


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**1952**

## "DVIPADAM VARA" IN GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKĀ (IV. 1)\*

BY

R. D. KARMAKAR

The author of the Gaudapādakārikās salutes some one described as द्विपदां वर in the opening verse of the Fourth Section of this work. The verse in question is

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान्यो जगनोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयाभिज्ञेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥ IV. 1

The द्विपदां वर is here described as one who had realised the Dharmas resembling the sky, by ज्ञान which is like the sky and non-different from the ज्ञेय. The next verse (IV. 2) may also be taken to refer to the द्विपदां वर as one who had taught the अस्पृश्ययोग,

अस्पृश्ययोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः ।

अविबादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥

Śaṅkarācārya understands this verse to mean that the अस्पृश्ययोग itself is saluted, presumably on the analogy of the last verse in the fourth chapter where the पद itself is saluted, but it would be better to take the last line to mean

येन ( द्विपदां वरेण ) अस्पृश्ययोगो देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ।

आनन्दगिरि in his comment on the Śaṅkarabhāṣya on IV. 1, says that Gaudapāda had practised penance at the Badarikāśrama to propitiate Nārāyaṇa who, pleased with the penance, gave him as a boon the philosophical knowledge and thus Nārāyaṇa could be regarded as Gaudapāda's teacher. द्विपदां वर according to आनन्दगिरि, thus refers to Nārāyaṇa.<sup>1</sup>

Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya in his edition of Gaudapādakārikā (which he calls Āgamasāstra) discusses this question in detail and comes to the following conclusion: 'It is said in the Kārikā that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly under-

\* This paper was read at the Darbhanga Session of the All-India Oriental Conference (1948). It is here printed with the permission of the Secretary of the Conference.

<sup>1</sup> परदेवतारूपमुपदेशारं प्रणमति । आचार्यो हि पुरा बदरिकाश्रमे नरनारायणविष्ठिते नारायणं भगवन्तमभिधेयं तपो महदतप्यत । भगवानतिवसन्नस्तस्मै दिदां प्रादादिति प्रसिद्धं परमगुरुत्वं परमेश्वरस्येति भावः । P. 157 माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, आनन्दाश्रम Edition.

stood the Dharmas. Here if he is meant to be Nārāyaṇa one would naturally ask: What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that Nārāyaṇa is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first Kārikā, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the Buddha'.

It is proposed in this paper to criticise the arguments advanced by Bhaṭṭācārya and to show that the expression द्विपदां वर could not possibly refer to Buddha; it may not also refer to Nārāyaṇa as stated by Ānandagiri. We are of opinion that by द्विपदां वर we should understand Śuka, the direct teacher of Gaudapāda. Prof. Vidhuśekhara wants to know what authority there is to prove that Nārāyaṇa understood the Dharmas. It is rather strange that such a question should have been mooted, when we find that Nārāyaṇa (even if we ignore the Purāṇic accounts about him) is certainly known to be the Rṣi of the celebrated Puruṣasūkta in the Rgveda. The Puruṣasūkta contains the famous passage पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम् which is the basis of the Advaitic theories. One who did not perfectly understand the Dharmas, could not surely have come to the above conclusion. Nārāyaṇa is the preacher of some yoga at any rate in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata and he is also presumably referred to in the Gītā (IV. 2) as the preacher of the yoga handed down by tradition (एवं परंपराप्राप्तमिमं राजर्षयो विदुः).

Prof. V. Bhaṭṭācārya sees Buddhist traces everywhere in the Gaudapādakārikās and has, in our opinion, misunderstood several kārikās, and twisted them consciously or unconsciously. We have, in our forthcoming edition of the Gaudapādakārikās criticised his interpretations in detail. We propose in this paper to confine ourselves to only IV. 99 which is admitted by all to refer to Buddha by name. No one questions the fact that Gaudapāda has made use of many Buddhistic terms but that cannot entitle us to infer that he held Buddhist philosophical views. Gaudapāda is obviously using Buddhistic philosophical terminology to combat the Buddhists on their own ground, by using their own weapons, so to speak.

Gauḍapāḍakārikā IV. 99 where Buddha is mentioned by name runs as follows—

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।  
सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नेतुं बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥

Prof. Vidhuśekhara translates it as follows :—

According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāyin*), Jñāna does not approach the *dharma*s (i. e. it does not relate itself to the objects). But all *dharma*s as well as *jñāna*—this has not been said by the Buddha.

Svāmi Nikhilānanda translates the same as follows :—

The knowledge of the wise one, who is all-light is ever untouched by objects. All the entities as well as knowledge (which are non-different) are also ever-untouched by any object. This is not the view of the Buddha.

Maṇilal N. Dvivedi translates the same as follows :—

Thought in the enlightened whose effulgence is everywhere never relates itself to objects, nor do attributes or knowledge, relate themselves to anything. This however is not the same as that which is held by the Buddhas.

It would be seen that Prof. Vidhuśekhara's interpretation is quite unconvincing. He takes बुद्धस्य in the first line to mean 'According to the Buddha' which is unwarranted. नेतुंबुद्धेन भाषितम् is taken by him to mean अवचनं बुद्धयचनम्. Vidhuśekhara quotes a long passage from the Laṅkāvatāra in support of his contention that Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. We think that the kārikā in question is just a parting kick from Gauḍapāḍa administered to Buddhism. Gauḍapāḍa having criticised the Vijñānavāda in his work says that the true doctrine was the अजातिवाद where nothing is produced or destroyed, only the Turya exists, and Buddha who in the Laṅkāvatāra is made to say again and again 'तेन हि महासते शृणु साधु च शृणु च मनसि कुरु भाषित्वेऽहं ते

1 Pp. 73, 89, 117, 133, 136, 138, 145, 148, 154, 161, 172, 191, 201, 220, 224, 234, 240, 245, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra edited Bunyiu Nanjio. The whole passage is religiously reproduced as many as eighteen times.

when answering the various questions asked by Mahāmāti, did not say anything about the अजातिवाद, which shows that he could not be looked upon as a trusted philosopher. The Śāṅkara-bhāṣya<sup>1</sup> on the kārikā in question correctly brings out the real meaning in the following words ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातृभेदरहितं परमार्थतत्त्वमद्वयमेतन्न बुद्धेन भाषितम् । यद्यपि बाह्यार्थनिराकरणं ज्ञानमात्रकल्पना चाद्वयसामीप्यमुक्तम् । इयं तु परमार्थतत्त्वमद्वैतं वेदान्तेष्वेव विज्ञेयमित्यर्थः । The Bhāṣya also explains बुद्धस्य as meaning परमार्थदर्शिनः and तायिनः as संतानवन्तो निरन्तरस्याऽऽकाशकल्पस्येत्यर्थः. Gauḍapāḍa wants to say that the ज्ञान of a pseudo-Buddha is concerned with धर्मस and vice-versa (In IV-54 एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चित्तं वापि न धर्मजम् । एवं हेतुफलाजातिं प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ the view of the Vijñānavādins is clearly shown to be untenable and Gauḍapāḍa emphasises the same in IV. 99); a really enlightened person who could be called a तायिन् proper knows that ज्ञान is entirely unconnected with धर्मस which do not exist at all. Nothing can be said to be connected with a बन्ध्यापुत्र. Gautama Buddha holding the view that धर्मस are चित्तज, did not realise the highest truth viz. अजाति. Gautama Buddha was therefore not a तायिन् बुद्ध.<sup>2</sup> We think IV. 99 definitely condemns बुद्ध and he could not have been referred to as द्विपदां वर by Gauḍapāḍa in IV. 1.

Prof. Vidhuśekhara relies upon IV. 2 to prove that बुद्ध is the द्विपदां वर. We now shall show how IV. 2 is quite a broken reed for Prof. Vidhuśekhara to rely upon, and that his long winded comments on this kārikā are only a piece of special pleading with a vengeance. (1) Prof. Vidhuśekhara says that the word अस्पर्शयोग does not occur in the Upaniṣads. He is however prepared to admit that the use of the word स्पर्श in the Bhagavad-gītā (मात्रास्पर्शस्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णसुखदुःखदाः । आगमापायिनोऽनित्यास्तांस्तितिक्षस्व भारत II. 14 and स्पर्शान्कृत्वा बहिर्बाह्यान् etc. V. 27) and Śāṅkara's explanation offered there cannot be rejected.

<sup>1</sup> Some are of opinion that this Bhāṣya is not the work of the famous Śāṅkarācārya, but that does not affect the argument in question.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. P. V. Bapat in his article 'Tāyin, Tāyī, Tādi' (D. R. Bhandarkar volume p. 258) says that Tāyin originally meant 'like' or 'same' and later came to be applied to the Buddha or any holy man who is unshakable, and lastly the meaning 'Protector' came to be fixed up.

We are of opinion that the expression मात्रास्पर्श really means the contact with the three मात्रास referred to in the Māṇḍukyaopaniṣad (the three states, जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति associated with विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ) and the योग involving अस्पर्श with these मात्रास is rightly spoken as सर्वसत्त्वसुख and हित by Gauḍapāda in IV. 2. This same योग is known as असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि in the Yogasūtras.

The term अस्पर्शयोग does not occur in Buddhist literature as well. So, the non-mention of अस्पर्शयोग in the Upaniṣads directly does not help Prof. Vidhuśekhara's contention.

(2) Undaunted by the fact that the expression अस्पर्शयोग is not found in Buddhist literature, Prof. Vidhuśekhara argues that

(a) अस्पर्श refers to the ninth or the last of the nine dhyānas or meditations called अनुपूर्वविहार. The ninth ध्यान is संज्ञावेदितनिरोध.

(But there is no mention of स्पर्श or अस्पर्श in the संज्ञावेदितनिरोध); Prof. Vidhuśekhara therefore argues

(b) that in the ninth stage, all the mentals headed by स्पर्श are suppressed; the cessation of वेदना is possible only when स्पर्श ceases. स्पर्श is the cause of वेदना, so when there is स्पर्श, there is वेदना, and when there is no स्पर्श there is no वेदना. We are thus expected by Vidhuśekhara to see the word स्पर्श in संज्ञावेदितनिरोध!

Prof. Vidhuśekhara goes on further to say—<sup>1</sup>

(c) In Buddhist works, there is the use of such words as स्पर्शविहार, स्पर्शविहारता, and अस्पर्शविहार. स्पर्शविहार is translated in Tibetan to mean सुखस्थिति or सुखावस्थिति; so अस्पर्शयोग is nothing but अ-सुखयोग (and this fact is referred to by Gauḍapāda in III. 39 अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः। योगिनो विभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः॥) meaning 'योग which is not that can be attained with ease'.

It is difficult to take the above rigmarole seriously, when Gauḍapāda calls the अस्पर्शयोग as सर्वसत्त्वसुख, and अनुपूर्वयोग for the matter of that ought to mean दुःखयोग, rather than योग which cannot be secured with ease.

(4) In the yoga called निरोधसमापत्ति, there is no स्पर्श of anything, so it is rightly named अस्पर्शयोग, says Prof. Vidhuśekhara.

If this argument is to be accepted as valid, then असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि is equally entitled to be called अस्पर्शयोग.

(5) Prof. Vidhuśekhara thinks that the fear of the Yogins referred to in III. 39 by Gauḍapāda, is illustrated by Buddha's own case. 'So when the Blessed one entered that state etc. संज्ञावेदितनिरोध before his परिनिर्वाण, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one having entered the stage of the dhyāna called संज्ञावेदितनिरोध. After a short time, however, He passed away' Prof. Vidhuśekhara further says "that Buddha's two teachers Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rūmapura knew the seventh and eighth of the dhyānas respectively. The Buddha was however not satisfied with what he had from his teachers, and he started to seek after a still higher state and succeeded in realizing it".

Prof. Vidhuśekhara should better not have referred to the above episode, as the testimony of the venerable Anuruddha and the venerable Ānanda, appears to go against Buddha having realised the highest Samādhi stage at all. The venerable Ānanda apparently saw Buddha for the first time in some state which he correctly diagnosed as death, while the venerable Anuruddha was all the while proclaiming that his Master was only enjoying the Samādhi state. All this does not show Buddha in a favourable light.

(6) Prof. Vidhuśekhara draws strange conclusions from the expressions विवदामो न तैः सार्धमाविवादं निबोधत in IV. 5. He says that the use of the two words अविवाद and अविरुद्ध (in IV. 2) shows that in the acceptance of अस्पर्शयोग by the Vedāntists, among whom the author himself (Gauḍapāda) is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view. This also shows, according to Vidhuśekhara, that the अस्पर्शयोग was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of Yoga.

The passages in question simply mean that when अज्ञाति is admitted, only अद्वैत remains and this अद्वैत does not simply bother itself with the different contradictory views involved in the admittance of ज्ञाति. One who knows that बन्ध्यापुत्र does not exist would hardly trouble oneself with carrying on dispute with theorists who indulge in controversies about the date and place of birth of the बन्ध्यापुत्र and so on. There being only अद्वैत,

<sup>1</sup> We are taking care to use as far as possible Prof. Vidhuśekhara's own words (pp. 95-100).

there cannot possibly be any internal or external opposition or contradiction about it.

It is unnecessary to probe the matter any further here. Prof. Vidhuśekhara has failed to make out a case for regarding Buddha to be understood by the expression द्विपदां वर.

Who then could be the individual referred to by Gauḍapāda as द्विपदां वर, if Buddha is out of the picture? Ānandagiri, as mentioned above, thinks of नारायण as the suitable choice. The traditional गुरुपरम्परा venerated in the Śāṅkara Pīṭhas is as follows :—

ॐ नारायणं पद्मभवं वसिष्ठं शक्तिं च तत्पुत्रपराशरं च ।  
व्यासं शुकं गौडपदं महान्तं गोविन्दयोगीन्द्रमथास्य शिष्यम् ॥

नारायण is here shown as the first traditional teacher of Advaita Vedānta, so Ānandagiri's choice cannot be regarded as unreasonable. We however think that Gauḍapāda in IV. 1 is thinking of his direct teacher viz. शुक.

(1) It is quite natural that an author should salute his direct teacher in his work.

(2) Śuka is certainly known to have been a great Yogin; though we may not believe in the traditional legends about him.

(3) The Yogavāsistha<sup>1</sup> devotes one whole Sarga (II. 2) in describing his greatness. He is said there to be even greater than Janaka who was greater than Vyāsa. After being in the Nirvikalpa-samādhi for 10010 years, he secured Mokṣa on the peak of the Meru mountain.

The expression द्विपदां वर is used in the MBh, and need not be regarded as a typical Buddhist term applicable only to Buddha;

व्यासादधिक एवाहं व्यासशिष्योऽसि तत्पुत्रः ।  
भोगेच्छातानवेनेह मत्तोऽप्यत्यधिको भवान् ॥ ४० ॥  
नीतशोकभयायासो निरीहच्छिन्नसंशयः ।  
जगाम शिखरं मेरोः समाध्यर्थमनिन्दितम् ॥ ४३ ॥  
तत्र वर्षसहस्राणि निर्विकल्पसमाधिना ।  
दश स्थित्वा शशामासावात्मन्यस्त्रेहदीपवत् ॥ ४४ ॥

(Yogavāsistha II)

even if it be so regarded, Gauḍapāda could be said to have deliberately applied it to शुक to show that in his opinion Buddha was not the proper द्विपदां वर.

(4) It is inconceivable that शङ्कर who is described as

बौद्धादिबुद्धितमसां खलु चण्डभानुः

... ..

भूमण्डले विजयते यतिसार्वभौमः ॥

in the traditional salutation formula by the Advaitins, should have his परमगुरु (Gauḍapāda) saluting बुद्ध.

On these grounds, we think that the द्विपदां वर is शुकाचार्य the direct teacher of गौडपाद.

It is clear that the अजातिवाद which is the out-standing contribution of Gauḍapāda to Indian philosophical thought, owes hardly anything solely to Buddhist philosophical ideas. Gauḍapāda had ample material in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā to base his अजातिवाद upon. He had undoubtedly mastered Buddhist philosophy in all its details and was influenced by the Lankāvatāra in particular, but this only resulted in his delivering forcible thrusts against Buddhism with greater effect. The Lankāvatāra sūtra<sup>1</sup> tells us that it contains the doctrine of धर्माणां नैरात्म्य taught by धर्मराज (Buddha). Gauḍapāda is thus on a firm ground when he declares in Kārikā IV. 99, that his doctrine of अजातिवाद and परमात्मद्वैत was not taught by Buddha.

नैरात्म्यं यत्र धर्माणां धर्मराजेन देशितम् ।

लङ्कावतारं तत्सूत्रमिह यत्नेन लिख्यते । opening stanza.

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
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“ WAS ŚAṅKARA THE AUTHOR OF THE COMMENTARY  
ON GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKĀS GENERALLY

ATTRIBUTED TO HIM ? ” \*

By

R. D. KARMARKAR

Prof. T. R. Chintamani, in his article ‘ Śaṅkara, the commentator on the Māṇḍūkyakārikās ’ has tried to prove that Śaṅkara wrote his Bhāṣya on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad along with the Gauḍapādakārikās, ( on which Ānandagiri has written his Ṭīkā ). Prof. Chintamani first tries to refute the arguments of Professors Jacobi and Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya ( who held the opposite view ) and then, discusses some arguments which could be put forward to prove that Śaṅkara could not have been the author of the Bhāṣya in question.

Prof. Jacobi<sup>2</sup> argues that Śaṅkara could not have been the author of the Bhāṣya in question, because Śaṅkara ‘ would hardly have stated the argument in the form and terms of an Anumāna, according to Nyāya principles ’ which has been done in the Bhāṣya on G. K. ( II. 9 )

अन्तःस्थानान् भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् ।

यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ॥ --

जाग्रद्दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यमिति प्रतिज्ञा ।

दृश्यत्वादिति हेतुः ।

स्वप्नदृश्यभाववदिति दृष्टान्तः ।

यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यं तथा

जागरितेऽपि दृश्यत्वमविशिष्टम् इति हेतूपनयः ।

तस्माज्जागरितेऽपि वैतथ्यं स्मृतम् इति निगमनम् ।

The writer of the Bhāṣya writes here as a confirmed Naiyāyika, in admiration of the five-membered syllogism. Śaṅkara as a

follower of the Mīmāṃsās would be admitting only the first three members of the syllogism. Hence Śaṅkara could not have been the author of the present Bhāṣya.

Prof. Chintamani rightly points out that the above is not a convincing argument to prove Prof. Jacobi's point. In his Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras and the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Śaṅkara, time and again, shows a complete grasp of the Nyāya tenets and syllogism and there is nothing to show that he did not admit the five-membered syllogism. Śaṅkara was always ready to make use of the opponent's weapons, if it suited him.

Prof. Bhattacharya argues that the Bhāṣya on G. K. ( III. 39 ),

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः । etc.

says— अस्पर्शयोगो ... .. नाम वै स्मर्यते प्रसिद्धमुपनिषत् । but अस्पर्शयोग is certainly not प्रसिद्ध in the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara who obviously had the Upaniṣads at his finger's ends could not have made such an impossible statement.

Against this Prof. Chintamani rightly points out that though the expression may not be प्रसिद्ध, the idea conveyed by it is sufficiently well-known, in the Upaniṣads,<sup>1</sup> in the Bhagavadgītā etc.

It may be admitted that the arguments advanced by Professors Jacobi and Bhattacharya have been properly answered by Prof. Chintamani.

Prof. Chintamani easily disposes of some minor arguments in favour of Śaṅkara's authorship as under :—

( 1 ) The commentary begins with two benedictory verses— This is rather unusual with Śaṅkara who has no such Maṅgalaśloka for his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.

This can be answered by pointing out that there are benedictory verses in the beginning of the Taittirīyabhāṣya ( as also of the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya ; but according to some, Śaṅkara did not write any Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā ). So no conclusion can be drawn from this.

( 2 ) The second benedictory verse is metrically defective.

<sup>1</sup> न लिप्यते कर्मणा पापकेन । B. IV. iv. 23

न लिप्यते लोकदुःसेन वासः । Katho. V. 11

मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय etc. B. Gītā II. 14

\* Read at the Ahmedabad Session of the All-India Oriental Conference ( 1953 ) and printed here with permission.

<sup>1</sup> Proceedings of the Third All-India Oriental Conference, Madras Vol. II, p. 419.

<sup>2</sup> Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. XXXIII p. 52, Foot-note 1.

This can be disposed of by saying that this is quite an insignificant matter or as Ānandagīri remarks, such a latitude is permissible in the composition of Gāthās.<sup>1</sup>

(3) The Bhāṣya on G. K. ( III. 25 ) संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते । says, “अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये संभूतिमुपासते” ( Īśāvāsyopaniṣad 12 ) इति संभूतेरुपास्यत्वापवादात्संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते ।, while in the Bhāṣya on the Īśa passage Śaṅkara reads येऽसंभूतिमुपासते and explains असंभूति as प्रकृतिः कारणभविष्या etc. According to the Īśabhāṣya two Upāsanās are mentioned, विद्या-अविद्या, and संभूति-असंभूति, while the G. K. Bhāṣya refers to only one Upāsanā, viz. that of विद्या-अविद्या.

In reply, Prof. Chintamani says that Śaṅkara might have been forced to give different explanations in conformity with the contexts.

In the G. K. Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara was required to bear in mind what Gauḍapāda had to say; in the Bhāṣya on the Īśa, Śaṅkara was more or less free to explain the passages at will.

Prof. Chintamani further says that tradition is in favour of Śaṅkara's having written a Bhāṣya on the work of his great preceptor Gauḍapāda. It is quite natural for a pupil to show his admiration for his preceptor by writing an explanatory commentary on the work of his preceptor. The language of the commentary, though not comparable to that of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya is certainly not un-worthy of Śaṅkara.

On these grounds Prof. Chintamani concludes that the Bhāṣya on the G. K. was written by Śaṅkara.

We are of opinion that the arguments put forward by Prof. Chintamani are quite unconvincing and we propose to bring forward fresh arguments to prove that Śaṅkara could not have written the Bhāṣya on G. K., that goes under his name. We have got to rely here mostly on internal evidence which can never be absolutely reliable. We want to point out here to the basic improbability about Śaṅkara's authorship which involves certain glaring discrepancies regarding the interpretation of some important passages:—

(1) To begin with, the G. K. Bhāṣya says at the outset, ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्वं तस्योपश्याख्यायाम् । वेदान्तार्थसारसंग्रहभूतमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयमोमित्येतदक्षरमित्याचारभ्यते । which means that the writer of the

<sup>1</sup> न च द्वितीयश्लोके चतुर्थपादे वृत्तलक्षणभावादसाङ्गत्यमाशङ्कनीयम् । गाथा लक्षणस्य तत्र सुसंवादादिनि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Bhāṣya regards the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and the Gauḍapādakārikās as one work. Now Śaṅkara could not have even dreamt of admitting this. The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad is a Śruti work and hence अपौरुषेय, while the Kārikās, howsoever great the status of their author might have been, are after all a human composition. It is well-known that Śaṅkara was almost a fanatic in the matter of admiration for the Śrutis. He quotes the Bhagavadgītā scores of times in his works, but is always careful to point out that it is after all a Smṛti ( we hold the view that the Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā that goes under the name of Śaṅkara, was not written by him and is not genuine ). He certainly calls the writer of the Gītā, Bhagavat; he is content with calling Gauḍapāda a mere Ācārya, who knows the traditional Vedānta philosophy; not even Vyāsa is called Bhagavat by him ( Only Upaśara has that distinction conferred upon him by Śaṅkara ). Śaṅkara, therefore, could not have thought of writing a commentary on a human composition, the work of a mere Ācārya.

(2) In the Bhāṣya on G. K. III-14

जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत्प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकीर्तितम् ।

भविष्यद्वृत्त्या गौणं तन्मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ।।

it is said, ... यत्प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्त्यर्थोपनिषद्वाक्येभ्यः पूर्वं प्रकीर्तितं कर्मकाण्डे । अनेकशः कामभेदतः इदं कामोऽदः काम इति । परञ्च “स दाधार पृथिवीं याम्” इत्यादि-मन्त्रवर्णैः । .... यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । .... इत्याद्युत्पत्त्यर्थोपनिषद्वाक्येभ्यः प्राक्पृथक्त्वं कर्मकाण्डे प्रकीर्तितं यत्तत्र परमार्थम् । किं तर्हि । गौणम् । महाकाशघटा-काशादिभेदवत् । यथौदनं पचतीति भविष्यद्वृत्त्या तद्वत् .... । We are convinced that this interpretation is, besides being clumsy, completely wrong. In the first place, there is no doubt that the passage the writer of the Kārikā has in mind is the well-known one, अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि । which explains the state of things prior to creation in the Chāndogya VI. 3. 2. Śaṅkara refers to this passage more than once in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. In the Bhāṣya on II. 1. 35 he says श्रुतो तावत् ‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना’ इति सर्गप्रमुखे शारीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन प्राणधारणनिमित्तेनाभिलपन्ननादिः संसार इति दर्शयति । आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सन्कथं प्राणधारणनिमित्तेन जीवशब्देन सर्गप्रमुखेऽभिलप्यते । न च धारयिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्यते । अनागतौ च संबन्धादतीतः संबन्धो बलवान्भवत्यभिनिष्प-न्नत्वात् । that is, Śaṅkara here understands प्रागुत्पत्तेः to mean सर्गप्रमुखे and refers to the Chāndogya passage अनेन जीवेनात्मना etc. and not to



स दाधार etc. the Mantravarṇa. Any one can see that the above interpretation fits in far more accurately the Kārikā in question, and the Kārikābhāṣya has made a complete mess by its absurd interpretation. Śaṅkara could not have made such a blunder, especially when the appropriate passage in question had been constantly before his eyes.

(3) G. K. II. 3 reads

अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् ।

वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं स्वप्न आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥

The K. Bhāṣya comments upon this as under :—

इतश्च स्वप्नदृश्या भावा विवक्षिताः । यतोऽभावश्चैव रथादीनां स्वप्नदृश्यानां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकं युक्तितः श्रुतौ “न तत्र रथाः” इत्यत्र । देहान्तः स्थानसंवृत्तत्वादिहेतुना प्राप्तं वैतथ्यं तदनुवादिन्या श्रुत्या स्वयंज्योतिष्प्रतिपादनपरया प्रकाशितमाहुर्ब्रह्मविदः ।

Thus (1) न्यायपूर्वकं is taken to mean ‘through reasoning’ (2) The श्रुति by pointing out to the स्वयंज्योतिः nature of the Ātman, is said here to repeat ( अनुवादिनी ) the argument in Kārikā (III. 1) अन्तःस्थानात् भावानां संवृत्तत्वेन हेतुना ।

There is no difference of opinion about the reference here being to Brhadāraṇyaka III. 3— न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्यानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान्वयः सृजते etc. Later while describing the संप्रसाद or सुषुप्ति state, the Upaniṣad says पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याव्रवति स्वप्नायैव that is, the soul comes back again from the सुषुप्ति state to the स्वप्न state ( just as he comes back again from the स्वप्न state to the जागरित state ). This is put in to refute the objection that the souls in the different states may be different altogether ; the soul is the same throughout, and he returns to his normal position after he has ceased enjoying any particular state. The Upaniṣad uses the same phraseology पुनःप्रतिन्यायं etc. in III. 15, 16, 17, to describe the passage of the soul and in this connection the word न्याय ( in प्रतिन्यायं ) is used. We are convinced that the G. Kārikā used the expression न्यायपूर्वकं with the meaning of न्याय as found in the Brhadāraṇyaka. Śaṅkara very lucidly explains the position in his Br. Bhāṣya as follows :— प्रतिन्यायं यथान्यायं यथागतं निश्चित आयो न्योयः । अयम् आयो निगमनं पुनः पूर्वगमनवैपरीत्येन यदागमनं स प्रतिन्यायः । यथागतं पुनरागच्छतीत्यर्थः । that is to say, that there is the same soul in the three states, and he returns to the previous state

in the same way ( of course reversely ) as he had gone. So that the Kārikā refers to two things — There are no real chariots etc. in the dream state, and also that the same soul, as in the waking state, works there too ; he is always coming from and going to the different states. It is clear that Śaṅkara's explanation of न्याय as given in the Upaniṣad Bhāṣya is far more satisfactory and pertinent. The explanation युक्तितः of न्यायपूर्वकम् in the K. Bhāṣya is quite unacceptable. Again to speak of the श्रुति as अनुवादिनी of a secular work is almost a sacrilege and Śaṅkara could not have been guilty of such a lapse.

(4) As regards G. K. ( III. 25 ) संसृतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते, the K. Bhāṣya refers to the Īsopaniṣad passage, but gives a long-winded explanation which is both unnecessary and misleading. Gauḍapāda wants here only to refer to the impossibility of origination and has nothing to do with the उपासना of संसृति and असंसृति in the Īsopaniṣad. Śaṅkara could not have possibly been so irrelevant and beside the point.

(5) The K. Bhāṣya upon G. K. अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः । ( III. 20 ) reads ये तु पुनः केचिदुपनिषद्वाक्यातारो ब्रह्मवादिनो वावदुका अजातस्यैवात्मतत्त्वस्यासृत्तस्य स्वभावतो जातिमुत्पत्तिमिच्छन्ति. While Śaṅkara refers to different interpretations of the Brahmasūtras, he never speaks of commentators on the Upaniṣads. Any way this reference to उपनिषद्वाक्यातुः seems to be quite unusual.

On the whole, therefore it appears to us that the K. Bhāṣya was written by some one belonging to the Śaṅkara school when Gauḍapādakārikās had attained to great importance ( as is seen from the fact that Kūranārāyaṇa comments upon at least one Prakaraṇa there ) and it was felt that the first systematic Advaita work of Gauḍapāda deserved more attention.

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
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MUTUAL RELATION OF THE YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA,  
THE LĀNKĀVATĀRASŪTRA AND THE  
GAUDAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀS\*

By

R. D. KARMAKAR

It is proposed in this paper to find out if any mutual relation can be established in respect of the three well-known philosophical works — the Yogavāsiṣṭha, the Lānkāvatārasūtra and the Gauḍapādakārikās — by a comparison of the tenets propounded, and the circumstances in which the three works seem to have been produced. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the dates of the three works have not yet been definitely ascertained. At any rate, it is not merely in the spirit of imitating Pāṇini who brought together in one Sūtra 'Śvan, Yuvaṇ, Maghavan', that the three works, belonging to different schools of philosophy and preaching more or less diametrically opposite views, are taken here for discussion.

The Yogavāsiṣṭha (variously called as Vāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa, Brhadyogavāsiṣṭha, Uttararāmāyaṇa, Vāsiṣṭhagītā etc.) is a huge work containing about 32000 ślokaś, and is ascribed to Vālmiki. We are told in the work itself<sup>1</sup> that Brahmadeva on hearing the

recital of Vālmiki's Rāmāyaṇa by Bharadvāja, went along with Bharadvāja to Vālmiki, and advised him to continue his work still further, especially with a view to help the people in crossing over the ocean of Saṃsāra. This means that the Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa proper contained only the history of Rāma, and that it was later supplemented by another work by Vālmiki himself, containing philosophical matter which was not much in evidence in the Rāmāyaṇa. (In course of time, this additional matter written by Vālmiki, sometimes called 'Uttararāmāyaṇa' came to have many additions and the Yogavāsiṣṭha in its present complete form can only be ascribed to the twelfth century A. D.). The Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa is generally accepted to have been completed by about the first century A. D., and it presumably refers to the Uttararāmāyaṇa in the following ślokaś, चतुर्विंशत्सहस्राणि श्लोकानामुक्त-  
वानृषिः । तथा मर्गशतान् पञ्च षट्काण्डानि तथोत्तरम् ॥ कृत्वा तु तन्महाप्राज्ञः स मविष्य-  
सहोत्तरम् । चिन्तयामास कोऽन्वेतः प्रयुञ्जीयादिति प्रभुः ॥ (Bālakaṇḍa IV. 2-3). We would not be wrong therefore if we conclude from this that some philosophical portion of the Yogavāsiṣṭha existed about the beginning of the Christian era.

The author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha was an amazingly bold person. Though Rāma lived centuries before Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa, the author describes the teachings of Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna (closely modelled on those of the Bhagavadgītā, borrowing bodily several verses therefrom), solemnly telling the reader that all that was to take place in the future.

The standard form for the teaching of philosophical doctrines is a dialogue between the teacher and the pupil who must have been affected by *Moha* and is desirous of getting rid of the same. Thus in the Mahābhārata, we have the *Sanatsujātīya* (in the Udyogaparvan) which is narrated to Dhṛtarāṣṭra who had been exceedingly distressed. The *Moha* of Arjuna for whose benefit the Bhagavadgītā came into existence is well-known. At the end of the Gītā, Arjuna says:— नष्टो मोहः स्फुटितलब्ध्या त्वप्रसादान्मयाच्युत । स्थितोऽस्मि गतसंदेहः करिष्ये वचनं तव ॥ (XVIII. 73). In the case of the Yogavāsiṣṭha, Rāma plays the role of the pupil and Vāsiṣṭha is the teacher, and Rāma is made to say at the end (almost in the words of Arjuna) नष्टो मोहः पदं प्राप्तं त्वप्रसादान्मुनीश्वर । संपश्येऽहं सत्यमव्यक्त-

\* Read at the Ahmedabad Session (1953) of the All-India Oriental Conference, and published here with the permission of the authorities of the Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Sarga 2, Vairāgyaprakaraṇa (13-15)—

रामस्वभावकथनाद्ममाद्वरमुने त्वया ।  
नोद्वेगात्त परित्याज्य आसमाप्तेरनिन्दितात् ॥ १३ ॥  
ग्रन्थेनानेन लोकोऽयमस्मात्संसारसंकटात् ।  
समुत्तरिष्यति क्षिप्रं पोतेनेवाशु सागरात् ॥ १४ ॥  
वक्तुं तदेवमेवार्थमहमागतवानयम् ।  
कुत्र लोकहितार्थं त्वं शास्त्रमित्युक्तवानजः ॥ १५ ॥

मवपातधीः ॥ स्थितोऽस्मि गतसंदेहः स्वभावे ब्रह्मरूपिणि । निरावरणविज्ञानः  
करिष्ये वचनं तव ॥ etc. . The removal of infatuation ( *Mohanivṛtti* )  
is the purpose for which both the Bhagavadgītā and the Yoga-  
vāsiṣṭha have been composed. Now, such works naturally have to  
show how the *Moha* came to arise. In the case of the Bhagavad-  
gītā, the writer ( he may be Vyāsa himself ) shows great dramatic  
genius by making Arjuna feel depressed to the extent of refusing  
to fight on the eve of battle and Kṛṣṇa tries his best to bring  
Arjuna back to his normal state of mind ( according to some  
scholars, Arjuna's sense of sudden depression is quite unnatural,  
and that the Gītā could not have been taught on the battle-field  
itself — we are not here concerned with such points ). The Yoga-  
vāsiṣṭha similarly describes how Rāma came to be depressed and  
stood in need of some mental shock-giving instruction :—

Rāma, while yet a child, had gone on a visit to various  
sacred places and to 'see the world'. He is described as having  
travelled over all the important places, mountains, rivers etc. in  
the then known world. On his return, Rāma ( usually, by perform-  
ing *Tīrthayātrā*, people become free from depression, and are  
composed in mind ) felt exceedingly distressed and came to the  
definite thoughtful conclusion that Saṁsāra was unsubstantial.  
He became indifferent to his daily duties, and passed his time in  
meditation in solitude, and no one could diagnose what the matter  
was with him. In the meanwhile, the sage Viśvāmitra came to  
Ayodhyā and requested king Daśaratha to send Rāma with him to  
drive away the Rākṣasas who were harassing him by interfering  
with his sacrifices. Daśaratha regretted his inability to grant  
Viśvāmitra's request on the ground that Rāma was but a child and  
quite inexperienced and it was unfair to pit him against the power-  
ful demons. Viśvāmitra became very angry and was about to  
leave Daśaratha in a huff, when Vasiṣṭha advised Daśaratha to  
grant Viśvāmitra's request. Rāma was then called to the Durbar  
Hall, and Rāma described in detail how his mind had been  
thoroughly out of sorts. Thereupon Viśvāmitra requested Vasiṣṭha  
to instruct Rāma. Vasiṣṭha's instruction went on for as many as  
eighteen days, in the morning and in the afternoon, each day,  
and gods and semi-divine beings also came to Daśaratha's court-hall  
to listen to this symposium.

As compared to the *Upakrama* of the Bhagavadgītā, that of the  
Yogavāsiṣṭha is very tame and is also packed with improbable situ-  
ations. But the author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha presumably has done  
this deliberately. The reason is not so much to outshine the Gītā,  
as to show Rāma's superiority over Gautama Buddha. Thus—

( 1 ) Gautama renounced the world after having enjoyed the  
pleasures of life.

Rāma's *Vairāgya* in its intense form appeared when he was only  
a child.

( 2 ) Gautama's *Vairāgya* is described as being due to his  
seeing one day, an old man, a man suffering from disease, and a dead  
man carried in procession to the funeral pyre.

Rāma's *Vairāgya* was of the highest Sāttvika type, being cause-  
less. ( The Yogavāsiṣṭha repeatedly harps on this point ) ' Who  
would not feel distressed on seeing a ' *bibhatsa* object ? ' the writer  
says. This appears to be a deliberate hit against the *Vairāgya* of  
Gautama and others ).

( 3 ) Gautama secured his 'enlightenment'; this we have to  
take on trust. Nowhere are to be found the teachings of Gautama  
as such or his experiences after he had become Buddha.

The various phases through which Rāma had passed and the  
intelligent queries he puts now and then are described in a detailed  
manner in the Yogavāsiṣṭha.

( 4 ) Gautama's enlightenment was more or less a private  
affair.

The instruction received by Rāma was shared by representa-  
tives of all beings, divine as well as earthly.

<sup>1</sup> सर्वस्यैव हि सर्वस्य साधोरपि विवेकिनः ।  
निमित्तपूर्वं वैराग्यं जायते राम राजसम् ॥ २१ ॥  
इदं त्वपूर्वमुत्पन्नं चमत्कारकरं सताम् ।  
तवानिमित्तं वैराग्यं सात्त्विकं स्वविवेकजम् ॥ २२ ॥  
बीभत्सं विषयं दृष्ट्वा को नाम न विरज्यते ।  
सतामुत्तमवैराग्यं विवेकादेव जायते ॥ २३ ॥  
तद्वैराग्यं परं श्रेयः स्वतो यदाभिजायते ॥ २४ ॥ etc.

In our opinion, such a treatment of the subject matter could not have been quite casual, or given in the ordinary course. The original nucleus of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, as has been said above, must have been written about the beginning of the Christian era. By this time, Buddhism had been fairly well established and a work like the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa describing in detail Buddha's life and enlightenment in a highly poetical manner, must have had a great influence on the thinking people. It was then found necessary for the Vedic people to do something to counteract this state of things. Luckily, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa* had not been so far shown up as a philosopher, and so the gifted writer of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* took this opportunity to produce a work which could make Buddhism pale into insignificance. In doing so, he gave the fullest scope to his amazing poetic and philosophical powers. The advent of a work like the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* can be satisfactorily accounted for in some such way only.

The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is a very important work of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism. Its authorship is unknown, but it was translated into Chinese in the sixth century A. D. As the name implies it is connected with *Laṅkā*, the capital of Rāvaṇa. The work begins with a detailed description of the Buddha sporting at the *Laṅkāpura* on the Malaya mountain in the ocean, with a large number of monks. Rāvaṇa, on hearing of Buddha's arrival, wished that Buddha should visit *Laṅkā* proper, and ascending his *Puṣpaka* air-chariot, went to him with a large retinue and praised him with songs. Rāvaṇa expressed his desire to hear the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* propounded by the *Pūrvabuddhas*. Buddha went to *Laṅkā* and was again worshipped by Rāvaṇa, Yakṣas, Yakṣiṇīs etc.<sup>1</sup> Buddha, quite pleased, then proceeded to answer one hundred and eight questions dealing with all sorts of subjects.

<sup>1</sup> तत्र गत्वा पुरीं रम्यां पुनः पूजां प्रलब्धवान् ।

रावणाद्यैर्यक्षवर्गेर्यक्षणीभिश्च पूजितः ॥ २५ ॥

यक्षपुत्रैर्यक्षकन्याभी रत्नजालैश्च पूजितः ।

रावणेनापि बुद्धस्य हारा रत्नविभूषिताः ।

जिनस्य जिनपुत्राणामुत्तमाङ्गेषु स्थापिताः ॥ २६ ॥

We are not concerned here with the details, but only with the manner in which the *Upakrama* is described. Actually in Buddhist mythological or story literature, Brahmanical gods like Indra, Kubera, figure largely, but Rāvaṇa is not much in evidence except of course in *Jātakas* dealing with the Rāma version; why is Rāvaṇa particularly selected for receiving the philosophical knowledge directly from Buddha? Our suggestion is that the Buddhist writer must have been provoked into doing this because some Hindu writer had previously described Rāma as having been the recipient of Hindu philosophical instruction. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* described Rāma as having been taught at length the highest philosophical truth; as a counter-blast to this, the Buddhist writer makes Rāvaṇa, along with Kumbhakarna and others, Yakṣas etc, learn things directly from Buddha himself. The author of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* goes one better in describing that Buddha was accompanied by a host of his pupils and that Rāvaṇa worshipped him with the offerings of jewels etc. Rāvaṇa's thirst for philosophical knowledge is also spontaneous. All this shows that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* was deliberately composed with a view to score over the Hindu *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (or some such work).

The *Laṅkāvatāra* is intended to teach the *Nairātmya*<sup>1</sup> of *Dharmas*. The *Bhagavat* is only too glad to reply to questions and is made to use the following expression a score of times in this connection:— ... तेन हि महामते शृणु साधु च सुष्ठु च मनसि कुरु । भाषिष्येऽहं तव ।<sup>2</sup>

The *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* is a well-known Vedāntic work by the great-great teacher of Śāṅkarācārya, generally assigned to the sixth century A. D. *Gauḍapāda* makes no secret of his indebtedness to Buddhist works, makes profuse use of Buddhist technical terms so

<sup>1</sup> नैरात्म्यं यत्र धर्माणां धर्मराजेन देशितम् ।

लङ्कावतारं तत्सुत्रमिह यत्नेन लिख्यते ॥

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 72, 89, 113, 133, 136, 138, 145, 148, 154, 161, 182, 191, 211, 220, 224, 234, 240, 245, edition by Bunyin Nanjo. See also 'Dvipadām Vara' in *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* (IV. 1), an article by R. D. Karmarkar, *Annals* (B. O. R. Institute) Vol. XXXII pp. 166-173.

much so that some have called him a Buddhist in disguise.<sup>1</sup> Gauḍapāda's debt to the Laṅkāvatāra can also be freely admitted.<sup>2</sup> Some of the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda are mere echoes of the passages in the Laṅkāvatāra. But what Gauḍapāda really wants to teach can be gathered from the significant expression नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् (in IV. 99) used by him. All agree that the expression बुद्धेन here refers to Gautama Buddha, and the deliberate use of the expression भाषितम् in our opinion is a pointer to no other work but the Laṅkāvatāra which uses the expression भाषिष्येऽहं तच्च, scores of times, as has been mentioned above. Gauḍapāda, in effect, seems to say:— 'Buddha wanted to teach the नैरात्म्य of Dharmas; he answered more than a hundred questions, but the main question, viz. the idea of Advaita or Brahman, which differentiates Buddhism from the Vedic religion, was not discussed or referred to by Buddha'. This fact is pointed out in the Gauḍapāda-kārikās (the expression नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् is explained by some differently, but as has been pointed out by us in our edition of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās, that fails to carry conviction).

The point we want to make out in this paper is that the three works, the Yogavāsiṣṭha, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the Gauḍapāda-kārikās came to be composed deliberately by their authors for the purpose of refuting the doctrines of their opponents and promulgating their own. At a time when Buddha and his renunciation were being boosted, the Yogavāsiṣṭha came on the field, to describe Rāma as the ideal renouncer whose *Vasanātyāga* was due to *Viveka* and not to any outside causes. The Laṅkāvatāra took for its hero, Rāvaṇa (the villain in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki, and the opponent of Rāma) and made him learn the highest Buddhist philosophy from Buddha himself. Gauḍapāda wrote his work, in a less spectacular fashion, confining himself to philosophical doctrines only, and in a sober but closely reasoned manner, pointed out how Buddhism and Vedānta had much in common, but Buddhism by insisting upon *Nairātmya* or *Sānyata* could not be said to have hit

upon the real nature of Reality. Attempts were later made by Buddhist writers to show that the Śūnyatā of the Mādhyamika Bauddhas is not a complete void, but they did not succeed in their attempt to reinstate Buddhism philosophically; the result was rather the opposite, for their preaching made Buddhism and Advaita philosophy identical and this, in no small measure, contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Buddhism from the land of its birth.

The three works taken for discussion here, are, it is hardly necessary to say, typical of the works of a similar nature. Our only endeavour here is to point out how the general trend of the philosophical development, both from the Buddhistic and Vedāntic points of view took place during the first six centuries of the Christian era.

<sup>1</sup> See the edition of Gauḍapāda-kārikā by the present writer, which discusses this point in detail.

<sup>2</sup> See p. XLV, Introduction, Gauḍapāda-kārikā edition by R. D. Karmarkar.

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
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### THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN HISTORY

*A Reconstruction and Analysis of Sri Aurobindo's  
Philosophy of History.*

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#### 1. THEORY OF IDEAS AND IDEALS

One of the persistent themes in political and Social Philosophy is the role of ideas in human history. The idealists tend to exalt moral and spiritual ideas. Plato and Kant and Robert Owen dreamt of the transformation of human cognition. If only man was imbued with the 'true' ideas, salvation would dawn upon the earth. On the other hand, hard and cold realists, Machiavellians and Hobbesians have sang the glories of the cult of the 'stronger'. In two of his books on political and social philosophy—*The Ideal of Human Unity* and *The Human Cycle*, Sri Aurobindo has attempted to deal with this very important problem of the place of ideas in human history and society.

Being a supramental idealist and a believer in Real-Ideas, Aurobindo accepts the great role of ideas and ideals in human history. Ideals are only ethical and utopian ideas; otherwise from the ontological standpoint they are similar. All ideas are forces and they have a faculty of formative and self-realising nature. This capacity

<sup>1</sup> *The Life Divine* (American Ed.), p. 257.



Finally, Political Science has one special aspect compared to other branch of human knowledge. We, as individuals, can ignore chemistry or literature but not politics. Even if we are not interested in politics, be it a question of war or peace, is never uninterested in us. We can never pursue our interest and calling during national and international emergencies. We are vitally affected by all major political questions of our time, simply because political relations are increasingly affecting our daily lives. Even the dangerous race for thermo-nuclear experiments vitally affect us and our future generation. And such problems are essentially political in nature. In that context, it is no exaggeration to say that we are virtually living in a political age. And we can never fully understand such an age without some knowledge of Political Science.

Thus the rise of the masses, increased production, technological revolution with its important social and political implications, the nature of the subject itself in contrast to other subjects are the principal aspects of contemporary Political Science.

## GAUḌAPĀDA: HIS WORKS AND VIEWS

NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY

*Lecturer, Krishnagar College*

Gauḍapāda is a great personality in Advaita philosophy of India. His works form the basis of Advaita and he is regarded as the preceptor of Govindapāda of whom Śaṅkarācārya was a direct disciple. Much is not known about his date, life and works. His views are gathered from the books which tradition ascribes to him.

### DATE AND LIFE

In the biography of Śaṅkara, it is stated that Gauḍapāda met Śaṅkara at a particular time. But there is no other proof to confirm such a statement. So, it seems that Gauḍapāda was no contemporary of Śaṅkara. But it is almost impossible to fix his actual date. Śaṅkara's date is generally admitted to be 788 A.D. But there is a hot controversy over this issue. If for argument's sake this date of Śaṅkara be taken as true, Gauḍapāda's date will approximately be the seventh century A.D. Gauḍapāda cannot be much earlier than Śaṅkara as his disciple Govindapāda was the preceptor of Śaṅkara.

It is difficult to determine the actual place where Gauḍapāda was born. Sureśvara, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, in his 'Naiṣkarmyasiddhi' calls him a man from Gauḍa or Bengal.<sup>1</sup> Gauḍapāda was a saṁnyāsin and Govindapāda, the preceptor of Śaṅkara was initiated by him. Besides this, nothing is known about his life. Ācārya Śaṅkara gathered his main principles from the writings of Gauḍapāda. Sureśvarācārya also quoted the different statements of Gauḍapāda in his 'Naiṣkarmyasiddhi'.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent Advaitins were also much influenced by his writings.

### WORKS AND VIEWS

Gauḍapāda wrote a 'kārikā' on Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad and this is his main work. There are various editions of this book and Śaṅkara annotated on it. An annotation Mitākṣarā by name on this Kārikā is also extant and this is found in Benares.

There is an annotation on Sāṅkhyakārikā composed by Gauḍapāda. But we are not sure about his authorship of this book. The

<sup>1</sup> N. S. (Benares Sans. Series 1904), 4/41, pp. 288.

<sup>2</sup> See N. S. (Benares Sans. Series 1904), pp. 286-287.

excellence of his pen is totally absent here. But tradition ascribes this book to him. Vācaspati Miśra has refuted the views of his annotation in his 'Sāṅkhya tattva Kaumudī'.<sup>3</sup>

There is again an annotation on this annotation 'Candrikā' by name. But the annotation on Sāṅkhyakārikā, perhaps, was not written by Gauḍapāda himself. It is not possible for an advaitin to write any annotation on Sāṅkhya. Though a few advaitins like Vācaspati Miśra annotated on Sāṅkhya, still it is not possible in the case of the writer of Māṇḍukyopaniṣad kārikā. Vācaspati Miśra did not refute the views of this book with any respect for the author. This is an additional reason why we may doubt the authorship of Gauḍapāda in respect of the annotation on Sāṅkhya kārikā.

His next book is the annotation on 'uttara Gītā', It has been published only in 1910 by T. K. Bal subrahmanya Sāstri, the proprietor of Vāni Vitās Press at Srīrangam. Uttara Gītā is regarded as a part of the Mahābhārata. But this portion is not found in many editions of the same. Uttara Gītā is full of the ideas of Advaita and it is nicely written. It may be that this was written by Ācārya Gauḍapāda, but the subsequent thinkers were not much influenced by this annotation.

The later advaitins accepted Māṇḍukyopaniṣad Kārikā as authoritative. The Kārikā contains four prakaraṇas, the first being—Āgama prakaraṇa, the second—Vaitathya prakaraṇa, the third—Advaita prakaraṇa and the last being Alāta Śānti prakaraṇa. Āgama prakaraṇa contains 29 slokas, Vaitathya prakaraṇa 38, Advaita prakaraṇa 48 and Alāta Śānti prakaraṇa 100 slokas. Thus there are 215 slokas in all in the whole Kārikā.

In the Āgama prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda explains the four principles—Viśva, Taijas, Prājña and Turiya. Viśva is the Vaiśvānara or the Great Person, Taijas is Hiranyagarbha or the golden egg and Prājña means Iśvara or God. They are at bottom identical. Difference is due to illusion. The individual soul or Jīva is always the Śiva or God. Jīvahood is illusory. Godliness is also of the same nature. Turiya alone is ultimately real. The creation is illusory. But the locus of this illusory creation is real. Even an illusion is not possible without a real locus. The snake that appears in illusion manifests itself on the locus 'rope' which is not illusory. The apparent difference among Viśva, Taijas and Prājña is due to ignorance or Avidyā. Atman is their real essence and this is the ultimate reality.

<sup>3</sup> See Sāṅkhyatattva Kaumudī (the edition by late Purna Chanda Vedāntacuncu) pp. 211.

After this, Gauḍapāda states the different theories of creation and refutes them. Some think that the creation is due to the will of God. Some others hold that the creation is from Time, some others are of opinion that the creation is for enjoyment or Bhoga. There are people again who will say that the creation is due to the sportive spirit and there is yet another view which holds that the creation is due to the nature of God. Gauḍapāda refutes all these views as he says that God the perfect being can have no desire for creation (āpta-kāmasya kā sphā). Therefore he concludes that creation is to be regarded as illusory.

Turiya Atman is the ultimate reality. It is imperishable. It is non-dual. It is also uncreated. Viśva and Taijas come under the law of cause and effect while Prājña is governed by the law of cause only. But Turiya transcends everything. Viśva can know Taijas. Prājña is incapable of grasping the reality. But Turiya is all-knowing. Turiya is all. It is knowledge in essence. Prājña and Turiya equally do not see duality, but Prājña contains the potentiality of tamas or sleep while Turiya transcends it. Viśva and Taijas lack the knowledge of reality. Prājña knows no dream, it has only the sleep. But Turiya has neither sleep or tamas nor dream. When the jīva wakes up from sleep and dream and acquires true knowledge, his ignorance is destroyed, the Advaita shines forth and he attains the Turiya stage.

Gauḍapāda, then, shows the identity between Virāt, Hiranyagarbha and Iśvara on the one side and Viśva, Taijas and Prājña on the other. Praṇava is Brahman. Three letters constitute Praṇava and these are—'A', 'U' and 'M'. 'A' represents Viśva, 'U' taijas and 'M' Prājña. As 'A' marks the beginning of all letters, so Viśva is the beginning. As 'U' is superior to 'A' and remains in between 'A' and 'M' so Taijas is superior to Viśva and stands concealed by Prājña. 'M' is the last letter here. As the letters here culminate in 'M' so every thing culminates in Prājña. Thus one who understands the identity between Viśva and Virāt, Taijas and Hiranyagarbha, Prājña and Iśvara and knows that Turiya or 'A' is the last resort is a respectable sage. Praṇava is to be realised and the knowledge of identity between the Jīva and Brahman is the *summum bonum* of life. One who fixes his mind on Praṇava knows no fear. Praṇava is the beginning, it is the end and again it is the middle. Praṇava is Iśvara and it resides in the hearts of all.

Gauḍapāda shows the identity between the Jīva and Brahman and also the falsity of the world with the help of the texts in Āgama

prakaraṇa and then in Vaitathya prakaraṇa he adduces arguments in order to confirm his views. He says that what is visible in dream is false or Vitatha. The mountains and elephants cannot reside inside the body and in dream, strangely enough, we find that this is true. So, the veracity of the dream objects is easily questionable.

Now the dream objects are as visible as the objects of the waking life. So, the objects of the waking life are as false as the dream objects. Of course, here it should be remembered that the dream objects are not on a par with objects of the waking life in all respects. The dream objects are private in the sense that only particular individuals observe them. But the objects of the waking life are not private, but they are public. All people who are in the world observe them. But still both the types of objects are equally false as they are visible.

If everything is false, nihilism becomes the only position. Gauḍapāda refutes this charge and tells us that Ātman makes the hypothesis of difference through its own māyā. Ātman alone is ultimately real and the false world appears on this locus.<sup>1</sup>

Gauḍapāda defines māyā or ajñāna as neither existent nor non-existent nor both. It is neither Composite nor non-Composite nor both. The knowledge of Brahman alone destroys it.<sup>†</sup>

Ācārya Saṅkara in his Adhyāsa Bhāṣya proves it as Common to all people. The doctrine of Māyā enunciated by Gauḍapāda attained its full fledged development in the philosophy of Saṅkara.

Gauḍapāda thinks that God exhibits the difference which remained as *latent desire* through Māyā. This is creation. As creation is due to Māyā, so God is not entangled in it. The relation between the real (God) and the false (the world) is not possible. Can there be any relation between what exists and what does not?

As the rope appears in the form of the snake, so God appears as the world. The illusion of snake ceases to exist when the rope is known as the rope. In the same way the world becomes naught with the knowledge of Brahman as the non-dual reality. The reality is non-dual and duality is due to māyā. Brahman appears as over-powered by Māyā, but actually it is not.

After this, Gauḍapāda gives us the different theories of Self or Ātman and describes them as due to ajñāna or ignorance. The differ-

<sup>1</sup> Kalpayatyātmanātmānamātmā devaḥ sya māyayā  
Sa eva vudhyate bhedāniti Vedānta niscayati.—M.K.

<sup>†</sup> 'Tacca na sat nāsat, nāpi sadasat, na Vinnam nā vinnaṃ nāpi Vinnā vinnam  
kutaścīt, na niravayam na, sāvaṃyam, nobhayam, kevala Brahmātmāikyavajñānāpanodyam—'  
Annotation on Uttara Gita.

ent theories are :—Prāṇa or life—breath as the self, Elements as the self, Attribute as the self, Tattva or principle as the self, Pāda or leg as the self, Viśaya or object as the self, loka or region as the self, Deva or god as the self, Veda as the self, Jajña or sacrifice as the self, Bhoktā or enjoyer as the self, Bhojya or the enjoyable as the self, Suksma or the subtle as the self, Sthūla or the gross as the self, Mūrta or the immanent as the self, Amūrta or the transcendent as the self, Kāla or Time as the self, Dik or Space as the self, Vāda or argumentation as the self, Bhuvana or the universe as the self, Mana or the mind as the self, Vijñāna or knowledge as the self, Dharma-dharma or Virtue and vice as the self and the like. Gauḍapāda says that these are the different ways in which the ignorant people think of the self. One who knows the Self as indeterminate and one is really a wise man. The locus of differences is One and above all modifications. Modification is false, the locus is true. The universe is as false as a dream ‡

People sometimes misunderstand Gauḍapāda and think that he did not recognise any difference between a dream and the world. But this is not true. Gauḍapāda calls the world a dream as he means to say that like dream the world is false. But he also knows that unlike dream the world is publicly observed and so it is not totally on a par with the dream. This was only implicit in the kārikā of Gauḍapāda and later on Saṅkara made this explicit by distinguishing between two grades of falsity—Vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika. To Saṅkara, the world is Vyāvahārika whereas the dream is only prātibhāsika.

Any way, Gauḍapāda was very much clear in declaring that from the transcendental or Pāramārthika standpoint, there is no creation, no destruction, no bondage, no aspirant for salvation and no salvation also; there is only the indeterminate non-dual Self and this is the only reality.

Now the question is : Who can know this Truth? According to Gauḍapāda, one who has overcome anger, fear and attachment and who is conversant in the Vedas can know this. The constant remembrance of Advaita is the means for liberation. This is the sum and substance of the Vaitathya prakaraṇa. In the Advaita prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda again establishes Advaita with the help of reasoning.

Gauḍapāda believes in jīvan mukti and tells us that a man may be free even when he is embodied and he behaves almost automatically

‡ Svapnamāye yathā dr̥ṣṭe gandharvanagaram yathā Tathā Viśva midam dr̥ṣṭam  
Vedāntesu Vicakṣanaiḥ.

without any consideration of the consequences. He does not believe in the death of Ātman or self. Ātman is uncreated. What is uncreated is also deathless. So the realisation of Brahman or Ātman after death means nothing.

To Gauḍapāda, Ātman is omnipotent like ākāśa. As ākāśa circumscribed by a pot is only empirical and really ākāśa is one and indivisible, so jīva is like ākāśa circumscribed by a pot and Ātman is one and indivisible. Creation etc. are all due to māyā and they have no ultimate reality. As with the destruction of the pot, the ākāśa, circumscribed by the pot is merged in the boundless ākāśa, so the ātman immanent in a jīva merges itself in Paramātmān. As the ākāśa circumscribed by a pot is really the same as the great ākāśa, so jīvātman and paramātmān are one, they appear as distinct only due to ignorance or avidyā.

Here it may be objected that if Ātman is one in all the bodies, why then the weal and woe of one person will not be the weal and woe of all? Gauḍapāda says in reply that this cannot be. As the presence of dust and smoke in the ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot does not imply the presence of dust and smoke in the ākāśa circumscribed by all other pots, so the weal and woe of a particular jīva do not imply the same for all the jīvas. Really there is no distinction in the ākāśa, but the particular ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot has its distinction of name, form and effect. There is equal difference in the ego of the jīvas, but there is no distinction in the essence of the self. The ākāśa circumscribed by a particular pot is no modification of ākāśa. So the jīva also is no modification of Ātman. Ātman undergoes no change, change occurs only in the ego. Śruti also testifies to only one self. Taittirīya upaniṣad speaks of the same self in all the five different sheathes or Kośas.

An objection may be easily urged against this contention of Gauḍapāda. In Śruti in the context of creation specially in Karma Kāṇḍa, the difference between jīva and Paramātmān has been clearly stated. How, then, they can be non-different in JñānaKāṇḍa? Here Gauḍapāda says that their difference is only apparent and not real. Only from the standpoint of the experience of ordinary life this difference is to be maintained, but ultimately there is no difference at all.

Now the question is: Worship or upāsana is advocated in Śruti. In upāsana the difference between the worshipper and the worshipped is admitted, If jñāna which is above all differences is ultimately real, then what is the use of upāsana which entails difference? Here Gauḍapāda says that everyone is not fit for the same spiritual dis-

cipline. As there is difference in capacity and calibre of different people, so there should be different disciplines meant for them.

Gauḍapāda classifies people in three groups according to their capacity and calibre in the spiritual sphere and these are: Bad, Medium and Good. People having bad and medium talents are fit for Karma and upāsana is prescribed for them. But a man with good talents knows that these are inferior to jñāna and jñāna alone represents the ultimate truth. Here Gauḍapāda says that the Advaitins have no quarrel with the dualists as they know that dualism implies the distinction of Advaita and this distinction is due to ignorance. The Advaitins cannot quarrel at all, as to them there is no second thing to quarrel with.

Gauḍapāda understands Jñāna, the ultimate reality as self-luminous or Svayamprakāśa, Jñāna remains manifested though it is no object in any sense.

Gauḍapāda, then, speaks of the means of liberation.<sup>1</sup> The mind is attracted to the objects of enjoyment. The mind is to be withdrawn [from objects. But this withdrawal is a long and laborious process. It is to be followed slowly and steadily. People derive joy in Savikalpaka Samādhi. But this is not the end of the process. People should proceed further to attain Nirvikalpaka Samādhi and when this stage will be achieved the non-dual reality will shine in its pristine purity. This is the *Summum bonum* of life and existence.

Let us now turn to the last chapter of the Kārikā which is technically known as Alāta Śānti prakaraṇa. The word 'alāta' means search light or Maśāla. If the search light is revolved, different forms appear. These forms do not remain in the light, nor are they lost in the light. Similarly the world appears. But it has no ultimate reality. The false world also really does not originate from Brahman nor is it lost in Brahman. Of course, Brahman is to be admitted as the locus of this false appearance.

Gauḍapāda thinks that what is non-existent is non-existent for all times—past, present and future. The silver in the nacre though appears in illusion, still from the ultimate stand point it is non-existent for all times. This is in short the view of Gauḍapāda in his Alāta Śānti prakaraṇa.

Gauḍapāda also refutes dualism and Buddhism in general in Alāta Śānti prakaraṇa. The unborn cannot be born. Those who say that the cause is the effect mean that the cause is born as the

<sup>1</sup> Laye saṁvoddhayeccittam Vikṣitam Samayet puṇḥ Sakaṣāyam Vijānīyāt sama grāptam na cālayet. (Gauḍapādiya āgama 3/44)

effect. If the cause is born, how can it be unborn and eternal? Thus he refutes the Parīṇama Vāda of the {Sāṅkhyists and the others. Those who advocate the origin of existence out of non-existence (Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas) cannot cite any example in support of their contention. If we admit the birth of the born, there is the fallacy of indefinite regress. So the conclusion is that the unborn appears as the born. The self is unborn, unmoved and unobjective. It is jñāna in perfect poise and non-dual.<sup>1</sup> The world is the false appearance or vivarta of this self. There are people who call the self non-existent (Buddhists) and this, according to Gauḍapāda is due to ignorance. The self is existence and it is bliss. One who knows the self attains the bliss of the self.

This is all about the Kārikā of Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad. We shall now discuss Gauḍapāda's annotation on 'uttara Gīta'. 'Uttara Gīta' contains three chapters. Lord Kṛṣṇa is the speaker and Arjuna is the listener there. In the first chapter, the distinction between yogārūḍha (one who has already been a yogin) and Āruruḥṣa (one who is desirous of being a yogin) has been clearly stated. In the second chapter, the identity between the Jīva and Brahman as the reflection (Pratibimba) and the original (bimba) respectively has been supported on a set of fresh arguments. Gauḍapāda was a believer in Pratibimba Vāda or The Reflection theory so far as the relation between the Jīva and Brahman is concerned. The third chapter of 'uttara Gīta' describes how a yogin surrenders himself to God as the last resort and abandons futile activities. The first chapter of 'uttara Gīta' contains 57 slokas, the second chapter 46 and the third one 16 and thus the total number of the slokas comes to 119.

#### CONCLUSION.

Gauḍapāda propagated Advaita philosophy with its necessary corollary Mayā Vāda. But this Mayā Vāda is never the replica of the Śūnya Vāda of the Buddhists. We have already discussed this point and this need not be repeated here once again.

From the historical point of view the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda and his annotation on 'uttara Gīta' are both authoritative. These two books are regarded as the earliest extant treatises on Advaita philosophy. Sāṅkara imbibed his main principles from the treatises of Gauḍapāda and the Post. Sāṅkarite Advaitins also quoted his views as authentic. This is why the importance and influence of Gauḍapāda and his works can hardly be exaggerated so far as the Advaita of India is concerned.

<sup>1</sup> Ajācalam Vastutvam Vijñānam Śāntam Iyayam.

## NYĀYA-MANJARI

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### THE DEFINITION OF A CHASTE-WORD IS PUZZLING

A dative case is that which is intended by means of a karma. The word 'karma' requires an explanation. Does it mean an action? Or, does it mean a case which is the most desired one? If the first meaning is accepted then as all cases are desired for the sake of an action, i.e., for its coming into being. So each of them should be taken as a dative case. In the sentence "A student gives honorarium to his teacher" the teacher should not be a case at all since he has got no action. He has been selected only as a recipient of a gift. He has got nothing to do with the verb 'to give'. He receives the gift. Therefore, he has an action to perform. But the act of receiving is distinct from that of giving. An object is the destination of an action. It is the goal towards which an action proceeds. Now, the defenders may hold that the word 'karma' stands for an objective case. Such an interpretation does not stand to reason since a noun or its equivalent does not become a case because of its relation to a case. The universally accepted view is this that a noun or its equivalent which is related to an action is a case. The etymological meaning of the word 'kāraṇa' is that what brings about an action is a kāraṇa (a case).

The best instrument by which an action is produced is 'kāraṇa' (an instrumental case). As the meaning of the nominal suffix 'tama' (i.e., the suffix indicative of the superlative degree) is hard to comprehend so the word 'sādhakatama', contained in the definition of an instrumental case, is inappropriate. An effect comes into being when all conditions without an exception assemble. But it does not come into being if anyone of them is absent. Such being the state of things which particular case shall we select as the best one in order to sprinkle waters from an auspicious pitcher? Now, the contenders may defend that the excellence of an instrumental case lies in its having intensive operation directed towards the production of the principal effect. Such an operation is shared by all cases. But it does not exclusively belong to fuels—an instance of instru-