveries made by the ancient seers in the realm of the spirit; they are a record of the declarations made by the sages and are designed to initiate the votary into the secrets of the intuitive or mystic experience. Even as in the sphere of physical science an investigator cannot afford to neglect the researches already made by others in the field, in the realm of the super-physical also a seeker of the truth must take into account the realisations of the sages. The appeal to the authority of *śruti* means no more and no less. The deliverances of Scripture may appear dogmatic to those whose inner eye has not been

²⁾ See B. Bosanquet, *Logic or The Morphology of Knowledge* (Second Edn.), p. 72: Reality is given for me in sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organised system, is for me an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension.

opened; but they constitute the testimony of the most real experience to those who are awake in the Spirit.³⁾ The students of Vedānta are required to place faith in *śruti*, even as the learners of science must begin with a sense of confidence in the scientific theories formulated by the master-minds in the field. The final test in Vedānta, however, is experience, just as in science the arbiters of theory are said to be facts. The end or goal of brahma-vijñāna, inquiry into the nature of Reality, says S'ankara, is experience (*anubhava*).⁴⁾ *Śruti*, to start with, is others' experience; and the knowledge one derives therefrom is but mediate (*parokṣa*). Unless this becomes immediate (*aparokṣa*), the goal of Vedānta which is self-realisation will not be reached. Hence the faith in Scripture insisted on in Vedānta has but a methodological value, and has as its sole purpose the realisation of intuitive experience. The knowledge that is revealed by Scripture must become a matter of experience; only then revelation would have fulfilled its mission. And for one who has realised the integral experience, there is no need to depend on any external authority in the form of *śruti* or to subscribe to a formal dogma. His wisdom is self-certifying and self-revealed. To him the Vedas are no Vedas.⁵⁾

We have explained for what reason and in what sense *śruti* is regarded as supreme *pramāṇa* in the system of Vedānta. We shall now proceed to show the part that reason plays in understanding the purpose of Scripture. It is well to remember that a scriptural passage *as such* is not a *pramāṇa*; only purportful scripture is authoritative. Those who accept *śruti* as the supreme *pramāṇa*, viz., the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, are agreed upon certain canons of interpretation such as the harmony of initial and concluding passages, etc. One of these canons, and by no means the least important, is *upapatti* or intelligibility in the light of reasoning. Revelation exceeds the grasp of reasoning; and on that account it is not to be regarded as irrational. Even if a thousand scriptural texts were to proclaim something which is nonsensical and absurd, one is not bound to accept to as true.^{6a)} Therefore it is that in unravelling the meaning of Scripture the greatest exercise of one's judgment-ability is called for. As S'ankara observes, that which is accepted or believed in without proper inquiry prevents one from reaching the final good and results in evil consequences.⁶⁾ Reason, then, has to function — and function vigorously — in the interpretation of Scripture. Though it is only one among the six canons

³⁾ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 51: What is dogma to the ordinary man is experience to the pure in heart.

⁴⁾ Com. on *Ved. Sū.*, II, i, 4. *anubhavāvasānam ca brahma-vijñānam*.

⁵⁾ Brh. Up., IV, iii, 22: *vedā aavedāḥ*.

^{6a)} See S'ankara's Commentary on the *Gītā*, XVIII, 66: *na hi śrutiśatam api śītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā itī bruvat prāmāṇyam upaiti*. 'Even a hundred scriptural texts, declaring fire to be cold or non-luminous, will not attain authoritativeness.'

⁶⁾ Com. on *Ved. Sū.*, I, i, 1: *tatrā'vicārya yat kiñcit pratipadyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratihanyeta, anarthaṁ ce'yāt*.

of interpretation, on a deeper examination it will be found that on it depends the application of some of the other canons. For instance, the application of the first canon which we have mentioned above, viz., the harmony of initial and concluding passages, is possible only after it has been determined which the initial and concluding passages of a topic are. And for this determination the services of reason are required. There are scriptural texts which would be nonsensical if the primary sense of the words that constitute them is taken. In such cases one must get behind the words and know their secondary implication (lakṣaṇā). There are again several modes of implication. It is reason that has to decide where the primary sense of words becomes absurd and what mode of implication is to be resorted to. There are passages where words are employed in a figurative sense and where the purport of Scripture is not to be found. Such are eulogistic and condemnatory passages. In detecting and understanding them reason must play an effective role. Thus it is evident that reason has to come in as a powerful aid at every stage in the selection and interpretation of Scriptural texts. ⁷⁾

It is significant that the first sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa speaks of *jijñāsā* or inquiry into the nature of Brahman. ⁸⁾ And the method of inquiry is the same here as in science. It consists in posing problems or doubts and seeking solutions for them. The problem here at the outset is about the knowledge of Brahman. Is Brahman something which we know already or do not know? If it is known, there is no need for inquiry; if it is not known, there can be no inquiry, for no one can possibly inquire into something of which he is not aware. The way out of this dilemma is to be found by escaping between its horns. The alternatives are not exhaustive, for there is a middle one between the two, viz., partial knowledge. As Brahman is the same as the Self, every one knows it, but knows it only superficially. Prior to inquiry into the Vedānta there is no specific or determinate knowledge of Brahman. Hence the conflicting views of the disputants about the nature of the Self. ⁹⁾ The purpose of inquiry, then, is to arrive at a settled knowledge of Brahman. As a sample of the method we selected almost the first question that is asked and answered in Vedānta-study. There are many such cobwebs of ignorance and prejudice that must be swept by the broom of doubt, before one becomes fit to receive the final knowledge. What is worthy of note here is that inquiry is essential for progress in the knowledge of Vedānta. The inquiry is to be made till the on-set of Brahman-intuition. That is the meaning, says S'ankara, of the word *jijñāsā*, 'desire to know'. ¹⁰⁾ Without inquiry, declares Ānandagiri, śāstra does not generate Brahman-knowledge. ¹¹⁾

⁷⁾ See the present writer's *The Philosophy of Advaita*, pp. 44—60.

⁸⁾ Ved. Sū., I, i, 1: lit. 'desire to know Brahman'.

⁹⁾ Com. on Ved. Sū., I, i, 1: yadi loke brahmātmātvena prasiddham asti, tato jñātam eve'ty ajijñāsyatvam punar āpannam. na; tad-viśeṣaṃ prati vipratipatteḥ.

¹⁰⁾ Ibid. avagatiparyantaṃ jñānaṃ san-vācyāya icchayāḥ karma.

¹¹⁾ Tīkā on GK, p. 6: brahma-vicāram-antareṇa taj-jñānanakartvā 'yogāt.

The exercise of reason has to start even earlier, according to S'ankara, than the inquiry into the Vedānta. We stated above that unless there is a superficial knowledge at least of the Brahman-self there is no possibility of inquiring into its nature. This, however, is possessed by all ¹²⁾, and is not enough qualification for study of Vedānta. Something more is needed; and that is discriminatory knowledge between what is eternal and what is non-eternal (nityānityavastuviveka). This is one of the four-fold means of eligibility prescribed for the students of Vedānta. It does not mean that there should be at that stage a clear and distinct knowledge of the eternal Self as contrasted with the non-eternal things that constitute the world. It is for the sake of this knowledge that Vedānta is to be studied. What is required on the part of the student is that he should not be the dupe of appearances. He must have a metaphysical bent of mind, a discerning intellect. There is no admittance into the shrine of Vedānta for those who are intellectually indolent, and cannot or would not think.

S'ruti itself prescribes *manana* or critical reflection as an auxiliary to *śravaṇa* or hearing the Vedānta texts. 'The self, verily, is to be seen, heard, reflected upon and contemplated,' says Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī. ¹³⁾ Mere *śravaṇa* will not take the student far. What he has heard he must reflect upon, look at it from different angles and resolve the doubts that might assail him, till conviction is generated. The policy of *ipse dixit* will not pay in the end. The good teacher is he who does not ask his pupil to believe blindly what he says but opens to him the way by taking which he would himself see the truth. Similarly, the ideal student is one who would not rest till he is convinced of the truth of what he has learnt. He has to see the truth by using his sharp intellect. ¹⁴⁾ What he learns on the authority of scripture must be mediated in thought before it could become a matter of experience with him. *Manana* is the midwife of the new awakening. Through reflection lies the way to sākṣātkāra. ^{14a)}

We are now ready to answer the question: in what relation does reason (yukti) stand to revelation (śruti)? Revelation is no doubt the principal pramāṇa. But what is revealed by Scripture has to be mediated in thought before it could get transformed into one's own experience. S'ruti is what is

¹²⁾ Ibid. sarvo hi ātmāstitvam pratyeti na nāham asmūti.

¹³⁾ Brh. Up., II, iv, 5; IV, v, 6: ātmā vā 're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.

¹⁴⁾ Kaṭha, III, 12: drśyate tu agryayā budhyā.

^{14a)} See A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 152—153: 'It seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by the relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the *what* and the *that* of simple feeling and proceeds to make the *what*, which it deals with in its isolation, even more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its *that* and its *what*.'

helped; yukti or tarka is what helps. As an aid to revelation, reason is of inestimable value; and it should be regarded as subsidiary to śruti and abubhūti. ¹⁵⁾

III

We shall now turn to the *Kārikā* and see how Gauḍapāda has employed the triple factors, śruti, yukti and anubhava, in a harmonious manner, and has succeeded in making Advaita a faith that enquires.

It is the philosophy of the Upaniṣads that Gauḍapāda expounds in his *Kārikā*. So it is but natural that he should quote from these scriptures. But in his selection and interpretation of the texts he makes the fullest use of reason. He states explicitly that śruti must be accepted as authoritative when it is compatible with reason (yuktiyukta) and not otherwise. ¹⁶⁾ Where the primary sense of a text is unintelligible, he prefers the secondary implication or explains it as having a figurative meaning. ¹⁷⁾ Citing the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage where the no-existence in dream of chariots, etc., is declared, Gauḍapāda observes that the śruti says so on grounds of reason (nyāyapūrvakam). ¹⁸⁾ When he refers to a topic discussed in Scripture, he uses such expressions as *prakāśita* (it has been made clear), *samprakāśita* (made very clear), ²⁰⁾ *vedānta-niścaya* (the settled conclusion arrived at in Vedānta), ²¹⁾ and *samañjasa* (it is reasonable). ²²⁾ Very often in the course of his *Kārikā* Gauḍapāda cites approvingly the views of elders; and the terms he employs to designate them show that, according to him, they were not blind believers in dogma but intelligent interpreters of scripture. He calls them *munis* (sages), ²³⁾ *manīṣins* (the wise), ²⁴⁾ *vicakṣaṇas* (subtle seers), ²⁵⁾ *tattvavids* (knowers of truth), ²⁶⁾ *vedapāragas* (those who have

¹⁵⁾ Com. on *Ved. Sū.*, I, i, 2: śrutyaiḥ ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupeyatvāt; II, i, 6: śrutyānugṛhīta eva hy atra tarko 'nubhāvāṅgatvena āśrīyate.

See Anandagiri on GK, IV, 1: svatantra-tarkāpraveśe 'pi tasmin āgamika-tarkasya sahakāritayā sambhāvanāhetutvāt, tarkeṇāpi jñātum śakyam.

D. Elton Trueblood, *The Trustworthiness of Religious experience*, p. 29: 'The task of reason is the humble one of the refiner, not the bold one of the prospector.'

Charles A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, p. 100: 'Reason may establish our certainties; it does not initiate them.'

¹⁶⁾ GK, II, 23.

¹⁷⁾ GK, III, 14.

¹⁸⁾ GK, II, 3.

¹⁹⁾ GK, II, 3; III, 12.

²⁰⁾ GK, III, 11.

²¹⁾ GK, II, 12.

²²⁾ GK, III, 13: Śāṅkara gives the meaning, *ṛjvavabodham nyāyyam*.

²³⁾ GK, I, 29; Śāṅkara says, *mananān munih*; II, 35: *munibhiḥ mananaśīlaiḥ, vivekibhiḥ*.

²⁴⁾ GK, II, 1: Śāṅkara: *pramāṇakuśalāḥ*; II, 5: *vivekināḥ*; GK, 14, 54.

²⁵⁾ GK, II, 31: *vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ*; Śāṅkara interprets thus: *nipuṇatara-vastu-darśibhiḥ, paṇḍitaiḥ*.

²⁶⁾ GK, II, 34; Śāṅkara: *paramārthatattvam ātmavido brāhmaṇāḥ*.

reached the other shore of the Vedas), ²⁷⁾ *buddhas* (the enlightened), ²⁸⁾ *vipras* (the wise), ²⁹⁾ *vidvāns* (the learned), ³⁰⁾ *mahādhis* (of great intellect), ³¹⁾ and *mahājñānas* (great knowers). ³²⁾ Significant, again, are the expressions by which Gauḍapāda denotes the ignorant. He calls them *abuddhas* (unenlightened), ³³⁾ *bālīśas* (childish), ³⁴⁾ and *avipaścids* (unwise). ³⁵⁾ From the foregoing it is easy to draw the inference that the authorities on which Gauḍapāda depends are those śruti texts which are intelligible in the light of reasoning and the views of those elders who had been great thinkers and seers of the truth, besides, of course, his own reason and experience.

Even a cursory perusal of the *Kārikā* will reveal the keen intellectual acumen and the great argumentative skill of its author. The Buddhist logic he seems to have mastered and used against the Buddhists themselves. The four-pronged dialectic (*catuṣkoṭi*) he employs in the fourth chapter with advantage to his *siddhānta*. ³⁶⁾ The favourite form of argument with him is the syllogistic. Śāṅkara puts one of the arguments into the form of a five membered syllogism. ³⁷⁾ Most of the reasonings are formulated in the syllogistic mode by Anandagiri. It can thus be clearly seen that Gauḍapāda bases the conclusion of each argument on the strength of *probans* (*hetu*) which is the soul of inferential reasoning. The *anvaya-vyatireki* mode of reasoning is made use of in several places. ³⁸⁾ The method of argumentation known as *tarka* in the technical sense (*reductio ad absurdum*) is also employed by Gauḍapāda. ³⁹⁾ What is known in Western logic as analogical reasoning is handled by our author with dexterity to prove the illusoriness of the waking world on the ground of its similarity with the world of dream. Other comparisons are also given such as those between the universe on the one hand and *fata morgana*, magic-elephant, rope-snake, illusory designs created by the waving of a fire-brand, etc., on the other. Gauḍapāda points out the following fallacies among others in the arguments of his opponents: *na-vyavasthā* (*anavasthā*,

²⁷⁾ GK, II, 35; Śāṅkara: *vedapāragaiḥ, avagata-vedārtha-tattvajñānibhiḥ, vedāntārtha tatparaiḥ, paṇḍitaiḥ*.

²⁸⁾ GK, IV, 19; Śāṅkara: *buddhaiḥ, Paṇḍitaiḥ*, GK, IV, 88.

²⁹⁾ GK, IV, 86.

³⁰⁾ GK, IV, 86.

³¹⁾ GK, IV, 89; Śāṅkara: *mahādhiyaḥ mahābuddheḥ*.

³²⁾ GK, IV, 95; Śāṅkara: *niratiśya-tattvaviśaya-jñānāḥ*. The *Mitākṣara* says: *mahājñānaḥ, mahatī niratiśayatattva-visaye asambhāvanādi-rahita-niścita-jñānavattvāt mahānubhāvā bhavanti arthah*.

³³⁾ GK, III, 8; Śāṅkara: *abuddhānām pratyagātma-viveka-rahitānām*.

³⁴⁾ GK, IV, 83; Śāṅkara: *bālīśaḥ avivekī*.

³⁵⁾ GK, IV, 97; Śāṅkara: *avipaścitāḥ avivekināḥ*.

³⁶⁾ See GK, IV, 22, 40, 83 and 84.

³⁷⁾ Com. on GK, II, 4.

³⁸⁾ E.g., in GK, II, 17—18; III, 31.

³⁹⁾ GK, I, 17—18.

infinite regress), ⁴⁰⁾ *aprasiddha-betu* (unestablished reason), ⁴¹⁾ *asakti* (inability to reply), *aparīṇāna* (ignorance about the topic), *kramakopa* (impossibility of stating the sequence between cause and effect), ⁴²⁾ *sādhya-sama* (the illustration being on a par with the *prebandum*, i.e., itself requiring to be proved, ⁴³⁾ and *lakṣaṇāśūnya* (devoid of characteristic marks). ⁴⁴⁾

In view of what has now been shown, the appositeness of the commentator's observation at the head of each chapter will be appreciated. For instance, introducing the second chapter (*vaitathya-prakaraṇa*), Sankara says: "It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second *prakaraṇa* is commenced." ⁴⁵⁾ At the beginning of the third chapter he observes, "Is non-duality to be known through scripture alone or through reasoning also? The teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. To show how this is possible the *Advaita-prakaraṇa* is commenced." ⁴⁶⁾ The two main aspects of the *Advaita* doctrine are the sole reality of the non-dual self and the illusoriness of the pluralistic universe. The point that is to be noted here is that *Gauḍapāda* establishes these two aspects of *Advaita* not only on the authority of scripture but also on grounds of reason. "Because it is determined through *śāstra* and reasoning," says Sankara, "the system expounding the non-dual self is true." ⁴⁷⁾ Not a little of the credit of having provided the system of *Advaita* with such solid foundations goes to *Gauḍapāda*.

The great teacher does not reason abstractly nor depend for the truth of his doctrine on barren logic. On the contrary, he uses logic to confirm experience. The discerning analysis of experience which he gives in the first chapter following the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* forms, in fact, the basis of the further elaboration he subsequently makes of the *Advaita* doctrine. The comparison he institutes between waking and dream and the way he meets the various objections go to show that he has a penetrating insight into the deep recesses of experience. A mastery of scripture, logical skill and rich spiritual experience he combines in a harmonious way when he expounds his philosophy in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. An observation made by *Ānandagiri* in the course of his gloss may well be applied to *Gauḍapāda*.

⁴⁰⁾ GK, IV, 13.

⁴¹⁾ GK, IV, 17.

⁴²⁾ GK, IV, 19.

⁴³⁾ GK, IV, 20.

⁴⁴⁾ GK, IV, 67.

⁴⁵⁾ Tatro 'papattyā 'pi dvaitasya vaitathyaṃ śakyate 'vadhārayitum iti dvitīyaṃ prakaraṇam ārabhyate.

⁴⁶⁾ Advaitam kim āgamamātreṇa pratipattavyam ābosvit tarkeṇāpi 'ty ata āha śakyate tarkeṇāpi jñātum. Tat katham ity advaitaprakaraṇam ārabhyate.

⁴⁷⁾ Com. on GK, III, 17: śāstropapattibhyām avadhāritatvād advayātmadarśanam saṃnyagdarśanam.

This is what he says: "Such an enlightened person does not become a bonds slave of the Veda. The meaning that he gives of the Veda, that alone becomes the meaning of the Veda." ⁴⁸⁾

ABBREVIATIONS

Brh. Up.:	Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
GK:	Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-kārikā.
Kaṭha:	Kaṭhopaniṣad.
Ved. Sū:	Vedānta-sūtra.

⁴⁸⁾ Gloss on GK, II, 30: yathokta-vijñānavān veda-kinkaro na bhavati, kiṃ tu sa yam vedārthaṃ brūte sa eva vedārtho bhavati.

The Relation between Mandukya Upanishad and the Karikas.

(S. S. Sastri)

In the colophons observed in the end of Sri Sankara Bhashya upon the four chapters of the Mandukya Karikas it is said श्रीशङ्करभगवतः कृतौ गौडपादीयागमशास्त्रविवरणे which shows that the four chapters of the Karikas including the Upanishad are called Agamasashtra. That the Upanishad beginning with ओमित्येतदक्षरम् and ending with आत्मनात्मानं य एवं वेद forms the text of the twenty-nine Karikas of the first chapter can be made out from the statement of Sri Sankara in the beginning of his Bhashya on the Mandukyopanishad—ओङ्कारनिर्णयाय प्रथमं प्रकरणं आगमप्रधानम्. It means that Agama is pradhana or the text for the first chapter.

Anubhutiwarupacharya (11th century) in commenting upon this Bhashya passage says that this chapter is Agamapradhana since it is a commentary upon the Sruti and not Yuktipradhana (mainly consisting of arguments) like the second chapter. The other three chapters of the Agamasashtra are also connected with the first chapter in so far as the second chapter is the explanation of the illusoriness of the world indicated by the Sruti text प्रपञ्चोपशमम् by reasoning, the third is the explanation of the word 'Advaitam' of the Upanishad; the fourth is a criticism of other systems in order to prove that Advaita alone is real.

But Sri Anandatirtha and others declare that the 29 Karikas of the 1st chapter belong to the Sruti itself. They point out that the words अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति in the beginning of the Karikas resemble such passages often observed in the Upanishads. But Sri Sankara has definitely shown that, they are all of human origin in his Sutra Bhashya (2-1-9) तदुक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्विजैः अनादिमायया सुप्त etc. Why then did these Acharyas leave out the latter three chapters and annotated on chapter one only? It is not because they knew not the existence of these chapters, since Sri Sankara himself has commented upon them, nor because they could not explain them according to their systems since for those who, have explained such Karikas as 'प्रपञ्चो यदि विधेत निर्वर्तेत न संशयः' 'उपदेशादयं वाशो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते' according to Dvaita School nothing could have been more difficult. But they left them in the same manner as they left out Yogavasishta or Adhyatmaramayana. Evidently they considered them independent works by some Advaitin.

Sri Sankara Bhagavatpada remarks in his introduction that the Agama Sastra is a collection of four Prakaranas bringing out the essence of the purport of the Vedas; and being prakaranas they have the same anubandha chatustaya viz (1) subject-matter, fruit, relationship, adhikari as the Sastra to which they belong.

Here, we are led to think out what Sri Sankara means by the word 'Sastra'. Generally the word 'Sastra' is used to indicate the Veda (eg) शास्त्रयोनित्वात्. The etymological meaning 'that which rules' too agrees with this. But there are many instances to show that the Brhma Sutras are also called Sastra (eg) वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् (Br. Sutra Bhashya 1-1-1) वेदान्तशास्त्रश्रवणारुतानाम् (Siddhanta Bindu).

If by the word Sastra Sri Sankara had meant the Veda it would not have been fair on his part to mention the Upanishad which is a Sastra in itself a prakarana. If on the other hand he had meant the Brhmasutras as Sastra then it would not have been fair for him to call the Upanishad a prakarana of Brhmasutras. But his position is this. He begins to comment upon the whole Agama Sastra consisting of four prakaranas. This Agama Sastra is only a prakarana or a primer of the Sastra viz Brhma Sutras. His view is that the Mandukyopanishad, though it is the text commented upon by the Karikas, is part of the Agama Sastra being submerged in it. Thus the accepted view that the Upanishad is the text and the Karikas form the commentary thereon stands to reason.

Sri Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya the learned professor of the Calcutta University has propounded another school of thought that the Karikas form the text and the prose passages, generally called the Upanishad, form the commentary thereon.*

He says that a comparison of the prose passages with the Karikas shows that it is the Karikas on which the prose passages are based and not *vice versa*. Supposing the Karikas are explanations of the prose passages, the professor continues that one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. It may add something new to the original but should not omit the difficult words or points in it. But the first two passages have nothing in the Karikas as we have them before us.

If we read the Karikas according to the Bhasya and Anandagiri Tika I think we have nothing objectionable to reverse the accepted view.

We admit that the Karikas 1 to 5 are exposition of the prose passages 3 to 5. The professor's objection here is that if they are the expositions, why then the words Saptanga & Ekonavimsatimukha are not explained, these two words being very difficult in the prose passages. We may point out that when, by the word Vaisvanara, we are drawn to the Vedic passage तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्ध्वं शुतेजाः etc (adj).

* Vide Agama Sastra of Gaudapada by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya published by the Calcutta University.

we can easily make out the meaning of Saptanga. When we come to understand that Visva & Vaisvanara are one according to Sruti and Nyaya explained in the Bhashya, the other phrase 'having nineteen mouths' could be easily explained.

Again the professor asks how can the discrepancy that in the prose passage Vaisvanara is mentioned and Visva in the commentary be accounted. We may here be permitted to point out that every commentary has its own peculiarities. The author of the Karikas uses the word Visva in the place of Vaisvanara only to identify them both. Such usages are not wanting in ancient works.

For example, the Prasnopanishad is the Brahmana of Mundaka which is mantra. Brahmanas are always explanatory passages for mantras. It is held that the mantras यथासुदीप्तात् etc., and एतस्माज्जायते प्राणः are commented upon by the 6th Prasna of the Prasnopanishad. But while the Akshara or Paramatman is spoken of as the creator in the Mundaka (3), Purusha or Jiva possessing 16 kalas is said to be the creator in the Prasna VI of the Prasnopanishad. Is not this variation meant to identify jiva with Brhman?

The author of the Karikas thinks that, by using the word Visva and identifying Visva with Vaisvanara the words सप्ताङ्ग and एकोनविंशतिमुख could be easily explained. Furthermore it may be noted that only what is vague and ununderstandable in the Upanishad is explained in the Karikas. Three atmans are presented in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5. We do not know whether they are different stages of one atman or they are different atmans having different qualities. We cannot make out their identity because of their relationship as padas of one atman since the padas may differ while the padi may be one. The author of the Karikas opens his commentary by explaining this knotty point. We can pick up the difficult points deserving explanation in the prose passages. They are (1) whether Visva, Taijasa and Pragnya are different atmans or they are one and the same (2) whether the pleasures and pains experienced by the atman are natural or they are due to some limiting adjunct (3) what is the nature and aim of creation?

These points are vividly explained in the Karikas following these prose passages.

The learned professor justly remarks that there is nothing in the Karikas explanatory to the prose passages 1 and 2. True; the author of the Karikas left them out as he considered them clear by themselves. If in the view that the Karikas form the text and the prose the commentary, we may ask the same question, (viz), what is there in the Karikas to be explained by the prose passages 1 and 2, the professor's position will be difficult. He can justify the words सोयमात्मा चतुष्पात् as an introduction but the insertion of Pranava in the tika would be quite new. In the same way the omission in the prose passages of दक्षिणक्षिप्तुसे विश्वः etc., and

the nature, aim, etc., of creation which are so noteworthy in the Karikas can be hardly accounted for. On the contrary the traditionist can say that दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वः etc., is meant to assign places to Visva etc., and प्रभवः सर्वभावानां etc., are only the explanation of सर्वस्य योनिः of the prose section.

The professor then observes that the three important words (viz) Jagarita, Swapna and Susupta found in the prose are not found in the Karikas and this omission suggests that the Karikas are not explanatory passages of the prose.

We may point out that by dealing with Visva, Taijasa and Prajna, the persons who enjoy the three stages and showing their functions viz., स्थूलमुक् प्रविविक्त-मुक् and आनन्दमुक्, the author of the Karikas has mentioned the three stages.

Again the professor points out that the words Jagarita, Swapna and Susupta found in the prose passages are clearer than the words bahishprajna anthaprajna and ghanaprajna of the Karikas and hence the conclusion that the Karikas are older.

This remark is not fair because the words jagarita etc., are conventionally used to signify waking, dream and deep sleep and hence seem to be simpler than bahishprajna etc. But the words of the karikas bring out the definitions of waking, dream, and deep sleep and as such they are explanatory. Readers may refer to Vedantaparihasha where the same definitions are given to waking etc. (V. Parihasha VII). Waking is the stage in which outward objects are seen by the outer senses. Dream is the stage in which the mind alone is active etc.

Thus it is clear that the Karikas are clearer than the prose passages.

The professor then asks us to take up the prose passage

यत्नं सुप्तो न कश्चन कामं कामयते न कश्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत्सुप्तम् ।

सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयोऽहानन्दमुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः

and compare it with the corresponding Karikas. In the Karikas we have घनप्रज्ञ while in the prose we have प्रज्ञानघन. The professor suggests that the prose passage has changed घनप्रज्ञ as प्रज्ञानघन and introduced एकीभूतः from एकी भवति न पश्यतीत्याहुः etc., in Brhadaranyaka.

We can assure the professor that the word प्रज्ञानघन is older as it is found in the Brhadaranyaka (II-4 & IV 5) and the change as घनप्रज्ञ is adopted only to bring out the purport clearly. प्रज्ञानघन means intelligence-solid while घनप्रज्ञ means one whose nature is solid intelligence. The Upanishad itself explains the word प्रज्ञानघन by एकीभूत. Several instances may be given where the Sruti explains its own

words (1) (eg केनेषितं पतति प्रेषितम् Here प्रेषितं is intended to explain the word इषितम्.

(2) स उत्कामन् त्रियमाणः Here the former explains the latter word. The Karikas 10 to 18 of the 1st Chapter clearly bring out the purport of the prose passage नान्तः प्रज्ञे etc., Here the professor cannot take the contrary view that the Karikas are the text. Mere reading of the prose and the Karikas shows that the former is terse and brief while the latter is vivid and clear.

The professor then takes up the Karika 15.

विश्वस्वात्वविवक्षायामादिसामान्यमुक्तम् ।

मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादासि सामान्यमेव च ॥

and the corresponding prose 'जागरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोऽकारः प्रथमामात्रा आसेऽदिमत्वाद्वा etc., and says that he is convinced that a comparison of these two will at first sight persuade any body to believe that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the Brahmanas. This too is not convincing. In the prose passage the meaning of the word आसेः etc., is obscure since the import of the 5th case is not clear and the Karika (14) clearly brings out the purport that on account of the two similarities *apiti* & *adimatva* Visva and the letter, *a* should be considered one. The word वा used in the prose text is explained in the Karikas as signifying *and* (समुच्चय) and not *or* (विकल्प).

If according to the professor the Karikas were the text and the prose its commentary how can the introduction of fruit (फलश्रुति) in the latter आमेति ह वै सर्वान् कामान् etc be accounted. Surely a commentator cannot freshly introduce any new fruit.

The insertion of fruit in Karika 1-5 स भुञ्जानो न लिप्यते is however new in the Karikas but it has been explained by the Bhashya as natural and not anything to be understood by express statement.

The same is the case with Karikas I 21, 22 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11. Here the similarities referred to in the Upanishad are *miti* and *apiti* while in the Karikas they are *mana* and *laya*. The author of the Karikas has explained *miti* as *mana* (measure) and *apiti* as *laya*: *Apiti* is Vedic and so its explanation was necessitated.

The professor then raises another point namely that the conception of atman having four padas is not so explicit in the Karikas as in the Upanishad and this idea fully developed in the prose (2) goes to show the priority of the Karikas.

We may attribute this to the nature of the commentary. What is clearly stated in the text is not repeated in any commentary. That atman has four quarters (padas) has been stated clearly in the text and it requires no repetition.

The commentator takes for granted that atman has 4 quarters and the first three are Visva, Taijasa and Prajna, and he calls them by name in I 1, 2, 3, 11 and 12 and explicitly mentions the 4th pada as turiya I 10, 11 etc. When the fourth pada is called turiya it goes without saying that Visva and others are the first three padas.

Our professor then observes that the distinction between Turiya and the other three made in the Karikas I 10-15 has nothing corresponding in the Upanishad but the nature of Turiya expressed in K. I 29 by words Siva and द्वैतस्योपशमः is explained in the prose नान्तः प्रज्ञं etc.

If this were the fact then we must account for the usage of the word Turiya in the Karikas. The author who has not even classified the atman into four padas has no business to call him by the epithet Turiya. If the words शिव and प्रपञ्चोपशम are to be explained by the whole prose passages 7 and 12 how can नान्तः प्रज्ञं etc., find their places there. That the Turiya is distinct from Visva etc., is not the meaning of प्रपञ्चोपशम or शिव

If on the other hand the Karikas 1-15 are the expositions of the prose text नान्तः प्रज्ञं etc., everything fits in harmoniously.

First of all the Sruti mentions the 4th pada through the process of elimination since the atman has no attribute through which he may be described. The Karikas 10 and 11 निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानामीशानः represent the idea contained in the words नान्तः प्रज्ञं and न बहिः प्रज्ञम् of the Sruti. Karika 12 explains the words न प्रज्ञं of the text. Karikas 13, 14 and 15 show the reason why the first three padas are in the state of bondage.

The objection that atman who is described in the Upanishad as having four quarters has no trace in the karikas has been met with since the author of the Karikas has in mind that Visva etc., are atman's three padas when he mentions the fourth as turiya. Though the Karikas are an explanatory work on the Upanishad they need not repeat what is expressly stated there and needs no explanation.

Then the professor alleges that a comparison of prose 8 and the Karika I-24 will reveal that the latter is the text and the former the commentary and not vice versa.

Prose 8 is सोयमात्माध्यक्षरमोङ्कारः etc and the corresponding Karika is ओङ्कारं पादशो विधातु etc. The same idea is expressed in the Karika with the addition न संशयः and न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत्. These additions are intended to help the meditator

to strengthen his belief that padas and matras are one, and to divert him from brooding over the fruits.

In the opposite view the prose which is explanatory will be defective in so far as it omits न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत्

The professor's last argument is this. Karika I. 6. प्रभवः सर्वभावानां may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upanishad प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् but the Karika explaining only प्रभव and not even touching apyaya or Pralaya would hardly be possible if the Karikas were meant to explain the Upanishad.

Sri Sankara in explaining the prose passage 6. says that He is yoni or material cause since he is the locus of birth and destruction (प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम्) What is laid down here is only that He is the material cause and this is explained in the Karika I. 6. Thus it will be seen that Karika 6 is not the explanation of the first part of the compound प्रभवाप्यय and therefore the omission to explain apyaya is justified.

Moreover the aims of creation presented in the Karikas 8 and 9 should be taken for pralaya also and the word सृष्टि (I. 8) implies creation and destruction.

In concluding the subject the professor observes that though most of the quotations of Madhvacharya may not be traceable in any book existent at any time, yet in the present case we have to accept his view that the mantras or Karikas are older and on them is based our Mandukya Upanishad.

I think the upholders of Madhva philosophy will not accept that the professor has correctly represented the view of Sri Madhva. Sri Madhva has often said in unmistakable terms that the Upanishads are parts of the Vedas and hence they are apourusheya (not of human origin.) They are beginningless. How then could the Karikas, be older than the prose which forms another part of the Upanishad? Of course the Brahmana part of the Vedas is admitted to be the explanation of Mantras. But in the present case what is there to prove that the Karikas are the mantras and the prose the Brahmana. We can show many prose mantras in the Veda (eg इषे त्वा etc) and the Mandukya Upanishad also is the Mantropanishad.

When a mantra is followed by Brahmana as in Taittiriya the mantra सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म etc., is followed by the Brahmana तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः the latter is recognised to be explanatory to the former. But when at the end of the prose passages the Karikas are introduced as in Brhadaranyaka तदेते ब्रह्मा मयति (4-4) nobody will accept that the previous prose passages are a commentary upon the forth-coming verses.