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PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA (ALĀTAŚĀNTI-
PRAKARAṆAM)

By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

INTRODUCTION

THE position of Gauḍapāda in the history of Hindu Philosophy is unique. So far as the extant literature goes, he was the first to make an effort to explain the Śruti from the standpoint of absolute monism which means, in short, that there is an eternal principle of absolute homogeneity which is truly existent while the world of multiplicity is truly non-existent. This standpoint he has set forth in a metrical treatise of four chapters, called Prakaraṇas, subjoined to the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad, the smallest of the ten principal Upaniṣads. It was undoubtedly this treatise which gave Śaṅkara the inspiration to explain all the ten Upaniṣads in the same light, for he was not able to quote any other exposition of the Śruti in support of his view and himself wrote a commentary on it. Indeed, Śaṅkara was a disciple of Govindapāda who was in the line of disciples of Gauḍapāda.

Absolute monism one may deduce from the Śruti when one has got an idea of it from somewhere else, but the Śruti nowhere states it in its fullness. The truth of the one universal principle called Brahma is, no doubt,

the theme of the ten Upaniṣads, but they nowhere posit that the world which evolves in it is false in the sense of being non-existent. To say, as Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have said, that true monism cannot rationally stand unless the world is considered really nonexistent and so the Śruti teaches absolute monism, is to beg the question, for here you first depend on a particular form of reasoning to get the idea of absolute monism and then impose it on the Śruti. All previous commentaries on the Śruti have been lost except the *Brahmasūtra*. Our present knowledge about them is limited to Śaṅkara's stray references to them. The ancient commentary, called the *Vṛtti*, on the *Brahmasūtra* is also lost and here also we have to depend on Śaṅkara's references to it for knowing its purport. None of these commentaries maintained that the Śruti or the *Brahmasūtra* taught absolute monism. And since the advent of Śaṅkara, great Hindu teachers have firmly declared that absolute monism, however logical it might be, is not warranted by the Śruti. The Śruti nowhere states that the world is non-existent, unborn, like a flower in the sky or a city of the Gandharvas, a dream, a *māyā*.

But this is the proposition which Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in every one of the Prakaraṇas or chapters of his book. In the 17th Kārikā or verse of the 1st Prakaraṇa, the only chapter which deals directly with the contents of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad, he says, "This dual world is nothing but a *Māyā*." In the 31st verse of the 2nd Prakaraṇa, in which the unreality of the world is ought to be established on a consideration of the dreaming state, he says, "As a dream and a *Māyā* are seen, as a city of the Gandharvas is seen, so is the world seen by those who are proficient in the Vedāntas." At the outset (verse 2) of the 3rd Prakaraṇa he clearly states his proposition. "I shall establish unlimited, universal Ajāti (non-birth), how the things which are seen to be born on all sides are not

born." In verse 23 of the same Prakaraṇa he says that he will depend on reasoning in the proving of this proposition. "The Śruti speaks of creation equally from the born and from the unborn. What is undoubtedly in accordance with reasoning, that is the fact and nothing else." This 3rd Prakaraṇa he devotes mainly to the consideration of a number of passages from the Upaniṣads, seeking therefrom to establish that the Śruti teaches an ultimate monistic principle and non-birth of the world. These three chapters together comprise 115 verses.

The elaborate reasoning by which the proposition of non-birth is to be proved is reserved for the 4th Prakaraṇa a chapter containing 100 verses, that is, almost as big as the three previous chapters taken together. In it are included some of the verses on dream of the 2nd Prakaraṇa and, with slight variations, some verses of the 1st and 3rd Prakaraṇas. It is called *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*, that is the chapter on the quietude of the fire-brand, the meaning of which will come out in the course of the exposition of the contents of the chapter by Satyānanda, the commentator. The chapter begins with an enunciation of the principle of absolute monism in five verses and the rest of it is devoted to the proof of the proposition thus enunciated.

The most important question for consideration here is, whence did Gauḍapāda get the idea of the nonbirth of the world if he did not get it from the Śruti? In verse 31 of the 2nd chapter, which has been quoted before, he himself says that this idea was held by wise men "proficient in the Vedāntas," and so he was not its originator. Now, who were these wise men if they were not the orthodox commentators of the Vedāntas and the *Brahmasūtra*? It may sound strange at present to announce that these wise men were the Buddha and his followers, for since the disappearance of Buddhism and Buddhist literature from India we have been persistently taught by all the writers

on Hindu Philosophy, great and small, that the Buddha was a great renegade who had absolutely no faith in the teaching of the Śruti and considered the world to be merely a flux of mentation with no abiding principle underlying it, and that his followers gradually ended by proclaiming a theory of absolute nihilism which gave denial not only to an ultimate reality but also to the perception of the world. And this culminating madness the Hindu writers ascribed to the great Nāgārjuna, who is supposed to be the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, and preached the doctrine of Śūnya or Emptiness which he has learnt from the Mahāyāna scriptures, the principal of which is the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and from his great predecessors such as Aśvaghoṣa. But the days were different when Gauḍapāda lived probably in the 3rd or 4th century A. D. within about two centuries from the time of Nāgārjuna. Then certainly the Mahāyāna was a power in the land and great teachers were not ashamed to call themselves followers of the Buddha and Vendāntists at the same time, just as people at present are not ashamed to call themselves followers of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja and Vedāntists at the same time, and Gauḍapāda was one of them. He had no scruple in accepting the Brahmvāda of Yājñavalkya and other Śrauta ṛṣis, supplementing it with the Ajātivāda of the Buddha and his followers and finishing with full-fledged absolute Advaitavāda as is laid down in the Mahāyāna scripture, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and this was exactly what he did. He took for his text the shortest Upaniṣad in which the ultimate Brahma-principle is clearly set forth without any admixture of talks about creation, proceeded in the first three chapters to elucidate the Brahma-principle from the standpoint of Ajātivāda quoting the Śruti and Nāgārjuna in the same breath and finished in the last chapter with a systematic summary of the *Mahāyāna-Sūtra*. In this summary we find all the details of the theory and exposition of absolute

monism contained in the voluminous Sūtra presented within a short compass, remarkably well arranged and retaining all the technicalities of the Sūtra in expression and diction. Noble indeed was the effort of Gauḍapāda and other Vedāntists to bridge the gulf between the Ārya-jñāna of orthodox Brāhmaṇas and the Ārya-jñāna of Buddhist reformers, and so tremendously successful was it that even when the name of the Buddha was on anathema, Śaṅkara, while he was leading the attack against Buddhism with his giant intellect and unflinching energy was unwittingly preaching the Mahāyāna and preserving and elucidating its essence in his immortal commentaries. And for all this we are indebted solely to Gauḍapāda, for Śaṅkara, though he never dreamt that absolute monism was Mahāyāna Buddhism, preached it on his authority. Now, that we have the Buddhist texts discovered in foreign lands, it seems strange to us that, coming only about three hundred years after Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara was not struck by the peculiarly un-śrauta character of his terminology. The result was that the terms of the Mahāyāna used by Gauḍapāda were misinterpreted. Gauḍapāda himself was presented as an anti-Buddhist and his references to the Buddha were considered as references to anti-Buddhist wise men (the word *buddha* literally means the wise man). It was only in the last but one verse that the term Buddha could by no means be interpreted as a mere wise man, but here also by the displacement of a *na*(no), Śaṅkara denied to the Buddha the paramount teaching which was his and his only. But in spite of all these vital defects in Śaṅkara's understanding of Gauḍapāda, he caught from him the principle of absolute monism, stuck to it and brought to bear such a fund of erudition and reasoning on it as has ever been the wonder of learned men.

We shall present the reader with a skeleton of Mahāyāna technology to enable him to see how closely Gauḍa-

pāda has followed it. The references to verse are to Kārikās of *alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*.

COSMOLOGY

1. *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*

Existence, reality (*sattā*) or truth (*satya*), which terms are almost synonymous from the philosophical standpoint, is two-fold, namely, *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*. *Samvṛti* means convention or usage, and *Paramārtha* means highest reality or ultimate reality. The truth of convention underlies the world which is really unreal, while the truth of ultimate reality is the ever-abiding truth or reality.

Verses 57, 73 and 74 deal with *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*.

2. *Parikalpita*, *Paratantra* and *Pariniṣpanṇa* svabhāvas

Existence is further subdivided, according to *svabhāva* or nature, into *Parikalpita* (imaginary), *Paratantra* (mutually dependent or relative) and *Pariniṣpanṇa* (absolute). These are the three *svabhāvas* of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. The *Parikalpita*-*svabhāva* is the imaginary nature of illusions like a mirage and a flower in the sky. The *Paratantra* *svabhāva* is the relative or mutually dependent nature of the practical world where all things are mutually dependent, nothing exists independently of all other things. The *Pariniṣpanṇa* *svabhāva* is the absolute nature of the ultimate reality which is neither *Parikalpita* nor *Paratantra*, *Parikalpita*, or merely, *Kalpita*, and *Paratantra* are subdivisions of *samvṛti*, while *Pariniṣpanṇa* is the same as *Paramārtha* which term is retained by Gauḍapāda in his delineation of the three *svabhāvas*.

Verse 24 speaks of *paratantra* existence, and verses 73 and 74 speak of all the three forms of existence.

“Let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva,” said the Buddha, “be well acquainted with the three kinds of *svabhāva*.”¹

3 *Five Dharmas*

Existence, subdivided into the three *svabhāvas*, is still further subdivided into five *Dharmas* or characteristic types. They are:—*Nimitta* (form), *Nāma* (name), *Vikalpa* (discrimination), *Samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge) and *Tathatā* (suchness).

Nimitta (form)—The word means cause and here signifies the world which binds a being to *saṃsāra* through attachment to it. *Rūpa* is another word for *nimitta* which is translated into form or appearance meaning “that which reveals itself to the visual sense and is perceived as form, and, in like manner, that which appearing to the sense of hearing, smelling, tasting, the body or the *Manovijñāna* is perceived as sound, odour, taste, tactibility or idea.”²

It is an inner or outer object perceived by the mind alone or through any of the external senses. Or, better, it is a sensual or mental image which is called an object.

Nāma (name)—A name is not merely the sound that is heard when it is uttered. As the sound it is a *nimitta*, a form, an appearance, an object of hearing. But the real significance of a name lies in its intimate connection with the object which it denotes as well as connotes. In merely denoting it points to an object and in connoting it refers to the class and individual marks of the object which combine to pick it out from other objects. A name is thus descriptive serving to draw the attention of the person to whom it is spoken to the object which it describes. If a dog is called Caesar, the term is not merely a sound-form but is also descriptive of the significant general characteristics of the dog-class and of the special individual characteris-

¹ *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, xxiii.

² *L. Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

tics of the particular dog-object; otherwise, it would not refer to a dog and the particular dog. As a *nimitta* is a sensual or mental image, so a *nāma* is a description in particular reference to it. Thus a *nimitta* and its *nāma* are inseparably bound together. Both rise together and fall together.

Vikalpa (discrimination)—“By ‘discrimination’ is meant that by which names are declared, and there is thus the indicating of (various) appearances. Saying that this is such and no other, for instance, saying that this is an elephant, a horse, a woman or a man, each idea thus discriminated is so determined.”³ Discrimination is that faculty of the mind which recognises or imagines distinguishing characteristic marks in objects and thus assigns names to them. It is what makes a being live in a world of *nimitta* and *nāma*. The basic distinction underlying a person’s worldly existence is that between himself the cogniser and his cognised world, the subject and the object, and on it depend all other distinctions, namely, those existing between the cognised objects. Hence discrimination is mainly concerned with the distinction between the subject and the object.

These three Dharmas, namely, *Nimitta*, *Nāma* and *Vikalpa*, constitute the *Parikalpita* and *Paratantra* *svabhāvas* of existence, the unreal reality, the *saṃvṛti*.

Samyagjñāna (right knowledge)—“By ‘right knowledge’ is meant this: when names and appearances are seen as unattainable owing to their mutual conditioning, there is no more rising of the *Vijñānas*, for nothing comes to annihilation, nothing abides everlastingly; and when there is no more falling back into the stage of the philosophers, *Śrāvakas* and *Pratyeka-buddhas*, it is said that there is right knowledge.”⁴ Right knowledge is where there

³ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

⁴ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

is no thought of the reality of the phenomenal world of name and form, and no discrimination of subject and object. It is knowledge in perfection, pure, eternal and universal. It is unattainable but is revealed when the *Manovijñāna* is destroyed by a thorough understanding of the unreality of the world. When it is revealed, the true existence, which is *Tathatā*, is revealed, for it is one with it.

Samyag-jñāna which is knowledge itself is also *samyak-sattā*, that is, Existence itself to which *Tathatā* (Suchness) and other names are given according to different characters attributed to it.

Tathatā (Suchness)—“When erroneous views based on the dualistic notion of assertion and negation are got rid of, and when the *Vijñānas* cease to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances this I call ‘Suchness,’ *Mahāmāti*, a *Bodhisattva*-*Mahāsattva* who is established on Suchness attains the state of imagelessness.”⁵ *Tathatā* or Suchness is the unchanging, eternal infinite, homogeneous monistic principle which alone exists and nothing else. As such it is undefinable and is hence called Suchness, that is, Such-as-it-is. Every definition must perforce contain a statement of the characteristics of the object defined. But the Ultimate is characterless and so cannot be defined. Our language is, moreover, limited to the limitations of our sense-perception and so always dualistic, and cannot, therefore, exactly define the unlimited. Even such terms as eternal, infinite, homogeneous, monistic and unborn do not correctly define the Reality, for they are all terms of dualism, dichotomous, eternity refers to non-eternity, infinity refers to finiteness and so forth; but the Reality has nothing to do with the dualism of eternity-non-eternity and so forth. Nevertheless, we have to express

⁵ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

it in language and this we do by attributing to it characters contrary to the characters of worldly objects. We conceive and characterise it in a negative way. It is eternal because worldly objects are non-eternal. It is Suchness, that is, Such-as-it-is, because it is undefinable, while worldly objects are definable. It is Brahma, that is, universal, or Dharmadhātu, that is, the universal basic principle in all Dharmas, because worldly objects are isolated. It is Light, Consciousness, Knowledge, because the world is dark, unconscious, ignorant. It is fearlessness, because the world is frightful. It is Bliss because the world is sorrowful. It is homogeneous (sama), because the world is heterogeneous. It is Nirvāṇa, because the world is saṃsāra. It is the container of all merits because the world is so deficient in them. Again, there is the idea that because it alone exists while the world does not, the world which is perceived as existing is in it, or of it. Hence it is called Bhūtatahatā (Existent-such-as-it-is, absolute Existence), Ālaya-vijñāna (the home of the vijñānas or repository consciousness), Tathāgatagarbha (the womb of tathāgata), Dharmadhātu (the material of the Dharmas), and Dharmakāya (the body of the Dharmas). It is Cittamātra, or Mind itself, because while it has no mentation it is the basic principle of the worldly mind which mentates⁶. It is Vijñāna-mātra, or Consciousness itself, because while it is not conscious of any object, it is the source of the worldly consciousness of objects.⁷ Says Aśvaghoṣa, "If the mind being awakened perceives an external world, then there will be something that cannot be perceived by it. But the essence of the mind has nothing to do with perception (which presupposes the dual existence of a perceiving subject and an object perceived); so there is nothing that cannot be perceived by it (that is, the world of relativity is submerged in the oneness of Suchness).

⁶ verse 27.

⁷ verses 45-47.

Thence we assign to Suchness this quality, the universal illumination of the universe (it is the Dharmadhātu)".⁸ The Dharmadhātu, that is, the Dharma as Tathatā, and the world, that is, the Dharmas as Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa, being thus in one sense contradictory and in another sense the same, the qualities which we attribute to the Dharmadhātu with our eye to it on the one hand and the world on the other, must of necessity be incomprehensible, heterogeneous from the worldly standpoint and homogeneous from the transcendental standpoint. Hence Aśvaghoṣa says, "There is no heterogeneity in all these Buddha-dharmas (qualities of the Buddha) which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be neither identical (ekārtha) nor non-identical (nānārtha), and which, therefore are out of the range of our comprehension".⁹ But if we can turn our eye from the world with a deep conviction that it is not, our vision will land on the transcendent Such-as-it-is which is neither ignorance nor knowledge, neither saṃsāra (birth-and-death) nor Nirvāṇa (emancipation), neither the Dharmas nor the Dharmadhātu. Hence, the Buddha said, "The discriminated by discrimination exist not, and discrimination does not obtain; discrimination being thus unobtainable, there is neither transmigration nor nirvāṇa".¹⁰ And, again, "In all things there is no self-nature, they are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality. Nirvāṇa is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything enter into Nirvāṇa."¹¹ With an eye to the world we must say, "Suchness, emptiness, (reality—) limit, Nirvāṇa, the Dharmadhātu, no-birth of all things, self-being— these characterise the highest truth."¹² Taking out our eye from

⁸ *Awakening of Faith*, p. 97.

⁹ *Awakening of Faith*, p. 96.

¹⁰ *L. Sūtra*, Sagāthakam, 621.

¹¹ *L. Sūtra*, xxxiv.

¹² *Sagāthakam*, 576.

the world we have to say, "In the state of imagelessness there is no reality, no Parikalpita, no Paraśantra, no five Dharmas, no two-fold mind".¹³ Following the spirit of the Sūtra Nāgārjuna formulated his eight "No's" for defining the Ultimate Reality:

"Anirodham-anutpādam-anucchedamaśāśvatam-
anekārthamanānārtham-anāgamamanirgamam.

Yaḥ Pratītyasamutpādam prapañcōpaśamaṁ śivam

deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varam."¹⁴

—I adore the greatest of speakers, the fully-enlightened one, who taught the Reality in which there is no destruction, no origination, no annihilation, no eternality, no one-thingness, no many-thingness, no coming in, no going out, mutual origination, quiescence of the multiple world.

In the same spirit Gauḍapāda formulates his six "No's" for the same purpose:

"Na nirodho na cotpattir—

na baddho na ca sādhaḥ.

na mumukṣur na vai mukta

ityeṣā paramārthatā."¹⁵

—no destruction, no origination, nobody in bondage, no devotee, nobody desirous of emancipation, nobody emancipated, this is the essence of Paramārthatā (ultimate reality).

Tathatā, or Suchness, is undefinable. But, for that reason, we are not to think that it is not, it is Such-as-it-is. The sense of the verb "to be" is inherent in everybody, it is the springhead of every one of our activities, physical or mental. I can never reasonably say that I am not, for that very 'saying' proves that I am. In fact, nobody feels his non-existence. But every thoughtful man feels that the form which his existence takes varies and in our worldly life we are concerned with only forms of existence which are

¹³ *Sagāthakam*, 569.

¹⁴ *Mādhyamika Vṛtti* Kārikā.

¹⁵ *Vaitathyaaprakaraṇa* 32.

impermanent and therefore unreal. Existence itself must, for this reason, be different from the forms of existence which are perceptible to us. In this sense the world is unborn as is the flower in the sky, without any substantiality or self-nature or ātmā, that is, a permanent principle of individuality, in it. In another sense the worldly forms of existence are nothing but Existence itself as it appears to our worldly vision and are hence permanent and eternal, not as individuals and particulars but as the universal Existence itself which is consequently termed the Dharmadhātu. What has been said above about Existence itself is true also about Light itself, named Citta or Vijñāna, for they are one and not different—to say that there is existence that is not revealed amounts to saying that existence is not existent. It is also Bliss itself, for here there is eternal rest from the conflicts of the dualistic world. The Buddha said, "When it is understood that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind itself, discrimination no more rises, and one is thus established in his own abode which is the realm of no-work."¹⁶ Thus *Tathatā* is Existence, Light and Bliss, the three being one in it although differently perceived in the dualistic vision. This teaching is conveyed in verses 91 to 93.

The two Dharmas, Samyag-jñāna and *Tathatā*, which are really the one absolute monistic principle, form the Pariniṣpanṇa svabhāva of existence, the true reality, the Paramārtha.

"Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa (correspond to) the two forms of svabhāva and Samyag-jñāna and *Tathatā* to the Pariniṣpanṇa form."¹⁷

"Samyag-jñāna and *Tathatā*, Mahāmāti, are indestructible and thus they are known as Pariniṣpanṇa."¹⁸

¹⁶ *L. Sūtra*, Lxxvii.

¹⁷ *L. Sūtra*, xxiii.

¹⁸ *L. Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

As the Dharmas are not capable of being dealt with separately as independent ones, they are generally treated together throughout the treatise. Verses 24 to 74 are, however, devoted specially to Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa, and verses 75 to 100 to Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā.

EPISTEMOLOGY

Three kinds of jñāna— *Laukika Śuddhalaukika*, and *Lokottara*.

In Laukika jñāna there is object as well as perception, in Śuddhalaukika jñāna there is no object but there is perception, in Lokottara jñāna there is neither object nor perception.

Existence and knowledge go together, for existence is the object of knowledge, the knowable. In the dualistic world they are different, but in the monistic realm they are one. Hence, corresponding to existence as samvṛti and Paramārtha there is knowledge as samvṛti and Paramārtha, and to existence as Parikalpita, Paratantra and Pariniṣpanṇa (or Paramārtha) there is knowledge as Parikalpita, Paratantra and Pariniṣpanṇa (or Paramārtha). In the subdivision of existence into five Dharmas Paramārtha, the monistic existence, is subdivided, for the easy understanding of unenlightened people, into Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā, but here knowledge and the knowable being one and the same, the corresponding knowledge which embraces both of them in its transcendental and self-revealing grasp is called transcendental knowledge or Lokottara jñāna, or simply, Jñāna. It is also called in Mahāyāna literature Ārya-jñāna, or noble wisdom, and Prajñā or highest knowledge. It is “the wise knowledge, the wise insight, the wise transcendental vision of the wise which is neither human nor celestial.”¹⁹

(To be continued)

¹⁹ L. Sūtra, lxix.

RĀVAṆA IN THE KAILĀSA TEMPLE AT ELLORA¹

By C. SIVARAMAMURTI

THERE are two ways of describing the superior qualities of a great hero. According to the recognised canons of Sanskrit literary criticism it is either a direct narration of the qualities of the hero or an indirect praise of the hero by recounting special distinctive traits of the outstanding opponent vanquished by him—अथवा प्रतिपक्षस्य वर्णयित्वा गुणान् बहून् ।

This latter is the better and probably a more telling manner of achieving the purpose of making clear the greatness of the hero. Vālmiki is eloquent in describing the great qualities of Rāvaṇa, his royal splendour, his personality, his prowess and so forth. The canto in the Sundarakāṇḍa where Hanūmān admires Rāvaṇa is one of the loveliest pictures of a vanquished hero painted in all his glory by the poet. If Hanūmān exclaims—

अहो रूपमहो सत्त्वं अहो धैर्यमहो वृत्तिः ।

अहो राक्षसराजस्य सर्वलक्षणयुक्तता² ॥

and reflects

यद्यधर्मो न बलवान् स्यादयं राक्षसेश्वरः ।

स्यादयं सुरलोकस्य सशक्तस्यापि रक्षिता³ ॥

his wonder is not without reason and his reflection only shows that if the great Rāvaṇa perished—Rāvaṇa who could have easily been a protector even of the gods including Indra himself, the lord of the devas—it was just because of the magnitude of his sins and not because he lacked personal valour.

¹ Paper read in the Indian History Congress 1949, December.

² Sundarakāṇḍa, Adhyāya 49. Verse 17.

³ Ibid, Verse 18.

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By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

(Continued from Vol. VIII Part 2, p. 14)

“It is the inner realisation by noble wisdom of noblewisdom, and in this there is no thought of existence or non-existence.”¹ It is inexpressible, for here the triple distinction between the knower, knowledge and known vanishes and thus there is triple emancipation. It is knowledge which is unattainable, for it is the eternal truth and infinite.² Dualistic knowledge is divided into Laukika (worldly) and Śuddhalaukika (super-worldly) according as it refers to the gross perception of objects as they are perceived by ignorant people, or to the subtle or refined (śuddha) perception of such advanced people as feel that objects are unreal but are still not so firmly established in true jñāna as to be able to give denial to their perception of them. He to whom the world is like a flower in the sky, never born, is the truly wise man possessed of lokottara jñāna.

Verses 87 to 89 deal with this tripartite division of knowledge.

¹ *L. Sūtra*, xxiii and xxxv.

² See quotations under verse 99.

Ryukan Kimura in "*A historical study of the terms Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism*"³ says that the doctrine that both subject and object are existing is of the Sthaviravādins and Sarvāstivādins, that subject is existing but object is not existing is the Yogācāra doctrine, that both are not-existing is the Mādhyamika doctrine.⁴

The eight vijñānas—The world and the super-world, as explained above, constitute the saṃsāra which is the playground of the triple combination of the perceiver, the perceived and perception. Knowledge here is dualistic and tantamounts to perception, the light or consciousness which establishes a connection between the perceiver and the perceived. It is also the essence of the perceiver and the perceived, for on it depends their very existence. Transcendental knowledge is the spring-head from which issue the three conjoined streams of the perceiver, the perceived and perception. It is Vijñāna or Vijñāna itself (vijñānamātra) and, as issuing from it, the three are also nothing but vijñānas. This is the monistic idea. Vijñāna itself is the Paramārtha, while the three are samvṛti. They are Vijñāna itself as it appears through the veil of ignorance which though obtaining in the saṃsāra since beginningless time, is an unreality, a nothing. Thus Vijñāna can be divided primarily into two kinds, namely, Paramārtha-Vijñāna and samvṛti-Vijñāna. Paramārtha-vijñāna is called Ālaya-vijñāna, because it is the source of samvṛti-vijñāna. It is also called citta (Mind) or citta-mātra (Mind itself). Gauḍapāda has used both the terms-vijñāna and citta—for it.⁵ The objective world is cittadṛśya, that is, Mind-right, the sight of Mind, or what is seen of Mind itself. In many places Gauḍapāda has not used this term for the objective world⁶. The subjective world

³ Calcutta University Publication.

⁴ Page 185.

⁵ Vide verses 26-28, 45, 54, 72.

⁶ Vide verses 28, 64, 66.

is composed of Manas (the ego) and Manovijñāna (ego-consciousness). Gauḍapāda has not used these terms, but has referred to the subject as Jīva (living being), dṛk (seer) and grāhaka (cogniser). Then there are the five vijñānas of the five senses. Thus in samvṛti we have seven vijñānas, namely, Manas, Manovijñāna and the five sense-vijñānas, which with Vijñāna itself, the Paramārtha, make up the number eight. For a fuller explanation of the terms of this classification it would be best to quote from the originals.

The Buddha says :—"With the Manovijñāna as cause and supporter, Mahāmāti, there rise the seven vijñānas. Again, the Manovijñāna is kept functioning as it discerns a world of objects and becomes attached to it, and by means of manifold habit-energy (or memory) it nourishes the Ālaya-vijñāna. The Manas is evolved along with the notion of an ego and its belongings, to which it clings and on which it reflects. It has no body of its own, nor its own marks; the Ālayavijñāna is its cause and support. Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of the ocean, Mahāmāti, the world which is the mind-manifested, is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves. Thus, Mahāmāti, when the Manovijñāna is got rid of, the seven vijñānas are also got rid of."⁷

The following analysis made by Aśvaghoṣa is interesting and instructive:- "By the law of causation (hetupratyaya) in the domain of birth-and-death (saṃsāra) we mean that depending on the Mind (i.e. Ālayavijñāna) an evolution of ego (Manas) and consciousness (Vijñāna) takes place in all beings. What is meant by this? In the all-conserving mind (Ālayavijñāna) ignorance obtains; and from the non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents,

⁷ L. Sūtra, Liii.

that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises. This is called the ego (Manas). Five names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (Karmavijñāna) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an un-enlightened mind begins to be disturbed. The second name is evolving-consciousness (Pravṛtti-vijñāna, that is, the subject) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness, in the sense that the ego (Manas) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clear mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously and without any effort. The fourth name is particularisation-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness (i. e., memory), in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness (or attention, manaskāra) it (manas) retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come.

“Therefore, the three domains (Triloka) are nothing but the self-manifestation of the Mind (i.e., Ālayavijñāna which is practically identical with Suchness, Bhūtatathatā). Separated from the mind, there would be no such things as the six objects of sense. Why? Since all things owing the principle of thier existence to the mind (Ālayavijñāna), are produced by subjectivity (smṛti), all the modes of particularisation are the self-particularisation of the Mind. The Mind in

itself (or the soul as Suchness) being, however, free from all attributes, is not differentiated. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (Avidyā) and subjectivity (smṛti) on the part of all being, have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They evolve simply from the ideality of a particularising mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.

“By ego-consciousness (Manovijñāna) we mean that all ignorant minds through their succession-consciousness cling to the conception of I and not-I (that is, a separate objective world and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, or phenomena-particularising-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (āsrava), intellectual as well as affectional.

“While the essence of the mind (Vijñāna) is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But in spite of the defiled mind, the Mind (itself) is eternal, clear, pure and not subject to transformation.

“Further, as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence.

“When the oneness of totality of things (Dharmadhātu) is not recognised, then ignorance as well as particularisation arises, and all phases of the defiled mind are thus developed. But the significance of this doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and no others.⁸”

The principle enunciated above is strictly followed by Gauḍapāda throughout the Prakaraṇa.

⁸ *Awakening of Faith*, pp. 75-80.

As regards the five sense-vijñānas, the Buddha says, the reasons whereby the eye-consciousness arises are four. What are they? They are: (1) the clinging to an external world, not knowing that it is of mind itself; (2) the attaching to form and habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time by false reasoning and erroneous views; (3) the self-nature inherent in the vijñāna; (4) the eagerness for multiple forms and appearances. By these four reasons, Mahāmati, the waves of the evolving vijñānas are stirred on the Ālayavijñāna which resembles the waters of a flood. The same (can be said of the other sense-consciousnesses) as of the eye-consciousness. This consciousness arises at once or by degrees in every sense-organ including its atoms and pores of the skin; the sense-field is apprehended like a mirror reflecting objects, like the ocean swept over by a wind. Mahāmati, similarly the waves of the mind-ocean are stirred uninterruptedly by the wind of objectivity; cause, deed and appearance condition one another inseparably; the functioning vijñānas and the original Vijñāna are thus inextricably bound up together; and because the self-nature of form etc. is not comprehended, Mahāmati, the system of the five consciousnesses (vijñānas) comes to function. Along with this system of the five vijñānas, there is what is known as Manovijñāna (i. e., the thinking function of consciousness) whereby the objective world is distinguished and individual appearances are distinctly determined, and in this the physical body has its genesis. But the Manovijñāna and other vijñānas have no thought that they are mutually conditioned and that they grow out of their attachment to the discrimination which is applied to the projections of Mind itself. Thus the vijñānas go on functioning mutually related in a most intimate manner and discriminating a world of representations.⁹

As regards the rise, abiding and ceasing of the vijñānas

⁹ L. *Sūtra*, ix.

the Buddha says:—"There are two ways, Mahāmati, in which the rise, abiding and ceasing of the vijñānas take place, and this is not understood by the philosophers. That is to say, the ceasing takes place as regards continuation and form. In the rise of the vijñānas, also, these two are recognisable; the rise as regards continuation and the rise as regards form. In the abiding also, these two (are distinguishable): the one taking place as regards continuation and the other as regards form.

"(Further), three modes are distinguishable in the vijñānas: (1) the vijñāna as evolving (2) the vijñāna as producing effects, and (3) the vijñāna as remaining in its original nature.

"(Further), Mahāmati, in the vijñānas, which are said to be eight, two functions generally are distinguishable, the perceiving and the object-discriminating. As a mirror reflects forms, Mahāmati, the perceiving vijñāna perceives (objects). Mahāmati, between the two, the perceiving vijñāna and the object-discriminating vijñāna, there is no difference; they are mutually conditioning. Then, Mahāmati, the perceiving vijñāna functions because of transformations taking place (in the mind) by reason of a mysterious habit-energy, while, Mahāmati, the object-discriminating vijñāna functions because of the mind's discriminating an objective world and because of the habit-energy accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time.

"Again, Mahāmati, by the cessation of all the sense-vijñānas is meant the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna's variously accumulating habit-energy which is generated when unrealities are discriminated. This, Mahāmati, is known as the cessation of the form-aspect of the vijñānas.

"Again, Mahāmati, the cessation of the continuation-aspect of the vijñānas takes place in this wise: that is to say, Mahāmati, when both that which supports (the vijñānas) and that which is comprehended (by the vijñānas) cease to function. By that which supports (the vijñānas) is meant the habit-

energy (or memory) which has been accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time and by that which is comprehended (by the vijñānas) is meant the objective world perceived and discriminated by the vijñānas, which is, however, no more than mind itself.

“Mahāmāti, it is like a lump of clay and the particles of dust making up its substance, they are neither different nor not-different; again, it is like gold and various ornaments made of it. If, Mahāmāti, the lump of clay is different from its particles of dust, no lump will ever come out of them. But it comes out of them, it is not different from the particles of dust. Again, if there is no difference between the two, the lump will be indistinguishable from its particles.

“Even so, Mahāmāti, if the evolving vijñānas are different from the Ālayavijñāna, even in its original form the Ālaya cannot be their cause. Again, if they are not different the cessation of the evolving vijñānas will mean the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna, but there is no cessation of its original form. Therefore, Mahāmāti, what causes to function is not the Ālaya in its original self-form, but is the effect-producing form of the vijñānas. When this original self-form ceases to exist, then there will indeed be the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna. If, however, there is the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna, this doctrine will in no wise differ from the nihilistic doctrine of the philosophers.”¹⁰

The substance of these quotations is beautifully set forth in verses 45 to 57 through the illustration of a fire-brand.

Two-fold egolessness (nairātmya)—“What is the two-fold egolessness? (It is the egolessness of persons and the egolessness of things. What is meant by egolessness of persons? It means that) in the collection of skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas there is no ego-substance, nor anything belonging

to it; the vijñāna is originated by ignorance, deed and desire, and keeps up its function by grasping objects by means of the sense organs, such as the eye, etc, and by clinging to them as real; while a world of objects and bodies is manifested owing to the discrimination that takes place in the world which is of Mind itself, that is, in the Ālayavijñāna. By reason of the habit-energy stored up by false imagination since beginningless time, this world (viśaya) is subject to change and destruction from moment to moment; it is like a river, a lamp, wind, a cloud; (while the Vijñāna itself is) like a monkey who is always restless, like a fly who is ever in search of unclean things and defiled places, like a fire which is never satisfied. Again, it is like a water-drawing wheel or a machine; it (i.e., the Vijñāna) goes on rolling the wheel of transmigration, carrying varieties of bodies and forms, resuscitating the dead like the demon Vetāla, causing the wooden figures to move about as a magician moves them.

“Now, Mahāmāti, what is meant by the egolessness of things? It is to realise that the Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas are characterised with the nature of false discrimination. Mahāmāti, since the Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas are destitute of an ego-substance, being no more than an aggregation of the Skandhas, and subject to the conditions of mutual origination which are casually bound up with the string of desire and deed, since thus there is no creating agent in them, Mahāmāti, the Skandhas are even destitute of the marks of individuality and generality; and the ignorant owing to their erroneous discrimination, imagine the multiplicity of phenomena, the wise, however, do not.”¹¹

Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas constitute the world of persons and things in their multifold existence. A person or jīva is a collection of them appearing as an organised living being. Separately they are things. The Skandhas are

¹⁰ L. Sūtra, IV.

¹¹ L. Sūtra, xxvi.

five in number, namely, Rūpa, Vedanā, Samjñā, Saṃskāra and Vijñāna. Rūpa is form or body; Vedanā is feeling or sensation; Samjñā is perception or thought; Saṃskāra is activities, mentation or conformation;¹² and Vijñāna is consciousness or cognition. Dhātus are the "factors of consciousness (18 in number=12 Āyatanas+6 Vijñānas)"; and Āyatanas are the six sense-fields, (12 in number=5 sense "organs+5 sense objects, 1 mind+1 Dharmas or things in general or abstract ideas.")¹³ The five Skandhas contain all the Dhātus and Āyatanas, for body contains the elements which are the objects of the senses and feeling etc. are fields for the play of the mind. Thus the individuality of a person is constituted solely of the five Skandhas and nothing else. He has a body consisting of the elements, the sense-organs and the brain; when a sense-organ comes in contact with an object a sensation is generated which is caught up by the mind, perceived, worked upon, discriminated, and distinguished in conformity with mental impressions stored up in the mind since beginningless time, and then the object is cognised as such-and such a thing. Objects thus determined and sensations, perceptions, mentations and cognitions determining them vary from moment to moment, and are consequently unreal, the products of false imagination. The cognising person and the cognised objects are therefore devoid of any abiding self-substance or ego, destitute of any permanent marks of individuality and generality. They evolve in consequence of the Ālayavijñāna being confused or veiled by ignorance as has been explained before in connection with the eight Vijñānas. The five sense-Vijñānas, Manovijñāna and Manas, which is called Vijñāna as one of

¹²Saṃskāra is translated as activity by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her translation of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, Part II, as mentation by Bhikshu Silācāra in his translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, and as conformation by Suzuki in his translation of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, Lii. 52. Saṃskāras are counted, composed of all forms of potentiality of the mind. McGregor p. 135.

¹³ McGregor p. 137.

the Skandhas, go on functioning so long as ignorance, or the beginningless attachment to unreal objects, obtains. When ignorance is destroyed, the world of multiplicities in the shape of persons and things vanishes, for they have no abiding ego-substance in them to permanently maintain their individual characters.

The egolessness of Skandhas, Dhātus and Āyatanas is further proved by the Buddha's teaching of mutual origination or Pratītyasamutpāda which is referred to in verse 28. The chain of mutual origination is :- Ajñāna (ignorance), Saṃskāra (deed and desire, habit-energy), Vijñāna (cognition, consciousness), Nāma-Rūpa (name and form), Saḍāyatanas (six-fold field), Sparśa (contact), Vedanā (feeling, sensation), Tṛṣṇā (craving), Upādāna (grasping), Bhava (becoming), Janma (birth). Considering that Nāma-Rūpa is conditioned by Vijñāna and Vijñāna by Nāma-Rūpa, there are 12 links (called Nidānas or causes) in the chain:—The following from the *Mahāpadāna Suttānta* explains the chain:—"To Bodhisattva Vipassi it occurred:—

Where birth is there is death and decay.

Where becoming is birth also is present.

Where grasping is there is becoming.

Where craving is there is grasping.

Where feeling is there is craving.

Where contact is there is feeling.

Where six-fold field is there is contact.

Where name-and-form is there is six-fold field.

Where cognition is there is name-and-form.

Where name-and form is there is cognition.

"Birth is the condition of death and decay.

Becoming is the condition of birth.

Grasping is the condition of becoming.

Craving is the condition of grasping.

Feeling is the condition of craving.

Contact is the condition of feeling.

Six-fold field is the condition of contact.
 Name-and-form is the condition of six-fold field.
 Cognition is the condition of name-and-form.
 Name-and-form is the condition of cognition.

"Cognition turns back from name-and-form, it goes not beyond. Only as follows can one be born or grow old or die or fall from one condition or reappear in another ; that is, in that cognition is conditioned by name-and-form and name-and-form by cognition, the six-fold field by name-and-form, contact by the six-fold field, feeling by contact, craving by feeling, grasping by craving, becoming by grasping, birth by becoming, decay and dying by birth, and so too grief, lamentation, ill, sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the coming to be of the entire body of ill."¹⁴

In explaining the mutuality between cognition and name-and-form the *Mahānidāna Suttānta* says:—

"Were cognition not to enter into the mother's womb name-and-form would not be constituted therein. Were cognition, after having descended into the mother's womb, to become extinct, name-and-form would not come to birth in this state of being. Were cognition to be extirpated from one yet young, youth or maiden, name-and-form would not attain to growth, development, expansion. Wherefore, cognition is the basis, genesis, cause of name-and-form.

"Again, were cognition to gain no foot-hold in name-and-form, then there would not be manifested, in the coming years, that concatenation of birth, old age, death and the up-rising of ill. Wherefore, name-and-form is the basis, genesis, cause of cognition. In so far only can one be born, grow old, etc, in as far as this is, namely, name-and-form together with cognition."¹⁵

¹⁴ Rhys David's translation.

¹⁵ Rhys Davids' translation.

The worldly existence of a person, constituted of five Skandhas, thus contains 10 out of the 12 links or nidānas. It is these which suffer momentary changes, are born, die and transmigrate. The momentary Vijñāna or cognition of the person is the consequence of ajñāna (ignorance) and saṃskāra (deed and desire or habit-energy, stored up since beginningless time)¹⁶ the first two of the nidānas. The term saṃskāra has evidently given trouble to the translators as we have seen before, for it is difficult to find a single English word to stand for it. It is in fact, the store of energy generated, since beginningless time, by the play of volition (cetanā, desire, will) and action (karma) in a person and is the result of inscrutable ignorance veiling the true Vijñāna, called in this connection, the Ālayavijñāna. "The Mind being influenced by habit-energy there arises a something resembling real existence (bhāvā-bhāsa); as the ignorant do not understand, it is said that there is the birth (of realities)."¹⁷ The triple world owes its existence to the Mind put into confusion by means of habit-energy."¹⁸ "There is no such evolving in the Mind itself which is beyond comprehension."¹⁹ Depending upon the Mind, there appears (within) a mind and without a world of individual objects (rūpiṇaḥ); this and no other is an external world which is imagined by the ignorant."²⁰ "Body, property and abode are objectifications of the Ālayavijñāna, which is in itself above (the dualism of) subject and object."²¹

The two forms of egolessness are categorically stated in verses 25 to 28 and verses 68 to 71, and discussed throughout the Prakaraṇa.

¹⁶ Vide quotation from *L. Sūtra*.

¹⁷ *Sagāthakam* 213.

¹⁸ *L. Sūtra* xxxi.

¹⁹ *L. Sūtra*, ix.

²⁰ *Sagāthakam* 70.

²¹ *L. Sūtra*, vii.

Seven-fold Śūnyatā (emptiness).—The egolessness or unreality of persons and things together with the reality of Ālayavijñāna are included in the comprehensive conception of seven-fold Śūnyatā or emptiness. Persons and things are characterised with six forms of emptiness, while Ālayavijñāna is the great Emptiness (Mahāśūnyatā), because in itself it has nothing to do with the world of persons and things. “To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it²². Asked about emptiness, the Buddha said, “Emptiness, emptiness, indeed! Mahāmāti, it is a term whose self-nature is false imagination. Because of one’s attachment to false imagination, Mahāmāti, we have to talk of emptiness, no-birth, non-duality and absence of self-nature. In short, Mahāmāti, there are seven kinds of emptiness : (1) The emptiness of individual marks (Lakṣaṇa-Śūnyatā), (2) the emptiness of self-nature (Bhāvasvabhāva-Śūnyatā), (3) the emptiness of no-work (Apracarita-Śūnyatā), (4) the emptiness of work (Pracarita-Śūnyatā), (5) the emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredictable (Nirabhilāpya-Śūnyatā), (6) the emptiness in the highest sense of ultimate reality realisable only by noble wisdom (Paramārtha-Āryajñāna-Mahāśūnyatā) and (7) the emptiness of mutuality (Itaretara-Śūnyatā) which is the seventh.²³ Then the Blessed one goes on to define each of these forms of emptiness. These definitions have been quoted under the verses in which they have been established, namely, verses 19, 23, 60, 67, 79, 80 and 91. Itaretara-Śūnyatā is the Anyonyābhāva of the Nyāya Philosophy and from the standpoint of emptiness it is the least important. Gauḍapāda utilises it in his refutation of the idea of causation, for when the effect is born there is not the cause and when the cause is born there is not the effect²⁴.

²² L. *Sūtra*, lv.

²³ L. *Sūtra*, xxvii.

²⁴ verse 17.

Of the other forms of śūnyatā the most important are Bhāvasvabhāva-Śūnyatā and Paramārtha-Āryajñāna-Mahāśūnyatā. The former, translated as emptiness of self-nature, is, more literally, emptiness of being-svabhāva, that is, the emptiness of the svabhāva, or self-nature, of what are supposed to be being, or existing, in the world; it is the emptiness of the Parikalpita and Paratantra svabhāvas, the two-fold egolessness of persons and things. The latter, however, is the truth of the ultimate reality which reveals itself when the emptiness of the world of multiplicity is thoroughly understood; it is the truth of the Pariniṣpanṇa svabhāva. It is such-as-it-is, untouched by the world as it is. Hence, as Aśvaghoṣa has aptly said, it has the two-fold aspect of Śūnyatā and Aśūnyatā (non-emptiness), and the same thing is said by Gauḍapāda in verse 72.

The world is *neither Śāśvata (eternal) nor Uccheda (annihilated)*—

The Buddha has persistently combated the notions of eternalism and nihilism about the world. The idea of eternalism rises from considering the world as composed of particulars which are eternal and not subject to causation and that of nihilism rises from not considering the true existence of the ultimate reality of which the particulars are a false presentation and from thinking that with the disappearance of a particular the conditions of ignorance, deed and desire which caused its appearance are annihilated.²⁵ Whatever comes to be passes away, was the life-long teaching of the Buddha and his last words before parinirvāṇa were, “Decay is inherent in all component things. Work out your salvation with diligence”.²⁶ Particulars are egoless as such and cannot, therefore, be eternal as such. But although they are devoid of any particularistic self-nature they are in their essence, which is

²⁵ *Vide* quotations under verse 57.

²⁶ *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*.

their true self-nature, the universal reality, the Ālayavijñāna or Dharmadhātu. Thus considered, "they are what is seen of Mind itself", essentially universals or, rather, the universal. But so long as the conditions of ignorance, deed and desire will obtain, they will appear and reappear and reappear, appear as particulars of samvṛti or Paratantra existence. Hence, the Buddha said, "I always preach emptiness which is beyond eternalism and nihilism. Saṃsāra is like a dream and a vision and Karma vanishes not."²⁷ The multiplicity of the world which is subject to birth and death is, like a dream and a vision, not eternal, but it is not also nihil because it is the manifestation of Ālayavijñāna under the influence of ignorance, deed and desire. "Mahāmāti," said the Blessed one, "my teaching consists in the cessation of sufferings arising from the discrimination of the triple world, in the cessation of ignorance, desire, deed and causality, and in the recognition that an objective world, like a vision, is the manifestation of Mind itself."²⁸ "Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of the ocean, Mahāmāti, the world which is the mind-manifested is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves."²⁹ "When the (ideas of) body, property and abode are cherished in what are nothing but the manifestation of Mind itself, the external world is perceived under the aspects of individuality and generality, which, however, are not realities."³⁰

(To be continued)

²⁷ L. Sūtra, xxvii.

²⁸ L. Sūtra, vi.

²⁹ L. Sūtra, liii.

³⁰ L. Sūtra, xxxi.

BHAVABHÜTI'S INDEBTEDNESS TO KAUṬILYA

By DASHARATHA SHARMA

IN a paper contributed to the *IHQ.*, XXV, Part 2, I have shown Kālidāsa's indebtedness to Kauṭilya for the *Arthasāstra* material utilised in the *Raghuvamśa*. That another great Sanskrit dramatist, Bhavabhūti, also borrowed freely from the *Kauṭilya* would be shown here. By Bhavabhūti's time, Kauṭilya indeed, appears to have become such an authority that, disregarding the anachronism thus involved, Bhavabhūti could make Rāvaṇa's minister, Mālyavān, quote from the *Kauṭilya Arthasāstra*¹ and say, यथोक्तं "लघ्वपि व्यसनपदमभियुक्तस्य कृच्छ्रमाध्यं भवति" इति तत्र च विभीषणावग्रहतः प्रतिविधानम्।²

Of Bhavabhūti's dramas, the *Uttara-Rāmacarita*, had no place for diplomacy, and therefore also none for the use of the *Kauṭilya*. In the *Mālatīmādhava*, Bhavabhūti goes to the *Arthasāstra* occasionally for a few words and ideas. The verse,³

बहिः सर्वाकारप्रगुणरमणीयं व्यवहरन्

पराभ्युहस्थानान्यपि तनुतराणि स्थगयति ।

जनं विद्वानेकः सकलमभिसन्धाय कपटे-

स्तदस्थः स्वानर्थान् घटयति च मौनं च भजते ॥,

has, perhaps, been inspired by the following passages from the section on counsel in the *Arthasāstra*:⁴—

(१) आकृतिग्रहणमाकारः । तस्य संवरणमायुक्तपुरुषरक्षणमाकार्यकालात् ।

(२) तस्मान्नास्य परे विद्युः कर्म किञ्चिच्चिकीर्षितम् ।

(३) नास्य परे विद्युः छिद्रं विद्यात्परस्य च ।

गूहेत् कूर्मं इवाङ्गानि यत्स्याद्विवृतमात्मनः ॥

¹ VII, 5.

² Todar Mall *Mahāvīracaritam*, p. 91. The words from the *Arthasāstra* have been put within inverted commas.

³ *Mālatīmādhava*, Act I, II. 103-6, Dr. R.G. Bhandarkar's edition


⁴ I, 15.

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ALLAHABAD

PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA (ALĀTAŚANTI- PRAKARAṆAM)

By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

(Continued from Vol. VIII Part 3, p. 233)

“ WHEN it is not recognised that all things rise from the discrimination of Mind itself, discrimination asserts itself. When this is understood discrimination ceases.”¹ Transcendental knowledge is revealed when the particulars constituting the world are not considered as real and attached to as such but are considered as the Mind itself, free from the particularistic dualism of existence and non-existence, being and non-being. “(The Buddhist doctrine is this.) Mahāmati, when a (psychological) revulsion takes place in the Yogins (by the transcendence) of the Citta, Manas and Vijñāna, they cast off the (dualistic) discrimination of grasped and grasping in what is seen of Mind itself, and entering the Tathāgatagarbha attain the realisation of noble wisdom ; and in this there is no thought of existence and non-existence”.²

“ That (transcendental) knowledge is unobtainable is due to the recognition that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind, and that these external objects to which being and non-being are predicated are non-existent”.³ “ Mahāmati, the self-nature of things is not as it is discriminated by the ignorant and simple-minded. Mahāmati, it is the creation of false imagination ; nothing indicative of self-nature is to be ascertained. But, Mahāmati, there is the self-nature of things such as is ascertained by the wise, by their wise knowledge, by their wise insight,

¹ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxv.

² L. *Sūtra*, xxxv.

³ L. *Sūtra*, xxxi.

by their wise transcendental vision.” “Mahāmati, my highest reality is the eternal-unthinkable since it conforms to the idea of a cause and is beyond existence and non-existence. Because it is the exalted state of self-realisation it has its own character; because it is the cause of (as?) the highest reality it has its causation; because it has nothing to do with existence and non-existence it is no doer; because it is to be classed under the same head as space, Nirvāṇa and cessation it is eternal. The eternal-unthinkable of the Tathāgatas is thatness realised by noble wisdom within themselves”.⁵ “There is something in all beings which is true, real, eternal, self-governing and for ever unchanging... this is called Ego, though quite different from what is known as such by the philosophers. This Ego is the Tathāgatagarbha, Buddha-nature which exists in every one of us and is characterised with such virtues as permanency, bliss, freedom and purity”—the point is thus clinchingly put in the *Parinirvāṇa Sūtra* quoted by Suzuki in the Introduction to his translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.

Aśvaghoṣa is very clear on this point. In fact, one of the main purposes of his book is to establish it. We have here only to refer to the extract from the *Awakening of Faith* quoted in the section on the eight Vijñānas, *vide* also quotations under verses 84, 91 and 93. In the course of his summary of the contents of the *Awakening of Faith*, McGregor in his *Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*⁶, says: “The external world has in its essence a real existence. It is a part of the stream of life based in the essence of Mind. The world as it appears to us, however, is the result of action of the Ālaya, Klišṭa-manas and Manovijñāna (soiled mind and mind-consciousness), stimulated by contact with the

⁴ L. *Sūtra*, Lxix.

⁵ L. *Sūtra*, xvii.

⁶ p. 65.

real external world, which in turn is but a phase of the universal Ālaya.”

Verses 57 and 91-95 deal with Śāśvatavāda (eternalism) and Uccēdāvadā (nihilism) and the essential nature of all the Dharmas.

Anābhāsa (imageless)

Although all things are, in their fundamental nature, Tathatā or Suchness, they are not in it. In the Dharmadhātu, the particularistic ābhāsas or images composing the world of subjects and objects have no place. “The gate of highest reality has nothing to do with the two forms of thought construction (subject and object). Where the imageless stands why should we establish the three vehicles”.⁷ See quotations under verses 45, 46, 47 and 48 where the imagelessness of the Ālayavijñāna is established.

“The five Dharmas, the Svabhāvas, the eight Vijñānas and the two-fold egolessness—they are all embraced in the Mahāyāna”.⁸ “The two-fold egolessness, the Citta, Manas and Manovijñāna, the five Dharmas, the Svabhāvas—they do not belong to my essence”.⁹ Therefore, the Mahāyāna does not exist in the state of imagelessness. “By passing on to Mind only, he passes on to the state of imagelessness; when he establishes himself in the state of imagelessness, he sees not the Mahāyāna”.¹⁰

Ajāti (non-birth)

From a consideration of all that has been said so long it follows that the world of multiplicity, the dual world of subject and object, is unborn. “Thus for certain the Buddhas have brilliantly established non-birth in all respects,”

⁷ L. *Sūtra*, xxxi.

⁸ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiv.

⁹ *Sagathakam*, 417.

¹⁰ *Sagathakam*, 257.

says Gauḍapāda in the second line of verse 19. The Buddha says, "Mahāmati, according to the teaching of the Tathāgatas of the past, present and future all things are unborn. Why? Because they have no reality, being manifestations of Mind itself, and Mahāmati, as they are not born of being and non-being they are unborn. Mahāmati, all things are like the horns of the hare, horse, donkey or camel, but the ignorant and simple-minded who are given up to their false and erroneous imaginations, discriminate things where they are not; therefore all things are unborn. The self-nature and characteristic marks of body, property and abode are evolved when the Ālayavijñāna is conceived by the ignorant as grasping and grasped; and then they fall into a dualistic view of existence where they recognise its rise, abiding and disappearance, cherishing the idea that all things are born and subject to discrimination as to being and non-being".¹¹ What is meant by "all things are unborn"? The Buddha answers, "Mahāmati, not that all things are unborn, but that they are not born of themselves, except when seen in the state of Samādhi—this is what is meant by 'all things are unborn'. To have no self-nature is, according to the deeper sense, to be unborn, Mahāmati. That all things are devoid of self-nature means that there is a constant and uninterrupted becoming, a momentary change from one state of existence to another; seeing this, Mahāmati, all things are destitute of self-nature".¹² Again, "Mahāmati, the philosophers who are the gathering of the deluded, foster the notion of deriving the birth of all things from that of being and non-being, and fail to regard it as caused by the attachment to the multitudinousness which rises from the discrimination (of the Mind) itself. . . . In this light the term 'unborn' is to be understood".¹³

¹¹ L. *Sūtra*, xix.

¹² L. *Sūtra*, xxvii.

¹³ L. *Sūtra*, xlv.

As we have said at the beginning of this Introduction non-birth is the proposition which Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in every one of the Prakaraṇas or chapters of his book, and the Śruti not being clear on this point because it "speaks of creation equally from the born and from the unborn", he depends on reasoning for the purpose, the reasoning of the Buddha which he sets forth in the 4th Prakaraṇa. Non-birth being his theme in the whole of this Prakaraṇa, he states it at its commencement (verses 3 and 4) and goes on proving it by the establishment of emptiness in all its aspects. The passages quoted above from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* may be considered as the text systematically followed by him. That all things are unborn "like the horns of the hare, horse, donkey or camel," he establishes by examining all ideas about causation up to verse 22 and proving their fallaciousness. Then he goes on examining "the self-nature and characteristic marks of body property and abode" up to verse 54 and proving that they are empty and that, consequently, all things are unborn. Next, he goes on showing, up to verse 80, that "the attachment to the multitudinousness which rises from the discrimination (of the Mind) itself" is the cause of the birth of the world of multiplicity and that, therefore, non-birth is the truth. In the last verses he shows that the Ālayavijñāna or Dharmadhātu is itself eternally pure, never really evolving as the world of particulars, and that they are evolved only "when the Ālayavijñāna is conceived by the ignorant as grasping and grasped", and by "their false and erroneous imaginations (they) discriminate things where they are not, and that this false evolution ceases and multiplicity disappears when transcendental knowledge is revealed and unborn infinite sameness is established within oneself (verse 100), when one knows "that the primary elements have never come into existence and that these elements are unborn".¹⁴

¹⁴ L. *Sūtra*, LI; verse 22.

Creation and Creator

From the Paramārtha or transcendental standpoint there is no causation, no birth, no creation, no creator. "The highest reality is no doer," says the Buddha.¹⁵ But from the Samvṛti standpoint things are born,¹⁶ they have a causation which is Paratantra.¹⁷ "It is because of worldly usage that things are talked of as existing."¹⁸ Who creates the world of things of wordly usage? Let the Buddha answer: "There are three attachments deep-seated in the minds of the ignorant and simple-minded. They are greed, anger and folly; and thus there is desire which is procreative and is accompanied by joy and greed; closely attached to this there takes place a succession of births in the paths. When one is cut off from this attachment, no signs will be seen indicative of attachment or of non-attachment";¹⁹ and again, "owing to the procreative force of desire, there arise all kinds of disaster such as birth, age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair, etc".²⁰ The mind is the cause,²¹ but not the agent of creation. It is desire or attachment which is the agent of creation, it alone possesses the procreative force. Destroy it and there is no creation. The same thing is said in verses 55, 56 and 76. Thus a person's own defiled mind is responsible for the actual creation of the world in which he moves.²² Purify the mind and the world will disappear. "Depending upon and attaching to the triple combination (of greed, anger and folly) which works in unison, there is the continuation

¹⁵ L. *Sūtra*, xvii quoted on p. 33.

¹⁶ Verse 57.

¹⁷ Verse 24.

¹⁸ L. *Sūtra*, xxxi.

¹⁹ L. *Sūtra*, Lxviii.

²⁰ L. *Sūtra*, Lxxiii.

²¹ L. *Sūtra*, xvii quoted on p. 33.

²² Verses 61—62.

of the vijñānas incessantly functioning and because of the attachment there is a continued and deep-felt assertion of existence. When the triple combination which causes the functioning of the vijñānas no more takes place, there is the triple emancipation, and when this is kept in view, there is no rising of any combination", that is, the world for ever disappears.²³ This is tersely put in verse 75.

Samsāra and Nirvāṇa

From the Paramārtha standpoint there being no creation and therefore no bondage of birth and death, there is not also any such thing as emancipation. But from the Samvṛti standpoint there is the bondage of birth and death and hence there is also emancipation, or, Nirvāṇa, from it. The Paramārtha standpoint is expressed by the Buddha when he says, "Nirvāṇa is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything enter into Nirvāṇa".²⁴ See also quotation under verse 30 in which the same idea is expressed. From the Samvṛti standpoint the Buddha defines Nirvāṇa as: "Nirvāṇa is (1) where it is recognised that there is nothing but what is seen of Mind itself; (2) where there is no attachment to external objects, existent or non-existent; (3) where getting rid of the four propositions, there is an insight into the abode of reality as it is; (4) where, recognising the nature of the Self-mind, one does not cherish the dualism of discrimination; (5) where grasped and grasping are no more obtainable; (6) where all logical measures are not seized upon as it is realised that they never assert themselves; (7) where the idea of truth is not adhered to but treated with indifference because of its causing a bewilderment; (8) where by the attainment of the exalted Dharma which lies within the inmost recess of one's being, the two forms of egolessness are recognised, the

²³ L. *Sūtra*, Lxviii.

²⁴ L. *Sūtra*, xxxiv.

two forms of passions are subsided and the two kinds of hindrance cleared away".²⁵ (The numbering is mine). These characters of Nirvāṇa are shown throughout the Prakaraṇa in their respective places of treatment namely, (1) in verses 47 and 72, (2) in verse 79, (3) in verse 84, (4) in verses 27-28, 46 and 54, (5) in verses 91-92, (6) in verse 25, (7) in verses 37-41, and (8) in verses 91, 93 and 97.

Although Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are relative, Nirvāṇa, which signifies extinction of desire and, consequently, of the perception of duality, is identified with Tathatā, the highest emptiness and reality, and transcendental knowledge which is one with it. Therefore, the Buddha says, "When the self-nature and the habit-energy of all the vijñānas, including the Ālaya, Manas and Manovijñāna, from which issues the habit-energy of wrong speculations... when all these go through a revulsion, I and all the Buddhas declare that there is Nirvāṇa, and the way and the self-nature of this Nirvāṇa is emptiness, which is a state of reality.

"Further, Mahāmati, Nirvāṇa is the realm of self-realisation attained by noble wisdom, which is free from the discrimination of eternality and annihilation, existence and non-existence. How is it not eternality? Because it has cast off the discrimination of individuality and generality, it is not eternality. How about its not being annihilation? It is because all the wise men of the past, present and future have attained realisation. Therefore it is not annihilation. Again, Mahāmati, the great Parinirvāṇa is neither destruction nor death. Again, Mahāmati, the great Parinirvāṇa is neither abandonment nor attainment, neither is it of one meaning, nor of no-meaning; this is said to be Nirvāṇa.²⁶ Aśvaghoṣa says, "Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity ever abiding

²⁵ L. Sūtra, Lxxiv.

²⁶ L. Sūtra, xxxviii.

in Nirvāṇa," and explains, "In truth enlightenment cannot be manufactured, nor can it be created; it is absolutely intangible; it is no material existence that is an object of sensation..... Wisdom itself has nothing to do with material phenomena whose characteristic feature is extension in space, and there are no attributes there by which wisdom can become tangible. This is the meaning of Buddha's brief statement just referred to".²⁷

This aspect of Nirvāṇa is dealt with by Gauḍapāda in verses 30 and 93 to 99.²⁸

Advaya (the non-dual)

The Mind itself or the Dharmadhātu is the eternal, infinite and perfectly homogeneous principle which alone exists and nothing else. Where there are no numbers there can be no numbering. Hence, it is not strictly logical to say that the Mind or Dharmadhātu is monistic, non-dual or non-multiple. Similarly, in the realm where there is no conception of non-existence or non-eternity, we cannot rightly say that it is existence or eternity. Hence, the Mahāyāna formulates the dictum that the ultimate reality does not come within the purview of the four propositions namely, existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence and not both existence and non-existence, or, oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness, being and not-being and eternity and non-eternity. The four propositions have been stated in these two ways in the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* respectively. Gauḍapāda has literally copied the statement of the *Awakening of Faith* in verses 83 and 84.²⁹

²⁷ *Awakening of Faith*, pp. 74-75.

²⁸ For a fuller treatment of the idea of Nirvāṇa in Buddhism and its development, the reader may refer to "The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana" by Th. Stcherbatsky, published by the Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences of U. S. S. R.

²⁹ See quotation under these verses.

But still we have to express the unity of the ultimate reality in contradistinction to the apparent duality or plurality inherent in our perception of the world, and this is done in the Mahāyāna in the negative way by calling it non-dual. The same principle is followed by Gauḍapāda.³⁰

But is the world, even as we perceive it, dual? If it is dual, its essence, the Tathatā or Ālayavijñāna or the mind itself, cannot be non-dual. The Buddha, therefore, says that if we intelligently examine our perception we shall see that the world also is non-dual. For, all our perceptions are dichotomous where the opposites are mutually dependent and mutual dependence disproves such independent individual existence as can alone justify two things being considered really two. We shall quote the Buddha's words: "Mahāmāti, what is meant by non-duality? It means that light and shade, long and short, black and white are relative terms, Mahāmāti, and not independent of each other; as Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are, all things are not two. There is no Nirvāṇa except where is saṃsāra; there is no saṃsāra except where is Nirvāṇa; for, the condition of existence is not of mutually exclusive character. Therefore, it is said that all things are non-dual as are Nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. For this reason, Mahāmāti, you should discipline yourself in (the realisation of) emptiness, no-birth, non-duality and no-self-nature".³¹ Gauḍapāda follows this idea and calls the world Dvayābhāsa, a two-fold image, that is, a false presentation of duality.³²

Āvaraṇa (veil, hindrance)

Erroneous speculations about the four propositions referred to above cover the face of the ultimate reality and present it as the world of multiplicity. "Clinging to

³⁰ Vide verses 45, 62.

³¹ *L. Sūtra*, xxvii.

³² Verses 61-62.

the memory (Vāsanā) of erroneous speculations and doctrines since beginningless time, they hold fast to ideas such as oneness and bothness, being and non-being, and their thoughts are not at all clear about what is seen of mind only".³³ "The signs of existence and non-existence are falsely imagined and go on so imagined".³⁴ Following this Mahāyāna idea, Gauḍapāda says that attachment to the four propositions obscures the ultimate reality to the vision of the ignorant.³⁵ The ultimate reality is the Jñeya or Jñāna, which are identical, hence this attachment is called Jñeyāvaraṇa or knowledge-hindrance.³⁶ The *Awakening of Faith* says, "Avidyā (ignorance) is called Jñeyāvaraṇa because it obscures the spontaneous exercise of wisdom from which evolve all modes of activity in the world" and the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* says that it "is purified when the egolessness of things is distinctly perceived".³⁷ Another form of Āvaraṇa is spoken of. It is Kleśāvaraṇa or passion-hindrance, constituted by the defiled Vijñāna or Manovijñāna which is the vijñāna-skandha of a person. "It obscures the fundamental wisdom of Bhūtatathatā" and "is destroyed when first the egolessness of persons is perceived and acted upon, for (then) the Manovijñāna ceases to function. "The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* further speaks of Dharma-hindrance which "is given up because of the disappearance of the habit-energy (accumulated) in the Ālayavijñāna, which is now thoroughly purified".³⁸ Gauḍapāda does not enter into these distinctions of Āvaraṇa based on distinctions of thing, person and habit-energy or vāsanā. He says that "attachment to any and every Dharma" is the

³³ *L. Sūtra*, xxxv.

³⁴ *L. Sūtra*, lxiv.

³⁵ Verses 82-84.

³⁶ Verses 82 and 97.

³⁷ Vide quotations under verses 82 and 97.

³⁸ Vide quotations under verses 82 and 97.

āvaraṇa of Dharmadhātu³⁹ that this attachment is manifested in the four ideas of existence, non-existence and so forth from which Dharmadhātu is really free,⁴⁰ and that unless touchless (intangible) transcendental knowledge (Jñāna) is fully realised the Āvaraṇa is not destroyed.⁴¹ and this practically contains the whole idea of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.

Habit-energy or attachment to name and form is the same thing as Avidyā. Its Ālaya or home is the pure Vijñāna itself, which is hence called Ālayavijñāna. The Mind (citta) is not separate from habit-energy, nor is it together with it; though enveloped with habit-energy, the Mind itself remains undifferentiated".⁴² Avidyā or ignorance, which means non-recognition of the truth that the world is the Mind-manifested, is the negative aspect and habit-energy or attachment to name and form the positive aspect of false discrimination or Vikalpa. Gauḍapāda has dealt with the positive aspect.⁴³ "The ignorant owing to their erroneous discrimination imagine here the multiplicity of phenomena; the wise however, do not."⁴⁴

Viparyaya (error) and Māyā

From the attachment to name and form arises the seeing of name and form. This seeing of name and form where there is the pure Mind or Vijñāna only is the Viparyaya (also called Viparyāsa) or error which constitutes the world. The Mind itself has no cognisance of name and form and hence it is free from error; in fact, there can be no darkness in light itself. This teaching of the Buddha is contained in verses 27, 31 and 41. But do not the wise also see name

³⁹ Verse 82.

⁴⁰ Verses 83-84.

⁴¹ Verse 97.

⁴² Sagathakam, 236. See verse 75 and quotations under it.

⁴³ In verses 55-56, 75, 82, 84.

⁴⁴ L. *Sūtra*, xxiv.

and form? They do, but not with the perverted idea that they have a self-nature apart from the Mind itself. Hence the Buddha says, "Even to the wise there is this error, only that they are free from perversion. Mahāmati, it is like (that is, seen by the wise as well as by) the unwitting in the world who conceive a perverted idea regarding a mirage, a fire-brand wheel, a hair-net, the city of the Gandharvas, a dream, a reflected image and an Ākāśa-puruṣa, but with the knowing that it is not so, though it does not mean that those illusions do not appear to them".⁴⁵ The same thing is said by Gauḍapāda in verse 46.

The error, as it is, is devoid of any self-substance. It is also causeless, because the pure Mind itself cannot be its cause and objects and things are included in it. It must, therefore, be considered beginningless. The person, who is a part of the beginningless error caused under the influence of his beginningless attachment to it, continues to be attached to it and so the error also continues birth after birth. If he can ever throw off this attachment, he will be no more born and the error will cease. The error itself is not a reality and so has nothing in it which can make a person get attached to it anew. Hence the person who has become free from the beginningless attachment no more gets attached to it and attains Nirvāṇa. The error can be compared with Māyā, or, illusion, in which things, which do not really exist, appear to all people, ignorant or wise, although the ignorant are influenced by them, while the wise are not. Hence, when the Buddha was asked "Is the error an entity or not?", he replied, "It is like Māyā, Mahāmati, the error has no character in it making for attachment. If, Mahāmati, the error had any character in it making for attachment, no liberation would be possible from the attachment to existence, the chain of origi-

⁴⁵ L. *Sūtra* xliii.

nation would be understood in the sense of creation as held by the philosophers".⁴⁶ The same thing has been said by Gauḍapāda in verse 75.

It must not be supposed that the error is an effect of Māyā. Māyā is merely a magical presentation of appearances, absolutely characterless. Hence the Buddha said, "Māyā cannot be the cause of the error, because of its incapability of producing evils and faults; and thus, Mahāmāti, Māyā has no discrimination of itself; it rises when invoked by the magical charm of a certain person. It has in itself no habit-energy of evil thoughts and faults that, issuing from self-discrimination, affect it. (Therefore), there are no faults in it. This is only due to the confused view fondly cherished by the ignorant regarding Mind, and the wise have nothing to do with it".⁴⁷

In short, the world-error is world-māyā, a cosmic illusion. This world-māyā is not unreal in the sense in which an ordinary illusion is unreal. It has a persistent reality till Nirvāṇa is attained. But the things which are presented in it are momentary and so unreal like an ordinary Māyā. They are not identical with it but in it. In fact, it is the continuous, unbroken flux of momentary phenomena which is the world-error or the world-māyā. Hence the Buddha taught, "Mahāmāti, Māyā is not an unreality, because, it has the appearance of reality, and all things have the nature of Māyā. It is not, Mahāmāti, that all things are Māyā because they are both alike in being imagined and clung to as having multitudinousness of individual signs, but that all things are like Māyā because they are unreal and like a lightning flash which is seen as quickly disappearing."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ L. *Sūtra*, xliii.

⁴⁷ L. *Sūtra*, xlv.

⁴⁸ L. *Sūtra*, xlix.

Again, as Māyā is not the cause of error, so it is not also the cause of ignorance or perverse attachment to non-existents. It is the presentation of unrealities as realities consequent on the attachment to unrealities. It is the projection of the self of perversion which hides the reality. "There is an essence entirely covered by thought-constructions and hidden inside all that has body. Because of perversion there is Māyā; Māyā, however, is not the cause of perversion."⁴⁹

From the Paramārtha standpoint Māyā is non-existent. But in Samvṛti it is manifested through the potency of ignorance or the perverse attachment to non-existents. "As Māyā is manifested depending on grass, wood and brick, though Māyā itself is non-existent, so are all things essentially".⁵⁰ Verses 44, 58 and 69 echo these ideas, verse 58 being almost a copy of portions of the passages quoted above.

Gauḍapāda's speciality

Gauḍapāda carried the idea of Māyā further. In the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* the appearance of the phenomenal world is Māyā, but it is not said that ignorance, owing to which the world-māyā spreads, is also Māyā. In the illustration quoted above, the world-māyā is compared with an ordinary Māyā or illusion in which illusory objects are said to spring from worldly realities like grass, wood and brick. But the world-māyā does not spring from anything which can be called a reality in comparison with the ignorance from which it springs and is equally an unreality with it. Hence Gauḍapāda gives the illustration of a Māyik seedling springing from a Māyik seed⁵¹. Consequently, according to him ignorance also is Māyā as its effect, the world, is Māyā.

⁴⁹ *Sagathakam*, 42.

⁵⁰ *Sagathakam*, 30.

⁵¹ Verse 59,

Again, having conceived both the effect and the cause as Māyā, he naturally conceived the cause as possessing the power or potency (Śakti, I should say) of producing the world-māyā. This he does in verse 61⁵² where he uses the term Māyā in the instrumental case. Thus, according to him, the appearance of the world is Māyā, ignorance is Māyā, and its potency to produce the world is Māyā. He, therefore, uses the term Māyā instead of Avidyā (ignorance) throughout the four chapters of his treatise to mean the same thing.

Next comes the question of the seat of Māyā. Māyā is not an independent principle such as may not require a seat. Considered whether as the world-appearance, or as its cause ignorance or as the potency of ignorance, it must have a seat to support it, to rest on. Speaking in terms of the case of an ordinary illusion, there must be an entity in whom there is the capacity to produce the world-māyā. The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* xliii, quoted above, suggests the same thing when it says: "It (Māyā) rises when invoked by the magical charm of a certain person"; but does not push the point further—perhaps it could not because it had not identified ignorance with Māyā. But Gauḍapāda having done so, had no hesitation in seating it in the Ultimate Reality. Hence, in verse 12 of the 2nd chapter and verse 10 of the 3rd chapter of his book, he calls it Ātma-māyā which, rendered in Mahāyāna terminology, may be called (Ālaya) Vijñāna-Māyā or Citta-Māyā.

This identification of Māyā with Avidyā (ignorance), making the ultimate reality its support, is the foundation of the Māyāvāda of Śāṅkara. Another great speciality of Gauḍapāda's exposition which helped Śāṅkara was his masterly analysis of the lesson of a dream and of a fire-brand.

(To be continued)

⁵² As also in verses 27-29 of the *Advaita Prakaraṇa* the 3rd Chapter of his treatise.

THE TRIPURA EPISODE IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

By KUMARI BHAKTI SUDHA MUKHOPADHYAYA

WHILE perusing the Purāṇic Literature we come across an overwhelming mass of myths and legends, the one and same story recurring in a number of places. They are not simply the creations of the imagination of individual poets, and if we can catch the spirit of them, we find that they give expression to some scientific or philosophical truth under the garb of a legend.

The story of Tripura¹ or Three Cities made of three metals is found in our most ancient literature and from that onwards, the mind of people has been so impressed by this popular legend that it is represented from time to time in Sanskrit Literature, either in a well-knit story or drama or an exquisite poem, composed even in very

Abbreviations used :

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Ait.=Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. | 9. Mat.=Matsya Purāṇa. |
| 2. Bhāg.=Bhāgavata Purāṇa. | 10. Mbh.=Mahābhārata. |
| 3. Ch.=Chapter. | 11. Pd.=Padma Purāṇa. |
| 4. D.P.=Droṇa Parvan of Mbh. | 12. Rud. Sam.=Rudra Saṁhitā. |
| 5. Hv.=Harivaṁśa. | 13. Śat.=Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. |
| 6. Jn.=Sam.=Jñāna Saṁhitā. | 14. Sk.=Skanda Purāṇa. |
| 7. K.P.=Karna Parvan of Mbh. | 15. Svar. Kh.=Svarga Khaṇḍa. |
| 8. Lg.=Linga Purāṇa. | 16. Tai.=Taittiriya Saṁhitā. |
| | 17. Vai. Kh.=Vaiṣṇava Khaṇḍa. |

¹ (a) *Tripuradāba*, Dima mentioned by Bharata as enacted before Parameśvara.

(b) *Tripuravijaya* by Bhoganātha, a companion of King Sangama II, I.A. XIV, 24.

(c) *Tripuravijaya Campū* by Atirātrayajvan, *Tanj.*, VIII. 3378.

(d) *Tripuradabana*, TC., II. 2589.


(e) *Tripuradabana Campū*, *Tanj.* VIII. 3048.

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cousins.⁶⁵ After ruling Vidiśā as his father's viceroy, Agnimitra was his successor as suzerain for eight years.⁶⁶

The king at Vidiśā was the son of Kāśī, i.e., a princess from Benares.⁶⁷ The Śuṅgas ruled originally as feudatories of the Mauryas at Vidiśā.⁶⁸ Both Puṣyamitra and Agnimitra belonged to Vidiśā.

The Purāṇas preserve a tradition which avers that when the Śuṅga rule ended, one Śiśunandi began to rule Vidiśā. They lead us to think that the residual power of the Śuṅgas lingered at Vidiśā side by side with the suzerainty of the Kāṇvas. It is generally assumed that at first Vidiśā and subsequently Ujjayinī became the official headquarters of Candragupta II.⁶⁹

In ancient Vidiśā copper *kārṣāpaṇa* was the standard money from slightly before the rise of the Mauryas to at least the beginning of the Gupta

Coins at Vidiśā.

supremacy, i.e., for upwards of 600 years.⁷⁰ Punch-marked coins were found at Besnagar (ancient Vidiśā) which had its own individual marks on its coinage. They contained strata reaching down to the 4th century A. D.⁷¹ The *kārṣāpaṇas* found at Besnagar seem to have been struck on river bank. A zig-zag sign appears on them denoting a river bank.⁷² Dr. Bhandarkar opines that owing to the enhancement of the price of copper the weight of copper *kārṣāpaṇas* was reduced at some periods in the ancient town of Vidiśā.⁷³

⁶⁵ Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. I, p. 50.

⁶⁶ *CHI.*, p. 520.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

⁶⁹ Raychaudhuri, *Political History*, p. 468.

⁷⁰ Bhandarkar, *Carmichael Lectures*, 1921, p. 88.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA (ALĀTAŚĀNTI-PRAKARAṆA)

By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

(Continued from Vol. VIII, Part 4, p. 370)

Śāṅkara's Commentary

It is not our purpose here to give a detailed criticism of what is commonly known as Śāṅkara's commentary on the Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa. We shall only give a few examples of how, owing to his ignorance of the Mahāyāna, the commentator thoroughly misunderstood Gauḍapāda's purpose :

1. In verse I, Gauḍapāda lays down the Mahāyāna doctrine that in transcendental knowledge all things are one with the Ultimate Reality and pays obeisance to Gautama Buddha for having formulated it. He uses the term *Sambuddha* (fully enlightened) by which Gautama always used to be designated by his followers. But all this Śāṅkara did not know. It is worth comparing Gauḍapāda's expression of obeisance with Nāgārjuna's expression of obeisance to the Buddha :¹

Gauḍapāda says :— यः सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विषदां-वरम् ।

Nāgārjuna says :— यः सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां-वरम् ।

2. Commenting on verse 19, Śāṅkara interprets the term *buddha* as learned man, not knowing that there was such a doctrine as Mahāyāna attributed to Buddha Gautama of which *Ajāti* or non-birth of things was the essential idea.

3. Not knowing that in Mahāyāna Buddhism existence (*Astitā*) was classified under three heads, namely Parikalpita, Paratantra and Pariniṣpanna, of which Paratantra, meant mutually dependent, Śāṅkara explained

¹ *Vide*, p. xii.

paratantra in verses 24 and 73-74 as *anyaśāstra*, that is, another śāstra.

4. Not knowing Mahāyāna, Śaṅkara thought that verse 28 was an attack on Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda.

5. The same ignorance was responsible for his not seeing that in verse 42, the term *buddha* referred to Buddha Gautama.

6. Not knowing that Lakṣaṇaśūnyatā was one, indeed, the very first, of the seven kinds of Śūnyatā or emptiness taught in Mahāyāna Buddhism, Śaṅkara, in interpreting verse 67, had to give the expression *tanmatena* a far-fetched meaning instead of the natural meaning "in this doctrine".

7. The mistake about the term *buddha* is, in a modified form, repeated in the interpretation of verse 80.

8. In reading verse 81 Śaṅkara had to split up the term *Dharmadhātu* so that the expression *Dharmadhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ* became, in his hand, *Dharmo dhātusvabhāvataḥ*, because he did not know that Dharmadhātu was a name given to the Ultimate Reality in the Mahāyāna.

9. Not knowing that it was a fundamental principle in the Mahāyāna that the Ultimate Reality was free from the four propositions of existence, non-existence and so forth, Śaṅkara had to give verse 83 a forced interpretation.

10. The same thing happened in his interpretation of verses 87 and 88, because he did not know that the tripartite division of knowledge was Buddhist, although Gauḍapāda distinctly acknowledges it.

11. That Śaṅkara failed to grasp the significance of the term *Agrayāna* in verse 90, leads one to think that he had not even heard that there was any such thing as Mahāyāna.

12. It is clear from the above why in interpreting verse 99 he had to transpose a *na* in order to say that the Buddha did not teach what was actually his teaching.

All this is based on the supposition that the great Śaṅkara who wrote the commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* was also the author of the commentary on the *Kārikās* of Gauḍapāda on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. It may, however, be said that the commentary on the *Kārikās* is not his, but of some other person, possibly one of his successors to his *gaddi* who all assume the title of Śaṅkara even up to the present time. The commentary is so meagre, halty, defective, evasive and inelegant that it is unworthy of even a much lesser intellect than that of the renowned Śaṅkara. The stamp of his forceful logic and lucid interpretation is quite patent on the commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* itself but not on that on the *Kārikās*. We can, therefore, safely absolve Śaṅkara of having written the almost foolish commentary on the *Kārikās*, specially on the fourth chapter, the *Alāta-śāntiprakaraṇa*.

Of course, he knew the *Kārikās*, for he quoted from them and quoted as his only authority on the main planks of his Māyāvāda. In discussing an interpretation of the ten Upaniṣads from the standpoint of Māyāvāda or Vivartavāda a few fundamental questions present themselves: (1) The ten Upaniṣads nowhere clearly state the vivarta idea, never even citing an example of vivarta such as rope-snake. On the contrary they have everywhere sought to explain the creation by clear examples of pariṇāma such as earth, earthen-ware and the like. It would seem as if their author or authors never conceived the idea of error (*bhrama*) or illusions in respect of the creation of the world. (2) If the world is māyika (illusory) then the states of bondage and liberation with which religion and philosophy deal, must also be illusory or unreal or rather the chains of worldly bondage with which a jīva considers himself bound exist nowhere but in his fancy, he being in reality eternally liberated but dreaming of bond-

age under the influence of *māyā*, the inscrutable and yet unreal creative energy which knows no beginning but has an end. The Upaniṣads, however, nowhere clearly speak of the world as a dream of the jīva's *māyika* sleep. (3) If the world is unreal, then this unreality must be demonstratable in some state of his worldly experience, waking, dreaming or sleeping. According to the *Māyāvāda* it is clearly demonstratable in the dreaming state. But the Upaniṣads nowhere put forth any argument to establish this point. The *Māyāvādin* has, therefore, himself to find his arguments for establishing it.

In answering all these questions from his standpoint of *Māyāvāda*, Śaṅkara had to depend solely on the authority of *Gauḍapāda* as an interpreter of the *Śruti*. On the first question he quotes, in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* 1-4-14, the 15th verse of the 3rd chapter of the *Kārikās* named *Advaitaprakaraṇa* :

मृत्लोहविस्फुलिगाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।

उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन ॥

“As regards the statement of creation in a different way by (the examples of) earth, gold and sparks of fire, it is only a means for introducing the fact that there is no diversity in the least.” On the second question he quotes, on the *Brahmasūtra* 2-1-9, the 16th verse of the first chapter of the *Kārikās* named *Āgamaprakaraṇa* :

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

“When the jīva, sleeping under the influence of unbeginning *māyā*, wakes then is understood non-dualism which is unborn, unsleeping and undreaming”.

On the question, all the arguments of Śaṅkara to establish that a dream is nothing but a *māyā* are taken from the second and fourth chapters of the *Kārikās*. The following table will show this:

Brahmasūtra 3-2-3, Śaṅkara's commentary

१. न तावत् स्वप्ने रथादीनामुचितो देशः सम्भवति । न तावत् संवृते देहदेशे रथादयोऽवकाशं लभेरन् ।

In a dream it is not possible for chariots etc. to have adequate room. For in the restricted room within the body chariots etc. cannot get space enough (to exist as real objects).

२. स्यादेतत् । बहिर्देशात् स्वप्नं द्रश्यति देशान्तरितद्रव्यग्रहणात् । × × नेत्युच्यते । न हि सुप्तस्य जल्लोः क्षणमात्रेण योजनशतान्तरितं देशं पर्येतुं विपर्येतुं च ततः सामर्थ्यं सम्भाव्यते । क्वचिच्च प्रत्यागमनवर्जितं स्वप्नं श्रावयति “कुरुबहं शय्यायां शयानो निद्रामिप्सुतः स्वप्ने पञ्चालानभिगतश्चास्मिन् प्रतिबुद्धश्च” इति । देहाच्चेदपेयात् पञ्चालेष्वेव प्रतिबुध्यते तानसावभिगत इति कुरुबहं तु प्रतिबुध्यते ।

It may be said that one sees a dream from an outer place, for he sees objects lying in another place. But it cannot be so, for the sleeping creature cannot possibly have the power to go to and return from a place, situated a hundred yojanas off, in a moment. Sometimes we hear of a dream in which there is no return even.

Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-Kārikās

१. वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वप्न आहुमतीविणः ।
अन्तःस्थानांतु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना ॥२॥१

Wise men have spoken of the unreality of all objects in a dream, for such objects appear within (the dreamer) where accommodation is restricted.

२. अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देहान्न पश्यति ।
प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्वस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ॥२॥२

And on account of the time (taken by dream) not being long the dreamer does not see (dream-objects) by going out of his body. And on waking he does not find himself in that place.

“Lying in bed in the Kuru land I slept and dreamt that I had gone to the Pāṇcāla land, and immediately awoke”. Had he gone out of his body he should have awakened in the Pāṇcāla land for he had gone there, but he awakes in the Kuru land.

३. येन चायं देहेन देशान्तरमस्तुवानो मन्यते,
तमन्ये पार्ष्वस्थाः शयनदेश एव पश्यन्ति ।

Again, the body by which he thinks to have repaired to another place is seen by people by his side to lie in the place where he went to bed.

४. यथाभूतानि चायं देशान्तराणि स्वप्ने पश्यन्ति न तानि तथाभूतान्येव भवन्ति । पश्चिमावर्चेत् पश्येज्जाग्रद्वस्तुभूतमर्थमाकलयेत् ।

Again, the other places which he sees in a dream are not such as they really are. Had he seen them by going (to them) they should have appeared exactly as in the waking state.

५. कालविसम्बादोऽपि च स्वप्ने भवति । रजन्यां सुप्तो वासरं भारते वर्षे मन्यते । तथा मुहूर्तमात्रप्रवर्तिनि स्वप्ने कदाचित् बहून् वर्षपूगान-
तिवाहयति ।

Again, incongruity of time also occurs in a dream. A man sleeping at night in India thinks that it is then day there. Similarly, in a dream lasting not longer than a moment one sometimes lives many years.

६. करणोपसंहाराद्धि नास्य रथादिग्रहणाय चक्षुरादीनि सन्ति ।
रथादिनिर्वर्तनेऽपि कुतोऽयं निमेषमात्रेण सामर्थ्यं दारुणि वा ।

If the senses are withdrawn (in a dream), one has not eyes and so forth to perceive chariots etc. Whence again has one the capacity or the materials (lit. wood) to build chariots etc. in a moment.

७. बाध्यन्ते चैते रथादयः स्वप्नदृष्टाः प्रबोधे ।

Again, on waking these chariots etc., seen in a dream, are missing.

८. स्वप्न एव चैते सुलभभाषा भवत्याद्यन्त्योर्ब्यभिचारदर्शनात् ।

Again, in the dream itself they are easily missed, because their beginning and end are not visualised.

३. स्वप्ने चावस्तुकः कायः पथगन्त्यस्य दर्शनात् । ४।३६

In a dream the body (i.e., the dream body) is a nothing, for another (i.e., the body of the waking state) is seen separately.

४. मित्राद्यैः सह समन्वय सम्बुद्धो न प्रपद्यते । ४।३६

After a conversation with friends and others (in a dream) the awakened person does not find (them).

५. न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालस्यानियमाद् गतौ । ४।३४

It cannot be argued that the sight takes place after going to them, for there is an absence of any law of time in the going.

६. उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वाजं सर्वमदाहुतम् । ४।३८

Everything (in a dream) is said to be unborn because birth (of objects) is not known (or proved there).

७. गृहीतञ्चापि यत्किञ्चित् प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति । ४।३५

And the awakened person does not also see the thing that he grasped (in a dream).

८. आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

वित्तयैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवित्तया इव लक्षिताः ॥

What is non-existent in the beginning and in the end is also so in the present. Being like unto unrealities they appear as realities.

२।६; ४।३४

१. स्पष्टञ्चाभावं रथादीनां स्वप्ने श्रावयति चास्त्रं "न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पथानो भवन्ति" इत्यादि।

From the Śāstra also we clearly hear of the non-existence of chariots and so forth in a dream, as, "There are no chariots, no horses, no roads etc."

१०. तस्मान्मायायामात्रं स्वप्नदर्शनम्।

Hence the seeing of a dream is a mere māyā.

१. अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम्।

The non-existence of chariots and so forth (in a dream), logically established, is also heard (from the Śāstra).

१०. तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः।

२१७; ४१२

Hence, as they (in a dream) have a beginning and an end, they are rightly considered as false.

Above in the left-hand column I have noted all the arguments, seriatim, advanced by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*² and in the right-hand column the corresponding *Kārikās* from the Vaitathya (2nd) and Alātaśānti (4th) Prakaraṇas. It is clear from even a cursory comparison of the two columns that Śaṅkara's arguments are no more than mere paraphrases of the *Kārikās* quoted.

It is settled, therefore, that Śaṅkara knew the *Kārikās*. In fact, from the *Kārikās* he got his inspiration.

A rather vexed question, according to the present standard, arises from Śaṅkara's never having acknowledged his indebtedness to Gauḍapāda by name. Such was the habit of our ancient scholars who perhaps used to think that their readers must always be learned enough not to require such acknowledgments. In the present case at least that certainly seems to have been Śaṅkara's idea. In the verse quoted above from the 3rd chapter of the *Kārikās* he acknowledges as, "सम्प्रदायविदो वदन्ति" i.e., those who know the (Advaita) sects say, and the verse, also quoted above, from the 1st chapter of the *Kārikās* is acknowledged as "वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः" i.e. "The teachers who know the sect (which is possessed) of the (true) meaning of the Vedānta speak thus in this connection". Thus Śaṅkara acknowledges his indebtedness to Gauḍapāda using, as usual, the honorific plural. There is, however, no such acknowledgment for his arguments on the subject of dream. This was perhaps due to the fact that they were arguments—not verbal quotations—which he thought were the settled arguments of the sect to which Gauḍapāda belonged. In this estimation of Gauḍapāda he was partially correct. He was correct in that Gauḍapāda was not the originator of the

² III, 2, 3.

main theme of the *Kārikās*, Advaitavāda or Māyāvāda, and incorrect in that the sect which developed pure Advaitavāda was not Vedāntic but Buddhistic and that perhaps, so far as we know, Gauḍapāda was the first to advance such arguments to establish the unreality of dream-objects.

It is thus quite evident that Śaṅkara knew all the four chapters of the *Kārikās*, no matter whether he was their commentator or not. It is, however, certain that he could not make out the true import of the fourth chapter, the *Alātasāntiprakaraṇa*, and this he could not possibly do without being acquainted with the fullest development of the Śūnya idea among Buddhist philosophers as is contained in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. His information of the Śūnya doctrine was limited to the perhaps earlier phase of it, associated with the name of Nāgārjuna, which speaks of the world as an absolute void without any substratum of reality. Prajñākaramati, in his commentary on Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*³ puts this view pithily as, "Paramārtha is the higher sense, the pure aspect of things, by the knowledge of which all the kleśas (sufferings) which follow in the wake of desire which veils it, are destroyed. It is the absence of self-nature in all Dharmas. Śūnyatā, Tathatā, Bhūtakoṭi, Dharmadhātu and so forth are its synonyms. The pāramārthika (true) aspects of all things which are created by dependent causation is certainly the absence of their self-nature, for worldly things as they appear are un-born."

(परम उत्तमोऽर्थः परमार्थः। अकृत्तिमं वस्तुरूपं यदभिगमात् सर्ववृत्तिवासनानुसंधि-
क्लेशप्रहाणं भवति। सर्वधर्माणां निःस्वभावता। शून्यता तथता भूतकोटिः
धर्मधातुस्त्रिद्विपर्यायाः। सर्वस्य हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नस्य पदार्थस्य निःस्वभावता
पारमार्थिकं रूपम्। यथाप्रतिभासं सांवृतस्यानुत्पन्नत्वात्।)⁴

³ Edited by Louis de La Vallée Poussin and published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

⁴ Prajñākaramati's commentary on *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 9-2.

The uselessness of a conception of citta-mātra, an ultimate reality, is spoken of in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as "ग्राह्य-
मुक्तं यदा चित्तं तदा सर्वं तथागताः। एवं च को गुणो लब्धश्चित्तमात्रेऽपि
कल्पिते॥" ग्राह्यमुक्तमित्युपलक्षणं ग्राहकादिमुक्तमपि वेदितव्यम्--(commentary)
"When the mind becomes free from thoughts of subjects and objects then all are Buddhas. If so what more is gained by imagining the existence of citta-mātra (Mind only) again." To the logical mind of Śaṅkara, whose best contribution to the realm of philosophy was his masterly interpretation of error as a false appearance on the background of a truth, this doctrine of absolute nihilism as a means of interpreting the world-vision was too foolish and absurd to require a discursive refutation. Hence, after using elaborate arguments to refute the Sarvāstivāda (externalism) and the Vijñānavāda (Idealism) of Buddhist philosophers, he, in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*⁵ dismisses their Śūnyavāda with the following few words: "The doctrine, however, of the Śūnyavādins is opposed to all forms of pramāṇa and so no pain is taken to refute it. Certainly, this world of experience of all people based on all forms of pramāṇa cannot be given denial to without experiencing another principle."⁶

Thus it is certain also that Śaṅkara was not acquainted with the other form of Śūnyavāda in the realm of the developing Buddhist philosophy which spoke of a positive aspect of Śūnya, Paramārtha-āryajñāna-mahāśūnyatā of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* of which the *Alātasāntiprakaraṇa* is a clear exposition. The chain of the development of Advaita philosophy was, therefore, broken to Śaṅkara

⁵ *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 9-30.

⁶ 11-2-31.

⁷ "शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते।
न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणप्रसिद्धो लोकस्य व्यवहारोऽन्यत्तत्त्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽपह्नोतुम्।"
--शारीरकभाष्यम्।

and he thus found no other authority than that of Śruti to support Gauḍapāda's position.

In the absence of a correct interpretation of the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa in accordance with Buddhist philosophy, this chapter of the Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* remained a queer composition with a peculiar terminology thoroughly unlike that in the Śrauta literature.

The original which alone could have made a correct interpretation possible had been lost to India, perhaps within the period which intervened between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. It has been made possible only recently by the publication of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* from Chinese sources. Professor Daisetz Yeitaro Suzuki of the Otani Buddhist College, Kyoto, Japan has placed all scholars of philosophy under a deep debt of obligation by publishing, in 1932, a translation of this wonderful and invaluable book.

As regards the antiquity of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, it needs only to be said that its first translation into Chinese was attempted as early as 443 A.D.⁸

Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* quotes a line from what he calls *Laṅkāvatāra* which, if it is at all in the original *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* as has been found in China, must, in the absence of a more intimate knowledge of the book in India, be supposed to have been taken by him from some earlier quotation.

The purpose of Satyānanda's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* is to bring to the notice of scholars the extreme likelihood, if not absolute certainty, of the Advaita idea having been originated by Buddhist philosophers. A continuity in the development of Advaita thought is thus established in the history of Indian philosophy. In the absence of a knowledge of such a

⁸ Vide Suzuki's Introduction to his translation, p. xliii.

continuity, the abrupt appearance of Gauḍapāda's Advaitic interpretation of Śruti always remained a mystery, giving rise to various conjectures, puerile and superstitious, amongst sectarians. There remains for the future scholars the arduous task of finding out how from the agnostic teachings of the Buddha was developed through the various scholars of Buddhist thought and in perhaps more than a thousand years, the culminating idea of absolute monism of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* which was such a near approach to the Śrauta idea of Brahmahood as to justify an interpretation of Śrauta in its light. If the line can ever be traced it will open to the eyes of scholars, a glorious vista of a unique progress of human thought, supremely interesting and instructive in the realms of history, philosophy, psychology and, perhaps, even material science.

To any one who has intelligently read the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, the sense of the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa, carefully read verse after verse, cannot but be patent.

Satyānanda's Sanskrit commentary on Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa for which this introduction was first intended was written in 1935. Some years later, I had the good fortune of being acquainted with the erudite scholar Māhāmahopādhyāya Vidhu Shekhara Bhattacharya. From him I came to know that he too, like Satyānanda, had been carrying on research into Gauḍapāda's philosophy for some years and that the fruits of his labours in this field were going to be published by the Calcutta University under the title "*The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*" (C. U. 1943). He was so glad to find that he and Satyānanda, working independently in the same field, unknown to each other, had arrived on main points at the same conclusions, conclusions of an extraordinary character, that he became eager to see Satyānanda's work also published. Dr. Narendranath Law, the learned and renowned editor of

the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, has kindly undertaken to publish it in his journal. Satyānanda's sincere thanks are due to both. Left to him the work would perhaps never have been published in the present abnormally difficult days.

THE KAUTALYAN RULER*

By DASHARATHA SHARMA

VIEWS regarding the nature of the Mauryan monarchy must differ according to the varying emphasis laid on the two sources of Mauryan history, traditional and contemporary. To some it appears as constitutional, to others as absolute. But with regard to the Kauṭalyan ruler there need be no two opinions, if we let the *Kauṭaliya Arthaśāstra* speak and decide for us whether the monarch was constitutional or autocratic, whether the state he ruled over was *mantri-pradhāna* or *rāja-pradhāna*,¹ and whether he was or was not the source of all governmental activity.

Partly, Kauṭalya's answer to the question is to be found in Book VIII of the *Arthaśāstra*. After discussing a number of views on the comparative seriousness of the calamities befalling the seven elements of the state, the ruler, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend, Kauṭalya concludes that no calamity is so great as that involving the ruler, and aptly too, for according to him the most summary exposition of the state is to say that the *rājā* is the *rājya*.² He is the primary *Prakṛti* on which depends the character of the rest.³ His excellence imparts itself to the other *Prakṛtis* and so do his vices too, for the people's badness and goodness, their habits of exertion and negligence, all

* One of the lectures on the *Kauṭaliya Arthaśāstra* delivered at the University of Delhi in 1949-1950.

¹ Perhaps the best example of a *mantri-pradhāna* state would be England.

² *Rājā rājyamiti prakṛti-saṅkṣepaḥ* (VIII, 2, 1).

³ *Svāmī ca sampannaḥ svasampadbhiḥ prakṛtiḥ sampādayati.*

Svayam ca yacchilas tacchilāḥ prakṛtayo bhavanti.

Utthāne pramāde ca tadāyatattvāt. Tatkūṭasthānīyo hi svāmīti.

— (VIII, 1, 15-18).