

35. *Ibid.* p. 134.
36. *Ibid.* p.135.
37. *Ibid.* p. 138.
38. *Ibid.* p.22.
39. In the *Meno* Plato propounded the doctrine of *anamnesis* or recollection, though he later abandoned it for the theory of Forms. Descartes also supported such a theory in *Meditation II* where he argued for innate ideas.
40. R. Descartes, *Meditation III* in E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (eds) *Philosophical Writings*, G. Britain, Nelson Paperbacks, 1970, pp.76, ff.
41. E.M. Conford, *The Republic of Plato*, London, OUP, 1945, Book VI, 505-509B.
42. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op.cit.* p.22.
43. *Ibid.* p.133.
44. James L. Christian, *Philosophy : An Introduction to the Art of Wondering*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977, p.537.
45. L. Von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and Minds*, New York, George Brazillar, 1967, p.92 of M. Polanyi's discussion of the personal coefficient in the task of knowledge acquisition in *Personal Knowledge*, London, Routledge and K. Paul Ltd, 1973, p.303.
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47. J.L. Christian, *Philosophy*, *op.cit.* p.537.
48. *Ibid.* p.42.
49. J. Rajchman and C. West, (eds), *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, Chapters 1,2,8,9 and 11.
50. J.L. Christian, *Philosophy*, *op.cit.* p.233.
51. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op.cit.* p.133.
52. *Ibid.* p.133.
53. *Ibid.* p.133.
54. *Ibid.* p.134.
55. *Ibid.* p.135.
56. *Ibid.* p.135.
57. I wish to acknowledge the thorough and useful comments, questions and corrections of Mrs. Ed. Brandon on the draft of this paper, particularly with regard to the interpretation of Dummett's work and the logical issues raised in the essay. Whatever errors remain are mine to bear, not his.

## THE MANDUKYA UPANISAD AND KARIKAS : THE ADVAITIC APPROACH

(0). I am deeply grateful to my teachers, Professor Ashok Gangadecan, Haverford College, USA, and Shri. Devarao Kulkarni, *Vedānta Kāryalaya*, Bangalore, for introducing me to *Advaita Vedānta*, and for continuing to nurture my apprenticeship in *Advaitic Thought*.

1.00. This paper attempts an introduction to the *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* and *Kārikās*. An aim of this paper is to curb blatant misconceptions about the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. The explication here definitely shows that the line of interpretation favoured by Bradley York Bartholomew in his "Inner Self Located" (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4) has no foundation in the *Upaniṣads*. B.Y. Bartholomew seems to suggest that the *Turiya* is a cavity inside the brain. This conclusion is simply ridiculous.

1.001. The *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* has some relevance to the ontological difficulties which naturally erupt when one distinguishes the "mind" and that which is "external" to the mind. Instead of immediately entering the *Upaniṣad*'s core, it seems beneficial to prepare by first critiquing various views which have emerged regarding this distinction. The reason for doing so is to elicit a sense of the philosophical arena within which the *Upaniṣadic* insights are relevant. In this way we will become acquainted with the conceptual tools necessary for reading the *Upaniṣad*. This is very important because the *Upaniṣad* is not situated at the level of presenting views about the world/ reality; rather the *Upaniṣad* investigates the very fact that it is possible to articulate differing views concerning reality.

1.01. The distinction of matter and mind seems: chairs, the sun, space, the physical body, etc., are considered "material," and the mind is considered the "immaterial," or, simply, "the mind." The mind is

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commonly thought to be waking, (when awake) dreaming (when dreaming) and deep sleeping (when deep sleeping). That it is not the mind, understood as the "immaterial," which is "undergoing" these "changes" (i.e., waking - dreaming - deep sleeping - waking-....) is one of the conclusions put forward by the *Upaniṣad*. This is, however, not of immediate concern since the positions outlined below do not utilize the ontological information available in all the "three states" in their attempt at discerning the nature of existence. The positions below restrict the foundations of their respective analyses to the knowledge obtainable in the waking state.

1.10. We may roughly present these positions as possible responses to an ontological puzzle which seems to emerge when one distinguishes the material from the immaterial:

(a) Is the "internal-mind" "prior" or is it the "external-material" which is the truly "primary"?

1.11. We can now see the outlines of two broad, mutually exclusive positions regarding (a) :

*Position 1:* The mind is theorized to be an expression of the functioning of the brain; much like the relationship between heart beat and the heart respectively. It is held that the body (brain) is being primary, and thus matter is the ontological "cause" of the mind. There might be two variations:

(1) The nature of mind is such that the material world "structures" mind - mind is analogous to a "blank tablet."

(2) The nature of mind is such the mind is "structuring" what is external to it. Yet, matter is still paramount. This is akin to notions where consciousness is said to "shape" phenomena, and yet consciousness is dependent on matter to exist.

*Position 2 :* Mind/consciousness is asserted to be supporting matter. Accepting this view might yield two sub-positions:

(1) Individual minds cause their respective bodies/brains; however, the external object structure the individual minds.

(2) There is only one mind which is causing everything else, and it is also structuring everything (solipsism perhaps).

1.12. Both the above hierarchies<sup>2</sup> seem plausible (in at least the sense that they may be considered philosophical positions). But is this situation satisfying? There seems no ground for certainty if one subscribes to either of the hierarchies by the very fact that an opposing hierarchy exists.

1.13. Postulating that existence is, in its very nature, contradictory is not the proper approach to resolving this, for existence/reality (understood in the broadest possible sense) is the very standard of ontological harmony. This suggests that we encounter mutually exclusive hierarchies (Position 1 vs. Position2)<sup>3</sup> because the manner in which we are *thinking* about reality does not reflect of reality's harmonious<sup>4</sup> nature. The faulty mode of thinking seems (term this "Logic 1"):  $X = X$  where "X" stands for any type of distinction. (X might be a certain belief, a certain state of affairs, any "this.") If Logic 1 is faulty, then Logic 1 must not exist. That is, when Logic 1 is considered inappropriate, then another "logic" (term this Logic2) must be operating (since existence is operational), but one may not be aware of Logic2's nature even though one must always be utilizing it/functioning within it. (This is analogous to the way in which one might live under gravity's influence while being unaware of its existence.) Mutually exclusive hierarchies exist because we have a mistaken way of thinking (Logic1) about what it means for something to be distinct from something else.

1.14. The nature of Logic 1 and how theorizing under its influence seems to lead to contradictions need further articulation. Holding that a "section/segment/part" of reality is ontologically capable of existing by itself (or independently of the other segments) is the essence of Logic 1. It is only when one adheres to this supposition can one hold that a part "supports" other parts, or that a part is "prior" to another part (and one can then proceed to hypothesize a ontological hierarchy such as Position 1 or Position2). A strategy, then, for establishing Logic 1's inappropriateness is to show how hierarchies are untenable. If we find contradictions at the very core of hierarchies, we may then conclude that the manner of thinking that led us to believe in the validity of the hierarchies, Logic 1, must be false:

Position 1: Matter 'causes' mind. (A is the ontological cause of B)

This is senseless since, strictly speaking,  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$  ( $A \neq B$ ). The only way this might be true is if mind is reducible to matter. But this is blatantly false because, for example, if one is thinking of a tomato, one's brain, the matter, is not physically turning into a tomato.

Position 2: Mind causes matter.

Again this seems meaningless since  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$ .

So why do we even begin to make statements like, "A causes B"?

It is because we have a certain naive approach to reality - we think that segments of reality (mind or matter in this case) can exist "independently" of other segments (Logic 1), and this leads us to propose that one segment may be causing another's being. However, nothing can ever be the ontological basis for anything else (if that thing is to maintain its identity as what it is), therefore Logic 1 seems mistaken.

1.15. Logic 2 is ( $\sim$ Logic 1). Thus Logic 2 is condensable as:  $X = (\sim Y)$ ,  $Y = (\sim X)$  where "X" and "Y" represent different "points of distinction". If X is *any* point of difference/segment of reality (beliefs, theories, a grain of sand, space, and "this"), then that segment is that segment because no other segment is that segment, and the truth of this is not based upon that segment being that segment (i.e., not upon  $X = X$ ). Under Logic 1,  $X = (\sim Y)$  was obviously true if  $X = X$  and if  $X \neq Y$ . But we have already discarded  $X = X$ , therefore, Logic 2 does not assert a relationship between segments; rather it concerns the very existence of segments. For example, a grain of sand is that grain of sand because another grain of sand is not that grain of sand, a tree is not that grain of sand, a thought is not that grain of sand, a monkey is not that grain of sand, and briefly, the rest of existence is not that grain of sand. Under Logic 2, existence is literally a "sea of difference" where no "section" is identical to another "section" of existence. Two "sections," however, may resemble one another. We are not here positively characterizing Logic 2, for Logic 2 is strictly nothing more than the negation of Logic 1. We may remind ourselves that Logic 1 is a manner of approaching difference, and thus Logic 2 signifies approaching reality while not being in the "mode" of Logic 1.

1.20. The *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* investigates reality while being cognizant of the inadequacies of Logic 1. As we discuss the main body of the *Upaniṣad*, we shall hopefully see better what exactly is meant by Logic 1, and also see that rejecting Logic 1 leads to the statement, "Existence is One without a second". It should be noted that by rejecting Position 1's and Position 2's source, Logic 1, the *Māndūkya* renders Position 1 and Position 2 irrelevant to a full understanding of existence.<sup>5</sup> The *Upaniṣad* scrutinizes the deep sleep, dreaming and waking "states" in Logic 2's mode of thinking. Since Logic 1 is abandoned, the ontological features of all the three states are given equal weight in determining the nature of existence. Under Logic 1's influence, it was easy to consider the waking as the "primary" state which gave rise to the other. But adopting Logic 2 demands a revised approach which examines the three states without ontological prejudice.

1.21. The first observation is that waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "interwoven". One does not, as it were, "hop" from waking to dreaming to deep sleeping, as though these were three absolutely separate states. There is continuity, ontological harmony. The states seem to melt into one another - there is no clash within this process. This melting of one state "into" the other seems akin to a "shift in emphasis." That is, it is not the case that upon waking, for example, that we are disconnected to the dreaming or to the deep sleeping. The latter states seem to "recede," or lose their emphasis, so to speak; they do not utterly disappear when one "wakes up". Similarly, upon "going to sleep", the waking world does not disappear; rather, the shutting of the sensory organs leads to the "bringing to the fore-front" what were already "there": dreaming and deep sleeping. We will see how the fact of the occurrence of "shifts in emphasis, and the fact that we are aware of the "shifting" are crucial to the *Māndūkya's* assertion that reality is "One without a second".

1.22. The Second observation is that waking and dreaming states are characterized by differences while the deep sleeping state is without difference. That is, in the dreaming and waking states of one's experience, differences are experienced (and thus these are "dual states"), while in the deep sleep state, differences are absent (and thus this is the "not-dual/singular state").<sup>6</sup>

1.23. The deep sleep state is such that the difference between the self, or "I" and what is "outside" the "I" seems non-existent. Differences do not seem to exist when one is deep sleeping. Thus, the "I," *when considered as something which is identifiable as different*, does not exist within deep sleep. Therefore, there are no "experiences", within deep sleep since there needs to exist an "experiencer", and an "experienced" for experience to occur). Therefore, the "experience" of deep sleep is not "experience" in the usual sense of "experience". Then, whence comes the conviction, "I was existing in deep sleep"? It must arise, it would seem, from the fact that one *was* the deep sleep.

1.24. Of the dream and waking states the following may be said: differences/segments/things in the former seem discontinuous, disorderly, chaotic at times, and in general unlike the continuity, order, and linearly progressive nature of the latter. This fact does not, however, prevent the question: "Is the ontological structure of the waking similar to that of the dreaming?" The first step toward answering this question is to discern the ontological nature of the dream. A clear conclusion seems that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dream state. To establish this, let us analyze the ontological components of the dream state. There seem to exist various differences/segments of the dream (and the "point of awareness" in the dream is also one of these differences-the "experiencer"). For example, suppose one is dreaming that one has wings and is flying in the sky. There exist the following relevant distinctions: the winged body, and the "locus" of awareness which is "doing" the experiencing, and the sky and various other "objects" of the dream. The "dream mind" is not identical to the sky, nor is it identical to the winged body - all three are distinct. Now, is Logic 1 applicable to any of these differences in the dream? Do any of these objects "self-exist" so that they are capable of supporting other aspects of the dream? Obviously not, because it is the dream itself which is being these distinctions and no one distinction is capable of causing the being of any other. Thus, though not obvious when dreaming, it is the "dream/dreamer" which is being the winged creature, the sky, the "dream-locus of awareness/dream mind", and any and all differences of the dream. Logic 1 would contradict this fact because under Logic 1, each of the differences is somehow self-existent, capable of causing, or being prior to the others. (Position 1 and Position 2 would then emerge by proposing different candidates as the truly self-existent. Position 1 would claim that

the winged body, the sky, etc., as primary (by labelling them "matter"), and Position 2 would claim the dream-point of awareness, ("mind") is the most primary. But the absurdity of such a conflict is obvious - none of the segments of the dream are self-existent; rather it is the dream which is existing as all of them.) Therefore, Logic 1 should be rejected as inappropriate to the dreaming state. Note here that the relationship between the dream and the various segments/differences of the dream is not of whole to a part, for each part is *fully* the dream-the dream is all that there is. This does not, however, deny the existence of differences in the dream; rather, differences are heightened, for no single point of difference can claim ultimate reality for itself. Now, given that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dreaming, what may be said of the nature of the waking?

1.25. The waking world/state is similar to the dreaming; and it might even be declared another kind of dream *qua* ontology - i.e., *qua* the fact that Logic 1 is inapplicable to both states<sup>7</sup>. Since this is a central notion, fully marshalling arguments seems desirable:

(a.25) As proposed in section 1.21., the three states seem to "melt" into one another. There is no "break" in the fabric of being as one wakes, dreams and deep sleeps. Thus, there is no reason not to suppose that the waking is a dream. This is not solipsism, for the *Māṇḍūkya* pauses to properly analyze the *ontology* of the dreaming state. It is not the case, in the dreaming, that the dream-subject's (the winged creature's, for example) mind is "giving rise" to the dream, rather it is the dream which is being every distinction in the dream. Similarly, the waking-subject's mind does not give rise to the waking state either; rather it is the "waker/waking" which must be *being* the entire waking state. The full argument unfolds thus; since Logic 1 is clearly inapplicable to the deep sleep, and since there seems to be a melting, or a *shifting of emphasis* from the deep sleep to the dreaming, Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dreaming. Similarly, Logic 1 is inapplicable to the waking world for the waking world is also a product of a shift in emphasis.

(b.25) Since the argument in 1.14. suggests that Logic 1 does not fit the ontology of the waking state, and since the dream also does not afford Logic 1, dreaming and waking must be similar, and both must reflect Logic 2. It should be strongly noted, however, that dreaming and waking remain different *qua* their differences. The similarity is ontologi-

cal, and, therefore, phenomenologically, the waking state may be considered more "concrete."

1.26. The above leads to the following further step: the "feeling" of "I" everyone is sometimes aware of, is that which is being the waking state, the dreaming state, and the deep sleeping state in the same way as the dream is being various differences in the dream. This is revealed when one says, "I slept", "I woke", "I dreamt". This "I" is the One without a second, the *Turiya*. For, the only way to account for the fact that we are indeed aware of the three "states" of our being, given that with each "shift" in emphasis from one state to the next, the respective selves (the waking body-mind, dream body-mind, the nothingness of deep sleep) in the states are "disappearing" into each other, is to posit that we are not restricted to any of these selves. Just as we know that we exist during deep sleep because we are deep sleep, we know we exist in dreaming because we are the dreaming, for otherwise, (if we were strictly the dream body-mind) the disappearance of the dream body-mind (which occurs while waking and deep sleeping) would mean that we would not possess any knowledge of having existed in dreaming. But we do have the recollection of having dreamt. This implies we are the dreaming while dreaming. Similarly, we are the waking state, and not just our respective waking body-minds.

1.261. To reiterate, if the "I" were exclusively the dream-self, then the disappearance of the dream-self/dream-body- mind-complex would have meant the annihilation of any sense of having existed during the dreaming. Similarly, one recollects that one was awake, because one is the waking, for if this were not so, the experience of the disappearance of the waking-self when dreaming (or deep sleeping) should have meant the loss of the memory of having existed. But the memory of having "been" persists through the shifts, and this is the "I", the *Turiya*. The "I" should not be considered as limited to the variety of differences (including the waking selves and dreaming selves) that might appear in dreaming and waking. Nor is it solely restricted to the "singularity" of deep sleep. This "I", the One without a second, stands in the same "relation" to dreaming, waking, and deep sleeping as the dream stands to the various differences of the dream. The One without a second is being all three states, and is the only existing. The steps to the realization of the One without a second is as follows:

(1) Since Logic 1 is not applicable to the waking state, the ontological nature of the waking state must be similar to the *ontological situation* in the dreaming, since Logical does not apply to the dreaming also. Therefore, the myriad of differences in the waking state are the "waking" itself, just as the numerous differences in the dreaming are dream itself.

This implies that the waking self (and all other distinctions in the waking) is really the waking.

Similar, the dreaming self=dreaming, and the deep sleep "self" =deep sleep.

(2) Observation: we are *aware* of having dream, slept and having been awake. Indeed we say "I woke", "I slept", "I dreamt". Thus, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "in continuum" with one another, and are not disconnected.

Now (1) and (2) imply

(3) Waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping must themselves be the being of the ultimate existence the "I". That is, the fact that the waking, dreaming and deep sleeping share the same ontological structure, Logic 2, and the fact that these exist in a continuum, and not disparately, suggests that what we were calling the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping is really the unifying principle, "*Turiya*," the very "I" which each one of us "feels" when one utters, "I".

Thus, the pattern of argument here renovates our understanding of the "I" (the immediate "feeling" that we all have-- and indeed the reader of this paper must be experiencing at this very moment) as follows:

(\*) We initially think the "I" to be one of the waking, dreaming, or deep sleeping selves (the waking self is the common candidate).

(\*\*) When we realize that these selves are actually *the* waking, *the* dreaming, and *the* deep sleeping respectively, we might be tempted to consider the "I" as one of these.

(\*\*\*) However, we must arrive at the further recognition, owing to the fact that we are aware/know that these states are not absolutely disconnected, that really, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are the "I", itself. That is, this "feeling" of "I", has always been, and is,

the three states, and thus It is all that there is, was, or will be. Calling the "I" "Turiya" does not gesture to some other fourth state, rather its intent is to capture the fact that we have cleared away mistaken notions (\*,\*\*) of the "I"'s nature.

1.2611. The *Turiya* is all distinctions -- there is no other outside it. It should not be confounded *with* the simple unity -- the one with a second, a third, a fourth, etc. The proper formulation is perhaps: everything is the "I" is not anything. All is It, but It is not in anything.<sup>8</sup> It cannot even be conceptualized as the "that which cannot be conceptualized". Knowing It is to recognize that one is always being It. In the context of the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* *Turiya* is Divinity, the only existing reality which is fully each one of us (understood as distinct waking-selves, dream-selves) and more. The One without a second is not the logical sum, [waking + dreaming + deep sleeping], for then the individual pieces (dreaming, deep sleeping and waking) would not be *fully* It. Note how this dissolves the initial ontological concern (a) of section 1.10, for the immaterial and the material have all been revealed to be the One without a second. The non-ontological issues concerning (a) can be left to the physicists.<sup>9</sup>

1.26111. There might arise a confusion here-- one might argue: if it is the case that, for example, mind is fully the *Turiya*, why then is it false to say that "mind causes matter" (Position 2)? The response to this is rather obvious: since the *Turiya* is also fully matter, we can also assert, "matter causes mind". This implies that "matter causes mind" and "mind causes matter" are equivalent. However, one usually means to exclude the possibility that "matter causes mind" when one asserts "mind causes matter" when one is operating outside of Logic 1.

1.262. Since all this is quite subtle, presenting a thorough rewording of the argument seems appropriate:

(a) *In the waking state*, one recollects three states of being -- dreaming, waking and deep sleeping. *When awake*, one usually considers the three "states" as follows: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Call the self which reasons thus, "The question that is being posed of the waking state is: Does the waking have the same "ontological structure" that the dream possesses?

(b) *In the dreaming state*, one is also capable of recollecting three states of being -- one might *dream* that there are "three states". That is, one can *dream* that one has a body which "rests", and a mind which dreams and deep sleeps. One then, when *dreaming*, might say: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Let us call the self in the dream which is capable speaking so, "the dream-self". The ontological structure of the dreaming is: there exists a dream-self (that point of "awareness" which might be accompanied or might be unaccompanied by a "body"), various other "objects", which are distinct from this dream-self and with which the dream-self interacts, and finally, the "dream" itself -- which is *fully* being the dream-self and the various other differences in the dream. Now, *within the confines of the dream*, none of the various distinct elements of the dreaming can conceive as an "entity",<sup>10</sup> the dream/dreaming. For, meaning can only be achieved by the activity of delineation, and the dream is not distinguishable in the dream. That is, in a dream, only "sections" of the dream may be articulated meaningfully. Thus, attempting to utter, "the dream" in a meaningful manner fails (*qua the dreaming -- we do, however, possess a meaningful notion of the dream since we can distinguish the dream from the waking, and from the deep sleep -- but we are incapable of defining the One without a second because the Turiya stands in the same relation to the three states as the dream does to its segments*). What can be asserted, or *known* meaningfully by any entity *in the dreaming* is precisely the fact outlined here: the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream cannot be known. Thus, though the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream, the dream-self may "recognize" itself as being the dream. (Similarly, I can come to *recognize* that I am *Turiya*, however, I cannot *characterize* myself as a "this".)

(c) *In deep sleeping*, one is the deep sleeping, and it is because of this fact that one is able to later recollect, "I deep slept". Because there is literally no notion of "another" in deep sleep, and indeed there is no "notion", including the notion, "there is no notion", it is impossible that one could have experienced deep sleep while being distinct from it. Thus, one is not distinct from the deep sleep while deep sleeping.

(d) Of the relationship between the dreaming and deep sleeping, there is not much room for controversy since it is easily seen that dreaming and deep sleeping are in "one continuum" --that is, the dream is nothing other than a "shift out" of the deep sleeping. An interesting query, however, arises regarding the waking state: is the ontological situation of the dreaming (the "relation" previously discerned between the dream, and the various entities of the dream) applicable to the waking? One might ask oneself, "Is this waking-body, and waking-mind really the 'waking' just as the dream-mind and dream-body are the dream?" As the first step toward a response, let us examine the main reason which might hinder such an assertion. That reason seems to be rooted in the sentiment that the waking-mind, or the "point of awareness" in the waking is in fact what became the dream, and the deep sleep. Thus, one may be led to believe that there is no justification for instituting the ontological structure of the dreaming to the waking. This sentiment is not, however, sufficient reason for rejecting the ontological similarity, for such a sentiment might be present even while dreaming -- that is, such a sentiment is quite possible in dreaming -- where, obviously, the ontological situation in question holds. That is, it is quite possible to *dream* such that one "wakes up" from another dream. While *dreaming*, one can feel exactly what one might feel when "awake": "I was dreaming, and my mind was that dream, and it was my mind which also deep slept." Therefore, the existence of this sentiment can never be sound reason for rejecting the imposition of the ontological structure of the dream on to the waking. One may, however, object that the occurrence of this sentiment in the waking deserves "greater value" than the occurrence of the sentiment in the dream because of the "greater order" of the waking. In other words, the fact that the waking world seems to be "regulated" when contrasted with the dreaming is reason enough for weighing the arising of the sentiment in the waking in a higher stead than the arising of this sentiment in the dreaming. For, one may say, in a dream anything might occur at any moment, but in the waking, there is a certain consistent "movement of phenomena". For example, in a dream one might turn into a goat, but such an occurrence is impossible in the waking. However, this objection does not seem sustainable, for:

(1) We must first observe that these arguments are being considered in the waking state, therefore, one must show care by not allowing the vivacity of the waking to become overwhelming.

(2) Since the same sentiment (that of thinking the "dream" to be a function of the "waking") might arise both in a "ordered" situation and in a "disordered" situation, how "ordered" is the ordered situation (waking) given the fact that when one is in fact "in" the disordered situation (dreaming), one perceives not that disorder, but in fact considers that disorder the very nature of order?

There is surely a difference between the waking and the dreaming. It is a fact that the phenomena, or "occurrences" in the waking are different from those of the occurrences in a dream. Does this, however, entail that the sentiment arising in the dream is inferior to the sentiment arising in the waking? Such a move can only be an assumption, a "labelling" of one set of phenomena as "superior" in their "reality" than another set of phenomena. Indeed, such a labelling is no different than when one asserts *in a dream* (call this dream 1), after having dreamed of having woken up from a dream (call this dream 2), "dream was disorderly, I am now in the 'ordered state'". The truth of the matter is that one has moved from one dream to another (where the phenomena are different-- that is how one distinguishes between dream 1 and dream 2, while being in dream 1), and this fact does not entail a movement from one ontological structure into an utterly different ontological state. These conclusions seem to suggest that there cannot exist any arguments based upon the phenomena occurring in the waking state which oppose the introduction of the dream's ontological structure to the waking. Again, this is true because, regardless of what phenomenon of the waking state is offered as an objection to the conclusion that the waking has the same ontological structure as the dreaming, the mere occurrence of that phenomenon can never exclude the possibility that the waking and the dreaming have the same ontological structure because that very phenomenon could have occurred in a situation where the ontological structure in question was operational. (I.e., the same phenomenon could have occurred in a dream, therefore, the mere occurrence of the phenomenon in the waking-- such as the sentiment that the dream is the waking mind-- cannot shed light on the nature of the ontological structure applicable to the waking world.) Thus, asserting that it is the "waker"/waking which is fully being the various differences in the waking (space, the moon, stars, planets, human beings, animals -- all the distinctions present in the waking universe) in the same manner that the dream is fully being the various differences in the dream seems quite plausible.

(e) It remains to suggest arguments for introducing the ontological structure of dreaming to the waking. The "flow" from one state into

another seems a sound reason for supposing ontological similarity, for it would seem that it is impossible for one ontological situation to be meshed with a completely different ontological situation. The "flow"/"shift of emphasis" argument, however, depends on considering the dreaming and the waking as equally real (or equally false)-- that is, analyzing the fact of the "melting" without regard to the "reality" and "unreality" issue (which is actually a species of "primary" and "secondary"). Even though it is not precise to speak of "real" and "unreal" regarding the three state, it may be instructive to utilize those sentiments in our arguments. To "real" and "unreal" let us associate Logic 1 and Logic 2 respectively. It may be asserted: Dreams are unreal, and Logic 2 is applicable to dreams, therefore, Logic 2 is unreal. This implies that the waking world is real, and Logic 1 is applicable to the waking, therefore Logic 1 is real. However, this statement is being asserted *while* awake. *While* dreaming, the dream is being considered real by the dream-mind: thus, *while* dreaming, it may be asserted that the dreaming is real, therefore Logic 1 is applicable to the dream. Now, if dreaming is considered real in the dream, there must be something unreal by virtue of which the real can be the real. This implies that the waking becomes the unreal, therefore, Logic 2 must be applicable to the waking state. Now this is a peculiar situation, for depending on the state, one is compelled to interchange the ontological structures: while dreaming, Logic 1 seems applicable to the dream, and Logic 2 to the waking, and while awake, Logic 1 is applicable to the waking, and Logic 2 to the dreaming. This suggests three possibilities: both the waking and dreaming "have" both Logic 1 and Logic 2, or both waking and dreaming have Logic 1, or both waking and dreaming have Logic 2. The first possibility, that of "both Logic 1 and Logic 2", can be disregarded as obviously contradictory-- Logic 1 and ~Logic 1 cannot both be true at once. Regarding the latter possibilities, if we restrict the investigation to the waking and dreaming states, there seems nothing which will enable us to determine the correct ontological structure-- it might be Logic 1 or Logic 2 (over-looking for the moment the arguments presented in previous sections of this paper against Logic 1). The deep sleep state must now be brought under consideration, for this state is clearly "in continuum" with the waking and the dreaming. Obviously, in deep sleep, Logic 1 is inapplicable, for the deep sleep is without any distinction. The question of the self-existence of "segments" does not arise at all in deep sleep. Therefore, we may conclude that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the waking and the dreaming since the dreaming and the waking "melt" "in" and "out"

of the deep sleep. Thus, Logic 2 (~Logic 1) must be operating in the waking and dreaming.

(f) Once the ontological similarity between dreaming and waking is accepted, the *next* step is to demand the answer to this question: "What is the relationship between the waking, the dreaming, and the deep sleeping?" Given that we have intimate knowledge of having existed throughout these "states," these states are "in" a continuum. That is, since the knowledge of "having been" in these state does not arise from any one of the "selves" of the dreaming or waking, since these selves fail to persist in the deep sleep (and indeed, they fail to persist at all -- the waking and dreaming worlds are always changing, and as Hume says, there is no persistence of identity, rather, the idea of identity is superimposed upon resembling and contiguous phenomena), the dreaming, the deep sleeping and the waking are in fact the One without a second, the *Turiya*, *Brahman*, *Ātman*, the Self. The *Turiya* holds the same relationship to the "three states" as the waking and dreaming hold to their respective segments. The waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping, however, are different from one another; therefore, they are conceptualizable, while the *Turiya*, the One without a second, defies any such characterization by being fully all of these states. The *Turiya*, is not something remote. It is right here, right now, the very "I" which is reading this paper. This analysis, then, should not be interpreted as the articulation of a hierarchy -- it is not the case that the *Turiya* is at the "top". It is top, bottom, and middle. The *Turiya* is the waking, the *Turiya* is the dreaming, the *Turiya* is the deep sleeping.<sup>11</sup> It ought to be noted that the waking, dreaming and deep sleeping are different from one another though they are "unified" in *Turiya*. This is maintainable because we reject Logic 1 as the appropriate mode for understanding difference.

1.27 Listing some objections and responding to them should help further clarify the above:

*Objection 1:* Why does not the world disappear when someone is deep sleeping/dreaming (if indeed the *Māṇḍūkya* is accurate)?

*Response:* This objection assumes that the *Māṇḍūkya* is propounding a sort of solipsism. The objection misinterprets the *Māṇḍūkya*



as asserting that the One without a second is an individual's mind (such that when that individual is dreaming, the waking is converted to dream.) Rather, the *Māṇḍūkya*'s analysis has been pointing to the inadequacy of considering the dream-subject as having any impact, say, on the dream itself when one is dreaming. For example, suppose Z is dreaming that he is talking to some person, say Q. Z shakes Q's hands, and Z is also thinking thoughts, just as he does had he met Q when awake. Z seems to possess both a body and a mind in the dream. Now it is not the dream-mind which is being the dream (for the dream mind is precisely not the dream-body, or other distinctions in the dream-the dream mind, however, in the deeper sense, is the dream, but in this deeper sense, there is nothing but the dream - in the deeper sense the statement "dream-mind is the dream" is equivalent to the assertion, "the dream-sky is the dream"). Z's dream body and Z's dream mind (both of which are distinct from Q) cannot have "given rise" to Q, and the rest of the dream. And since Z's waking body and waking mind are similar to a dream body and mind, the former pair can even less be said to be upholding the dreaming, let alone the waking.

*Objection 2:* The waking-self does not disappear upon dreaming or deep sleeping, owing to the fact that someone perceives the waking body in a "restful" state - perhaps lying on a bed. Moreover, scientists see brain-wave patterns, etc., in sleeping person. Therefore, the entire analysis here is utterly mistaken.

*Response:* One may conceivably make the same argument while dreaming, where there are no doubts regarding the ontological nature (though it is possible that all types of doubts may creep in while dreaming). Therefore, this objection fails. Further, the change from the waking to the dreaming selves is not dissimilar from the changes which occur in the waking phenomena themselves - everything is in flux - the body and mind are always changing, and so is everything else. Thus, it might be said that the body of one moment is not the body of the next moment. Has not the old body disappeared? How are we to grapple with these ontological issues? The *Māṇḍūkya* responds by recognizing all this to be That (One without a second). Thus, the fact that there are brain waves etc., is true insofar as it is true - they are all fully true/real in that they are One without a second.

*Objection 3:* The argument here seems entirely like the "Poori Dough" hypothesis. Such a formulation is blatantly absurd. That is, to say "all this is One without a second" is analogous to saying that existence is a mass of Poori Dough - some same "stuff" which constitutes everything.

*Response:* This is a dangerous confusion. Let us explore the Poori Dough hypothesis. Let us imagine a mass of Dough. Imagine that two figures "X" and "Y" are sculpted from the Dough such that the quantity of Dough in X is greater than the quantity of Dough in Y. Now, we must ask the question, "Is the Dough that constitutes X identical to Y's dough?" Clearly, the answer is "No." For the Dough which is in X is in X, and in addition, the Dough in X is of greater mass than the Dough which is in Y. But the ontological nature of a dream is different. Each "segment" of the dream is *fully* the dream. It is not the case that there are smaller quantities of dream in different entities in the dream- all are the dream, and the dream is restricted to no single one of them. Similarly, the *Turiya* is fully everything. Existence itself is *Turiya*.

1.30, The *Māṇḍūkya* considers the purpose of this analysis to be therapeutic. The ethical approach is thus psychological, aimed at renovating one's *thinking* from that of Logic 1 to that of Logic 2. The cause of fear, which seems at the root estrangement from the "other," is deemed to be Logic 1, for it is Logic 1 which proposes that one exists independently of the other. Rejecting Logic 1 affords a way of accepting the fact that there are differences without this fact impinging upon the fact that everything is unified. Logic 1 is what makes difference and unity seems contradictory and problematic, but reality (which seems diverse in its unity) cannot be a problem, for reality/existence is the very standard by virtue of which one knows what it means for something to be problematic or otherwise. What is contradictory is Logic 1, not existence.

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Notes

1. "Primary" "prior," and similar words are used equivalently throughout this paper. They are meant to highlight ontological status. For example, the ontological status associated with "brain" in the sentence, "brain causes mind" leads us to say, "the brain is primary." "Causality" here is to be comprehended ontologically and not in the sense of the causality involved in someone kicking a football. I.e., the concern here is not with the efficient cause, to use Aristotle's term.
2. Roughly, whatever the possible variety, Position 1 places body, objects on "top" of a "ladder of primacy" while Position 2 places consciousness/ mind on top.
3. Now, the same opposition might be seen within the general position--deciding between the various permutations--these will be "sub positional" conflicts. If it be objected here that we have a fine method of choosing between one position or another based upon, say, "scientific investigation", we can surely argue, "why consider a certain methodology of approaching phenomena as leading to the truth?" Is not such a move (that of "science") ultimately based upon the *supposition* of the validity of such an approach? We must remember further that science might help us discover causal chains--the "occurring" of phenomena in a certain order, but does this mean that it aids in the discovery of ontological primacy? Whatever may be the case, surely there exist mutually opposed ontological possibilities regarding the mind and body, the material and the immaterial, and complex issues therein. Their existence is itself philosophically significant.
4. The mere fact that mind, body, and objects interact smoothly.
5. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, Chapter IV, Verse 5. *Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya* Volume 2. Translated by Swāmi Gambhīrānanda (Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 5 Delhi Entally Road, 700014). Seventh Edition, 1989. (All references to Verses from this source.)
6. *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, Verses 3,4,5.
7. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, Chapter II, Verse 4.
8. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, Chapter I, Verse 7.
9. There can be a legitimate physics, for the waking state is not a dream insofar as "disorder" is concerned. Thus, we can be certain of causality of the sort seen in the kicking of a football. But what this causality entails has been renovated. That is, the situation is similar to what might happen

- in a dream where someone kicks a football: of course the football has been kicked, but the kicker, the ball, the fact that the ball travels, are all fully the dream. Therefore, from the perspective of the dream itself, there has been no kicking, or causality. Similarly, all that exists is said to be One without a second, and in this sense, there is no kicking, nor causing, nor body, nor mind, nor anything, but only the One without a second.
10. By "entity" or "a point of difference" we mean to signify any difference whatsoever. That is, "X" is an "entity" if X is in any way different from some "Y". Thus, for example, "mind" is an "entity" just as chair is an entity if by "mind" one means something different from what "chair" signifies. This feature seems to be in the very heart of meaning -- if one is to successfully mean something, one has to distinguish something from something.
  11. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, Chapter I, Verse 1.

## Culture, Genre and the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*: philosophical inconsistency, historical uncertainty, or textual discontinuity?

STEPHEN KAPLAN

**ABSTRACT** Daniel H. H. Ingalls referred to Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, a very early Advaita text, as '... the most puzzling perhaps, of all Sanskrit philosophical texts'. This article shows that some of the philosophical quandaries associated with this text are the result of inappropriately imposing a graphic and prose model of textuality upon a text composed in the *kārikā* (memorial verse) genre and in an oral cultural context. Developing a model of textuality consistent with the literary genre and cultural context, the article is not only able to resolve some of the philosophical problems associated with the text, but also raises the possibility that this inappropriate hermeneutical process has contributed to mislabelling Gauḍapāda as an idealist.

There have been a number of excellent studies recently on both the general issue of orality and textuality as well as the important role of orality in India. From the former we have learned how indebted we are to a graphic model of textuality and all that is associated with that. From the latter, we have learned that India, above all cultures, prized orality not because it lacked the ability to produce graphic texts; but rather, because India believed that oral textuality was the preferred method of instruction and learning.

This paper will bring the significance of these studies to bear on a specific text—namely, Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (MK). [1] This text, apparently the earliest extant text within the history of the Advaita Vedānta school of Hinduism, was composed in an oral cultural context and in the *kārikā* (memorial verse) genre. It is my contention that these two factors affected the boundaries in which philosophical statements were made. My thesis is that the literary genre of the MK afforded the author the ability to present a text which revelled in discontinuity while the oral cultural context was utilised to supply the continuity. I will show that important philosophical interpretations of this text have ignored the significance of these two factors to the detriment of the hermeneutical process.

Contemporary readers, employing a primarily graphic model of texts, have often lost sight of the discontinuity and dynamism that are inherent in this text and as such hermeneutical problems have arisen. Following the scholarship of Graham [2] and Kelber [3], we must be cognisant of the characteristics that are inherent in oral textuality. These characteristics include dynamism, evanescence, personalism, and the presence of intervals, vacuums and gaps. We must also be leery of utilising the notion of linearity to comprehend texts composed in an oral context. Linearity, associated with the written text, can create 'the illusion of orderly succession'. [4] It can make us forget

the gaps and discontinuity that existed in the oral context and lead us to impose inappropriate standards for the reading of the *MK*.

The discontinuity of thought that I believe characterises parts of the *MK* must be distinguished from an inconsistency of thought. The former exhibits gaps in thinking while the latter exhibits conflicts in thinking. The discontinuity of thought within the *MK* is sometimes mistaken for an inconsistency of thought. The alleged inconsistencies are attributed either to the lack of philosophical prowess of the author or to historical alterations and uncertainties surrounding the text. A major thrust within the study of the *MK* has been to dissolve the philosophical enigmas by resolving the historical quagmires. This procedure rests upon the assumption that the *urtext* was philosophically less enigmatic and that historical tinkering has altered the consistency and/or clarity of the text.

In this paper I will contend that at least some parts of the original text may never have read more clearly, more consistently, or less enigmatically. Reading the text may have always produced such queries because this text was not primarily read. It was presented in an oral culture in which the textual discontinuity would have been the stops in which the guru imparted the knowledge of the text to the student. Therefore, in what follows I will try to show that: (1) textual discontinuity exists at points within the *MK*; (2) this discontinuity should not be overlooked when reading this text; (3) it should not be labelled inconsistency of thought; and (4) we are not at liberty to remove this discontinuity from the *MK* as if it were an historical accretion resulting from either the inclusion or exclusion of textual material.

To advance this position, five points must be acknowledged. First, I am not challenging the notion that there are numerous historical uncertainties surrounding the *MK*; nor do I underestimate the value of resolving these historical uncertainties. However, my contention is that resolving the historical problems associated with this text is not the only method by which we should approach this text. As we will see, it has certainly been a predominant approach to this text. Second, this paper rests upon the assumption that literary genre, cultural context, and philosophical expression are inextricably intertwined in religious texts such as the *MK*. While this assumption will be discussed below, it should be noted that I do not expect that knowledge of these two factors will resolve all the puzzles associated with this text. Such information is a useful tool that will allow us to resolve some of the discrepancies. [5] Third, this paper presupposes that the *MK* can be classified according to genre. Here we will follow traditional Indian genre classifications. Fourth, my position does not rest upon the assumption that the *MK* was originally composed as an oral text. This text may have been composed in a written format or it may have been composed orally. Regardless of the original nature of its production—written or oral—my contention is that this text was presented in an oral culture and must be understood with that in mind. [6] Finally, while this type of analysis may be extended to other texts, it is not the intent of this paper to claim that all *kārikā* type texts exhibit philosophical discontinuity; nor even that all *kārikā* type texts composed in an oral context do. My contention is solely that philosophical discontinuity does flourish in this text composed within an oral context and recorded in the *kārikā* genre.

In order to develop this thesis, this paper will first focus upon Gauḍapāda and the controversies surrounding this text. This overview will allow us to see how much historical uncertainty exists and it will provide some inkling of the philosophical consequences of this uncertainty. The next section of this paper will focus on what we know about the *MK*—namely, the literary genre and the cultural context—rather than

focussing on what we do not know. A review of the first *prakaraṇa* (book) of the *MK* will illuminate a pattern of discontinuity that has been seen by others to be either philosophically problematic or an indication of historical tampering. This pattern will then be utilised to briefly raise one of the chief issues surrounding Gauḍapāda—namely, was Gauḍapāda an idealist?

### Gauḍapāda and the *MK*: The Uncertainties

Daniel H. H. Ingalls has referred to the *MK* as ‘... the most puzzling perhaps, of all Sanskrit philosophical texts’. [7] While I do not wish to debate which Sanskrit philosophical text is the most puzzling, there is no denying that any overview of the *MK* and Gauḍapāda that goes beyond traditional Advaita accounts is riddled with philosophical puzzles and uncertainties. The Advaita tradition maintains that Gauḍapāda was the teacher’s teacher (*paramaguru*) of the illustrious Śaṅkara. Accepting this tradition, the *MK* can be dated somewhere before the end of the 8th century C.E. The *MK* is presented as a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (*MU*). The latter is allegedly a late *Upaniṣad* and a very short *Upaniṣad*—consisting of only 12 stanzas. The *Upaniṣad* and the first book (*prakaraṇa*) of the *MK*—*Āgama Prakaraṇa* (*AP*)—open with a discussion of the four states of consciousness—waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and the highest, non-dualistic state (*turiya*). Each state of consciousness is correlated with a different level of existence and each is also associated with a different letter or sound of the mantra *aum*. One is encouraged to know *aum* and this knowledge is knowledge of *ātman-Brahman*, the non-dual. This allows us to see that knowledge of *Brahman* and the liberation of the individual is the primary intention of this work.

According to the commentary, attributed to Śaṅkara, the other three books of the *MK* demonstrate by reasoning, respectively, (1) the falsity of duality, (2) the truth of non-duality (*advaita*), and (3) refutation of opponents’ views on duality (and causality). Gauḍapāda utilises a number of analogies to make these points. For example, he invokes the analogy of space and the space of a pot in order to illustrate the non-duality of the individual from *Brahman*. The space within a pot only appears different than other spaces, but it is, for Gauḍapāda, only one space. The analogy of the rope-snake illusion illustrates that any appearance of change and individuality—the snake—is only an illusion (*māyā*) imposed upon the real—the rope/*Brahman*. His doctrine of *māyā* is related to his notion of non-origination (*ajātivāda*) which informs us that no individual (*jīva*) is ever born. Change is unreal; *Brahman* is real, unchanging and non-dual. As such, there is no individual (*jīva*) that is ever born or that needs to be liberated (III: 48). However, both preceding and following that declaration, the text proclaims that one should utilise *aśparśayoga*—*yoga* of no touch or relation—as the path to liberation.

This brief synopsis glosses over all the philosophical enigmas associated with the *MK* and it totally ignores the historical uncertainties surrounding this text. The historical uncertainties surrounding the *MK* certainly complicate the task of arriving at a philosophical understanding. The historical problems can be grouped in four categories.

First, the identity of Gauḍapāda is obscure. We are not even certain that ‘Gauḍapāda’ refers to a single individual or a group of individuals. [8] Second, the dating of this text in relation to Śaṅkara must be doubted since it appears that earlier Buddhist texts quote the *MK*. [9] Third, there is an enormous disagreement about the authenticity of the four books. Some maintain that the fourth book—‘The Cessation of the Firebrand (*Alātāsānti*)’—is a separate Buddhist work, while others have devised different schemas to account for the appearance of Buddhist influences upon this

book. [10] There is also debate about the first book—namely, whether this book is part of the *MU*, whether this book is a separate work, or whether this book is older than the *MU* upon which it allegedly comments. [11] Finally, in light of all this controversy it would be helpful if we could turn to the commentaries on the *MK* for guidance. While the Advaita tradition certainly looks to Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* and Ānandagiri's *ṭīkā*, scholarship has thrown the reliability of these sources into question. [12] On the one hand, there is doubt about the authenticity of the commentary attributed to Śaṅkara; and on the other hand, there is doubt about the reliability of the commentary. [13] Both scenarios impinge upon the significance of the *bhāṣya*.

This brief overview leaves us with some inkling of the enormous historical uncertainties surrounding Gauḍapāda, the *MK*, and the *MKB*. These uncertainties undoubtedly raise philosophical quandaries. Our interpretation of Gauḍapāda's philosophy would be different if we were certain that Book 4 and/or Book 1 were not his creations. It would also be different if we knew for certain whether Gauḍapāda was a crypto-Buddhist, as is often charged, trying to undermine Hindu thought; an Advaitin trying to attract Buddhists to a revitalised Hinduism; or a syncretist who saw little difference in how one labelled oneself. In addition, a complete review of Gauḍapāda and the *MK* would further illustrate that the dialectic between the historical and the philosophical puzzles has been at the centre of most of the research on this text. One cannot deny that resolving the historical problems associated with the text would certainly dissolve many of the philosophical problems surrounding the text. Nonetheless, it is my opinion that our ability to resolve these problems seems mired in the historical quicksand of India. In addition, I will try to show that some, but not all, of the historical and philosophical quandaries associated with this text arise when one utilises a linear reading that ignores the role of textual discontinuity within the *MK*.

### Literary Genre and Cultural Context of the *MK*

The literary genre and the cultural context of the *MK* are well known; however, the significance of this information seems woefully underutilised. As indicated, this position rests upon the assumption that literary genre, cultural context, and philosophical meaning are inextricably intertwined in religious texts. Philosophers and social scientists of religion have called our attention to part of this situation. We have been cautioned about divorcing the text from the context. [14] Milton Singer warns us that the separation of text and context '... tends to be a collection of disembodied "ideas" logically manipulable into a systematic "philosophy"'. [15] We need to know the context of a religious text—how the text actually functions in the life of the people—if we are to appreciate the text.

This position not only assumes the significance of understanding the cultural context, but it also rests upon the notion that literary genre affects the manner and nature of philosophical expression. For example, one does not read the myths of Genesis in the same manner as one reads the *Critique of Pure Reason*. One cannot expect the parables of Jesus to express the philosophical concerns of Whitehead or Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya; on the other hand, the imagery of Genesis or the *Rg Veda* eludes the prose of Whitehead and Bhattacharyya. Different literary genres need to be read in different ways and different literary genres offer different avenues for expressing philosophical points. Danto states this as follows:

I only mean to emphasize that the concept of philosophical truth and the form

of philosophical expression are internally enough related that we may want to recognize that when we turn to other forms we may also be turning to other conceptions of philosophical truth ... The form in which the truth as they [Plato and Descartes] understood it must be grasped just might require a form of reading, hence a kind of relationship to those texts, altogether different from that appropriate to a paper, or to what we sometimes refer to as a 'contribution'. [16]

With reference to Gauḍapāda, my contention is that the *kārikā* genre afforded Gauḍapāda the means to express philosophical points in a discontinuous manner and this style was appropriate in the cultural context in which the text was composed. The points of discontinuity, structured by this textual genre, were the stops in which reflection and meditation upon the text could be incorporated by the student with the culling of the guru.

The *kārikā* genre needs to be located within the framework of other major genres—most notably, the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*. *Sūtra* which means thread or cord is compared to the most laconic telegram messages that 'attain to an almost algebraic mode of expression? [17] *Sūtras* have also been compared to a syllabus that presents only an outline of the material to be covered [18] and to 'an index of topics which, committed to memory, enabled the student to carry the instructions of his teacher in his mind'. [19] In *sūtra* literature, conciseness replaces grammatical structure in importance. *Sūtras* do not even pretend to present complete grammatical structures. Their conciseness is epitomised in the proverbial saying that a *sūtra* writer rejoices as much in the 'economising of half a shortvowel as much as in the birth of a son'. [20] Such condensation makes a *sūtra* almost impossible to comprehend without a teacher or without an accompanying *bhāṣya* (commentary) to explicate the text.

The *kārikā*, the literary genre of Gauḍapāda's text, is not nearly so cryptic or condensed as the *sūtra*. [21] Nonetheless, Monier-Williams defines *kārikā* as a 'concise statement in verse of (esp. philos. and gramm.) doctrines'. [22] Hemachandra allegedly defines *kārikā* as 'that which indicates profound meaning in a few words'. [23] These definitions point us toward the conciseness of this genre, its verse nature, and the fact that it was designed to be memorised. The literary patterns within the verse structure made memorisation of the text easier. Harrison, in reference to both *kārikās* and *sūtras* says:

Both classes of works had the same object, to minimize as far as possible the difficulty of remembering lengthy treatises at a time when writing was not unknown, but was still regarded as subsidiary to the memory in the preservation of literature. Both kinds of works endeavoured to abbreviate the material to be understood and to put it in a form which could be easily remembered. Both use literary forms used in the treatment of other subjects as well as philosophy. The *kārikās* rely upon the device of metrical form for fixing their content in the memory.... [24]

The *MK* is presented in *ślokas* (verses) and each *śloka* is generally divided into four sections. The following comment by Dasgupta and De about the *śloka* structure with regard to *kāvya* (poetry) seems even more relevant when applied to philosophy.

The *śloka* form in which the Sanskrit *kāvyas* are generally written renders the whole representation into little fragmentary pictures—which stand independently by themselves and this often prevents the development of a joint effect as a unitary whole. The story or the plot becomes of a secondary interest and

the main attention of the reader is drawn to the poetical effusion of the writer as expressed in little pictures. [25]

Utilising the *śloka* structure, the *MK* is not interested in developing plot or story, nor are we overwhelmed by its poetic effusion. In fact, one may go further by agreeing with Renou [26] who maintains that this genre tends to be scholarly and hardly poetical, even though it is written in verse. Integrating these points, we can say the following: (1) this literary genre directs our attention to the particular verse and each verse may stand independently of other verses (*ślokas*); and (2) this literary genre presents us with 'fragmentary pictures'—with philosophical notions presented in independent sections. It is essential to remember these points when reading the *MK*. If we are presented with 'fragmentary pictures', then should we not expect textual discontinuity?

The *kārikā* must also be distinguished from the *bhāṣya*. The *bhāṣya*, in particular the *bhāṣya* to the *MK*, is written in prose and its goal is the explanation of the accompanying text. Cole describes the relationship between the *MK* and Śaṅkara's *MKB* as follows:

In the *Kārikā* there is a net-work of interwoven arguments for this purpose [showing the absurdity of duality]. The method on the whole is not a thoroughly systematic one, for Gauḍapāda passes from argument to argument and the connection is often tenuous, even in the face of Śaṅkara's masterly commentary. [27]

My point is that one should expect the connections between the verses of the *MK* to be tenuous. Such tenuous connections are consistent with its literary genre. One should also expect the arguments within a commentary to be more coherently connected.

Continuity of thought is the model of intellectual development that is appropriate to philosophical prose. In philosophical prose each sentence should build upon or explain the preceding sentence until the topic/thought has been exhausted. In philosophical prose the transition from one thought to another should be obvious and smooth. In this genre, one informs the reader that one is about to begin talking about a particular subject and one informs the reader that one is finished talking about a particular subject. Philosophical prose should exhibit continuity and completeness. However, such is not the case with the *kārikā*. In the latter, each verse may serve as a philosophical statement. Verses need not be attached to other verses. This genre may leave the reader without 'proper' introduction, 'adequate' transitions, and 'formal' conclusions. Such transitions are not easily accommodated within this literary genre. In fact the most common associative device in the *MK* is the relative adverb, *yathā-tathā*—just as, so also—that functions within verses and usually not between verses. The verses within the *kārikā* state the points; they do not introduce the points; nor do they provide a summation of the philosophical points. As already indicated, I believe that it was the cultural context which provided much of the introductions, explanations and summations.

The cultural context of Sanskrit philosophical texts in India between the 5th to 8th centuries C.E. was marked by three characteristics. [28] This culture is noted for its admiration for the orality of texts, its enamourment with the guru-*śiṣya* relationship, and its understanding that such Advaita texts were to be understood within a quest for *mokṣa*. These three factors combined to provide the continuity of thought that was inhibited by the literary genre of the *MK*.

First, we have so often been reminded that India, above all cultures, prized the orality of texts that I will only highlight these ascriptions. As we know, the *Vedas* are *śruti*—that

which is heard. The sacred *Vedas* are the oral *Vedas* and not a written composition. [29] Writing and the written text are associated with the incompetence of the scribe [30] and with various defilements that render a pupil too polluted to recite the *Vedas*. [31] The record of Chinese monks like I-Tsing (671–695 C.E.) leave us with the following impression. [32]

The Brahmins are regarded throughout the five parts of India as the most honorable (caste) ... The scriptures they revere are the four Vedas, containing about 100,000 verses.... The Vedas have been handed down from mouth to mouth, not transcribed on paper or leaves. In every generation there exist some intelligent Brahmins who can recite 100,000 verses. [33]

This notion of the oral transmission of the Vedas has persisted into modern times. Max Müller says:

Even at the present day, when MSS. are neither scarce nor expensive, the young Brahmins who learn the songs of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, and the Sūtras, invariably learn them from oral tradition, and know them by heart. They spend year after year under the guidance of their teacher, learning a little, day after day, repeating what they have learnt as part of their daily devotion, until at last they have mastered their subject, and are able to become teachers in turn ... the fiercest imprecations are uttered against all who would presume to acquire their knowledge from written sources. In the Mahābhārata we read, 'Those who sell the Vedas and even those who write them, those who also defile them, they shall go to hell'. [34]

The orality of texts was not limited to the sacred scriptures—to the *Vedas*. We find that in Buddhism, particularly through the first five centuries of the common era, the oral transmission of texts predominated. [35] Among the orthodox schools of Hinduism, the oral transmission of texts was also the model. Van Buitenen informs us that:

For many religious sects, the manner of the Vedic transmission was the prototype of their own transmission. Followers of the sect will speak of the 'handing down' (*sampradāya*) or of a 'succession of gurus or teachers' (*guruparamparā*), and it is well known that written texts contain only part of the doctrines actually handed down in a sect. [36]

Van Buitenen alerts us not only to the orality of the texts but also to the limited nature of the texts which have been handed down to us. Eliot Deutsch describes this phenomena in the following manner:

... what constitutes the text in Indian thought is precisely the *sūtra* (or *kārikā*) and/or other authoritative sources, together with the ongoing exegetical work. In Indian philosophy we have as the basic unit what we might call the 'tradition text': the philosophical content of a 'school', in the best sense of the word.... A tradition text has, as indicated, its authoritative sources grounded in oral transmission, its summaries, its ongoing written elaborations. [37]

The oral components of the 'tradition text' can be lost forever, but they should not be forgotten when we proceed with our interpretations of the written text. My contention is that some of the problems we encounter when reading the *MK* do not arise because of alterations to the graphic text or because Gauḍapāda could not think clearly, but rather because parts of the 'tradition text' are missing.

In presenting the oral cultural context of Gauḍapāda's *MK*, two additional factors need to be presented. The significance of the guru-*śiṣya* relationship in the transmission

and explication of the texts cannot be overlooked. These texts were not borrowed from libraries and skimmed overnight. [38] These texts were presented by the guru to the student. If the student was unworthy to learn the text, the written manuscript would be discarded. [39] Worthy students would be taught the text, but not as to advance their philosophical acumen. Most of these texts were *sādhana* texts. Gauḍapāda's *MK* was intended to assist the student in the realisation of *mokṣa* (*MK* 1:18, 3:39, 4:90, etc.).

The standard format for the learning of texts within the Hindu-Advaita tradition is three-fold. This process includes *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection on the meaning of the text), and *nididhyāsana* (concentration/meditation). [40] This three-fold process informs us that the *śiṣya* did not merely read the text. The text was to be integrated into the being of the student and the guru was the catalyst for this process. This process was primarily an oral process in which the written text was examined and re-examined, linguistically and philosophically, word by word, line by line. This analysis would have illuminated the meaning of each verse and the connections between the verses. The pandit tradition in India today keeps this process alive. [41]

### Textual Discontinuity within the *MK*—Book I

I have already noted that Colin Cole informs us that the philosophical connections within the text are often tenuous. Conio echoes this position in her work on Gauḍapāda.

There is in Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* a network of interwoven arguments, which is difficult to unravel.... The method of argumentation is not a systematic one, for the author passes from one argument to another, sometimes in a manner which is far from clear. [42]

Those who label the *MK* as problematic because of the abruptness or the lack of continuity between verses should recognise that they are expecting continuity rather than discontinuity. Continuity is their heuristic model. My position is that some points of discontinuity are programmatic to this text. At least some of these points of discontinuity should be anticipated by the reader of the written text if the written text is only one part of the 'tradition text'.

It must be clear that I am not proposing that the points of discontinuity are not problematic. They are indeed problematic for our present understanding of the text. However, we are not at liberty to alter the composition of the text in order to remove these points of discontinuity. Given our knowledge of the literary genre and the cultural context of the *MK*, it is more problematic to remove or to overlook the points of discontinuity by assuming that they were not inherent within the presentation of the written text than it is to acknowledge these points of discontinuity between verses.

This general pattern of textual discontinuity can be illustrated by reference to the first book of the *MK*—the *AP*. (This pattern of discontinuity can be discerned in the other books as well.) To illuminate this point, we can turn to the insights of Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya who has not only written extensively on the philosophical points of Gauḍapāda and on Gauḍapāda's relationship to Buddhism, but he has also produced, in the words of Lindtner, 'the only edition that comes close to what by modern standards can be considered a critical one'. [43] At several points within his analysis of Gauḍapāda's text, Bhattacharya declares that he expects from this text not only

transitional statements that would provide continuity between verses, but also transitions between the books. For example, he says:

Here arises a question: If the connection between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Śaṅkara to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning, though he could do so easily? But instead of doing this he begins it without any reference to Book I, only alluding to the opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so. [44]

Bhattacharya is calling our attention to the lack of connection between Book I and II. I agree with him. The connections are missing. My disagreement with Bhattacharya is that he demands the connections; I do not.

The *kārikā* genre is not the genre appropriate to announce the connections between the books. This verse style does not facilitate an opening statement which summarises what preceded in Book I, nor does it facilitate an announcement of what will follow in Book II. Given that the *MK* was composed in an oral cultural context that esteemed the guru-*śiṣya* relationship, then one may expect that the guru would explain the relationship of the present book to that which precedes it. Likewise, a *bhāṣya* may do that and Bhattacharya recognizes that Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* to Book II (verse 1) does exactly that. In fact, the *bhāṣya* begins by referring to a passage in Book I (No. 18) that informs us that when non-duality is known, duality does not exist. [45] (This passage will be discussed below.) The commentary then informs us that what had been shown by *śruti* in Book I will be proven by reasoning in Book II—namely, the unreality of duality (*vaitathya*) will be proven. *Vaitathya* is also the title of the second book. These kinds of associations between the books are what we would expect of a *bhāṣya* and not of a *kārikā* or *sūtra*. [46] Likewise, a journal article or a classroom lecture most often informs its audience what it will say, then says it, and finally offers a synopsis of what was said. On the other hand, lecture notes for (oral) classroom presentations often lack those introductions, summations, and transitions. The *MK* frequently seems more like the latter than the former and must be interpreted accordingly.

Before proceeding with a review of the *AP*, an additional comment must be made about the *bhāṣya* to the *MK*. I have just cited this text to indicate that commentaries, whether written or oral, would have supplied the connections that are missing from the text itself. However, one cannot expect that the *bhāṣya*, attributed to Śaṅkara, could have originally performed the role of filling in the missing pieces. By all accounts the *bhāṣya* was not existent at the time of the text's composition. According to traditional Advaita accounts Gauḍapāda was the guru of Govinda who was the guru of Śaṅkara. According to other accounts the separation between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is far greater than two generations and still others doubt that Śaṅkara wrote the commentary. In any case, the original presentation of the *MK* by Gauḍapāda was not accompanied by Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. Given the cultural context, it is more likely that Gauḍapāda originally presented his text to his students.

A review of Book I will illustrate the pattern of discontinuity that is inherent within the *MK*. Book I, containing 29 *ślokas*, can be divided into 5 or 6 major divisions. [47] As five sections, discussed below, they would be as follows: group A consists of verses 1–5; group B is verses 6–9; group C is 10–15; group D is 16–18; and



group E is 19–29. [48] While this particular structure could be revised, it is essential that the changes in subject matter are recognised to be endemic to the text.

The first transition within Book I occurs between verses 5 and 6 as noted above. Bhattacharya recognizes this transition; however, this unannounced transition sounds an alarm for him that leads him to look for an extra-textual explanation. He postulates that verses have been lost.

Let one read *kārikās* 5 and 6 and say if there is any connection between them. *Kārikā* 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Saṅkara is silent here on their mutual connection. Does this not lead one to think that a *kārikā* or *kārikās* are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost. [49]

While it is possible that verses have been lost, one need not resort to an explanation that calls the integrity of the text into question. Such a procedure allows one to fiddle with the composition of the text; rather than wrestling with the meaning of the text and its discontinuity. [50]

With regard to the relationship between verses 5 and 6 of Book I, the transitional gap that Bhattacharya notes can be viewed in the following manner. Verses 1–5 (Group A) discuss the three states of consciousness identified here as *viśva*, *taijasa*, and *prājña* and associated with waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. Verses 6–9 (Group B) discuss different creation theories that include the notion that *prāṇa* (breathe) creates all, that creation is like a dream or *māyā*, that it is the desire of the Lord. No explicit transition is announced between these two groups of verses. As Bhattacharya notes, the subject matter has simply changed. However, it should be noted that verse 10 reverts back to a discussion of states of consciousness by introducing the notion of a fourth state (*turya/turiya*). This state is the non-dual, the cessation of all suffering, unchanging. The other verses in this section refer back to the first three states of consciousness and explains the relation between each state of consciousness and ‘cause and effect’ (*kārya-kāraṇa*). We are told that waking and dreaming are bound to both cause and effect, but *prājña* is only bound by cause. Gauḍapāda declares that the fourth state of consciousness is without cause or effect. The text also tells us that this state is all-seeing, unlike the first three states. Therefore, although the transition from a discussion of the first three states of consciousness (Nos. 1–5) to a discussion of different theories of creation (Nos. 6–9) is unannounced, both subjects—namely, states of consciousness and issues related to creation—namely, cause and effect—are united in verses 10–15 (Group C). Thus, one may say that this third section discusses the different states of consciousness in a more ontological context.

It can now be said that in the first fifteen verses Gauḍapāda discusses one subject, then a totally different subject, then he puts the two subjects together by introducing a new term. Nowhere does he introduce us to what he will do; nowhere does he inform us that he is changing subjects; and nowhere does he provide a synopsis of what he has done. He simply makes philosophical statements in verse form. While I understand Bhattacharya’s desire to account for the discontinuous nature of the text, it seems that we need not imagine that the text has been altered. The discontinuity encountered here could be the consequence of the missing oral cultural context that would have intensely analysed each verse, word by word, and reviewed the relation between the verses disclosing the connections between the groups as well as the distinction between these groups.

Continuing with an analysis of Book I verses 16–18, Wood [51] finds the discontinuity between these verses and the other sections of the *AP* so great that he maintains that verses 17 and 18, in particular, were not part of the original composition. He contends that these verses are both textually and philosophically problematic and therefore, unauthentic. With regard to the philosophical issue, he says:

The gravest problem with *AP* 17 and 18, however, is not textual: it is philosophical. How can the doctrine that the world is unreal account for the fact that we perceive the world, or, at the very least, that we perceive *something*? It will not do to say in reply that what we see is an illusion (*māyā*), for this explains nothing. How can something that is *totally* unreal be seen? As Descartes observed, even if you are dreaming the world, it must still be real as *a dream* ... this interpretation is totally implausible philosophically, for it provides, as I have just argued, no way of explaining even the *appearance* of the world. [52]

Unless I misunderstand Wood’s position, finding the notion of *māyāvāda* ‘totally implausible philosophically’ is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason to reject the authenticity of these verses.

Wood also finds these verses textually problematic. He maintains that they are in conflict with the rest of the *AP* as well as with parts of the second book of the *MK*. [53] Why the latter should matter to Wood is unclear since he contends that the first and second books are composed by different individuals. [54] On the other hand, Wood’s notion that verses 17 and 18 are textually inconsistent with other parts of the *AP* strikes me as the graver objection and more pertinent to the discussion here. However, here I would agree with Karl Potter that verses 17 and 18 are part of the text; they represent the extreme Advaita position—the highest, non-dualistic perspective. These verses are ‘... another way of teaching *ajātivāda*, but it carries that doctrine’s implications to an extreme length’. [55] *Ajātivāda* (the doctrine of non-origination) is rooted in the notion that *Brahman* is not only non-dual, but also unchanging. No thing (*jīva*) ever comes into existence since all is the one, non-dual *Brahman*. That is the highest truth and the message of verses 17 and 18. They read as follows:

If the phenomenal world (*prapañca*) were real, (it) would cease no doubt. This duality is only *māyā*. Non-duality is the highest truth. (17)

The falsely imagined would cease if it were imagined by someone. This discourse is for the sake of instruction. When known, duality does not exist. (18) [56]

Verses 17–18 clearly demarcate themselves from the other verses. They state that they are speaking from the perspective of *paramārtha*. According to Gauḍapāda and the Advaita tradition the *paramārtha* sublates the lower perspective—it sublates all talk about the first three states of consciousness and different theories of creation. Verse 18 informs us that such talk is merely ‘for the sake of instruction’. In these verses the shift in perspective to the highest truth and the implications of this shift are radical; yet, they are not expounded upon by Gauḍapāda. The level of discourse simply jumps without any introduction that it will do so or an explanation of where it is going. Certainly, an explanation of the relation between the different levels of truth—between the duality that appears and non-duality—would be most welcome. This discontinuity both textually and philosophically is disconcerting and it leaves us pondering the relationship between the different levels of truth. However, the change is not to be unexpected in



light of what has been said here, nor is it out of character with Advaita philosophising. On the other hand, while removing these two verses eliminates this discontinuity, it also radically alters the meaning of the text making it more theistic and less non-dualistic.

The first Book could have ended with No.18—the highest truth. However, such is not the case because despite the declaration that all is the non-dual Brahman, we suffer from ignorance and need to be liberated. Therefore, Group 5, verses 19–29, must change levels of discourse and lead us to the highest truth—to *mokṣa*. In fact, these verses are verses of instruction on the meaning of *aum*, letter by letter. If one knows this mantra, one will know that which was stated in verses 17 and 18—the highest truth of non-duality. One will know, in the words of verse 29, the auspicious, the cessation of duality which is without measure and without end to measure. [57]

This review of Book I, and by implication the other books, has illustrated that Gauḍapāda's composition is best understood in sections. These sections are not outlined in a table of contents; nor are they introduced in prefatory remarks; nor summarised in concluding statements such as this. The fact that these sections are not neatly tied together should not be taken as an indication of Gauḍapāda's lack of philosophical prowess or his inability to express ideas in a systematic manner. In addition, I have been trying to show that our primary recourse to textual discontinuity should be to assume that it is concomitant with the literary genre and cultural context in which Gauḍapāda expressed himself and in which he, most likely, commented upon his own expressions. Our primary recourse should not be to assume that the text has been altered and verses lost or added. Such an assumption leads us to perform extra-textual gymnastics intended to restore the historically pristine text. Such procedures alter our interpretation of the *MK*.

### Overlooking the Discontinuity and the Question of Idealism

In the review of Book I, the instances that have been highlighted were cases in which others have noted moments of textual discontinuity and assumed that they were philosophical inconsistencies or signs of historical tampering. In what follows, I would like to briefly highlight one case in which a linear reading of the text may have contributed to the overlooking of textual discontinuity between verses. The case in point is Book III, 'Advaita', verses 27–29. These verses are routinely read as a single unit expressing a single point of view. No sense of discontinuity is usually associated with these verses. [58]

As a single, homogenous unit these verses are understood to indicate that Gauḍapāda is an idealist—that he believes that the mind creates the world when it moves. The idealistic interpretation is based upon assuming that the third verse, No. 29, is an ontological declaration just like the first two verses—27 and 28. The first two verses read as follows:

The birth of that which is existent is reasonable through *māyā*, but not in reality. For those who hold that the real is born, for them what was born is (now) born. (27)

Truly the birth of the non-existent through *māyā* is not reasonable. Nor is the son of a barren woman born in reality or through *māyā*. (28) [59]

Verse 27 is informing us that individuality—the creation of individuals—is a provisional concept that is only reasonable through *māyā*. Verse 28 moves to the ultimate level of

truth and denies even the previous provisional notion. Here birth (*jān*) is not reasonable even through *māyā*; the text tells us that birth is like a barren woman's son, completely non-existent. (The logic of these two verses is similar to 1:17–18 reviewed above.) Then, verse 29 states:

Just as in dream the mind moves by *māyā* with the appearance of duality, so also, in waking, the mind by *māyā* moves with the appearance of duality. (29) [60]

Almost all readers of Gauḍapāda interpret this verse to mean that the mind creates the external world of objects. [61] The assumption is that this verse, like the two preceding verses, is speaking ontologically. Certainly, 27 and 28 are ontological. The text does not indicate that it will cease its ontological discussion in 29; and therefore, the inclination is to assume that verse 29 is likewise ontological. One may then ask: why should we assume a change in the level of discourse if no change is announced?

My response is two-fold. First, we should not expect such an announcement. I have tried to show throughout this paper that such announcements are not consistent with the textual style of the *MK*. Thus we should reverse the question and ask: should we not be looking for unannounced transitions? Gauḍapāda certainly changes levels of discourse between verses 27 and 28. He moves from an ontology of relative truth (*saṃvṛti*) to ultimate truth (*paramārtha*). Such changes are also possible for verse 29.

Second, if we do not assume that verse 29 is the same as the two preceding verses—namely, that it too is an ontological declaration—then we may be more cognisant of linguistic and philosophical cues that indicate a change in subject. For example, if one did not presuppose an ontological interpretation, one may note the philosophical similarity between this verse and the Advaita theory of perception. The latter informs us that during sense perception the mind (*manas*) goes out through the sense organs, into the world, and takes the form (*ṛtti*) of the object perceived. In this theory, the mind in the process of perception moves and bifurcates into perceiver and perceived. This seems to be what Gauḍapāda is saying in verse 29 when he tells us that the mind when it moves presents the appearance of duality. The duality that the mind presents is that of the perceiver and perceived (*grāhaka-grāhya*). Thus, verse 29 seems to correspond to the Advaita theory of perception and not to an ontological declaration of creation.

In addition, there is a linguistic shift at this point in the text. The terms that Gauḍapāda uses in verses 27 and 28 are different than the terms he uses in verse 29 and those that immediately follow, 30–32. In the former he employs the verbal roots *as* (to be) and *jan* (to be born). These terms have clear ontological connotations as we have already seen. In the subsequent verses these words are absent. Instead we find the term *dvayābhasam* (the appearance of duality) which refers to the notion of perceiver and perceived (*grāhaka* and *grāhya*). These terms are often used in discussions about perception. In addition, he uses the verbal roots *drś* (to see) and *upalamb* (to perceive) in the verses immediately following No. 29 and related to it. Again, these terms seem consistent with a phenomenological description of perception rather than an ontological description of creation. If Gauḍapāda had wanted to tell us that the mind created the world, why did he not use one of the two verbs previously employed to discuss ontological issues?

In light of the pattern of discontinuity that we have uncovered throughout the *MK*, I believe that we must also be cautious about overlooking unannounced transitions in this text and not assuming continuity or linearity of thought. Like the guru-śiṣya

relationship that would have reviewed the text grammatically, linguistically, and philosophically, we must review each verse in that manner. If we pay heed to this approach, then verse 29 for both philosophical and linguistic reasons may not be a declaration of idealism. Utilising this approach we may find that Gauḍapāda is not telling us that the mind creates the world. Rather we may uncover that verse 29 is a description of what happens to the mind during perception. What happens to the mind is also to be called *māyā* (illusion). From this perspective, *māyā* also refers to the illusion by which the mind mistakes itself in the form of an object for the object itself. This would be a far cry from a declaration that the mind creates the world.

In conclusion, it must be clear that reading Gauḍapāda and the *MK* in the manner that has been suggested here does not in itself produce a non-idealistic interpretation of the text. Much more needs to be done with regard to this issue. This style of reading does open up different avenues by which we can approach the text and some of the puzzles that have been associated with it.

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## NOTES

- [1] GAUḌAPĀDA (Samvat 2026) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad, Gauḍapādīya Kārikā, Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (Gorakhpur, Gita Press).
- [2] GRAHAM, WILLIAM (1987) *Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in the History of Religion*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 22; GRAHAM, WILLIAM (1989) Scripture as spoken word, in: M. LEVERING (Ed.) *Rethinking Scripture* (New York, State University of New York Press), p. 143.
- [3] KELBER, WERNER, H. (1983) *The Oral and Written Gospel* (Philadelphia, Fortress Press), p. 28 ff.
- [4] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- [5] ROSMARIN, ADENA (1985) *The Power of Genre* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press).
- [6] See GOODY, JACK (1987) *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 110 ff. Goody has raised a number of questions about the nature of the oral transmission of texts within India. His concerns about this process, while significant, do not alter this argument since I am not presuming that this text was originally composed orally. However, the following statement from Goody is in concert with the work of this paper: 'Whatever the original mode of composition, we know that these texts were taught orally even when written texts existed' (118).
- [7] INGALLS, DANIEL, H. H. (1952) The study of Śāṅkarācārya, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 33, p. 11.
- [8] See WALLESEER, MAX (1910) *Der ältere Vedānta Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre* (Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung), p. 3. Walleseer proposed that the name Gauḍa referred to a geographical region and not to a single individual. This thesis has encountered a great deal of resistance (see BHATTACHARYA, VIDHUSHEKHARA (Ed., Trans. & Annotator) (1989) *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), p. lxxi (reprint, originally published 1943), and MAHADEVAN, T. M. P. (1952) *Gauḍapāda: A Study of Early Advaita* (Madras, University of Calcutta), p. 5], but it is almost always mentioned.
- [9] Scholars have maintained that verses from the *MK* are found and therefore quoted in the works of Buddhist philosophers Bhāvaviveka, dated before 630 C.E., and Santiraksita, dated 700 C.E. (WALLESEER, *ibid.*, p. 7; KARMARKAR, RAGHUNATH (1973) *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* (Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute), p. iv). There is general agreement that Gauḍapāda lived after Nāgārjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu (200–400 C.E.) who seem to be major influences upon the *MK*. This leads a number of scholars to date the *MK* around 500 C.E. (BHATTACHARYA, *ibid.*; INGALLS, *op. cit.*, note 7; JOSHI, L. M. (1969) Gauḍapāda's reappraisal between Buddhism and Vedānta, *Journal of Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad*, 1, pp. 11–22).
- [10] See BHATTACHARYA, *op. cit.*, note 7, p. cxliv, MURTI, T. R. V. (1968) *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, George Allen & Unwin), p. 115, and MAYEDA, SENGAKU (1967–1968) On

the author of the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and the Gauḍapādīya-bhāṣya, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 31–32, p. 13. They contend that the fourth book is a Buddhist work. The alternatives to that position are either to deny the Buddhist nature of the work [MAHADEVAN, *op. cit.*, note 8, pp. 184 ff.; PANDEY, SANGAM LAL (1983) *Pre-Samkara Advaita Philosophy* (Allahabad, Darshan Peeth), p. 325] or to assert that Gauḍapāda was transforming Buddhist notions into his Advaitin message [DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, LOUIS (1978) Vedānta and Buddhism, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain*, 42 (1910), reprinted in CHATTOPADHYAYA, DEBIPRASAD (Ed.) *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 3 (Calcutta, K. P. Bagchi), p. 291; WHALING, FRANK, Śāṅkara and Buddhism, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 7(1979), p. 21]. A different response to this problem is offered in VETTER, TILMANN (1978) Die Gauḍapādīya-kārikās: Sur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (A)dvaita, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, 22, pp. 95–131, who suggests that the books of the *MK* be renumbered—namely, 4, 3, 2, 1. In this schema, the fourth book would be the oldest while the others would be correspondingly younger. This renumbering would not only maintain the distance between the most Buddhistic book which is the fourth and the least Buddhistic book which is the first, but it would also indicate that the change that we find in the author is away from Buddhism and toward an Upaniṣadic-Advaita position.

- [11] See SARMA, B. N. K. (1931) New light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās, *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, 2, pp. 35–56. Referring to other Vedānta schools such as Rāmānuja and Madhva's, Sarma has argued that the first book should be seen as *śruti* and therefore as part of the *upanīṣad*. More recently Wood [WOOD, THOMAS (1990) *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Āgama Śāstra* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii)] has argued that the *AP* is not only a separate work, but that this book does not present the classic Advaita philosophy. He believes that *AP* presents the view that '... associates īśvara with the fourth (*catūrtha*) or absolute state of the self' (p. xiv) Wood's reading of this book is therefore more theistic since the highest state of consciousness is not identified with the unqualified *ātman-Brahman* of classical Advaita; but rather, according to Wood, the fourth state of consciousness is associated with the Lord (*īśvara*). Bhattacharya has argued that the *MK* was written before the *MU* [see BHATTACHARYA, *op. cit.*, note 8].
- [12] See LARSON, GERALD (1980) The format of technical philosophical writing in ancient India, *Philosophy East and West*, 30, pp. 375–380. Larson cautions us about the reliability of commentators who may postdate the original text by several centuries. Not knowing the date of the original text, it is difficult to say how close Śāṅkara (and Ānandagiri) could have been to Gauḍapāda.
- [13] Potter questions the authenticity of this work [POTTER, KARL (1981) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), p. 309]. Hacker and Mayeda maintain the authenticity of this commentary, but each notes particular problems with the commentary. [HACKER, PAUL (1953) *Vivarta: Studien zur Geschichte der illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder* (Mainz, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur); MAYEDA, *op. cit.*, note 9.] Hacker maintains that this is the work of a young Śāṅkara influenced by Yoga philosophy (p. 117) and he notes places in the commentary where Śāṅkara's illusionistic cosmology does agree with Gauḍapāda's position (p. 127). Mayeda maintains that Śāṅkara deliberately misinterprets certain Buddhist notions in order to transform the text into a more Advaita-like text (90 ff). More recently Isayeva, in reference to the *MKB*, has said the following about Śāṅkara: 'I would not say that he consciously distorts the tenets of the *Kārikā*; he rather proposes essential additions which sometimes entirely change the perspective of Gauḍapāda's work' ISAYEVA, NATALIA, *Śāṅkara and Indian Philosophy* (New York State University, New York Press) [p. 60 NOT CITED]. Thus, with reference to these four scholars, the values and reliability of this commentary for our understanding of the *MK* is often strained.
- [14] SINGER, MILTON (1972) *When a Great Tradition Modernizes* (New York, Praeger); LARSON, GERALD (1975) The Bhagavad Gita as cross-cultural process, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 43, pp. 651–669.
- [15] SINGER, *ibid.*, p. 39.
- [16] See DANTO, ARTHUR C. (1984) Philosophy as/and/of literature, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 58, pp. 7–8.
- [17] MACDONELL, ARTHUR A. (1909) *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (London, Heinemann), p. 35.
- [18] See JANACEK, ADOLF (1959) To the problems of Indian philosophical texts, *Archiv Orientalni*, 27, p. 464.
- [19] FARQUHAR, J. N. (1967) *An Outline of Religious Literature of India* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), p. 124.
- [20] MÜLLER, F. MAX (1860) *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (London, George Allen & Unwin), p. 71.

- [21] Joshi maintains that Nāgārjuna wrote the first *kārikā*. He says: 'Nāgārjuna was the father of the *kārikā* style in Sanskrit literature, and after his *Madhyamakakārikās*, many other Buddhist and Brāhmanical authors began to write philosophical texts in *kārikās* or memorial verses'. [JOSHI, L. M. (1987) *Studies in the Buddhist Culture of India* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass) p. 341.]
- [22] MONIER-WILLIAMS, MONIER (1974) *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press), p. 274.
- [23] This passage is quoted from MAHADEVAN, op. cit., note 8, p. 30. This reference can also be found in: COLE, COLIN A. (1982) *Asparśa Yoga: A Study of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), p. 14. However, neither source indicates the title of Hemachandra's work from which this quote is taken and I have yet to find the text which contains this reference.
- [24] HARRISON, MAX HUNTER (1932) *Hindu Monism and Pluralism* (London, Humphrey Milford), pp. 38–39.
- [25] DASGUPTA, S. N. & DE, S. K. (1947) *A History of Sanskrit Literature: Classical Period*, Vol. I (Calcutta, K. P. Bagchi), p. xxi.
- [26] RENOU, LOUIS (1963) Sur le genre des sutras dans la littérature Sanskrite, *Journal Asiatique*, CCLI, pp. 165–216.
- [27] COLE, op. cit., note 23, p. 29.
- [28] See Blackburn's discussion of these characteristics for non-Sanskrit Hindu texts [BLACKBURN, STUART H. (1988) *Singing of Birth and Death: Texts in Performance* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press)]. Blackburn contends that for the folk tradition, the written material had an almost magical quality to it.
- [29] SIVARAMAN, KRISHNA (1977) The word as a category of revelation, in: H. COWARD & K. SIVARAMAN (Eds) *Revelation in Indian Thought: a Festschrift in Honour of Professor T. V. R. Murti* (Emeryville, CA, Dharma), p. 46.
- [30] LANCASTER, LEWIS (1979) Buddhist literature: its canons, scribes and editors, in: WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (Ed.) *The Critical Study of Sacred Texts* (Berkeley Religious Studies Series) (Berkeley, CA, The Graduate Theological Union), p. 225.
- [31] COBURN, THOMAS (1989) Scripture in India: towards a typology of the word in Hindu life, in: M. LEVERING (Ed.) *Rethinking Scripture* (New York, State University of New York Press), p. 104.
- [32] For other accounts, see also Fa-Hien in: LEGGE, JAMES (Trans. & Annot.) (1886) *A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms being an account by the Chinese Monk Fa-Hien of His Travels in India and Ceylon (A.D. 399–414)* (Oxford, Clarendon Press), 98 ff., who describes the oral transmission of Buddhist texts in the 5th century C.E. and Yuan Chwang's travel accounts in the 7th century C.E. [WATTERS, THOMAS (Ed. & Trans.) and after his death RHYS DAVIDS, T. W. & BUSHILL, S. W. (1904) *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India 629–645 A.D.* (London, Royal Asiatic Society).]
- [33] I-TSING (1966) *A Record of Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671–695)*, J. TAKAKUSA (Trans.), (Delhi, Munishiram Manoharlal), p. 182.
- [34] MULLER, op. cit., note 20, pp. 501–502.
- [35] MOOKERJEE, RADH KUMUD (1969) *Ancient Indian Education (Brahmanical and Buddhist)* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), p. 497.
- [36] VAN BUITENEN, J. A. B. (1980) Hindu sacred literature, in: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 8, p. 933.
- [37] DEUTSCH, ELIOT (1988) Knowledge and the Tradition text in Indian philosophy, in: G. LARSON & E. DEUTSCH (Eds) *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy* (Princeton, University of Princeton Press), p. 169.
- [38] While Macdonell (op. cit., note 17, p. 20) discusses the existence of private libraries during this time period, I do not believe that these libraries would affect the type of education that is being discussed here.
- [39] WINTERNITZ, MAURICE (1972) *The History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, S. KETKAR (Trans.), (New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp.), p. 37.
- [40] For a full discussion of this issue, see HACKER, PAUL (1972) Notes on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and Śaṅkara's Āgamaśāstravivarāṇa, in: J. ENSINK (Ed.) *India Maior: Congratulatory Volume Presented to J. Gonda* (Leiden, E. J. Brill), 118 ff.; and CENKER, WILLIAM (1983) *A Tradition of Teachers: Śaṅkara and the Jagadgurus Today* (Missouri, Sotu Asia Books), 65 ff.
- [41] Some of my limited insight into this process may be laid at the feet of Subramania Sastri, Advaita Sanskrit pandit, of Varanasi who guided me in my study of Gauḍapāda (Spring, 1980).
- [42] CONIO, CATERINA (1971) *The Philosophy of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (Varanasi, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan), p. 71.
- [43] LINDTNER, CHRISTIAN (1989) Foreword, in: BHATTACHARYA, op. cit., note 8, p. vib.
- [44] BHATTACHARYA, op. cit., note 8, pp. l–li.
- [45] The commentary opens with the words 'jñāte dvaitam na vidyate' which is quoted from MK I:18.
- [46] It can also be noted that the commentary to Book I begins by laying out the relationship between the four books of the MK and the primary intention of each book. The *bhāṣya* informs us, for example, that the first book relies on scripture, the next two on reasoning, and the fourth repudiates the views of other schools.
- [47] These divisions are similar to the division that Potter [POTTER, op. cit., note 13, pp. 106–107] utilizes in his synopsis of this text—namely, 1–5, 6–9, 10, 11–18, and 19–29. I think that there may be good reason to separate verse 10 as Potter does. It is, as indicated in my analysis, a pivotal verse. It should also be noted that these divisions can be correlated to the divisions of the MK in relation to the MU as found in the Sanskrit texts. The MK gets divided there as follows: 1–9, 10–18, 19–23, and 24–29.
- [48] This last section could be subdivided. MU 12 is placed between MK 23 and 24. Verses 19–23 deal with the first three states of consciousness and the letters a, u, and m. Concomitant with MU 12, MK 24 moves to a discussion of the fourth state of consciousness. For expediency sake, since these last ten verses are not the focus of this discussion, I have placed them together.
- [49] BHATTACHARYA, op. cit., note 8, pp. vii–lix.
- [50] In contrast to Bhattacharya's position, it appears to me that the commentary does relate the verses in Group A to verse 6 when it glosses the opening words of verse 6—'all existing things' ('sarvabhūtānām satam') with the first three states of consciousness—*visva*, *taijasa*, and *prājña*. As will be discussed in the following pages, these terms are found in Group A, verses 1–5.
- [51] WOOD, op. cit., note 11.
- [52] Ibid., pp. 14–15.
- [53] Ibid., p. 14.
- [54] Ibid., p. 90.
- [55] POTTER, KARL (1979) Was Gauḍapāda an idealist?, in: M. NAGATOMI (Ed.) *Sanskrit and Indian Studies* (Dordrecht, D. Reidel), p. 190.
- [56] *prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayaḥ/ māyāmātram idaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ* (17); *vikalpo vivivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit/upadeśādayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate* (18).
- [57] *amātro 'nantamātrāś ca dvaitasyopāśamaḥ śivāḥ* (MK I: 29).
- [58] VETTER, op. cit., note 10, p. 109, also uncovers textual discontinuity at this point; however, he attributes it to the conflation of an older and more Buddhist part of the text—namely Book III:29 through to the end of Book IV—with a younger and more Advaitic portion of the text—namely those verses up to and including verse III:28. This explanation for the discontinuity is aimed at resolving one of the historical problems—namely, Gauḍapāda's relation to idealistic Buddhism. Vetter's proposal is to make that an older strand of thought within the MK, while the younger sections of the text move more toward Advaita-upanisadic notions. The suggestion made here does not look to reshape the historical text, but rather it attempts to re-examine the very notion that the text is idealistic.
- [59] *sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tatvataḥ/ tatvato jāyate yasya jātam tasya hi jāyate* (27) *asato māyayā janma tatvato naiva yujyate/bandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vapi jāyate* (28).
- [60] *yathā svapne dvayābhāṣaṁ spandate māyayā manah/tathā jāgraddvayābhāṣaṁ sandate māyayā manah* (29).
- [61] Two exceptions to the idealistic interpretation are Potter (op. cit., note 56) and Kaplan [KAPLAN, STEPHEN (1987) *Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism: A Study of Projection and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass)].

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stehen sich graphisch nicht sehr fern." In §11 it would be better to read *dravyam niṣkrāmya tiṣṭhati*, taking *dravyam* as object of *niṣkrāmya*. In both §11 and §31 the translation has to be changed accordingly.

Already the detailed table of contents (pp. 27–29) shows the great variety of topics dealt with in the text. The text itself contains a table of contents but this covers only the first part of the text, §§1–50. §50 contains a verse:

*bhrūmadhye yo bhaven nityam sa uṣṇīṣa iti smṛtaḥ /  
lambakabhūpanandasya ācāryasya mahātmanah || iti ||*

According to George the second line is the colophon of the first part of the *Ṣaṇmukhakalpa*: "Dies ist [das Werk] des Mahātman, des Lehrers, des Sohnes des Lambaka-Königs." However, it is more likely that both lines form a complete verse: "That which is between the two brows is the *uṣṇīṣa*. So is said by the Mahātman, the master, the son of the king of Lambaka." With § 51 begins a new section with the words: *athāta uttaratantrasya dīkṣām samkṣepato vakṣyāmi*.

George has taken great trouble to explain the numerous practices mentioned in the text. His commentary is an excellent contribution to the study of the popular magic described in the text and will be very useful for further studies of similar texts. In an appendix George lists items relating to *Ṣaṇmukha* (names, titles, parentage, *Ṣaṇmukha* as commander, his courage and heroic deeds, his companions, iconographic descriptions, names related to the contents of the *Ṣaṇmukhakalpa*), names of other gods, plants, animals, and *mudrās*. Dieter George's work is a dissertation submitted in 1966 to the university of Marburg. We must be grateful to the Stiftung Waldschmidt for having published this interesting work of Dieter George whose untimely death in 1985 was a great loss for Indian studies.

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Richard King, *Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism. The Mahāyāna Context of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995. X, 341 pp. \$19.95 ISBN 0-7914-2514-2 (pb.)

Much has been written on the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā (GK), although Richard King remarks that "There have been little more than a handful

of works exclusively devoted to an appraisal of Gauḍapāḍian thought" (p. 3). In his critical review of recent work on the GK King discusses no less than eleven books and one article, which is a considerable amount of literature for a text of no more than 215 verses (16 pages in King's 'running translation'). He does not mention Walleser's pioneer work *Der ältere Vedānta* (Heidelberg, 1910) one of the great merits of which consisted in showing that verses of the GK are quoted by Bhāvaviveka in his *Tarkajvālā* and by Śāntirakṣita in his commentary on verse 93 of his *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*. In King's book there is only one reference to Walleser's book, whom he reproaches for having maintained that *Madhyamakāhṛdayakārikā* (MHK) 8.13 is a verbatim quotation of GK 3.5. King forgets to mention that Walleser could not know the Sanskrit text, as Olle Qvarnström points out in his book *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective* (Lund, 1989), p. 24, n. 16. Apart from Tilmann Vetter's article mentioned by King there are many more which ought to have been cited, beginning with Louis de La Vallée Poussin's 'Vedānta and Buddhism' (*JRAS* 1910, pp. 129–140).

According to King "As yet, no one has provided a study of the GK that displays anything like an adequate consideration of the Mahāyāna philosophical context to which the GK is undoubtedly indebted. Consequently, their assessment of Gauḍapāḍian thought has been sadly deficient" (pp. 11–12). It is not only the Mahāyāna philosophical context which King examines in his book. In chapter two "The Vedāntic Heritage of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā" he studies the Upaniṣadic heritage of the GK, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the GK and the doctrines of the *Brahmasūtra*, without adding anything important to what is already well-known. For instance, on p. 65 King remarks that the *Brhadāraṇyaka* and *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣads are the Upaniṣadic texts to which the GK seems most indebted, something already pointed out in 1943 by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya in his book *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, p. ciii. The use of the terms *svabhāva* and *dharma* in the GK is for King a reason to write a lengthy chapter on "The Abhidharma Context of Non-Origination". In a note he enumerates the verses in which *svabhāva* and the related notion of *prakṛti* occur (p. 275, n. 3). He includes I.23 and III.32 in which neither *svabhāva* nor *prakṛti* are to be found. King discusses at length Abhidharma ideas (pp. 91–108) before studying the Mahāyāna understanding of *dharma* and *svabhāva*. In chapter 4 King arrives at last at one of the most important aspects of the GK, the relation between the fourth prakaraṇa and Madhyamaka thought: "Non-Origination in the GK: Early Vedāntic Ontology and Madhyamaka Buddhism". Here too, one looks in vain for some new point of view.

Chapter 5 is entitled “Asparśa-yoga in the GK”. The word *asparśayoga* occurs twice in the GK: III.39 and IV.2. In III.39 *asparśayoga* is said to be *durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ* and in IV.2 to be *sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ* and *avivādo viruddhaḥ*. The word *asparśayoga* does not seem to occur anywhere else apart from a late Buddhist work in which there is a reference to a yoga *asprśayogotvāt* (sic), cf. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. 305. Although the GK gives very little information on the exact meaning of *asparśayoga*, much has been written about it. King’s chapter contains no less than 41 pages and concludes by remarking that “it refers both to a form of meditative practice (yoga) and to the goal of that practice (*samādhi*). As such, it also presupposes a specific epistemological theory – the theory that the mind does not touch an external object” (p. 181).

In the following chapter “Gauḍapāḍian Inclusivism and the Mahāyāna Buddhist Tradition” King tries to show that the authors of the GK rely upon Buddhist ideas and arguments for the formulation of their own distinctive position. This was already made abundantly clear by Bhattacharya and even before him by Walleser (*op. cit.*, p. 37). In the last chapter “Buddhism in the GK and the Mahāyāna: the Tathāgatagarbha Texts” King enters new territory. He gives a brief history of the Tathāgatagarbha theory in India and even in Tibet, reproaching previous scholars for having restricted the scope of analysis to the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra scholastic works. Of course, the tathāgatagarbha theory existed in India before the GK and its influence on the GK cannot therefore be excluded. Paul Williams has hinted that possibly Gauḍapāda was influenced by Tathāgatagarbha texts (cf. *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1989, p. 100). However, nobody has been able, so far, to demonstrate evidence of such influence and King himself is forced to acknowledge that “There is little textual evidence, however, that might suggest that the author has been specifically influenced by the notion of the tathāgatagarbha or by texts which utilize that notion as their central concept” (p. 234). In fact, one looks in vain in this chapter for even a little of the textual evidence referred to by King.

King’s work shows many traces of negligence. There are numerous misprints in the Sanskrit quotations. Errors have not been corrected. On p. 35 King states that an entire chapter (chapter III) is devoted to the views of the Vedānta in Bhāvaviveka’s MHK, whereas all his references are to chapter VIII. On p. 309 he writes that according to Ruegg “only in the late Madhyamaka of Kumāṛila (sic) aspects of the tathāgatagarbha strand of thought were integrated into Indian Buddhist

scholasticism”. Of course, Ruegg mentioned Kamalaśīla, not Kumāṛila. The Appendix comprises a running translation of the GK in which verses IV.73–86 are omitted without any word of explication.

However, the main objection to this work is that King has not taken the trouble to study carefully the text of the GK. For instance, he renders on p. 209 GK IV.93 (*ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ, sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam sāmīyam viśāradam*) as follows: “By their very nature all dharmas indeed are quiescent from the very beginning, non-arising, liberated and homogeneous. [Reality] is non-separate, devoid of fear and uniformly unoriginated”. *Anutpannāḥ* does not mean ‘non-arising’; *prakṛtyā* belongs to *sunirvṛtāḥ*; *samābhinnā* qualifies *sarve dharmāḥ* and *sāmīyam* does not mean ‘uniformly’. That King does not take any care in rendering GK verses, is also obvious from the fact that he gives an entirely different translation of the same verse on p. 89. King several times mentions Tilmann Vetter’s article ‘Die Gauḍapāḍīya-kārikās: zur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (A)dvaita’, *WZKM* 22 (1978), pp. 95–131, but seems to have overlooked his careful translation of GK IV.93: “Alle Gegebenheiten sind nämlich von Anfang an zur Ruhe gekommen, nichtentstanden, von Natur aus schon gut erloschen [und daher] gleich und nichtverschieden; die Gleichheit ist unentstanden [und] furchtlos” (p. 98). In his article Vetter examines in depth the meaning of *dvaita* and *advaita* and concludes that *dvaita* does not mean duality but ‘Vielheit’. King does not seem to have paid any attention to Vetter’s arguments. In translating Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.5 (*karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ, te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate*) King refers to Kalupahana’s translation and renders this verse in the same way: “On the cessation of the karmic defilements, there is liberation. For the one who constructs (*vikalpataḥ*) the karmic defilements [exist] due to conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*), but this conceptual proliferation ceases with emptiness” (p. 135). There are many translations of Nāgārjuna’s kārikās but few translators have managed to make as many mistakes as Kalupahana who does not seem to know the meaning of the suffix *-taḥ* in *vikalpataḥ* (for Kalupahana’s work see Lindtner’s review, *JAOS* 108, 1988, pp. 176–178). The same elementary mistake is made by F. J. Streng in his book *Emptiness* (Nashville, 1967) to which King refers several times (cf. Streng, p. 204: “for pains of action exist for him who constructs them”). It would take too much space to point out all of King’s wrong translations but it is necessary to draw attention to his translation of IV.51 (*viññāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhavaḥ, na tato nyatra viññānān na viññānam viśanti*): “When consciousness (*viññāna*)

is vibrating, the images do not derive from anywhere else. When it is not vibrating, [they] do not reside elsewhere, nor do they enter consciousness" (p. 177). In quoting the Sanskrit text of this verse King completely overlooks the fact that in the addenda and corrigenda of his book Bhattacharya corrected *viññānān* to *niṣpandāt*.

Apart from the carelessness with which King has studied the text of the GK one finds many instances of strange comments. For instance, after quoting GK IV.93 King states: "Here the author of GK IV appears to be endorsing the concept of *ādibuddha* in the light of his absolutistic view that all things, insofar as they possess a *svabhāva*, are unoriginated and already essentially in *nirvāṇa*" (p. 209). The term *ādibuddha* occurs in GK IV.92 where it is said that all dharmas are *ādibuddhāḥ* which King renders with "enlightened from the very beginning" (p. 209). What this has to do with the concept of the *ādibuddha* King fails to explain. Neither does he explain what 'enlightened dharmas' are.

In his discussion on the date and authorship of the GK King does not bring forward any new evidence. He remarks that no author makes any reference to the fourth prakaraṇa. Lindtner has noted the similarity between MHK 5.6 and GK IV.24. According to him GK IV.21 is based upon MHK 5.6. King seems to agree with Lindtner although he does not exclude the possibility that the fourth prakaraṇa was already in existence at the time of Bhāvaviveka (p. 40). One text which is not mentioned at all by King is the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. Already in 1932 B. L. Atreya noticed "much common between *kārikās* (i.e., GK) and *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, not only in thought, but also in language" (cf. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. lxxxvi). The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is generally considered to be post-Śāṅkara (cf. Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 13) but in a recent study Walter Slaje has proved that the oldest layer of the text teaches a pre-Śāṅkara Vedānta (*Vom Mokṣopāya-Śāstra zum Yogavāsiṣṭha-Mahārāmāyaṇa*, Wien, 1994). In the Kashmiri recension of *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 7.195.63 the text is almost entirely identical with GK IV.1 which has *sambuddhas* instead of *samboddhā* (Slaje, *op. cit.*, p. 94). The rather uncommon term *amanastā* in GK III.32 is also found in *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 5.91.37 (Slaje, *op. cit.*, p. 194). In the light of Slaje's work it would certainly be useful to reconsider the relationship between the GK and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

The GK is an important text and needs further study and research. However, without an intensive study of the text and its terminology, it is not possible to arrive at satisfactory results. In his article Vetter has given an example of the importance of the study of some key concepts of the GK. Similar studies would be very welcome. In the second place, one has to take into account text such as the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*

the importance of which for the study of Vedānta in the period before Śāṅkara has been demonstrated by Slaje.

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Martin Pfeiffer, *Indische Mythen vom Werden der Welt. Texte – Strukturen – Geschichte*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1994. XIII, 432 pp. DM 198,- ISBN 3-496-02515-8

In his book Martin Pfeiffer has collected 300 texts relating to the creation or formation of the world from the Indian subcontinent (including also Nepal and Sri Lanka). His material consists of texts of the Sanskrit tradition and texts of non-Sanskrit traditions. Pfeiffer distinguishes three historically defined Sanskrit zones: Rgveda and Atharvaveda (RAV); other Vedic literature (BRA; Yajurveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads); Epics, Purāṇas and related texts (EPU) and nine geographically defined non-Sanskrit zones: Sri Lanka (SLA); South-India (SIN); West Central India (WZI); East Central India (OZI); North India (NIN); North-West Frontier region (NWG); Northern Frontier region (NGR); North-East Frontier region (NOG); Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI).


In chapter two Pfeiffer examines the methodologies and models developed by Vladimir Propp, Alan Dundes and Claude Bremond. From Dundes he takes over the concepts 'Motivem' and 'Allomotiv' which he defines as follows: "das unter dem Aspekt seiner Funktion betrachtete Erzählelement als Motivem bezeichnet wird und alle Varianten, die im Erzähl Ablauf dieselbe Funktion haben, Allomotive dieses Motivems genannt werden" (p. 32b).

Chapter three is entitled "Ein deskriptiv-funktionales Textmodell für indische kosmogonische Mythen". Pfeiffer develops three partial models (Teilmodelle): eine Übersetzungsversion (auf deutsch); eine Allomotivversion (in einer deskriptiven Modellsprache – dMS); eine Motivemversion (in einer funktionalen Modellsprache – fMS). Pfeiffer discusses the problems which the German translation of sources in other languages presents and the necessity to preserve as much as possible the literary qualities of the original texts. In order to develop a descriptive model language Pfeiffer rephrases the texts so that only principal clauses which consist of the following constituent parts remain: (actor) predicate field (modal, local and temporal determination). The

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seems utterly unsatisfactory to Uddālaka. The youngster has come home without the faintest idea of *adhyātmavidyā*. Uddālaka now takes the initiative himself. 'The one becomes many without ceasing to be one. The gross emerges from the subtle, leaving the subtle intact.' Through initiation in these truths of *brahmavidyā* Uddālaka leads his son to realize that all that is around is Brahman and that he himself, Śvetaketu is Brahman. 'Thou art that', 'Thou art Brahman'. The experiments with salt dissolved in water, with a Nyagrodha seed, tiniest of all seeds growing up into a mighty Nyagrodha tree, were conducted with the precision, the point and laboratory efficiency of a master teacher. Conviction is born in Śvetaketu that he is indeed Brahman and *sarvaṃ khalv idam* is also Brahman.

We need to remember that instruction in *brahmavidyā* is not something to be learnt from books, but from the living inspiration of the Ācārya who is himself a *brahmajñānī*. We seem to be content to let our youngsters be pre-initiated Śvetaketu-s all their lives. This is deadly dangerous. The Upaniṣad-s are there to help us save ourselves and our children from the disastrous renunciation of the fundamental rights to knowledge, the only knowledge that is true knowledge, the knowledge that gives meaning and sense to the life we ought to lead and currently dare not, being content to gather and spend.

P.K. SUNDARAM

## GAUḌAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM

Some scholars like Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya have pointed out that Gauḍapāda adopts the standpoint of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda, favouring subjectivism, reducing every phenomenon to ideas, composing the world as a favourite dream. The so-called objects of the external world are the projections of the mind. Externality is an illusion. Internal happenings of the mind are the only reality.

Scholars like T.M.P. Mahadevan (*Gauḍapāda : A Study in Early Advaita*) defended the position of Gauḍapāda as a staunch Advaitin, and claimed that Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara shared the same views on Advaita. Perhaps the Madhyamaka-s also derived their inspiration from the Upaniṣad-s. Gauḍapāda was not a crypto-Buddhist.

Hindu tradition considers Gauḍapāda as a pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the shortest of all Upaniṣad-s, contains one of the Mahāvākya-s—*ayam ātmā brahma*. Brahman reality is the basic platform for Advaita. The individual self is accepted at the empirical stage only. That the Brahman and the *jīva*-s are one and the same is the Advaita tenet.

Gauḍapāda uses the Madhyamaka dialectics of *ajāti* (no-creation). This dialectic is found in Nāgārjuna

who used it to reject the reality of creation. Gauḍapāda wants to affirm the reality of Brahman, and Brahman alone to the exclusion of everything else. This he does on the basis of the Upaniṣad-s.

The subjective realism of the Vijñānavāda reduced the world to ideas, thereby affirming the reality of the mind and consciousness alone. There is no world external to the mind. In other words it affirmed the *dharmaśūnyatā* or non-existence of the external world. The realistic schools of Buddhism like the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, on the contrary, tried their best to deny the mind or the person. This denial is the *pudgalaśūnyatā*, (non existence of individual mind, or consciousness, or the person).

The Mādhyamaka denied both these extremes, holding that the mutual considerations for or against the realist and realistic positions effectively cancelled each other and what resulted was the non-existence of both the mind and matter (*sarva-śūnyatā*).

This is exactly the method Gauḍapāda used for his purpose to show, not non-existence of everything, but, the existence of Brahman alone. This is what Gauḍapāda himself noticed, when he declared that the existence of Brahman, the Reality of the Upaniṣad-s, which was neither mind nor matter, but from which mind and matter took their rise as apparent projections, was not mentioned by the Buddha—*naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*.

Gauḍapāda cannot be said to have borrowed the dialectic from Nāgārjuna at all. Such a dialectic was

already available in the Upaniṣad though in a germinal form. Even granting that he did borrow, it does not make him a Buddhist, because the conclusions which he deduced from that dialectic were quite dissimilar to those of Nāgārjuna in the ultimate analysis and quite contrary to them both in intent and content.

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