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The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda

The question of the relation of the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* to the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* has been engaging the attention of the present writer ever since Mm. Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya raised a discussion over it.¹

The *Māṇḍūkya* is traditionally regarded as one of the ten major upaniṣads, and the kārikās of Gauḍapāda are supposed to be explanatory verses thereon. The *Muktikopaniṣad* names 108 upaniṣadas and holds that the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough to liberate a man.

There is a good deal of controversy over the extent of the *Māṇḍūkya*, which is set forth in Professor Bhattacharya's paper referred to above. While present-day Advaitins are unanimous that the twelve prose passages found interspersed in Gauḍapāda's work constitute the upaniṣad, most Vaiṣṇava commentators of it since the days of Madhvācārya have, on the other hand, held the kārikās of the first book also to have been a part of the upaniṣad, Puruṣottama, the grandson of the suddhādvaitin, Vallabhācārya, going further and holding the entire work of Gauḍapāda as a part of it. It has also been pointed out by Bhattacharya that all the four books of the kārikās have been severally held by others as distinct upaniṣads, while some latter-day advaitins have accepted the Vaiṣṇava view. Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma has pointed out² that kārikā I. 17 is referred to in *Sūta-saṃhitā*, IV. 55, as *Śruti*, and he has further attempted without success to prove that both

Śaṅkara and Sureśvara knew the kārikās of BK. I to have been a part of the upaniṣad. All that he has succeeded in proving is that a few of these kārikās have been mentioned as *Śruti* in Śaṅkarācārya Apocrypha like the 'Viṣṇusahasranāma' commentary, the 'Nṛsimhapūrvatāpaniya' commentary, and the 'Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.' Bhattacharya has pointed out that Śaṅkara, in his commentary on B.S., II. 1. 9, distinctly refers to kārikā I. 16 in the following terms:—*atrotam vedāntārthasampradāyavidbhīrācāryaiḥ*. It is also found that in his *Brahmasiddhi*, Śaṅkara's senior contemporary, Maṇḍanamīśra, quotes kārikā, I. 11, but does not mention it as *śruti*.³ Nor does Sureśvara refer to kārikās BK. I as such. He refers to them as 'āgama-mātram' or 'vedāntokti', but that is because the entire work of Gauḍapāda is described as the 'Āgama-śāstra' and the first book is particularly named the 'āgamaprakaraṇa.'

So there can be no doubt that Śaṅkara and his contemporary advaitins did not look upon the kārikās of BK. I as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. If the prose passages and the kārikās had been works of the same author, there is no reason why the prose passages should use the terms 'vaiśvānara' and 'turiya'; while the kārikās vary them as 'viśva' and 'turya'; nor should we expect in such a case a difference of opinion as between prose passage 9 and kārikā 19, BK. I. Madhva, however, anticipated these difficulties when he said that Varuṇa, in the shape of frog, saw the passages, while he introduced explanatory *mantras* in the shape of the verses which had been seen by Brahmā, the creator, a view which he supports by quotations from certain Purāṇas which, according to Bhattacharya, cannot be traced in the printed editions thereof. This practically amounts to an admission that the prose and the verse portions of BK. I are not works of the same author.

¹ 'The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda.' *IHQ.*, I, pp. 119-25, and 295-302.

² 'Some light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās.' 'Further light on Gauḍapāda Kārikās,' and 'Still further light on Gauḍapāda Kārikās'—in the *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, II, pp. 35 ff.; III, pp. 45 ff. and IV, pp. 174 ff.

³ *Brahmasiddhi*, ed. by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Śāstrī, p. 150.

Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the twelve prose passages are a later work than the kārikās of Gauḍapāda, and that probably it is a post-Śaṅkara work, since Śaṅkara is not found referring to them, even where one would expect him to do so, in this recognized commentaries. He is also of opinion⁴ that the author of the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya* and kārikās is not really Śaṅkara, but somebody else assuming that great man's name,—a view which it should be possible to accept in spite of tradition and the opinion of such a distinguished scholar as Mm. Prof. S. Kuppaswami Śāstrī to the contrary.

One may also readily accept Bhattacharya's view that the kārikās are by no means what they are supposed to be, namely, a sort of vārtika on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, since they have no characteristic of a vārtika which consists in discussing what is said, what is not said and what is badly said (*uktānukta-durukta-cintā vārtikam*—Rājaśekhara). The reasons set forth by Prof. Bhattacharya need not be repeated here.

But one cannot help joining issue with this erudite scholar when he insists that the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that is, the twelve prose passages, is a post-Śaṅkara or even a post-Gauḍapāda work. First, the tradition that the *Māṇḍūkya* is one of the ten major upaniṣads cannot be discarded without adequate reason. Secondly, Y. Subrahmaniya Sarma has pointed out⁵ that Sureśvara actually quotes from this upaniṣad and names it:—

एषो ऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवोऽप्ययौ ।

माण्डूकेय-श्रुति-वच इति स्पष्टम् अधीयते ॥

Thirdly, Māṇḍanamīśra, who like Sureśvara, was a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, quotes the Nṛsiṃhottaratāpaniṣa passage *ekam amṛtam ajam*, and the *Māṇḍūkya* words—*sarvajñah*, *sarveś-*

4 *Sir Ashutosh Silver Jubilee*, vol. III, pt. 2, pp. 101-110.

5 *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, IV, p. 220.

varah.⁶ Fourthly, Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, IV. 2. 3 and 4., leaves hardly any doubt in one's mind that he is referring therein to the *Māṇḍūkya*, though not expressly naming it. I refrain from quoting the relevant commentary *in extenso*, and hope that my readers will take the trouble of reading the commentary at first hand. Swami Mādhavānanda, in the excellent translation of Śaṅkara's commentary on this *Up.*, appears to have come across references to the *Māṇḍūkya* in the *bhāṣya* for he names this *Up.*, in the list of abbreviations, prefixed to his work, but I have unfortunately failed to trace the references. Then, again, in view of Sureśvara's quotation of the *Māṇḍūkya* passage containing the expression, *prabhavāpyayau*, it seems likely that Śaṅkara, too, had this passage in mind when he used the expression in his *B.S.*, I. 1. 9, commentary and not *Kaṭha*, II. 3. 11, as Bhattacharya contends, for the expression appears to have a somewhat different import in the latter context. Lastly, Bhattacharya has himself shown that the terms 'Vaiśvānara' and 'Turiya' are older than 'Viśva' and 'Turya' found in the kārikās, and also that the prose passages have a tinge of the language of the Brāhmaṇas. For all these reasons it would be legitimate to hold that the *Māṇḍūkya* is a pre-Śaṅkara and pre-Gauḍapāda work and that it would be wrong to reject the tradition that it is one of the ten major upaniṣads. Even Nāgārjuna might have borrowed the word 'prapañcopaśama' from it.

We shall now proceed to discuss the real problem before us, viz., what is the relation of the kārikās to the Upaniṣad. In agreement with Bhattacharya, I have already said that the kārikās of Gauḍapāda are not a vārtika on the *Māṇḍūkya*. What, then, is the relation between the two? To come to a finding on this point, it is necessary to examine first what it is that the kārikās aim at. Are they pure Vedānta as the orthodox commentators would have

6 *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 4, 127.

us believe? Most probably not. It stands to the credit of Poussin⁷ and Bhattacharya⁸ that they have been the first to tell us what the kārikās really aim at. The kārikās of the first BK. establish non-dualism of the Māṇḍūkya type, the second and the third BKs, have, to use Poussin's words, a *double entendre* or, in the language of Prof. Bhattacharya: they begin with the Vedānta and end with Buddhism, while the kārikās of the fourth BK. confine themselves to the exposition of Mahāyāna Buddhism, mainly of the Vijñānavāda but partly also of the Mādhyamika variety. Bhattacharya points out how, in this book, the terminology used is entirely Buddhistic, such upaniṣadic terms as 'ātman' and 'brahman' being discarded, how the word 'agrayāna' (which means 'Mahāyāna,') is used and how the author begins by saluting the Buddha and ends by telling us what the Buddha did not teach.⁹ Any one having a moderate acquaintance with Yogācāra and Mādhyamika literature, who goes through the kārikās dispassionately, will have little doubt left in his mind that the sole object of Gauḍapāda in writing this prakaraṇa work was to show, first, what Vedāntic non-dualism really stood for and, next, to make out that Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhism could be reconciled to it and placed on an upaniṣadic basis.

The question which now confronts us, and which should not be difficult to answer, is how the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* came to have a place at the head of the kārikās. Even in the case of an upaniṣad, we know that the *Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpaniya* quotes almost the

whole of the *Māṇḍūkya*. Now, Gauḍapāda, in order to show that his views had the support of the *Śruti* could do no better than to begin his prakaraṇa work of four Books with the quotation of the *Māṇḍūkya* passages. After quoting six prose passages, Gauḍapāda introduces some of his verses with the words, *Atraite ślokā bhavanti*; and the process continues till the entire Upaniṣad is exhausted. The introductory words do not mean, in this case at least, that the verses are older than the prose passages. Gauḍapāda evidently preferred the *Māṇḍūkya* to any other Upaniṣad because this very brief and unambiguous work was best calculated to support his own point of view, and he has distributed the prose passages just as they suited his purpose.

The commentator of the Upaniṣad and the Kārikās, whoever he might be, was, therefore, perfectly right when he said that this 'prakaraṇa' work of four Books began with the words "*Om ity etad akṣaram.*" But this does not certainly mean that the entire work is Gauḍapāda's in the sense that there is no such thing as a *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, as Dr. Venkatasubbiah contends.¹⁰ The entire work is Gauḍapāda's, but he has quoted the entire *Māṇḍūkya* in support of his thesis. This seems to be the right solution of the problem before us.

AMARNATH RAY

7 'Vedanta and Buddhism,' *J.R.A.S.*, 1910, pp. 129-40.

8 'The Gauḍapāda Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad,' *Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*, pp. 439 ff.

9 According to Poussin and Bhattacharya Kārikā 99, BK., IV, tells us what the Buddha did not teach. I am inclined to think however, that the Kārikā tells us what the Buddha taught; it repeats what has been said in the introductory Kārikā I, viz., that 'jñeya' is not different from 'jñāna'. This, however, does not affect the conclusions arrived at in this paper.

10 See his paper in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1933, pp. 181-193.

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
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INDEX

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Vol. XIII

1939



त म सो मा ज्यो ति र्ग भ य

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17, 20, 76-81; Macdonell, *Vedic Grammar*, 9, 11, 24, 27, 28. B. K. Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 21.]

It is plausible therefore to derive all the simple *IE* vowel phonemes and diphthongs (except, of course, \check{o} , \check{a} and their diphthongs) from the accented vowel phonemes *e* and \bar{e} , through the operation of ablaut. Scholars like Kuhn,¹ Scherer, Verner² and Meyer³ were not inclined to treat \check{o} and \check{a} as distinctive vowel phonemes in the proto Indo-European. Their view was that *e*, *o*, and *a* are phonemic variants of one macro-phoneme, to use the terminology of the modern linguisticians. The musical character of the *IE* accent, at an early period might have been the cause of the rise of the phonemic variants *e*, *o* and *a* of an *IE* simple vowel phoneme which must have been "of unstable, obscure or medium quality, which varied within sufficiently wide limits, and answered to *e*, *o*, or *a* according to the speaker's dialectal or individual peculiarity."⁴

(To be Continued).

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MĀṆḌŪKYA KĀRIKĀS.

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While preparing an annotated translation of Śeṣa's 'Paramārthasāra', my attention was drawn to some notable parallels between that work and the 'Māṇḍūkya-kārikās' of Gauḍapāda. The former work is ascribed to Patañjali, as an incarnation of Ādiśeṣa; it is in some places referred to as Pātañjala-smṛti; Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his 'Laghu-mañjūṣā' accepts the ascription and is at pains to reconcile the Sāṅkhya-Yoga realism of the Yoga philosopher and the sad-asat-khyāti of the grammarian with the advaita doctrine propounded in the 'Paramārthasāra'. If there is any value in the ascription (which it is difficult to dismiss lightly), it seems permissible to look to this Patañjali as in part at least the inspirer of Gauḍapāda.

I

The resemblances may be briefly noticed. Both works are largely concerned with the three avasthās and their presiding sentiencies, viśva, taijasa and prājña; these veil the fourth, which is the real.¹ That mātā is a śakti or vibhūti or svabhāva of the Lord (deva) is a conception characteristic of the earliest advaita; this is found in both works.² Both advocate the view that the Lord appears to delude himself as it were.³ Both declare clearly that in truth there is neither origination nor destruction, neither bondage nor release.⁴ The jīvanmukta is described by both authors as living according to his own sweet will, without obligations and in such wise as to be comparable to an inert being (jaḍavat).⁵ Advaita, say both these authors, has no conflict with any other school of thought, though these latter

1. Kuhn, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, Vol. XV, 402 ff.

2. Verner, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, Vol. XXIII, 123 ff.

3. Meyer, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, Vol. XXIV, 226.

4. B. K. Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

1. *PS*, v. 31; *MK*, I, 1 and 11.

2. *PS*, vv. 30, 32, 33, 56; *MK*, I, 9, 11 and 12.

3. *PS*, v. 32; *MK*, II, 19.

4. *PS*, v. 69; *MK*, II, 32.

5. *PS*, v. 71, 78; *MK*, II, 36, 37.

may conflict among themselves.¹ Less significant points of agreement are the extensive use of analogies like shell-silver and rope-snake. But the ether analogy employed by both calls for some attention. Real unity and apparent multiplicity are explained by the advaitin with the help of the illustration of ākāśa, which though really one and infinite appears to be delimited and many because of adjuncts. Sukha-duḥkha-vyavasthā among various jīvas is made intelligible by this analogy; for in spite of the unity of the ether, the defilement of one pot-ether by smoke etc., does not import defilement of other pot-ethers or of ether at large. The explanation is necessary and has point when a plurality of jīvas is admitted or the position in regard to this question is not clearly defined; this is the case in the 'Paramārthasāra'. Gauḍapāda adopts the analogy and the explanation of the vyavasthā,² but appears to be more definite in rejecting a plurality of jīvas. Thus while Śeṣa has no hesitation in accepting the mṛd, loha and visphuliṅga analogies of Śruti in respect of the relation between Paramātmā and the jīvas, Gauḍapāda dismisses them all as not teaching difference, their purport being but the introduction of the doctrine of non-difference³. This is significant when taken in conjunction with the view noted earlier that it is the Lord himself who appears to be bound by māyā and appears to be released through vidyā, a view consistent with eka-jīva-vāda, more than with nānā-jīva-vāda. It seems plausible to conclude that the rejection of plurality which was less definite in the work of Paṭaṅjali was made more definite by Gauḍapāda, without at the same time eschewing the upapatti suggested by the ether-analogy. A textual consideration may be taken to add slightly to the plausibility. The example of clay in relation to its products comes from the 'Chāndogya'⁴; the analogy of sparks from fire is found in the 'Bṛhadāraṇyaka' and the 'Muṇḍaka'; the two are referred to in two consecutive verses of the 'Paramārthasāra' (vv. 46, 47). When we find these taken together and jointly refuted in a single verse by Gauḍapāda, it seems not implausible to hold that the latter had Śeṣa's work in mind, not merely the text from two (or three) independent Śrutis.

1. *PS*, v. 65; *MK*, III, 17; *IV*, 5.

2. *PS*, v. 36; *MK*, III, 5.

3. *MK*, III, 15; cp. *PS*, vv. 46, 47.

4. Also the analogy of iron (as exemplified in a pair of nail scissors) and its products.

II

When we turn to the fourth prakaraṇa of the 'Māṇḍūkya-kārikās' we find that it is nearly as long as the first three put together (100 verses as against 108), that it repeats many of the ideas and the words of the earlier prakaraṇas¹, and is reminiscent of Bauddha terms and ideas. The last-mentioned feature is so marked that it has led (misled?) scholars like Das Gupta to the view that Gauḍapāda "was possibly himself a Buddhist."² It may be difficult to maintain the view that the invocation³ at the commencement of the alātaśānti-prakaraṇa is to the Buddha, though this has been stated and re-stated by scholars of weight like Prof. MM. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya;⁴ for, the words "naitad buddhena bhāṣitam" in the penultimate verse seem clearly to distinguish Gauḍapāda's doctrine from that of the Buddha; and this is by no means consistent with addressing an invocation to the Buddha. "But where is the necessity", it may be asked, "for bringing in the Buddha at all?" It is because Bauddha concepts are used in the prakaraṇa and an approach made to advaita through the channel of Buddhism. Prof. Bhattacharya has (in the article mentioned) referred to the use of the term 'dharma', the comparison of it to ākāśa and so on. The Buddhist view of dharma as constitutive of the world, without importing a dharmin, is a characteristic doctrine of great significance; it corresponds in a measure to the Sāṅkhya view of guṇas as constituent

1. Cp. IV, 6-8 and III, 20-22; IV, 31-32 and II, 6-7; IV, 61-62 and III, 29-30; IV, 71 and III, 48.

2. *HIP*, p. 423.

3. A curious point about this invocation is that though commencing a prakaraṇa, it occurs in the middle of the whole work, which contains no invocation at the beginning or end. The bhāṣyakāra has no explanation to offer; but Ānandagiri says that the praṇava occurring at the beginning serves as an invocation; so too does the obeisance in the final verse to that supreme state difficult to discern, free from multiplicity etc.; an invocation being required to the middle too, to conform to śiṣṭācāra, it is supplied here. The explanation is ingenious, but hardly serves to remove the impression that the fourth prakaraṇa with self-contained invocations at the beginning and end, and many verses repeating ideas and words from the other prakaraṇas, was an after-thought, if not an independent work.

4. See *Journal of the Benares Hindu University*, I, pp. 3-13.

of prakṛti, not as qualifying it.¹ It is possible that the two views developed independently without borrowing. However that may be, their value is unquestionable for the advaitin in dissolving the naive belief in a world of hard substrate-entities possessing qualities; once the substrates go, the qualities are naturally realised to be evanescent. An early advaita teacher, as Gauḍapāda undoubtedly was, might be expected to show to his disciples the culmination of both Sāṅkhya realism and Bauddha idealism in the non-dualism of the Vedānta. To this end he would make large use of the terminology of these alien systems. In the case of the Sāṅkhya, it is here suggested, the work was already done for him in part; the 'Paramārthasāra' had presented a nondualist doctrine making use of Sāṅkhya terms and concepts; all that was needed was to add a critique of the causal concept; this Gauḍapāda did, and gave us the first three prakaraṇas; then he started from the idealist view-point of the Bauddhas and reached the same conclusion; that is why the fourth prakaraṇa is nearly as long as the other three. Thus, Gauḍapāda, the earliest known systematic formulator of advaita, may, in this work, be said to have developed his doctrine, like a wise teacher, by basing himself on earlier current realism and idealism and dialectically developing his own view. The hypothesis suggested is not inherently improbable, though it is highly problematical. If adopted, however, it will be seen to have the merit of explaining one or two knotty problems in advaita.

III

One such problem relates to jīvan-mukti and videha-mukti. For the realist, who believes that matter is never destroyed, but only reduced to a subtle, causal condition, release necessarily involves the destruction at least of the body, *i.e.*, its reduction to the causal state; for, however much one may learn to discriminate

1. See Th. Stcherbatsky on 'The Dharmas of the Buddhist and the Guṇas of the Sāṅkhyas', *Indian Historical Quarterly* X, iv, 737-60. Stcherbatsky's own view is that Buddhist relativism derives from Sāṅkhya realism, much as, we may say, Hume's scepticism derives from Berkeley's idealism. If such a view is correct, one may well understand the advaitin re-acting against Sāṅkhya realism and at the same time distinguishing his own from the parallel re-action of the Bauddha, in the words "nai 'tad buddhena bhāṣitam".

the self from the not-self, so long as the latter is there in a particularised form, there is a possibility of confusion; and in any case, if release has been achieved, the cause of the particularised evolute ceases to be; and with that the effect must be merged in the cause. The cause of release is discrimination alone, nothing else; it is possible that this may come on even while the body persists by momentum, like the whirling of a potter's wheel; but its effect is not complete until the body ceases to be; for the non-merger of the body would be a clear indication of the persistence of the cause of evolution, which is also the cause of bondage. The need for videha-mukti is thus clear on Sāṅkhya bases. But it is not so for the advaitin. Once dehābhimāna is lost, there is no reason why he should not be considered fully and finally free. Not for him as for the Sāṅkhya is prakṛti real out there beyond the self; with discrimination it should have been realised not only never to have bound spirit, but never to have been real. For such a person, what is to be reduced and to what? Whence the need for videha-mukti? Is it not legitimate to argue that there is only one mukti for the advaitin, that it is what is called jīvan-mukti, and that videha-mukti is a cumbersome heritage from an alien system, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga?

A similar case of *haereditas damnosa* would seem to be the notion of *asat*. Latter-day advaita wearisomely repeats the argument "the *asat* cannot be cognised (*asac cen na pratīyeta*)"; but there is the difficulty, how, of the unreal, even non-cognisability can be known. The advaitin has to narrow down his predicate to immediate cognition; the unreal cannot be *perceived*. Even thus the proposition is difficult to defend. What is the perceptible? The smoke on the hill is perceptible, but not the fire (unless one goes up the hill); what is without the body is perceptible, not what is within (except to Yogic experience, or when one's body is cut up under a local anaesthetic); one's actions are perceptible, not one's *punya* or *pāpa* (except to God); in all such cases, the exclusion of perceptibility is within the real (*sat*) and is with limitations; the negation is not absolute, but subjective. And theistic systems postulate at least one being, *Īśvara*, to whom everything is immediate. Is the unreal immediate to *Īśvara*? Obviously not. Nor in our experience is it related to the immediately presentable in any manner analogous to the others which we class as *parokṣa*. The unreal is what is wholly other; its very mention is a contradic-

tion; and any predication of it, that it is parokṣa or aparokṣa, is a greater contradiction still. This is not the place to give a detailed exposition of advaita; but it can be expounded without the use of this category which is a nest of contradictions. Is it illegitimate to assume that it was inherited from the Bauddhas, partly by assimilation (as in the inferences as to the world not being sat or asat or sadasat) and partly by negative reaction (as against the doctrine of asat-khyāti)? If the derivations suggested are not implausible, the suggestion that Gauḍapāda in the 'Kārikās' was blending realism and nihilism into idealist Vedānta will gain some credit.

IV

It has been said with some justification that the commentator on the 'Kārikās' cannot be properly identified with the great bhāṣyakāra, Śaṅkara.¹ An argument of some weight in this connection is the commentator's failure to do justice to Bauddha terms like 'dharma' occurring in the 'Kārikās'. Special notice may be drawn for instance to the commentary on IV, 53: "dravyam dravyasya hetuḥ syād anyad anyasya cai 'va hi| dravyatvam anyabhāvo vā dharmāṇām no 'papadyate||". As it stands, the verse need mean no more than this: Substance can be the cause of substance, e.g., threads of cloth; the non-substance too may be the cause of non-substance, e.g., the colour of threads in respect of the colour of the cloth; but the world we hold is constituted of dharmas without a dharmin; they are therefore neither substance nor non-substance (as understood by the Logician realists); how can the causal category apply to these dharmas? To any one familiar with the Bauddha-prakriyā, this would seem the natural and normal explanation. But the commentator goes off at a tangent; he says that of any one substance *another* substance may be the cause, not itself; no non-substance is seen to be independent cause, as even an asamavāyi-kāraṇa can function only through a samavāyi-kāraṇa; neither substance-ness nor otherness is intelligible in the case of selves (dharmas); hence the self is neither cause nor effect. The self is not substance, it is said by Ānandagiri, because it is nirguṇa and substance is that which possesses guṇa; nor is it other, since as the one reality

1. See Amarnath Ray on 'The Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London, VIII, i, 107-111.

it is the nature of all. Assuming that the explanation is not wholly implausible, it seems to go far from the words of the Kārikā and strain the word 'anya' to say nothing of 'dharma'. In the context anyatva would naturally mean not reciprocal difference as of substances, but a nature other than substance-ness. And the opening words of Ānandagiri's ṭikā would seem to imply this; thus he says: "avayava-dravyam avayavidravyasyo 'pādānam; avayava-guṇāś cā 'vayavi-guṇeṣu samāna-jātiyeṣv asamavāyino drṣṭāḥ". But later he exhibits fidelity to his immediate original, the bhāṣya. Here and elsewhere the ṭikākāra's ingenuity commands greater respect than the bhāṣyakāra's. And for what is there the claim of nirguṇatva and ananyatva? For dharmas (dharmāṇām) in the plural. Even if by a metaphysical feat we could conceive of a quality-less plurality, the acceptance of their ananyatva is an impossible achievement. Is this the bhāṣya of the renowned advaitin, Śaṅkara?

IV

The commentary on III, 14 offers a real difficulty.¹ It says that whatever difference is declared by Śruti between the jīva and the Paramātmā is figurative, bhaviṣyad-vṛttī; such declarations cannot be taken in their literal sense. The first difficulty is offered by the word 'utpatti' in the first line 'prāg

1. III, 13 presents a curious problem; it refers to the unanimous Śruti praise-of non-difference between jīva and the Supreme, and the condemnation of difference, and says "tad evam hi samāñ-jasam" presumably meaning that such praise and blame are intelligible in the light of the reasoning already set forth. There is an alternative reading 'eva' for 'evam' but it does not make much sense; Ānandagiri is cognisant of the reading 'evam', explaining it thus: "dvaitasyā 'śāstrīyatvam advaitasyai'va tattātparyagam-yatvam ity aṅgikāre sati". Curiously enough, the bhāṣyakāra gives no explanation of 'evam', but writes so as to suggest that he adopted the 'eva' reading: "tad evam (alternative reading is 'eva') hi samāñjasam rjvabodham nyāyām ity arthaḥ; yās tu tārīka-parikalpitāḥ kuḍṣṭayaḥ tā anrjvyo 'nirūpyamāṇā na ghaṭanām prāñcati 'ty abhiprāyaḥ"; the exclusion in the second sentence is consistent only with the reading 'eva' in the first; but it is in commenting on that sentence (not the Kārikā) that Ānandagiri reads 'evam'. That there is some confusion between the ṭikākāra and the bhāṣyakāra is evident; but the point needs not to be laboured, since it is largely a matter of readings.

utpatteḥ'. This would mean 'prior to origination' or 'before creation'. We do not know of Scriptural declarations of difference prior to creation. The commentator refers to difference as taught in the karmakāṇḍa, but does not make it clear how he arrives at the reference. Here again Ānandagiri comes to the rescue (of the reader) explaining utpatti as vyutpatti, perfect knowledge such as is given by the Vedānta alone. What precedes it is the karmakāṇḍa; the difference declared therein is figurative. But why bhaviṣyad-vṛtṭyā? The example usually given and adduced here by the bhāṣyakāra is 'odanam pacati (he cooks food) where only rice-grains are undergoing the process of cooking; these are referred to as 'food' because they will become food. Is difference similarly taught, because difference will come to be? Is it not the entire purport of the Vedānta on the contrary that what will be realised is non-difference? If any figurative predication is to be made bhaviṣyad-vṛtṭyā, should it not be abhedā rather than bheda? In the bhāṣyakāra's own words what is desired to be declared (pratipādayiṣitam) is but the oneness (ekatvam) of the jīva and the Paramātmā; the bhaviṣyad-vṛtṭi refers to this ekatva (upaniṣatsv ekatvam śrutyā pratipādayiṣitam bhaviṣyati 'ti). In the light of this non-difference which is going to be or going to be declared, it would be intelligible to use terms signifying non-difference even in the present stage of difference; this would correspond to the usage in the example 'odanam pacati'. What happens, however, is the opposite, *viz.*, the teaching of difference; how can this be a case of bhaviṣyad-vṛtṭi? The bhāṣya gives no explanation; but it contains a suggestion which is ingeniously if not convincingly worked up by Ānandagiri. Śruti can have for purport only what is novel and is a human goal. Difference is not novel being repetitive of what is found in ordinary experience; nor is it a desirable human end. If it appears to be taught by Śruti, then it should be taken not literally, but figuratively in the light of, and as leading up to, the non-difference which in the Vedānta part of Śruti will be seen to be the real purport. This is plausible, but by no means clear in the bhāṣya, which says "bhāvinīm ekavṛttim āśritya" not "ekavṛttes tātparyatvam āśritya"; Ānandagiri's *ṭīkā* appears to extricate from a tangle rather than explicate what is implicit. And the bhāṣya of Śaṅkara is, for all its depth (gāmbhīrya), always clear (prasanna), never requiring to be helped out in this way.

VI

Some of the statements in the bhāṣya seem to be casual and unjustifiable. The Upaniṣad by identifying the praṇava with Brahman would seem to favour a view like the grammarians' *advaita*. This, of course, is not acceptable to Śaṅkara, who, as we know, rejects *sphoṭa*. In apparent consistency with this rejection, the Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya says "The purpose of the knowledge of the unity (of the name and the thing signified by it) is to simultaneously *remove*, by a single effort (the illusion of) *both the name and the thing* and establish (the nature of) *Brahman which is other than both*."¹ Yet when the highest, the *turiya*, is identified with *Omkāra* in its unquartered totality, the bhāṣya gives us no light as to whether this 'name and thing' are to be removed or whether we should rest at the level of that identification, as the Upaniṣad seems to intend.² It may be thought that even at this *turiya* stage the duality of the name and the named is transcended; for, we are told in *MU*, XII that this fourth is *amātra* and *avyavahārya*; and the bhāṣya in explaining the latter says it is because "speech and mind which correspond to the name and the object disappear or cease".³ Presumably the *mātra*-less *praṇava* is identical with Brahman, the Supreme real. This is intelligible. But why then does the commentator say earlier (in the context already noted), that "as a thing is known through its name, so the highest Brahman is known through *Aum* alone" and "because *Aum* is the means to the knowledge of Brahman on account of its having the closest proximity to Brahman".⁴ The *praṇava* either is Brahman or is the name of Brahman; either position is intelligible, but not the bhāṣyakāra's vacillation between the two.

Again, in introducing the commentary on the third *prakaraṇa*, it is said "Now it is asked whether non-duality can be established only by Scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well?"⁵ Presumably in the bhāṣyakāra's view this chapter is given to a dialectical establishment of *advaita*;

1. Commentary on *MU*, I; the English translation is Nikhilānanda's; the italics are mine.

2. See bhāṣya on *MK*, I, 25-29.

3. *Nikhilānanda*, p. 89.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

yet we find a not inconsiderable part of it dealing with the purport of Śruti texts; such for instance are verses 13 and 14, the commentary on which we had to consider just now. What is the special propriety of this introductory remark, which has led some,¹ through an illegitimate assumption, to the legitimate conclusion that advaita is not theology but philosophy? Such casualness may be expected of a minor commentator, not of the great Śaṅkara.

VI

The relation of the commentator to Gauḍapāda is by no means well settled. The expression paramaguru in the penultimate verse need mean no more than "supreme teacher (of advaita)" especially when taken together with the superlative praise given to him as the person who "rescued this nectar (of advaita) from the innermost depths of the ocean of the Vedas by churning it with the (churning) rod of his illumined reason".² It has been suggested³ that a number of other advaita teachers may have intervened between Gauḍapāda and the bhāṣyakāra. In what is undoubtedly Śaṅkara's work, the references to Gauḍapāda are as remote as they are reverential, e.g., 'sampradāyavit'⁴. In any case Das Gupta's suggestion that Gauḍapāda was alive and perhaps taught his own bhāṣyakāra is an unfortunate mistake due to taking the last verse to be an obeisance addressed to Gauḍapāda. As Ānandagiri points out, it is an obeisance by the bhāṣyakāra, offered to his own guru, since devotion to him is the proximate cause of the attainment of knowledge (svagurubhakter vidyāprāptāv antaraṅgatvam aṅgikṛtya tadya pādasarasīruha-yugalam praṇamati). There is no mention of any name either in the last or the penultimate verse; but upapatti as well as usage sanction the interpretation given by Ānandagiri. It is not uncommon to offer obeisance to the writer of the work commented on and then to one's own guru; and the relation between these latter need not be that of immediate master and disciple. In any case there is no room for the

1. Like Mr. V. Subrahmaṇya Iyer of Mysore, and some others.

2. *Nikhilānanda*, pp. 360-361.

3. By Amarnath Ray, *loc. cit.*

4. See *Sūtrabhāṣya*, I, iv, 14-15; II, i, 9.

fantastic assumption that the bhāṣyakāra "also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gauḍapāda."¹

VIII

No reference has been made here to the vexed problem of whether the Āgama-prakaraṇa is Gauḍapāda's work or part of the Upaniṣad. It has been suggested that all four prakaraṇas are part of a more extensive Āgama-śāstra now lost.² And the thesis that Madhva was right in treating the Āgama-prakaraṇa as Upaniṣad has been re-affirmed³ of late with much force and some ability. It is difficult to account for the reference to it as Śruti by some admittedly competent Advaita writers.⁴ Even apart from these ancient questions, there are enough of other problems in the Kārikās and the bhāṣya, claiming investigation and fresh consideration from scholars. This paper, it is hoped, will serve some purpose by drawing attention to a few of these, though doing nothing to solve them.

1. *HIP*, p. 423.

2. By Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah, in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, December, 1935.

3. By Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.

4. E. g. Raṅgarāja, Appayya's father, in the *Advaitavidyā-mukura*. See article under this name, *J.O.R.M.*, IX, p. 281, n.

same thing]. Thus the mere presence of *Constancy* in *Non-constancy* does not constitute an effective objection against us.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In fact, what appears (and is regarded) as the 'modification of Letters' is not that one Letter becomes transformed into another, or that one Letter (as product) is produced out of the other (as the constituent cause); what it really is, is shown in the following *Sūtra*—

Sūtras 57

What appears as the 'modification of Letters' involves a change in (one or the other of) the following forms—(a) the coming in of fresh properties, (b) suppression, (c) diminution, (d) increase, (e) curtailment and (f) coalescence.—

BHĀṢYA

What is actually meant by 'the modification of Letters' is that, there is substitution of another cognate letter,—i.e., one cognate letter is used on the cessation of the use of another; and this substitution is in diverse forms ;—(a) in some cases there is *coming in of fresh properties*; e.g., when the low accent takes the place of the high-pitched accent ;—(b) in some there is *suppression*; e.g., when one form being dropped, another comes in its place ;—(c) in certain cases there is *diminution*; e.g., when the short vowel takes the place of the long one ;—(d) in others there is *increase*; e.g., when the long vowel takes the place of the short one, or the prolated vowel takes the place of the long and short one ;—(e) in certain cases there is *curtailment*; i.e., 'stah' (a single syllable) takes the place of 'asti' (two syllables);—(f) in other cases there is *coalescence*; e.g., when there is an augment, either in the base or in the affix. These are the changes that are spoken of as 'modifications'; and these are only *substitutions*. If this is what is meant by 'modification,' then we admit the statement that 'Letters undergo modifications.'

* What is impossible is the co-subsistence of both, Constancy and Non-constancy, in any one thing, and not the subsistence of Constancy in Non-constancy. And this latter fact does not shake our position; as the mere fact of there being Constancy in Non-constancy does not imply that there is constancy as regards the *Original* and *Modification*. It is admitted that there is non-constancy in regard to this; and if the Constancy of this Non-constancy were to imply Constancy as regards the *Original* and *Modification*, then it would mean that in regard to this latter there are both Constancy and Non-constancy, which however is impossible.

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GAUDAPĀDA'S ASPARŚAYOGA

AND

ŚĀṆKARA'S JÑĀNAVĀDA

(P. C. Divanji)

Introductory Remarks :

The Kārikās of Gaudapāda is a well-known pre-Śāṅkara work on the Advaita philosophy. The most famous and perhaps the only known earliest Bhāṣya on it is that of the first Śāṅkarācārya whom tradition calls his grand-pupil through Gowindapāda. The doctrine expounded therein is that consisting of a positive assertion of the existence of the Para (absolute) Brahma and a negative denial of the separate existence of an individual soul and the group of objects collectively called the universe, which is succinctly called Ajātivāda. Strictly speaking there could be no room in such a doctrine for any kind of Yoga. Nevertheless the author of this work has made room for one called Asparśayoga in G. K. III. 39 and IV. 2 and has laid down the *modus operandi* thereof in chapter III by taking note of the fact that though not existing from a strictly philosophical view-point human beings are in fact conscious of the separate existence of their self and of the objects around them, by explaining that this consciousness is due to ignorance or error which again is the result of an illusion, and by opining that it would cease to arise if the particular kind of Yoga named as above is practised. The object of this paper is to ascertain what is the meaning of that technical term, whether it designates an unknown species of Yoga or merely expresses a familiar one by a strange nomenclature and whether Śāṅkara who is commonly believed to be an exponent of the pure Jñānavāda does or does not admit the necessity of the practice of any Yoga for the realisation of the true nature of the Self.

(I) The compound 'Asparśayoga'

2. The principal term in the compound 'Asparaśayoga' is 'Yoga'. This is an abstract noun formed by the addition of the *kṛt* termination 'ghañ' (A) to the root 'yuj' meaning 'to join'. Its etymological meaning therefore is 'the process of joining together' any two things either objectively or subjectively. In that sense it is found widely used in the Saṅskṛt literature and in the Modern Indian literature allied to it, on almost all the subjects of human interest including philosophy. Over and besides that, it has, however, a secondary and specialized sense in Indian philosophy and that is 'a process by which it is sought to restore the individual soul to its original state'. There is a wide divergence of opinion amongst the Indian philosophers as to the true nature or original state of the individual soul and as to the particular process which should be resorted to for the attainment thereof. But all, even the philosophers of the Non-Vedic schools called the heterodox schools, except the Cārvākas, are agreed on one point and that is that the individual soul is distinct from the physical body, that it existed before the body came into existence, and that it will continue to exist somewhere in some form even after this body become lifeless, so long at least as individual consciousness persists, which according to some is a permanent feature and according to others a transitory one and since even those of the former class look upon the embodiment of the soul as a source of misery all Indian philosophers, except the Cārvākas, are agreed that the possibility of its being embodied should be avoided and that that can be done by resorting to some special effort, which may be of the nature of Jñāna (knowledge), Upāsana (propitiation of the Supreme Being) or Karma (action), all of which fall under the general category of 'Yoga' and are distinguished from one another by prefixing a distinctive term to it.

3. This three-fold classification seems to have come into existence at a late stage in the development of the Indian philosophical thought. Till then the term 'Yoga' seems to have been used rather indiscriminately in several senses. Thus for instance in the Muṇḍaka and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads the compound words Sannyāsa-yoga, Dhyāna-yoga and Sāṁkhya-

yoga emphasize a particular means recommended for adoption by an aspirant while in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad the compound word Adhyātma-yoga leads to the inference that it emphasises the goal to be reached namely the self i.e. the realization of the true nature of the self. In the Bhagawadgītā too, which is called a Yoga-śāstra, the term 'Yoga' has been used in the colophons to its several Adhyāyas in the compound words Arjunaviśāda-yoga, Sāṁkhya-yoga, Karma-yoga etc., in the sense of "an exposition of" but in the several other such words which occur in the body of the work such as Buddhi-yoga, Jñāna-yoga, Karma-yoga etc., there seems to be an emphasis on the particular means to be adopted as in the terms "Sannyāsa-yoga, Dhyāna yoga and Sāṁkhya-yoga" of the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, an interesting point for investigation in what sense the term 'Asparśa-Yoga' which occurs in G. K. III. 39 and IV. 2 must have been used by the author. I therefore proceed to make it.

(II) Meaning of that Compound

4. The said Kārikās run as follows:—

Asparśa-yogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ |
Yogino bibhayati hyasmādabhaye bhayadarśinaḥ || (III. 39)
Asparśa-yogo vai nāma sarva sattavasukho hitaḥ |
Avivādo' viruddhaśca deśitastam namāmyaham || (IV. 2).

Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on the first of them says:—"Although the Paramātmata is such it is verily Asparśayoga, so called because it is devoid of all touch known as Sambandha (connection). This is well-known in the Upaniṣads." It might, at first sight, appear from this as if he meant that Asparśayoga was verily a synonym of Brahma, the highest spiritual essence of the universe. A reference to his Bhāṣya on G. K. IV. 2 however shows that this is not what he meant. He there says, "Now follows an obeisance to the Advaitadarśana-yoga. (Therein) 'Sparśanam' means 'Sparśaḥ' or "Sambandhaḥ". That Yoga which has it not with anything else at any time is 'Asparśa-yoga'. This (i.e. asparśa) is the very nature of Brahma. (The indeclinables) 'Vai' and 'Nāma' indicate that this Asparśa-yoga is well-known amongst the knowers of Brahma. This is the meaning (of the compound 'Asparśayoga')." From this it is perfectly clear that he understands the term 'Yoga' in the com-

pound 'Asparśayoga' in the sense of 'a process by which the individual soul (Jīva) is joined to the Supreme soul (Brahma) and that the first member 'Asparśa' determines the meaning of the compound as a whole by emphasizing its special characteristic or principal feature which is the elimination of all kind of touch or connection. It is also further clear that he calls Brahma itself 'Asparśayoga' because 'Asparśa' is the very nature of Brahma and that the identification of this specific Yoga with Brahma does not result directly from the combination of the two words but by a further process of the identification of an attribute and the thing which possesses it (Guṇaguṇinorabhedah). We, therefore, conclude that Śaṅkara understood this to be a particular kind of Yoga for the restoration of the Jīva to its original state in which it was unaffected by anything at any time.

5. This is further made clear by Ānandagiri in his gloss on the portion of the Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39. He says while explaining what Śaṅkara means by saying "*Asparśayogo nāmāyām* etc.:—"(He) now explains that realisation of the essence of which a repose in one's own nature is said to be the fruit by making the statement 'Asparśeti'. The realisation of the non-dual is Asparśa because by virtue thereof no touch takes place therein of Dharmas such as those of the Varṇas and the Āśramas and of impurities such as those of sins etc." and while explaining the terms 'Nāma' and 'Vai' he cites the Upaniṣad text "Na lipyate karmaṇā pāpakena" and others of that class. It is thus clear beyond doubt that the term "Asparśayoga" means the Yoga that is the realisation of the essence or the non-dual whose fruit is repose in one's own nature and whose special characteristic is Asparśa, a complete absence of touch of or connection with any merit or demerit.

(III) What is that Yoga ?

6. This does not, however, explain what that consists of *i. e. to say* what is its *modus operandi*, the nature of the process which leads to that result. For this we must examine the context in which G. K. III. 39 occurs. Thus by the first 30 Kārikās of that chapter the author refutes the Dvaita view and establishes the Advaita one. Then in the 31st he says that our experience in the waking state is: of the same nature as that

in the dreaming state and that since the latter is admittedly a purely imaginative subjective creation the former also is such *i. e. to say*, that the appearance of all the apparently diverse objects of both the animate and inanimate classes, is the result of our own imagination and that just as the dream-phenomena ceases to trouble us when our mind is brought under the control of our will-power in the waking state, so too the world-phenomena appearing in the waking state would cease to trouble us when the mind attains to the state of unmindness (Amanibhāva) *i. e. to say*, when it is effectually restrained from running its own natural course. Then in Kārikās 32 to 34 he explains how by a gradual process of the realisation of the true nature of the self such restraint is secured. But as the mind ceases to wander about even while we are in a state of dreamless sleep he explains the difference between that state which is well-known to every human being by self-experience and the fourth which it is his aim to make known by his work, by setting forth in bold relief in Kārikās III. 35 to 38, the distinguishing characteristics of the latter. It is thereafter in the 39th Kārikā above-quoted that he says that this is known as 'Asparśa-yoga'. It is clear from this that this author has given that specific name to the actual cessation of the aberrations of the mind and its repose in a state of equilibrium following upon the knowledge of the true nature of the self, which is a state of the individual soul quite distinct from the three daily experienced states and therefore called the fourth and that consequently "Asparśayoga" is a specific kind of yoga involving a definite course of mental exercises, that the knowledge of the true nature of the self derived from the scriptures or a Guru is in his view a means to that end and that the actual experience or realisation thereof its fruit. This inference drawn from the context with the aid of the commentaries is strengthened by the fact that in that Kārikā there is not the word 'Ayam' which would indicate that the author intended to equate 'Asparśa' with Yoga *i. e. to say*, the characteristic with the thing the fruit with the process by which it is acquired. Śaṅkara seems to have taken that word as understood when he says *Yadyapīdamitthaṁ paramātmataṭtvam asparśa ogo nāmāyām* while commenting on this Kārikā and when he further introduces

the second Kārikā of the fourth chapter by the words *Adhunā advaitadarśanayogasya namaskārastutaye* etc. he seems to imply that it is the realisation of the non-dual essence itself which was intended to be called "Asparśayoga". As a matter of fact it is not so, for he has further made it clear that what he explains as Asparśayoga is not the fact of realisation of the non-dual essence but the process by which that realisation takes place because the principal characteristic of that process is that as the result of it the soul remains untouched by anything at any time. Hence he must be deemed to have used the word 'ayam' in the Bhāṣya on the first Kārikā above-quoted in the sense of 'in this' or 'here', not in that of 'this' and to have used the compound word 'Advaitadarśana-yoga' in the Bhāṣya on the second in the sense of 'the Yoga which leads to the realisation of the non-dual essence' and the reason for doing so seems to be to establish a connection between the subject-matter of this Kārikā and that of the preceding ones.

7. Even if we take into consideration the nine Kārikās which follow no. 39 in the third chapter, the same conclusion seems to follow. Thus in the 40th he says that the state of fearlessness of a Jivanmukta is dependent upon a control of the mind, in the 41st to 44th he gives a measure of the patience required in acquiring that control and draws attention to the pitfalls on the way, in the 45th he cautions the aspirant against being attached to the happiness which is experienced when the mind begins to acquire a balanced state and advises him to proceed to acquire a state of perfect equilibrium in which it remains completely steady like a lamp in a place where there is no breeze and says that Brahma is said to have been realised on the attainment of such steadiness, in the 47th he cites an opinion in support of that view and in the 48th winds up the exposition by saying that no soul is ever born because there is no reason which can be assigned for its individuality and that therefore the highest truth is that Brahma in which nothing is produced and in which no Vṛtti whatever arises. The reason for thus winding up the exposition is to warn aspirants against being led to believe that individual souls are produced from Brahma and return to its state by the remedy above-mentioned,

because such a belief is inconsistent with the Ajātivāda which the author has expounded in the previous chapters and which he has made perfectly intelligible by arguments and illustrations in the further chapter named "Alāta-śānti". This does not, however, exclude the possibility of Yoga practice. It only reduces it to the same kind of effort as is made in achieving any object outside the scope of philosophy and has therefore as much reality for the purpose of intercourse as the latter. Thus it is perfectly clear from Kārikās 40 to 46 also that the term 'Asparśayoga' has been used by the author not in the sense of a realisation of non-duality itself but in that of a specific kind of Upāsana or mental exercise and that its peculiarity consists in making the mental arena clear of all objective and subjective ideas.

(IV) Is that a new species of Yoga ?

8. The next question for consideration is whether this Asparśayoga is a new species of Yoga or it is one already known but named differently by Gauḍapāda. As to that he himself has not incorporated any Śruti texts in his Kārikās but as he has used the indeclinables 'Vai nāma' while mentioning that name it can be reasonably inferred that he meant that it was a familiar kind of Yoga. Śaṅkara too says in his Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39 that this is well-known in the Upaniṣads and in that on G. K. IV. 2 that it is well-known by that name to the knowers of Brahma. He does not, however, cite any texts in support of that view at any of those places. In his gloss on the portion of the Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39 Ānandagiri cites one text namely *Na lipyate karmaṇā pāpakeṇa* and indicates others by the term 'ādi' but that is in support of the meaning of the term Asparśa given by him and cannot therefore explain how the Asparśayoga can be said to be well-known.

9. But we need not despair of knowing in view of which texts of the Upaniṣads the author could have said so, for the Kārikās themselves furnish a clue to determine that. Thus a reference to Kārikās 40 to 48 of Chapter III thereof shows that the author has recommended thereby the cultivation of Vairāgya (non-attachment) and the practice of Abhyāsa (mental exercises) in order to get control over the mind. It can therefore

be inferred from that fact that these are the two principal characteristics of his Asparaśa Yoga. Such a Yoga is certainly not unknown to the Upaniṣads. In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* I. 2. 12 there is mention of an Adhyātmayoga and its *modus operandi* has been described in details further up to the end of the sixth Valli. In *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III. 2-6 there is again a mention of a Sannyāsa-Yoga and it has been further up explained therein what constitutes it. In *S'vetāśvataropaniṣad* I. 3. there is a similar mention of a Dhyānayoga and in VI. 13 thereof one of a Sāṅkhyayoga. These are not really distinct kinds of Yoga but only distinct designations of the same Yoga looked at from different view-points.

10. Nor does Yoga seem to be unknown to the authors of the Smṛti works primarily based upon the Upaniṣads. It is true that in *Brahmasūtra* II. 1. 3 there is a refutation of a doctrine propounded in a *Yogasmṛti*¹ but Śaṅkara commenting upon it says that the Sūtrakāra has done that not because Yoga was unknown to the Śruti but because some of the Tattvas such as Pradhāna and Mahat mentioned in the work on Sāṅkhya philosophy on which the Yogasmṛti has been based are unknown to the Śruti and that being so the author was of the view that correct knowledge cannot arise from such a treatise. Further from the mere fact that there is no direct reference to any Yaugic exercises in the *Brahmasūtra*, it does not follow that Bādarāyaṇa was of the view that according to the Vedāntas it was not necessary to follow any course of such exercises. The term Saṁśodhana occurring in *Br.* III. 2. 24 has been explained by Śaṅkara as meaning an "Anuṣṭhāna of the nature of Bhakti, Dhyāna, Prāṇidhāna, etc." Moreover it is implied in the Udgītha, S'āṇḍilya, Dahara and other Vidyās discussed in *Br.* III. 3. Even in Book IV of that work Yoga practice has been referred to at several places either expressly or impliedly. The Abhyāsa yoga or Ātmasaṁnyama-yoga which has been expounded in *Bhagavadgītā* VI which Śaṅkara calls 'Dhyāna

1. The *Yogasmṛti* here referred to does not seem to be Patañjali's *Yogadarśana* because the first Sūtra quoted from it in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya namely *Atha tattvadarśanopayo yogoh* is not the same as the first Sūtra in that Darśana.

yoga' has the same characteristics—Abhyāsa and Vairāgya as the Asparśayoga of Gauḍapāda. The elaborate exposition of the *modus operandi* in the former of which the principal features are Abhyāsa and Vairāgya according to VI. 35 is in no way inconsistent with the main features of the latter Yoga and the goal to be reached according to both is identical and the only difference is that an intermediate stage is described in the *Gītā* but not in the *Kārikā*. In Pāda I of the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali also there is a description of a course of mental discipline, having Abhyāsa and Vairāgya as its principal characteristics, to be gone through by men who have a Samāhita citta (steady mind) and of the fruit resulting from it and in the second Pāda thereof there is a scientific and minute exposition of the physical exercises and materials besides the mental exercises consisting of Tapas, Svādhyāya and Īśvarapraṇidhāna which are recommended to be resorted to by those who have a Vyutthita citta (an unsteady mind) in order that they may be prepared for the higher course recommended in the previous Pāda. There is of course a difference as to the goal to be reached and the nature of God between the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavadgītā* and *Brahmasūtra* on the one hand and the *Yogasūtra* on the other but there cannot be any doubt as to the definition of 'Yoga' as *Citta-vṛttinirodhaḥ* in Y. I. 1. 2 and as to the principal means for attaining it namely Abhyāsa and Vairāgya mentioned in Y. I. 1. 12 and the alternative means Īśvarapraṇidhāna expounded in Y. I. 1. 23-28 having been based upon the relevant Sruti texts. Therefore one can conclude with certainty that the Asparśa Yoga under consideration is not a new species of Yoga but an old one with a distinctive designation which has reference not to the means for accomplishing it as in the case of the terms 'Dhyāna-yoga', 'Sāṅkhya-yoga', 'Sannyāsa-yoga' etc., but to the objective to be kept in view by the practiser namely complete detachment from the products of Avidyā, mental as well as material, as in the case of the term 'Adhyātma-yoga'.

(V) Is there a place for such a Yoga in Śaṅkara's Jñānavāda?

11. The last question to which I address myself is whether Śaṅkara, who is well-known as a strong advocate of the view that Mokṣa takes place only as the result of knowledge of the true

nature of the self, admits that there is a place for the practice of Yoga of the above type in his said doctrine. At first it might be thought that he could not have done so and many people confidently assert that he does not. My study of a few of his principal works has however convinced me that he does. In order to be convinced of this one must read patiently and reflect over his Bhāṣyas on *Brahma-sūtra* II. 1. 3 and *Bh. G.* V. 27 and VI. 1. In that on *Bh. G.* VI. 1. he has called the Dhyānā-yoga an "Antaraṅga" of "Samyagdarśana". In *Aparokṣānubhūti* 101-44 he having given this process the name 'Rāja-yoga' has expounded each of its Aṅgas, whose names are the same as those of the Aṣṭāṅga-yoga expounded in *Yogasūtra* II. There can be no doubt that this Rājayoga is the same as Nididhyāsana or Paraśamkhyāna, which is the third stage in the Jñāna-mārga, the first two being Śravaṇa (study of the scripture) and Manana (reflection over what one has gathered from the study). In order that this may not appear inconsistent, he has in his Bhāṣya on *G. K.* III. 40 made it clear that no practice is required by those who are of the nature of Brahma and look upon the mind and the senses as imaginary substances like a rope in a snake and therefore as having no separate existence apart from Brahma, but that those Yogis who are of the low or the middling type cannot attain the Śānti known as Mokṣa without resorting to some remedy and that therefore in their case, it is dependent upon a control of their mind.

12. Now since Yogis of the first type were few and far between in the whole history of Advaita doctrine it is crystal clear that even according to Śaṅkara the statement that Mokṣa takes place through knowledge unaccompanied or unsupplemented by any kind of Yoga must be taken to be true only in the case of an ideal individual and that in the case of all practical men in all ages the right view even according to him is that knowledge derived from the scripture or a Guru is not enough by itself for reaching the goal but must be supplemented by the Yoga which consists of a control of the mind as stated in this work or in the *Bhagavadgītā* and the concentration thereof on the true essence without which the eradication of Vāsanā (latent desire) is impossible and so long as that has not taken place it would be self-deception to believe oneself to be a *Brahmavit*.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF SAMSĀRA

(H. G. Narahari)

It is a painful fact that we have to admit that the origin of the theory of Transmigration is still something of a problem, and that, though numerous views have been advanced in this direction, there is no settled opinion that is as yet available. The views that have been hitherto brought forward can be broadly divided into two classes: the first, which denies the origin of this doctrine in Vedic literature, attempts to seek its origin among the aboriginal inhabitants of India; and the second, less extremist in character, is insistent upon finding the traces of the doctrine in the early stages of Vedic belief alone. Two tendencies are perceptible among the followers of the latter view; some of them feel that it is inconsistent to think that the eschatology of the *Samhitā* period admits of a belief in this theory also, and hence trace the origin of the doctrine of Transmigration to the *Brāhmaṇas*; but others who are less conservative in nature feel that, if not these two doctrines in entirety, at least the conceptions that later led to the formulation of the theory of *Samsāra*, are all clearly seen even in the early stages of Vedic belief, that is to say, even in the *Samhitās*.

Macdonell¹ and other exponents of the same view feel that it is impossible to think that the Vedic Indians, whose attitude towards life was joyous and optimistic, could formulate a theory like the doctrine of *Samsāra*, which is so thoroughly opposed to their creed. But the fact is undeniable that, as early as the sixth cent. B. C. when Buddhism arose, the doctrine of Transmigration was, in its full-fledged form, already established on a sure foundation. These scholars, therefore, feel that the Aryan settlers might have received "the first impulse in this direction from the aboriginal inhabitants of India".² Feeling, however, that among these aboriginal races "the notion of transmigration does not go beyond a belief in the continuance

1. A.A. Macdonell—"A History of Sanskrit Literature" p. 387.

2. Ibid, p. 387 f.

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SOME PROBLEMS OF THE MAṆḌŪKYA-KĀRIKĀ

By

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

I

In the course of his introduction to *The Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda,¹ Professor Vidushekhara Bhattacharya makes the following salutary remark: 'When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible?'² In spite of this observation of his he rejects the evidence of tradition on many points, apparently because he finds contradictions and incongruities. Yet it is worthwhile examining if there are real and insurmountable difficulties in following the Advaita tradition regarding the composition and character of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

The traditional Advaita view is (i) that the twelve mantras beginning with 'om ity etad akṣaram' constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (ii) that the *Kārikā* consisting of four chapters is the work of Gauḍapāda, an early teacher of Advaita, (iii) that the 29 verses of the first chapter form a commentary on the Upaniṣad, and (iv) that the following three chapters seek to establish the truth of non-duality through such reasoning as may be found in support of Scripture.

Professor Bhattacharya accepts whole-heartedly only one of these propositions, viz. that Gauḍapāda is the author of the *Kārikā*, and calls in question the others. After briefly noticing his partial agreement with tradition, we shall consider the grounds on which he feels constrained to differ therefrom and see if they really warrant disagreement.

II

As against Walleser who thinks that there was none named Gauḍapāda who is believed to have been the author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, that there existed long before the time of Śaṅkara a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century, and that this school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra* (a school doctrine) and embodied it in a collection of sayings consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gauḍapādakārikā*, Professor Bhattacharya believes that tradition is right in ascribing the work to Gauḍapāda, for the reason that a work cannot be the production of the whole people of a land, though, written by a single individual, it may represent the views of the entire country to which he belonged. In this connection he quotes the view of Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th century A.D.) that in the country of Kurukṣetra there was a river called Hīrārāvātī on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people, the pre-eminent of whom was Gauḍapāda, and that as the Ācārya was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his proper name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.³

Though Professor Bhattacharya grants that Gauḍapāda was the author of the *Kārikā*, he is not prepared to believe that the *Kārikā* is a single work in four chapters. He is of the view that the four prakaraṇas are independent treatises which were put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.⁴ According to him, the attempt of the commentator, whom tradition identifies with Śaṅkara, to show the interconnection of the chapters is a miserable failure. Introducing the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara⁵ says that though it is declared in the first chapter that there is no duality, yet as it is merely an expression of *āgama*, the second chapter is written to support it by reasons. Professor Bhattacharya finds fault with this statement, because though the second chapter advances various arguments, the first is not devoid of them. And he asks, "If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś [Śaṅkara] to be, then why is it that

3. Ibid, pp. lxiii-lxxi.

4. Ibid, p. lvii.

5. Or whoever the commentator was; the identity is of no consequence for the present discussion.

1. Published by the University of Calcutta (1943). We shall refer to this book in the foot-notes as *Āgamaśāstra*.

2. Ibid, p. lxxi.

the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily?" At the commencement of the third chapter, Śaṅkara says that non-duality can be understood not only by āgama, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well, and that consequently to exhibit the reasoning the third chapter is required. The Professor's objection to this is that if Śaṅkara were right, the object of the second and third chapters must be the same, viz. to formulate the arguments for non-duality. But, then, why should there be two chapters at all? Cannot all the arguments be included in one? The fact, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, is that non-duality is mentioned only incidentally in the third chapter, and as such is not discussed. The purpose of the fourth chapter, as stated by Śaṅkara, is the establishment of the system of Advaita through pointing out the contradictions that vitiate the schools that are opposed to it, viz., those of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas. As against this, Prof. Bhattacharya contends that there is no detailed criticism of the Dvaitins' view in this chapter, that there is no allusion to the Vaināśikas, and that the views of the Vaināśikas are accepted and endorsed by Gauḍapāda, who cannot therefore criticise them. As regards each succeeding chapter the Professor wants us to ask these questions: does it presuppose the preceding chapter somehow or other? What do we lose if we take it as an independent work on the Advaita Vedānta? Do we find in reading it in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming its connection with the preceding chapter? Professor Bhattacharya's answer to these questions is in the negative; and he regards the four prakaraṇas as independent manuals of Advaita.⁶

Let us gather afresh Śaṅkara's statements about the nature of the work as a whole and about the purpose of each chapter. In his introduction to the first prakaraṇa, Śaṅkara describes the argument of the four-chaptered *Kārikā* thus: "For the purpose of determining (the sense of) Omkāra is (written) the first prakaraṇa which abounds in Scriptural passages (āgamapradhānam) and which is the means for knowing the true nature of the self. When the world of duality is resolved, the non-dual is known, as when the serpent, etc., imagined in the rope are resolved the rope which is real is cognised. In order to explain through reason the illusoriness of (the world of) duality there is the second prakaraṇa.

When there occurs the contingency that non-duality too may likewise be illusory, the third prakaraṇa shows through reasoning that non-duality is not so. There are views which are *avāidika* and opposed to non-duality being absolutely real. For the purpose of refuting them on rational grounds, by showing that those views cannot be true as they are mutually contradictory, is commenced the fourth prakaraṇa".⁷ At the beginning of the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says: "It was said, 'When (Reality) is known, there is no duality' (I, 18), and this is supported on the basis of such *śruti* passages as 'One only, without a second'. That is only Scripture (āgama-mātram). It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakaraṇa is commenced".⁸ At the beginning of the third prakaraṇa Śaṅkara remarks, "While discussing the nature of Omkāra it was stated 'the self is the cessation of the world, blissful, without a second,' and 'When (Reality) is known there is no duality'. That was only as a premise. Of these (i.e. the two propositions 'the self is' and 'the world is not'), the non-existence of the world was explained in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa by illustrations like dream, magical show, and *fata morgana*, and through reasoning on the ground of *probans* such as 'because it is seen', 'because it is with beginning and end', etc. Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? Asking thus, the teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also? How is that? To show how the Advaita-prakaraṇa is commenced."⁹ Explaining the connection of the fourth prakaraṇa with the preceding ones, Śaṅkara observes, "By way of determining Omkāra non-duality was stated (in the first prakaraṇa) as a premise known from Scripture. The same was established (in the second prakaraṇa) on the ground that the external world of objects is illusory. Again (in the third prakaraṇa) of the non-duality which was ascertained directly from Scripture and through reasoning, it was conclusively stated. 'This is the supreme truth'. At the end (of that prakaraṇa) it was indicated that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas which are opposed to the view of non-duality, the sense of Scripture, are wrong because of their mutual opposition and because they give rise to passions like attachment and aversion. Non-

6. *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. xlvii-lvii.

7. Vani Vilas Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, p. 89.

8. Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, 122.

9. *Ibid*, Vol. 5, 144.

dualism is praised as the right view on the ground that it does not give rise to passions. Now, the *Alātaśānti-prakarana* is commenced for showing in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another, and for establishing finally through negative reasoning non-dualism".¹⁰

Now let us return to Prof. Bhattacharya's questions. The relation between the first and the second *prakaraṇa*, according to Śaṅkara, is that while the first chapter states as a premise the non-reality of the world of duality, supported by Scripture, the second chapter establishes the illusoriness of the world through reasoning. The first objection raised by Prof. Bhattacharya is that the first chapter is not devoid of arguments. He cites *kārikās* 16-18 to show that arguments are advanced for proving the illusoriness of the world even in the first chapter. But a comparison of the method and contents of the first chapter with those of the second will clearly reveal that while in the former Scripture is the main source of evidence, in the latter various reasons are given for the illusory nature of the world. This is all that the commentator means when he says 'āgamamātram tat.' The word 'mātra' here has the sense of 'prādhānya', for that is how Anandagiri interprets it. Śaṅkara himself says in his general introduction at the head of the first chapter: 'prathamam prakaraṇam āgama-pradhānam'. To the next objection that if the relation between the first and the second chapter were as it is declared by Śaṅkara, why does the author himself not say so at the beginning of the chapter, we need only reply that it is not necessary. What we should consider is whether Śaṅkara has correctly understood the teachings in the two chapters and their connection, if there be any. Let us turn to the contents of the chapters themselves to find an answer. The *āgama-prakarana* begins with a summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.¹¹ *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are described; different theories of creation are mentioned with a view to show that they are unsatisfactory, as the world is in truth the very nature of the *Deva*; in the *Turiya* which is the absolute non-dual reality, there is neither cause nor effect; *Prājña*, the self in sleep, is conditioned by the cause of world-manifestation, viz. nescience; *Viśva* and *Taijasa*, the self of the waking state and the self of dream res-

pectively, are conditioned by both cause and effect, i.e., nescience and its product; the *Turiya* is not to be confused with *Prājña*, for while *Prājña* is associated with dreamless sleep, in the *Turiya* there is neither sleep nor dream; as a corollary from this it is said that the universe does not really exist; the non-dual self (*Turiya*) is the sole reality; the world of duality is illusory (*māyāmātra*); then, following the *Upaniṣad*, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are identified with the three letters of *Om*, *a*, *u* and *m*, and the *Turiya* with the soundless culmination of *Om*; lastly, meditation on *Pranava* is prescribed, as it leads to the supreme. From this brief outline of the contents of the *Āgama-prakarana* it will be evident that the main subject of study is the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. No doubt it is declared there that the world is non-real. But that declaration is based on such words of the *śruti* as 'prapañcopaśamam' and 'advaitam'. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara is not wrong in characterising the first *prakaraṇa* as 'āgama-pradhāna.' The second chapter, *Vaitathya-prakarana*, begins with the statement that the wise declare all the objects seen in dream to be illusory; and then it is argued that the objects perceived in waking also must be illusory because of similarity with those seen in dream. Now, does not this line of reasoning presuppose the discussion of *avasthās* in the previous chapter? Is it not an elaboration through logic of what was premised on the authority of *śruti* in the *Āgama-prakarana*? After showing in detail how there is parity between waking and dream, the author of the *Kārikā* proceeds to say that the entire world is a mistaken reading of the non-dual self. As when the rope is seen the snake-illusion is removed, so also when the self is known, the world of plurality disappears; then follows a catalogue of different views about the self; but the truth is, there is nothing other than the self; a few more illustrations are given to prove that the universe is illusory; the final truth is proclaimed as the non-dual reality which knows neither dissolution nor origination, neither bondage nor release; and lastly, how the *yati* could know the truth and after knowing how he should live in the world are declared. Here again Śaṅkara seems to be substantially correct in his statement that the purpose of the second chapter is to establish through reason the illusoriness of the world of duality.

As regards the relation between the second and the third chapter, Prof. Bhattacharya's objection, as we have already seen, is that if the object of the third chapter were what Śaṅkara regards it to be, then there should be no need for this chapter at all, as all the arguments for non-duality could be included in one. As

10. Ibid, Vol. 5, 180.

11. The view that the *Upaniṣad* must have been composed later than the *Kārikā* we shall examine below.

a preliminary observation we may point out here that the treatment of the same topic in two successive chapters is not uncommon even in modern books. But that apart, does Śaṅkara say or mean to say that the object of the second and the third chapters is the same? Is it not his view that while the Vaitathya-prakarāṇa establishes through reason the illusoriness of duality, the Advaita-prakarāṇa seeks to show the non-illusoriness of non-duality? The two are related topics, no doubt; but they are not identical. The contention of Prof. Bhattacharya is that non-duality, though mentioned in the third chapter, is not its main topic, but something else. And this will be clear, he says, if one examines the contents with some amount of care. The following is his own account of the contents of the third chapter "Here at the beginning (III, 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end (III, 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth".¹² We have no quarrel with this analysis. But what does it show? How is *ajāti* a topic different from *advaita*? Why is non-origination the truth? Is it not because the truth is non-duality alone? Prof. Bhattacharya admits that Gauḍapāda asserts in this chapter the absence of difference between jīva and Brahman. If this is not *advaita*, what else is it? And what is *asparśayoga* if it is not the path to the realisation of non-duality?

The fourth chapter, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, points out the mutual contradictions that are to be found in the systems opposed to Advaita and establishes non-duality by a process of negative reasoning. Where in this chapter is a detailed discussion, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, of the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśīkas, assuming that they are wrong because of their mutual contradiction? And secondly, where is the allusion to Vaināśīkas as opponents, whose views Gauḍapāda accepts by implication throughout the book? Before we make an attempt to answer these questions we may notice in passing the argument that the *Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa* must be an independent treatise as it commences with a *maṅgalācaraṇa*. Prof. Bhattacharya himself dismisses this argument as not carrying much weight. In a

12. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. lii.

Bauddha work, the *Pañjikā* of Prajñākaramati on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* which consists of nine chapters, there is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. But where is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the first prakaraṇa of the *Kārikā*? It has been answered by the commentators that OM with which the Upaniṣad begins is itself the *maṅgalācaraṇa*. Not only at the beginning of the fourth chapter but also at the end there is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the form of obeisance. Does it not imply, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, that the prakaraṇa is an independent work and complete in itself? We do not, however, see the implication, because there is nothing unintelligible in a book ending with an obeisance. Now about the other questions. The *Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa* just immediately after the *maṅgalācaraṇa* refers to the disputants who uphold the reality of origination and quarrel among themselves. Then there is an elaborate and detailed dialectical criticism of the category of origination, the concept of cause. Is not the notion of cause one of the cardinal doctrines of the pluralists (*dvaitinaḥ*), and in criticising it in detail, is not the author of the *Kārikā* examining the view of those who are opposed to Advaita? The next question is about the reference to Vaināśīkas. In his notes on *kārikā*, III, 3, Prof. Bhattacharya says that among the Buddhists the Vaibhāṣikas maintain *satkāryavāda*, and the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold *asatkāryavāda*. The verse in question maintains that the two views regarding the causal relation are mutually contradictory, and in subsequent verses Gauḍapāda provides a critique of the causal category and rejects it finally. Is this not an implicit criticism of the Vaināśīka views, at any rate of the three schools of Buddhism mentioned above?¹³ There is one more question raised by Prof. Bhattacharya. A number of *kārikās* from the second and third chapters are repeated in the fourth; the *ajātivāda* discussed already in the third chapter is discussed again in the fourth. Why is this repetition? Is it not useless? In reply it need only be pointed out that repetition is not a defect in an *upadeśa-grantha*.

That the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* was considered to be an *upadeśa-grantha* will be evident from the colophons in some of the manuscripts.¹⁴ The main object of the work is to teach students of Advaita the essentials of Non-dualism. And the teacher,

13. We shall examine the question of Bauddha influence later.
14. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. 244.

Gauḍapāda, grades his lessons in an intelligent manner. After setting forth the purport of Scripture in the first chapter, he justifies it through reasoning in the next two chapters. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* teaches the illusoriness of the worlds of waking and dream and the absolute reality of the Self, the Turiya. The second chapter is concerned with the former and the third with the latter. Having expounded the philosophy of Advaita through Scripture and reasoning, Gauḍapāda examines in the fourth chapter the views opposed to Advaita, exhibits their contradictions and shows the excellence of his own system. Such a view of the *Kārikā*, we submit, is the most rational one to take, having regard to the nature of the work and the topics dealt with therein.

III

Contrary to the traditional Advaita view which holds the 29 verses of the first chapter to be Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* consisting of the 12 prose passages, Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the verses or *kārikās* must have been already in existence before the prose passages came to be composed. The reasons offered for his view by the Professor are these: (1) After the 6th, 7th, 11th and 12th mantras of what is called the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the *kārikās* are introduced in the words 'atraite śloka bhavanti,' (here are these ślokas). In other Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* similar expressions are employed to introduce ślokaṣ in support of the prose passages that precede them. It follows, therefore, that the prose portions must have come into existence after the verses, and not *vice versa*.

(2) A comparison of the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding verses bears out this view. If the *kārikās* were really explanations of the prose passages, they should throw light on those portions of the latter which are difficult or obscure and should not omit the most important words of the original. But what are the actual facts? (a) The *kārikās* 1-5 which are supposed to explain the prose passages 3-5 omit altogether the words 'saptāṅgaḥ' and 'ekonaviṁśatimukhaḥ' the most difficult ones which require explanation. (b) In the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara*; but in the corresponding *kārikās* the word *viśva* is used. The business of a commentator is to explain the original word and not introduce a word which is not identical or synonymous with it. (c) The terms

jāgaritasthāna, *svāpanasthāna*, and *suṣuptasthāna* of the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively are not found in the *kārikās*. (d) That the so-called Upaniṣad, instead of being the original, is really a commentary on the verses will be evident from the fact that taking a word or two from the *kārikās* it expands and explains the idea contained therein. For instance, the terms *ghanaprajña* (1), and *ānandabhuḥ* or (3) *ānanda* (4) are explained in prose passage 5, (e) The *karikā* I, 19 says that *Viśva* is identical with the first letter of *Om* because each of them is the first (*ādi*) in its series and each is pervasive (*āpti*). The corresponding Upaniṣad clearly says that the identity is either because of each being the first or because of each being pervasive (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). This option seems to be a later development. (f) There is divergence as regards two words between *Kārikā* I, 21 and Upaniṣad 11. In the former there are the word *māna* 'measure' from *mā* 'to measure' and the word *apīti* 'disappearance,' from *api-i*, while in the latter there are *miti* 'measure' from *mi*, and *laya* 'disappearance'. (g) The *kārikās* (I, 10-15) make a distinction between Turiya and the other three, viz., *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*; but no such distinction is found in the Upaniṣad. (h) The Upaniṣad (1) says that Brahman or *Ātman* has four quarters (*catuspād*); but there is no such mention in the *kārikās*.

(3) Lastly, there is the view of *Ācāryas* like Madhva that the 29 verses of the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* form part of the Upaniṣad, and that the verses are older than the prose passages. On these grounds Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the *kārikās* of the first chapter are not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that the Upaniṣad is mainly based on the *kārikās*, and that it must have been composed later 'with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*'.¹⁵

Let us examine the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya *seriatim*. (1) There is nothing unintelligible in the *Kārikākāra* introducing his explanatory verses in the words 'atraite śloka bhavanti'. In some manuscripts these are said to be the words of the *Vārttika-kāra*.¹⁶ The *Vārttika-kāra* here referred to is

15. *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. xxxi-xlvii.

16. See *Anandāśrama* edition of the *Kārikā* with Anandagiri's *Ṭikā*, p. 25; *atha vārttikakāroktam vākyam*.

Gauḍapāda, for the *Kārikā* is also known by the name *Māṇḍūkya-vārttika*.¹⁷

(2) Before answering the next set of questions, it may be useful to ask ourselves as to what sort of a commentary we hold the 29 verses of the Āgama-prakarāṇa to be. Certainly, they are not meant to be a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages.¹⁸ They re-arrange the concepts found in the Upaniṣad in a more logical manner with a view to show that the Turiya is the absolute non-dual reality; and this again is only a foundation for the succeeding three chapters. Those expressions in the Upaniṣad which are not materially useful are passed over, and certain implications which are not expressly stated in the Upaniṣad are explained because they are regarded as important by the author of the *Kārikā* for the development of his thesis. A case in point is the mention and criticism of the several creationistic theories. Without departing from the spirit of what is declared in the Upaniṣad, the *Kārikā-kāra* prepares his own *precis* of the passages and makes it the nucleus of his subsequent philosophical construction. Now we may turn to answer the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya against regarding the Upaniṣad as the earlier text. (a) Since the object of the first five verses is to analyse the three manifestations of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, and to show that Reality is one in the three states though the contents and types of enjoyment vary, the verses leave out expressions which are not useful for this purpose. Viśva and Taijasa being endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths is of no metaphysical consequence subserving the purpose Gauḍapāda has in view. It is points of contrast that are important; for the philosopher wants to show that inspite of apparent differences there is an underlying unity. Hence it is that to the differences in objects of consciousness and modes of enjoyment mentioned in the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda adds the differences in principal locations and types of satisfaction. The reason we have just given will also explain why the author of the *Kārikā* has nothing to comment on the first two mantras of the Upaniṣad, though at a later stage and in its proper place he refers to Omkāra and its *mātras*. (b) The terms

17. Rāmakaṛṣṇa Paṇḍita in his commentary on the *Pañcadaśī* (II, 29) refers to the *Kārikā* (III, 39) as *Vārttika*. Whether the name *Vārttika* as applied to Gauḍapāda's work is proper or not is not germane to the present discussion.

18. See S. K. Belvalkar: *Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I, p. 193.

'Viśva' and 'Vaiśvānara', whatever be their etymological significance, have come to mean the same in Advaita usage. Probably, Gauḍapāda's intention is to show the identity of the self of the waking state with the all-consciousness which has the manifest universe for its object, the identity, in short, of the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* forms of the self. Hence it is that he describes 'Viśva' as all-pervading (*vibhu*). The suggestion, however, comes from the *Śruti* itself. The Upaniṣadic passage 6 describes Prājña, the self in sleep, as the Lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, etc. Since it is the same self that persists in and through the changing states, the *Kārikā-kāra* identifies the apparently individual soul that is awake with the self of the universe. (c) The terms *jāgaritatsthāna*, *svapnasthāna* and *suṣuptasthāna*, need not be repeated in the *Kārikā*, because the verses, as we said, present only a summary of the Upaniṣadic passages for a set purpose which their author has in view. They are not, however, unnoticed, for the fifth verse refers to them together in the words 'in the three states' (*triṣu dhāmasu*). (d) That a prose passage is longer than the corresponding verse or verses can be no argument for its subsequent composition. In the Upaniṣad 5 the state of sleep is explained and the self of that state is described. In fact, we have an independent passage for each of the three. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. Gauḍapāda adopts a different method. The first four *Kārikās* speak of all the three, and the trio are compared in respect of their objects of consciousness, types of enjoyment, locations and kinds of satisfaction. Viewed in this light, it may be seen that Gauḍapāda has incorporated in his verses all the terms that are necessary from the Upaniṣadic passage 5. (e) The *Kārikā* I, 19 identifies Viśva with *a* because each is the first in its series and each is pervasive. The Upaniṣad calls them identical for either of the two reasons. From this alleged difference between the *Kārikā* and the Upaniṣad Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the latter must have been composed later. But what is the force of 'or' (*vā*) in the Upaniṣadic text? Is it used in the sense of a disjunction either of ignorance or of exclusion? We do not think that the Upaniṣad means to say that 'Viśva' and *a* are to be identified either only because each is the first or only because each is pervasive. Both are equally valid reasons for identification. And it is this meaning that is expressed by the word 'and' (*ca*) in the *kārikā*, 19. (f) We have already said that the verses of the first prakaraṇa do not constitute a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages. And so it does not matter from which root a particular word is formed

in the *Kārikā* provided it expresses the same idea. Prof. Bhattacharya himself admits that there is no difference in meaning between *māna* and *miti*, and between *apiti* and *laya*. (g) The *Kārikās* 10-15 make a distinction between the *Turiya* and the other three, *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. The *Turiya* is the changeless lord of all, one without a second; it is unconditioned eternal consciousness; in it there is neither the veiling of the true nor the projection of the untrue. Prof. Bhattacharya holds that there is nothing corresponding to this idea in the *Upaniṣad*. But what do the two *Upaniṣadic* passages, 7 and 12, which set forth the nature of the *Turiya* mean? Do they not declare that the *Turiya* is trans-phenomenal (*prapañcōpaśama*) and thereby distinguish it from the three, *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*? (h) There is no mention in the *Kārikā*, says Prof. Bhattacharya, of the four quarters of Brahman or *Ātman* declared in the *Upaniṣad*. This, however, is not the case. The *kārikā* 24 makes mention of the *pādas* (quarters); and that they are four will be evident from the description of *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña*, and *Turiya*, in the preceding verses.

(3) As for the rival tradition which regards the prose passages and the 29 verses of the first *prakaraṇa* as constituting the *Upaniṣad*, it must be noted that it does not lend countenance to Prof. Bhattacharya's view that the prose passages came into being after the *kārikās*. If the entire *prakaraṇa* is *śruti*, in the sense in which the orthodox schools of Vedānta accept the term, its different parts cannot be dated in sequence. It is not our task here to examine the *rationale* of the tradition which holds the *kārikās* of the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* to be part of the *Upaniṣad*. We are only concerned with pointing out that the Advaita tradition is an old one—at least as old as Śaṅkara—and that it is not either unpalatable or unjustifiable. That the tradition is an ancient one is admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself. Even if the evidence of the commentator on the *Kārikā* is set aside as that of a spurious Śaṅkara, there are unmistakable references in Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya* and Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* from which one may gather that according to these two Advaitins, master and pupil, the verses of the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* are not *śruti*.¹⁹ Śaṅkara quotes the *kārikā* I, 16 in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II, i, 9, and says that it is a statement made by the teacher who

19. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. xxxiv.

knows the tradition of the Vedānta.²⁰ Sureśvara quotes the *kārikā* I, 11, in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, IV, 41, and says that it is stated by the worshipful Gauḍas. It is no doubt true that some of the verses of the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* which are cited by Advaita teachers are declared as *śrutis*. But this only shows that in their view the verses were composed after the *Māṇḍūkya-śruti*. The term *Upaniṣad* is rather loosely employed by the old teachers. For instance, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is called 'Upaniṣad'. In some of the manuscripts of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* all the four *prakaraṇas* are called 'Upaniṣads'. Kamalaśīla, a disciple of Śāntirakṣita (705-763 A.D.) quotes in his *Pañjikā* some verses from the *Vaithya* and Advaita-*prakaraṇas* and speaks of them as belonging to *Upaniṣatsāstra*.²¹ And so, the verses of the first *prakaraṇa*, when they are characterised as *śruti* or *Upaniṣad*, must be considered so in the secondary and not the primary sense.

IV

There is one more problem of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* which we shall discuss here in brief. It is believed that Gauḍapāda, if he himself was not a Bauddha, ought to have been greatly influenced by Bauddha views which he accepted and incorporated in his *Kārikā*. Especially the idealist schools of Buddhism, *Vijñānavāda* and *Mādhyaṃika*, it is thought, must have appealed to him as sponsoring views very much like his own, and so without any hesitation or scruple he made use of the arguments advanced by these Bauddha schools to prove his thesis of the non-reality of the world and its absolute non-origination. The contents of the fourth chapter are indistinguishable from those of any *Mādhyaṃika* work. The terms and phrases employed there are those of Nāgārjuna. Even the title of the chapter, '*Alātaśānti*' is borrowed from Bauddha terminology. Though the first three chapters cite here and there the authority of Scripture, no *Upaniṣadic* passage is quoted or referred to by Gauḍapāda in the last *prakaraṇa*.²² Probably the great teacher was so much struck with the close parallelism between his Vedānta view and the views of the Bauddhas that after finishing the third chapter he wrote an independent work calling it '*Alātaśānti*', advocating therein the Bauddha views and thereby preaching non-hostility to them.

20. atroktam vedānta-saṃpradāya-vidbhir ācāraiḥ.

21. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. xxxviii n.

22. Ibid, p. lxxxiii.

The question of Bauddha influence is a vexed one, and we do not propose to enter into the details here. Certain general considerations will suffice to show that Gauḍapāda's main object in the *Kārikā* is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is true that in accomplishing this object he presses into service some of the arguments of the Bauddha idealists and even their terminology. But that does not prove his Bauddha leanings or agreement with the conclusions of Buddhism. In the first place, it must be remembered that those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who refer to his *Kārikā*, do not regard him as a Bauddha or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śāntirakṣita quotes in his *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-kārikā* verses from Gauḍapāda's work, while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas. Kamalaśīla refers to the *Kārikā* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat śāstra*.²³ That the metaphysical position of the *Mādhyamikas* is nihilism in the primary sense is urged not only by Advaitins but also by Jaina writers.²⁴ The *Mādhyamikas* themselves do not refute the charge of nihilism brought against their view, though they carefully distinguish their philosophical nihilism from 'common or vulgar nihilism'.²⁵ No one denies a certain measure of similarity between Advaita and the idealistic schools of Buddhism, especially in the matter of their negative logic. Śaṅkara the commentator himself says that the *kārikās* IV, 25-27 employ the arguments of the *Vijñānavādins* for the purpose of refuting the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects.²⁶ The procedure is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists of the West in their criticism of Realistic doctrines. But it does not follow that either Advaita or Absolutism is identical with Subjectivism. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the *Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa* where he employs Bauddha terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away from the Upaniṣadic moorings. It is not true to say that there is no reference to Upaniṣadic passages in the fourth chapter. As Dr. Belvalkar has pointed out, familiar Upaniṣadic expressions are employed in IV, 78, 80, 85, and 92. That these expressions are used by Bauddha writers also can only show that they were borrowed by them from the Upaniṣads. And it is

23. Ibid, p. lxxvi.

24. See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 8.

25. Ibid, p. 222.

26. Mem. Edn. Vol. 5, p. 196.

significant that Gauḍapāda should have used such expressions as 'brāhmaṇyam padam', and 'amṛtatva' in the concluding portion of his work, and that he should have stated at the end 'naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' (This was not declared by the Buddha).²⁷ Thus it will be clear that Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* is essentially a work on Vedānta inspired by the Upaniṣads. The exigencies of his time must have made him employ Bauddha terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the west to-day feel the necessity for clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions.

It would appear that Prof. Bhattacharya agrees with this view to a large extent when he says. "It goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion"; "And among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being Advaita 'non-duality'".²⁸ The Professor even grants in one place that "Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist".²⁹ But we do not find our way to agree with him when he says that there are two schools of *Vijñānavādins*, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head.³⁰ He himself sets forth the distinction between the two schools in clear terms. The real difference between them, he says, is with regard to the intervention of the *Ātman* with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.³¹ Even where Gauḍapāda applies the term *citta* to signify reality, he uses it as a synonym for *Brahman*. While to the *Vijñānavādin* the *Ālayavijñāna* is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and continuous like a current (*dhruva*), to the Advaitin *Brahman-Ātman* is eternal (*nitya*). Therefore it helps in no way philosophically to call Advaita a school of *Vijñāna-vāda*. And tradition is not wrong in regarding Gauḍapāda as a stalwart Vedāntin, the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara.

27. Prof. Bhattacharya gives a novel interpretation of this sentence. See *Agamaśāstra*, p. 212.

28. Ibid, pp. cxxvii & cxxviii.

29. Ibid, p. cxxxii.

30. Ibid, p. cxxxii.

31. Ibid, p. cxxxiii.

V

In conclusion we repeat that the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is a single work of Gauḍapāda setting forth the quintessence of Vedānta, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that its first chapter, the *Āgama-prakaraṇa*, is a verse-summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which is made the nucleus for the rational exposition of the system of Advaita in the subsequent three chapters. We hold no brief for tradition. Yet we cannot help pointing out that the Advaita tradition as regards Gauḍapāda and his *Kārikā* is essentially sound, neither taxing our credulity nor involving us in contradictions.

FREEDOM OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS

By

K. VENKOBA RAO

The title of this article requires an apology. The use of the word 'state' in connection with the Indian constitution is invariably associated with the federated native states and hence by way of explanation it may be added that the article has reference to the freedom of interprovincial trade (trade between governors' provinces) so far as it is treated in the Indian constitution act of 1935.

One of the modes by which the members of a federal union strive to derive the maximum advantage from the act of federation is to create a customs barrier against foreign goods and to permit absolute freedom of trade among the units; by this means indigenous trade gets two advantages, one negative and another positive; the former consists in the protection afforded against foreign competition by tariffs, the latter arises out of the free movement of commodities as among the units *inter se* with a consequent augmentation of the country's wealth. Thus freedom of internal trade is a cardinal item in many federal constitutions and we shall note how the American, Canadian, Australian and Indian constitutions have dealt with this matter.

In the United States by Article I section 8(3) of the constitution, the power of the Congress is to 'regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states and with the Indian tribes.' By a process of judicial interpretation, the rule has become well-established that since the subject is one of national concern requiring national treatment the Congressional power is exclusive. Thus the states in America have no power to pass legislation affecting interstate commerce at all. Most of the decisions in America where state acts have been impugned have turned on the question, is the state act one dealing with police powers of the state and hence within its competence, or does it purport to indirectly regulate interstate commerce and encroach upon the