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NEW LIGHT ON THE GAUDAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS *

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA.

मांडूक्योपनिषद्गताः सुविदिताः श्रीगौडपादस्य ये
श्लोकास्तानिह विभ्रमादुपनिषत्वेनैव मेने तथा ।
तद्व्याख्यां च समातनोत्सुविगुलामानन्दतीर्थसुधी-
रित्यद्वैतिजनोक्तदोषदलने बद्धोत्सुकोऽस्यादरात् ॥

The opinion is strongly held in the fashionable circles of Vedānta Philosophy that the Kārikās of Gaudapāda on the *Māṇḍūkya-upanīṣad* have been mistakenly confounded with and taken as a part of the original Upanīṣad by Śrī Madhvācārya and his followers. This attitude of Madhva has been severely criticized 'as one of scholarly stupidity and he and his philosophical system have been sought to be discredited on this and on other accounts.

I propose to demonstrate in the course of this article that the 'upanīṣadic theory' of the Kārikās (as I shall hereafter designate it) is perfectly tenable. It can readily be pointed out that the tradition which Madhva inherits and in accordance with which he reads the first twenty-nine Kārikās of Gaudapāda as part of the *Māṇḍūkya upanīṣad* is a very old one. And apart from what Madhva and his followers have to say, the mass of external evidence relating to the text and interpretation of the Kārikās unmistakably proves that Madhva's position is entirely justifiable.

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1. Modern scholars have not so far openly come out with a criticism of Madhva. But orthodox advaitins of the past century like Triyambaka Śāstri have written elaborate criticisms not however available in print. Many responsible votaries of Advaita still hold the belief that Madhva has committed a serious blunder and preach it as a fashionable fad.

Before proceeding to set forth and examine these grounds, it is necessary to briefly notice the arrangement of the text according to the Advaita and Dvaita schools of Vedānta.

The Gauḍapāda Kārikās, two hundred and fifteen in number, are arranged in four sections or chapters, designated *Āgama Prakaraṇa*, *Vaitathya-Prakarāṇa*, *Advaita-Prakarāṇa* and *Alātaśānti-Prakarāṇa* in order. The Advaitic tradition ascribes all of them to the authorship of Gauḍapāda, the grand-preceptor of Śaṅkara. The first twenty-nine kārīkās about which has arisen the present controversy, come under the first chapter. They are inter-woven with the original upaniṣadic passages at regular intervals and are introduced everytime with the words : *atraite śloka bhavanti*.

The arrangement of the Upaniṣad according to Madhva consists of four short Khaṇḍas. The Kārikās are interwoven with the original upaniṣadic passages and are introduced with the same remark as in the other school. The Upaniṣad thus ends with the twenty-ninth Kārikā. It is interesting to note that with the first twenty-nine Kārikās which Madhva reads as part of the Upaniṣad, also ends the first chapter of Gauḍapāda.

It will be seen from the foregoing that Madhva has incorporated only twenty-nine of the whole lot of Gauḍapāda-Kārikās numbering two hundred and fifteen into the original. We may also remember that the twenty-ninth Kārikā marks the close of a chapter i. e. of a topic. The designation of the first chapter as *Āgama Prakaraṇa* would seem to suggest 'the (quasi)? scriptural character of that chapter which indirectly strengthens Madhva's position. If therefore, as had been suggested, Madhva had been misled and had mistaken there is nothing to have prevented him from mistaking some more or all the rest of the Kārikās'. Inadvertence is unimaginable on the part of Madhva who is all alert. And the fact that he himself attributes the Kārikās to some other source equally distinct and different from both the Upaniṣad and Gauḍapāda proves that he was far from inadvertent. It follows on the other hand that he deliberately identified the twenty-nine Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad. When we say that Madhva

1. Prof. K. Sundararama Iyer of Kumbakonam, who is one of the ablest expositors of Advaitic tradition in these parts, in the course of one of his talks with me opined that there need be no quarrel over this since even the Advaitins tacitly attach scriptural validity to the disputed Kārikās by dubbing the chapter *Āgama Prakaraṇa*.

incorporated some of the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda it is understood that he was aware of the whole body of the Kārikās numbering two hundred and fifteen. His own commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* shows that he was aware of the Advaitic interpretation of some of the Kārikās. And the fact that he has taken no notice of the rest of the Kārikās shows that he ought to have had very good reasons to doubt the genuineness of the tradition which attributed those twenty-nine Kārikās to Gauḍapāda. Madhva could as well have given the slip to the Advaitin by coolly turning his back upon all the Kārikās and boycotting them. Why should he have worried himself about the Kārikās of a certain Gauḍapāda who was above all else a pucca Advaitin? Madhva, it should be remembered, was a rising philosopher. He was a newcomer in the field. Would he have jeopardized his popularity by committing a conscious blunder and introducing what would otherwise have been a new-fangled fad? Would his rivals and critics have simply tolerated his aberrations? Could he, I ask, have simply attempted the feat? Or again, Madhva ought to have known very well that that surely was not the way either to beard the lion in his own den!

The fact that with the portion which Madhva regards as part of the Upaniṣad also ends the first Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda is significant. The evidence against Madhva would have been stronger, and still more conclusive if he had ventured into the 'Kārikā portion' a little further and appropriated some more. But it would be enough to appeal to the continuity of thought which is seen throughout the Upaniṣadic passages and the suspected Kārikās against the view that the latter have been mistakably or forcibly appropriated. The phrase *Māyāmātram idam dvaitam* against Madhva's interpretation of which a hue and cry is often raised, is thus an obvious and unmistakable echo of a foregoing *icchāmātram prabhoh sṛṣṭiḥ*. It will thus be seen that Madhva's rendering of *māyāmātram* into *icchāmātram* has not only dialectical and verbal but also semantic and contextual consistency — a fact to which Śrī Vyāsaśa Svāmin himself draws pointed attention in his *Nyāyāmṛta*. Śrīnivāsatīrtha, in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* points out the interrelation between the Upaniṣadic passages and the Kārikās and the continuity of thought is sufficiently discernible to rebut the charge of their having been forcibly or otherwise sifted to suit a preconceived notion.

The same amount of consistency cannot be shown on the Advaitic side. The advaitic interpretation of the *kārikā* प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत involves great confusion and a lot of inconsistencies. Some kind of अनुकूलतर्क is evidently sought to be made out by the dictum : प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः. Now, the proper statement of it would be in the form of what is called a विपर्ययपर्यवसान. Such a syllogism would run : प्रपंचो न विद्यते । यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत । न निवर्तेत । तस्मात्तस्ति प्रपंचः ॥ i. e. to say :—*The universe does not exist. If it existed, it would disappear. It does not so disappear. Therefore, it does not exist.* Now, this is more than the Advaitin can conveniently grant. It would be hazardous for him to deny that the universe does disappear—no matter when. The entire edifice of Advaitism rests on the assumption that the phantasmagoria of creation disappears at the dawn of monistic consciousness. So then, the dictum : प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत would only land him in difficulties. Gaudapāda, an adept in logic that he was, would not have framed such an awkward dictum which is so suicidal in effect. The best thing for the Advaitin would therefore be to absolve Gaudapāda of the authorship of such *kārikās* and adopt the other alternative of regarding them as part of the Upaniṣad whose interpretation however, may quite logically be left an open question.

However that may be, the *kārikā* प्रपंचो यदि विद्येत (and many others besides to be noticed presently), *QUA* *kārikā* is extremely fatal to Advaitic dogmas. One may also draw attention to a palpable contradiction between Śaṅkara's own dicta : सच्चिदानन्दो विद्यमानश्चेन्निरवर्तेत. The other hemistich विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यदि केनचित् is equally fatal to Advaitic dogmas. It unmistakably establishes the reality of the universe by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*. The reasoning runs :

The universe if it were a phantasy would be negated some day.

It is not so negated.

∴ It is not a phantasy.

That is to say, it is a reality !

The *Nāropantiya*¹ has a lucid exposition of the whole argument : विकल्पः प्रपंचः यदि कल्पितः स्यात्तदा निवर्तेत इति यद्युपबन्धाद्विद्वन्तान्ब-याच्च तर्क एवात्र श्रुतावुपनिषदः । न तु यथार्थकथनं । तर्कस्य विपर्ययपर्यवसानमावश्यकम् ।

विकल्पः प्रपंचः कल्पितश्चेन्निरवर्तेत ।

न च निवर्तेत ।

तस्मान्न कल्पितः । किंतु परमार्थिक एवेति वाक्यशेषोऽवगम्यते ॥

1. A printed commentary on Madhva's *Tattvodyota*.

Gaudapāda could not have framed such a *vyāpti* for himself ! As Vādirāja Svāmī¹ aptly remarks :

इयं श्रुतिः पञ्चभेदनिवृत्त्या सत्यते स्फुटं ।

यदि प्रपंचोविद्येत निवर्तेत नदाकिल ॥

इममर्थं महानर्थकरं कः पंडितो वदेत् ।

ब्रह्मैवात्म्यं ब्रह्मैवमात्मा तत्तत्कर्मणि कर्माः ॥

एवं च ब्रह्मणो हर्त्री किं न व्याप्तिरियं तव ।

विपर्ययो महानासीत्तर्कस्यास्य विपर्यये ॥

Another case of doctrinal inconsistency crops up if we assume Gaudapāda to be the author of the *Kārikās*. Just see. What is his view of the nature of the world? That it is a merest illusion (मायामात्रं). It is interesting to note that in the first chapter several theories of the nature and motive of creation are stated and refuted² :—

विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ।

स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः ।

कालात्मसृष्टिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥

भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयमात्मकामस्य का सृष्टा ॥

And among the theories thus criticized is found the Advaitic view that creation is an illusion and a myth : स्वप्नमाया-सरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता. Śaṅkara says that here reference is made to two views of creation 'स्वप्नसंस्था मायासरूपाचेति'. Of these, the latter is obviously the Advaitic view (of. मायामात्रमिदं जगत्). There is no denying³ the fact that the real Advaitin regards the world as the merest illusion (मायासरूप). Śaṅkara himself strikes a timely note of warning⁴ at the end of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra : लोकवस्तुलीलाकैवल्यं (II, 33), that the truth of the unreality of the Universe should not be lost sight of. From this it is clear that the Advaitin is pledged to the theory of the unreality of the Universe. But the conclusion of the author

1. *Yuktimalika* of Vādirāja, Kumbakonam Edn. p. 435.

2. *Gaudapāda Kārikās* I, 7-9.

3. Vācaspati Miśra comes out with a clear confession परमार्थस्तु न विभ्रमो नाम कश्चिन्न च संसारो नाम. Śaṅkara himself declares : तस्मान्न कश्चित्प्रपंचः प्रयुक्तो निवृत्तौ वास्तीत्यभिप्रायः

4. न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः । अविद्याकल्पितमायामप्यवधारणोच्चारणात् । ब्रह्मात्मभाषप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यं ॥ (II, 33).

of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikās* is different: *देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयं* which implies that the universe as caused by the Will of God is a reality. The *Kārika* '*देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयमात्मकामस्य का सृष्टिः*' simply denies that God is motivated by any external desire, personal aim or objective in his creation of the world but not that the world itself is a reality'. If it were not so, the whole series of *pūrvapakṣas* and the show of an ultimate conclusion would be grotesquely out of place and would amount to a parody of reasoning. And in the *Kārikās* the theory of the unreality of the world has been definitely set aside; so it cannot again be raised to the rank of a *Siddhānta* view. The slightest endeavour to do so would constitute an insult to the genius of the author of the *Kārikās* — whoever he be.

The author of the *Nyāyāmṛta-Taraṅgiṇī*² also adopts a similar mode of argumentation in establishing the upaniṣadic theory of the *Kārikās*.³ He points out that *इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिः* and *देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयं* should be taken as representing the considered opinion of the author of the *Kārikās*. His reasons are that (1) the term *विनिश्चिताः* used in connection with *इच्छामात्रं* etc., necessitates its acceptance as the ultimate conclusion⁴ and (2) that the absence of terms like *अन्य* in this one case alone, confirms the fact that it is intended to be taken as the ultimate conclusion of the author of the *Kārikās*. Under the circumstances therefore, *मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं* etc. must necessarily mean what

1. Of *Nyāya-sūdhā*, p. 309 — अन्यथा परिणामादिवादापि प्रशंस्येत् ।

2. I am deeply indebted to His Holiness Śrī Suvratīndra Tīrtha Svāmī of the Sumatīndra Mutt for his first drawing my attention to the fact that Rāmācārya is the earliest writer in Dvaita theology, to have felt it necessary in his times to defend the upaniṣadic theory in his own way. It might presumably have been a burning question of the day. It is a pity, however, that Rāmācārya did not deal exhaustively with the question or take into account the opinions of his predecessors in the other Schools of Vedānta such as are at our disposal now.

3. विष्णुर्नि प्रसवत्वये.....विनिश्चिता इत्यादिना सृष्टेरीश्वराधीनत्वं स्वमतमित्युक्तं । श्रुत्या मायामात्रमित्यत्र मतांतरत्वद्योतकस्य अन्यादिशब्दस्याभावेन तस्यापि स्वमतत्वविज्ञानात् स्वमते च सृष्टेरीश्वराधीनत्वावगमात् मायामात्रमित्यत्रापि मायाशब्देन ईश्वरेच्छैव तत्त्वैर्द्रजालक-रूपा मायित्यर्थः ॥ *Taraṅgiṇī*, edited by T. R. Krishnacharya, p. 211.

4. The term *विनिश्चिताः* in the advaitic interpretation turns out to be pointless. Why should Gauḍapāda use such a term of eulogy in connection with a *pūrvapakṣa*? Jayatīrtha also draws pointed attention to this cue.

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिः means. That is to say, Madhva's rendering¹ of *मायामात्रं* into *इच्छामात्रं* is absolutely correct and to the point. The conclusion set forth in *इच्छामात्रं* etc. is that the world is caused by the will of God and is as such a reality. The theory of the unreality of the world having been already disordered, *मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं* must necessarily mean the same thing i.e. the world is caused by the will of God. *माया भगवदिच्छा*.² तयामितं त्रातं च मायामात्रं । अथवा मायामात्रं भगवदिच्छाधीनमिति वा ॥

Thus an examination of the real meaning of the *Kārikās* in the light of the context also establishes beyond doubt that the doctrine of the unreality of the world is not warranted by the trend of the *Kārikās*; and hence Gauḍapāda's authorship of those *Kārikās* naturally collapses.

The position of the twenty-nine *Kārikās qua Kārikās* is highly suspicious. Why are they thrust in between the Upaniṣadic passages? Gauḍapāda was after all a commentator and the normal procedure for a commentator — however eminent — is to keep the original and the commentary unmixed. He should not have allowed them to run riot, encroach upon the original, nay thrust themselves in between the body of the original Upaniṣadic passages and thus jeopardize their sanctity as a piece of revelation!

This strange admixture of text and *Kārikās* extends only up to the first chapter. We do not know if Gauḍapāda himself was responsible for this. Apologists may come forward with the explanation that Gauḍapāda or for the matter of that Śaṅkara himself might have inserted these *Kārikās* in between the Upaniṣadic passages as embodying a most faithful interpretation and as such inseparable from the original. But suffice it to say that the faithfulness of an explanation or interpretation has to be accepted by all and it is for later generations to say if a particular interpretation is faithful. Discounting the self-complacency of the procedure, it is difficult to see in that case why the same method was not followed in regard to the rest of the work of Gauḍapāda. The other three chapters stand by themselves. There seems to be no reason, however, to withhold the honour in their case alone. Or

1. Of *महामायेत्यवियेति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च* ।

प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तद्वेच्छानन्त कथ्यते ॥

2. Of *मायेनीच्छासमुद्दिष्टा मायामात्रं तदुद्भवं* ।

उत्तमत्वात्परार्थोऽसौ भगवान्विष्णुरुच्यते ॥

if it were true that everything pertinent to the original had been set forth in the first twenty-nine Kārikās, there would have been no need at all for Gaudapāda to have written three more chapters on the same subject! The only reasonable conclusion we can come to on a consideration of these and similar difficulties is that the first twenty-nine Kārikās were not Gaudapāda's own.

He might have had access to an original Upaniṣad with an explanatory tract thereon, on which again he based his more elaborate treatise. Thus the twenty-nine Kārikās may have simply served as the nuclei of his later and more detailed treatise. The designation of the first chapter as *Āgama Prakaraṇa* also suggests the quasi-scriptural character of these Kārikās in contradistinction from the purely secular character and human authorship of the rest of the work.

II

Madhva's ascription of the Kārikās to the upaniṣad seems to have met with tacit acquiescence at the hands of prominent Advaitic writers as well.

(1) Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta* elaborately discusses the meaning of a number of so-called monistic texts (*advaita śruti*). In the course of his exposition he fully quotes the two Kārikās: 'प्रपञ्चे यदि विद्येत' and 'विकल्पो विनिवर्तते.....' not as Kārikās indeed but as *śruti* texts *par excellence* and establishes after an elaborate process of reasoning that these *śruti* texts do neither contemplate nor advocate Advaita Vāda.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the great champion of Advaitism, vehemently criticizes the *Nyāyāmṛta* in his *magnum opus*, the *Advaitasiddhi* and leaves no opportunity unavailed of to discredit his adversary. In the present case, Madhusūdana could easily have assailed his opponent not only for misinterpretation of the Kārikās but what is more for his mistaken identification and misappropriation of the two Gaudapāda Kārikās into the genuine Upaniṣadic text. But it passeth strange that the great veteran of Advaitism has simply held his peace and has slipped over this text of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. It is significant to note the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, who is at times only too ready to flare up against his opponent in unparliamentary invective, consciously overlook a most vulnerable point in his adversary's position. It is therefore impossible not to interpret this 'masterly silence' into a tacit acquiescence in the Upaniṣadic theory.

(2) Śaṅkara himself gives no indication of the authorship of Gaudapāda in the course of his commentary on the disputed Kārikās. Not to speak of a recent theory of Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya¹ that Śaṅkara himself is not the author of the commentary attributed to him, it is highly surprising that he does not even once mention the name of Gaudapāda anywhere in his commentary – not even where the context requires it! There is every chance and necessity for him to do so as under the headlines: अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति, he simply adds: अत्र एतस्मिन्यथोक्तेऽर्थे श्लोकमवन्ति, but does not at all say who the author of these ślokas is or why on earth the Upaniṣad should take any notice of them. Now, either the Upaniṣad may be taken to cite some parallel passages as is usual in Upaniṣadic literature, or Gaudapāda himself may be taken to have quoted them from an earlier source for purposes of elucidation. In any case, they cannot be his own. The words अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति preclude that assumption. If one would rather not have them as the Upaniṣad's own words we have to take it that the quotations following are from an earlier or contemporaneous source. This would only substantiate Madhva's attitude toward the Kārikās. If on the other hand, they are to be treated as emanating from Gaudapāda himself, even then the conclusion is irresistible that he is quoting from an earlier source. In any case, the parallel passages cannot be treated as Gaudapāda's own. Indeed to be his they ought to have been prefaced in a more complete form. It is ludicrous to believe that Gaudapāda began his treatise in the most abrupt manner possible without any benedictory verse and plunged into the subject with a mere—'so it is'! And one can legitimately wonder why at all he should have stated that much (i.e. अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति) when the readers can very well see for themselves what is going to happen!

(3) And if Śaṅkara had felt them to be the ślokas of Gaudapāda he would have said so in so many words. The versatile Editors of the Ānandāśrama series make out that the words अत्रैते श्लोकमवन्ति proceed from Gaudapāda (and not the upaniṣad as we may be led to think). But this would result in suggesting an abrupt and unnatural beginning for the

1. It remains to be seen how Dr. Bhattacharya who has himself been carrying on independent research in regard to Gaudapāda would view or welcome the disclosures made in the present article.

Kārikās which already suffer¹ for want of a benedictory verse.

(4) Ānandagiri evidently feels nervous that his master should have left Gauḍapāda's name out of account at the very beginning of the Bhāṣya and he therefore hastens to supply the omission. He writes: "श्रीगौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् माण्डूक्योपनिषदर्थविष्करणपरानपि श्लोकानाचार्यप्रणीतान्याचिख्यातः". A close scrutiny of this passage would reveal that he himself had his own doubts and difficulties about ascribing the disputed Kārikās to Gauḍapāda. Ānandagiri clearly leans to the view that Gauḍapāda used some portion of the Kārikās as nucleus to his more elaborate treatise. This original portion he attributes to some Providential source. The phrase नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् is clearly and unmistakably antithetical to the other आचार्य-प्रणीतान्. It only means that Gauḍapāda had access to some explanatory verses which he used as his starting point. These he attributes to the grace of Nārāyaṇa. Madhva attributes them to Brahmā while another authority of whom mention will be made anon does likewise. Anyhow, all are agreed that these Kārikās do not belong to Gauḍapāda.

The consideration of the charges against Madhva leads us happily enough, to unexpected quarters. During the course of my researches into this *verata questio* I have lighted upon some startling evidences tending to prove Gauḍapāda a plagiarist! Often times genuine research lands us in unexpected quarters and reveals a staggering vista of information. The tables are turned sooner than we are aware. I have already suggested in the foregoing pages that the utmost that can be said of Gauḍapāda is that he can be credited with the authorship of all the three chapters excepting the first which (I further maintain) he ought to have used as nucleus to his more elaborate treatise.

(5) Far from Madhva's having sifted or torn off a portion of Gauḍapāda's work knowingly or otherwise from its proper context and author, and passed it off as *śruti* text, it is Gauḍapāda who turns out to be the real offender.² Madhva himself gives us the cue in his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.

1. It appears to me that Gauḍapāda's beginning his treatise without the usual benediction is highly unaccountable and tends to argue forcibly against his authorship of the first twenty-nine Kārikās.

2. I am aware of the seriousness of such an allegation but the proofs in support of it are glaring.

It is thus: Madhva quotes a number of passages from the *Brahma Tarka* which paraphrase the particular Kārikās beginning with प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत etc.—

तन्वा स्वस्वामिसंबन्धः प्रपञ्चोऽस्य शरीरिणः ।
वस्तुतोऽसौ न चैवास्ति परमात्मवशो यतः ॥
तन्वादिकस्तथाप्येष ह्यभिमानात्प्रदृश्यते ।
अतः स विद्यत इति ह्यङ्गीकारो भवेद्यदि ॥
तथापि भगवद्ज्ञानात्स निर्वर्तदसंशयः ।
विकल्पो देहबन्धादिः केनचित्कारणेन तु ॥
कल्पितो विनिवर्तत गुरुवाक्यादसंशयः ।
एष एव सतां वादो ज्ञाने द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥
निवर्तत तथाज्ञानं नत आनन्दमेत्यसौ ॥

And again commenting on the words अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति he cites relevant passages from the *Gāruḍa* in which the propriety of the *śruti* quoting from elsewhere in support of its own views is discussed and exemplified:

प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणं चेद्वल्लवद्विद्यतं मुने ।
मग्नदृष्टानतो मन्त्रान्प्रमाणं सलिलेश्वरः ।
अत्र श्लोकाभवन्तीति चकारैव पृथक् पृथक् ॥

Thus the fact that Madhva has cited parallel passages from the *Purāṇas* shows that the Kārikās whose import these parallel passages convey must necessarily belong to some *śruti* consistent with the dictum: इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं सहपबृंहयेत्. It is out of the question to suppose that the *Gāruḍa* or for the matter of that any other *Purāṇa* thought it worth its while to paraphrase the Kārikās of a certain Gauḍapāda. As the *Tarāṅgini* remarks:

ननुमाण्डूक्योपनिषद्विवरणरूपगौडपादीयवार्तिकस्थो प्रपञ्चो यदीत्यादि श्लोकौ । न श्रुतिस्थौ । अत एव गौडपादीयवार्तिकभाष्यानन्दगिरावुक्तं । गौडपादाचार्यैः माण्डूक्योपनिषदं पठित्वा तद्व्याख्यानश्लोकावतरणं अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्तीत्यनेन कृतमिति । तत्कथमुच्यते श्रुत्यर्थ इति । मैवं । आचार्यैः माण्डूक्यभाष्ये तन्वा स्वस्वामिसंबन्ध इत्यादिना व्याख्यातत्वात् तयोः श्रुतित्वमवसीयत ॥¹

All these parallel passages could not be pronounced to be fabrications of Madhva. Critics and scholars would be carrying their prejudice too far if they begin to doubt the *bona fides* of Madhva at every step. Let them consider for a while what on earth he could have gained by indulging in a systematic and wholesale fabrication thus raising a hornet's nest about him.

Taking a more sober view of the situation we cannot be far wrong in supposing that these parallel passages cited by Madhva testify to the existence of an ancient tradition which identified the disputed Kārikās as part of the original upanishad. It is only in this spirit that Madhva himself offers these quotations. His contemporaries and successors among whom there were veritable veterans of the day would not have easily swallowed his pills. Ignorance of the exact state of the philosophical and polemical atmosphere during the times of Madhva and long afterwards (for which lack of sufficient historical material is a partial excuse) coupled with a rank Monistic bias is alone responsible for refusing to see thro' this a clear case.

(6) I shall now come to the startling evidence which exposes Gauḍapāda in the unsuspected light of a plagiarist. Its value is naturally enhanced as it comes from one who is sufficiently impartial and who certainly had no love lost for Madhva and his much-maligned dualism. It is none other than Vijñāna Bhikṣu, the author of the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*. Bhikṣu cites two verses in the course of his aforesaid commentary which are both of them found in the extant and undisputed portion of Gauḍapāda's treatise. One of the verses:

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्वृते ।

न च सर्वे प्रयुज्यन्ते एवं जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥

is quoted by Bhikṣu from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. Commenting on the Sāṅkhya Sūtra I, 152, Bhikṣu writes:¹: तथा प्रत्येकं बुद्धिधर्माणां सुखदुःखादीनां शरीरधर्माणां च ब्राह्मण्यक्षत्रियत्वादीनां आरोपितानामपि व्यवस्थास्ति शास्त्रेषु । यथा विष्णुपुराणे—यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे.....' etc. This verse is cleverly given out by Gauḍapāda with a slight alteration as his own:

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ।

न सर्वे संयुज्यन्ते तत्र जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥

(अद्वैतप्रकरण III, 5)

The *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* is a much more ancient affair than Gauḍapāda and I believe it will be granted by Oriental scholars that it is not likely that the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* has borrowed the verse in question from Gauḍapāda. The painful conclusion stares one in the face that Gauḍapāda has plagiarised a bit here – not without an effort to conceal the same.

1. *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, Ohoukh. Edn., p. 100.

(7) Another instance of a similar procedure is to be seen in:—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न वदो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्नैव मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ (वैतथ्यप्रकरण II, 31)

which is quoted¹ by Vijñāna Bhikṣu as a *Śruti* text!! Bhikṣu writes:—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिरित्यादि श्रुतेस्तु आत्मतिरिक्तस्य कूटस्थनित्यतारूपाति-
परमार्थसत्ताविरहोऽर्थः । किंचात्मनो निरोधाद्यभावोऽर्थः । अन्यथा एतादृशज्ञानस्य मोक्ष-
फलकत्वप्रतिपादनविरोधात् । न हि मोक्षो मिथ्येति प्रतिपाद्य मोक्षस्य फलत्वमप्रमत्तः प्रति-
पाद्यतीति । यावद्यात्मैक्यश्रुतयः तास्तु प्रथमाध्याय एव व्याख्याताः । ब्रह्ममीमांसाभाष्ये
च एताज्ज्याश्रय श्रुतयः अस्माभिर्व्याख्याता इति दिक् ॥

The Bhikṣu would not have taken so much trouble and racked his wits to harmonize his ideas with the text in question if it were merely a Kārikā from Gauḍapāda. Bhikṣu is quite clear that the text is a *śruti* which requires to be satisfactorily answered and explained. He also says how he has already reconciled similar *śruti* texts advocating Advaitism. The case admits of no doubt or division of opinion. Bhikṣu is a versatile scholar and cannot easily be dislodged. He cannot be mistaken in treating न निरोधो etc. as a *śruti* whose advaitic interpretation he challenges. It is utterly impossible that he is inadvertent² especially when he is quoting this *śruti* for adverse comment.

The conclusion therefore is that Gauḍapāda has simply passed off this *śruti* as his own Kārikā. Seeing that at least two of the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda admit of being traced to earlier sources, a serious and genuine suspicion may rightly be entertained with regard to the disputed Kārikās as well. Madhva's ascription of them to the original upanishad is thus a legitimate conjecture. Enough has been said to prove the inherent validity of his contention and more will follow. Thus Gauḍapāda ought to have purposely drawn³ his materials

1. Ibid. p. 225. Bhikṣu once again quotes the same *Śruti* in his commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras*—which thus leaves Gauḍapāda utterly exposed. Indeed, Bhikṣu does not forget to quote it in his *Yoga-Vār-tika* too!

2. Bhikṣu again quotes the same text in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* (p. 101) along with वाचस्पत्यश्रुति and repudiates its advaitic interpretation.

3. Some such suggestion is presumably thrown out by Sāṅkara himself whenever he remarks with significance अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तसम्प्रदायविद्विज्ज्ञानैः etc. in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

bodily, from various authentic sources while composing his Kārikās. The two verses quoted by Vijñāna Bhikṣu only illustrate this methodological device of Gauḍapāda. He himself might not have scrupled to use the twenty-nine Kārikās preserved by current tradition as nucleus to his treatise and might have proceeded, in his zeal, to incorporate them into the body of his work to such an extent that modern Advaitic tradition has entirely missed the real character of these verses and imagined them to be the original productions of Gauḍapāda.¹ If the equation of our Gauḍapāda with the author of the commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* is tenable, further evidences of an aptitude for plagiarism can be adduced in the *Gauḍapāda-vṛtti*, being an unacknowledged abridgement of the *Mādhara Vṛtti*.

(8) Śaṅkara himself throws out unmistakable hints that he attaches some sort of scriptural validity to these twenty-nine Kārikās. In the opening lines of his commentary on the second chapter of Gauḍapāda's work, he writes:—ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्युक्तं । आगममात्रं तत् । तत्र उपपत्त्यापि वैतथ्यं शक्यतेऽवधारयितुमिति द्वितीयं प्रकरणमारभते । It means that the proofs so far adduced in respect of the doctrine of the unreality of the world being mainly scriptural, the author proceeds to establish the same on logical grounds also. This leaves us in no doubt that the quotation ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते is here regarded as a *śruti* text. Since this occurs in the Kārikā verse, it is conclusive evidence to show that this Kārikā and others besides are regarded by Śaṅkara as plain *śruti* texts which are sought to be reinforced by logical argumentation. There is however, a slight difficulty in adopting this view because in the commentary we find the words एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः intervening between 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं.....' and आगममात्रं तत् thus creating the impression that the scriptural text so referred to is not ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते but एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म thus strengthening the Advaitic view that the Kārikās are not to be included in the Upaniṣad. But the spurious character of this intervening line is

1. It would be interesting in this connection to draw the attention of readers to the disclosures made by Prof. R. D. Ranade, and Dr. Belvalkar in their joint publication of the History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. ii regarding the authorship and authenticity of the fourth chapter of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās (p. 96-7. *ibid*). I have not so far taken up this question or utilised the suggestions of Prof. Ranade because this question is not germane to my thesis. But I hope to deal with this question exhaustively on a future occasion.

self-evident. In the first place, the commentator proceeds to recount briefly what had been set forth in the previous chapter. He naturally quotes from the previous chapter. 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं.....' has no earthly connection with the present context. It has not been taught in the original and no reference to it can reasonably be expected. The Kārikās themselves profess to interpret the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and not any other. Under the circumstances therefore it will be out of place to refer to some scriptural text which has nothing to do with subject-matter, and which does not also occur in the upanīṣad about which the Kārikās and the Commentator himself happen to be speaking.¹ No sane commentator would have the temerity to hang his thesis upon a non-contextual and far-fetched allusion. Śaṅkara himself cannot be guilty of such a piece of illogicality. The sentence therefore seems to be an evident interpolation.²

(9) Nor is the above the only instance where Śaṅkara refers to the Kārikās 'ज्ञाते द्वैत' and others as upanīṣadic texts. In the opening lines of his commentary on the third chapter, he again remarks: 'ओंकार निर्णयउक्तः । प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोद्वैत आत्मेति प्रतिशमात्रेण । ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इति च । अद्वैतं किमागममात्रेण प्रतिपत्तव्यमाहोस्वित्तर्केणापीत्यत आह शक्यते तर्केणापि ज्ञातुं ॥ Here again he pointedly quotes a Kārikā verse in company with an upanīṣadic passage and argues the doctrine of the unreality of the Universe so arrived at on the basis of scriptural evidence alone, is sought to be reinforced through a process of logical reasoning. This leaves us in no doubt that the text 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं—' uttered in the same breath with a recognized *śruti* text must also be a *śruti* text. And again commenting upon the passage: नान्तः प्रज्ञं he once more says अन्तःप्रज्ञादिनिवृत्तिसमकालमेव प्रमातृत्वादिभेदनिवृत्तेः तथा वक्ष्यति ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इति॥

(10) In his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtra* लोकवतु लीलकैवल्यं (II. 1. 33) Śaṅkara argues very strongly against the attribution of any motives to the creation of God. We have

1. It is a mystery why Śaṅkara should have gone all the way to the *Chāndogya* to cite a *śruti* regarding the unreality of the Universe when he could more easily and naturally have cited one from the *Māṇḍūkya* itself besides the Kārikā! It is also doubtful whether ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते and एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म have anything in common. Śaṅkara's own interpretation of the latter is not specially favourable to the Monistic view.

2. Granted this and construed with आगममात्रं तत् the Kārikā ज्ञाते द्वैतं विद्यते becomes a *śruti* text.

already seen how the same topic was discussed in the Gaudapāda Kārikās as well and what the conclusion put forward by the author of the Kārikās was. Śaṅkara takes up the cue furnished in one of the Kārikās देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा reviews various views about creation and its motive and rejects them one by one on the strength of *Śruti* texts which disapprove of them- नहीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितोवा संभवति । न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोज्योक्तुं शक्यते । यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्विबरचना गुस्तरसंरंभेवाभाति तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयं । अपरिमितशक्तिवात् । यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते । आप्तकामश्रुतेः । नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वी । सृष्टिश्रुतेः । सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च ॥ Śaṅkara here presumably means by 'आप्तकामश्रुति' the Kārikā देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा. Since this occurs among the disputed Kārikās we have to take it that Śaṅkara regarded it as a *Śruti* text. Thus we have in this an additional confirmatory evidence for the reasonableness of the Upaniṣadic theory.

(11) We shall notice another evidence which clinches the issue once for all. It appears beyond a shadow of doubt from Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Nṛsiṃhatūpani Upaniṣad* that he is positively and avowedly in favour of treating the disputed Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad. The *Nṛsiṃha* in one place (IV, 1), entirely agrees with slight alterations and omissions with the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Commenting upon this difference in reading Śaṅkara remarks :—किं च उभयत्रापि बहुतरपाठसाम्येपि किञ्चित्पाठभेदोपि दृश्यते and further on¹ अत ऊर्ध्वं माण्डूक्ये उक्त एवार्थं श्लोकाभ्यामथ तुरीयः पादः । एतस्मिन्तापनीयेतुं तानिहाय तुरीयः पादः ॥ which means that herein the reading in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* includes some ślokas before the Turiyapāda while the reading in the *Tāpānīya* would omit these ślokas. These Ślokas are no other than the disputed Kārikās beginning with बहिः प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वः etc. Thus Śaṅkara seems to be entirely in favour² of the Upaniṣadic theory.

1. I have not been able to trace any other *Śruti* wherein the words आप्तकाम occur as a प्रतीक as is intended by Śaṅkara and associated with the act of creation.

2. Works of Śaṅkara (Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam) Vol X, p. 108 containing *Nṛsiṃhatūpani Upaniṣad* and comm.

3. Ibid. p. 110.

4. Śaṅkara's reference to a disputed Kārikā (I—16), in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* with the words अत्रोक्ते वेदान्तसंप्रदायविद्विद्विचारार्थः admits of other explanations.

(12) There is also another and a most effective evidence in favour of the upaniṣadic theory from the works of Śaṅkara. His Holiness Śrī Satyadhyānatīrtha Svāmi of the Uttarādi Mutt, to whom I submitted my thesis for approval besides helping me in a general manner with very valuable hints and suggestions and evincing a personal interest in my work was kind enough to draw my attention to the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* of Śaṅkara, wherein the hemistich मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः is quoted as a *Śruti* text ! I am indebted beyond expression to His Holiness for the particular verse which runs :—

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।

इति ब्रूते श्रुतिः साक्षात्सुषुप्तानुमन्यते ॥¹

and this clinches the matter once and for all. And His Holiness rightly holds that a vigorous research is bound to reveal many more evidences from extant Advaitic works.

III

The balance of evidence thus inclines to the side of the upaniṣadic theory. Except for the solitary criticisms of Triyambaka Śāstri² a very recent writer, the upaniṣadic theory has continued to pass muster and has not been in the least questioned or repudiated by hosts of Advaitic veterans who came after Madhva and who created for themselves many opportunities and lost none to criticize him.³ The author of the *Advaita Siddhi* as indicated before, has observed a masterly silence over this vexata questio.

(13) In the *Taraṅgiṇī* for the first time the upaniṣadic theory is sought to be maintained and reiterated. But in the

1. Works of Śaṅkara (Vani Vilas Edn.), Vol. xiv, p. 82, śl. 406.

2. These are known to have been answered by the late Hulugi Śrīyāpatyaśārya.

3. It is interesting to note in this connexion that Appayya Dikṣita who bore a special grudge against Madhva for his quotations from untraceable works etc :

तथाप्यानंदीर्थीयं मतमग्राह्यमेव नः ।

यत्र वेदिकमर्यादा भूयस्याकुलतीगता ॥

has not raised the present problem anywhere. And seeing also that Vijayindra Tīrtha, his contemporary and critic has not also adverted to a discussion of these problems, Appayya's silence towards the same is established.

famous *Brahmānandīya* which is a reply to the criticisms of the *Taraṅgiṇī*, not the slightest attempt is made to clear up the problem of the *Kārikās*. On the other hand, the author of the *Gauḍa Brahmānandīya* tacitly admits the upaniṣadic theory and simply criticizes the dualistic (*dvaita*) interpretation of the texts: मायामात्रं etc. This is clear from the statement of 'the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Brahmānandīya*. Just see: "मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैत परमार्थ इति गौडपादीयोक्तश्रुतौ भेदसमानार्थकं द्वैतपदं । मायामात्रपदमीश्वरेच्छाधीनतया सत्यमित्यर्थः । तथा च सर्वोऽपि भेदः सत्यः इति श्रुत्यादेरद्वैतार्थकत्वखंडनं परेणोक्तम् ॥" In the foregoing citation the author of *Brahmānandīya* accepts मायामात्रं etc. as a *Śruti* and criticizes the interpretation thereof put forward by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and defended by the *Taraṅgiṇī*. It does not require a genius to see that had the *Brahmānandīya* disagreed with the upaniṣadic theory and meant to criticize it, the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa* would have been made in a different strain.²

A colossal misunderstanding prevails in regard to Madhva's attitude toward the *Kārikās*. It has been repeatedly urged in some quarters that he reads them as part of the upaniṣad. Even the late Rāi Bahadur Śrīś Chandra Basu—the excellent translator of Madhva's commentaries on the Upaniṣads who had understood Madhva's system much better than most modern writers on Indian philosophy—has made the mistake of fancying that "the above *Kārikās* are really *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda but are read by Madhva as part of the Upaniṣad."³

It is therefore necessary to clearly set forth Madhva's attitude toward the *Kārikās*. In the first place, amazing as it might seem, Madhva never regards the *kārikās* as an integral part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. He is clearly of opinion that the twenty-nine *Kārikās* or *Ślokas* as they are called, and the rest of the Upaniṣad did not emanate from the same source. Setting aside the orthodox and traditional view of the *apauruṣeya* doctrine (अपौरुषेयत्व) of the *Śruti* for a while, we may understand in more modern terms that he was prepared to grant that the author of the upaniṣad and the author of the *kārikās* were two different personages. It will be overstepping the limits of research to

1. *Advaitasiddhi* with *Brahmānandīya*, Bombay, 1917, p. 827.

2. And further, no attempt is made by *Brahmānanda*, after closing the *pūrvapakṣa*, to criticize the upaniṣadic theory and establish the authorship of Gauḍapāda as one would naturally expect.

3. *Sacred Books of Hindus Series*, Vol. i, Allahabad, 1911.

presume to say whether these *ślokas* were written (or 'seen') before or after the *Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad* or when they came to be associated with it. Madhva proceeds to show in his commentary that the *Ślokas* are quoted to explain and reinforce the original. He also states that Varuṇa is the Rṣi of the upaniṣad to whom they were revealed by Brahmā. Divested of its mytho-poetic garb, the import is plain in more modern terminology.

I have already indicated how it would be impossible for Śaṅkara to account for the presence of the *kārikās qua kārikās* in between the upaniṣadic texts and how as a consequence of the admixture of the text and the *kārikās* the sanctity of the former *per se* would seem to suffer. With Madhva no such difficulty arises. सल्लेश्वरः स्वोक्तार्थदाढ्यं ब्रह्मदृष्टान्मन्त्रान्प्रमाणत्वेन वक्तुं प्रतिजानीते । (Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha). The peculiar position of the *Kārikās* would also necessitate such an inference.

(14) It is no strange phenomenon for the upaniṣads to quote in support of their views. Instances of such parallel quotations (समाख्या) can be pointed out in profusion. The method of introduction is also the same everywhere: तदेतदहचाभ्युक्तं तदेव श्लोकोभवति or as we have it in the *Māṇḍūkya* अत्रैते श्लोकाभवन्ति To cite but a few of them —

तदेतदहचाभ्युक्तं (Praśna i-7) तदेव श्लोकः (i-10, iii-11, iv-10, vi-5) तदेतौ श्लोकौ भवतः (v-5) तदेतदहचाभ्युक्तं (Mundaka iii-2.9) तदुक्तमृषिणा (Aitareya ii-4.4) तदेव श्लोकोभवति (Brhad. iv-2.3, vi-3.11, vi-4.8) तदेतदहचाभ्युक्तं (vi-4.23).

(15) I have come across an old Telugu Edition 'of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* with an independent commentary published by Mr. A. Buchia Pantulu, as a supplement to the (now defunct) 'Hindu Reformer,' Madras. This edition contains the text and the *kārikās* separately numbered. But the last quarter of the twenty-ninth *kārikā* is repeated twice: सद्गुणैर्नैतरोजनः सद्गुणैर्नैतरोजन इति । which is very significant.² Such a repetition also occurs in the Bombay editions with Madhva's commentary as well as in another to which reference will be made anon. It is a well-known fact that the last few words are usually repeated in the Upaniṣads and allied works as a sort of emphasis and reiteration. Commenting on this repetition Śrīnivāsa Tīrtha remarks: उपनिषदर्थस्यावधारणार्थमन्ते द्विरुक्तिः and he quotes a

1. Rājā Rām Mohan Roy Press, 1893.

2. This edition is earlier than the Ānandāśrama Edn. (1900) and the repetition in reading seems to have been based on well authenticated Mss.

well-known tag : अध्यायान्ते द्विरुक्तिः स्यादेवेति वैदिकेपि । Thus, on the strength of the repetition we may infer that the twenty-ninth kārīkā marks the close of the Upaniṣad.

(16) I shall now notice some of the formidable evidences available from among the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sources. Rāmānuja has not of course left any continuous and complete commentary on any of the Upaniṣads. But he makes plain his attitude toward the disputed kārīkā in the course of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra i.1.1 wherein he criticizes the advaitic interpretation of all the authoritative texts in which the term माया occurs. He shows that the term माया does not mean unreality or illusion as Śāṅkara holds. नहि सर्वत्र मायाशब्दः मिथ्याविषयः । अहर-राक्षसशस्त्रादिषु सत्येष्वेव मायाशब्दप्रयोगात् यथोक्तं ।¹ and he proceeds to examine a number of *Śruti* texts wherein the term माया occurs, and offers his own interpretation of them. In the course of his examination, he introduces a kārīkā : जीवस्यैव हि मायया निरोधः श्रूयते । तस्मिन्धान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः इति । अनादि मायया ह्यतो यदाजीवः प्रबुद्धयत इति च ॥² Rāmānuja would not have quoted this kārīkā if he regarded it as one of Gaudapāda. He would have treated it with the utmost indifference if not also with scorn. But the fact that he quotes it with approval and places it on a par with a text from the *Svetāśvatara* clearly indicates the scriptural validity he attaches to it.

(17) And naturally enough, some of his disciples followed Rāmānuja. Long before Madhva was born, Kūranārāyaṇa Muni, a contemporary and disciple³ of Rāmānuja, wrote a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* in which he treated the first twenty-nine Kārīkāś as part of the Upaniṣad and at-

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, xlviii. p. 102.

2. *Gaudapāda-kārīkā*, I, 16.

3. There is some difference of opinion among the followers of Rāmānuja at the present day, whether this Kūranārāyaṇa is the same martyr-disciple of Rāmānuja. I had occasion to discuss the question with Mahāmahopādhyāya Kapistalam Deśikācārya in the esteemed presence of H. H. Śrī Suvratindra Svāmi Tīrtha of Sumatindra Mutt. M. M. Deśikācārya places this Kūranārāyaṇa later than Vedānta Deśika. But I have reasons to believe along with the learned Editor of Kūranārāyaṇa's commentary in Grantha, that he was a disciple of Rāmānuja. I cannot discuss the question here for want of space. Apart from the question of his identity, the probative value of his attitude to the Kārīkāś remains unshaken. The question of identity may be left an open one without any prejudice to my point.

tributed them to the same source as Madhva¹: उपनिषत्स्वयंप्रमाणत्वेपि स्वोक्तार्थदात्र्येयं स्वोक्तार्थं मंत्रानुवाहरति । मंत्रद्रष्टा ब्रह्मणा भगवद्गुणानामेतेषामेकत्वं स्मृतमिति । He also holds that these Kārīkāś were 'seen' by Brahmin. He also notices the repetition in the reading सद्गुणैर्न-तरोजनः and adds द्विरुक्तिरुक्तसर्वप्रमेयावधारणार्थो उपनिषत्समाप्यर्थो च ॥ There is no doubt that he was fully aware of the more elaborate treatise of Gaudapāda. The work of Gaudapāda was well-known in those days. Yāmūnācārya has a quotation from it. Nobody can therefore say with any show of reason that the comparative oblivion of the work resulted in a confusion afterwards of the genuine Kārīkāś with the Upaniṣad. Kūranārāyaṇa could not have been removed from Śāṅkara by more than three centuries; and if just three hundred years after Śāṅkara there was a persistent tradition which assigned the disputed Kārīkāś to a source earlier than Gaudapāda, there is every reason to suppose that Madhva had equal access to it in his own days. Nor is this surprising considering the versatility of Madhva and the wonderful range and variety of his equipment as is evidenced in his numerous works.

(18) Kūranārāyaṇa is not the only writer to be mentioned in support of Madhva. There is another, belonging to the self-same school of Rāmānuja. It is Doḍḍācārya alias Mahācārya, who calls himself of the Vādhūlagotra, and a pupil of Śrīnivāśācārya. He seems to have been a contemporary of Appayya-Dikṣita. He is the author of some polemical works against the Advaita Vāda such as the *Advaitavidyāvinjaya*, *Pārātaryavinjaya*, *Sadvīdyāvinjaya*, *Brahmavidyāvinjaya* etc. In the first-named he criticizes the monistic interpretation of many *Śruti* texts. A Telugu manuscript of the book is deposited in the Government Oriental Mss Library, Madras. It bears the Descriptive Catalogue No. 4851. I managed to examine the work in parts with the help of a Telugu Pandit in the Library and to my surprise I found the author inclined to treat the Kārīkāś beginning with अत्रैते श्लोकाभवन्ति in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as part of the original. Mahācārya is found actually to challenge Śāṅkara's interpretation of the text प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं

1. It was my esteemed Professor, Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppu-svami Sastriar, of the Presidency College, Madras, who drew my attention originally to Kūranārāyaṇa; which enabled me to look up his commentaries. And with the help of information gathered from elsewhere, I was able to make an exhaustive study of the question of his identity and come to definite and independent conclusions.

मन्यन्ते । In the course of his criticism Mahācārya writes:—
 माद्वैक्योपनिषदि उपक्रमे प्रपञ्चोपशमं.....मन्यन्ते इत्युक्त्वा तद्विवरणाकांक्षायाह्वयं । अत्रैते
 श्लोकाभवन्ति । निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानांविमुः स्मृत इति ॥ * * * * *
 * * * * * कोऽर्थस्तर्हीस्य वाक्यस्येति चेत् । तद्व्याख्याने न आवाभ्यां यतितव्यं ।
 श्रुत्यैव व्याख्यानात् ”. Thus one more proof is added
 if any more were wanted, in support of Madhva's position.

Thus it will be seen that there is voluminous evidence in favour of the Upaniṣadic theory. And it has been fully and unreservedly acquiesced in by all the prominent champions of the three Schools of Vedānta not to speak of alien writers like Vijnāna Bhikṣu. The Upaniṣadic theory of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās can no longer be dismissed by the noblesse of Oriental scholars and savants as a mad freak of Madhva and his followers. It is high time for the slumbering sexagenarians of Sanskrit Research to wake up and modify some of their pet theories and opinions in the light of recent research.

And the present article would not have been written in vain if it would convince impartial scholars and critics that Madhva is fully justified in treating the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad. And I would consider myself amply requited for all my labors if it would dispel ignorant and calumnious criticisms against Madhva and his followers in this respect. Much remains to be done in the field of the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva. A satisfactory solution of the problem of Gauḍapāda Kārikās would in turn facilitate a sympathetic approach to and understanding of the system of Madhva; and it is hoped the present article has not failed in this its aim.

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FURTHER LIGHT ON THE GAUDAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS.*

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA, B.A. (Hons).

माण्डूक्योपनिषद्भूताः सुविदिताः श्रीगौडपादस्य ये
श्लोकास्तानिह विभ्रमादुपनिषत्वेनैव मेने तथा ।
तद्व्याख्यां च समातनोत्सुविपुलामानन्दतीर्थस्सुधी-
रित्यद्वैतिजनोक्तदोषदलेने बद्धोत्सवोस्म्यादरात् ॥

In the course of a paper contributed by me to the Sixth All India Oriental Conference, Patna, on the Gaudapāda Kārikās and since published in Vol. II, No. 1, of the *Review*,¹ I maintained that Śrī Madhvācārya has been wrongly accused of having mistaken the first twenty-nine Kārikās of Gaudapāda—the grand-preceptor of Śaṅkara—on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as part of the original since these twenty-nine Kārikās have been treated as *Śruti* texts by all the prominent exponents of the three Schools of Vedānta such as Śaṅkara,² Ānandagiri, Madhusūdana, Brahmanānda, Rāmānuja, Kūranārāyaṇa, Mahācārya,³ Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsarāja Svāmin, Rāmācārya etc. It would appear therefore, that Gaudapāda was never at all credited with the authorship of the Kārikās of the first or *Āgama Prakaraṇa* as it is called—a designation not without significance in this connection—and that Madhva was propounding no new or startling theory when he identified these twenty-nine 'Kārikās' as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* in his commentary on the same in consonance with early Advaitic tradition also. The testimony of the early Advaitic sources to be set forth in detail in the following pages will amply reinforce this view.

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1. The present article is a continuation from p. 56 Vol. II, No. 1 of the *Review*.

2. *Vivekaśūdhamaṇi*, sl. 406.

3. *Advaita—Vidyā-Vijaya*.

IS THERE ANY PROBLEM AT ALL?

Quite expectedly, my article on the Kārikās has evoked a lot of interesting and hostile criticism on the one hand and some amount of achromatic criticism on the other. I shall dispose of the latter in a few words. A very learned friend of mine remarked to me that all my endeavour at the 'problem' of the 'Kārikās' is 'love's labor lost'! I can only trust that my friend was not serious at the time. Another competent authority, Mr. A. V. Gopālācārya of Trichinopoly, writes "I do not know" if any of the modern exponents of Advaitism maintain that the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* is not part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* but is only a production of Gauḍapāda and I should be surprised if such a position should be taken up.....there opinions possible on this matter to the Advaitins who considered being no two themselves bound by their Sampradāya. I do not believe that any of them will disown their Sampradāya" (Italics mine).

All this amounts to a simple query—Is there anything like a 'problem' of the Kārikās at all? My friendly critics seem to think there is none whatsoever and that I am simply attacking a spectre and a ghost of my own creation! I do not blame them, for they know not what they say. But I must however enlighten them that the admission of the early Advaitins like Śaṅkara notwithstanding, the later Advaitins, their present-day descendants and representatives—mostly English-educated scholars—stoutly maintain that Śrī Madhva has committed a serious blunder in misreading the twenty-nine kārīkās of Gauḍapāda as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. In fact, I myself have heard the same charge against Madhva, urged by one of the greatest Sanskrit scholars now living, Mahamahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Professor S. Kuppusvāmi Śāstriar of the Presidency College, Madras. And I can even say that I owe the first impulse to my recent researches into the Kārikās to a criticism of Madhva in regard to his attitude to the Kārikās which emanated from him. That I am attacking no ghost of my creation would be clear when it is revealed that already at least two prominent scholars (one of them a Professor from Mysore and the other Mr. R. Krishnasvāmi Śāstri, a scholar from the south) have already resolved to refute my position and establish that "so far as the Advaitic position is concerned, there is irrefragable evidence that all the four books were composed by Gauḍapāda." It is quite superfluous to add that the noblesse of European scholars and savants generally regard the disputed Kārikās as part of

Gauḍapāda's work for the very simple reason that they are not aware of any other tradition to the contrary. Weber, in his *History of Indian Literature*,¹ opines "The *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* is reckoned as consisting of four *upaniṣads*, but only the prose portion of the first of these is to be looked upon as the real *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, all the rest is the work of Gauḍapāda."² Dr. A. B. Keith, holds that the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* are "215 memorial verses written by Gauḍapāda, of which the first part deals with the short *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*."³ And accredited exponents of Indian Philosophy such as Dr. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, also hold the same view.⁴

And quite apart from contemporary critics, it appears that at one time, later Advaitins themselves happened to forget and miss the real position of the first set of Kārikās and attribute it to Gauḍapāda. This initial mistake of the later Advaitins dates from the 18th century or thereabout. This mistake, it appears, began with certain latter-day commentators on the well-known Advaitic works e.g., Rāma Tirtha, commentator on Sureśvara's *Mānasollāsa*, Jñānottama,⁵ commentator on Sureśvara's *Naishkarmya Siddhi* and Kṛṣṇānanda Tirtha, commentator on Appayya's *Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha*—who seem to regard the first

1. Tr. by John Mann, and Theodor Zachariae, Trübner, 1882.

2. Ibid., p. 161. The Professor unfortunately, confuses the four Khandas of the Upaniṣadic text (prose), with the four chapters of the Kārikās.

3. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 475-6. Dr. Keith, to whom was sent an off-print of my original article, promptly admitted: "No doubt there is evidence that the first set of Kārikās is not by Gauḍapāda and very possibly this is the case". It is, not however, clear what he means by this halting and vague confession.

4. The resolute silence maintained by many reputed scholars of Advaita and Professors of Indian Philosophy in general, and the jejune non-committal attitude adopted by others in reply to my requests for an expression of their minds only confirms my suspicion that they would fain adopt the excellent policy of giving a dog a bad name and hang him. But such tactics cannot still be repeated with impunity.

5. cf. प्राक् दृष्टेः तन्निवृत्तिर्नास्तीति यदुक्तं तत्र प्रमाणत्वेन गौडपादीयवाक्यमुदाहरति । अस्मैति ॥ The text quoted by Sureśvara here is कार्यकारणबद्धौ तौ'(1, 11); *Naishkarmya Siddhi* with comm. of Jñānottama, p. 192. *Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*.

twenty-nine kārīkās as Gauḍapāda's own. And even as early as the last century, the illustrious Triyambaka Śāstri, is reputed to have found fault with Madhva for his mistaking the Kārīkās of Gauḍapāda for *Śruti*. And quite recently, the late lamented Rāmasubbā Śāstrigal of Trivisanallur, a scholar of no mean repute, actually raised the question of the Kārīkās in his criticism of the *Tūtparyā Candrikā* of Vyāsarāja. In fine, there is historical continuity in the charge against Madhva, albeit untenable; and the criticisms, veiled attacks, and suppressed sighs of modern scholars against Madhva are simply a recrudescence of the old complaint. As early as the 17th century A.D. the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta Tarāṅgiṇī* which is a criticism of the *Advaita Siddhi*, adverts to the problem of the Kārīkās and puts up a defence of Madhva. And it is obvious that it was a burning question of the day. It will thus be seen that I am attacking no ghost of my creation but a stern reality and facing a problem which deserves to be squarely faced by one and all interested in a satisfactory solution of one of the most intriguing of textual problems in Indian philosophical literature.

V

Since the publication of my article, in the March number of the *Review*, I have been carrying on further researches into the problem of the Kārīkās and I propose to place the results of my investigations before impartial scholars and critics in the following pages.

I must herein mention that Dr A. B. Keith, of the Edinburgh University, acknowledging receipt of an offprint of my article writes under date 7, vi. 31:—

"I have read your paper on the *Gauḍapāda Kārīkās* with interest. No doubt there is evidence that the first set of Kārīkās is not by Gauḍapāda, and very possibly this is the case.

I am very doubtful whether it is the case that Gauḍapāda is a plagiarist (pp. 12,13). The evidence of Vijñāna Bhikṣu in citing the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* is insufficient and so also his mere reference to *Śruti*".¹

I have already referred to the reported criticisms of my article by two scholars from South India. Needless to add I await their threatened action!

1. These and other objections of Dr. Keith will be dealt with in a separate note.

I have been accused by some critics of partiality¹ to Madhva in undertaking a vindication of his attitude toward the Kārīkās. To such my only answer is that they are using the term partiality in the wrong sense. Indeed, on such a view, any one writing on any topic can be accused of partiality to that topic or the subject of his writings. No man can thus afford to escape the charge. But as Zeller has it, real philosophical impartiality lies not merely in the absence of all presuppositions but in bringing to bear presuppositions that are true. The case is not different with historical or textual problems. My point is that Madhva has been *wrongly accused* of misreading the Kārīkās of Gauḍapāda as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*; and if one were to point out to such critics that Madhva is not at all responsible for the original identification of the disputed Kārīkās as part of the *upanīṣad* but that the identity had long been established before him and accepted as valid by all prominent Advaitic and Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers, where is partiality in this?

Another criticism warns me that I am wrong in saying that Gauḍapāda is a plagiarist.² Here again, there is a slight misconception. My point here is that if we are slow to recognize that Gauḍapāda incorporated the existing explanatory mantras of the *Māṇḍūkya upanīṣad* into the body of his separate work, no doubt with the best of intentions, we are driven to the unhappy necessity of suspecting him of plagiarism since textual evidences enable us to trace some of his well-known Kārīkās occurring in

1. Mahamahopādhyāya Dr Ganganath Jha, for instance has been kind enough to remark, "Your work shows to the neutral man traces of sectarian bias." But I submit that in the light of further evidences brought together in the present article, it would be clear that only a false sense of loyalty to 'alleged' advaitic traditions prevents many scholars from realizing that Madhva is not the original sinner in treating the disputed kārīkās as *śruti* but that all earlier Advaitins too have themselves followed the same procedure.

2. Dr. Keith's objection to my dubbing Gauḍapāda a plagiarist relates not to the first set of Kārīkās but to some others occurring in the other portions of Gauḍapāda which are traced to earlier sources in later works. Since Dr. Keith admits that very possibly Gauḍapāda is not the author of the first set of Kārīkās, the question of his plagiarism also does not arise in the absence of any claim on his behalf to the authorship of those Kārīkās.

the other (undisputed?)¹ parts of his work to still earlier sources—a fact which justifies a similar suspicion being entertained in the case of the disputed Kārikās as well (which turn out to be *Śruti* texts on Śaṅkara's and his followers' own showing).

Of course, it was not the central thesis of my article that Gaudapāda must be a plagiarist. Rather, I was demonstrating that the accusation of mistaking the Kārikās of Gaudapāda for *Śruti* texts against Madhva would, critically examined, lead to the inevitable nemesis of engendering a charge of plagiarism against Gaudapāda himself and casually pointed out what may be regarded as evidences in this direction by citing Vijñāna Bhikṣu. Dr Keith's objections against the evidence of Vijñāna Bhikṣu are extremely volatile and will be dealt with in some other connection.

But to return to my point, it is my firm belief that the presence of the twenty-nine Kārikās *qua* Kārikās in Gaudapāda can be satisfactorily explained otherwise than as a plagiarism. I have set forth my explanation sufficiently clearly on an earlier occasion. I do not hold Gaudapāda to be a wilful plagiarist who wanted to hide his real colors. My complaint is against the modern Advaitins who seem to have missed the real truth about the kārīkās and who by thoughtlessly accusing Madhva have created a veritable quagmire around themselves. I have clearly anticipated that Gaudapāda did not care 'for what we call originality.' I merely drew attention to the two quotations in Vijñāna Bhikṣu to corroborate the possibility and probability of Gaudapāda's having embodied the twenty-nine 'Kārikās' of the

1. Whatever we may think of Walliser's startling disclosures regarding the authorship and authenticity of the fourth chapter of Gaudapāda which even jeopardized the very existence of an individual author of the name of Gaudapāda, the parallel passages in the *Tarkajvālā* of Bhūvaviveka and in Gaudapāda deserve attention from a different point of view viz. of determining how far Gaudapāda could have drawn from his undisputed Buddhist predecessor. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar's (Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta, p. 183) ultimate suggestion of "the possibility of the *Tarkajvālā* referring to an independent text or author that may have been also drawn upon by the author of the *Gaudapādīya-Kārikās*" cannot still absolve Gaudapāda of a habitual aptitude for "drawing" without acknowledgment from earlier sources or writers (it does not much matter whether these are Buddhist or even earlier "Vedāntic writers" cf. op. cit., p. 183, f. n. 2)—an attitude which may have its own value in regard to the question of his authorship of the first set of Kārikās. Want of space forbids an entry into these controversial issues.

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad into his more elaborate treatise—being presumably struck by the apparent Monistic tenor of the 'Kārikās.'

From the evidences that I have already set forth in my previous article, and others still which will follow, it would be utterly impossible to deny that the disputed Kārikās were from very early times regarded even by early Advaitins as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Granted this, the authorship of Gaudapāda must collapse. One cannot serve two masters—nay not even the modern Advaitins, their present-day descendants and representatives. The disputed 'Kārikās' must either belong to the Upaniṣad or to Gaudapāda. There is no half-way house between the two. And since the early Advaitins themselves have admitted them as '*śruti*' texts, the only way out of the difficulty is to admit that Gaudapāda merely embodied them in his more elaborate treatise and did not want them to be mistaken for his own. If, however, modern Advaitins and their representatives desire to be more loyal than the earliest exponents of their School, and insist willy nilly on the authorship of Gaudapāda whatever the internal textual evidence to the contrary in the earliest works of their own School, one is constrained to draw attention to the inevitable nemesis of such misplaced loyalty! In the light of the unequivocal evidences in support of the upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās in the recognized works of Advaita, it would be little short of a pious peulance to insist on the *authorship* of Gaudapāda. In other words, those who would *still* uphold the authorship of Gaudapāda must do so at their own risk and at the risk of subjecting Gaudapāda to a charge of plagiarism which is bound to be suggested by the voluminous evidence disproving his authorship. This is my final say on the matter and this my reply to such of my critics as have misunderstood the charge of 'plagiarism.'

VI

I shall now proceed to set forth further evidences from among the early Advaitic sources in support of the 'upaniṣadic theory' (as I have herein designated it) without further ado.

EARLY ADVAITIC SOURCES SURVEYED.

* (19) In addition to the express statements of Śaṅkara, in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya*, the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, the *Nṛsiṃha-Tāpani*

* The numbering of the points is continued from the first article in the *Review*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 56.

Commentary etc., already quoted by me in my first article,¹ we shall herein notice one more statement from the commentary on the *Viṣṇu Sahasranāma*. In the course of his exposition of the Holy Name *Viṣṇu*² Śaṅkara quotes a number of *Śruti*s. He writes:

..... ओमित्येतदक्षरं मित्युपक्रम्य

प्रणवोऽक्षरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परं स्मृतः ।

अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोबाह्यो न परः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ॥

सर्वस्य प्रणवोऽद्यादिः मध्यमन्तस्तथैव च ।

एवाहि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यञ्जते तदनन्तरम् ॥

प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात्सर्वस्य हृदये स्थितं ।

सर्वव्यापिनमोकारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥

अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः ।

ओंकारो विदितो हेन स मुनिर्नैतरो जनः ॥ इति

ओतद्ब्रह्म, ओतद्वायुः, ओतदात्मा, ओतत्सत्यं इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः³ ॥

It is clear beyond a shadow of doubt that Śaṅkara here quotes these as *śruti* texts. And the fact that he himself quotes later on, three other *Kārikās* from the undisputed portion of Gaudapāda's work and ascribes them expressly to Gaudapāda fully proves that he made a pronounced distinction between the two sets of *Kārikās* and identified the one as part of the *Śruti*. The *Kārikās* quoted from the undisputed portion are :—

मनोजिह्वंभितं चैतद्यत्किंचित्सचराचरं ।

मनसोऽहमनीभावे द्वैताभावात्तदनुयात् ॥

यद्यद्वैतं प्रपञ्चस्य तन्निवर्त्यहिचेतसा ।

मनोजिह्वमयं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥

यथा स्वप्ने द्रव्याभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ।

तथा जाग्रदवस्थाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ॥

इत्यादि गौडपादीये⁴ ॥

(20) It would come as a surprise to my would-be critics that Sureśvara, the immediate disciple of Śaṅkara, is heart and soul in favor of treating the disputed *Kārikās* as *Śruti* texts. A close scrutiny of his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya-Śloka-Vārtika* has revealed that he makes a clear distinction between the *Kārikās* occurring in the first chapter of Gaudapāda which he distinctly dubs *Śruti* texts and others occurring elsewhere in Gaudapāda which he quite faithfully attributes to Gaudapāda by

1. Ibid., pp. 50, 51.

2. विश्वं विष्णुविषयद्वारः श्रुतमव्ययव्ययः ।

3. Opening sentence of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.

4. *Viṣṇu Sahasranāma Bhāṣya, Vārti Vilāsa* Edn. pp. 34, 35.

5. Ibid., p. 24-5.

name. And Ānandagiri, who has fortunately commented on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śloka Vārtika* of Sureśvara, also identifies the passages as *śruti* texts or as those of Gaudapāda as the case may be.

Sureśvara has :—

अनिश्चिता यथारज्जुरिति न्यायोपबृंहितं ।

स्फुटार्थं गौडपादीयं वचोऽर्थेनैवगीयते ॥

wherein he refers to Gaudapāda by name, and quotes from the undisputed portion of his work. Ānandagiri faithfully identifies this *Kārikā* :—

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरंधकारे विकल्पिता ।

सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैः तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥

(II, 17)

with the remarks: प्रत्यगज्ञानविवर्तो जगदित्यत्र संप्रदायविदां वाक्यं प्रमाणयति ।¹ These remarks of Sureśvara and Ānandagiri have to be contrasted with Sureśvara's :—

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाची प्राज्ञस्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।

इत्यादि स्थानभेदेऽपि वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितः² ॥

and Ānandagiri's significant comment :

— स्थानभेदे श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति । स्वप्नेति । दर्शितश्रुतेरर्थं संगृह्णाति । इत्यादीति³ ॥

Sureśvara's next reference to a disputed *Kārikā* is as hereunder :—

कार्यकारणबद्धौ तावित्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।

प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्यं न सिद्ध्यतः⁴ ॥

on which Ānandagiri comments : अज्ञानेन स्वापे जागरादावज्ञानतज्जाभ्यां प्रतिबद्धं तत्त्वमित्यत्र मानमाह कार्येति⁵ ॥ Notwithstanding the fact that Sureśvara and Ānandagiri do not refer to this disputed *Kārikā* as a *śruti* in so many words, it is plain that they did regard it as a *śruti* since another verse preceding it in the text of the *Kārikās* and yet others following it are found quoted as *śruti* texts.

Sureśvara further on identifies Gaudapāda *Kārikā* i, 3, as a *śruti* :—

विश्वोद्दिस्थूलभुङ्गित्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तशुक् ।

आनन्दशुक्लतथाप्राज्ञ इति चागमशासनम्⁶ ॥

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śloka Vārtika* with comm. Ānandāśrama Edn., p. 510.

2. *Gaudapāda Kārikā* i, 14.

3. Ānandagiri, p. 566.

4. Sureśvara, *Bṛhadārtika* i, 4, 713. and Gaudapāda, i, 11.

5. Ānandagiri, p. 576.

6. Sureśvara, i, 4, 744.

I have already, in my previous article¹ drawn attention to the significance of the term 'āgama' in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*—ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्युक्तं । आगममात्रं त्वे ॥ Here also 'Kārikā' i, 3, of Gauḍapāda is referred to as an 'āgama' i.e. a *Śruti* text. Earlier in this connection, we saw Sureśvara remarking: वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितः which Ānandagiri fully clarified as a reference to *Śruti*: स्थानभेदे श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति ॥ Here again, Ānandagiri clinches the matter to the utter consternation of critics when he remarks: अत्रापि श्रुतिं पठति । विश्वोहीति² ॥ I leave them to swallow this pill as best as they could.

Ānandagiri himself, elsewhere in his commentary on the *Vārtika* cites a passage from the disputed portion of the *Kārikās* and identifies it as a *Śruti* on his own authority. This same is also rather loosely associated with Gauḍapāda by Śaṅkara in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* to which reference had been made in my first article.³ It is this same text that is also quoted by Rāmānuja.⁴ Ānandagiri, in the course of his commentary on the *Sambandha Vārtika* of Sureśvara writes: ननु त्वत्पक्षेऽपि अविद्या, तदनादित्वं, तस्या बन्धकत्वे विद्यापोषणत्वं चेति बहुकल्पनादायोः तुल्यता । नेत्याह कल्पयेति ॥ अविद्यानादित्वानिर्वाच्यत्व-बन्धकत्वज्ञानापोषणत्वादीनां, अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदाजीवः प्रबुध्यते⁵ । 'प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव,' 'नासदासीन्नोसदासीत्,' 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्,' 'मायाहेषामयासृष्टा,' 'मायामेतां तरन्ति ते' इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिभिरेव सिद्धे: न तान्यविद्यायाः कल्पयेत्पि कल्प्यानीतिभावः⁵ ॥

In the foregoing passage, Ānandagiri quotes a disputed *Kārikā* first and then follow other texts of well-known *Śrutis* and *Smritis* ॥ It is clear that the first passage from its very place at the head of the quotation, must be a *Śruti* text since otherwise it would be little short of an unpardonable sacrilege to relegate the other *Śrutis* to a secondary place and give the first place of honor to a *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda. Ānandagiri, I am sure, would not plead guilty to such a charge. Everything is right when we remember that Ānandagiri has already identified many of the so-called '*Gauḍapāda—Kārikās* as *Śruti* texts and the passage 'अनादिमायया.....' is no exception.

Thus, it will be seen that a very clear, sharp and pronounced distinction between the disputed *kārikās* on the one hand and others occurring in the undisputed portions of Gauḍapāda's work is made by Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Ānandagiri. On an earlier

1. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, vol. II, No. 1, p. 48.

2. Ānandagiri, comm. p. 582.

3. R. P. R. vol. ii, No. 1 p. 50, fn. 4.

4. loc. cit. p. 54.

5. Ānandagiri's Comm. on *Sambandha Vārtika*, pp. 57, 58.

occasion,¹ I drew attention to a passage² in Ānandagiri's sub-commentary to Śaṅkara's commentary on the *kārikās* of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which on close scrutiny was shown to presuppose a decided distinction between the two sets of '*Kārikās*' (one to be reckoned as part and parcel of the *Upaniṣad*, and the other as belonging to Gauḍapāda) in view of the antithesis between the two phrases 'गौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान्' and 'आचार्य-प्रणीतान् श्लोकानपि' । It is really gratifying to note that such a distinction is really confirmed by internal textual evidence in Ānandagiri's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śloka Vārtika* (besides the evidence of the original) and hence could not be dismissed, as may be sought to be done by critics, as resting on a tortuous and hair-splitting interpretation of Ānandagiri's words. Indeed, Sureśvara quotes³ in all, four *Kārikās* from the undisputed portion of Gauḍapāda and attributes them to Gauḍapāda by name whereas he quotes three disputed *Kārikās* and ascribes them in so many words to the *Śruti* in which he is expressly supported by Ānandagiri.

Summing up, therefore, we find that Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Ānandagiri are all three of them fully and unreservedly in favor of reading the disputed *kārikās* as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.

Other Advaitic works dating from after the thirteenth century will be examined on a later occasion. I am already working at them and the results of my investigation will be placed before scholars and critics in due course.

1. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 44.

2. गौडपादाचार्यस्य नारायणप्रसादतः प्रतिपन्नान् माण्डूक्योपनिषद्व्याख्यानपरमविश्लोकान् आचार्य-प्रणीतान् व्याख्येयान् भगवान् भाष्यकारः etc.

3. आनिश्चिता यथाऽज्जुति न्यायोपपन्नं ।
स्फुटार्थं गौडपादीयं वचोऽर्थेनैव गीयते ॥
निःशेषवेदसिद्धान्तविद्वद्भिरपि भाषितं ।
गौडपादाचार्यैरेवेवस्तु यथास्मान्मिःप्रवृत्तम् ॥
भूतैर्विस्तृलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्याचोदितान्वया ।
उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन ॥
श्लोकांश्च गौडपादादेः यथोक्तार्थस्य साक्षिणः ।
अधीयतेऽयं यत्नेन संप्रदायविदः स्वयम् ॥
तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा तत्त्वं दृष्ट्वा तु वास्तवः ।
तत्त्वोद्भूतस्तदारामः तत्त्वावप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥
यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।
अनिर्गमनमाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं वा ॥

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STILL FURTHER LIGHT ON THE GAUDAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS*

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माण्डूक्योपनिषद्भाष्यविदिताः श्रीगण्डपादस्य ये
श्लोकास्तानिह विभ्रमादुपनिषत्वेनैव मेने तथा ।
तद्व्याख्यां च समातनोत्सविपुलामानन्दतीर्थस्सुधी-
रित्यद्वैतिजनोक्तदोषदलेन बद्धोत्सवोऽस्म्यदरात् ॥

Readers of the *Review of Philosophy and Religion* would readily recall the evidences urged by me on an earlier occasion in support of the view that the Kārikās of the Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gaudapāda have been from very early times regarded as *Śruti* texts forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and quoted as such by all the early writers of the Advaita Vedānta; and that therefore, the charge against Madhva of having mistaken these Kārikās as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* could never be sustained. Without stopping to take note of the rude shock which my disclosures from early Advaitic sources might have given to vested interests, I proceed to set forth additional corroborative evidences in support of Madhva from among the other Advaitic works not noticed already covering a period altogether of six centuries from the 12th.¹ Certain schematic exigencies, however, prevent a strictly chronological treatment of the evidences; but it is hoped that the information furnished in the body of the article anent the date or period of the works examined, then and there, would be enough to enable the readers to make a strictly chronological rearrangement of the whole if so desired.

VII

When Vyāsarāja Svāmin (1467-1539)² threw the gauntlet against the Advaita Vedānta in his supreme classic, the *Nyāyā-*

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1. This article is a continuation from page 55, Vol. iii, No. 1 of the Review.

2. Vyāsarāja Svāmin, also known as Vyāsātīrtha, was the Guardian Saint of the Vijayanagar Empire and Adviser of Emperor Kṛṣṇadevarāya and many others who succeeded him; and for a time even sat on the throne of Vijayanagar. A brilliant biography of Vyāsātīrtha was given by a contemporary—poet Somanātha in his excellent Campū Kāvya entitled *Vyāsagīcarita* (Bangalore Press, Bangalore City) whose historical value is unsurpassed. The Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism headed by Caitanya owed its inauguration to Lakṣmīpati a direct disciple of Vyāsātīrtha.

mṛta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī readily accepted the challenge and gave forth his *Advaita-Siddhi* in brilliant reply to the above. As a follower of Madhva, Vyāsarāja accepted, without reserve, the position of his Ācārya that the twenty-nine Kārikās of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* were really part of the original and were not, as claimed by some stray Advaitins,³ the composition of Gaudapāda though finding a place in the Āgama Prakaraṇa of the latter's work. From this vantage then, Vyāsātīrtha argued on occasions² that certain of these texts were prejudicial to the interests of an Advaitic attunement of the Vedānta.

Madhusūdana was therefore, in duty bound, to set aside the claims of his adversary. A careful scrutiny of the passage of arms between these two veteran controversialists of the 16th century throws much startling light on our present problem.

(21) Discussing the Ekajīvajñānavāda of Advaitism that the phantasmagoria of creation is the outcome of the beginningless Nescience of a single individual, Vyāsātīrtha argues³ that such a hypothesis finds no support in the *Śrutis*, which, even while explaining the operation of this Nescience on the Ātman, use the plural in sign of the fundamental plurality of selves. To this Madhusūdana replies that the texts such as अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः etc., should be explained away in the light of those which assert that the one Ātman or Jīva it is that is subject to Nescience. It is precisely at this juncture that Madhusūdana introduces the well-known Kārikā of Gaudapāda; अनादिमायया सप्तः as a *Śruti* text supporting his contention:—ननु श्रुतिषु, 'अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमाना' इत्यादावविद्या, 'रमणीयचरणा' इत्यादौ कर्मबन्धः, 'सति संपद्य न विदुः' इति सति सुषुप्तिः 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्था' इत्यादौ तत्त्वज्ञानं 'परा-मृतात्परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे' इत्यादौ मुक्तिश्च चेतनधर्मः कथमनेकेष्वुच्यत इति चेन्न । 'अनादि-मायया सप्तः यदा जीवः प्रवृध्यते' (G. K. i, 16) इत्यादि श्रुतिषु एकवचनप्राप्तैकत्व-विरोधेन उदाहृतश्चतीनामनेकत्वपरत्वाभावात् । नचोदाहृतश्रुतिविरोधेन, 'इतिसृष्टौ विनि-

1. Besides the *Nyāyāmṛta*, Vyāsātīrtha wrote other masterly treatises, the *Tarkatāṇḍava* and the *Tātparyacandrikā*. In the *Candrikā* too, he cites certain disputed Kārikās as *Śrutis*. In a modern work entitled *Candrikākhaṇḍana* the late Rāmasubba Sastri denies that the text quoted by Vyāsātīrtha in one place: आत्मकामस्य का सृष्टा is a *Śruti* and claims that it is a Kārikā of Gaudapāda pure and simple.—p. 124, *Madhva Candrikā Khaṇḍana*, Choukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1919.

2. One such occasion has already been dealt with in my first article—p. 42, Vol. ii, no. 1.

3. *Nyāyāmṛta* i, 43, p. 295, Nirnayasagar Edition.

विज्ञाताः' (G. K. i, 8) इति पूर्वेण, 'स पूज्यः सर्वभूतानां' (G. K. i, 22) इत्युत्तरेण च विरोधादिदमेकवचनं नैकत्वपरमित्येव किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ॥
(अद्वैतसिद्धौ-एकजीवाज्ञानवादः).

It should be noted here that Madhusūdana is citing the *Kārikā* अनादिमायया (i, 16), as a *Śruti* text on his own authority and of his own accord, and that his adversary has not at all referred to this *Śruti* in dealing with the question of एकजीवाज्ञानवाद². It may be pointed out that under recognised canons of first-rate debates it would be ridiculous for Madhusūdana to have urged a mere *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda against the array of *Śrutis* cited by Vyāsa-tīrtha. Such a procedure would have been enough to have put Madhusūdana out of court in any debate. Moreover a mere *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda would not, in any manner, have weakened the position of the opponent, nor furnished sufficient *raison d'être* to modify the surface interpretation of the *Śrutis* invoked by the pluralistic pūrvapakṣin.

(22) In the same context, later on, Madhusūdana rejects a supposed claim of the Dvaitin that the oneness (Ekatva) referred to in अनादिमायया सुतः may be explained away in conformity with many others pledged to a plurality of selves and with the use of the plural in इति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः (G. K. i, 8) etc; and rejoins that such plurality as has been referred to in these instances is a fiction of the mind and that it is not intended to convey any sort of real plurality:—नचोदाहृतश्रुतिविरोधेन, इति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः (G. K. i, 8) इतिपूर्वेण, स पूज्यः सर्वभूतानां (G. K. i, 22) इत्युत्तरेण च विरोधादिदमेकवचनं यदा नीतिपरोराजा, स्वर्गकामो यजेत इत्यादिवन्नैकत्वपरमित्येव किं नस्यादिति वाच्यं—प्रत्यक्त्व पराक्त्व, त्वमहमित्यादिव्यवहारप्रयोजकान्तःकरणाभेदाध्यासबलात् बहुत्वस्य प्राप्तत्वेन, पूर्वो-त्तरवाक्योदाहृतश्रुत्यादीनामतत्परत्वात् ॥³

1. *Advaitasiddhi*, Nirnayasagar, 1917, p. 540.

2. For this reason it would be foolish to attempt to explain away this admission of the *Śruti* of the *Kārikā* in question as a piece of *Abhyupagamyavāda*; for (1) there is no occasion for such an *Abhyupagama*; (2) the opponent has not referred to this verse as a *Śruti*; (3) the Siddhāntin has not anywhere else repudiated the theory; (4) the commentators have not stated it to be an *Abhyupagama* and (5) the opponent could, in that case, legitimately refuse to be bound by the modified interpretation suggested by the Siddhāntin for this text, pleading that the *Śruti* of the *Kārikā* being unproven (asiddha), from the point of view of the Siddhāntin, any argument based on it would be inconclusive. (6) Granting even that there is an *Abhyupagamyavāda*, the pūrvapakṣin may point out that as accepted by him the use of the singular, here is in a generic sense and that therefore the Siddhāntin has no business to play tricks with evidence! अणुपगमे च पूर्वपक्षिणीत्या अनादिमाययेत्यत्रचैकवचनस्य जातिपरत्वस्यैव व्यवस्थापितत्वात्, तत्रैव अर्थजरीयानुपपत्तेः ॥

3. *Advaitasiddhi* i, *Ekajīvavāda* (Nirnayasagar, p. 540.)

It should be noted that Madhusūdana makes no attempt at a denial of the *Śruti* of the texts relied upon by his opponent either here or anywhere else in the whole range of his *magnum opus*; but, on the contrary, admits their *Śruti* and resorts to the good old procedure of all Vedāntins of twisting texts to meet his requirements.

(23) The same attitude towards another *Kārikā* quoted by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* is taken up by Madhusūdana. Quoting his adversary:—ननु यदि विश्वं कल्पितं स्यात्, तदा..... लोकवतुलीकैकत्वमितिसूत्रे (*Brahma-Sūtra* ii, 1, 33) आप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा (G. K. i, 9) इत्यादि श्रुतौ च, प्रयोजनाभावेपि लीलया सृष्टाश्रुतिः..... इत्याद्युक्तं स्यादिति चेन्न। प्रपञ्चस्य कल्पितस्यापि व्यावहारिकदशायां सत्त्वाभ्युपगमेन, तद्दशायां विरोधशङ्कात्परिहारयोक्तत्वात् ॥¹

Here too, Madhusūdana does not call upon his opponent to establish the *Śruti* of the disputed *Kārikā*; neither does he repudiate it.

(24) Similar again is the treatment accorded to 'तुरीयं तत्सर्वदृक्सदा' (G. K. i, 12.) quoted by Vyāsatīrtha. Madhusūdana simply asserts:— 'तुरीयं सर्वदृक्सदा' इति तुरीयसर्वज्ञश्रुतेः सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां सत्यत्वसिद्धिरिति निरस्तम् ॥

(द्वितीय परिच्छेदे निर्गुणत्वोपपत्तौ).²

And later on: ननु शुद्धब्रह्मणश्चिन्मात्रस्याज्ञानाश्रयत्वे सार्वज्ञविरोधः। न च विशिष्ट एव सार्वज्ञं 'तुरीयं सर्वदृक्सदे' (G. K. i, 12) ति विशिष्टस्यैव सर्वज्ञत्वोक्तेरिति चेन्न सर्वदृक्पदनं, सर्वेषां दृक्भूतं चेतन्यमुच्यते न तु सर्वज्ञं तुरीयम् ॥³

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, however, introduces some complication on two occasions by introducing the name of Gauḍapāda-gōḍapādīye ānādi-māyayetyādīvākya; तुरीयं सर्वदृगिति गौडपादीयं वाक्यं तु; but he maintains a discrete silence about आप्तकामस्य का सृष्टा।

Even these two statements do not seem to be intended to uphold Gauḍapāda's authorship; for, (1) in that case, he would have said इति गौडपादवाक्यं instead of गौडपादीयं वाक्यम् ॥ (2) he clearly admits the Upaniṣadic theory of the *Kārikās* when he writes: 'मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमेतत् परमार्थतः' इति गौडपादीयोक्तश्रुतौ द्वैतपदं भेदसमानार्थकं। मायामात्रपदं ईश्वरेच्छाधीनतया सत्यमित्यर्थकम्। तथा च सर्वोऽपि भेदः सत्यः इति श्रुत्यादेरद्वैतार्थकत्वखण्डनं परणोक्तम् ॥ in connection with the section dealing with भेदश्रुतेः षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गभङ्गः। The term गौडपादीयोक्तश्रुति simply lets the cat out of the bag. Brahmānanda then, refers to the real fact of Gauḍapāda's having used the explanatory verses of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as nucleus to his more

1. *Advaitasiddhi* pp. 502-3.

2. Op. cit. p. 730.

3. Op. cit. 583.

elaborate treatise. That Brahmananda was by no means hostile to the Upaniṣadic Theory is easily demonstrable. Attention has already been drawn to the masterly silence maintained by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī about the two famous Kārikās: प्रपञ्चो यदि विवेत..... (G. K. i, 17) and विकल्पोविनिवर्तेत (G. K. i, 18) of Gaudapāda quoted and expatiated upon by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. It is interesting to note that the able Dvaitin Rāmācārya, the author of the *Taraṅgiṇī*, would not let Madhusūdana go in peace: he himself wantonly raises the problem of the Kārikās and decides that the passages प्रपञ्चो यदि etc. are not at all the composition of Gaudapāda but are really *Śruti* texts¹:—ननु, माण्डूक्योपनिषद्विषय-गौडपादीयवार्तिकस्थौ प्रपञ्चो यदीत्यादि श्लोको । न श्रुतिस्थौ । अत एव गौडपादीयवार्तिकभाष्यानन्दगिरावुक्तं । “गौडपादाचार्यैः माण्डूक्योपनिषदं पठित्वा, तद्व्याख्यानश्लाकावतरणं अत्रैते श्लोकाभवन्तीत्यनेन कृतं” मिति । तत्कथमुच्यते । श्रुत्यर्थ इति ? मैवम् । आचार्यैः माण्डूक्यभाष्ये, ‘तन्वा स्वस्वामिसंबन्धः’ इत्यादिना (समाख्यापूर्वकं) व्याख्यातत्वात् तयोः श्रुतित्वमवसीयते ॥

(न्यायामृततरङ्गिणी).

It would appear therefore that Rāmācārya wanted to expose the hollowness of the claim that was being presumably set up in his times and give it its deathblow. But what shall we think of a Brahmananda who tightly holds his peace over this vital question even when it is raked up by his rival ! Certain it is that Brahmananda was not prepared to catch a Tartar in the author of the *Taraṅgiṇī* and oppose the Upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās which, he doubtless knew, was in conformity with the views of early Advaitins. As men steeped in the orthodox traditions of their school, Madhusūdana and Brahmananda had no mind to forswear the long-cherished and carefully transmitted traditions of their own Sampradāya for the temporary gratification of finding fault with their opponents.

(25) That orthodox Advaitic Tradition also leans to the Upaniṣadic theory of the disputed Kārikās is betrayed by no less a champion of Advaitism than Mahāmahopādhyāya N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin in one or two of his careless moments. The learned Sastriar is today one of the staunchest upholders of the view that Madhva has committed a blunder in regard to the disputed Kārikās; and when I had the honor of soliciting a critical appreciation of my first article on the Kārikās from him, Syt. Sastriar was kind enough to tell me, even as I had expected that the evidences adduced by me were absolutely unconvinc-

1. *Nyāyāmṛta Taraṅgiṇī*, p. 123 b, (Nirnaya Sagar), Edited by T. R. Kṛṣṇasāstrya.

ing ! Syt. Sastriar has, however, not cared to controvert my proofs openly or substantiate his position in any manner. Nor has he yet given me the benefit of his criticism of the further evidences adduced by me in the second article. I am therefore constrained to place before the readers his attitude towards the disputed Kārikās fifteen years ago as embodied in his “critical summary” appended to his edition of the *Advaitasiddhi* with the sub-commentary of Brahmananda together with extracts from the *Nyāyāmṛta* and the *Taraṅgiṇī*. In this critical summary appearing at the close of certain convenient sections of the *Advaitasiddhi* Mm. Sastriar summarises for the benefit of the readers the respective positions taken up by the authors of the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Advaitasiddhi*, *Taraṅgiṇī* and *Laghucandrikā*.

On one occasion Syt. Sastriar observes¹ :—

तत्र न्यायामृतकाराः—शुद्धचैतन्यस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादपि, नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वं ‘तुरीय सर्वदृक्सदे’ ति शुद्धस्यैव सर्वज्ञत्वश्रवणात् इति वर्णयन्ति ।

अद्वैतसिद्धिकारास्तु—सविशेषणमेव सर्वज्ञं । ‘तुरीयं सर्वदृक्सदे’ (G. K. i, 12) ति श्रुतिरपि, तुरीयस्य सर्वदृक्त्वत्वं चैतन्यत्वमेव बोधयति ; न तु सर्वज्ञत्वं इति निरूपयन्ति ।

तरङ्गिणीकारास्तु—तुरीयं सर्वदृक्सदेत्यनेन शुद्धस्य सर्वज्ञत्वमेवोच्यते, न तु चैतन्य-रूपत्वं, सर्वप्रवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः इति प्रतिपादयन्ति ।

लघुचन्द्रिकाकारास्तु— तुरीयसर्वज्ञत्वे उक्तश्रुतेः प्रमाणाभावात् सर्वज्ञस्याप्यविद्याश्रयत्वमिति विवेचयन्ति ॥

On a second occasion he writes²:—अद्वैतसिद्धिकारास्तु अनादिमायया स्रष्टः यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते, (G. K. i, 16) इति एकत्वश्रुतिविरोधेन, अविद्यायामित्यादिश्रुतेः (Katha i, 2, 5) अमप्राप्तबहुत्वानुवादेनैवोपपत्तेः वर्णनीयतया ... इति निरूपयन्ति ॥

These two instances unmistakably show which way the wind was blowing when Syt. Sastriar published his “critical notes” ! Another redoubtable champion of Advaitism in these parts, Mm. Karuṅḡḷam Kṛṣṇa Śāstrin who has only recently enlivened the philosophical world by his *Brahmasūtrānugūnyasiddhi*, confidently quotes प्रणवं ह्रींश्चरं विद्यात् (G. K. i, 28) as a *Śruti*.³ It behoves a veteran scholar of the type of Syt. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri to announce to the world publicly if he has since changed

1. *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 584. (Syt. Sastri's Edn. Nirnayāsagar).

2. *Advaitasiddhi* with comm., Edited by Mm. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Sastri, Nirnayāsagar, p. 543.

3. *Brahma-Sūtrānugūnyasiddhi* by Kṛṣṇa Śāstrin, p. 93, Kumbakonam, 1926. The learned Śāstrin writes :—

तदेवं—प्रणवं ह्रींश्चरं विद्यादिति श्रुति समीरितम् ।

न्यायतेः कर्म कुर्वन्ति परात्परतरं शिवम् ॥

his opinion; and if so the reasons therefor in the interests of Oriental Research.

(26) At this stage of our investigation, an extraneous evidence in support of the *Śrutitva* of the disputed *Kārikās* would be particularly welcome. Tradition has it that Śaṅkara was a close student of the *Sūtasamhitā* and that he had read the same no less than nine times in his life! This *Sūtasamhitā*, in one place, quotes the well-known *Kārikā* मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमाथेतः (G.K.i,17) as a *Śruti* text and places it on a par with another well-known Upaniṣadic text:—

एकमेवाद्वितीयं सदित्याहुश्चुतिरादरात् ।

मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमिति चाह पराश्रुतिः ॥

(सूतसंहिता iv, 55).¹

(27) The evidence also of such an authoritative exponent of the Advaita Vedānta as Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th century), adds further weight to the Upaniṣadic theory. In his polemical work entitled '*Siddhānta Siddhānjana*' this author² quotes certain *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda occurring within the Āgama Prakaraṇa as *Śruti* texts. Just see:— तथा च, प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधोऽपि, श्रुत्यनुकूलतर्कानुसन्धानेन समाधास्यते— श्रुतिश्च—उपदेशादयं वादः (G. K. i, 18), इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपोपदेशार्थश्रुतिषु सृष्ट्यादिवाद इति दर्शयति । तथा, 'द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणोरूपे' इत्युपवर्ण्य अथात आदेशो नेति नेतीति³ ॥ The text उपदेशादयं वादः in the above, quoted as a *Śruti* is identical with Gauḍapāda *Kārikā* i, 18. That the author made a very clear distinction between the first Prakaraṇa and the rest of Gauḍapāda's works is clear from his citation of another wellknown *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda: मृल्लोहविस्फुलिगाद्यैः iii, 15, from an undisputed portion of that work which he further ascribes to some human author with the significant phrase: यथाहुः ।⁴ This leaves no room to quibble for any one.

Further on the author quotes Gauḍapāda *Kārikā* क्रीडार्थं i, 9, as a *Śruti* text:—नापि क्रीडानिर्वृतिः प्रयोजनं स्वसिद्धनित्यनिरतिशयानन्दस्वभावस्याप्तकामस्य परनिमित्तप्रयोजनलेशस्याप्यसंभवात् यथाहि श्रूयते:—

क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टिः ॥

इति । सृष्टिरपि प्रयोजननिरपेक्षमेव प्रवर्तते परमेश्वर इत्येवंपरा⁵ ॥

1. *Sūta-Samhitā*, with comm., attributed to Mādhavācārya, p. 425, Ānandāśrama series, No. 25, 1893.

2. He is reported to have been a Pontiff of the Nāḍvil Maṭham at Trichur.

3. *Siddhānta-Siddhānjana* of Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī, p. 41, Trivandrum Sanskrit series, No. XLVIII, 1916, (Part iii).

4. Ibid.

5. Op. Cit., p. 102.

The passage क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिः.....etc., is here quoted as a *Śruti* text. The reference to Smṛti, here, is to a well-known Smṛti text मोदते भगवान् भूतैः etc. relied upon by the Pūrvapakṣin.

Elsewhere the same देवस्यैषस्वभावोऽयं (G. K. i, 9,) is given the first place of honor as a *Śruti* text:—कथं पुनरीश्वरस्य अमनसः कामादि संगच्छेत? मा सङ्गत । अस्यैवैतानि सर्वाणि निश्चसितानीति कामसंकल्पाद्यनपेक्षमेव सृष्टि श्रवणात् । तथा च श्रुतिः देवस्यैषस्वभावोहीति । सोऽकामयत, सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्प इत्यादेशश्च¹ ॥

VIII

REPRESENTATIVE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA TEXTS SURVEYED

(28) Reference has already been made to the indications in the *Sri-Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja² in support of the Upaniṣadic theory of the disputed *Kārikās* and to the express statements of Mahācārya in his *Advaitavidyāvijaya*.³ Further examination of the representative works of Viśiṣṭādvaita has furnished additional evidences in support of my original claim. The following statement from the *Śrutaprakāśa* of Sudarśana Sūri, the illustrious commentator on the *Sri-Bhāṣya*, who flourished somewhere about the 14th century, clinches the matter once for all:—हेयत्वावचनाच्च, न परं प्रति केवलमानुकूल्याभावमात्रं । किंतु प्रातिकूल्यं चापीत्याह । प्रत्युतेति । स्थूलोऽहमित्याद्यनुसन्धानस्येव, न सदात्मकानुसन्धानस्य हेयत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । अपि तु, उपादेयत्वमेवोच्यते । तच्च प्रधानपरत्वेऽप्युपपन्नं । 'अनादिमायया युतः' (G. K. i, 16), 'मायया सन्निरुद्धः, 'अनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः', जहात्येनां युक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः इत्यादिषु, प्रधानप्रस्तावेषु, तस्य हेयत्वेनैव प्रतिपादनादित्यर्थः ॥ (श्रुतप्रकाश)⁴

Sudarśana places आनादिमायया on a par with wellknown Upaniṣadic texts and interprets Māyā, occurring in it, in terms of Prakṛti: an interpretation, which it would be illegitimate for him to ascribe to it, had it been taken from the work of Gauḍapāda where its purport is fixed in terms of the advaitic Māyā or Nescience which agrees with the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti as well as God with the Devil. The point at issue in the *Vedānta Sūtra* i, 1, 9, is this. Is the Pradhāna or Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya Jagatkāraṇa and Jijñāśya or not? The *Sūtrakāra* says that it is not; because in the *Śruti* the relinquishment of Prakṛti is advised whereas no such command is given

1. Op. cit., p. 184 (Part 3)

2. *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. ii., No. 1, p. 54

3. Op. Cit., p. 56

4. *Śruta-Prakāśa*, Sudarśana Sūri (i, 1, 9), p. 762 Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1889.

with reference to Brahman. In his commentary on this Sūtra Sudarśana asserts that Prakṛti is not the subject of enquiry proposed by the Sūtrakāra since the Śrutis with one voice condemn it and assert that salvation lies in the Seeker's rising above the charms of Prakṛti. It is here that Śrutis like आनादिमायया सुतः which (please note) is given the first place amidst मायया समिद्धः जहात्येनां मुक्तमोगाम् are cited. If Sudarśana had admitted Gauḍapāda's authorship of the disputed Kārikās, it would be absurd for him to state that the Sūtrakāra (Vyāsa) had the text आनादिमायया सुतः too, in mind, when he wrote: हेयत्वावचनाच्च। This would further show that Kūranārāyaṇa was not the only early Viśiṣṭādvaitin to subscribe to the Upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās. The date and identity of this Kūranārāyaṇa are alike debatable. Even if my view of this Kūranārāyaṇa¹ could not be admitted, for whatever reasons, it would still be seen that the established antiquity of belief in the Upaniṣadic theory among the early Viśiṣṭādvaitins is not disturbed.

(29) Attention has been drawn to Mahācārya's acceptance of the Upaniṣadic theory in his *Advaitavidyāvijaya*.² The same writer throws further light on the problem in the course of his commentary *Caṇḍamāruta* on the *Śatadūṣaṇi*³ of Vedānta Deśika. Mahācārya takes great pains to repudiate the contention of certain Advaitins that their doctrine of 'दृष्टिः' has the sanction of the Śruti आनादिमायया सुतः etc., (G. K. i, 16) :—अत्र कश्चिदाह दृष्टिः पक्षे सर्वापि व्यवस्था स्वप्रवृत्तपद्यते । 'आनादिमायया सुतो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते' इति श्रुत्या, जाग्रतोऽपि जीवस्य सुप्तत्वोक्त्या दृष्टिः स्तेयस्तत्पर्यवश्यत्वेन प्रतिपादितत्वात्..... मानाभावाच्च न दृष्टिः । 'आनादिमायया सुतः' इत्यादि श्रुतिस्तु न तत्र मानं । तत्र हि तत्त्वज्ञानाभाव एव सुषुप्तिधर्मः प्रतिपाद्यते । न तु दृष्टिः । दृष्टिः स्तेयस्वप्नधर्मत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यत्वे, 'सुतो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते' (G. K. i, 16), इति स्वापविरोधि प्रबोधामकत्वेन, प्रतिपाद्यमानतत्त्वज्ञानाकाले दृष्टिः स्वभावप्रसंगात् । इष्टापत्तिरिति चेत् । न । अन्ततः वृत्तिरूपस्यैव आवश्यकत्वात् ॥ प्रत्युत, इयं श्रुतिः 'मायया सुतः' (G. K. i, 16), इति वदन्ती तदभावमेव प्रतिपादयति⁴ ॥

It is obvious that Mahācārya would not have spent so much energy in repudiating the claim of the Pūrvapakṣin that 'दृष्टिः' has the sanction of the Śruti आनादिमायया सुतः if such a claim had not been made by the Advaitins in this form during his days. If it were not so, Mahācārya, instead of racking his brains to

1. See p. 54 *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. ii, no. 1.

2. Ibid. p. 56.

3. *Śatadūṣaṇi* of Vedānta Deśika with Comm., *Caṇḍamāruta* of Mahācārya, Śāstramuktāvalī Series, Conjeeveram.

4. *Caṇḍamāruta*, pp. 106-107, Śāstramuktāvalī Series.

offer a different interpretation of the Śruti, would, more easily, have dismissed their contention as puerile based as it would then be on the sole authority of Gauḍapāda.

IX

The evidences so far collected and made available to scholars and critics would show that the Upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās has received formidable support at the hands of the mighty champions of the three schools of Vedānta from very early times. The attitude taken up by Madhva towards these Kārikās could not, therefore, be simply laughed away nor dislodged by the mere fiat of their pen by ill-informed critics and self-complacent Professors airing their views from within the four walls of a tightly-closed lecture-room or authors and book-makers delivering themselves of delightful dogmatisms about Madhva's gross blunder. None of early Advaitins have raised their voice of protest against Madhva's alleged misreading of the twenty-nine Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad; which shows that such a theory was not opposed to their own views. As I pointed out on an earlier occasion, it is the later Advaitins and their present-day descendants and representatives who have missed the real fact about the Śruti of these Kārikās which Gauḍapāda used as nucleus to his treatise and incorporated them into his own work with the best of motives.

I am glad to note that the evidences that I have been able to place before the readers in my two previous articles have opened the eyes of many to the reasonableness of Madhva's attitude toward the first set of Kārikās. Prof. J. N. Sinha of the Meerut College opined: Your article was a revelation to me. Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri of the Madras University was kind enough to write, "I do not feel that you have proved your thesis; but most of your points are worth serious consideration while some seem to be very strongly in your favour." Syt. Y. Subba Rao, the author of that thought-provoking Sanskrit treatise *Mūlāvidyānirāsa*, wrote "You have succeeded in showing that there are evidences in the works of Śaṅkara's followers as well as of Rāmānuja's followers that the Āgama Prakaraṇa has been regarded as part of the original by all of them." The admission of Mr. A. V. Gopālācārya has been brought to the notice of the readers. (Italics mine).

By far the most straightforward Advaitin to agree with my conclusions is Prof. K. Sundararama Iyer of Kumbakonam who is one of the greatest exponents of Advaitic thought now living in these parts. Prof. Iyer has expressed complete agree-

ment with my views on many an occasion, and is one, perhaps the only one, among the many Advaitins who feel that there need be no quarrel over this problem between the two schools of Vedānta since even the Advaitins recognise the first set of Kārikās as *Śruti* by dubbing it Āgama Prakaraṇa. The Professor's sense of impartiality and enthusiasm in the cause of the advancement of truth could be easily judged from the fact that he has been pleased to furnish me with the valuable information that the fact of Gauḍapāda's having used the *Śruti* texts of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as nucleus to his treatise and christened it Āgama Prakaraṇa accordingly, has a weighty parallel in the inclusion of a number of *Śruti* texts from the *Śukarahasyopaniṣad* by Vidyāranya in his *Pancadaśi*;¹ and that therefore there is nothing inherently impossible in Gauḍapāda's having done the same thing with reference to the verses of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.

If, therefore, in spite of the evidences brought together by me, certain reputed scholars and Professors of Indian Philosophy and Orientalists at large, would still refuse to take cognizance of

1. One whole chapter or section entitled महावाक्यविवेक embodying the exposition of the import of the so-called *mahāvākyas* of the Advaita Vedānta running to the extent of 8 verses, is incorporated by Vidyāranya as the fifth section of his *Pancadaśi*. The verses :

येनेक्षते श्रुणोतीति जिघ्रति व्याकरोति च ।
स्वाद्वस्वाद् विजानाति तत्त्वज्ञानमुदीरितम् ॥
चतुर्मुखेन्द्रियेषु मनुष्याश्च वादिसु ।
चेतन्यमेकं ब्रह्मातः प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म मय्यपि ॥
परिपूर्णः परमात्मिन्देह विद्याधिकारिणि ।
बुद्धेः साक्षितया स्थित्वा स्फुरन्नहमितीर्यते ॥
स्वतः पूर्णः परात्मात्रं ब्रह्मशब्देन वर्णितः ।
अस्मीत्येक्यपरामर्शः तेन ब्रह्मभवाम्यहम् ॥
एकमेवाद्वितीयं सत्तामरूपविवर्जितम् ।
सृष्टेः पुराधुनाप्यस्य तादृक्त्वं तदिति र्यते ॥
श्रोतुर्देहन्दिशतीति वस्तुवन्न स्वपदेरितम् ।
एकता यावन्तेऽसीति तदेक्यमनुभूयताम् ॥
स्वप्रकाशात्परोक्षत्वमयमित्युक्तितो भवेत् ।
अहंकारादिदेहान्तात्यगास्मेति गीयते ॥
दृश्यमानस्य सर्वस्य जगत्सत्त्वमिरीयते ।
ब्रह्मशब्देन तद्ब्रह्म स्वप्रकाशात्मरूपकम् ॥

(इति श्रीपंचदश्यां महावाक्यविवेकः)

occurring on pp. 48-50, of the Nirnayasagar Edn. (1894) appear exactly in the same form, with the remark:—

अथ रहस्योपनिषद्भिर्भागशो वाक्यार्थश्लोकाः प्रोच्यन्ते—

येनेक्षते श्रुणोतीति.....etc. etc.

in the Śukarahasyopaniṣad p. 221, (108 Upaniṣads)
Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1917.

them but stick to their own old fads; or plead either that "Your reasonings do not appeal to me"; or reserve their opinion until doomsday under pretext of being 'overwhelmed with work'; or simply evade the whole risk by chiming in that my work is 'a good beginning'; or allege 'indifferent health' when reminded that their threatened reply to my article is long overdue, I can only take it that they refuse to accept the challenge for obvious reasons and capitulate unconditionally. Readers will remember that reference was made in my second article in the March Number (1932) of the *Review* to two would-be critics. Strange to say these two have not still come out with their threatened action. I take it that the evidences from early Advaitic sources set forth by me have completely silenced them once for all.

X

THE DISPUTED KĀRIKĀS, A PART OF THE MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANISAD

My thanks are due in an infinite measure to Prof. A. B. Keith of the Edinburgh University who has, more than once, given me the benefit of his criticisms from abroad despite *real* pressure of work. Dr. Keith admits frankly in the course of a letter dated 30-7-32 "Your evidence shows that certain of the Kārikās are treated by Śaṅkara and others as *Śruti* and not as the work of Gauḍapāda". Prof. Keith, however, hastens to observe, "I am not at present convinced that the Kārikās are really an *original part* of the Upaniṣad" (*Italics mine*); and suggests 'the possibility' of the Kārikās being 'an addition to the Upaniṣad' and desires me to 'consider carefully this aspect of the question'. When I pointed out to him in reply that the alternative hypothesis offered by him would land us in further difficulties of having to decide (i) the literary status of such a later interpolation in the text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*; (2) the question of the date at which such an interpolation could have been made; (3) account for the novel method of introducing a series of interpolated verses with a needless अत्रैतेश्लोकमवन्ति and (4) above all to explain the absence of any reference or clue to such an interpolation having been made at anytime in the carefully preserved and genuinely transmitted Vedic traditions in India, the learned Professor at once realised the difficulties vividly and wrote, "the materials for a really valid discussion of the issues which you raise are lacking."

The Professor, in fine, recognises that certain of the disputed Kārikās are treated by Śaṅkara and others as *Śruti* texts and

not as the work of Gauḍapāda. But his difficulty is that these Kārikās cannot on this ground be concluded to form an *original part* of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. On an earlier occasion I had expressed the view that the disputed Kārikās must either belong to the Upaniṣad or to Gauḍapāda: that there was no halfway house between the two. Prof. Keith, however, inclines to the view that there is one (which I have ignored) and believes in the possibility of these Kārikās *qua Śrutis* having been a later addition to the *Māṇḍūkya* and maintains that these Kārikās cannot be regarded as an original part of the Upaniṣad simply because of our inability, at the present day, to decide with confidence the question of the possibility of their having been later additions in the capacity of *Śruti* texts. I too am firmly of opinion that we cannot settle this aspect of the question with anything like finality from the point of view of purely historical and textual criticism. It should be remembered at the same time that no such question or a possibility thereof would arise from the point of view of the purely traditional Indian attitude towards the Upaniṣads as revealed literature existing from beginningless eternity. If therefore, traditional philosophers like Śaṅkara or Madhva have not cared to be as historical or scientific as we would like them to be in anticipation of our modern problems, it neither be-littles their claims to recognition nor suggests yet that even a few of their statements may not be interpreted, if need be, in a modern sense. If it were proved, then, that the disputed Kārikās *qua Śruti* texts were a later addition of unknown date to the *Māṇḍūkya* it would not still be impossible to rationalise this fact with Madhva's statement that the Kārikās are the mantras *seen* by Brahma and quoted by the Rṣi of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* from a contemporary source. Students interested in the problem would be agreeably surprised to find that Madhva is prepared to grant that the explanatory and the prose passages do not emanate from the same source or author. This is also the conclusion reached by Prof. Keith. Only, where Keith—as a non-believing outsider—would theorise about the possibility of the explanatory mantras being a later addition to the Upaniṣad, Madhva, as an orthodox believer in the theory of the *Apauruṣeyatva* of the *śruti* considers the Mantras to be citations from a co-eternal source. The answer to the question then whether the twenty-nine mantras or Kārikās formed an *integral* part of the *Māṇḍūkya* from the very beginning depends entirely upon the attitude with which we look upon the upaniṣads in general. If we adopt the traditional attitude, such a question would simply not arise. There is

nothing to have prevented the Seer of the Upaniṣad from having seen the prose portions along with the other portions seen by another. There would thus be no question of priority or posteriority. The fact would then be that the Upaniṣad when it was seen by Varuṇa, its Rṣi (according to Madhva), included the mantras seen by Brahma as a homogenous whole. In so far as no date of composition could be conceived of in the case of these two sets of passages, the subtle distinction of the mantras' being *a part but not an integral part* of the Upaniṣad has no place in a purely traditional attitude towards the *Śruti*. From a historical and modern point of view also, the question would have to be left an open one. Dr. Keith himself confesses "we really do not know how Upaniṣads came to be put together as in the case of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* or the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*." On his own showing, then, it would be rash to say that the mantras of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* were distinctly later additions to it. There is nothing to prevent their having been contemporaneous originations. That would be the nearest modern interpretation of Madhva's statement:—

प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणं च बलवद्विद्यते मुने ।

ब्रह्मदृष्टानतो मन्त्रान्प्रमाणं सलिलेश्वरः ।

अत्रलोकाभवन्तीति च कौरव पृथक् पृथक् ॥

(*Māṇḍūkya Lhāṣya*, Madhva).

Whatever might be the truth about the authorship and date of inclusion into the body of the (prose) text of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* of the twenty-nine mantras, one thing at least is beyond doubt. It is this that so far as it concerns the question of the recitation and the interpretation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, these twenty-nine mantras or ślokas as they are called, are doubtless a part of the Upaniṣad. It is to be feared that the problem of how far these ślokas could be regarded as an integral, original and homogeneous part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* smacks too much of a wild-goose chase at this distance of time especially when "the materials for a really valid discussion of the issues are lacking." Taking a more pragmatic view of the situation, we can safely rest satisfied with looking upon the twenty-nine Ślokas as just a part of the entire Upaniṣad—integral or otherwise, it matters practically little,—so far as concerns our recitation or interpretation of it. That is precisely the view of traditional authorities who are pledged to the Upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās and who look upon these twenty-nine Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad without troubling themselves about the puzzles and antinomies involved in a hyper-criticism of the same.

XI

One can readily understand the hesitation of an outsider like Prof. Keith to recognise certain of the Kārikās quoted by Śaṅkara and others as *Śruti* texts, as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Admit the *Śruti* of the twenty-nine Kārikās (for whatever reasons) and you have, of necessity, to find a place for them within the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*! For, none of the twenty-nine Kārikās—several of which are quoted by influential exponents of all schools of Vedānta as *Śruti* texts—is known to occur in any other Upaniṣad. Not only this. Express statements too referring and attributing these texts to the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* by certain illustrious exponents of the Advaita Vedānta compel us to endorse the rationale of Madhva's position. I shall, therefore, indicate these powerful evidences which I hope will not fail to convince outsiders like Prof. Keith and bring the Madhva-phobes to their senses by making them realise that their charges against Madhva on this point are wholly suicidal.

Three prominent Advaitins at least, who have not been noticed so far, hold definite and unequivocal views about the disputed Kārikās being regarded as *Śruti* texts and therefore entitled to be read as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. These, in chronological order, are 1) Advaitānanda, 2) Vidyāranya and 3) Appayya Dīkṣita. I shall now deal with these three in order.

(30) In the course of his commentary entitled *Brahma vidyābharaṇa* on Śaṅkara's *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, Advaitānanda under ii, 1, 33, discusses the conflict of opinions between two Upaniṣads in regard to the motive or purpose behind creation which is apprehended in turn to weaken the position taken up by the Sūtrakāra. The two Upaniṣads pitted against each other here are the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Māṇḍūkya*. Advaitānanda exhibits the contradiction thus: ननु 'स्वभावमेके कवयोवदन्ति' इति श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रे स्वभाववादं प्रतिक्षिप्य महिमशब्देन क्रीडापक्षो व्यवस्थापितः । माण्डूक्यश्रुतौ,

क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टिः ॥ (G. K. i, 9)

इति क्रीडापक्षं प्रतिक्षिप्य स्वभावपक्षो व्यवस्थापितः । अतः श्रुतिद्वयविरोधात् सृष्टिः क्रीडेति वा, स्वभाव इति वा, अवस्थातुं न शक्यत इति चेत् । उच्यते । ॥

According to the Pūrva-pakṣa view, here, the *Śvetāśvatara* rejects the theories of creation by nature and time and upholds the view that it is due to the sheer excellence of the Supreme ;

1. *Brahma vidyābharaṇa* of Advaitānanda, p. 461, Srividya Press, Kumbakonam.

which supports the view that creation is a sort of sport to the Almighty. But in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (as Advaitānanda has it) the theories of creation for the sake of sport, and 'pleasure' are summarily dismissed and the conclusion is upheld that there is no motive or purpose behind creation save the nature of the Divine. Thus there is a contradiction between the two Upaniṣads—the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Māṇḍūkya*—which maintain respectively the theories of creation for the sake of sport and creation for the sake of nothing (आप्तकामस्य का सृष्टिः). Advaitānanda, as a believer in the equal validity of both the Upaniṣads, examines the alleged contradiction with a view to showing that there is really no such contradiction. He argues that the Svabhāvapakṣa of the *Māṇḍūkya* too should be interpreted in the sense that it (creation) could be regarded as a sport: even in so far as it is not particularly so motivated, or as an act of pure nature having, as it does, no special motive or object in view at the time:—माण्डूक्ये प्रतिक्षिप्य क्रीडापक्षोपि यथा वनविहारदिरूपा ईषत्प्रयोजनोद्देशपूर्विकाभवति । नैवं परमात्मनः सृष्टिरित्यभिप्रायेण ; प्रयोजनोद्देशरहिततया स्वभावरूपा वा क्रीडारूपा वा परमात्मनः सृष्टिरिति श्रुतिद्वयपर्यालोचनया पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ॥

(ब्रह्मविद्याभरणे-ii, 1. 33.)²

I should like to make one point clear. I am not in the least concerned about the rationale of Advaitānanda's arguments. My point is that he recognises unhesitatingly the Kārikā i, 9,

क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का सृष्टिः ॥

which occurs among the twenty-nine disputed Kārikās as a *Śruti* text forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya*; for, otherwise, it would be ludicrous for him to set about reconciling the position taken up by that Kārikā with that of an Upaniṣadic passage in the *Śvetāśvatara*. Other than देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयं which occurs among the Kārikās attributed to Gauḍapāda, there is no passage in the rest of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* espousing the Svabhāva or any other theory of creation under comment. It would be idle to argue, therefore, that Advaitānanda did not recognise the Kārikā आप्तकामस्य का सृष्टिः as a *Śruti* text forming part of the *Māṇḍūkya*. It would be seen that Śaṅkara's reference also under ii, 1, 33 to an '*Aptakāma śruti*' is to the same Kārikā as suggested by me on an earlier occasion; and that in identifying the *Śruti* referred to by Śaṅkara, Advaitānanda incidentally goes a step further to notice

1. Of Śaṅkara on ii, 1, 33:—यदिनाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित् दृश्यं प्रयोजनात्तर-
मुच्येत.....

2. *Brahma vidyābharaṇa*, p. 461.

an apparent contradiction between the respective positions taken up by the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Svetāśvatara* in regard to creation.

Advaitānanda was the spiritual great-grandfather of Vidyā-tīrtha who occupied the pontifical seat of the *Kāmakoti Pīṭha* in the 14th century and who, besides, was the guru of Sāyana alias Vidyāranya. Advaitānanda is reckoned to have been a contemporary of the poet Śrīharṣa who lived in the 12th century; and this agrees well indeed with the fact of his having been the spiritual great grandfather of the guru of Sāyana. Advaitānanda would thus appear to have been a predecessor of Madhva even. If this were acceptable, it would further mean that Madhva was not at all the original sinner in reading the disputed *Kārikās* as part of the *Māṇḍūkya*; but that even earlier than him there were responsible Advaitins who held the same view in conformity with that of still earlier writers of their own school like Śaṅkara, Śureśvara and Ānandagiri.

(31) Now for Vidyāranya. In my second article, attention was drawn to the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaślokaṭīkā* of Śureśvara where the author was conclusively shown to have made a clear, sharp and pronounced distinction between the *Kārikās* of the first *Prakarāṇa* of Gaudapāda which he styles वेदान्तोक्ति, आगमशासनम् etc., his purport being fully clarified by Ānandagiri's significant comments: 'अति पठति' 'अत्रापि श्रुति पठति' etc., and those of the other *Prakarāṇas* of Gaudapāda, quotations from which are always given by him under the name of Gaudapāda.

Śureśvara's quotation of Gaudapāda *Kārikā* i, 3 as a passage from Scripture faithfully identified by Ānandagiri as a *Śruti* text: अत्रापि श्रुति पठति is again repeated by Vidyāranya in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad—Bhāṣya—Vārtika-sāra*:-

विश्वो हि स्थूलभु इत्येतत् तैजसः प्रविक्तमुक्त्वा ।

आनन्दमुक्त्वा तथा प्राज्ञ इति चागमशासनम् ॥ (G. K. i, 3).¹

which, in turn, is clarified further by his commentator Maheśvara Tīrtha: अत्र माण्डूक्यश्रुति पठति ²॥

It is not, however, a mere guess or inference of mine based on Maheśvara Tīrtha's commentary that Vidyāranya too regarded the disputed *Kārikās* as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Express statements to the effect from Vidyāranya's own writings are not lacking. A careful study of the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* of

Vidyāranya has placed the problem of the *Kārikās* beyond a shadow of doubt. Vidyāranya too makes the usual distinction between the first set of *Kārikās* and the rest of Gaudapāda's work. Passages from the undisputed portion of Gaudapāda's work are always cited by Vidyāranya under the name of Gaudapāda whereas verses from the first *Prakarāṇa* are quoted as *Śruti* texts. The following are the relevant texts:—गौडपादाचार्याश्चाहुः:

आत्मसत्तानुरोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा ।

अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहः ॥ (G. K. iii, 32)

इति ¹ ॥

सोऽयं समाधिः सुषुप्तिसमानः साक्षिचेतन्येनानुभविष्यति शक्यः ।

तदासौ सर्वधीवृत्तिराहित्यात् सुषुप्तिरेवेति न शङ्कनीयम् ।

मनः स्वरूपस्य सदसत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात् । तदुक्तं गौडपादाचार्यैः

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः ।

प्रचारः स तु विज्ञेयः सुषुप्तेऽन्यो न तत्समः ॥

लीयते हि सुषुप्तौ तन्निगृहीतं न लीयते ।

तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ॥ इति ² ॥

(Gaudapāda *Kārikā* iii, 34-35).

But to the utter consternation of dissenters, Vidyāranya continues:—माण्डूक्यशाखायामपि श्रूयते—

द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः

बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः साच तुर्ये न विद्यते ॥

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावायौ प्राज्ञस्वप्ननिद्रया ।

न निद्रां नैव च स्वप्नं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चितौ ॥

अन्यथा गृह्यतः स्वप्नो निद्रातत्त्वमजानतः ।

विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्रुते ॥ इति ³

(Gaudapāda *Kārikās* i, 13-15).

आद्यो विश्वतैजसौ । अद्वैतस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यथा ग्रहणं नाम, द्वैतरूपेण प्रतिभासः । स च विश्व-तैजसयोर्वर्तमानः स्वप्नउच्यते ॥ तत्त्वस्याज्ञानं निद्रा । साच, विश्वतैजसप्राज्ञेषु वर्तते । तयोः स्वप्ननिद्रयोः स्वरूपप्रत्ययोर्विपर्यासः मिथ्याज्ञानं । तस्मिन्विद्ययाक्षीणे सति तुरीयं पदमद्वैतं वस्तुश्रुतेऽनुभवतात्पर्यः ⁴ (जीवन्मुक्तिविवेकः)

It will be seen from the foregoing that Vidyāranya cites at least three disputed *Kārikās* and ascribes them to the *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā*!—meaning, doubtless, our *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*! ⁵

1. Vidyāranya, *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, p. 219, Anandaśrama Series No. 20, 1916.

3. Op. cit., p. 311.

2. Op. cit., p. 310.

4. Ibid.

5. The use of the term *Śākhā* to denote an *Upaniṣad* is by no means uncommon especially for Vidyāranya. Compare:—स मायौ सृजतीत्याहुः श्वेताश्वतरे-ज्ञाखिनः *Pancadaśī*, p. 37, N. Sagar, 1894. Neither the Editors of the *Anandaśrama* nor any versute critic therefore, could possibly try to deprive the *Upaniṣadic* theory of its strong support at the hands of Vidyāranya by doubting the sanity, adequacy or genuineness of the phrase: माण्डूक्यशाखायामपि श्रूयते ॥

1. Vidyāranya, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad—Bhāṣya—Ślokaṭīkā—Sāra* p. 856, Choukhamba Sanskrit Series.

2. Ibid.

A NEW THEORY

Vidyāranya's curious statement here, however, raises a very interesting side-issue which may have its own value in helping us tackle the question of the stratification of our present *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and account for the presence of the explanatory *Kārikās* therein, which now have become a veritable Jack in the Box. Without in any manner withdrawing my contention that the disputed *Kārikās* form part of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as understood by most Vedāntins, I should like to hazard a guess that the disputed *Kārikās* might have originally formed part of the now lost *Māṇḍūkya* or *Māṇḍūkeya Śākhā* of the *Rgveda* whence they were excerpted by the author of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* whoever he might have been, at an unknown date. It is now an admitted fact that certain Upaniṣads have changed their allegiance from one Veda or *Śākhā* to another. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, now counted as an Upaniṣad of the *Atharvaveda*, might originally have belonged to the now defunct *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā* of the *Rgveda*. When, therefore, long after the obsolescence of the original *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā*, its Upaniṣad came to be put together, the *ślokas* which originally formed part of that *Śākhā*—which were (presumably) all that had been preserved of that ancient *Śākhā*—came to be incorporated into the Upaniṣad with a suitable device of *अत्रेति श्लोक भवन्ति*. For reasons which were beyond the control of tradition, the whole Upaniṣad itself was then conveniently assigned to the *Atharvaveda*. In hazarding this tempting theory, I am not oblivious of the inherent difficulties in working it out completely. It is, however, beyond the scope of my present paper and my original thesis. I must, therefore, desist from further speculations in the matter; but I cannot help drawing attention to the legitimacy of regarding the twenty-nine *Kārikās* as earlier than the prose text of the Upaniṣad on such a view. And a suggestion thrown out by Madhva in this direction may also be helpful in pursuing this line of thought. Prof. Keith wrote to me "It is now clear that you do not claim that the *Kārikās* and the prose are by the same hand; but you hold the *Kārikās* older than the prose. That seems to me a position which cannot be pressed; and on the whole, the contrary view appears more attractive." I venture to think, however, that in the light of what I have said about the possible relation that might have existed between the now lost *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā* of the *Rgveda* and our present *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, such a position may not be entirely unattractive. I can, therefore, only wind up this digression with a reference to the original suggestion of Professors Ranade and Belvalkar in

their joint edition of the 'Creative Period of Indian Philosophy' that our *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* might have originally belonged to the now lost *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā* of the *Rgveda*—a suggestion which, I may further add, has the cordial approval and support of Prof. Jarl Charpentier.¹

But, to return to our point. Vidyāranya has cited the three disputed *Kārikās* occurring in the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* as Vedic texts and is faithfully followed by his commentator Acyutarāya Modaka who says :—उदाहृतमाण्डूक्यशाखायश्लोकौ सांप्रदायिकरीत्या विशदयति आद्यावित्यादिना ॥ (जीवन्मुक्तिविवेकव्याख्या).

* * *

It will be seen from the passages cited by Vidyāranya that he mentions the name of Gaudapāda expressly in the case of the *Kārikās* cited by him from the undisputed portions of the latter's work; whilst the *Kārikās* from the disputed portion are ascribed studiously to the *Māṇḍūkya Śākhā*.

But the versute Editors of the *Ānandāśrama* Series have tried to play their usual pranks. An editorial footnote on page 310 of the *Ānandāśrama* Edition of the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* says anent the sentence *माण्डूक्यशाखायामपि श्रूयते* :—

धनुश्चिह्नान्तर्गतं अधिकमिव दृश्यते । द्वैतस्येत्यादीनां गौडपादाचार्यकृतकारिकायामेव दृश्यमानत्वात् ॥ (सम्पादकमहोदयानां वाक्यमेतत्).

But the *arriere pensee* of this camouflage needs no comment. One can quite see that the statement in the text of Vidyāranya: *माण्डूक्यशाखायामपिश्रूयते* makes the blood of the editors boil. But such a statement cannot be rescinded by the mere fiat of their pen by the editors. Their claim that this line 'seems' to be superfluous ('अधिकमिव दृश्यते') cannot be accepted by any scientifically-minded person in the absence of any recorded variation in reading. It is obvious that there is none. If there had been any, the learned editors could as well have stated the variation instead of trying to bolster up a mischievous stunt with their own sapient comments. The commentator too is not aware of any variation and comments significantly on the phrase *माण्डूक्यशाखायामपिश्रूयते*. A slight variation in

1. "That the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* bearing the name of a *Śākhā* of the *Rgveda*, did once, and perhaps in a different shape, belong to that *Sāṃhitā* seems a plausible suggestion." p. 309, *Comptes-rendus of History of Indian Philosophy*, II, Creative Period by Ranade and Belvalkar, *Le Monde Oriental*, vol. XXIII, Fasc. 1-3; 1929 (Uppasala).

the text mentioned by the editors on p. 311, that in the manuscript with the commentary, the Kārikā 'द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यं' is omitted, can be accepted without the least prejudice to the authenticity of the two other Kārikās: 'स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाचौ' and 'अन्यथागृह्यतः स्वप्नः ।' As a matter of fact, Vidyāranya himself, in this connection, after quoting the three Kārikās comments from the second Kārikā onwards. The first is not also taken up by the commentator—thus making it quite probable that it is an additional one. But, there is absolutely no indication that the sentence माण्डूक्यशाखायामपि श्रूयते is not the genuine reading of the text of Vidyāranya.¹ The *onus probandi* in this direction, rests entirely with the editors of the Anandāśrama and it is no fault of ours if they have not substantiated their belief with facts and figures.

(32) The *Jīvanmuktiviveka* is not the only work of Vidyāranya which throws light on his attitude to the disputed Kārikās. If the identity of Vidyāranya with Śāyana is admissible, we may draw attention to another instance in another well-authenticated work of the former, the bhāṣya on the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, wherein a disputed Kārikā is quoted as a *śruti* text. If the identity is not admitted, even then, we would have in support of the Upaniṣadic theory, in addition to the evidences of Vidyāranya, that of another equally prominent Advaitin and great Vedic scholar, the great Śāyana himself. It is thus: In the course of his commentary on the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, Śāyana writes:—नानाविधभोगैस्तृप्तस्य राजादेः किं द्यूतमृगयादिप्रयासेनेति त्वया वक्तव्यं । लीलेति चेत्, तदत्रायनुसन्धेहि । तथाच श्रुतिः "भोगार्थां सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे" इति व्याससूत्रमपि । लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् इति ॥

(33) Lastly we turn to Appayya Dikṣita—the unrivalled monarch of post-Śāṅkarite Advaitism. The point here centres round the enigmatic *Aptakāmaśruti* referred to by Śāṅkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on ii, 1, 33. In company with Advaitānanda, Appayya Dikṣita coolly identifies the *Aptakāmaśruti* of Śāṅkara as: क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Says he:—

क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये भोगार्थमिति चापरे ।
देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥ इति माण्डूक्योपनिषदि तात्कालिकानन्द-

1. From the Editors' statement, it is clear that the sentence माण्डूक्य-शाखायामपिश्रूयते is found in all the mss. collated.

2. *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* (ii, 1, 1) with the bhāṣya of Śāyana, p. 1337, Anandāśrama Series, No. 42, 1901.

प्रयोजनलीलात्वमेव 'क्रीडार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये' इत्यनेन अभिमतं प्रदर्शितं । न तु हासमानादितुल्यप्रयोजनोद्देशरहितं लीलात्वम् । अतः लीलास्वभावपक्षयोर्न श्रुतिविरोधः ॥

(कल्पतरुपरिमलः)

and adequately explains the alleged contradiction between the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* even as Advaitānanda has done. The text just now cited speaks for itself; and it would be the height of unreasonableness, false sectarianism, and downright intellectual cowardice to argue that the Upaniṣadic theory of the Kārikās of the Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gaudapāda finds no support at the hands of the great and illustrious Ācāryas of the Advaitavedānta ranging from the 8th to the 16th century.

CONCLUSION

I have come to the close of a prolonged discussion of a vexed and inconvenient problem which has been engaging the attention of our Indian polemical literature for long without any attempt being made to tackle the same from the point of view of impartial, sympathetic and historical research. The difference of opinion that existed on the point was mostly clouded by sentimentalism; and adherents of one school, who for the mere pleasure of it went on accusing Madhva of a serious blunder, were lost too much in the self-complacence arising out of this pleasant illusion to see that they were only entangling themselves in a quagmire from which it would be impossible, one day, to extricate themselves. And such a day seems well nigh to be in sight. Let the modern Advaitins, their descendants and representatives, therefore, try to understand the position of the early veterans of their own school and cease to prattle about Madhva and his historical blunder in respect of the Kārikās—in their books, lectures and talks—and shed crocodile tears on his account. If, for whatever reason, they heed not a friendly advice, and change not the nefarious tactics of their Schoolmen, they would have to be prepared for a fate like unto that of those unhappy and misguided creatures in glass houses attempting to throw stones at others! Amen.

माण्डूक्योपनिषद्तात्त्विकविदिताः श्रीगौडपादस्य ये
श्लोकास्तानिह विभ्रमादुपनिषत्वेनैव मेने तथा ।
तद्व्याख्यां च समातनोत्सुविपुलामानन्दतीर्थस्सुधी-
रित्यद्वैतिभिरुक्तदोषदलनैः प्रीणन्तु निर्मेत्तराः ॥