

The Palace, Mysore.

PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
OF
THE EIGHTH
ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE
MYSORE

DECEMBER 1935



BANGALORE :
PRINTED BY THE SUPERINTENDENT AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS
1937

THE GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKĀS AND BUDDHISM

BY PROF. N. B. PUROHIT, M.A., B.T.,

Bahauddin College, Junagadh.

I. *Ajātivāda or the Doctrine of No-origination.*

Unique place of the Gaudapādakārikās in Indian philosophy.—The *Kārikās* of Gaudapāda on the *Māṇḍukya Upanishad* hold a unique place in the history of Indian philosophy, both by reason of the interest they have evoked in connection with their antecedents and of the influence they have exercised on the development of the Advaita Vedānta. Their greatest contribution to philosophy in general and to absolute idealism in particular, is their *Ajātivāda* or the Doctrine of No-origination.

Ajāti, the highest truth; its two aspects: positive and negative.—*Ajāti* represents, according to Gaudapāda, the highest truth of philosophy. The word has a twofold denotation in the *Kārikās*—negative and positive. The former consists in an uncompromising denial of creation and, hence, of the existence as such of the empirical world and experience, subjective as well as objective. The latter denotation is an equally uncompromising assertion of the ever-unborn (*ajāti aja*) as the absolute reality, variously designated as *Ātman*, *Brahman* and *Vijñāna*. Stated dogmatically, the highest truth (*paramārtha*), in its negative aspect, is that “there is neither extinction nor origination; there is none in bondage; there is none aspiring and none wishing to be released; there is none released” (II, 32). “Nothing that presents itself as becoming all round, is born” (III, 2). “Hence, neither the mind (*chitta*) nor its phenomena are born; those who see

their birth, see footprints in the sky” (II, 28). “Thus, mind is not born, thus, things are known to be unborn; those who realise the truth thus, and thus alone, fall not in error” (IV, 46). “All entities (*dharma*s) are, by nature, similar to *ākāśa*—without a beginning; they do not at all admit plurality in any form” (IV, 91). “Nothing is born from itself or from another; nothing, be it being, non-being or being-non-being, is born” (IV, 20). “No living soul is born, he is not created (*sambhava*); the highest truth is that, which admits no origination whatever” (IV, 71). The same truth, in its positive aspect, is “the ever-unborn (*ajāti*), which is ever-the-same (*śamatām gatam*) and unconditioned (*akārpanyam*)” (III, 2). “The unborn is pure (*viśārada*) and ever-the-same” (IV, 93). It is realised in abstract meditation. “In that state, there is neither apprehension (*graha*), nor avoidance (*utsarga*), nor thinking (*chintā*); knowledge, then, becomes one with *Ātman*, the unborn and ever-the-same” (III, 38). “Those who would be quite determined in respect of the unborn and ever-the-same, which the lay world cannot fathom, would, alone, be endowed with the great enlightenment” (IV, 95). As a matter of fact, not only the word *ajāti*, but the verbal forms of the root *jan* also are often used in our work, as in the *Upanishads*, with a *double entendre*, sometimes denoting, sometimes implying, both the transitive and the intransitive meanings (see III, 24, 27, 1). *Ajāti*, thus, means both ‘non-origination’ (*Tatpuruṣa*) and ‘Unborn’ (*Bahuvrīhi*). Both are *prakṛiti* and, so, admit no change in their original state in any form, the non-creation cannot become creation, the unborn cannot evolve itself into what is born (IV, 29). As the highest truth, *ajāti* can, thus, be predicated both of the phenomena and the noumenon at the same time. As a philosophical doctrine, it is at once the negation of creation and assertion of the absolute reality. From the viewpoint of the Vedāntin, as Gaudapāda certainly was, the negation is but the logical corollary of the positive ultimate principle, taught by the *Upanishads*.

And this doctrine of *ajāti* is, in the opinion of Gauḍapāda, forced upon us by the Upanishadic testimony, by the nature of empirical experience and by reasoning, and its truth becomes capable of verification and realization in moments of intuition and abstract meditation.

Upanishadic Testimony.—Gauḍapāda examines the Upanishadic testimony in the first and the third chapters of his work. The Upanishad, he expounds, and other Upanishads as well are at one in their attempts to demonstrate that the ultimate reality is transcendent and absolute. Thus, the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* represents *Ātman*, who is at once the psychological and the metaphysical ultimate, as beyond all means of knowledge, beyond all language and empirical determinations, untouched by phenomenal extension (*prapañchopaśama*), non-dual, immutable (*śānta*) and blissful. The *Taittirīya Upanishad* regards *Ātman* as the innermost fact of all existence (III, 11). In the *Madhuvīdyā* of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, *Ātman* is the ultimate fact of being, *param Brahman*, both in the macrocosm and the microcosm (III, 12). Other texts speak of *Ātman* as unborn (III, 24). If such be the truth *par excellence*, it precludes all possibility of discrimination and definition. Distinctions in the sphere of sentient and non-sentient existence must, from the view point of such truth, be fictitious. And this, according to Gauḍapāda, is exactly the gist of Upanishadic teaching. This universe is regarded as a dream, an illusion, a Gandharva-city in the Vedāntas (II, 31). “This unborn principle becomes divided on account of delusion (*māyā*) and of nothing else; the immortal would become mortal, were it to be divided in reality (*tattvataḥ*)” (III, 19).

Hypothesis of Māyā.—This leads us to the consideration of Gauḍapāda’s conception of *māyā*. The plurality of subjects and objects is, according to him, not created, in the ordinary sense of the word, but falsely imagined (*vikalpita*) by the *Ātman* in himself owing to his own *māyā* (II, 12, 19), which is as beginningless as himself (I, 16). In other words, as a result of his association

with the coeval *māyā*, the *Ātman* imagines himself first as subjects or individual souls and then as manifold objects, internal and external (II, 16, 13), the extent and intensity of this particularisation being determined, in each case, by previous individual experience and memory (II, 16). The case is one of erroneous supposition (*vikalpa*), similar to mistaking a rope for a snake, streak of water, etc., in the dark, till it is finally determined to be a rope (II, 18, 19). The word *māyā* is freely used by Gauḍapāda in the sense of illusion as of a magic show. As associated with, and belonging to *Ātman*, *māyā* is, in the *Kārikās*, a principle of self-delusion of the *Ātman* (II, 19 *Māyāisā tasya devasya yayā sammohitaḥ svayam*). It is positive in a sense; it is a factor—and one whose origin is lost in eternity—to be counted, if empirical experience is to have even a shadow of significance. It is also negative in a sense; it is unsubstantial, a figment of imagination, a contradiction of reality (III, 19) capable of being removed (I, 16) and, so, as unreal as the illusion it sets up in the *Ātman*. The question of *māyā* thus reduces itself to a paradox; *māyā* both is and is not.

The hypothesis of *māyā* is, in the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*, a philosophical offshoot and explanation of *ajāti*, sanctioned by such Upanishadic texts as: *Indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa iyate; ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate*—the word *vijāyate* in the last being interpreted by Gauḍapāda as *māyayā jāyate* (III, 24). The universe is a mystery. It is nothing but what we know of it. It is, because we are aware of it, and it is what we think it to be. Without the thinking subject, it is naught. Each thinker has his own notion of the universe. Universe is, in other words, an act of his ideation. The thinking subject, the fund of his experience and his memory are responsible for the exuberance or poverty and the depth or faintness of the colouring of his ideation. Different thinkers have different notions of the universe, and these cannot be all correct at the same time. The appearance of the universe has therefore no substantiality of its own. It is not ultimately true. It is

deceptive, unreal like a magic show. And if the world-appearance is unreal, the subject, who ideates it and is its necessary correlate, must also be unreal as subject, because the one is true so long as the other is true. All distinctions, or causes of distinctions, being thus unreal, what remains is just a positive something, in which they all proceed. This cannot be nothing, because even unreal appearance must have a substratum. "A son of a barren woman," says Gauḍapāda, "cannot have birth, real or unreal" (III, 28). This something is *Ātman*, who, though truly above all predication, may, in the conventional language, be called the un-originated and the un-originating *ajāti* or *aja* (IV, 74). This is the truth *par excellence* reached retrospectively. Prospectively, we have to start with the postulate of *māyā*. Universe may be unreal. But even as unreal, it does proceed in the real. This real itself cannot be the cause of the unreal. The effect must have the elements of its potentiality in the cause. If therefore the effect be unreal, the cause must contain within itself the potentiality of the unreal. This potentiality is *māyā*, the principle of self-delusion, coeval with *Ātman*. *Māyā* is thus both the cause and the effect of the universe. The postulate of beginningless *māyā* does not go against *ajativāda*, because *māyā* is unsubstantial, a shadow, an illusion, an erroneous notion. Such seems to be the line of reasoning, which led Gauḍapāda to adopt the hypothesis as an explanation of *ajativāda*. Gauḍapāda does not subject the postulate of *māyā* to further scrutiny as his followers did. For him, *māyā* is an illusion, pure and simple, and hence, though without a beginning (*anādi*), it does not affect the non-duality of the *Ātman*. Further investigation into the nature of *māyā* would have involved the recognition of some sort of *sattā* or existence for *māyā* and of inconsistency in the coeval co-existence of *māyā* and *Ātman*, but this would have been fatal to his uncompromising stand on *ajāti*. It was left to Śaṅkara, his spiritual grandson, to push the issue of *māyā* to its logical conclusion and formulate a definite theory *anirvachanīyatā*

or unaccountability, which is clearly hinted at in the *Kārikās* (III, 34; IV, 52, 67).

All plurality is thus reduced to *māyā*. Gauḍapāda explains this, in the case of individual souls, by comparing *Ātman* to *ākāśa*, *jīvas* to *ghaṭākāśas*, and *saṃghātas* physical and mental aggregates—to *ghatas* (III, 3-10). That the *Ātman* is, like *ākāśa* one, immutable, indivisible, untouched and untainted by his mental and physical conditions, is supported by the gist of the Sheath-theory of the *Taittirīya* and the Honey-theory of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishads (III, 11-12). *Jīvas* or individual souls are all *Ātman* in his pristine purity in all states (III, 9), only conditioned. Take away the conditions, and they are one with *Ātman* (III, 4). At no time are they either modified effects (*vikāras*) or constituent or segregated parts (*avayavas*) of *Ātman*, just as *ghaṭākāśas* are at no time modifications or parts of the *ākāśa* proper (III, 7). The analogies of earth, gold and sparks, given in the Upanishads, do not countenance distinction. They are intended to bring the incomprehensible within the grasp of the mind through the imperfect medium of language and should not, therefore, be stretched too far (III, 15). The relation of individual souls with *Ātman* is that of identity, as is clear from the Vedānta texts which praise non-distinction (*ananyatva*) between the two and condemn distinction and plurality (III, 13). Texts countenancing distinction, even before creation, by representing *Ātman* as urged by desire, are of secondary value and refer to what was to be in future; if they were principal, texts describing reality as one and secondless would not be accounted for (III, 14). The analogy of *ākāśa* and *ghaṭākāśas* again explains how individual selves might differ from one another in their forms, names, functions (*kārya*), and in their experience and equipment as a result of association with *rajas*, *tamas*, etc., in different proportions, and in their mutually exclusive nature, without in the least compromising the unity and purity of the *Ātman* (III, 5-6). The *saṃghātas* or aggregates are, like *ghatās* in the case of

ākāśa, conditions, unreal like dreams, set forth by self-delusion (*ātma-māyā*); there is no logical clue to decide whether they are all alike or graded (III, 10). Thus, creation, if it means anything, means, in the Vedāntas, the apprehension of the unconditioned as conditioned, so far as the individual selves are concerned (III, 3 ff).

This last point is made more clear by the Upanishadic position towards phenomena, subjective and objective. These are, one and all, sheer illusion—*māyāmātra* (I, 17-18). If reality is essentially (*svabhāvena*) absolute, it must ever remain absolute. If origination and death be the essence of the being (*svabhāva*) of reality, the reality ceases to be essentially absolute (III, 19, 22). All creationists agree in regarding the first cause to be essentially unborn and undying, but if that be so, it would be absurd to think that it can admit division or modification, as this would make the first cause mortal (III, 20). Mortality and immortality are mutually exclusive. All phenomena must therefore be a chimera. The texts speaking of *māyā* as the basic ground of manyness bear out this point (III, 24). Nay, the text *nēha nānāsti kiñchana* denies the existence of distinctions altogether; *andhaṃ tamah praviśanti yē sambhūtim upāsate* denies creation by condemning it; *kōnvenam janabhet* refuses to admit any efficient cause for it (III, 25); and *sa ēsha neti neti* gainsays every phenomenon and reveals the unborn as the only reality, by not admitting possibility of empirical determination in it (III, 26). Thus, the attitude of the Śrutis to creation, whatever its source, real *Ātman* or unreal *māyā*, is the same: creation is just what it is determined to be by the Vedānta and demonstrated by reasoning, i.e., unreal (III, 23).

Testimony of Empirical Experience.—The nature of empirical experience also leads to the same conclusion. This can be demonstrated by comparing the experiences of the waking and the dream states, which together make up the totality of our knowledge of distinctions. Both are false. Both annul each other (II, 4). Dream

experience is unreal, because it does not answer to the peculiar temporal and spatial needs of the waking experience. It is inward, confined within the body (II, 1; IV, 33), and so, from the viewpoint of the waking experience, precludes the reality of such dream activities as journeys to far off countries (II, 2; IV, 34), talk with friends, holding and the like (IV, 35), and of sights of chariots, etc., (II, 3), which are concerned with the world outside the body. The supposition of the dream-subject, going out of the body and apprehending all these things, is ruled out by the shortness of the duration of dream, particularly in case of long journeys (II, 2; IV, 34). Besides, the truth of the dream experience is gainsaid in point of time, place and things, seen or done, the moment we wake up (II, 2-3; IV, 34-35). What is true of the dream experience from the viewpoint of the waking experience, is also true of the waking experience from the viewpoint of the dream experience (II, 4), for the dream experience is as much real, while it lasts, as the waking experience. Both experiences are, again, similar as far as the diversity of subject and objects is concerned (II, 5). The reality of both is provisional: it endures as long as their respective states endure. As states, the two are mutually exclusive: we either wake or dream as far as our experience of diversity is concerned. Thus, each state is preceded and followed by some other state, which contradicts its experience. It does not, therefore, exist before and after its own duration. Its duration is, thus, limited both ways, and so unreal, even though apprehended as not unreal (II, 6). The difference between the two, if any, is apparent. Thus, the practical utility *saprayojanatā* generally brought forward as a distinguishing feature of the waking experience, constituting the pragmatic test of its truth, is gainsaid in the dream state. To illustrate after the commentator, even after a sumptuous feast in the waking state, a man may well dream that he has been starving for days. The extraordinary character of some dreams is but a result of the peculiar condition of the

dream-subject. The objects witnessed in dreams are the ordinary objects of the waking life; they are only witnessed in combinations, unusual in mundane life. The denizens of heaven see differently than us. There is a lot of difference in the perception of the same thing by an educated and an uneducated man (II, 8). Nor does the awareness of distinction between true and untrue, that is, the awareness that mental vagaries are untrue as they exist but subjectively, whereas material objects are true as they are apprehended externally, constitute the distinctive feature of waking experience, because the same kind of experience holds good in the dream state also. If therefore the dream awareness of the true and the untrue is false, as it ought to be from the standpoint of the waking state (*drishṭa*), equally so must be the waking awareness of the true and the untrue (II, 9-10).

Gauḍapāda does not overlook some fundamental distinctions between the two sets of experiences. He admits that the dream is more or less a reproduction, or rather a reconstruction by the mind of the waking experience, intensely undergone (IV, 39). The latter is, thus, the basis of dreams. The two are related as cause and effect. As capable of producing an effect, *i.e.*, dream, waking experience has a greater claim to reality. And real or unreal, it is the waking experience which admits of repetition in dream and not *vice versa* (IV, 39). But he argues that this reality is conditional. Waking experience is real in relation to dream experience only (IV, 37). And the unreality of dreams is patent: the dream-body must be unreal, as the real—tangible—body exists differently from it even in sleep; so too must everything mentally visualised in the dream (IV, 36). But this only proves the unreality of the waking experience; it is the cause of unreality, and as such cannot be real (IV, 38). Dream-world is again on a par with the subjective world of the waking state; both are mental. Their stuff (*bhāva*) is inward, indistinct and coeval with awareness (*chittakāla*) as against the objective stuff which is external, distinct and

related to two times, *i.e.*, (i) duration of awareness and (ii) either past or future. But even these distinctions, Gauḍapāda explains as being due to the distinction of perceiving sense organs (II, 15) and to ideation, and to nothing else (II, 14). Both, the objective world on the one hand and subjective and the dream world on the other, are nothing but figments of imagination (II, 14).

To sum up, in waking as certainly as in dream, duality is, in the first place, an act of non-dual mind and, in the second place, nothing but appearance (*abhāsa*) (III, 29-30; IV, 61-62). The appearance of duality ceases to present itself, the moment this mind ceases to function, ceases to be mind (III, 31). Again, in both, the numerous living creatures perceived by their respective subjects, moving about in all quarters, are not different from the perceiving minds of the two, and these minds themselves, in turn, are perceptible to their respective subjects alone (IV, 63-66). To elucidate, in both sets of experience, the subject and the mind (from which things perceived by it are not different) are alone the test of each other's veracity. It is thus impossible to determine the nature of their truth by applying any other test (IV, 67). Birth and death, existence and non-existence of living beings in empirical life are like birth and death, existence and non-existence of apparently living beings set up by dreams, or projected by magic illusion, or mechanically contrived (IV, 68-70). The nature of empirical experience thus leads us to the same truth, namely, that nothing truly originates (IV, 71).

Reasoning supports Ajāti.—Reality of creation does not stand to reason. No theory of creation is satisfactory. This becomes evident from the great disagreement that prevails among the creationists themselves, whose conceptions of truth are more a matter of individual whims than of regard for the whole truth. Gauḍapāda enumerates as many as thirty-five of such conceptions (II, 20-28), which, in fact, are but partial and erroneous notions about the self-same, single reality, the *Ātman* (II, 29-30). The creationists are, again, not agreed regarding the nature of the first

cause, as to whether it is existent or non-existent (I, 7); regarding the form of creation, as to whether it is a modification or evolution, or illusion or merely an act of the simple will of God (I, 8); and finally regarding the object of creation, as to whether it is fruition of past deeds (*bhōga*), or diversion (*kṛdā*), or mere nature (*svabhāva*) of the Lord (I, 9). This disagreement, nay, the mutual disputes and refutations of creationists supply Gauḍapāda with an argument against creationists themselves and a basis to build his own theory of *Ajāti* upon (IV, 3). He steers clear of the same argument being used against himself on account of his doctrinal disagreement with all creationists by neatly pointing out that his doctrine, though different, does not clash with the doctrines of the creationist dualists, because while it advocates non-duality as the highest truth, it also admits duality as its aspect (*bhēda*), of course lower and unreal. For the creationists, on the other hand, duality is both the highest and the conventional truth, and hence their highest truth turns out to be as unreal as their conventional truth (III, 17-18).

To start with, Gauḍapāda takes up the question of causality on the physical plan. The very idea of creation is based on the assumption of the First Cause, which, according to some is *sat* or existent and, according to others, *asat* or non-existent. The two views disprove each other: what is *sat* cannot be born, *i.e.*, in the form of the effect; much less what is *asat* (IV, 4). Further, the First Cause, whether *sat* or *asat*, may be unborn or born. If unborn, it must be immortal too, for the absence of birth implies absence of change and mortality in the original condition. If immortality, therefore, constitutes the very nature (*prakṛiti*) or self-essence (*svabhāva*) of the First Cause, it will not admit any change in itself, because the true nature of a thing, whether it be the result of acquired perfection (*samsiddhi*), or of its condition (*svabhāva*), or of birth (*sahaja*) or of the absence of foreign influence (*akṛita*), is to remain what it is (IV, 6-9). If the cause becomes the effect, it subjects itself to produc-

tion in a new form. It thus ceases to be unborn. It becomes partite (*bhinna*) and hence non-eternal (IV, 11). To avoid this contingency, if the effect were supposed to be non-distinct (*ananya*) from the cause, it would be unborn itself. But to speak of the unborn effect is to commit a contradiction in terms. Or, arguing from the effect to the cause, the supposition of non-distinction will render the cause as much liable to birth as the effect itself (IV, 12). Finally, the whole argument of the universe being produced from the unborn, if stated syllogistically, would be found wanting in corroborative instance, as the whole universe is the subject (IV, 13a, b). Thus the unborn cannot logically be the First Cause.

The case becomes worse, if the (First) Cause is assumed to be born. A born cause is nothing but an effect. As such, every so-called cause will argue its own cause *ad infinitum* (IV, 13c, d). Again, both cause and effect being produced, the assumption that the first cause is beginningless (*anādi*) falls to the ground (IV, 14). Further, cause and effect are correlated. Their relation is based on the sequence in time. If this sequence is not assumed, that is, if both cause and effect are produced simultaneously, they will not be related to each other as cause and effect, like the two horns of a bull (IV, 16). If, on the other hand, the sequence is assumed, it may be regulated or unregulated as regards priority or posteriority. If unregulated, it may lead to the absurd state of cause being produced from the effect, like that of the father being born of the son! (IV, 15). Regulated it cannot be. A cause which is produced is itself an effect, and so cannot be accepted as a cause, at least not as the First Cause and, as such, existing prior to creation, because it would itself be creation. And what cannot be accepted as *the* cause, cannot also be held competent to produce an effect (IV, 17). The universe would thus be either eternal in its present form or not created at all. One who argues that the relation of cause and effect is determined, one by the other, has to answer the question: Which of the two is to be accepted as

existing prior to the other, to serve as the basis of determining the relative position of the other—the cause or the effect? (IV, 18). The question is unanswerable. The answer is beyond human knowledge. If essayed, it leads to the confusion of the order of succession, as already shown (IV, 19). The illustration of the seed and the sprout cannot be admitted, for the law of valid reasoning does not allow a reason (*hētu*), which is hypothetical, in proving a hypothesis (IV, 20). Thus our ignorance of sequence in time between the cause and the effect strikes at the very root of the creationist view, for, if the universe were really created, its antecedent must needs have been known (IV, 21). It follows that nothing can be created either from itself or from what it is not (IV, 22). Cause does not undergo production, because to be produced means to have a beginning, that is, to be an effect, which is foreign to the very essence of cause. Nor does effect undergo production, because by the very condition of its being (*svabhāva*), it is already produced and does not require to be produced. And what has no production, must have no beginning; i.e., must be eternal (IV, 23).

Advocacy of causation on the mental plane is equally baseless. Impossibility of the origination of the physical world, as proved above, argues the impossibility of the origination of the mental world. It does not, as some subjective idealists (*viññānavādins*) assume, argue the independent existence of mental phenomena. The mental phenomena, if real, can be real only in relation to objects which cause them (*paratantra*). This becomes evident if we analyse subjective consciousness (*prajñapti*). We notice that it is as varied as the objective world outside. We also notice that every act of consciousness refers to an object: we are always conscious of something, which is other than consciousness itself. In other words, consciousness presupposes a dual distinction of subject and object (*dvaya*). This distinction will vanish, if consciousness alone existed. The emotional reaction of pleasure and pain in presence of certain objects also proves that

conscious experience must have an objective basis (*nimitta*). Existence of external world to serve as basis of the variety of conscious experience is thus a logical necessity. But the facts of the case show that this requisite basis, the external world, is no basis at all (*animittatva*). It is in the first place already shown to be unproduced, and, in the second, it is denied altogether by the subjective idealist. The mind therefore can at no time—past, present or future—come in contact with the objects, as these do not exist. Nor can it apprehend their appearance, the impressions left by them, because there can be no impressions in the absence of objects (IV, 25, 26). Thus, both objective and subjective basis being impossible, the diversified mental phenomena (*viparyāsa*) cannot be accounted for (IV, 27). It follows that neither the mind nor its phenomena suffer origination. The subjective idealists who see origination (*jāti*) see footprints in the sky (IV, 28).

The unjustifiability of the position of creationists, realists as well as idealists, corroborates the doctrine of *ajāti* or no-origination and the Unborn, which being the original state of ultimate reality, can suffer no change (IV, 29). Origination, movement and materiality are but appearances of the absolute consciousness (*vignāna*), which is unoriginated, un-moving and non-material (IV, 45). This absolute consciousness and its phenomenal forms of subject and object can be compared to the fire-brand (*alāta*) and the straight and circular phenomenal forms it gives rise to. In both appearances cannot be assumed to originate and merge back anywhere but in their respective substratums. Yet they cannot be called the product (*nirgata*) of the substratums, because they lack the generic characteristics of the substratums, namely, substantiality (*dravyatva*). Their appearance and disappearance are dependent on the stir (*spandita*) and its absence in the substratums. Thus, in both, the causal relation between the substratum and its phenomenal forms remains incomprehensible, as it is not reasonably possible to determine

whether the phenomenal forms are substance or otherwise (IV, 47-53). Thus, as it cannot be determined whether, as subjective idealists held, phenomena originate from the mind, that is, are mere mental projections, or, as realists maintain, the mental world originates from (external) phenomena, the wise are led to the doctrine of re-origination of both cause and effect (IV, 54). Things appear to originate, but do not originate in fact (*tattvatah*). Their origination is illusion-like, which does not exist at all (IV, 58). The case of phenomena is like that of a magic plant, which grows up from a magic seed and, having no substantial existence, cannot be called either eternal or uneternal (IV, 59).

Testimony of Mystic Intuition.—Truth of *Ajāti*, thus attested by all accepted means of knowledge—verbal testimony of the Upanishads, nature of day-to-day direct experience and logical reasoning—is vouchsafed also by mystic experience and thus rendered capable of realisation to the aspirant. The necessary qualifications for such realisation are enlightenment and self-discipline. The former consists in the knowledge of the truth (*tattva*), psychological (*ādhyātmika*) and metaphysical (*bāhya*) (II, 38)—that *Ātman* alone is true (III, 32); that he is *Brahman*, the unborn and eternal, not distinct from the unborn and unimagining consciousness (*jñāna* or *viñāna*, (II, 33); that this consciousness is above the four-cornered predication of 'is,' 'is not,' 'is and is not,' and 'neither is nor is not' (IV, 83-84), above the realism of the waking state (*laukika dvaya*), pure idealism of the dream and subjective states (*laukaika śuddha*) and ultra-empirical state of deep sleep (*lōkottara*), and above the ethical categories of things to be avoided, known, acquired and perfected (*heya-jñeya-āpya-pākyā*) (IV, 90); that the consciousness in turn is the same as the objectless, eternal, and contactless mind (IV, 72), free from activity and phenomenal forms (III, 46), from attachment to cause and effect (IV, 55-57) and to unreality (IV, 79); and finally that all phenomenal appearances are like *ākāśa*, over the

same and emancipated from the first (IV, 91-93). The second qualification, self-discipline, is just the qualification of a true *Brahmana*. It consists of mental peace (*śama*) and self-control *dama*, (IV, 86), of freedom from passion (*rāga*), fear and anger (II, 35), of a life of asceticism (*yati*), care-free and insensitive to worldly concerns (*jaḍayāt*). Given these qualifications, the aspirant may prolong his moments of self-realisation by the practical method of Yoga, by concentrating the mind on the mystic syllable *Om*, by abstracting it from all notions of duality (II, 36) and relativity (IV, 56-57, 77-78), withdrawing it from all contacts, by remembering how they result in pain (III, 43-44), by waking it up whenever it passes into oblivion (*laya*) (III, 44, 34, 35), till the aspirant reaches the stage of *Asparśayoga*, in which the mind ceases to be mind and becomes identical with reality, which, though above words, may in conventional terms be described as Unborn, ever-the-same and pure—the truth absolute (*nirvikalpa*), realised by sages well-versed in the Vedas (II, 35).

Place of Realism in Gauḍapāda's Philosophy.—How-so-ever free and blithe like a sky-lark an idealist might be in the skyey regions of speculation, he has to climb down to the work-a-day earthly existence and dash his head against things, which painfully convince him of their own importance in the scheme of the universe. The vast majority of his fellow-men do not possess his powerful wings of enlightenment, and not a few of those who ever essay a flight soon get frightened of the giddy depths of the blue of universal life, almost verging on nothingness, perhaps of everything, certainly of individuality (III, 39). They therefore prefer to tread the *terra firma* of earthly or heavenly bliss. Things as they appear to be have a greater hold on their minds than things as they are. Realism after all is not such a magic illusion as can be blown up by the charmed breath of idealism. Things of the universe have their own pragmatic individuality, function and purpose. For Gauḍapāda, there is an additional

consideration of some scriptural texts. These texts assume the distinction of the teacher and the taught (I, 18), take for granted the universe as it appears to the lay man (III, 15), and enjoin religious duties and discipline (III, 1, 16). He, therefore, like others of his fold, concedes a provisional reality to worldly life and religious duties for those who cannot rise to the intellectual level of the enlightened (IV, 42; III, 16). Reality, as the one, all-encompassing totality of existence (I, 26-29), may suffer this as its aspect (*bheda*) (III, 18), how-so-ever illusive, in the interest of the lay men. It may, nay, it does, a lot of good to them without doing much harm (IV, 43). Partial insight may not straightway lead to the *summum bonum*, but it does vouchsafe a partial good which is better than no good (II, 29). Faith in partial truth is certainly to be preferred to scepticism and agnosticism which lead to nothing. The error does not lie in accepting life as it is and conscientiously endeavouring to make the best of it according to the light derived from scriptural, but in accepting it, and the scriptural injunctions connected with it, as final; in other words, in forgetting that these texts play but a second fiddle in the epistemology of the Vedānta (III, 14, 15), that the world of distinctions is but the lower (*apara*) aspect of Brahman (I, 26), as it presupposes the origination of the unoriginated and the unoriginating Brahman (III, 1), and as its reality is relative and conventional and therefore non-permanent (IV, 57). The realists' notions of worldly existence (*samsāra*) and liberation are unlogical figments; the former being beginningless, cannot have an end; the latter having a beginning, cannot be endless (IV, 30). For Gauḍapāda, realism, and all it means to religion and life, is a poor substitute for the grand truth of *Ajāti* (III, 1-2), to be tolerated out of sympathy for the incompetent, deluded souls, frightened at the very idea of No-origination (IV, 43).

II. THE GAUḌAPADAKĀRIKAS AND BUDDHISM.

Charge of crypto-Buddhism.—It would be interesting to touch upon the question of the influence of Buddhism, particularly the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools, on the Gauḍapādakārikas. The charge of crypto-Buddhism on Advaitism is an old one, and was long understood to imply, in a general way, a hostile sneer at the apparent doctrinal affinity of Advaitism to heretical Buddhism, or rather at the tendency of Advaita philosophy to verge on the philosophical position of Buddhist nihilism. Applied to Gauḍapāda, however, the charge amounts to much more than this. According to some critics, "Gauḍapāda gives a Vedāntic adaptation of the Buddhist Śūnyavāda."¹ Principal Das Gupta goes a step further, when he says that "there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upanishads tallied with those of Buddha."² Both criticisms assume that Gauḍapāda accepted the Buddhist philosophy and interpreted the Upanishads in its light. Their grounds for such assumption are broadly three:—1) Similarity of Gauḍapāda's philosophy to the Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and more particularly to the Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna; (2) Use by Gauḍapāda of Buddhist terminology and dialectics; and (3) References to Buddha in Chapter IV. Let us briefly examine these one by one.

Comparison of Buddhist and Gauḍapāda's philosophies.—So long as the tenets of the Buddhist schools were studied through non-Buddhist manuals of Indian philosophy, it was not hard to distinguish Advaita philosophy from Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda. Vijñānavāda was just subjectivist idealism, and Śūnyavāda pure nihilism, unworthy of the notice of the great Śankara on account of

¹ See 'Indian Philosophy' by S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. II.

² See 'A History of Indian Philosophy,' Vol. I, p. 423.

its opposition to all known means of knowledge.¹ Closer study of Buddhism, however, through original texts during recent years, has revealed that these doctrines were not, after all, purely negative, but had a positive counterpart. The *viññāna*, or rather *ālayaviññāna*, was not merely a continuously changing stream of consciousness in each individual being; it was also cosmic consciousness, even the absolute background of all phenomena, technically designated as *tathatā* or suchness. Similarly, the *śūnyatā* of the Mādhyamika did not merely mean self-essenceless (*niḥ-svabhāva*), ever-changing state of phenomenal world, but also the absolute essence of things, stripped of all attributes and designations. Thus, like Gauḍapāda, reality for both Buddhist schools is two-fold: one which refers to the phenomenal world, and is relative (*para-tantra*) and conventional (*samvṛiti*); the other which refers to the noumenon and is absolute (*pariniṣpanna* or *paramārtha*). In both the Buddhist schools again, as in Gauḍapāda, the former is nonpermanent, unreal and illusion-like, while the latter is permanent, real and transcendent.

Striking as this resemblance may appear, difference is not less so. The fundamental distinction between the Buddhist schools and Gauḍapāda is, of course, that while for Gauḍapāda permanent *Ātman* is the ultimate reality and basic fact of absolute as well as empirical existence, it is neither the one nor the other for the Buddhist philosophers. According to them, self is nothing but an uninterrupted series of momentary mental states. Permanent self is, according to Nāgārjuna, a daring and dogmatic postulate². If Buddha taught *Ātman*, it was to save people from falling into the heresy of nihilism.³ The Vijñānavādin, no doubt, rises to the conception of *viññāna* as universal subject, but only as the cause and

¹ Bhāṣhya on B. S. II, ii, 31.

² See Rādhākrishnan, *Ibid*, p. 653.

³ *Ibid*, p. 389 ff.

end of phenomena. To quote S. Rādhākrishnan, "The Yogācāra does not carefully discriminate between the individual and the universal consciousness . . . he tacitly admits the reality of an absolute consciousness, though the subjective tendency makes itself heard quite frequently."¹ Again, "the philosophical impulse led the Yogācāras to the Upanishadic theory while their Buddhist presuppositions made them halting in their acceptance of it."² Besides, though the highest truth in both the Buddhist schools be positive, it is reached negatively. It is the unaccountability of the everchanging phenomena, which forces upon them the postulate of an absolute principle. In Gauḍapāda, on the other hand, it is the *Ajāti* or non-origination of the self-evident, non-dual, ultimate *Brahman*, which primarily necessitates the assumption of the unreality of the universe. The goal to be reached through abstract meditation is different in Gauḍapāda and the Buddhist schools: with the latter, *amanibhāva* or *nirodha* of mind is an end in itself; with Gauḍapāda, it is a means to self-realization (III, 32-33). Coming to the world of relations, we find that the *jīva* of Gauḍapāda, as already indicated, is not recognised by either Buddhist school. Gauḍapāda, again, distinguishes himself from the Vijñānavādin by rejecting the latter's subjectivist idealism (IV, 24-28); if any reality is to be admitted for phenomena, then, for Gauḍapāda, the objective phenomena is as much real as the subjective. He classes subjectivist idealism (II, 25), and possibly nihilism also (II, 28), among the thirty-five views which fail to grasp the truth about the *Ātman* (II, 30). If he does not refute Śūnyavāda in the *Kārikās*, as he refutes Vijñānavāda, it is perhaps because, like others of his age,³ e.g., the author of the *Brahmasūtra*, who preceded him, and Śaṅkara, who followed him, and like not a few of the

¹ *Ibid*, pp. 696-7.

² *Ibid*, p. 635.

³ B. S. II, ii, 32. Cf. M. Hiriyanna, 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy,' pp. 221-2.

present day,¹ he really believed Śūnyavāda to be a nihilist doctrine,² which, while it gave cogent arguments against other schools of thought, had but little to say for itself. As regards the root cause of phenomena, it is *māyā* according to Gauḍapāda and *avidyā* according to Buddhists. We may not stress any subtle distinction between the two, but needs must notice a fundamental difference. Gauḍapāda's *māyā* is both a cosmic and an individual principle of self-delusion (II, 12 and 16^v); the Buddhist *avidyā* is not cosmic, but individual. *Māyā*, again, is what causes delusion in the true nature of the Self; *avidyā* is the ignorance of the four noble truths taught by Gotama Buddha.³

The difference is vital. Affinity, though apparent, is stressed on two uncertain assumptions. One is chronological, the other negative. Nāgārjuna (c. 200 A.D.) and Aśaṅga (c. 400 A.D.) preceded Gauḍapāda (c. 800 A.D.) and their works were known to him; and Gauḍapāda's Advaita philosophy does not seem to have had any antecedents but the Upanishads and the Buddhist Śūnya and Vijñāna doctrines. The two are pieced together, and a case made up for Gauḍapāda's indebtedness to Buddhism. Let us take the negative assumption first. In the first place, it loses much of its force by being negative. In the second place, labours of scholars during recent years have brought to light the fact that it is possible not only to find earlier traces but also to reconstruct doctrines of many later schools of Vedānta from the extant philosophical literature. Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Upanishads and Brahmasūtra refer to some of these.³ It would be a strange irony of fate, therefore, if, during the long centuries that separated Gauḍapāda from the Upanishadic period, the Advaita philosophy, which of all other Vedānta philosophies embodies the most direct conclusions and

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 697.

² See Hiriyanna, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

³ See M. Hiriyanna, I. A., Vol. LIII, pp. 77 ff. Also Śaṅkara's Com. on B. S., II, i, 4, 6, 14, etc.

implications of the Upanishads,¹ had not caught the fancy of any Brahmanical thinker. That the case could not have been so, is quite clearly indicated by references to Advaita views prior to Gauḍapāda both in the sacred and profane literature. The view of Kāśakṛtsna cited in *Brahmasūtra* I, iv, 22 is Advaitic. Whatever may be accepted as the final teaching of the *Bhagavadgītā*, its recognition of māyāvāda in some part at least (see VII, 13-14) is undeniable. For references to Advaitic Pantheistic view-point bordering on Māyāvāda in Sanskrit literature, I would refer the curious student to Dr. S. K. Belvalkar's 'Vedānta Philosophy' Part I, pp. 185-6, where he has very impartially and ably proved not only the existence but also the diffusion of Advaita philosophy before the time of Gauḍapāda. Thus, the negative evidence to prove Gauḍapāda's indebtedness to Buddhist tenets being untenable, the chronological evidence loses its probative force. Gauḍapāda's acquaintance and use of Buddhist arguments cannot prove his acceptance of their philosophy. This would be more clear, if we examine the question of Buddhist terminology and dialectics in the *Gauḍapādakārikās*.

Use by Gauḍapāda of Buddhist Terminology and Dialectics.—The *Gauḍapādakārikās* contain Buddhist words, like *dharma* (entity or thing), *saṃghāta* (aggregate or body), *adhvan* (time), *saṃvṛiti* (conventional truth), and *paratantra* (relative truth), and Buddhist analogies of *alāta* or firebrand and *māyāhastin* or counterfeit elephant. Poussin has cited some verbal similarities between the *Gauḍapādakārikās* and Buddhist works, and they show that Gauḍapāda had not only used the phraseology of Nāgārjuna but imitated him in style and mannerisms also. The title of our work itself looks like an imitation of Nāgārjuna's title for his work, the *Mādhyamikakārikā*. Gauḍapāda, further mentions and utilises the Buddhist *chatushkōṭi* or four-cornered dialectics (IV, 83-84) and

¹ Cp. Thibaut, S. B. E., XLV, p. cxxiv; also Poussin, J. R. A. S. LXII (1910), pp. 129 ff.

the arguments of Yogāchāras and Mādhyamikas are laid under contribution in refuting the reality of external objects (IV, 3-23), of subjectivist idealism (IV, 24-28) of causation in general and in tracing the empirical world to *māyā*, or, in Buddhist terminology, *samvṛiti* (IV, 57-74).

Now, taking the use of Buddhist dialectics first, we may attribute it to Gauḍapāda's deliberate practice of refuting one view by setting it against another, opposed to it, and building his own thesis on the ruins of mutually warring theories. Thus, the mutual opposition among the dualists is made the basis of the truth of his own non-dualism (III, 17) and the dispute between the Sat-kāryavādin and Asat-kāryavādin creationists is used to establish the reality of *Ajāti* (IV, 4-5). In the same way, Gauḍapāda accepts the arguments of the Vijñānavādin to demolish the Sarvāstitvavāda or Realism, and the arguments of the Sarvāstitvavādin and Śūnyavādin to demolish the Vijñānavāda (IV, 24-28). The use of Nāgārjuna's arguments to disprove causality and to trace empirical existence to *samvṛiti* or *māyā* is also to be ascribed to a similar object of allowing a powerful controversialist to disprove an undesirable view-point, only taking care that his own position is not compromised but strengthened thereby. The argument based on the Buddhist words and phrases is not conclusive enough. In the first place, almost all the words are more or less common to other systems of thought also. In the second place, mutual loans of words, which express common or similar ideas, is unavoidable in systems of thought, which grow up side by side; Buddhism itself shows a number of words, which were earlier common or later confined to other schools of philosophy: *e.g.*, the Upanishadic words—*nāmarūpa*, *avidyā*, *upādāna*, *arhat*, *śramaṇa*, *buddha*, *nirvāṇa*, *prakṛiti*, *ātman* and *nivṛitti*¹ and the Jain words *śrāvaka*,² *jīna*, etc. Lastly Gauḍapāda's was a time when

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

² Yamakakami Sogen, 'Systems of Buddhist Thought,'

Brahmanism was engaged in a vigorous onslaught on Buddhism, and so the knowledge and use of the technical terms and subtleties of the opponent was often necessary to meet him on his own ground. Coming to the analogies, it may be pointed out that the simile of the fire-brand occurs in the *Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad* (IV, 24), while the phrase *alātaśānti* has not been traced in Buddhist books.¹ Nor was the analogy of *māyā-hastin* a sole property of the Buddhists, as it was drawn from a well-known historical episode in the life of king Udayana, whose romantic love is twice dramatised by Bhāsa and whose popularity as subject of folk-tale is corroborated by Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūta* (I, 31-34). Although Poussin draws attention to verbal similarities between the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* and Buddhist works, he does not contribute to the view of Prof. Jacobi and Mr. A. V. Sukthankar that Advaita Vēdānta was indebted to Buddhism. On the other hand, he believes that autonomous—if not absolutely independent—developments of both are admissible. Some of these verses in the *Kārikās*, if read in their proper context, show that Gauḍapāda borrows not the thought but language only of the Buddhist prototypes, or, when he borrows thought also, he does so because he finds in it a handy tool to serve his own purpose. Such conscious or unconscious loans are not confined to Buddhist works only. The reader of the *Kārikās* catches in them, equally frequently, the familiar ring of ideas and phraseology of the *Bhagavadgītā* as well. Let the critic of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*, before he jumps at any conclusion about indebtedness, compare what Gauḍapāda says about meditation on the mystic syllable *Om* in I, 24-29 with Bh. G., VIII, 12-13, 16; about mind-control and Yoga in III, 31-47 with Bh. G. VI, 10, 25, 27, 34, etc.; and about the enlightened man in I, 28-29, II, 35-38, and IV, 84 ff. with similar descriptions in Bh. G. II,

¹ Poussin, J. R. A. S., LXII, p. 130.

55-71, V, 29, etc. Let him particularly compare the following:—

Gauḍapāḍakārikās

Bhagavadgītā.

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|------|----------------------------------|
| (1) II, 12; II, 19 | | VI, 6; VII, 12, 13. |
| (2) III, 21=IV, 7 | | III, 33. |
| (3) IV, 85 | | VI, 28; VI, 22. |
| (4) II, 6=IV, 31 | | II, 28. |
| (5) II, 7=IV, 32 | | V, 22; II, 14. |
| (6) IV, 93=III, 2, 38, etc. | | IV, 19. |
| (7) II, 29; also IV, 43 | | IV, 14; also VII, 20-23, IX, 25. |
| (8) II, 35 | | II, 56; IV, 10. |
| (9) III, 21=IV, 7 | | II, 16. |
| (10) IV, 92 | | II, 15. |

A constituent part of the Gauḍapāḍakārikās.—Attempts have been made to show that Chapter IV of the *Gauḍapāḍakārikās* is a distinct work, possibly from the pen of an author other than the author of the first three chapters. The arguments for this supposition are (1) that the chapter is replete with Buddhist dialectics, (2) that it contains direct or indirect references to Buddha or Buddhas, (3) that, unlike the previous chapters, it opens and ends with salutations which have a Buddhistic tinge, and (4) that *asparśayoga*, whose teacher is saluted, was taught by Buddha. Now, we have already disposed of the first argument. As to the second, it may be pointed out that the sense of the word *buddha* in all cases where it is found is ambiguous. Neither the context nor the trend of argument restricts it to Gotama Buddha; neither, again, suffers by taking it to be 'enlightened' or 'wise' (see *manīṣinaḥ*—IV, 54), who may be Advaitins. Ambiguity cannot prove the case. The question of salutations, raised by the third argument, is inadmissible. The salutation at the close does not stand in need of justification, and the explanation for salutation at the beginning, if at all necessary, must be sought in what Gauḍapāda has accomplished in the previous chapters.

In these, he has proved his doctrine of Ajāti mainly on the strength of the Vedānta texts. Before starting to prove the same by logical reasoning, he may well express his reverence to one who first taught or promulgated it, or, better, to whom-so-ever has realized or realizes its truth (*sambuddhaḥ*) in life in the manner stated at the close of the third chapter. And such a man, dead or living, would be a right object of reverence—the best among men—to a man like Gauḍapāda who valued self-realisation as the be-all and end-all of existence. That the phrase *dvipadām vara* is used in Buddhist literature for the founder of that religion, does not preclude the possibility of its use by others. Ignorance is no proof. Nor is there anything in the substance of the opening and closing verses to compel us to restrict the word to Buddha. The last verse is only a salutation to reality as Gauḍapāda conceived it, i.e., *Ajāti*, pure and simple (*Ajam sāmyam viśāradam*). The first verse, which is similar in sense to IV, 99, represents complete identity and absence of distinction between *jñāna* and *jñeya*, consciousness and its object, during enlightenment or self-realisation, when both become merged into the Absolute, as pure and attributeless as Ākāśa. They merely summarise the idea already expressed in III, 31-33 and 3-10 taken together, where *jñāna*, the unborn and unconceiving (*ākālpaka*), is said to become one with its object, *jñeya*, i.e., *Brahman*, also unborn and eternal, and both are again said to be one with *Ātman*, the truth. There is hardly anything Buddhistic in the first verse.

The last argument, based on the name and meaning of *Asparśayoga*, becomes untenable in view of the fact that the Buddhist literature does not know the word. The term which is used to express the sense of *Asparśayoga*, there, namely, the ninth stage of abstract meditation is *Sanjñāvedayitānirodha*. The only Buddhist work which mentions the two constituents of the word, *asparśa* and *yoga*, in close proximity is the *Chatuḥsatika* of Āryadeva but on the critic's own showing, the passage means

that there can be no contact between a tangible and an intangible thing. Thus the sense of the passage has "nothing to do with *Asparśayoga* which is a *samādhi*, as described in III, 37, 39." The name being untraceable in Buddhist literature, refuge is sought in the sense. But here too, the argument hangs on a very slender, rather imaginary, thread of Gaudapāda's description of *Asparśayoga* as one of which Yogins are afraid. This fear of the Yogins is connected by the critic with the fear of Ānanda, a disciple of Buddha, who had thought that Buddha, when he had entered this state of *samādhi*, had passed away, and did actually pass away after some time. The connection is, on the face of it, far-fetched. The Yogins of Gaudapāda would be afraid not so much of physical as of spiritual death, of the mind's plunge into the deep of nothingness instead of the ocean of universal life, or, as the commentator puts it, of annihilation of the Self. The Upanishads utter a word of warning against mistaking the Absolute for nothing, or pure consciousness for complete unconsciousness. The Indra-Virochana myth in the *Chāndogya Upanishad* (VIII, vii-xii), is a good instance of this. The reference to fear of Yogins need not, therefore, lead us to the conclusion that *Asparśayoga* was first taught by Buddha. Its very name suggests a Brahmanic origin. It is Yoga, union, and presupposes the object with which the mind, freed from all contacts, is to unite itself. The forms of Buddhist meditation, at least in its earlier history, are negative. The end of *samādhi* is *nirodha* or extinction, of course, of desires, as the name for the ninth stage of Buddhist meditation distinctly suggests. Whatever be the source of the word, whether it was coined by Gaudapāda himself—and this is not improbable, considering his partiality for Yoga—or whether he got it ready-made from some work or oral tradition, Gaudapāda could not have adopted it, if he had any Buddhist leanings. Even if we may not stress the positive implication of the word *Asparśayoga*, though Gaudapāda has done so in quite clear terms, we need not

go to Buddha for its negative implication of extinction of thinking process, for it is the same as *Asamprajñāta-samādhi* of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, which how-so-ever late (between 200 A.D. and 500 A.D.) was certainly prior to Gaudapāda. It is again similar to one taught in the *Gīta* and can be traced back to the *Kāthaka Upanishad* (II, 3-10 ff).

There is thus hardly anything which can demonstrate a distinct Buddhist bias for the fourth chapter of the *Gudapāda-kārikās*. On the other hand, it can be easily shown that it is a necessary compliment of the first three chapters and comes from the same pen. The thesis that *Ajāti* is the final reality, the style, the mannerisms and the general trend of thought are all the same. The fourth chapter repeats the ideas (cp. IV, 1, 99 III, 31-33; IV, 3-4 III, 23; IV, 5 III, 24; IV, 10, 30, II, 32; IV, 42 III, 16; IV, 43 II, 29; and IV, 71, III, 48), and whole verses and arguments of, (cp. IV, 6-8, 29 III, 20-22; IV, 31-32, II, 6-7; IV, 33-35, II, 1-4; and IV, 81, III, 36, also I, 16) and refers to, (cp. IV, 2 III, 37-39; IV, 91 III, 3-12; IV, 92 I, 16; IV, 94 III, 17) matters dealt with in the first three chapters. The so-called Buddhist words and ideas are found in the second and third chapters also; e.g., *samghāta* in III, 3, 10; *samvṛiti* (with some change in sense) in II, 1, 4; *dharma* in III, 1; *nirvāṇa* in III, 47; also compare, II, 32 to *Mādhyamikakārikā* I, 1. That *Ajāti* taught in the fourth chapter is the same Upanishadic *Ajāti* of the previous chapters can be seen from what is said about it in IV, 71 (III, 48), 74, 77 (III, 2). It is the goal, free from grief, desire and fear—the same as ascribed to the *munis*, well-versed in the Vedas in II, 35. It is *ajam sāmīyam advayam*, the object of the Buddhas in IV, 80, and described in IV, 81 in terms found in III, 36 and I, 16. If any doubt is left, it is dispelled by the goal being called, in IV, 85, the non-dual state of Brahman (*Brāhmanyam padam*), which leaves nothing more to be desired, and, in IV, 86, the end of the culture of the *Vipras*, the pristine quietude (*śama*). The separation of

the fourth chapter from the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* and assigning it to another author are hardly warranted. As a matter of fact, without the fourth chapter, the philosophy of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās* would have been dogmatic and incomplete, lacking in the rational support of logic.

Conclusion.—It is clear that the grounds on which the critics assume Gauḍapāda's indebtedness to Buddhism are not sound enough. That Gauḍapāda wrote a commentary on the *Mādhyamikakārikā* of Nāgārjuna¹ is an assumption which requires to be substantiated by facts.² For aught we know from the *Gauḍapāda-kārikās*, Gauḍapāda was certainly not a Buddhist, not even a Vedāntin with Buddhist predilections, but an Advaita Vedāntin with a bent for asceticism and Yoga. The facts that he chose an Upanishad for the basis of his thesis, supported the latter by a close analysis and synthesis of the texts of the main Upanishads and repeatedly asserted that his doctrines were the final teaching of the Vedāntas (*vedānta-nūschaya*), taken together with the Vedāntic conception of an enlightened Muni or Yogin, the Vedāntic goal of the *Brāhmaṇya pada* for the aspirant and the Bhagavadgīta phraseology and ideas, must be conclusive enough in this matter. The straight meaning of the words, *naitad Buddhena bhāṣitam*, in I, 99 would be that Buddha never taught that the Absolute was the final reality, though such a teaching verging on Advaita conception of the absolute *Brahman* or *Ātman*, is ascribed to him by the different Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism.

The solution of the contact between the philosophic positions of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda on the one hand and Advaita Vedānta on the other is to be sought in the historical evolution of Buddhism, rather than in the indebtedness of Advaitism to Buddhism. From the time of its inception, Buddhism has evinced its predilections for Upanishadic teaching. To quote S. Radhakrishnan again: "Buddhism is only a later phase of the general movement

of thought of which the Upanishads were the earlier. 'Many of the doctrines of the Upanishads are no doubt pure Buddhism (says Max Muller), or rather Buddhism is on many points the consistent carrying out of the principle laid down in the Upanishads.' Buddha did not look upon himself as an innovator, but only a restorer of the ancient way, *i.e.*, the way of the Upanishads."¹ Buddhism came to be outlawed as heretical not so much for its ethical and philosophical views as for its revolt against Brahmanical ritualism and social order. Whatever was the attitude of Gautama Buddha towards the Ātman theory of the Upanishads, he has nowhere repudiated the Upanishadic teaching, even though almost all other philosophical theories of the day received from him a word of disapprobation. If we add to this, the facts that most of the Buddhist controversialists, who followed Buddha's teaching and were responsible for the later development of Buddhism, were Brahmana converts, and that about the beginning of the Christian era, it was Buddhism which saw the necessity of adopting itself to popular emotions and tastes in religious and philosophical matters to capture the imagination of the masses, it becomes easy to see how the original, implicit Upanishadic tendencies could have led the Buddhist philosophers to doctrinal positions analogous to Advaitic philosophy, so much so that in two of the latest developments of Buddhism in China, the Tien Tai and the Avatamsaka schools, which are "regarded as the two most beautiful flowers in the garden of the Buddhist thought,"² the Vedantic Brahman and Ātman once more assert themselves side by side with their conception of *Tathatā*. The Mahāyāna Buddhism is no less accused of being crypto-Advaitism than is Advaitism of being crypto-Buddhism.¹ While, thus, some sort of philosophical affinity between Advaitism and Buddhism was inevitable, scrupulous care was taken by both Advaitins and Buddhists to stress their differences. Both are overinfluenced by

¹ Das Gupta, *op. cit.*, I.

² Belvalkar, *Vedānta Philosophy*.

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 470.

² Yamakami Sogen: 'Systems of Buddhist Thought,' p. 287.

their religious pre-suppositions. Gauḍapāda never forgets that he is maintaining a Vedāntic position, just as, already pointed out, the Buddhist, even when his philosophic impulse drags him on to the Vedāntic conception of reality, never disentangles himself from his religious pre-conceptions. It is necessary to bear in mind this deliberate and religiously attempted mutual exclusiveness to correctly evaluate the two great systems of Indian philosophy. The similarity and dissimilarity between Advaitism and Buddhism are thus both fundamental and have a historical significance. They are the necessary result of the early outlawing of Buddhism from the pale of Brahmanism and of the long conflict that ensued between the two religions, making it impossible for Vedānta to accept any heterodox doctrines of Buddhism.

THE SĀNKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN THOUGHT

BY VIDVAN H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR, M.A.,

Maharaja's College, Mysore.


I

1. The term 'evolution' in modern sense means change. It is not a blind and chartless change. It is a change in describable and definable directions. It is evident in the growth of an organic life. Such growth consists in the descent of the more complex from the simple with increasing diversity in, and interdependence of, parts.

2. 'Evolution' thus defined can be applied only to particular aspects of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. The Sāṅkhya term for evolution is *parināma*. *Parināma* is change. It is either a change of an entity into itself or into a complex entity or a change of a complex entity into a more complex entity. Sāṅkhya traces all change finally to what he calls *prakṛiti*. *Prakṛiti* is the name given to three factors—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Prakṛiti* at a stage changes into itself. This is the state of equilibrium (*samyāvasthā*). At another stage her state of equilibrium is disturbed by the presence of *puruṣa*, the spiritual principle and now she changes into a complex entity. And in the continuation of the changing process, she changes from the less complex to the more complex. At the stage of equilibrium the three factors change into themselves—*satva* changing into *satva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. If this state is disturbed by the presence of *puruṣa*, then the three factors mix with one another and

¹ Poussin, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Also Yamakami Sogen; *op. cit.*

BULLETIN
OF THE
SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
(UNIVERSITY OF LONDON)



VOLUME VIII: 1935-37.

Published by
The School of Oriental Studies,

Reprinted with the permission of the original publishers

KRAUS REPRINT LTD.
VADUZ
1964

warm water and allowed to draw over night. The fluid is then strained, sometimes cooled, and perhaps mostly mixed with spices or other flavouring stuffs. So far there seems to be little difficulty. That it should be in special use in the Punjab¹ is, of course, quite possible, though it seems to be widely known in different parts of India.

There remains, however, the derivation of the word *pōst* (पोस्त) or *pōstā* (पोस्ता) itself, which seems to cause some uncertainty. Sir George Grierson, whose knowledge of everything connected with India is unrivalled, and who was for a couple of years himself an Opium Agent in Bihār, tells us² that the usual name of the *Papaver somniferum* L. is really *pōst* or *pōstā*, which thus, at least within Bihār, denotes the whole plant. I ventured to write to Sir George Grierson on the subject, stating it as my humble opinion that it is really the seed-capsule that is called *pōst(ā)*, and that this name was then transferred to the plant itself; and in his reply³ Sir George willingly endorsed this opinion. He further tells me that the common opinion in Bihār seems to be that *pōst* is really the Persian word *pōst* meaning "skin",⁴ which is "in this connexion referred to the 'skin' or outer shell of the poppy capsule". For phonetic reasons it seems impossible that *pōst(ā)* could be a genuine Indian word, and it must thus be suggested that it was borrowed from somewhere. The difficulty seems to me to be that Pers. *pōst* does really mean "skin, hide of an animal",⁵ and that it seems slightly uncertain whether such a meaning could be developed into the "skin" (or rather shell) of a poppy capsule. As, however, no other probable derivation seems to be at hand we shall so far have to rest content with this one.

¹ Watt, l.c., p. 845.

² *Bihar Peasant Life*, 2nd ed., p. 241.

³ Letter dated 11th January, 1935.

⁴ On this word which has been borrowed into Sanskrit as *pusta(ka)*- "manuscript, book" cf. Gauthiot, *MSL.*, xix, 130 f.

⁵ Pers. *pōst* should be related to Kurd. *pōst* "skin" (*G.I.P.A.*, i, 2, 267) and to Avestan *pōsta*- "skin". There is considerable difficulty concerning the root-vowel; but undoubtedly the Avestan word owes its origin to a false writing and should really be *prost* or *p'rost* (i.e. **pōsta-* or **pausta-*).

Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda

By AMARNATH RAY.

ABOUT three years ago, I sent a paper on "The Date of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa" to the I.H.Q. The publication of the paper was delayed, and it was forestalled by B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma's paper on the same subject, which appeared in the *Annals* of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, vol. xiv, pts. iii-iv. The object of both the papers was the same, viz. to controvert the views of Vaidya and Winternitz who proposed the tenth century A.D. as the date of the Bh.P. Sarma suggests that this Purāṇa was composed in the fifth century, if not earlier. My own view is that the work came into being some time between A.D. 550 and 650. The mention therein of the Huns (ii, 7, 26) and of the Tamil Saints (xi, 5, 38-40) would go against Sarma's hypothesis. Sarma and the present writer adopted somewhat different lines of attack upon the position taken up by Vaidya and Winternitz. It is unnecessary, however, to state the additional matter my paper contained, or to publish it. This will be done if the other view finds a defender who has to be refuted.

I propose in this place to raise a discussion as to whether the composition of the Bh.P. preceded or followed that of the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda. From the parallelisms cited below, it will be clear to all that one of these two writers must have been influenced by the other. Sarma points out a quotation from Bh.P. (x, 14, 4) in the *vr̥tti* on the "Uttaragītā" (ii, 45), attributed to Gauḍapāda, and also two clear references to the Bhāgavata in the so-called *Mādhara vr̥tti* on the "Sāmkhyakārikā". As regards this latter work, it has been doubted whether we have the original text before us; the work appears to have grown with the times, and the Bh.P. references found therein do not appear in Paramārtha's Chinese translation. If the Uttaragītā commentary were a genuine work of Gauḍapāda, as Belvalkar and Sarma think, it would be clear that the author of the Bh.P. preceded Gauḍapāda. I must, however, invite these and other scholars to reconsider the question in the light of what follows.

Compare the similarity of ideas in the following quotations from the Bh.P. and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda :—

- (a) “*Adāvante ca yan nāsti vartamane’pi tat tathā
Vitatthaiḥ sadrśāḥ santo’vitathā iṣa lakṣitāḥ.*”
G. K., ii, 6, and iv, 31.

“*Na yad idam agra āsa na bhaviṣyad ato nidhanād-
Anumitam antarā tvayi vibhāti mṛṣaikaṛase
Ata upamīyate draviṇajātivikalpapathair
Vitatthamanovilāsam ṛtam ityavayantyabudhāḥ.*”
Bh.P., x, 87, 37.

“*Ādyantayer yad asato’si tad eva madhye.*”
Bh.P., xi, 19, 7.

“*Na yat purastād uta tan na pascāt
Madhye’pi tan na vyapadeśamātram.*”
Bh.P., xi, 28, 21.

Note the word *vitatha* in the Kārikā and in the first of the Bhāgavata passages.

- (b) “*Na nirodho na cetpatti na baddho na ca sādhakah
Na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā.*”
G. K., ii, 32.

“*Baddho mukta iti vyākhyā guṇate me na vastutaḥ
Guṇasya māyāmūlatvān na me mokṣa na bandhanām.*”
Bh.P., xi, 11, 1.

- (c) “*Advaitam samanuprāpya jaḍavallokaṁ-ācāret.*”
G. K., ii, 35–6.

“*Ātmārāmo’nayavṛttyā vicarej jaḍavanmunih.*”
Bh.P., xi, 11, 16–17.

- (d) “*Māyāśa tasya devasya yayā yaṁ mohitaḥ svayam.*”
G. K., ii, 19.

“*Svamāyāguṇam āviśya bādhyabādhakatām gataḥ.*”
Bh.P., vii, i, 6.

- (e) “*Ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāsādayo yathā
Ākāśe sampṛalīyante tadvaj jīva ihātmani.*”
G. K., iii, 4.

“*Ghate bhinne ghaṭākāśa ākāśa syād yathā purā
Evaṁ dehe mṛte jīvo brahma sampadyate punaḥ.*”
Bh.P., xii, 5, 5.

- (f) “*Manoḍṛṣyam idam dvaitam yat kiñcīt sacarācaram
Manase hy amanibhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate.*”
G. K., iii, 31.

“*Manah sṛjati vai dehān guṇān karmāṇi cātmanah
Tan manah sṛjate māyā tato jīvasya saṁsṛtiḥ.*”

Bh.P., xii, 5, 6.

(g) In interpreting Bh.P., xi, 24, 7, Śrīdhara quotes the well-known G.K., iii, 15 :—

“*Mṛllohaṁviṣphulingādyaiḥ sṛṣṭirya coditānyathā
Upāyaḥ se’vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathaṇcana.*”

(h) The similes of the Rope and the Snake and of the city of Gandharvas, so familiar to Advaita Vedānta, occur in both the works. (Bh.P., vi, 9, 37 ; xi, 26, 17 ; and G.K., ii, 17–18 ; and Bh.P., vi, 15, 23, and G.K., ii, 31.)

(i) Bh.P. (vii, 15, 54) names the four states or modes of the Being, viz. *viśva*, *taijasa*, *prājña*, and *turya*, just as they occur in the Kārikās, which Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya considers to be older than the so-called Māṇḍūkya Up., where the first and the fourth appear as *Vaiśvānara* and *turiya*.

A closer comparison of the two works would, I am sure, disclose many more parallelisms. In the absence of any earlier semi-Buddhistic Vedānta work of the type of these Kārikās, a student of Indian Philosophy is naturally led to think that the Kārikās were earlier than the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, which looks like attempting to harmonize their Vedānta with the Pāñcarātra Bhakti religion, without, at the same time, disowning the latter’s original allegiance to what is known as the Paurāṇic Sāṁkhya. But while the author of the Purāṇa appears to be familiar with the “Ajātavāda” doctrine, he does not know the “Anirvacanīyatā” doctrine posited by Śaṅkara. I am inclined, on this among other grounds, to think that the author came between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. No doubt the latter does not mention the Bhāgavata in his commentaries, but if the “Govindāṣṭakam” be a genuine work of his, as the sixteenth-century Bengal Vaiṣṇava writer, Jīva Gosvāmin thought, and as Belvalkar and others of this day think, Śaṅkara must have known the Bhāgavata. It may be noted also that both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are said to have known Puri or Jagannath, but that holy place does not appear to have been known to the author of the Bh.P. It would otherwise have found mention in the chapter on Balarāma’s pilgrimage (x, 79).

The difficulty in the way of the acceptance of my hypothesis is twofold : Firstly, the Bhāgavata passage, hunted out by B. N. Krishna-murti Sarma, from the “Uttaragītāvṛtti,” and, secondly, the tradition that Gauḍapāda was the teacher’s teacher of Śaṅkara.

The first difficulty is not really so insuperable as it appears. The attribution of the *ṛtti* to Gauḍapāda rests on the evidence of the colophon in one or two manuscripts of the text. Such colophons cannot form independent evidence, knowing, as we do, that they often originated from ignorance or fraud. Nor does the fact that the philosophy of the *ṛtti* is Advaita of the Gauḍapāda type mean much, for that is also the philosophy of the "Uttaragītā" itself. I should be prepared to ascribe that work, rather than the commentary, to the great Gauḍapāda.

The second difficulty is harder to meet, as in meeting it, one has to reject a time-honoured tradition. The traditional relation between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara would not leave sufficient time for the pre-Śaṅkara author of the Bh.P., belonging to the extreme south of India, to be familiar with the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda. Two pieces of evidence are adduced in support of the tradition, viz. the mention of Gauḍapāda as *paramaguru* in the *pūṣpikā* to the commentary on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās, usually attributed to Śaṅkara; and the reference to Gauḍapāda as *guror garīyase* in the metrical "Upadeśa-sāhasri" (xviii, 2), an undoubted work of Śaṅkara. But can either of the expressions mean nothing else but "teacher's teacher"? I see no reason to restrict the meaning in this way, in either case, though *paramaguru* is generally understood to mean "teacher's teacher". I have besides grave doubts as to the authorship of the commentary on the Kārikās. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya would reckon it among the Śaṅkarācārya apocrypha,¹ and I agree with him for a reason which he does not adduce, viz. the author's ignorance of the real import of a good many Buddhistic philosophical terms which abound in the Kārikās. Śaṅkara was more familiar with Buddhism than any other commentator on the Brahmasūtras we know of, and I am not prepared to ascribe such ignorance to him. One has only to consider the widely varying attitudes of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara towards Theism, as also towards the Buddha and Buddhism, to be convinced that more than one teacher must have come between the two.² I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion of all that has been said by others about Gauḍapāda and his age, but I am inclined to agree with Barnett and Jacobi in thinking that a date,

¹ *Sir Ashutosh Silver Jubilee Memorial Volume*, iii, pt. ii, Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Upaniṣads!

² Note also the remote nature of Śaṅkara's references to Gauḍapāda in his commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras, i, 4, 14-5, and ii, 1, 9), as "Sampradāyavit" and "Vedāntārtha-sampradāyavit".


later than A.D. 500, should not be assigned to this great teacher.¹ This would place him nearly 300 years before Śaṅkara, and allow for an interval, during which the Kārikās might travel down to the south. May it be that the influence of the Purāṇa itself led Śaṅkara to find a respectable place for a personal God and his worship in his system? Gauḍapāda appears to have felt little concern for Theism and *bhakti*.

¹ See Barnett's review of Walliser's work in *JRAS.* 1910, and Jacobi's paper on "Māyāvāda" in *JAOS.* 1913.

THE
INDIAN HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY

Edited by
NARENDRA NATH LAW

Vol. XIV



CALCUTTA

1938

Gaudapāda

“नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ।”

“This is not said by the Buddha.”

The following is the last but one kārīkā of the fourth or last chapter of Gaudapāda's *Āgamaśāstra*:

कमते नहि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।

सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥

Literally it says that according to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (*tāyin*)¹ *jñāna* 'knowledge' does not approach the *dharmas* 'elements' of existence (i.e. it does not relate itself to the objects). But all *dharmas* and *jñāna*—this is not said by the Buddha.

1 The word *tāyin* is thus interpreted by Prajñākaramati in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, p. 75: तायिनाम् इति, स्वाधिगतमार्गोपदेशकानाम् । यदुक्तं तायः स्वदृष्टमार्गोक्तिः (*Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 2. 145). See the present writer's paper, 'Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti' in *IHQ.*, vol. XIII, 1937. This explanation is partly followed by Udayanācārya in his *Tātparyatikā-parīśuddhi* (Bib. Ind.) in explaining *tāyin* in Vācaspatimiśra's *Tātparyatikā*, 2 (अक्षपादाय तायिने)। तायी तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणसम्प्रदायप्रवर्तकः । Prajñākaramati (*loc. cit.*) offers another explanation: अथवा तायः सन्तानार्थम् आसंसारमप्रतिष्ठितनिर्वाणतया अवस्थायिनाम् । This word is widely used in Buddhist [e.g. *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, p. 421; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, III. 2; *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* (Bib. Bud.) pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.] and Jaina [e.g. Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra*, (Bib. Ind., vol. 1, pp. 1, 47); *Daśavaikālika* (Devacānd Lalbhai Jaina Pustakodhāra, No. 49, p. 115)] works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as *trāyin* 'protector,' and *tāpin*, as in the present case. As a name for Buddha it is translated into Tibetan by *Skyob pa* (*Mahāvūyutpatti*, § 1. 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent *trāyin* 'protector'. See *JRAS.*, 1910, p. 140; *JPTS.*, 1891-1893, p. 53; *JA.*, 1912, p. 243; *Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference*, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1.

It has been repeatedly shown in the *Āgamaśāstra*² (specially in IV. 96) that *jñāna* is *asaṅga* 'free from attachment, i.e. free from any relation to its objects', as the *dharmas* or objects have no reality. Here the author refers to that fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is neither *jñāna* nor *dharmas* as he has said neither of them: *naitad buddhena bhāṣitam*.

What does the last line mean? Scholars of the orthodox school interpret it in various ways, but without sufficient justification.³ In this paper an attempt will be made to throw some new light on the line.

In one way it can be said that there are only two things, *jñāna* 'knowledge' and *jñeya* 'knowable' or *dharmas* 'elements of existence', 'objects'.⁴ Here we are told that neither of them is said by the Buddha. But how? Has he ever said anything? The Buddhists would give the answer in the negative. According to them the Buddha has never uttered a single word, as the following quotations will show:

Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamakakārikā*, XX, 25:

सर्वोपलम्भोपशमः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवः ।

न क्वचित् कस्यचित् कश्चिद् धर्मो बुद्धेन देशितः ॥

Tathāgatagubhyasūtra quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti* on the above:

याच्च रात्रिं तथागतोऽनुत्तरां सम्यक् सम्बोधिमभिसम्बुद्धो याच्च रात्रिमुपादाय परि-
निर्वास्यति अत्रान्तरे तथागतेन एकमप्यक्षरं नोदाहृतं न व्याहृतं नापि प्रव्याहरति नापि
प्रव्याहरिष्यति ।

2 See IV. 72: चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ।

See also IV. 97, 79 (*niḥsaṅga*); cf. III. 32 (*agraha*).

3 Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Ananta Krishna Shastri: *Vedāntarakṣaṇaṇi*, 1937, Introduction, p. 6.

4 See our text, IV. 1.

Laṅkāvatāra, ed. B. Nanjio, 1923, pp. 142-3:

याच्च रात्रिं तथागतोऽभिसम्बुद्धो याच्च रात्रिं परिनिर्वास्यति अत्रान्तरे एकमप्यक्षरं
तथागतेन नोदाहृतं न प्रव्याहरिष्यति । अवचनं बुद्धवचनम् ।

Nāgārjuna in his *Nirauṇpamyastava*, ed. G. Tucci, *JRAS*, 1932, pp. 309 ff. 17:

नोदाहृतं त्वया किञ्चिदेकमप्यक्षरं विभो ।

कृतञ्च वैनेयजनो धर्मवर्षेण तपितः ॥

Bhagavat quoted in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 264, and *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 365 (with a slight change):

अनक्षरस्य धर्मस्य श्रुतिः का देशना चका ।

श्रूयते देश्यते चापि समारोपादनक्षरः ॥

Laṅkāvatāra, p. 137:

न मे यानं महायानं न घोषो न च अक्षराः ।⁵

तत्त्वं ह्यक्षरवर्जितम् । *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

निरक्षरत्वात्तत्त्वस्य । *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

Vajracchedikā, ed. Max Müller, p. 24:

तत् किं मन्यसे सुभूते अपि न्वस्ति स कश्चिद्धर्मो यस्तथागतेन देशितः । एवमुक्त
आयुष्मान् सुभूतिर्भगवन्तमेवमोचत् । यथाहं भगवन् भगवतो भाषितस्यार्थमाजानामि
नास्ति स कश्चिद् धर्मो यस्तथागतेनानुत्तरा सम्यक्सम्बोधिरित्यभिसम्बुद्धो नास्ति धर्मो
यस्तथागतेन देशितः ॥

तत् किं मन्यसे सुभूते अपि न्वस्ति स कश्चिद्धर्मो यस्तथागतेन भाषितः ।
सुभूतिराह । नो हीदं भगवन् नास्ति स कश्चिद्धर्मो यस्तथागतेन भाषितः ।

Laṅkāvatāra, p. 144:

यस्याच्च रात्र्यां धिगमो यस्याच्च परिनिर्वातः ।

एतस्मिन्नन्तरे नास्ति मया किञ्चित् प्रकाशितम् ॥

Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 539:

अवाच ऽनक्षराः सर्वे शून्याः शान्तादिनिर्मलाः ।

य एवं जानति धर्मान् कुमारो बुद्ध सोच्यते ॥

5 Cf. *Āgamaśāstra*, IV. 60: यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते ।

The passages quoted above show that the Buddha has said nothing. Let us now try to understand what it signifies. This statement is based on two grounds: (i) *pratyātmadharmatā*, i.e. the nature of the highest truth that it is realised in one's own self, and (ii) *paurāṇasthitidharmatā*, i.e. the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation.

As regards the first it is held that the transcendental reality (*paramārtha*) springs up only as an inward conviction (*pratyātmavedya*), it cannot be attained through an instruction from others (*aparapratyaya* = *paropadeśāgamya*), for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence.⁶ This is well-known in the Vedānta.⁷ Candrakīrti writes in his *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 493:

सर्वे एवायमभिधानाभिधेयज्ञानज्ञेयादिव्यवहारोऽशेषो लोकसंवृत्तिसत्यमित्युच्यते । नहि परमार्थत एव तत् सम्भवति । कुतस्तत् परमार्थे वाचां प्रवृत्तिः कुतो वा ज्ञानस्य । स हि परमार्थोऽपरप्रत्ययः शान्तः प्रत्यात्मवेद्य आर्याणां सर्वप्रपञ्चातीतः । स नोपदिश्यते न चापि ज्ञायते ।

Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 539, just after the passage, No. 2, cited above:

अथ च यथाधिसुक्ताः सर्वसत्त्वा नानाधात्वाशयास्तां तां विविधां तथागतवाचं निश्चरन्तीं संजानन्ति । तेषामेवं पृथक् पृथक् भवति । अयं भगवान् अस्मभ्यमिमं धर्मं देशयति । वयं च तथागतस्य धर्मदेशनां शृणुमः । तत्र तथागतो न कल्पयति न विकल्पयति सर्वकल्पविकल्पजातवासनाप्रपञ्चविगतो हि शान्तमते तथागत इति विस्तरः ।

यदि तर्ह्येवं [न] कश्चित् कस्यचित् [तत् कश्चि-]द् धर्मो बुद्धेन देशितस्तत् कथमिम एते विचित्राः प्रवचनव्यवहाराः प्रज्ञायन्ते । उच्यते । अविद्यानिद्रानुगतानां देहिनां स्वप्रायमानानामिव

6 *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 56: परमार्थो हि आर्याणां तूष्णीम्भावः ।

7 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 4. 1: यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह । See also *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. 3; *Brahmasūtras* with *Sāṅkara*, III. 2-17; *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 19 ff.

स्वविकल्पाभ्युदय एषः । अयं भगवान् सकललिभुवनसुरासुरनरनाथ इमं धर्ममस्मभ्यं देशयतोति ।

The following may also be cited here from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 194:

न च महामते तथागत अक्षरपतितं धर्मं देशयन्ति ।० पुनर्महामते योऽक्षरपतितं धर्मं देशयति स प्रलपति । निरक्षरत्वाद् धर्मस्य । अत एतस्मात् कारणान्महामते उक्तं देशनापाठे मयान्यैश्च बुद्धबोधिसत्त्वैर्यथैकमप्यक्षरं तथागता नोदाहरन्ति न प्रव्याहरन्तीति । तत् कस्य हेतोर्यदनक्षरत्वाद्धर्माणाम् । न च नाथोपसंहितमुदाहरन्ति । उदाहरन्त्येव विकल्पमुपादायानुपादायान् (०दानान् ?) महामते सर्वधर्माणां शासनलोपः स्यात् ।

And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the meaning and not on only letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand :

अर्थप्रतिशरणे⁸ महामते बोधिसत्त्वेन महासत्त्वेन भवितव्यं न व्यञ्जनप्रतिशरणे ।⁸ व्यञ्जनानुसारी महामते कुलपुत्रो वा कुलदुहिता वा स्वात्मानं च नाशयति परार्थं च नावबोधयति । *Op. cit.*, pp. 194-95.

This second ground is this: The Buddha has said nothing because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (अवचनं बुद्धवचनम्).

Taking both the grounds together the *Laṅkāvatāra* says (pp. 143-4):

यदुक्तं भगवता याश्च रात्रिं तथागतोऽभिसम्बुद्धो याश्च रात्रिं परिनिर्वास्यति अतान्तर एकमप्यक्षरं तथागतेन नोदाहृतं न प्रव्याहरिष्यति अवचनं बुद्धवचनमिति किमिदं सन्धायोक्तम् । भगवानाह । धर्मद्वयं महामते सन्धाय मयैतदुक्तम् । कतमद्धर्मद्वयम् । यदुत प्रत्यात्म-धर्मताश्च पौराणस्थितिधर्मताश्च ।० उत्पादाद् वा तथागतानामनुत्पादाद्वा तथागतानां स्थितैवैषा धर्माणां धर्मता धर्मस्थितिता धर्मनियामता पौराणनगरमहापथवन्महामते । तद्

8 In such cases other texts read °pratisarāṇa for °pratiśarāṇa.

यथा कश्चिदेव पुरुषोऽटव्यां पर्यटन् पौराणं नगरमनुपश्येदभिविकलप्रवेशं । स तं नगरमनुप्रविशेत् । तत्र प्रविश्य प्रतिनिविश्य नगरं नगरक्रियासुखमनुभवेत् । तत् किं मन्यसे महामते अपि नु तेन पुरुषेण स पन्था उत्पादितो येन पथा तं नगरमनुप्रविष्टो नगरवैचित्र्यञ्च । आह । नो भगवन् । भगवानाह । एवमेव महामते यन्मया तैश्च तथागतैरधिगतं स्थितैवैषा धर्मता धर्मस्थितिता धर्मनियामता तथता भूतता सत्यता । अत एतस्मात् कारणान्महामते मयेदमुक्तं याश्च रात्रिं तथागतोऽभिसम्बुद्धो नोदाहरिष्यति ॥

The following may also be quoted here from the *Vajracchedikā*, p. 24, just after the passage, No. 9, cited above :

तत् कस्य हेतोः । योऽसौ तथागतेन धर्मोऽभिसम्बुद्धो देशितो वा अग्राह्यः सोऽनभिलष्यः । न स धर्मो नाधर्मः । तत् कस्य हेतोः । असंस्कृतप्रभाविता ह्यार्यपुद्गलाः ।

This is the significance of the passage under discussion (i.e. सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम्, IV. 99), and it is reasonable that the author who begins the chapter (IV) with *jñāna* and *dharmas*⁹ should state in conclusion the transcendental truth about them.

VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA

JOURNAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY

This journal is mainly intended to promote research work by the teachers and students of the University of Bombay. It will contain original articles, abstracts of theses and reviews of books and will be issued six times a year, the issues being devoted to the following subjects in their order:

- No. 1. History, Economics and Sociology. (July)
 No. 2. Physical Sciences, including Mathematics. (November)
 No. 3. Arts and Law. (November)
 No. 4. History, Economics and Sociology. (January)
 No. 5. Biological Sciences, including Medicine. (March)
 No. 6. Arts and Law. (May)

RATES OF SUBSCRIPTION

Annual Subscription for six issues	Rs. 14
" " " Nos. 1 and 4	5
" " " " 2 " 5	5
" " " " 3 " 6	5
Single Copy	3

(Inland Postage Free)

NOTICE

Remittances, correspondence relating to subscriptions, advertisements and notices of change of address should be addressed to

MESSRS. LONGMANS, GREEN & CO. LTD.

Post Box No. 704

BOMBAY

JOURNAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY

[ARTS AND LAW: NO. 12]

VOL. VI.

MAY 1938

PART VI.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES.

MR. W. H. AUDEN K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR	1
TWO FUNDAMENTAL POINTS IN LITERARY THEORY J. O. BARTLEY	12
HYMNS TO INDRA BY THE VĀMADEVAS H. D. VELANKAR	28
THE MAṆḌŪKYOPANIṢAD AND GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKAS V. A. GADGIL	66
DATE OF VAIDIKA-VAIṢṆAVA-SADĀCĀRA OF HARI KRIṢṆA MIŚRA BETWEEN 1713 AND 1744 A.D. P. K. GODE	80
OUTLINES OF PALÆOGRAPHY H. R. KAPADIA	87
SĀNGATYA AND ṢAṬPADI METRES IN KANNADA LITERATURE PART II K. G. KUNDANGAR	111
A 15TH CENTURY GĪTAGOVINDA MS. WITH GUJARĀTĪ PAINTINGS M. R. MAJMUDAR	123

REVIEWS:

THR JASMINE GARLAND (KUNDAMĀLĀ)	138
ORIENTAL LITERARY DIGEST	140
THE NEW CATALOGUS CATALOGORUM	140
DHARMAKOŚA: VYAVAHĀRAKĀṆḌA	141
THE MAHĀPURAṆA OF PUṢPADANTA	142
ŚRĪ YOGĪNDEVA'S PARAMĀTMAPRAKĀṢA	143
PSYCHOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION	145

BOOKS RECEIVED	149
-----------------------	-----

AOKNOWLEDGMENTS	151
------------------------	-----

EXOHANGES	152
------------------	-----

THE MĀṆḌŪKYOPANIṢAD AND THE GAUḌAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀS

Sanskrit scholars have expressed divergent and even conflicting views on the Māṇḍūkya and the Gauḍapāda-kārikās which have consequently become a bone of contention among them. Dr. A. Venkata-subbiah holds the view [Indian Antiquary, October 1933, Vol. LXII] that the Māṇḍūkya and the Gauḍapāda-Kārikās must have been composed by one and the same author i.e. Gauḍapāda and that the former is not naturally *Śruti*. Prof. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma, on the other hand, contends [Review of Philosophy & Religion, Vol. II. No. 1 ; Vol. III. No. 1 ; Vol. IV. No. 2 and the Poona Orientalist, Vol. I. No. 2] that the whole of the *Āgama prakaraṇa* including the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad is a *Śruti* text. An attempt is, therefore, made in this article to review the whole question in the light of the internal evidence supplied by the text of the Māṇḍūkya and the Kārikās and the external evidence supplied by the commentary on the text by Śaṅkara, the greatest and the earliest *Advaitin* to know about Gauḍapāda and his work, and the references to the Gauḍapāda-kārikās found in the works of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, the immediate disciple of Śaṅkara. At the outset it should be borne in mind that Ānandagiri and other *Advaitins* are of opinion that the Māṇḍūkya is an Upaniṣad as well as *Śruti* whereas Madhva followed by other *dvaitins* believe that the whole of the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* consisting of the Māṇḍūkya and the twenty nine kārikās is *Śruti*.

The numbering of the sections of the upaniṣad portion is different from that of the following śloka. If Gauḍapāda were to be the author of both the māṇḍūkya and the kārikās, there is no reason why he should have resorted to this method. Besides the upaniṣad text itself contains a bare statement about the identity of the four moras of the ॐ symbol with the four stages of the soul and does not give any indication about the contents of the remaining three *prakaraṇas* of the kārikās. One fails to understand the purpose that must have prompted Gauḍapāda to write this upaniṣad with such a bare outline, as some critics would have us believe, unless he wanted the public to look upon it as *Śruti* which supports the tenets of his philosophy. Such an assumption is unwarranted as there is nothing very special in this upaniṣad which he could not have found in other upaniṣads and on which alone he could base his philosophy. The most probable

reason why he chose the māṇḍūkya of all other upaniṣads is that it must have been looked upon by his *sampradāya* as the authoritative *Śruti* text on which the *Advaita* school of philosophy relied for inspiration. That this is so will be clear in the course of this article. One of the striking features of this upaniṣad is the mention, for the first time, in the history of the upaniṣadic thought, of the four parts of the symbol ॐ as the maitrāyaṇī upaniṣad mentions only three moras of the symbol. The reason why the fourth part is added is obvious because this upaniṣad tries to show the correspondence of the four parts of the ॐ with the four states of consciousness and consequently with four conditions of the soul. The real contribution made by this upaniṣad to the upaniṣadic thought is this systematic treatment of the four states of consciousness. One can clearly see that in the last three *prakaraṇas* of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās in which practically the *Advaita* view advocated by Gauḍapāda is clearly set forth there is hardly any reference conspicuously made to the four parts of the ॐ much less to the four states of consciousness and still more less to the moraleless part of it. This does not mean that the Māṇḍūkya does not support his philosophy in general. In fact the negation of the worldly phenomena emphasized by this upaniṣad paves the way for Gauḍapāda's view about the illusory nature of this world. But the two more important doctrines namely the *Māyāvāda* and the *Ajāti-vāda*, rather the corner stones of his philosophy, are not in the least mentioned in the Māṇḍūkya. It is extremely difficult to account for this omission if Gauḍapāda were to be the author of the upaniṣad.

The fact that the kārikās do not follow the upaniṣad in its order and in its terms, and that many words and terms occurring in the upaniṣad are not explained in the kārikās and many passages are simply passed over, does not lend support to the assumption that Gauḍapāda is the author of both. For instance the first five sections of the upaniṣad are not commented upon in the kārikās in the order in which they appear. The kārikās only present a summary of these sections in the order and in the manner the author of these kārikās thinks fit. The first two sections are not at all explained. The term *Viśvānara* is replaced in the kārikās by the term *Viśva* and a new word *Vibhu* is added by the author of the kārikās even though it is not in the upaniṣad. It is further stated in the kārikās that in waking the activity of the soul centres round the right eye, in dreaming it is within the mind and in sleep it is in the *hṛdayākāśa*. All this is added by the author of the kārikās as it is not found in the upaniṣad. The idea that the soul is happy in a particular sphere that is assigned to him for the time being is not in the upaniṣad. The terms *saptāṅga* and *ekonavimśati* are not explained in the kārikās. It seems that the

author does not explain them because he is obviously more interested in explaining the philosophical point of view than in explaining mere verbal expressions. Coming to the *kārikās* 10-18 which are supposed to be a sort of a commentary on the seventh section of the upaniṣad one fails to find any reference in the upaniṣad to the *bijānidrā* as the cause of the *anyathāgrahaṇa* leading to further complications and also to the term *māyā* and the *māyā* view of the phenomenal existence. All these ideas not expressly stated in the māṇḍūkya seem to be imported by the author of the *kārikās* with a view to establish his *advaita* view of life and thus run counter to the view held by Dr. Venkatasubbiah.

The *kārikās* present as it were an independent thesis which has got only some ideas common with the contents of the upaniṣad. For instance the 6th section of the upaniṣad containing words such as *antaryāmi*, *yonī* etc. gives an opportunity to Gauḍapāda to make a statement in the *kārikās* about different view-points concerning the creation. Similarly the description of the nature of the soul in the *turiya* stage in the 7th section of the upaniṣad must have helped him to state the *advaita* as the absolute truth on rational grounds in the following *prakaraṇas*. But barring these points of agreement between the upaniṣad and the *kārikās* there are some other points dealt with in the *kārikās* which strictly speaking are not referred to by the upaniṣad. (1) The necessity for *yoga* practices for the purpose of attaining the fourth i.e. the *turiya* stage emphasized in the *pranavopāśanā* is not at all alluded to in the upaniṣad. (2) The cessation of the phenomenal world is only referred to in the upaniṣad but not fully discussed nor are the corollaries deduced from this suggestion worked out in detail. (3) As pointed out above Gauḍapāda tries to establish the absolutistic view about the nature of the self and the universe by the systematic and logical treatment of the *māyāvāda* and the *Ajativāda* in the following *prakaraṇas*. Besides it is by the exposition of these *vādas* that he is able to meet the arguments advanced in favour of the *sāṅkhya* view and the nihilistic view. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the māṇḍūkya should not even allude to these important theories even in their bare outline if the author of the upaniṣad and the *kārikās* were to be the same person.

Another striking feature of the Māṇḍūkya that goes against Gauḍapāda's authorship of the upaniṣad is the verbal equations of words to abstract notions or things in the manner of the Brāhmaṇa literature. For instance the first mora or *mātrā* of the symbol ॐ conveys the ideas of attainment (*āpti*), the second mora or *mātrā* stands for the idea of exaltation (*utkarṣa*) and the third *mātrā* con-

veys the idea of measurement (*mīti*). Further even the method of *phalaśruti* is just in the manner of the Brāhmaṇas. Now it will be readily granted that Gauḍapāda is all the while interested in philosophical discussions of polemical nature and would naturally be eager to resort to these alone with a view to establish his *advaita* point of view. He does not stand to gain anything by indulging in verbal equations and the *Phalaśruti* which characterise the māṇḍūkya and remind us of its affinity, in some measure at least, with the Brāhmaṇa literature. Moreover the fact that the upaniṣad is laconic in style and cryptic in thought unlike the following *kārikās* is hardly calculated to support Gauḍapāda's authorship of the same.

The introductory words *atraite ślokā bhavanti* occurring between the text of the upaniṣad and the *kārikās* cannot properly be explained if Gauḍapāda be considered as the author of both; for there is no justification for the insertion of such words between portions of the text composed by one and the same author. On the contrary the way in which the *kārikās* are introduced by these words would go to show that the former i.e. the *kārikās* were in existence before Gauḍapāda who may appear to quote them in support of the contents of his upaniṣad—a conclusion likely to defeat the end in view in so far as Gauḍapāda cannot then be alleged to be the author of these *kārikās*.

The title *āgama prakaraṇa* given to the first *prakaraṇa* containing the text of the upaniṣad shows that the māṇḍūkya is *Śruti*. If this point is not conceded, how can we explain the title *āgama prakaraṇa* in contrast to the significant titles given to other *prakaraṇas* by Gauḍapāda? Evidently according to the author the first *prakaraṇa* contains the *āgama* which means source, written testimony, traditional or sacred śāstra or the *āgama pramāṇa* of the Naiyāyikas. Taking any one of these senses of the term *āgama* the first *prakaraṇa* was so called because it contained the māṇḍūkya *Śruti* as the *āgama* on which the following twenty nine *kārikās* were a sort of a commentary and on which the remaining three *prakaraṇas* may in a general way be said to be based. Under the circumstances is it proper or even feasible that a great *advaitī* Ācārya like Gauḍapāda would himself venture to write the *āgama* portion and still believe quite naively that his *advaitī* followers and *dvaitī* opponents would be simple enough to treat his *advaita* view of life as the really philosophical view because it is supported by the māṇḍūkya *Śruti*? Was it not in the interest of the Ācārya himself and his school of thought that he should produce some *Śruti* text acknowledged by all scholars as the authoritative text in support of his philosophy? There were so many upaniṣads before the author which he would have quoted in support of his thesis. Out

of these he chose the māṇḍūkya partly because this upaniṣad was considered as the authoritative *Śruti* text by his *saṃpradāya* and partly because there was ample justification in that upaniṣad for his *advaita* view. His *advaiti* followers and even *dvaiti* opponents believed that this procedure represented facts correctly. In this logical sequence there is nothing that is unnatural and nothing that can be disproved by any positive evidence.

In the light of the above discussion based on the internal evidence it will be seen how Gauḍapāda cannot be the author of the māṇḍūkya. Let us now turn to the *advaiti* authors and see what their attitude is towards this upaniṣad. Śaṅkarācārya alludes to the first *prakaraṇa* in his *bhāṣya* on the first section of the upaniṣad as *āgama-pradhānam prakaraṇam*. This expression makes the meaning of the title of the first *Prakaraṇa* clear ; for he does not interpret this *prakaraṇa* merely as *āgama prakaranam* but as *āgama pradhanam*, which implies that the first *prakaraṇa* is so called because the *āgama* i.e. scriptural authority is the *pradhāna* portion in it. In short it comes to mean that the upaniṣad portion is the *āgama*, i.e. *Śruti* in the real sense of the term whereas the *kārikās* of the first *prakaraṇa* are included in it because they reiterate the *āgama* and as such are incorporated along with the *āgama* in one and the same *prakaraṇa*. Further in the opening of his commentary on GK. *Prakaraṇa* ii, Śaṅkara writes with reference to GK i, 18d as follows :—

“*jñate dvaitam na vidyate ityuktam | ekamevā dvitīyamityādi-śratibhyaḥ | āgamamātram tat | tatropapatyāpi dvaitasya vaita-thyam śakyate'vadhārayitumiti.*” What Śaṅkara wants to convey about the statement in GK. i, 18d. is that it is of the nature of the *āgama* as it exactly reproduces the gist of the *āgama* namely the words ‘*advaita*’ from the māṇḍūkya and ‘*ekamevādvitīyam*’ from some other *Śruti* and the same will be proved by means of reasoning in the second *prakaraṇa*. In this connection a possible objection may be raised to the effect that instead of quoting from the māṇḍūkya *Śruti* why Śaṅkara takes a citation from some other upaniṣad in support of GK. i, 18d. The reason for this is that the quotation ‘*ekamevādvitīyam*’ from another upaniṣad is more emphatic and telling in its effect than the one namely the words *advaitam Śivam* from the māṇḍūkya which even though appears like a description of the *Paramātmā* is primarily concerned with the soul in the *turiya* condition and its identity with the *Advaita*, the Absolute. It will be, therefore, very improper to infer from the non-mention of the māṇḍūkya text by Śaṅkara that he did not consider it as a *Śruti* text. In fact he has no-

where said that it is not *Śruti*. All the later *advaitins* and *dvaitins* look upon the māṇḍūkya as *Śruti*. Under the circumstances the remark made by Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah [The Poona Orientalist, Vol. i, No. 1, p. 13] that the Māṇḍūkya section 7 is not a *Śruti* text has no justification. The remark may justly apply to GK, i, 18 which is *āgama mātram* as it is directly a paraphrase of a *Śruti* text. Lastly it is interesting to examine the colophones at the end of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the four *prakaraṇas* and to distinguish between them in so far as they are concerned with the question whether the māṇḍūkya is an upaniṣad, i.e. *Śruti* or not. The colophone at the end of the *bhāṣya* on the first *prakaraṇa* unmistakably refers to the māṇḍūkya as the upaniṣad and the *ślokas* as the Gauḍapada-kārikās on the upaniṣad. That these colophones form an integral part of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the Gauḍapada-kārikās is evident.

Let us now turn to Sureśvara, the immediate disciple of Śaṅkara. He never quotes from the māṇḍūkya text but from the remaining portion, i.e. the *kārikās* in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya Vārtika* and *īaiṣkarmyasiddhi*. For instance at Bṛ. Bhā. Vār. i, 4.744 he refers to GK. i, 3 as *āgama śāsanam*. Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah is right in interpreting the expression *āgama śāsanam* on the analogy of a similar expression used by Sureśvara : ‘*ekadhaivānuvijñeyamiti ca śrutiśāsanam*’ where the author is not quoting the exact words of the *Śruti* but is giving the purport of the *Śruti* text [The Poona Orientalist, Vol. i, No. 1, p. 17]. In the above quotation, therefore, Sureśvara alludes to GK. i, 3 as *āgamaśāsanam* meaning the statement giving the purport of the *āgama* which is no other than the sections 1-5 of the māṇḍūkya. The reason why Sureśvara did not quote the actual *āgama* but the *kārikā* giving the purport of the *āgama* is quite plain. The *āgama* is rather too long for the purpose of a quotation and is summarised by the *kārikā* [Gk. i, 3] in such a masterly and brief style that Sureśvara thought of it as a very suitable quotation for the sake of convenience and effect. Besides the *bhāṣya vārtika* being metrical, ready made metrical summary of the *āgama* was considered by him more convenient for quotation rather than making his own metrical summary. The fact, therefore, that Sureśvara does not quote the māṇḍūkya text any where as *Śruti* does not warrant the conclusion that the māṇḍūkya is not *Śruti*. Ānandagiri expressly states in his sub-commentary on the Māṇḍūkya that the latter is an upaniṣad, i.e. *Śruti*. Prof. B. N. Kṛṣṇamurti Sarma has shown in his articles referred to above that later *advaitins* as well as *dvaitins* including Madhva and his followers have all along considered the māṇḍūkya as *Śruti*. Even Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah [The Poona Orientalist Vol. i,

No. 2 : p. 11] accepts this fact but believes that Gauḍapāda is the author of the māṇḍūkya as well as the kārikās. The main argument that he offers for his belief is that Śaṅkara in the course of his commentary on them, never mentions the māṇḍūkya text as *Śruti*, but on the other hand says in the opening of his commentary as follows :—*Vedāntārthasaṃgrahabhūtamidaṃ prakaraṇacatuṣṭayamomīyeta-dakṣaramītyādyārabhyate*". It appears that Dr. Venkatasubbiah is unnecessarily stretching the meaning of this line ; for the line in question implies simply that Śaṅkara is commenting on the work in the form of four *prakaraṇas* known as *Gauḍapādiyakārikās*. He does not say that every line in the four *prakaraṇas* is originally conceived and composed by Gauḍapāda and that the author is not basing his treatise on any upaniṣad or authoritative text. As a matter of fact Śaṅkara refers to the first *prakaraṇa* as *āgama-pradhāna* and it has been already shown above what the exact and correct implication of that expression is. Moreover it is very strange that a critic who believes in a part of the tradition does not, at the same time, believe in the remaining part of the same tradition without giving any sound argument ; for Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah accepts the traditional fact that Śaṅkara has written commentaries on the *Prasthānatraya* meaning the ten major upaniṣads including the *māṇḍūkya*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhagavadgīta*, and at the same time denies the validity of the same tradition by which the māṇḍūkya is looked upon as an upaniṣad meaning *Śruti* without giving any positive evidence.

Let us now take into consideration some other arguments that he has advanced in support of his contention in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. 62, 1933. It has been already pointed out above that the introductory line *atraite ślokā bhavanti* cannot be explained on the assumption that Gauḍapāda is the author of the upaniṣad. Moreover the absence of any regular *maṅgala* by Gauḍapāda in the beginning of his work is another knotty point that can hardly be solved on the above assumption. Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah, however, imagines that there is a *maṅgala* in the form of the first benedictory verse occurring at the beginning of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. He evidently relies on Ānandagiri's statement that the first benedictory verse was considered by some critics to form part of Gauḍapāda's work. But Ānandagiri himself has repudiated this suggestion in his sub-commentary on logical grounds. According to him the fact that Śaṅkara does not comment on this verse but gives it as his own śloka and that in the beginning of his commentary Śaṅkara distinctly says that the *Prakaraṇacatuṣṭaya* begins with the symbol , goes to show that the verse in question was not intended as a benedictory stanza by Gauḍapāda.

Dr. Venkatasubbiah's refutation of Ānandagiri's explanation in an apologetic tone is not satisfactory ; for just as in the beginning of his commentary Śaṅkara has paid his homage to the Brahman in the first benedictory stanza and added one more benedictory stanza, exactly so at the end of his commentary he again pays his homage to the Brahman in one stanza and adds two more verses in which he pays his humble respects to his *Parama Guru* namely Gauḍapāda. There is thus no valid reason why the first benedictory stanza in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* can be considered as written by Gauḍapāda. How the absence of a regular *maṅgala* can be otherwise explained is another question. It is very probable that Gauḍapāda did not think a separate *maṅgala* by him necessary as he had already before him the *āgama* i.e. *māṇḍūkya Śruti*, and he only wanted to make his own contribution by way of addition to the already existing portion. The explanation of the śloka occurring in the beginning of the fourth *prakaraṇa* which is considered by some critics as a *maṅgala* śloka may be given in the following manner. Gauḍapāda considered probably the first three *prakaraṇas* as merely an exposition of the central doctrine of the *Śruti* which he incorporated in the first part of his work, whereas the last *prakaraṇa* could not be considered as primarily concerned with the exposition of the Śrauta doctrine since it was mainly intended for attacking the Buddhistic tenets. Under the circumstances it appears that the verse in question is not a *maṅgala* in its real sense but a sarcastic and deprecatory reference to the Lord Buddha in contrast to his own *Guru* whom alone Gauḍapāda considered not merely *buddha* but *sambuddha*. Thus the reference to his *guru* by Gauḍapāda in this śloka is merely incidental and may not be intended to serve the purpose of a technical *maṅgala*.

Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah has given many references from Śaṅkara's commentary with a view to show that the twelve sentences or sections of the Māṇḍūkya form an integral part of the *Prakaraṇacatuṣṭaya*. But this inference does not tend to prove that the text of the upaniṣad was composed by Gauḍapāda. As already remarked above it only shows that Gauḍapāda brought forth a treatise consisting of four *prakaraṇas* which incorporated the *māṇḍūkya* text and contained the exposition of the *advaita* doctrine of the upaniṣad in its various aspects.

The discussion about the terms *śāstra* and *prakaraṇa* occurring in Ānandagiri's sub-commentary (page 12. Ānandāśram series Edition) does not help Dr. Venkatasubbiah in any way. As alleged by him the fact that Śaṅkara does not generally use the word *prakaraṇa* or *śāstra* with regard to *Śruti* passages but uses these terms with reference to

the Gauḍapāda-kārikās does not support his contention that the māṇḍūkya is not a *śruti* text ; for in his commentary Śaṅkara has never referred to the māṇḍūkya by the terms *Śāstra* even though he calls Gauḍapāda's work as a whole by that term. In this connection it is noteworthy that Gauḍapāda has never confounded the issue. He has taken care to distinguish the first *Prakarana* from the remaining *prakaraṇas* by calling it as the *āgama prakaraṇa* because it contained the *āgama* i.e. the māṇḍūkya *Śruti* and has thereby clearly shown that he is not the author of the upaniṣad.

The fact that Śaṅkara quotes from all other major upaniṣads excepting the māṇḍūkya is further adduced by Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah to support his view. We are all aware that the māṇḍūkya is not only the smallest of the ten major upaniṣads but it also contains very meagre matter or substance as compared with other upaniṣads. The only contribution made by the upaniṣad is the statement about the four stages of the soul and especially the fourth one i.e. the *turiya* as the *advaita* stage. The great importance attached to this upaniṣad is only due to the masterly work of Gauḍapāda on it which practically overshadows and in a way throws into the back-ground the original. The *advaita* view of life is indeed firmly established by the Gauḍapāda-kārikās which evidently derive their inspiration from the upaniṣad. There is, therefore, very little in the upaniṣad proper that can be usefully and effectively quoted by Śaṅkara in preference to the kārikās. In fact Śaṅkara's heritage in point of his philosophical outlook on life can all be claimed from the Gauḍapāda-kārikās and not so much from the māṇḍūkya. It is Gauḍapāda who for the first time presents the *advaita* view of life in a systematic form of philosophy based on *Śruti* and on reasoning as well. It is but natural, therefore, on the part of Śaṅkara to quote the kārikās in preference to the Māṇḍūkya whose long sentences, as already remarked above, are not suitable for the purpose of a quotation. In view of this discussion it is now very hard to maintain that the māṇḍūkya is not *Śruti* simply because Śaṅkara does not quote it just like other *Śruti* texts. Besides Śaṅkara has neither even suggested, much less said, that the māṇḍūkya is not a *Śruti* text nor has he suggested or said that Gauḍapāda is the author of it.

The argument about the use of the word *śloka* with reference to the kārikās advanced by the learned critic loses its force when it is carefully analysed. Śaṅkara has never referred to the text of the māṇḍūkya by the word *ślokāḥ* although he calls the kārikās as *ślokāḥ*. On the other hand by calling the first *prakaraṇa* by the name of *āgama* meaning *āgama pradhāna* he shows that the māṇḍūkya is *śruti*. No

doubt Śaṅkara interpretes the word *ślokāḥ* in the sense of *mantras* in his commentaries on the nine major upaniṣads because the śloka occurring in those upaniṣads are considered earlier than other portions of the upaniṣads. But in the present case Śaṅkara knows full well that the śloka known as the kārikās are composed by Gauḍapāda and therefore does not treat them as *mantras*. He, however, does not refer to the sections of the Māṇḍūkya by the term *ślokāḥ* because he is well aware that they are not composed by Gauḍapāda.

Lastly Dr. Venkatasubbiah tries to account for the tradition current among all the *advaitins* and the *dvaitins* that the māṇḍūkya is a *Śruti* text by remarking that this vogue, i.e. the tradition, was started by the Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita (705-765 A.D.) who referred to the *āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda as the *upaniṣad-śāstra*. This explanation is likely but the learned doctor does not try to find out the reason why Śāntarakṣita should refer to the Gauḍapādakārikās as the *upaniṣad-śāstra*. The very fact that an early writer of an antagonistic school like Śāntarakṣita who comes so closely after Gauḍapāda calls the latter's work the *upaniṣadśāstra* is very significant in so far as it shows unmistakably that Gauḍapāda's work could be legitimately called by this name because it incorporated the *Śruti* text as its basic text. It has also been shown above how Śaṅkara's remark that the first *prakaraṇa* is *āgama pradhāna* can be properly understood if the term *āgama* be interpreted as meaning the upaniṣad i.e. *Śruti*. The arrangement of the other *prakaraṇas* also supports this interpretation. Besides Śaṅkara says in his *bhāṣya* that the first *prakaraṇa* mentions the *āgama*, i.e. *Śruti* and the teaching of the *Āgama* is corroborated in the following *prakaraṇas* by the help of reasoning and corresponding *Śruti* passages from other upaniṣads. Thus the natural interpretation of facts before us leads to the conclusion that the Gauḍapāda-kārikās were based on the *Māṇḍūkya Śruti* and were later on correctly called the *upaniṣad-śāstra* by Śāntarakṣita and the *āgama-śāstra* by Śaṅkara. Some later *ācāryas* were, however, misled by these titles into believing that the whole of the *āgama prakaraṇa* was *Śruti* possibly because it was called the *āgama* in contrast to other *prakaraṇas*. It seems now pretty certain that there is no positive evidence to challenge the validity of the tradition by which the māṇḍūkya has been considered as *Śruti* since the days of Śaṅkara.

After discussing the complicated question about the authorship of the māṇḍūkya it is desirable to turn to the other allied problem as to whether Gauḍapāda appears to be the author of all the kārikās of the first *prakaraṇa* or not. Apart from Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the māṇḍūkya he has twice referred to the kārikās in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-*

sūtras. It is interesting to note the words in which he refers to Gauḍapāda. At *Br. Sūtra Bhāṣya* 2, 1, 9 while quoting the *kārikā* i, 16 he mentions Gauḍapāda as the *saṃpradāyavid ācārya* and again at *Br. sūtra Bhāṣya* 1, 4, 14 while quoting the *kārikā* iii, 15 he repeats the words *Sampradāyavid ācārya* with reference to him. The word *saṃpradāyavid* as applied to Gauḍapāda deserves close attention. From treatises available teaching the *advaita* doctrine it is practically clear that the Gauḍapāda-kārikās were the first in the field to enunciate and establish the *advaita* view. No other writer prior to Gauḍapāda belonging to this *saṃpradāya* is known. Still Śaṅkara calls him *saṃpradāyavid*. The question is whether Gauḍapāda had before him the *advaita saṃpradāya*. From Śaṅkara's reference to it the answer is in the affirmative. Similarly this *saṃpradāya* must presuppose some predecessor of Gauḍapāda as the founder of the *advaita* tradition. It is likely that Śaṅkara's words *saṃpradāyakartuḥ* as referring to Nārāyaṇa occurring in the opening of his *bhāṣya* on the *alāta-śānti-prakarana* may be cited in this connection to show that Nārāyaṇa, the great God laid down the *saṃpradāya*. But this explanation of a legendary nature is not calculated to satisfy our curiosity. We are all aware of such explanations being offered when the actual originator or the founder is not known. Śaṅkara, indeed, has not mentioned any predecessor of Gauḍapāda in the *advaita saṃpradāya*, but there must be surely some predecessor from whom Gauḍapāda must have received his lessons in the *saṃpradāya* which he later on tried to propound in his *kārikās*. The gist of the discussion is that Gauḍapāda should have before him not only the *māṇḍūkya* but some other śloka embodying the *saṃpradāya* view-point. This contention is rendered more probable by certain other factors.

The introductory line *atraite ślokā bhavanti* inserted between the text of the *māṇḍūkya* and the *kārikās* cannot be properly explained if the author of this introductory line and the following *kārikās* were to be the same. Whenever such words or other words having a similar meaning occur in other Sanskrit works such as the Chāndogyaopaniṣad and the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, the author of the following śloka is generally considered to be earlier than the author of the words in the introductory line which, however, is supposed to form part of the text of the upaniṣad proper. But in the present case the line cannot be considered as a part of the *māṇḍūkya* text inasmuch as Śaṅkara as shown above, does not treat the *kārikās* or śloka introduced by this line as *mantras* claiming a higher antiquity than the text of the *māṇḍūkya* even though he treats śloka occurring in the older upaniṣads mentioned above as *mantras*. Besides Anandagiri in the open-

ing of his sub-commentary on the first *kārikā* of the first *prakaraṇa* distinctly attributes the introductory line to Gauḍapāda whereas he considers the *māṇḍūkya* as *Śruti*. The way the line introduces the śloka shows clearly that the author of the line and the following śloka is not the same. What appears probable is that Gauḍapāda wrote the introductory line and that at least some *kārikās* of the *āgama prakaraṇa* were not originally composed by him but were merely reproduced. This conjecture is corroborated by the arrangement of the sections of the *māṇḍūkya* and the division of the *kārikās* of the first *prakaraṇa*. In the Ānandāśrama edition of the *kārikās* published in 1890 A.D. the introductory line, *atraite ślokā bhavanti* occurs only thrice and not four times as given in later editions. That the later editions mentioning the line in question four times do not represent the text of the *kārikās* correctly is clearly supported by Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on them; for the word *pūrvavat* occurring in the beginning of his *bhāṣya* on the *kārikā* 24 of the first *Prakarana* unmistakably shows that in the text which Śaṅkara used the line in question introducing the *kārikās* was not found inserted between the 12th section or sentence of the upaniṣad and the 24th *kārikā*. That is why Śaṅkara had to say *Pūrvavadatraite ślokā bhavanti* before actually commenting on the 24th and the following *kārikās* of the first *prakaraṇa*. In later editions editors have erroneously taken the words *atraite ślokā bhavanti* from Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* and inserted them between the 12th sentence of the upaniṣad and the 24th *kārikā*. But the expression *pūrvavat* remains hanging without any proper connection and thus clearly shows that the text of the later editions is defective. Ānandagiri's *bhāṣya* on these words also proves that the introductory line was not inserted before the 24th *kārikā* in the original text of the Gauḍapāda-kārikās. It appears, therefore, very probable that all the *kārikās* of the *āgama prakaraṇa* were not composed by Gauḍapāda and that the śloka immediately following the introductory line were already composed by a predecessor of Gauḍapāda in the *advaita saṃpradāya*. In view of this possibility it is now not hard to explain the title *saṃpradāyavid* as applied to Gauḍapāda by Śaṅkara. The former must have some predecessor or other who was obviously not known even to Śaṅkara. A story or legend was, therefore, hit upon to account for the founder of the *saṃpradāya* and *Bhagvān Nārāyaṇa* was then declared to be the founder of the *advaita* tradition.

The absence of a regular *maṅgala* in the beginning of the *kārikās* goes also to support the view set forth above. The *māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* with some explanatory śloka on it was already known to Gauḍapāda before he wrote his *kārikās*. He, therefore, obviously did not think

it necessary to write any regular *maṅgala* apart from the already existing opening of the upaniṣad.

From the above discussion it seems that the kārikās 24-29 of the first *prakaraṇa* were composed by Gauḍapāda because there were originally no kārikās introduced by the line *atraite ślokā bhavanti* to explain the 12th sentence of the māṇḍūkya. Further it will be seen, if one were to analyse these 24-29 ślokas very carefully, that barring the last one which may be called explanatory to some extent, the remaining kārikās namely 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 are simply glorificatory of the symbol ॐ and do not contain anything that can be called strictly explanatory. Even the 29th kārikā is hardly explanatory as it merely reproduces the words of the upaniṣad. It seems that Gauḍapāda's intention is not so much to explain the text of the māṇḍūkya but rather to expound his pet *advaita* theory whenever there is a suitable opportunity for doing so. Bearing this attitude of Gauḍapāda in mind one may go a step further and venture to point out that the first twenty three explanatory ślokas may be found to contain some ślokas which are not strictly explanatory when they are subjected to critical examination and analysis. For instance the first six ślokas are explanatory since they give the import of the first six sentences of the upaniṣad. In the 6th sentence or section of the upaniṣad the cause of the universe is stated and naturally an opportunity presents itself to Gauḍapāda to state other theories about the cause of the universe even though nothing of this sort is contemplated in the upaniṣad. Therefore, the ślokas 7-9 discussing different view-points regarding the creation of the world appear to be later additions made by Gauḍapāda while the first six ślokas appear to be older, being composed by some predecessor of his belonging to the *advaita sampradāya*. Similarly in ślokas 10-14 the exact implication of the 7th sentence of the upaniṣad is brought out inasmuch as the *viśva*, the *taijasa* and the *prājña* are clearly marked out from one another with their distinguishing characteristics and the *turiya* is fully explained. The 15th śloka gives an explanation of the terms *svapnā* and *nidrā* occurring in the preceding ślokas and therefore may be a later addition made by Gauḍapāda with a view to give a philosophic but rather unusual interpretation of these terms. In the ślokas 16-18 the question of the unreality of the phenomenal existence is raised and the term *māyā* occurs in connection with the *dvaita*. All these are patent tenets of the *advaita* doctrine for the first time brought into vogue in the following *prakaraṇas* by Gauḍapāda to prove his view already suggested by the upaniṣad. The ślokas 15-18, therefore, seem to be later additions. Applying the same criterion to the ślokas 19-23 one can easily see that the ślokas 19-22

are really explanatory but the same may not be said of the 23rd śloka because it deals with the process of *dhyāna* not at all contemplated in the upaniṣad or in the preceding explanatory ślokas but referred to at great length in the following ślokas, i.e. 24-29. The 23rd śloka, therefore, like the following ones, seems again to be a later addition while the ślokas 19-22 may be older. One has to admit that this classification of old and new ślokas with reference to the *āgama prakaraṇa* is based on grounds which may appear more or less subjective to some critics. But at the same time it is needless to say that in the matter of text-criticism involving the consideration of old and new texts based on the nature of ideas and thoughts embodied in the texts, this subjective process is inevitable. We have tentatively attempted this classification as it appears to us possible from the facts set forth above. As regards the authorship of the remaining *prakaraṇas* excepting the fourth, there is hardly any doubt. Even Gauḍapāda's authorship of the fourth *prakaraṇa* is not now seriously contested and therefore is not discussed in this article.

It will be now clear that the whole of the *āgama prakaraṇa* is not a *Śruti* text but contains a *Śruti* text namely the māṇḍūkya upaniṣad on which the remaining portion of the *prakaraṇa* is a sort of a commentary whereas the other three *prakaraṇas* are an elaboration of the central doctrine of the upaniṣad.

V. A. GADGIL