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# Sanskrit and Indian Studies

*Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls*

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WAS GAUḌAPĀDA AN IDEALIST?<sup>1</sup>

I

Considering the amount of work that has been done by scholars attempting to interpret Śaṃkarācārya's philosophy, the disparity among the various interpretations is rather remarkable. Confining ourselves to epistemology, we may note that on such a basic point as to whether Śaṃkara was an epistemological realist or an idealist one can find noteworthy authority for both views – or rather, for a variety of views spanning the full spectrum between the extremes. One purpose of this paper is to try to make a bit of headway toward identifying factors contributing to the disagreement.

More consistency can be found among Advaita scholars concerning the place of Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* in the development of Advaita epistemology. Practically all take Gauḍapāda as pioneering whatever may seem to be epistemological idealism in Advaita thought. Granted that much controversy has arisen over the relative influence of Buddhism on the *kārikās*, on their status as scripture and on several other concerns, it is generally agreed that by insisting that nothing is ever really born, by likening the world to the objects seen in a dream, or to the snake mistakenly cognized in a rope, Gauḍapāda gave to Advaita its characteristic flavor.

This characteristic flavor has been termed 'illusionism' by one of the most influential of modern Advaita scholars, Paul Hacker. In a recent series of important papers<sup>2</sup> Hacker suggests that Śaṃkara perhaps began as a follower of Pātañjala Yoga, and that his conversion to Advaita was occasioned by his being exposed to Gauḍapāda's thought. Hacker considers it likely that Śaṃkara first wrote a commentary on the *Yogabhāṣya*, then a commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikās*; he finds a comparable stage of illusionism expressed in certain portions of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, and he suspects further development of Śaṃkara's thought away from the extreme illusionism of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikābhāṣya* through a transitional period characterized by his *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* to his mature thought, more conservatively realistic, as propounded in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

It is not my primary concern here to support or to dispute these speculations concerning the possible order of Śaṃkara's writings and the origins of his thought. I am, however, puzzled by certain assumptions which seem to me to underly Hacker's thinking on the matter, assumptions of a

philosophical rather than a historical nature. The plausibility of the picture of Śaṅkara's development which Hacker paints rests to some extent on shrewd stylistic analysis, but also to some extent on our taking for granted certain connotations or implications of the term 'illusionism', which he considers a proper way of characterizing Gauḍapāda's philosophy. These connotations make it natural for Hacker to assume that Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* catches the full flavor of Gauḍapāda's 'illusionism', that that flavor was contributed to Advaita by Gauḍapāda rather than by Śaṅkara himself (or someone else altogether), and that Śaṅkara accepted it here only to modify it somewhat later on in his development.

Specifically, I wish to suggest that Gauḍapāda may have held views in epistemology which, if 'illusionistic', were in no way idealistic, and that proper attention to Gauḍapāda's language makes it likely that Gauḍapāda intended to use, e.g., the rope-snake analogy to make a point quite different from the one the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* takes it to be used to make.

Unlike others, who have examined Gauḍapāda's text with closest attention to occurrences of the critical term '*māyā*', I want to take my lead from passages in which certain terms are used which derive from the root  $\sqrt{klp}$ , words which are found throughout Indian philosophy – Buddhist as well as Hindu – to indicate factors which regularly play their part in exposition of an idealist world-view.

## II

My method in this section will be to examine the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* in order to gauge the extent to which a certain hypothesis can be substantiated. The hypothesis is this: that Gauḍapāda practices a consistent distinction in usage between *kalp(anā)(ita)* and *vikalp(a)(anā)(ita)*,<sup>3</sup> using the former to mean the process of producing the appearance of something, while the latter is used to indicate the wrong interpretation of something. The distinction may be akin to the one, drawn regularly in later Advaita, between projective (*vikṣepa*) and veiling (*āvaraṇa*) *avidyā*. However, whereas later Advaita viewed projection and veiling as twin functions of the same thing, viz., *avidyā*, I shall try to show that Gauḍapāda may not have viewed *kalpanā* and *vikalpanā* as twin functions at all. Indeed, if my suspicions are correct, it was the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* who identified the locus of the two functions and led the way toward the later view. I shall discuss the implications of this after reviewing the relevant passages.

There are some 21 passages where Gauḍapāda uses  $\sqrt{klp}$  or *vi + √klp*

in a way pertinent to our concerns. Here are the passages, together with indications of what they seem to me to be saying.

I.7: "...svapnamāyāsvarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpitā."

Gauḍapāda is in the course of mentioning a variety of views about the origin of the universe, and here he is referring to a view, clearly not his own, according to which creation (*sṛṣṭi*) is wrongly-interpreted (*vikalpita*) as dream (*svapna*) and *māyā*.

I.17–18: "Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ  
Māyāmātram idaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ.  
Vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit  
Upadeśād ayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate."

If the world were to exist then no doubt it could cease to exist; but this duality is merely *māyā* (i.e., wrong-interpretation); really there is (only) non-duality. A wrong-interpretation would disappear if it were created as appearance by someone; but this is only a way of speaking for the purposes of instruction; when it is understood, duality does not exist at all.

II.9: "Svapnavṛttāy api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṁ tv asat  
Bahiś cetogrhitam sad drṣṭam vaitathyaṁ etayoḥ."

In dreams the unreal (*asat*) is created as an appearance (*kalpita*) in internal awareness (*antaścetas*), while what seems to be real (*sad drṣṭa*) is grasped as external awareness; actually both are erroneous (*vaitathya*).

II.10: "Jāgrad vṛttāy api tv antaś cetasā kalpitaṁ tv asat  
Bahiś cetogrhitam sad yuktaṁ vaitathyaṁ etayoḥ."

Likewise in waking (*jāgrad*) the unreal is created as appearance in internal awareness, while what is understood as real is grasped as external awareness; actually both are erroneous.

II.11: "Ubhayaḥ api vaitathyaṁ bhedaṇām sthānayaḥ yadi  
Ka etān budhyate bhedaṇ ko vai teṣāṁ vikalpakaḥ."

If the different things in the two states are erroneous, who is aware of the variety of things, who is the one-who-makes-the-wrong-interpretation of them?

II.12: "Kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātmā devaḥ svamāyayā  
Sa eva budhyate bhedaṇ iti vedāntaniścayaḥ."

It is the self (*ātman*), the god (*deva*), who creates the appearance of a self by

(or from) himself through his own *māyā*. It is he (that self) alone who is aware of the various things – that is the Vedānta doctrine.

II.13: “Vikaroty aparān bhāvān antaś citte ’vyavasthitān  
Niyatāms ca bahiś citta evaṃ kalpayate prabhuḥ.”

God (*prabhu*) manifests (*vikaroti*) various *bhāvas* (states?) in internal awareness, and likewise produces the appearance of fixed states in external awareness.

II.14: “Cittakālās ca ye’ntas tu dvayakālās ca ye bahiḥ  
Kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣa na anyahetukaḥ.”

States which are internal and *cittakāla* (private?), as well as those which are external and *dvayakāla* (public?), are both merely apparent productions; no such distinctions have another thing as their cause.

II.15: “Avyaktā eva ye ’ntas tu sphuṭā eva ca ye bahiḥ  
Kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣas tv indriyāntare.”

These (states) which are ‘internal’ are just unmanifest (*avyakta*), while the ‘external’ ones are merely vivid (*sphuṭa*); all such states are only apparent productions, distinguished according to the sense-organs involved.

II.16: “Jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān prthagvidhān  
Bāhyān adhyatmikāms caiva yathāvidyās tathā smṛtiḥ.”

*Jīva* is the first to be apparently-produced; after that (come) the different states, external and internal, for just as (one’s) knowledge (*vidyā*) (is), so (his) memory (is).

II.17: “Aniścitaḥ yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā  
Sarpadhārādhibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ.”

Just as a rope, not fully ascertained in the dark, is wrongly-interpreted to be a snake, a stream, etc.; so the self is wrongly-interpreted as states.

II.18: “Niścitaḥ yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate  
Rajjur eveti ca advaitam tadvad ātmavinīcayāḥ.”

Just as the wrong interpretation ceases when the rope is fully ascertained as merely rope, so the self is ascertained as non-duality.

II.19: “Prāṇādibhir anantaś tu bhāvair etair vikalpitaḥ  
Māyaisā tasya devasya yayāyam mohitaḥ svayam.”

But it (i.e., the self) is wrongly-interpreted as endless states such as life

(*prāṇa*), etc. This is the *māyā* of the god (*deva*); this same one is bewildered by that (*māyā*).

II.30: “Etair eṣo ’prthagbhāvaiḥ prthag eveti lakṣitaḥ  
Evaṃ yo veda tattvena kalpayet so ’viśamkitaḥ.”

This (self) is characterized (*lakṣita*) as “merely separate” from these states which are (really) non-separate (from it?). One who knows thus may without hesitation produce appearances according to (his) nature (*tattvena*).

II.33: “Bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ  
Bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā śivā.”

This (individual self) is apparently-produced by the non-dual as non-existent states only. The states also (are apparently-produced) just from the non-dual. Therefore non-duality is the most auspicious thing (*śivā*).

II.35: “Vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ  
Nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ dṛṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo ’dvayaḥ.”

Wise men (*muni*) free from passion, fear and anger and who are well-versed in the Vedas see this non-dual cessation of the world (*prapañca*) free from wrong-interpretation.

III.32: “Ātmasatyānubodhena na saṃkalpayate yadā  
Ātmanastam tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt.”

When, through experiencing the truth of the self, there is no imagining (*na saṃkalpayate*), then comes quiescence of perception, since one cannot grasp something in the absence of anything graspable.

III.33: “Akalpakam ayaṃ jñānam jñeyābhinnaṃ pracakṣate  
Brahma jñeyam ayaṃ nityam ajenāyaṃ vibudhyate.”

III.34: “Nigrahītya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ  
Pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyāḥ suṣupte’nyo na tatsamaḥ.”

The manifestation of the internal organ (*manas*) when it is restrained, pure consciousness free from wrong interpretations, should be understood as different from that in deep sleep, not similar to it.

IV.73: “Yo ’sti kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena nāsty asau  
Paratantrābhisamvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthataḥ.”

Whatever exists as concealed (*saṃvṛtyā*) through having been produced as an appearance does not really exist. According to other theories it may (be said to) exist, but in reality it does not.

IV.74: "Ajaḥ kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena na apy ajaḥ  
Paratantrābhiniṣpattyā samvṛtyā jāyate tu saḥ."

The unborn, having its nature concealed by having been an apparent production, is not even unborn really; what is dependent is (only) 'born' as an appearance, with its nature concealed.

What sort of metaphysics do these passages suggest? It seems to be this. On Gauḍapāda's assumptions whatever has its nature 'concealed' (*samvṛtya*) or 'internal' (*antas*) is non-existent (*asat*) by comparison with what is responsible for the concealing. Common sense supposes that dream objects are internal and concealed or limited in the sense that they are dependent upon the dreaming state and have no existence outside of our dreams. By contrast we normally suppose that the objects of our waking experience exist as external to our awareness, since they are not taken to be limited to waking experience. But common sense is mistaken. The objects of the waking world are only apparent productions and so limited to waking experience just as dream-objects, being apparent productions, are limited to dreaming. Thus they are internal to waking experience and concealed by it, and are therefore non-existent by comparison with what is responsible for the concealing.

Now, what *is* responsible for the concealing in the two cases? It is we dreamers who are responsible for the concealment of our dreams – we produce the appearances which constitute our dream experiences, 'we' being understood as our empirical selves, technically called '*jīva*'. Analogously, God is responsible for the concealment of our waking experience – He produces the appearances which constitute the objects experienced in the waking state.

Now we are not normally aware that all this is so; we wrongly-interpret waking objects as independent, thinking that these objects in the form confronting us have an existence which transcends the bounds of waking experience. It is this wrong interpretation which makes us think, for instance, that we *really* create dream-objects and that God *really* creates waking objects. In fact, nothing is ever really created, for to 'really create' something would be to foster another thing, an effect, which was independent of and thus as real as its cause, and this violates the monistic insights of the Upaniṣads. To suppose that causality operates as it is ordinarily supposed to, by producing an independent effect, is a wrong-interpretation. Indeed, any imputation of difference is a wrong interpretation.

The logic of this last thought has paradoxical results. It must lead us to conclude that even an apparent-production is not what it seems, since it involves difference and so is a result of wrong-interpretation. So not only is

it the case that "the unborn is not really unborn", as IV.74 asserts, but it is even the case, as I.17–18 implies, that when it is taught that there is only apparent-production (rather than real production) that too is ultimately a wrong-interpretation indulged in only for the purpose of teaching (*upadeśa*).

These implications of Gauḍapāda's *ajātivāda* have been noted before, and in themselves would not require reiteration. I think they have been too easily construed, however, as requiring something akin to what in Western thought has been called 'subjective idealism'. And indeed, subjective idealism would follow from *ajātivāda* if the one who apparently-produces things were held to be the very same one who wrongly-interprets them. If the mechanism by which an agent *A* apparently-produces something *x* is that *A*, by distinguishing *x* from something else, wrongly-interprets it, then the world of waking experience is dependent on our misinterpreting it just as the world of dream experience is dependent on our misinterpreting it. That this position is a possible one, and consonant with some things in the Upaniṣads, I do not deny; the question is whether it was Gauḍapāda's view.

My contention is that there is little in Gauḍapāda's language to suggest that he held subjective idealism, and some reason to think he did not. The major reasons which lead me to think he did not are (1) that Gauḍapāda never uses *vi + √kṛ* in speaking of the relation between a type of experience and what (or who) is commonsensically taken as its cause, and (2) that he specifically identifies (in II.12–13) the one who *kalpayati* the world as God.

In II.12 and 13 the one who *kalpayati* the world is identified as *deva* and *brahmu*. In the succeeding verses (II.14–16) where the causal origins of temporal and other states are under discussion those states are referred to as *kalpita*, not *vikalpita*. In II.16 *jīva* is explicitly said to be *kalpita*, not *vikalpita*, in a context where it is relevant what is 'earlier' or 'first' (*pūrva*) so that origins are once again clearly under discussion. In II.30, in a remarkable statement, it is said that one who knows the truth may *kalpayet* according to his nature. It would be odd to have the text advise him to wrongly-interpret according to his nature!

To be sure, other passages are more ambiguous. Nevertheless, I believe a consistent and sensible reading has been found for them by sticking with the distinction I propose. For example, II.9–10 finds a thing unreal (*asat*) because *kalpita*. Couldn't one understand *kalpita* here as meaning 'wrongly-interpreted'? Well, it is clear enough that a wrong-interpretation (*vikalpa*) is always unreal on Gauḍapāda's view, but it seems more consistent with the passages mentioned above that the unreality is a result of their *kalpita* status. The connection between being *kalpita* and being unreal lies in the notion that things are 'concealed' when *kalpita*; the notion seems to be, not

that anything which is misinterpreted is concealed, but rather that what is concealed is enclosed within the limits of, and so dependent on, the kind of experience in which it occurs.

An apparent counterinstance to my theory is contained in II.11–12. II.11 asks a question – “who is the *vikalpaka*?”, and II.12 appears to answer that it is God. If this were correct, Gauḍapāda would be saying that God projects the appearance of differences by making wrong-interpretations, and if we add the premiss that God is a self, an idealistic interpretation of the *Gauḍapādakārikās* will result.<sup>4</sup> But attractive as that interpretation may be it is not the only one that may be proposed. An equally plausible explanation is that Gauḍapāda is here answering a question with a different point, a challenge to monism which recurs in Advaita writings over and over again. Advaita teaches monism; the questioner propounds the following puzzle:

you say that differences (*bheda*) are apparently-created by a self, viz., God, but surely it is not God but we (*jīvas*) who wrongly-interpret things by ascribing these differences to reality. So mustn't you hold that there are at least two things – God and (at least one) *jīva* – and doesn't that conflict with your alleged monism?

And Gauḍapāda answers in the traditional Advaita manner by explaining that ultimately God and the *jīvas* are one and the same self, that the distinctions among them, like all the others, are erroneous (*vaitathya*). The reader may say at this point “yes, you see, the apparent-producer and the wrong-interpreter are the same, contrary to Potter's reading”, but Potter's reply is likewise firmly based in Gauḍapāda's own words – “of course, ultimately they are the same, but we are here interpreting the teaching (*upadeśa*), not the truth, which cannot be ‘interpreted’ but can only be directly realized without words.”

This leaves us the puzzling stanzas I.17–18 to consider. I.18a is the only passage in the work where “*vi + √kḷp*” and “*√kḷp*” are found used together in the same sentence, and it may be thought that the meaning clearly refutes my thesis, since the passage appears to imply that *vikalpa* is *kalpita*, though not by anyone. But only a little thought will suggest that that is not by any margin the most plausible reading of the passage. What Gauḍapāda is saying here, as I see it, is precisely that neither the world (*prapañca*) nor wrong-interpretations of it (*vikalpa*) have independent existence, and so neither can be destroyed in the way we think pots, etc., are normally destroyed. In other words, this is another way of teaching *ajātivāda*, but it carries that doctrine's implications to an extreme length. Being

apparently-created (*kalpita*) is rightly contrasted with being actually created in that things which are actually created are independent of their cause and so subject to decay and destruction independently of their cause while things apparently-created do not have existence independent of their cause and so are not subject to destruction independently of their cause. But I.18 then goes on in a different manner to apply the logic of this to things apparently-created. If those things are supposed to be apparently-created by someone different from his apparent-creation, then that is a wrong-interpretation; and *that* apparent-creation *would* be subject to destruction since it involves postulating actual difference between the producer and what he produces. But in fact wrong-interpretations (*vikalpa*) are not subject to destruction in the way that pots, etc., are commonly supposed to be, and this is added evidence for the view Gauḍapāda is propounding. The wrong-interpretation of apparent-production, namely that it is someone producing something independent of himself, is a way of speaking (*vāda*) we can hardly avoid, but it is only made necessary because of the necessity of teaching (*upadeśa*).

These passages featuring occurrences of  $\sqrt{kḷp}$  or *vi + √kḷp* comprise a large number of the stanzas in the *Gauḍapādakārikās* which bear on the question of idealism. Turning briefly to consider how Gauḍapāda's use of *māyā* relates to this, it is evident that *māyā* is used ambiguously, but that in the great majority of its occurrences it is used synonymously with *vikalpa*, ‘wrong-interpretation’. In a few cases, though, it is used to suggest the power of the Lord (e.g., II.12; II.19; III.10). Of the majority of passages, where *māyā* = *vikalpa*, let me cite only those not previously quoted.

II.31: “Svapnamāye yathā dr̥ṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā  
Tathā viśvam idaṃ dr̥ṣṭam vedānteṣu vicakṣanaiḥ.”

Just as dreams, wrong-interpretations and the city of the Gandharvas are seen (in the mistaken way they are seen by us), so all this (world) is seen (in a mistaken way) – this is the view (set forth) in the Vedānta (i.e., in the Upaniṣads).

III.19: “Māyā bhidyate hy etān na anyathājaṃ kathañcana  
Tattvato bhidyamāne hi mṛtyatām amṛtaṃ vrajet.”

Because, this unborn is differentiated in no other way than through wrong-interpretation; for, if it were really differentiated the immortal would become mortal.

III.24: “Neha nāneti ca āmnāyād indro māyabhir ity api  
Ajāyamāno bāhūdā māyā jāyate tu saḥ.”

From scriptural authority in texts such as “neha nānā. . .” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.9 = Kaṭha Upaniṣad IV.11) and “indro māyabhir. . .” (Rgveda CI.47.18 = Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.5.9) (we know that) that which has not been born is wrongly-interpreted in many forms.

III.27: “Sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ  
Tattvato jāyate yasya jātaṃ tasya hi jāyate.”

The existent is joined with birth through wrong-interpretation, but not actually; for that (if anything) which is really born should be born (again?).

III.28: “Asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate  
Vamdhyaṇpūtro na tattvena māyayā vā api jāyate.”

Non-existents are not in reality joined with birth through wrong-interpretation, for the son of a barren woman is not thought really to be born even in wrong-interpretation.

III.29: “Yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ  
Tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ spandate māyayā manaḥ.”

Just as in dream the internal organ vibrates in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation, so in the waking state (also) the internal organ vibrates in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation.

IV.58: “Dharmā ya iti jāyante samvṛtyā te na tattvataḥ  
Janma māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate.”

The *dharma*s which are said to be born are not actually born; their birth is like wrong-interpretation, and wrong-interpretation does not occur (at all, and so cannot be born.)

IV.59: “Yathā māyāmayād bījaj jāyate tanmayo ’ṅkuraḥ  
Nāsau nityo na ca ucchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanā.”

Just as from seeds constructed from wrong-interpretations are (seemingly) born sprouts constructed from wrong-interpretations, so that neither are eternal or non-eternal, so it is with respect to the *dharma*s.

IV.61: “Yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā  
Tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṃ cittam calati māyayā.”

Just as in dreams the internal organ moves in seeming duality by wrong-interpretation, so in the waking state it does so likewise.

IV.69: “Yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate ’pi ca  
Tathā jīva āmi sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca.”

Just as the *jīva* as wrongly-interpreted (seems to be) born and dies, so all the *jīvas* (seem to) both exist and not to exist.

The translations (or paraphrases) of these passages are intentionally made consistent with the interpretation I am defending. Some, perhaps all of them are capable of being read idealistically as well. My concern is only to suggest that they do not require abandonment of the distinction between apparent-production and wrong-interpretation.

A final textual matter. The one passage where Gauḍapāda makes use of the rope-snake analogy is at II.17–18, already quoted. Note that it is explicitly the term *vikalpita* and not *kalpita* that is used in describing *both* how the snake is ‘made’ and how the *bhāvas* are ‘made’. The distinction I am arguing Gauḍapāda adheres to renders this choice of words significant. If to be *vikalpita* is different from being *kalpita* then certain things follow which do not follow if we take him to use the two terms interchangeably. Specifically, if the distinction is adhered to this passage says that just as we *jīvas* wrongly-interpret the rope as snake, so we *jīvas* wrongly-interpret the Self as *bhāvas*. On that reading, II.18 very appropriately adds that when we ascertain the nature of a rope (realizing it cannot be a snake) the wrong-interpretation ceases, just as when we ascertain the nature of the Self the wrong-interpretation of states (*bhāvas*) ceases. Read thus, the passage says nothing about the epistemological status of the world, other than to indicate through an illustration what Gauḍapāda is fond of saying more straightforwardly over and over again, namely that we wrongly-interpret what is actually one as plural, as having various forms.

The rope-snake analogy is a remarkably fertile one. Consider the following uses it might be put to:

1. Just as we (*jīvas*) wrongly-interpret there to be snake in the rope, so we (*jīvas*) wrongly-interpret there is to be a rope, etc. in the non-dual (Brahman.)

2. Just as we (*jīvas*) wrongly-interpret there to be snake in the rope, so God wrongly-interprets there to be rope in Brahman.

3. Just as we (*jīvas*) apparently-create a snake in the rope, so we (*jīvas*) apparently-create a rope in Brahman.

4. Just as we (*jīvas*) apparently-create a snake in the rope, so God apparently-creates a rope in Brahman.<sup>5</sup>

I suggest that Gauḍapāda only uses the analogy to make the first point. He doesn’t wish to say, as I read him, that God wrongly-interprets things, and I see no reason to impute to him the notion that we apparently-create ropes or snakes, since he explicitly denies this in other passages, as we have seen.

## III

To summarize what I have been trying to suggest, Gauḍapāda's views seem to me to come to this:

1. God apparently-creates the world; we do not.
2. We apparently-create our dream-world(s).
3. Whatever is apparently-created is 'concealed', 'unborn' and 'unreal'.
4. We (*jīvas*) regularly wrongly-interpret and find differences and multiplicity where none actually exists, in both dream and waking states.
5. When one discovers the truth (by *asparśayoga*, Vedantic wisdom, etc.) one's wrong-interpretations cease, analogously to the way one ceases to see a snake in the rope after investigation.
6. However, after realization one may still apparently-create according to one's true nature (just as God does).
7. And after realization one still is aware of something positive (it is not like deep sleep).
8. So, creation of the world is not by wrong-interpretation; the creation of the world by God is *not* analogous to our wrong-interpretations, nor is it the case that we apparently-create the objects of the waking world.

I submit that if these are Gauḍapāda's views he is not an idealist. What is an idealist? I take him to be someone who holds that the objects of veridical (waking) knowledge are dependent for their existence on someone's thinking of them. I see no reason to suppose that Gauḍapāda holds such a view. As I have argued, the passages seem capable of being construed naturally in a way quite contrary to idealism.

If Gauḍapāda is properly termed as 'illusionist' (as Hacker, Vetter and others term him) that would be in virtue of his teaching of *ajātivāda*. But one cannot infer idealism automatically from illusionism. The fact that no 'real' creation occurs, that objects common-sensically assumed to be real creations and therefore to have a kind of existence which transcends the limits of human awareness are not such, does not entail that anyone produced their appearance by merely thinking of them. We do not produce the appearances in our dreams that way: our dreams arise in us from the material provided by *vāsanās*, traces of past experiences. Likewise, God does not create the objects of waking experiences merely by thinking about them; He too utilizes the traces of past experiences laid down in transmigrating bodies as the material for His creation, presumably to provide occasions for us to work off our stored-up *karma*. And the resulting apparent objects that He produces, though not 'real' in the sense of transcending the limits of waking experience, *are* real in the sense that we must deal with them seriously and cannot merely think them out of existence or into some other form.

However, we are habituated to regularly wrongly-interpret these matters, and to find the wrong kind of 'reality' in the multiplicity of subjects and objects with which we deal. We believe that the objects we see in our waking life, and in our dream life as long as we are dreaming, are such that they would exist even if we were not experiencing them, and thus that if we wish to destroy them we must do them violence of some sort. This is wrong-interpretation, because it takes difference as fundamental and proposes to seek the improvement of things by generating more plurality through smashing things into their constituent parts, etc. Our mistake is not that we think seriously of these things – that would be a mistake if they didn't exist at all, but as we have seen, the fact that God produced them does not entail their complete mind-dependence – but that we think seriously about them in a perverse way. It would be even more perverse to think about them idealistically, to suppose that we could make the things go away merely by wishing. This would be not to think seriously about them at all.

Then how should we think about them? Gauḍapāda seems to answer this by pressing the *ajātivāda* teaching to an extreme, though logical, conclusion. Even to think of God as creator of waking appearances is to be guilty of a wrong-interpretation, since it involves drawing distinctions between God and His creation, between God and oneself, between the objects created by God and one's self, etc. It is, to be sure, a wrong interpretation which is essential as a stage in instruction. It would be virtually impossible to instruct a pupil in the right way of thinking without being able to explain the wrong way and then to contrast it with the right way. But once the pupil has seen that things are not 'real', i.e., transcendent of their experiential limits, and has appreciated why they are not 'real' – because they are not born at all in the way we normally think things are born – then by pointing out the paradoxically far-reaching implications of that insight one can root out all temptation to wrongly-interpret, all ways of thinking and talking that involve reference to duality. Learning to think non-dualistically (and probably not to speak at all except in a playful way) does not in itself destroy the objects which God creates the appearance of. These continue to appear as long as there are *vasanās*, (i.e., *prārabdha karma*) occasioning His exercise. But it does preclude the laying down of further traces, so that when the *prārabdha karma* has been exhausted God has nothing further to work with, and no further experiences of objects accrue.

## IV

One may naturally ask, then, why has scholarship almost universally held



Gauḍapāda to be an idealist? I can see several reasons, each of them interesting.

1. Though Gauḍapāda does not think that the world is dependent for its existence on our thinking about it, he probably held (as a standard reading of the *karma* doctrine) that some of the properties we impute to things are wrong-interpretations for which we are ultimately responsible through the *vāsanās* laid down in the past. If so, those characteristics we find in the world are dependent on us, or at least on our pasts, and it is easy to conflate this kind of dependence with the mind-dependence associated with idealism, according to which latter the properties of our experiences are merely the projections of our present desires and expectations. However, though this conflation is natural it is ultimately irrelevant, since it is one thing to say that the properties we attribute to the world are our constructions, and quite another to say that the world has no properties other than those we wrongly attribute to it. I take it, for example, that Gauḍapāda wants us to believe that *God* apparently-created the world, that we did not, and that *this* property of the world belongs to it not merely in virtue of our thinking it so.

2. An added source of complexity is the Advaita thesis that ultimately we *jīvas* are in some sense non-different from God and all of us non-different from Brahman. If I am non-different from God, for example, and if the world depends on God for its existence, then doesn't it follow logically that the world depends on me for its existence? I think it is clear that Gauḍapāda does not sanction this inference, at least "for the purpose of the teaching". As long as he is explaining something to us there are some distinctions he needs; he must teach us how to think rightly by teaching us to progressively reject distinctions, but in order to do that he must get us to identify and discriminate the distinctions he wants us to reject. That in the end we should come to reject all distinctions should not be allowed to become an obstacle to our being able to understand and accept the teaching at some intermediate stage. If I am being addressed as a bound *jīva* I don't help myself by responding as if I were God!

3. Nevertheless, it is tempting to conflate the process of apparent-production with wrong-interpretation, since the resulting view is so much simpler. If every erroneous judgment is literally a construction, that is, a projection of a content into an imagined world which is thus completely mind-dependent insofar as it is entirely comprised of those projected contents, it will of course follow that all imputations are equally groundless, and one can escape to an easy ineffabilism in which no instruction need be taken seriously. Since there is a strong sympathetic streak in most of us for anti-intellectualism, it is not surprising that this mystical world-view is so

attractive that it is easily mistaken by most amateurs as the Advaita views, if not the view of all Indian philosophy.

4. The author of the most famous commentary on Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* is traditionally taken to be Śaṅkarācārya. In the authentic works of Śaṅkara, the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* most prominent among them, he shows a tendency to identify the processes of apparent-production and wrong-interpretation under his own theory of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), a theory which appears destined in the end (though perhaps not in Śaṅkara's handling itself) to assimilate the metaphysical role of *māyā* with the epistemological role of *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. The result of the assimilation is not fully idealistic, however; Śaṅkara insists that every superimposition requires a ground to which the superimposed characters are imputed, a ground which is not mind-dependent, although it turns out to be nothing but pure consciousness. The resulting account holds that all imputation of any character is erroneous – strictly speaking, even the imputation of non-duality, etc. The fact that Brahman, or pure consciousness, is required as the ultimate ground of superimposition does not provide all that much of a distinction of his view from idealism, however, especially in the eyes of philosophical scholars (Indian or Western) whose epistemological training has been through the works of the British empiricists and Kant. In this way a slight misinterpretation of Śaṅkara may have been turned into a greater misinterpretation of Gauḍapāda.

5. The author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* (= *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*), whoever he may have been,<sup>6</sup> is also responsible for extending the implications of the rope-snake analogy in such a way as to make it seem that Gauḍapāda was an idealist. Whereas Gauḍapāda only invokes the analogy in one passage and for a single purpose, as we have seen, the author of the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* invokes it frequently and in such a way as to conflate *kalpanā* with *vikalpanā*. He uses it over and over in the first Book to help explain the process of realization, and in doing so implies that the complete removal of the dream state (*taijasa*), for example, is accomplished by discovering the nature of the true Self, just as the discovery of the nature of the rope removes the snake completely. Did Gauḍapāda think that dreaming as a type of experience would be completely destroyed when one realizes that nothing is ever really born, etc.? It would seem that at least he thought that the complete rooting out of the dream state takes a kind of training, some kind of yoga based upon the intuition of non-duality, whereas the *Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya* seems to suggest that the intuition immediately demolishes all mundane experience, dream or waking. Again, where Gauḍapāda seems to me to suggest that dream and waking alike

contain wrong-interpretations such as the rope-snake, the author of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya* uses the rope-snake to develop a theory of epistemic levels, of dream-objects depending on waking-consciousness as waking-objects depend on a higher consciousness. By II.14 he is clearly assuming that the doctrine being defended is that "everything is *parikalpita* by *citta*, like dreams",<sup>7</sup> and in the commentary to II.17 he uses the fact that the snake is *vikalpita* as an analogy for talking about the *kalpanā* which produced *jīvas*(s).<sup>8</sup> Thus the *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya* uses the rope-snake to help demonstrate the idealistic thesis, #3 in our list on p. 15, rather than merely the neutral #1 in that list.

None of my arguments make the *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya* reading of Gauḍapāḍa an impossible one. And there are ways of taking Gauḍapāḍa historically which would seem to corroborate the idealistic interpretation – e.g., Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya's notorious theory that at least Book IV, if not all of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikās*, is a Buddhist treatise.<sup>9</sup> Hacker's recent work, alluded to at the beginning of this paper, would seem to suggest a greater affinity for the young Yogin Śaṃkara on his way to a more mature Advaita.<sup>10</sup> Hacker is properly cautious on these matters, but one does get the impression that he finds a certain plausibility in the young Śaṃkara's turning from the Pātañjala Yoga realism to his own later quasi-idealism by way of a reading of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikās*. That plausibility most naturally stems from a reading of Gauḍapāḍa's work as idealist itself. What I have been endeavoring to show is that it is not necessary to construe Gauḍapāḍa idealistically, that it is uncritical to infer idealism from his *ajātivāda* alone, and that Gauḍapāḍa need not be supposed to have been more inclined to idealism than Sāṃkhya or Yoga are. Even so, it remains perfectly possible that Śaṃkara was first a Yogin, wrote a *Vivaraṇa* on the *Yogabhāṣya*, then read Gauḍapāḍa and prepared a commentary on it, misunderstanding the text and finding in it an idealism that was in fact not intended by its author. Nevertheless, the plausibility of Hacker's acceptance of Śaṃkara's authorship of the *Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, as well as of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya*, seems lessened somewhat by these considerations. If Gauḍapāḍa did not provide Śaṃkara with the clues to his idealism, who did? Did Śaṃkara come to the characteristic views of his maturity by way of mistakenly finding idealism in a text which sets forth a position no more idealistic than that found in the *Yogabhāṣya*, a text which in turn he was closely-enough acquainted with to have written a commentary on himself, then subsequently modifying the idealism by returning in his mature works to a position closer to his youthful Yoga? Or are we in these matters dealing with more than one author? I have no answers to these questions, but suggest that the whole truth may not yet be known.

University of Washington

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I wish to thank Professor Allen W. Thrasher for his help in improving a number of aspects of this paper. He is of course not responsible for my mistakes.

<sup>2</sup> See, especially, Paul Hacker, 'Sankara der Yogin und Sankara der Advaitin: Einige Beobachtungen', in *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, 12–13, 1968–69, pp. 118–146; also 'Notes on the Mandukyopaniṣad and Sankara's Agamasāstravivaraṇa' in *India Major* (Congratulatory Volume presented to J. Gonda) (Leiden, Netherlands, 1972), pp. 115–132.

<sup>3</sup> A quirk of Sanskrit usage rules out a third variation: we find 'vikalpa' meaning (on the proposed reading) the result of wrong-interpretation, but not 'kalpa', which word means things entirely different in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* and elsewhere. This disparity might be construed as further evidence for my hypothesis, viz., that the two roots  $\sqrt{k\bar{l}p}$  and  $\sqrt{klp}$  were not necessarily thought interchangeable.

<sup>4</sup> Though not a 'subjective' idealism.

<sup>5</sup> Not to speak of a whole series of further variations, e.g., "Just as we (*jīvas*) wrongly interpret a snake in the rope, God apparently-creates a rope in Brahman", etc.

<sup>6</sup> That Śaṃkara wrote the *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya* is argued by Hacker in the second article cited in note 1, as well as by Tilmann Vetter in the Frauwallner Festschrift (cited in note 1), pp. 407–423.

<sup>7</sup> "Svapnavac cittaparikalpitaṃ sarvaṃ..." *Works of Shankaracharya* (ed., H.R. Bhagavat), Volume II, Part 1 (Poona, 1927), 2nd. edition p. 445.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 446.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāḍa* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943).

<sup>10</sup> Hacker does not deny Buddhist influence, however; cf. p. 121 of the second article cited in footnote 1.

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# JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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- <sup>11</sup> J. D. Mabbot, "Symposium: Negation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. Vol. 9 (1929), p. 68.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- <sup>13</sup> Gilbert Ryle, "Symposium: Negation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. Vol. 9 (1929), p. 86. This appears to be an early formulation of Ryle's conception of a category-mistake.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- <sup>16</sup> This controversy is widely discussed by Western philosophers: see W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, pt. I (Cambridge University Press, 1921; republished ed., New York: Dover Publications, 1964), pp. 66–69; *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, "Negation," by A. N. Prior, pp. 458ff.; A. N. Prior, "Entities," *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 32 (1954), p. 160.
- <sup>17</sup> This latter commitment reveals that the Nyāya cannot agree with the Buddhists on the extreme form of *prasajya-pratiṣedha* negation, in which the commitment aspect is reduced to zero.
- <sup>18</sup> See W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, pt. I, pp. 67–68.
- <sup>19</sup> A. N. Prior, "Entities," p. 160.
- <sup>20</sup> G. Ryle, "Symposium: Negation," pp. 83–84.
- <sup>21</sup> In a sense our discussion here boils down to a stipulation: Either you stipulate that the question whether virtue has a color does not arise, from which it follows that 'Virtue is blue' and 'Virtue is not blue' are meaningless, or you stipulate that the question whether virtue has a color or not is meaningful.
- <sup>22</sup> H. H. Price, "Symposium: Negation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. Vol. 9 (1929), pp. 110–111.
- <sup>23</sup> A. N. Prior, "Entities," p. 159.
- <sup>24</sup> M. Shorter, "Meaning and Grammar," p. 83.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

## A CRITIQUE OF AN ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO GAUḌAPĀDA'S MĀṆḌŪKYA KĀRIKĀS

The implicit hermeneutical categories employed to interpret Advaita Vedānta texts have led to the ontologizing of Advaita Vedānta presentations. Some scholars, and possibly even Advaitins themselves, have had a tendency to read *ślokas* concerning the relationship between mind and *māyā* as if they were, without question, ontological-metaphysical statements. The assumption of a connotative, ontological referent to these *ślokas* makes their explication a forgone conclusion. The contention of this paper is that one need not presume that Advaita Vedānta is always generating ontological-metaphysical statements. In fact, the aim of this paper will be to disclose that what others have assumed to be ontological depositions may be understood as phenomenological statements.<sup>1</sup>

Specifically, we intend to focus upon Gauḍapāda's presentation of *māyā* and the relationship of *māyā* to the movement of the mind.<sup>2</sup> We will show that *māyā* as the movement of the mind (*cittaspandita*) need not be understood as a metaphysical-ontological statement. These statements do not proclaim the creation/fabrication of objects by the movement of the mind — some form of idealism. Such an interpretation presupposes an ontological category. Rather, we will disclose that *māyā* in this context should be understood as a phenomenology of experience and not an ontology of existence. In this sense, *māyā* is embodied in the very act of perception (*pratyakṣa*) — in the movement of the mind which allows the mind to take the form (*vṛtti*) of the object and hence appear as that which is other than itself. *Māyā* as a phenomenological principle is the appearance (*ābhāsa*) of the mind as perceiver and perceived (*grāhya-grāhaka*), where this appearance is imagined (*vikalpita*) to be two distinct entities (*vastus*).

We must note that we are not denying that Advaita Vedānta, and in particular Gauḍapāda, present *māyā* as both a metaphysical-ontological principle and as an epistemological principle. *Māyā* is understood in both metaphysical and epistemological terms. As a metaphysical principle, it is that which explains how the world of becoming appears when in fact all that exists is Being, *Brahman*, *Ātman*. *Māyā* is thus at the heart of the Advaita

explanation of "creation" and is in this sense a cosmological principle – the principle which relates the cosmos to the non-dual *Brahman*. *Māyā* is also an epistemological principle. *Māyā* is used as synonymous with *avidyā* and as such represents the epistemological principle by which the categories of our knowing structure a known-world. From this perspective, *māyā* is the dilemma of the knowing-subject (*Jīva*) whose mode of knowing itself as object is imposed upon the world. Thus, the epistemological categories of the knowing-subject become the prototype of the known-world.<sup>3</sup> These various explanations of *māyā* are intended to illuminate the nature of *māyā* from different perspectives. As the nature of the world and the explanations of the world are *māyāmātram* (only an illusion), the various perspectives are not conflicting explanations, but rather they are different approaches to the problem of *māyā* which is *māyā*.<sup>4</sup>

*Māyā* is thus the most pervasive philosophical principle within Advaita Vedānta. It is the world that is presented and the principles for its presentation. For wherever we look and however we look, it is *māyā* at which we look and it is because of *māyā* that we look. Therefore, it seems that *māyā* should not only be understood as a metaphysical and as an epistemological principle, but that its pervasiveness should encompass the domain of the phenomenological. Hence, equally relevant to a discussion of the world which we see and our seeing the world is a discussion of perception (*pratyakṣa*). *Māyā* is the world which is presented in our experience and perception. To overlook this relationship between *māyā* and *pratyakṣa* is to overlook the phenomenological perspective upon *māyā*. This oversight leads to the continual attempt to read statements dealing with the phenomenological as if they were ontological. We therefore will present *māyā* as a phenomenological principle in order to address ourselves to this problem.

Before proceeding any further, it would be most helpful to delineate what we mean by phenomenology and to contrast it with ontology-metaphysics and epistemology. The term phenomenology is specifically being employed to indicate an investigation or study of that which appears, that which is presented in, or to, consciousness. Our phenomenological presentation therefore will focus upon understanding the nature of that which is presented within experience – that which we know as the result of our experiencing. Our use of the term phenomenological will be juxtaposed to both metaphysical-ontological considerations and epistemological considerations. Our use of the term metaphysical-ontological will be directed towards those endeavors

which seek to uncover the nature of objective reality – reality or objects independent of their presentation in experience. The use of the term epistemological will be associated with those endeavors which seek to uncover the principles within the knowing-subject which structure the knowing of the subject. The emphasis within the term phenomenological is directed neither strictly to the subject pole as epistemology would be nor to the object pole as ontology-metaphysics would be; but rather, the term phenomenological is directed towards understanding that which presents itself to, or in, experience while pointing to something other than the one who experiences it.

#### THE DEBATE AS CONTEXT

By claiming that Gauḍapāda's presentation of *māyā* should be understood as a phenomenological principle as well as an ontological an epistemological principle I also claim that others have neglected the former perspective while concentrating upon the latter two perspectives. The failure to recognize Gauḍapāda's statements as phenomenological is blatantly evident in the debate over Gauḍapāda's religious-philosophical allegiance. This debate has pondered whether Gauḍapāda is a Vijñānavādīn Buddhist or an Advaita Vedāntin; or whether the latter is only a disguise for the former. The debate often presupposes that Gauḍapāda is making ontological pronouncements and hence one proceeds from that point to argue whether Gauḍapāda makes such pronouncements based upon *śruti* or upon the heterodox texts of the Buddhists. The debate is from this perspective, often misplaced. It is misplaced to the degree that it fails to read at least some of the *ślokas* in question – those concerning the relationship between *māyā* and *cittaspaṇḍita* – as phenomenological statements.

The intention in referring to this debate is only to provide the context for our phenomenological presentation and to distinguish our presentation from what has been done. We do not intend to resolve this debate. In illuminating the phenomenological perspective which, we maintain, is overlooked in this debate, we are not claiming emphatically that one should forget the entire enterprise of discerning the relationship between Advaita Vedānta and the various schools of Buddhism. Nor are we claiming that one should abandon all attempts to uncover Gauḍapāda's place within this schema. The task at this point is simply to review a few of the remarks made about Gauḍapāda in order to illuminate that which we are not doing. A full exposition of our

position, and thus an alternative to the interpretations cited, will be offered in the subsequent section of this paper.

We are not doing ontology-metaphysics and we maintain that Gauḍapāda need not be understood in those categories. However, we do find others who, quoting the same *ślokas* as we will quote in support of our position, claim that Gauḍapāda is doing only ontology-metaphysics.<sup>5</sup> For example, we see this in S. S. Roy (*The Heritage of Sankara*). He summarizes Gauḍapāda's presentation of "the entire process of the externalisation of consciousness, whereby a dualistic situation is created."<sup>6</sup> Roy then interprets this process as follows:

This metaphysical theory, though originally Upaniṣadic in essence bears such a semblance to the Buddhist doctrine of the Void and to certain tenets of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist Philosophy, that an adverse critic of Gauḍapāda might go to the length of identifying the philosophical doctrine propounded in the Āgamaśāstra with Buddhism.<sup>7</sup>

Roy reads the "externalization of consciousness" as metaphysics. With reference to the same *ślokas*,<sup>8</sup> we will show that this "externalization of consciousness" is a phenomenology of perception. It is the projection of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in perception (*pratyakṣa*) whereby the *antaḥkaraṇa* appears as both *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

The employment of ontological categories of interpretation is also evident in the scholarship of T. M. P. Mahadevan. Mahadevan in arguing that Gauḍapāda is an Advaita Vedāntin and not a Buddhist quotes the following *śloka*:

This duality in the manner of the perceiver and the perceived is only the movement of the mind. Therefore the mind is spoken of as always being without (sense) object and without attachment.<sup>9</sup>

Mahadevan informs us that the "duality in the manner of perceiver and perceived" (*grāhya-grāhaka*) is "the world" and here I take Mahadevan's reference to the "world" to refer to the totality of objects – that which is believed to be given independent of an observer, the ontological. In addition, we discover that according to Mahadevan's interpretation of Gauḍapāda, this "world" is only the creation of mind and mind is Ultimate Reality, *ātman*. Mahadevan says:

Using the terminology of Vijñānavāda, Gauḍapāda says that the world is the result of the vibration of *citta* (*cittaspaṇḍita*). But what he means by *citta* in this context is not the content-less mind which is the reality, according to Vijñānavādin, but the Self (*ātman*).<sup>10</sup>

By the presumption that "*grāhya-grāhaka*" are ontological terms, Mahadevan is forced into a metaphysical debate over the nature of Ultimate Reality.

We will read the phrase "the duality in the manner of the perceiver and perceived" as phenomenology. As far as this author is concerned the statement says nothing about independent, external objects – "the world". The statement neither affirms, nor denies the existence of external objects. The statement is leading us to see that that which one experiences as other – the perceived – and that which one experiences as oneself – the perceiver – are both part and parcel of one's experience. As one's experience, this duality which one may in fact believe to be external objects is only the movement of the mind. In this light, we may take the statement as an attempt to correct the fallacious belief held by the common, naive individual – us – that, for example, the experience of "this hard rock" is the real, external, hard object. Gauḍapāda is informing us that the experience of "this hard rock" is an experience of the bifurcation of the mind which takes the form (*vṛtti*) of the hard rock and the form (*vṛtti*) of the perceiver who knows this. As to the ontological status of the object, the hard rock, the *śloka* says nothing.

Another example of this situation will help to clarify the previous references. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya has edited, translated and annotated Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* and in this process has gone to great lengths to show how Gauḍapāda is extremely influenced by Vijñānavāda while maintaining his position as an Advaita Vedāntin.<sup>11</sup> Bhattacharyya cites numerous passages to support his contention and many of these references are ontological-metaphysical in nature. Rather than cite an example similar to examples we have already cited or to those to which we will refer, we shall illuminate a passage whose theme has been called upon countless times in order to indicate that Indian philosophy is metaphysical-ontological idealism. The passage which we will cite discusses the relationship between waking and dreaming.<sup>12</sup> The passage reads as follows:

It is declared, by analogy to that (the dream experience), that differences in the waking state are (also) located within. So there as in dream, (differences) are distinguished while being enclosed.<sup>13</sup>

Bhattacharyya's comment upon this is:

As to how the state of being enclosed (*samvṛtatva*) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following *Kārikās* (II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15; III 29, 30; IV. 61, 62, 64–66), where it is fully explained, as the Vijñānavādins would say, that

there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (*samvṛta*).<sup>14</sup>

In examining this passage and the others to which Bhattacharyya refers, I find Bhattacharyya's explanation quizzical and overly ontological. First, I find it difficult to imagine the sense of declaring that external objects do not exist, while attributing their non-existence to their being "imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body." As far as I am aware a body which can enclose a mind is an external thing. Thus, to take the term *samvṛta* as referring to that which is enclosed within a body while simultaneously declaring this statement as proof of Gauḍapāda's belief in the non-existence of external things, i.e., bodies, is, to say the least, quizzical.

Second, I find the analysis offered presupposes ontological categories. It seems that one could read Gauḍapāda's analogy between waking and dreaming without reference to ontology, but rather as a fundamentally simple, but grossly overlooked, insight into the nature of our phenomenological experience. Whatever is experienced is experienced by the mind: whatever is experienced within dreams is experienced within the dreaming mind: whatever is experienced within the waking state is within the waking mind. Therefore, the nature of phenomenological experience is the same in waking and dreaming as regards their being enclosed — contained within — the mind.

The other *śloka*s that Bhattacharyya elicits in support of his interpretation provide no greater support. For example, he cites the following two passages:

Just as in dream the mind with the power of *māyā* moves with the appearance of duality; so also in waking the mind with the power of *māyā* moves with the appearance of duality. And there is no doubt that in dreams the mind which has the appearance of duality is non-dual; so also, there is no doubt that in waking the appearance of duality is non-dual.<sup>15</sup>

The problem being raised here by Gauḍapāda is not with the existence or non-existence of external objects — the world. The problem here is taking the appearance of duality to be something other than the mind which presents this duality. One readily accepts that in the dream experience the characters are all identical with the dreamer's mind. Yet in the waking experience one arrogantly demands that that which one experiences is an independent object. Bracketing the ontological existence of objects and the world, the waking experience is a mental experience where the mind assumes,

as in dreams, the appearance of the duality of the perceiver and the perceived. The problem raised by Gauḍapāda is that we take the experience of our mind to be other than our mind. In other words, the problem according to Gauḍapāda is that we "wrongly-interpret" (*vikalpa*) the phenomenological appearance of objects within our experience to be the object (*vastu*) itself. The problem is not, as V. Bhattacharyya would maintain, that we imagine — create — an external world.

Professor Karl Potter also reviews these passages dealing with the analogy between waking and dreaming. Although Professor Potter is not directly engaged in the debate over Gauḍapāda's religious-philosophical allegiance, his views on this matter are pertinent to our discussion and to our claim that others have presupposed an ontological hermeneutic of Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*.

Potter, unlike Bhattacharyya, does not maintain that Gauḍapāda was an idealist. Rather, Potter articulates the notion that Gauḍapāda may be termed an "illusionist", following Paul Hacker and others, where "illusionism" is not to be equated with idealism. Potter's position is based upon maintaining a distinction between  $\sqrt{k/p}$  and  $vi + \sqrt{k/p}$  where the former indicates "apparent-production" and the latter indicates "wrong-interpretation of something." Potter argues that if one does not conflate *kalpa* and *vikalpa* then one will see that "apparent-production" is not the same as "wrong-interpretation." Maintaining the distinction between these two terms allows one to realize that Gauḍapāda was not declaring that all things which appear to exist (*kalpa*) are merely the fabrication of an individual's "wrong-interpretation" (*vikalpa*) — some form of idealism. Potter summarizes Gauḍapāda's views on this as:

1. God apparently-creates the world; we do not . . .
4. We (*jīvas*) regularly wrongly-interpret and find differences where none actually exists, in both dream and waking states.<sup>16</sup>

Potter also states that although *māyā* is used ambiguously by Gauḍapāda, it is often used synonymously with *vikalpa*. "wrong-interpretation."

Professor Potter's analysis of Gauḍapāda as an "illusionist," but not an idealist, and his understanding of *māyā* as *vikalpa* is to be applauded. However, Potter's analysis differs from ours in assuming that Gauḍapāda's references are primarily metaphysical-ontological in nature. Thus, Potter's views seem to represent a move away from an idealistic interpretation without a corresponding shift away from interpreting Gauḍapāda in ontological

terms. For example, Potter's analysis of that which is *samvṛta* (concealed) is not the idealism of Bhattacharyya (note 14), nor is it our phenomenology; but rather it is a "metaphysics of creation." After presenting a list of *kārikās*, Potter says:

What sort of metaphysics do these passages suggest? It seems to be this. On Gauḍapāda's assumptions whatever has its nature 'concealed' (*samvṛta*) or 'internal' (*antas*) is non-existent (*asat*) by comparison with what is responsible for the concealing . . . . Now, what is responsible for the concealing in the two cases? It is we dreamers who are responsible for the concealment of our dreams — we produce the appearances which constitute our dream experiences, 'we' being understood as our empirical selves, technically called '*jīvas*'. Analogously, God is responsible for the concealment of our waking experience — He produces the appearances which constitute the objects experienced in the waking state.<sup>17</sup>

Potter's analysis of this waking-dreaming analogy avoids the idealism of Bhattacharyya by proposing that waking experience is enclosed by God who apparently produces the world.

Our explanation of these passages seen in response to Bhattacharyya did not need to introduce the notion of God into the analogy between waking and dreaming, nor did it fall into idealism. It must be noted that in the first three *kārikās* of Book II, we find Gauḍapāda explaining the unreality of dreaming experience on the grounds that it is enclosed, etc. In 2:4, he declares waking to be analogous to dreaming; and therefore false, because it too is enclosed. However, Gauḍapāda makes no reference to God here and does not make reference to God until after the full development of the waking-dreaming analogy (2:1–10). Reference to God is not made until 2:12–13. In light of this and with regard to our phenomenological approach, our position maintains that the waking experience, like the dream experience, is enclosed within one's own mind, but this does not mean that the mind creates the world. Our interpretation understands Gauḍapāda to be declaring that we should realize that all our experience — both waking and dreaming — is a mental phenomena and therefore contained within the mind. To say that all our experience is enclosed within the mind is not to say that only mind exists. If I read Gauḍapāda correctly, these passages are intended to correct the "wrong-interpretation" which believes that our experience is an experience of an actual *vastu* and not an experience of our mind in the *vṛtti* of the *vastu*. Potter's understanding that God apparently creates the objects could be profitably introduced at this point. The objects apparently created by

God would be the source of the varied *vṛttis* which are experienced by the mind.

Our phenomenological interpretation is also applicable to the other dreaming-waking analogy which declares them both false because they are non-dual (*advayam*). We have already cited this analogy (note 15) and Potter cites two of the passages (3:29 and 4:61) in which this analogy is established. Although Professor Potter does not offer an explicit analysis following his citing of these passages, I understand his interpretation to be grounded in the metaphysical — upon the notion of *ajātivāda*. Potter only tells us that "wrong-interpretation" of the duality of waking experience is to be righted by knowing that things are not born at all. "Even to think of God as creator of *waking appearances* is to be guilty of a wrong-interpretation, since it involves drawing distinctions between God and His creation, between God and oneself, between *the objects created by God* and one's self, etc. It is, to be sure, a wrong interpretation which is essential as a stage in instruction. . . . But once the pupil has seen that things are not 'real' . . . because they are not born at all in the way we normally think things are born — then by pointing out the paradoxically far-reaching implications of that insight one can root out all temptation to wrongly-interpret, all ways of thinking and talking that involve reference to duality."<sup>18</sup> Potter's analysis differs from ours in that Potter does not seem to maintain a distinction between "waking appearances" and the "objects created by God" which give rise to our waking appearances. (See our italics above.)

Our phenomenological perspective understands Gauḍapāda to be maintaining a distinction between the content of one's mind and the object to which it refers. For example, in the analogy to which we are referring, Gauḍapāda uses the phrase *dvayābhāsam* and says that this appearance of duality (*dvayābhāsam*) in the waking state is not dual (*advayam*). I understand Gauḍapāda to be referring to the content of one's mind and the forms which one's mind assumes in order to manifest this content — the duality of perceiver and perceived. I do not understand Gauḍapāda to be referring to empirical, God-created, objects at this point. This distinction to which, I maintain, Gauḍapāda adheres is lucidly portrayed by Professor Potter in an earlier article. Potter says:

I hypothesize that Indian philosophers are a good deal more sensitive to the niceties of epistemic situation than conflation of content with object would suggest, and that for the most part when they write '*viśaya*' they mean something which is intended in thought



but whose ontological status is an open question. There are plenty of good terms for actual objects — e.g. *vastu*, *artha*, etc.<sup>19</sup>

If we maintain the distinction between content and object which Potter elucidates, and I believe that we should maintain this distinction when reading Gauḍapāda, then we will find that we must concomitantly posit a phenomenological analysis of Gauḍapāda's treatment of the non-duality of *dvayābhāsam*. If *dvayābhāsam*, like *viśaya*, is not an ontological term, but rather a phenomenological term referring to the content of one's mind, then an ontological analysis of this term is misplaced. Clearly, one may argue that a metaphysical-ontological analysis of non-duality resting upon *ajātivāda* renders all duality non-existent. However, to take recourse to the metaphysics of *ajātivāda* when reading these passages dealing with the dreaming-waking analogy seems to by-pass a very important insight which Gauḍapāda offer us. It seems to overlook Gauḍapāda's phenomenological insight. Gauḍapāda is declaring that the phenomenological appearance of duality (*dvayābhāsam*) in waking and in dreaming is, in fact, non-dual (*advayam*) in a phenomenological sense. He also declares that this phenomenological *dvayābhāsam* arises because of wrong-interpretation (*māyayā*). Thus, he is offering us some insights into *māyā* as a phenomenological principle. *Māyā* is declared to be the agent (principle) of the phenomenological presentation of duality. We must therefore turn to an exposition of *māyā* as a phenomenological principle in order to solidify our position that Gauḍapāda's references to *māyā*, to the appearance of duality and to the movement of the mind, are not to be understood as ontological either in an idealistic or non-idealistic sense.

#### MĀYĀ AS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

Our contention is that ontological interpretations of Advaita Vedānta texts, in particular Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*, have so forcefully dominated our understanding that they have excluded other perspectives. Having reviewed a few examples of this situation, we will now disclose how Gauḍapāda's statements concerning *māyā*, *dvayābhāsam* and *cittaspaṇḍitam* are phenomenological pronouncements. This approach to these terms concentrates upon the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived as the appearance of duality and reveals that their relationship arises in the process of perception (*pratyakṣa*). *Māyā* as *dvayābhāsam* and *cittaspaṇḍitam* will be shown to be

the presentation of the phenomenological and not the creation of the ontological — not the creation of empirical objects, *vastus*. Gauḍapāda is not an idealist; but rather, he is a phenomenologist who is also a metaphysical monist.

*Māyā* as a phenomenological principle is the appearance of the duality of the perceiver and the perceived. The appearance of duality is the illusion. Gauḍapāda succinctly states: "this duality is *māyāmātram*".<sup>20</sup> This duality is nothing but *māyā* because that which is presented as perceiver is the mind and that which is presented as the perceived is also the mind. Gauḍapāda says: "And there is no doubt that the mind in dream which has the appearance of duality is non-dual; so also, there is no doubt that in waking, the appearance of duality is non-dual."<sup>21</sup> The presentation of the duality of the perceiver and the perceived are both part of an individual's experience. It is *māyā* to imagine that that which arises from, or in, one's experience somehow assumes an existence independent of its source. Gauḍapāda uses the analogy of a fire-brand to illustrate this point. When a fire-brand is in motion the appearances are not other than the fire-brand. Likewise, when the mind presents the appearances of perceiver and perceived, these appearances do not depart from the mind — they cannot be considered separate from the mind.<sup>22</sup>

Gauḍapāda also employs the analogy of the fire-brand to indicate how these appearances arise.<sup>23</sup> He maintains that the duality of the perceiver and perceived is nothing but the movement of the mind.

This duality in the manner of the perceiver and the perceived is only the movement of the mind.<sup>24</sup>

Just as the movement of the fire-brand gives the appearance of being straight, crooked etc., so also the movement of the mind gives the appearances of one who perceives and perception — perceiving.<sup>25</sup>

The consciousness which presents itself, as the result of its movement (*spandita*), as perceiver and perceived is perceptual consciousness. This movement of the mind as perceiver and perceived constitutes the condition of perception. This movement is the projection of the mind. It is the projection by which the mind takes the form (*vṛtti*) of the object "out-there" and yet remains as perceiver "over-here." This projection is one of the basic components within the Advaita Vedānta theory of perception.

The Advaita Vedānta theory of perception informs us that the known-object is a mode (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*, internal organ). Again, one

should not understand this notion as a form of subjective idealism — that the only things that exist are individual minds. On the level of *samvrti satya*, Gauḍapāda does acknowledge the existence of empirical entities which give rise to our perceptions. He says:

There is an objective cause to our subjective knowledge and to the experience of pain; otherwise there would be the disappearance of duality. This existence is held to be relative (*paratantra*).<sup>26</sup>

Śāṅkara in his commentary to the above passage states that external objects do exist and that they are the cause of our perceptions.<sup>27</sup> Gauḍapāda acknowledges the relative existence of object at other points, but as a mystic whose text often overflows with the non-duality of *asparśayoga*, one sometimes overlooks the empirical.<sup>28</sup> The latter is however the focus of this paper.

The statement that the known-object is a mode of the mind — the knowing subject — asserts a fundamental proposition within the Advaita Vedānta theory of perception. It informs us that the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) goes out towards the object via the respective sense organ and assumes the form (*vṛtti*) of the object.<sup>29</sup> The Advaita theory maintains that the mind only has to leave the body in visual and auditory perception for the *vṛtti*-modification to occur. In the senses of smell, taste and touch, the object of the perception is in contact with the body; and therefore, the mind does not leave the body. However, there still must be a modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in order for perception to occur. We see this process described in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*:

Here, just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering fields through channels comes to have, even like those (fields), a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight, etc. and reaching the locality of contents like pot, is transformed into the form of contents like pot. This same modification is called a psychosis (*vṛtti*).<sup>30</sup>

Gauḍapāda expresses a position like that of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Mahadevan in his discussion of Gauḍapāda's notion of *asparśayoga* notes that one of the major obstacles which Gauḍapāda foresees as hindering one's effort at *asparśayoga* is the outflowing of the mind in the form of the objects. Mahadevan says:

Deluding itself with the thought that its good lies in the objects of enjoyment, the mind goes out in the form of its psychoses, and as a consequence gets enmeshed in misery. The yogin must cry halt to such a dissipating process and withdraw the mind from its objects.<sup>31</sup>

In the following passage, we find Gauḍapāda describing this projection of the mind to sense objects — objects which according to his definition of that which is real, made from the perspective of *paramārtha*, are non-existent. The non-reality of the objects, as well as the mind, from the perspective of *paramārtha*, does not preclude the possibility that the empirical mind (*citta*) goes out to empirical objects. As Gauḍapāda puts it:

(The mind) goes out resembling that (the objects) because of the stored attachment to the non-existent. When it (the mind) comes to know the non-existence of the objects, (then) it returns without contact. The mind which comes back and does not go forward is then in the condition of being without movement.<sup>32</sup>

The mind in its function of moving out to the object and assuming the form of the object appears as that which is perceived (*grāhya*). The mind in its function of knowing the object is the perceiver (*grāhaka*). Both of these are, in fact, the presentation of the mind. They are the appearance of duality (*dvayābhāsam*) which arises from the movement of the mind (*cittaspaṇḍita*). The mind by this movement becomes relational and appears as the perceived to itself as perceiver. In presenting the perceived and the perceiver, the mind designates one the cause (*hetu*) and the other the effect (*phala*).<sup>33</sup> The presentation of this duality and the concomitant conviction in their reality as cause and effect is dependent upon the projection of the mind as subject and as the *vṛtti* of objects: it is dependent upon the mind going out and taking the form (*vṛtti*) of objects.

The capacity of the mind to appear as both itself, the perceiver, and as other than itself, the perceived, discloses the spatiality of the world. The known-object is revealed as distant from the knower because the mind goes out and takes the form of an other. The mind which appears as other than itself by its own projection is the known-object "over-there" and the mind in its function of knower-perceiver presents itself as "right-here", the subject (*grāhaka*) in a world of objects. This projection of the mind in perception is that which presents the perceived as distant from the perceiver when in fact both are the individual's mind. Spatiality is thus immediately given as the mind traverses the "unknown", assumes the *vṛtti* of objects and reveals itself as "over-there".

This process whereby the projection of the mind bifurcates itself into the duality of the perceiver and the perceived presents the boundaries of shape and size, of distance and relation. This is the process whereby that which is

presented to us (the *grāhya*) is measured as distance from us (*grāhaka*). This is the measuring of the subject from the known-objects and the known-objects from the subject. This measuring of the world into perceiver and all that is perceived is *māyā*. *Māyā* as a phenomenological principle is the principle of measuring. It is the measuring which presents the duality of *grāhya-grāhaka* – the measuring which presents the appearance of duality (*dvayābhāsam*). As Prabhu Dutt Shastri puts it:

The word 'maya' is derived from 'mā, to measure –' mīyate anayā iti, i.e., by which is measured, measuring thereby, as tradition has it, that illusive projection of the world by which the immeasurable Brahman appears as if measured. The same root gives the sense of 'to build', leading to the idea of 'appearance' or illusion.<sup>34</sup>

The world of appearance is the world which is measured by the projection of the mind and its concomitant bifurcation as perceiver and perceived in the process of perception.

*Māyā* as a phenomenological principle is the principle of measuring. This is not a measuring of things – objects. It is the measuring which results from the movement of the mind (*cittaspaṇḍita*). It is the measuring of the perceiver from the perceived. This is the presentation of appearances (*ābhāsa*) not things. These appearances are not other than the mind. Rather, *māyā* as measuring is the movement of a mind which presents itself as distant and hence as other than itself. Thus, *māyā* is the conviction that that which appears as distant, the *grāhya*, is in fact other than the knowing subject, the *grāhaka*; and as other, it is therefore believed to be an object (*vastu*). *Māyā* is the belief that that which appears is that which exists.

#### A CONCLUDING REMARK

The attempt by some to interpret as ontological statements those *sloka*s which deal with the relationship between *māyā* and the movement of the mind may lead one to fall prey to *māyā*. The ontological interpretations often insist that the movement of the mind creates objects, the world. The danger in this position is that it allows one to assume that there can be a mind without the creations of the mind – without the objects. On the other hand, the phenomenological perspective upon *māyā* leads us to see that there is no mind without the duality of the perceiver and the perceived. The perceived is not independent from the perceiver and the perceiver is not independent

from the perceived. This duality is only an appearance (*ābhāsa*). It is the appearance of a mind as dual. Both perceiver and perceived are a mind and without both, you have neither. You have, as Gauḍapāda says, *amanibhāva* – being without a mind.<sup>35</sup> You have *asparśayoga* – the yoga of no-touch, no relation – because there is neither that which is perceived, nor that which is the perceiver.<sup>36</sup> You have no-mind and not simply mind without an object – without a world of objects.

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> One may ask whether the Advaitins intended this phenomenological perspective or whether we merely are extrapolating such a perspective from the texts. It is the working assumption of this paper that the phenomenological insights which we will disclose were intended by at least some Advaitins, but have since been mired in the scholastic debates focusing upon metaphysics and epistemology. However, we do realize that there is a degree of futility in attempting to discern the intent of a text's author who has taken his intent with him to a funeral pyre. In light of this, we do aim to present a convincing case and one which is consistent with the entire religious-philosophical *gestalt* in which it arises.

<sup>2</sup> The focus will be on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*. I am indebted to the previous translations for their insights, but all translations here are the responsibility of this author – unless otherwise noted. The Sanskrit text quoted is: *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, Gauḍapādīya Kārikā, Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, (Gorakhpura: Gitapress) Samvat 2026. Hereafter listed as *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*.

<sup>3</sup> For a full discussion of this perspective upon *māyā* as an epistemological principle see: K. C. Bhattacharyya, "Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance," in *Studies in Philosophy, Volume I* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers) 1956.

<sup>4</sup> Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969), p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> The following is a brief list of those scholars who have engaged in this debate: Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya ed. and trans., *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943). Swami Nikhilananda ed. and trans., *The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śāṅkara's Commentary* (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama; 1955). Raghunath Demodar Karonarkar ed. and trans. *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973). Conio Caterina, *The Philosophy of the Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971). S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita* (Madras: University of Madras, 1952). S. S. Roy, *The Heritage of Sankara* (Allahabad: Udayana Publications, 1965).

- <sup>6</sup> S. S. Roy, *The Heritage of Sankara*, pp. 8–9.  
<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.  
<sup>8</sup> See *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* III: 20, 30, 31, 34; IV: 47, 48, 49, 51, 52.  
<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 4: 72: *cittaspanditamevedaṁ grāhyagrāhakavaddvayam/ cittam nirviṣayaṁ nityamasāṅgam tena kirtitam//*  
<sup>10</sup> T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita*, p. 199.  
<sup>11</sup> V. Bhattacharyya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, pp. cxxii–cxxxiii.  
<sup>12</sup> In this context one also can examine Frank Whaling's treatment of Gauḍapāda. ("Śāṅkara and Buddhism," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979), pp. 24–25.) Whaling, in maintaining that Gauḍapāda is more Buddhist than Śāṅkara, states that Gauḍapāda equates waking and dreaming and that Gauḍapāda is close to sharing the subjectivism of Vijñānavāda as evidenced by Gauḍapāda's understanding of the relationship between mind and objects (4: 26). Although this presentation is not specifically focussed upon the issue we are raising, it may be reviewed in light of our presentation.  
<sup>13</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 2: 4: *antaḥsthānāttu bhedānām tasmājjāgarite smṛtam/ yathā tatra tathā svapne saṁvṛtatvena bhidyate//*  
<sup>14</sup> V. Bhattacharyya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, p. 18.  
<sup>15</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 3: 29–30: *yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manaḥ/ tathā jāgraddvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manaḥ// advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ manaḥ svapne na saṁsayah/ advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ tathā jāgranna saṁsayah//*  
<sup>16</sup> Karl H. Potter, "Was Gauḍapāda an Idealist?", M. Nagatomi, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson, and E. Dimmock (eds.), *Sanskrit and Indian Studies* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1979), p. 194.  
<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.  
<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.  
<sup>19</sup> Karl H. Potter, "Toward a Conceptual Scheme for Indian Epistemologies," J. N. Mohanty and S. P. Banerjee (ed.), *Self, Knowledge and Freedom: Essays for Kalidas Bhattacharyya* (Calcutta: The World Press Private Limited, 1978), p. 21.  
<sup>20</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 1: 17.  
<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 3: 30.  
<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 4: 49–51.  
<sup>23</sup> Śāṅkara uses the same analogy to make this point: Sri Sankaracharya, *Upadeśa Sahasri*, ed. and trans. Swami Jagadamenda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1973), p. 276.  
<sup>24</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 4: 72: *Cittaspanditamevedaṁ grāhyagrāhakavaddvayam/*  
<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 4: 47: *rjuvagrādikābhāsamalātasponditam yathā/ grahaṇagrāhakābhāsam vijñānaspanditam tathā//*  
<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 4: 24: *prajñāpteh sanimattatvamanyathā dvayanāśataḥ/ saṁkleśasyopalabdheśca paratantrāstatā matā//*  
<sup>27</sup> Śāṅkara bhāṣya to *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 4: 24: See also 4: 74 and Vidyanā, *The Pañcadaśī*, ed. and trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967) 4: 36.  
<sup>28</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 4: 57–58; 4: 73–74; 4: 87–88.  
<sup>29</sup> Dharmarāja, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre), "Pratyakṣa," # 122–123.  
<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, "Pratyakṣa," # 18.  
<sup>31</sup> T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda, A Study in Early Advaita*, p. 117.

- <sup>32</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 4: 79–80: *abhūtābhiniveśādhi sadrśe tat pravartate/ vastvābhāvaṁ sa buddhvaiva niḥsaṅgaṁ vinivartate// nivṛtasyāpravṛtasya niścala hi tadā sthitiḥ/*  
<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 4: 55–56.  
<sup>34</sup> Prabhu Dutt Shastri, *The Doctrine of Māyā*, (London: Luzac and Company, 1911), p. 29.  
<sup>35</sup> *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, 3: 31.  
<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 3: 39–40.

सम्यग् वाक्-२

प्रधान सम्पादक :  
भिक्षु समदोङ् रिनपोछे

सम्पादक :  
डा० थुपतन छोगडुप

प्रथम संस्करण : ५०० प्रतियाँ ( १९७७ )

द्वितीय संस्करण : ५०० प्रतियाँ

मूल्य : सजिल्द : रु०

गजिल्द : रु०

© सर्वाधिकार सुरक्षित

१९८५

प्रकाशक

केन्द्रीय उच्च तिब्बती-शिक्षा-संस्थान

सारनाथ, वाराणसी

मुद्रक : तारा प्रिंटिंग वर्क, वाराणसी ।

सम्यग् वाक्-२

## MĀDHYAMIKA DIALECTIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NĀGĀRJUNA

*With an Introduction by*

T. R. V. MURTI



भोट विद्या संस्थानम्

CENTRAL INSTITUTE OF HIGHER TIBETAN STUDIES  
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truth, which shows the way that all things should be. The Sūnyatā which is the ultimate existence of all things fills the universe in the form of infinitesimal particles. Some of the particles which are condensed and fixed by the distortion of the Sūnyatā turn into matter. The phenomena of matter are caused by the fluidity of Sūnyatā which acted to matter. This Sūnyatā is called energy by modern scientists. The Sūnyatā makes everything. This is the fundamental truth of all things. This truth reveals the Buddhist teaching that matter and mind are one. This truth unites materialism with spiritualism.

Western scholars have hitherto tried to find this truth, not to rely on it, so that they have formed many perverted views. The scientists tried to find laws by establishing many hypotheses, but do not yet reach the reality of all things. They do not yet understand, for instance, what electricity real is. It will be made clear only when we see that electricity is the Sūnyatā which appears through the medium of metal. Electricity has no independent existence. It is a phenomenon of the Sūnyatā which is connected with metal.

The above statement of Prof. Yamamoto provides strong support for Sūnyatā of the Mādhyamika and no doubt we may put our faith on it and believe that our ancient philosophies bear relevance to modern times and produce results if applied to the development of science and technology in quest of health and plenty for humanity.

## NĀGĀRJUNA AND GAUḌAPĀDA

C. T. Kenge

Although belonging to two altogether different traditions Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda present a very interesting study in similarity. Nāgārjuna, as is well known, was a great Buddhist philosopher and the most prominent exponent of the nihilistic school of Buddhism. His *Madhyamaka-kārikā* is a unique and wonderful treatise on the nihilistic logic and metaphysics. Besides this main work, a number of other philosophical and tantrika works have been ascribed to Nāgārjuna. The authenticity of some of these works is dubious. Gauḍapāda belonged to the Vedic tradition and is regarded to be the most prominent exponent of the absolutist school of Vedānta, before Śaṅkarācārya. According to uniform tradition preserved by most of the mathas of Śaṅkarācārya, he is regarded as his grand teacher being the teacher of his preceptor. Gauḍapāda's main work also consists of the kārikās popularly known as the *Gauḍapāda kārikā*. This work is also known as the *Āgamaśāstra* or *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. It is based on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Besides this main work, Gauḍapāda too is supposed to have written a number of other philosophical and tantrika works the authenticity of which is rather dubious.

As is usual in Indian history, the dates of both these philosophers cannot be decided with certainty. However, there should be no doubt as regards their relative chronology. Nāgārjuna was certainly the earlier of the two. Gauḍapāda definitely seems to have been inspired by Nāgārjuna in writing his main philosophical work viz. the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, as has been pointed out by Dr. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.

Prof. Karmarkar has vainly tried to contradict the view by maintaining that Gauḍapāda was inspired in writing this work by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the well known author of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās*. Although a commentary as the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is believed to have been written by Gauḍapāda, its authenticity is dubious and as far as similarity in style and diction is concerned, the *kārikās* of Gauḍapāda, resemble much more the Madhyamaka *karikas* of Nāgārjuna than the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself was under the influence of Nāgārjuna, as far as the style and logical method are concerned, although his metaphysical position was diametrically opposed to that of Nāgārjuna. The *Sāṃkhya-kārikās* certainly seem to have been based on the *Vigraha-Vyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna in their metre, style and logical method. Karmarkar's argument that Gauḍapāda quotes the views of Nāgārjuna only to refute them cannot be considered to be tenable in any way. Actually the whole of the Māṇḍūkya *kārikās* can be said to be a very nice exposition of the first two words of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka *kārikās*, although Gauḍapāda has certainly tried to reconcile this philosophy with the Vedic tradition.

Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya has, however, gone too far in his attempt to make Gauḍapāda just a Buddhist writer. He has tried to show that the four chapters of Gauḍapāda's work are completely independent works and especially the fourth chapter is a purely Buddhist treatise. This position can in no way be justified on the evidence of the manuscripts and the tradition. A number of links between the four chapters can also be easily seen by an unbiased student of Gauḍapāda's work. Many ideas, expressions, lines and even verses can be seen to be common in different chapters of this work. It is true that the fourth chapter of his work begins with a benedictory verse which much resembles

Nāgārjuna's benedictory verse at the beginning of the Madhyamaka *kārikās*. This in itself cannot be considered to be a sufficient proof to establish this chapter as an independent Buddhist work. Viewing the similarities, Gauḍapāda is greatly indebted to Nāgārjuna in his style, diction and logical method. Many of his famous lines and even verses can be said to be a revised version of Nāgārjuna's text. This, Gauḍapāda's famous declaration 'प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद् भविष्यति ।' (4, 7, 29) is based on Nāgārjuna's declaration 'प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो नाह जातूपपद्यते ।' (15, 8).

Similarly, Gauḍapāda's another famous statement 'आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।' (2, 6, 4, 31) is based on Nāgārjuna's statement 'नैवाग्रं नावरं यस्य मध्यं तस्य कुतो भवेत् ।' (11, 2).

Gauḍapāda has, at places, very nicely summarised in one verse the ideas discussed by Nāgārjuna in several verses or even the whole chapter. To give but one instance, the whole of the twentieth chapter of Nāgārjuna's *kārikās* entitled 'Hetu parikṣā' has been summarised by Gauḍapāda in one verse as follows.

'हेतोरादि फलं येषामादिहेतुः फलस्य च,  
तथाजन्य भवेत्तेषां पुत्राज्जन्म पितुर्यथा ।' (4-15)

A similar verse occurs in Nāgārjuna's *Vigraha Vyāvartanī* as well. Thus, there should be absolutely no doubt as regards Gauḍapāda's indebtedness to Nāgārjuna, as regards logic and style.

It is not easy to decide the exact extent of Gauḍapāda's indebtedness to Nāgārjuna as far as the whole philosophy is concerned. For this purpose, first of all, it is necessary to consider the impact of the Upanisads on Buddhism in general and Nāgārjuna in particular. Gauḍapāda is definitely an exponent of the Upaniṣadic philosophy and in the first three chapters of his work, he has quoted and

referred to several Upaniṣadic passages apart from the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* on which his work is based. It also is an accepted fact that the principal Upaniṣads were composed not only before Nāgārjuna but also before Gautama Buddha himself. Many of the philosophical ideas of Buddhism in general and Nāgārjuna in particular can be said to be a common heritage of early Indian tradition. As regards the general nature of the two systems represented by these two philosophers, one is nihilistic and the other absolutist. Common ideas permeate in both these systems and apart from the common heritage, it can certainly be said that Gauḍapāda was under a positive influence of Nāgārjuna in the following respects.

1. In applying his logic to establish non-validity of all means of knowledge or *pramāṇas* in proving reality of the objective world, Gauḍapāda can certainly be said to be under the influence of Nāgārjuna. Such a logical approach can neither be found in the Upaniṣads nor in the whole of Indian philosophical tradition, except in Nāgārjuna and his followers.

2. In declaring the whole universe to be completely illusory, Gauḍapāda has followed Nāgārjuna and the Buddhist tradition rather than the Vedic tradition. No doubt, unreality of the objective world is implied in the Upaniṣadic non-dualism as well. But no Upaniṣadic passage of the pre-Buddhistic period has declared the whole of the universe to be completely illusory. The illustrations used by Gauḍapāda to explain such nature of the universe have also been clearly borrowed from Nāgārjuna and the Buddhist tradition.

3. In explaining the non-dual nature of reality as free from the four accepted categories of the objective world

viz. being, non-being, being and non-being and neither being nor non-being, Gauḍapāda owes much to Nāgārjuna and the Buddhist tradition. Although the non-dual nature of reality has been emphatically asserted by the Upaniṣads as well and in this respect Buddhism itself is indebted to the Upaniṣad; yet the peculiar way of describing the four categories of the objective world and proving them to be non-applicable to Reality was devised by Nāgārjuna and the Buddhists.

4. With the acceptance of complete unreality of the whole universe, Gauḍapāda has naturally to declare that nothing in the world was ever produced or created. In this theory of *Ajāti* or non-creation also Gauḍapāda has evidently followed Nāgārjuna. The Vedic tradition and the Upaniṣads have clearly described the different theories of creation and evolution of the universe. It was Nāgārjuna who for the first time emphatically declared that nothing was ever created and Gauḍapāda has followed him in this respect.

5. Lastly, after accepting such an extreme view of the universe, Nāgārjuna was required to devise a special technique to explain the words of Gautama Buddha whom he accepted as the authority. He devised the idea of two degrees or standards of truth. Wherever any idea of reality of the world was implied Nāgārjuna declared it to be a statement from a lower or covered viewpoint. Such a lower viewpoint was necessary, according to him, to lead the people involved in the world illusion to the Absolute Reality. This lower viewpoint he called the *Samvṛti Satya* or the covered truth. Gauḍapāda was also required to use this device for explaining the Upaniṣadic texts of creation and also to justify the spiritual practices of yoga recommended by him. He has borrowed even the word '*Samvṛiti*' from Nāgārjuna, for this purpose.



After having differentiated the Absolute Reality from all categories of worldly objects, Gauḍapāda has emphasised the positive aspects of the Absolute Reality unlike Nāgārjuna. Gauḍapāda does not stop with the destructive logic but builds up a constructive philosophy on its basis. It is hence that the lower standpoint has far greater significance in the philosophy of Gauḍapāda than that of Nāgārjuna. Gauḍapāda has no dispute with any system of thought whatsoever. He maintains that all systems of thought represent some aspect of Reality and all of them will be reconciled after the immediate experience of the transcendental Reality. He has emphasized that this transcendental Absolute can be realised as the innermost self and not objectively in any way. For this purpose, he has very nicely utilized the analysis of the different states of experience given in the Māṇḍūkya and other Upaniṣads. This acceptance of the self as pure, objectless awareness or consciousness certainly differentiates him from Nāgārjuna and all other Buddhists for that matter. He accepts utility of the Vedic revelation as an aid to immediate experience of Reality. Although from a lower viewpoint, he can certainly assign a good deal of importance to God and religion as well. Keeping this difference in mind, we feel that Gauḍapāda has intentionally stated at the end of his work that this is not spoken by Buddha, being fully aware that he is dangerously near the Buddhist philosophy and we cannot agree with *Bhattacharya's* interpretation viz- 'Silence was the speech of Buddha'. It can thus be stated that Gauḍapāda and following him Śaṅkarācārya assimilated the essence of the Buddhist philosophy and reconciled it with the main stream of the Vedic philosophy. A comparative study of these two great philosophers should convince us that the Vedic and the Buddhist traditions cannot be looked upon sporadically and study of both of them is absolutely essential for understanding the essence of Indian philosophy.

## THE NĀGĀRJUNA LITERATURE IN TIBETAN

Suniti Kumar Pathak

In the bsTan 'Gyur Collection as many as 113 texts are ascribed to Nāgārjuna, Klu-sGrub in Tibetan, according to the dKar-Chag of the sDe-dGe edition. Among the Indian authors whose texts were translated and preserved in that collection, Nāgārjuna is accredited with authorship of the largest number of books in the list. It suggests that the Tibetan lo-tsa-ba scholars had a great interest for Nāgārjuna's erudite scholarship and that prompted them to translate as many texts as they could collect.

Nāgārjuna is traditionally regarded as exalted as Buddha who is said to have turned the Wheel of Truth (Dharmacakra-pravartana) for the second instance. In the growth and development of the Buddhist faith in India, Nāgārjuna made an epoch of his own and that influenced the Buddhist philosophy, logic and the Buddhist Tantras in later days. The Tibetans, therefore, paid their highest tribute to Nāgārjuna, the great exponent of Buddhism by preserving his works in Tibetan, and that facilitates now-a-days, to survey the Nāgārjuna Literature in various fields.

Comparatively, we may refer to Kumārjīva's work the 'Biography of Nāgārjuna' which mentions five kinds of Nāgārjuna's contribution as follows :

- (i) Upadesa in 1,000 Gathas (Treatise on didaction)
- (ii) Buddhāmārgālaṅkārasāstra in 5,000 gathas (Treatise on the factors of the Way of Buddha)
- (iii) Mahākaruṇopāyaśāstra in 5,000 gathas (Treatise on the skilfulness of Buddha with Great Compassion)

## REMARKS ON THE GAUḌAPĀDĪYA-KĀRIKĀS (GK)

Though the *Gauḍapāḍīya-Kārikās* (GK) – also known as *Āgama-Śāstra* and *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikās* – have been the object of several valuable philosophical and historical studies, there are nevertheless some very important facts that seem to have escaped the notice even of such careful and critical scholars as Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya (*Āgamaśāstra*, Calcutta 1943) and Tilmann Vetter (“Die Gauḍapāḍīya-Kārikās: Zur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (a)dvaita”, *WZKS* 1978, 95-131 and *Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras*, Wien 1979, 27–74). Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to call attention to some of these oversights.

(1) We may begin by quoting GK III, 2:

*ato vakṣyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatām gatam /*  
*\*yathā na jāyate kiṃcij jāyamānaṃ samantataḥ //* (\*yathā w. r. for  
*yatra?*)

and III, 38:

*graho na tatra notsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate /*  
*ātmasamsthāṃ tadā jñānam ajāti samatām gatam //*

What interests us here is the phrase *akārpaṇyam/jñānam ajāti samatām gatam*. All the modern translations that I have come across follow the *Bhāṣya* ascribed to Śaṅkara in taking *ajāti* and *samatām gatam* as two independent attributes of *akārpaṇyam/jñānam*, cf. *Bhāṣya ad* III, 2: *tad ajāti, avidyamānā jātir asya; samatām gatam sarvasāmyam gatam*, and *ad* III, 38: *ajāti jātivarjitam; samatām gatam: param sāmyam āpannam bhavati*.

But, as I hope to show, it is not advisable to take *ajāti* and *samatām gatam* as an instance of asyndeton. On the contrary there is good reason to believe that what the author of GK actually had in mind and what he wrote was *akārpaṇyam/jñānam ajātisamatām gatam*.

In the eighth chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahr̥daya-Kārikās* (MHK) (dealing with the philosophy of Vedānta, cf. *IJJ* 1958, 165–180) we find the following verses (provisionally numbered 78–80 and quoted from Hajime Nakamura, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Delhi 1983, 200):

*ajāṭisamatām yāte jñāne 'bhedāt kva darśanam /  
adarśanād vimuktiḥ syān muktir vā nāsti kasyacit //*  
*bodhe sati tadutpādād ajāṭisamatā kutah /  
satyabhāvād anutpāde tadvikalpasamo 'pi saḥ //*  
*ajāṭir jātivād dharmaś tadabhāve ca sā satī /  
naivātmasamatā tasya yuktā nāpi na tatsthatā //*

There can hardly be any doubt that Bhavya here in 80cd: *naivātmasamatā tasya yuktā nāpi na tatsthatā* (*nāpi na*: “and certainly also not”) is referring either directly to GK 38cd: *ātmasaṁsthaṁ tadā jñānam*, etc., or, to be sure, to some passage virtually identical with this in word and thought. What is more interesting, however, is that Bhavya (see 78 and 79) takes *ajāṭi* and *samatā* as a compound: *ajāṭisamatā*. And not only as a compound, but almost as a catchword, or technical term, describing the philosophical system he is criticizing in a characteristic manner. What remains to be settled is, of course: Who is right, Bhavya who definitely takes *ajāṭi* and *samatā* together as a *Karmadhāraya*, or the modern interpreters who, following the *Bhāṣya*, here see an asyndeton?

The only one who could really settle this question would of course be the author of the GK. As good luck would have it I think he does settle the question. In the fourth chapter of GK we meet an expression quite equivalent to *ajāṭisamatā*, viz. *ajam sāmīyam* (93d), *aje sāmīye* (95a) and *ajam sāmīyam* (100b). Here *sāmīya* is, needless to say, a substantive predicated by the adjective *aja*. This shows that the author of GK did not take *ajāṭi* and *samatā* (*ṁ gatam*) in III, 2 and III, 38 as two co-ordinate, asyndetic terms but intended *ajāṭi* as an attribute to *samatā*. In other words, Bhavya is right whereas the author of the *Bhāṣya* (followed by modern editors, etc.) is wrong: the author of the GK wrote *ajāṭisamatām gatam*, not *ajāṭi samatām gatam*. As far as I am aware this compound is not to be met with in philosophical literature prior to (or even posterior to?) the GK. It is thus a term almost showing the “fingerprint” of Gauḍapāda — let us call him by that name (in the same sense as the term *vijñānapariṇāma* shows the fingerprint of the author of the *Trimṣikā*). The Buddhist background of this term, as of so many others in GK, is, of course, quite obvious.

Here we shall not enter upon a further discussion about the *\*ajāṭisamatāvāda* or Gauḍapāda but instead turn our attention to another interesting case where, incidentally, “Śaṅkara”, the alleged author of the *Bhāṣya*, again displays a remarkable ignorance of the actual intention of the author of the GK.

(2) The *textus receptus* of GK IV, 24 runs:

*prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ /  
saṁkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā //*

“Śaṅkara”, etc. are, of course, right in taking this as an objection raised by an opponent but how far the *Bhāṣya* is off the mark in its understanding of the context of the verse is clear from its explanation of the term *paratantra*: *pareṣāṁ tantraṁ paratantram ity anyāśāstram; tasya paratantrasya paratantrāśrayasya bāhyārthasya jñānavyatiriktasyāstitā matā 'bhipretā*. What the author of the GK here has in mind, as already indicated by Bhattacharya *ad loc.*, is the *paratantrasvabhāva*, the celebrated Yogācāra notion. (I need not say that such a gross misunderstanding of this verse on the part of “Śaṅkara” together with the misinterpretation of III, 2 and III, 38 pointed out above taken in itself, quite apart from other considerations, makes it almost inconceivable that the author of the *Bhāṣya*, as tradition would have us believe, should have been a direct pupil of a direct pupil of the author of the GP.)

The interesting question now arises: If this verse refers to Yogācāra ideas can we then trace its source? Is it a paraphrase or a first- or second-hand quotation? Again Bhavya affords us with a clue to an answer.

In the fifth chapter of his MHK (being a critique of Yogācāra) verse 6 runs:

*prajñapteḥ sanimittatvād anyathā dvayanāśataḥ /  
saṁkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā //*

The Tibetan version, to be sure, has:

*/btags pa rgyu mtshan bcas phyir dan//gzan du gñis po med phyir dan/  
/kun nas ñon moñs dmigs pa'i phyir//gzan dbaṅ yod pa ñid du 'dod/*

Regrettably Bhavya does not here inform us of the source of this verse, but in the appendix to chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa* he also quotes this verse while criticizing the Yogācāra concept of *paratantrasvabhāva*. As I have pointed out in notes 4 and 26 to my critical edition of (the Tibetan version of) this historically and philosophically important appendix (to appear in the *Csoma de Kőrös Commemoration Volume*) one of Bhavya's main sources of knowledge of Yogācāra is the huge *Xiān-yāng-shèng-jiào-lùn* (often ref. to under the reconstructed term *\*Vikhyāpana*) ascribed to Asaṅga. Apart from a few Sanskrit fragments (in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*) it is now only extant in a Chinese version (Taishō daizōkyō, XXXI, 1602). This text also proves to be the source of GK IV, 24 (~MHK V, 6). In the Chinese version we read (558c 25–26):

*jiǎ yǒu suǒ yī yīn      ruò yì huàì ěr zhǒng,  
zá rǎn kě dé gù      dāng zhī yī tā yǒu.*

This, then, permits us to conclude that the verse *prajñāpteḥ*, etc. found in MHK and GK are quoted from the *\*Vikhyāpana*, its original source. Moreover the Chinese (-gū), the Tibetan (-phyir) and the Sanskrit (-tvād) permit us to emend *sanimittatvam* in the *textus receptus* (also the *Bhāṣya*) of GK IV, 24a to *sanimittatvād*, which, of course, is also required in order to make good sense and good syntax. Again “Śāṅkara” was unaware of this reading.

But what is even more interesting is that this quotation found twice in Bhavya and once in Gauḍapāda (but cf. also IV, 25) raises the question of the interrelationship of these two authors anew. Now, ever since Max Walleiser in his valuable book on *Der ältere Vedānta, Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre* (Heidelberg 1910) called attention to the fact that the eighth chapter of Bhavya’s MHK seems to contain several more or less exact quotations from the GK (cf. esp. MHK VIII, 12 and GK III, 5, which are, however, *not* verbatim identical!) it has apparently been generally assumed (see recently Vetter, “Die Gauḍapādīya-Kārikās . . .”, 95, n. 1) that Bhavya had GK before him when composing his MHK (and this fact, as known, has been decisive when proposing a date for the GK). It must also be admitted that the above observations on the term *ajātisamatā* point in the same direction, i.e. in the direction of GK being prior to MHK.

Nevertheless there is a circumstance to be taken into consideration. When MHK and GK quote the same verse from an old Yogācāra treatise (which, incidentally, is otherwise very seldom quoted in later literature) it seems rather unlikely that they should be citing exactly the same source quite independently of one another. It would seem more likely – and fully in accordance with the normal usage of citing in Indian *śāstras* – that one of them is quoting from the other. And if this is the case then it is certainly most likely that GK is quoting from MHK rather than vice versa, not only because the appendix to the *Prajñāpradīpa* referred to above leaves no doubt whatsoever that Bhavya in several places had the *\*Vikhyāpana* before him when referring to Yogācāra, and thus knew it from autopsy, but also, if I am not wrong, because there are otherwise no references at all to the *\*Vikhyāpana* in the GK. It thus seems likely that the quotation in GK is a second-hand one.

I am, however, far from suggesting that this observation in itself is strong enough to make us assume that the GK is dependent upon MHK – a fact that, if true, would upset our chronology considerably – but I do think that it is sufficient to make us say that the interrelationship between the four chapters of the GK and the fifth and the eighth chapter of MHK may well be far more complicated than has hitherto been assumed and surely in need of a thorough reconsideration. This, however, must remain a task for future research.

For now, to conclude, I hope that these remarks have shown that the *textus receptus* of the GK and the reliability of the *Bhāṣya* (with regard to readings

and interpretation) still deserve to be regarded with a good deal of critical suspicion. Moreover the nature of the relationship between the GK and MHK cannot be regarded as finally established.

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