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Some Problems of the Mandukya-Karika

By

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I

In the course of his introduction to *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*,¹ Professor Vidushekhara Bhattacharya makes the following salutary remark: 'When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible?'² In spite of this observation of his he rejects the evidence of tradition on many points apparently because he finds contradictions and incongruities. Yet it is worthwhile examining if there are real and insurmountable difficulties in following the Advaita tradition regarding the composition and character of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.

The traditional Advaita view is (i) that the twelve mantras beginning with 'om ity etad 'akṣaram' constitute the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (ii) that the *Kārikā* consisting of four chapters is the work of Gauḍapāda, an early teacher of Advaita, (iii) that the 29 verses of the first chapter form a commentary on the Upaniṣad, and (iv) that the following three chapters seek to establish the truth of non-duality through such reasoning as may be found in support of Scripture.

Professor Bhattacharya accepts whole-heartedly only one of these propositions, viz., that Gauḍapāda is the author of the *Kārikā*, and calls in question the others. After briefly noticing his partial agreement with tradition, we shall consider the grounds on which he feels constrained to differ therefrom and see if they really warrant disagreement.

II

As against Walleser who thinks that there was none named Gauḍapāda who is believed to have been the author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, that there existed long before the time of Śaṅkara a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century, and that this school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in the form of a *śāstra* (a school doctrine) and embodied it in a collection of sayings consisting of the four *pādas* of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, Professor Bhattacharya believes that tradition is right in ascribing the work to Gauḍapāda, for the reason that a work cannot be the production of the whole people of a land, though, written by a single individual, it may represent the views of the entire country to which he belonged. In this connection he quotes the view of *Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī* (17th century A.D.) that in the country of Kurukṣetra there was a river called Hīrarāvātī on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people, the pre-eminent of whom was Gauḍapāda, and that as the Ācārya was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the *Dvāpara* age, his proper name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.³

Though Professor Bhattacharya grants that Gauḍapāda was the author of the *Kārikā*, he is not prepared to believe that the *Kārikā* is a single work in four chapters. He is of the view that the four prakaraṇas are independent treatises which were put together in a volume under the title of the *Āgamaśāstra*.⁴ According to him, the attempt of the commentator, whom tradition identified with Śaṅkara, to show the interconnection of the chapters is a miserable failure. Introducing the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara⁵ says that though it is declared in the first chapter that there is no duality, yet as it is merely an expression of *āgama*, the second chapter is written to support it by reasons. Professor Bhattacharya finds fault with this statement, because though the second chapter advances various arguments, the first is not devoid of them. And he asks, "If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Ś [Śaṅkara] to be, then why is it that

1. Published by the University of Calcutta (1943). We shall refer to this book in the foot-notes as *Āgamaśāstra*.

2. Ibid., p. lxxi.

3. Ibid., pp. lxiii-lxxi.

4. Ibid., p. lvii.

5. Or whoever the commentator was; the identity is of no consequence for the present discussion.

the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily?" At the commencement of the third chapter, Śaṅkara says that non-duality can be understood not only by *āgama*, but by reasoning (*tarka*) as well, and that consequently to exhibit the reasoning the third chapter is required. The Professor's objection to this is that if Śaṅkara were right, the object of the second and third chapters must be the same, viz., to formulate the arguments for non-duality. But, then, why should there be two chapters at all? Cannot all the arguments be included in one? The fact, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, is that non-duality is mentioned only incidentally in the third chapter, and as such is not discussed. The purpose of the fourth chapter, as stated by Śaṅkara, is the establishment of the system of Advaita through pointing out the contradictions that vitiate the schools that are opposed to it, viz., those of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas. As against this, Prof. Bhattacharya contends that there is no detailed criticism of the Dvaitins' view in this chapter, that there is no allusion to the Vaināśikas, and that the views of the Vaināśikas are accepted and endorsed by Gauḍapāda, who cannot therefore criticise them. As regards each succeeding chapter the Professor wants us to ask these questions: does it presuppose the preceding chapter somehow or other? What do we lose if we take it as an independent work on Advaita Vedānta? Do we find in reading it in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming its connection with the preceding chapter? Professor Bhattacharya's answer to these questions is in the negative; and he regards the four prakaraṇas as independent manuals of Advaita.⁶

Let us gather afresh Śaṅkara's statements about the nature of the work as a whole and about the purpose of each chapter. In his introduction to the first prakaraṇa, Śaṅkara describes the argument of the four-chaptered *Kārikā* thus: "For the purpose of determining (the sense of) Omkāra is (written) the first prakaraṇa which abounds in Scriptural passages (*āgamapradhānam*) and which is the means for knowing the true nature of the self. When the world of duality is resolved, the non-dual is known, as when the serpent, etc., imagined in the rope are resolved the rope which is real is cognised. In order to explain through reason the illusori-

ness of (the world of) duality there is the second prakaraṇa. When there occurs the contingency that non-duality too may likewise be illusory, the third prakaraṇa shows through reasoning that non-duality is not so. There are views which are *avaidika* and opposed to non-duality being absolutely real. For the purpose of refuting them on rational grounds, by showing that those views cannot be true as they are mutually contradictory, is commenced the fourth prakaraṇa".⁷ At the beginning of the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says: "It was said, 'When (Reality) is known, there is no duality' (I, 18), and this is supported on the basis of such *śruti* passages as 'One only, without a second'. That is only Scripture (*āgama-mātram*). It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakaraṇa is commenced".⁸ At the beginning of the third prakaraṇa Śaṅkara remarks, "While discussing the nature of Omkāra it was stated 'The self is the cessation of the world, blissful, without a second', and 'When (Reality) is known there is no duality'. That was only as a premise. Of these (i.e. the two propositions 'the self is' and 'the world is not'), the non-existence of the world was explained in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa by illustrations like dream, magical show, and *jata morgana*, and through reasoning on the ground of *probans* such as 'because it is seen', 'because it is with beginning and end', etc. Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? Asking thus, the teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. How is that? To show how the Advaita-prakaraṇa is commenced".⁹ Explaining the connection of the fourth prakaraṇa with the preceding ones, Śaṅkara observes, "By way of determining Omkāra non-duality was stated (in the first prakaraṇa) as a premise known from Scripture. The same was established (in the second prakaraṇa) on the ground that the external world of objects is illusory. Again (in the third prakaraṇa), of the non-duality which was ascertained directly from Scripture and through reasoning, it was conclusively stated, 'This is the supreme truth'. At the end (of that prakaraṇa) it was indicated that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, which are opposed to the view of non-duality, the sense of Scripture, are wrong because of their mutual opposition and because

6. *Āgamaśāstra*, pp. xlvii-lvii.

7. Vani Vilas Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, p. 89.

8. Memorial Edition, Vol. 5, 122.

9. Ibid, Vol. 5, 144.

they give rise to passions like attachment and aversion. Non-dualism is praised as the right view on the ground that it does not give rise to passions. Now, the Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa is commenced for showing in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another, and for establishing finally through negative reasoning non-dualism".¹⁰

Now let us return to Prof. Bhattacharya's questions. The relation between the first and the second prakaraṇa, according to Śaṅkara, is that while the first chapter states as a premise the non-reality of the world of duality, supported by Scripture, the second chapter establishes the illusoriness of the world through reasoning. The first objection raised by Prof. Bhattacharya is that the first chapter is not devoid of arguments. He cites kārīkās 16-18 to show that arguments are advanced for proving the illusoriness of the world even in the first chapter. But a comparison, of the method and the contents of the first chapter with those of the second will clearly reveal that while in the former Scripture is the main source of evidence, in the latter various reasons are given for the illusory nature of the world. This is all that the commentator means when he says 'āgamamātram tat'. The word 'mātra' here has the sense of 'prādhānya', for that is how Ānandagiri interprets it. Śaṅkara himself says in his general introduction at the head of the first chapter: 'prathamam prakaraṇam āgama-pradhānam'. To the next objection that if the relation between the first and the second chapters was as it is declared by Śaṅkara, why does the author himself not say so at the beginning of the chapter, we need only reply that it is not necessary. What we should consider is whether Śaṅkara has correctly understood the teachings in the two chapters and their connection, if there be any. Let us turn to the contents of the chapters themselves to find an answer. The āgama-prakarāṇa begins with a summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.¹¹ Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are described; different theories of creation are mentioned with a view to show that they are unsatisfactory, as the world is in truth the very nature of the *Deva*; in the Turiya which is the absolute non-dual reality, there is neither cause nor effect; Prajña, the self in sleep, is conditioned by the cause of world-manifestation, viz. nescience;

10. Ibid., Vol. 5, 180.

11. The view that the Upaniṣad must have been composed later than the *Kārīkā* we shall examine below.

Viśva and Taijasa, the self of the waking state and the self of dream respectively, are conditioned by both cause and effect, i.e., nescience and its product. The Turiya is not to be confused with Prājña, for while Prājña is associated with dreamless sleep, in the Turiya there is neither sleep nor dream; as a corollary from this it is said that the universe does not really exist; the non-dual self (Turiya) is the sole reality; the world of duality is illusory (māyāmātra); then, following the Upaniṣad, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are identified with the three letters of Om, *a*, *u* and *m*, and the Turiya with the soundless culmination of Om; lastly, meditation on Praṇava is prescribed, as it leads to the supreme. From this brief outline of the contents of the Āgama-prakarāṇa it will be evident that the main subject of study is the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. No doubt it is declared there that the world is non-real. But that declaration is based on such words of the *śruti*, as 'prapañcopaśamam' and 'advaitam'. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara is not wrong in characterising the first prakaraṇa as 'āgama-pradhāna'. The second chapter, Vaitathya-prakarāṇa begins with the statement that the wise declare all the objects seen in dream to be illusory; and then it is argued that the objects perceived in waking also must be illusory because of similarity with those seen in dream. Now, does not this line of reasoning presuppose the discussion of *avasthās* in the previous chapter? Is it not an elaboration through logic of what was premised on the authority of *śruti* in the Āgama-prakarāṇa? After showing in detail how there is parity between waking and dreaming, the author of the *Kārīkā* proceeds to say that the entire world is a mistaken reading of the non-dual self. As when the rope is seen the snake-illusion is removed, so also when the self is known, the world of plurality disappears. Then follows a catalogue of different views about the self. The truth is, there is nothing other than the self. A few more illustrations are given to prove that the universe is illusory; the final truth is proclaimed as the non-dual reality which knows neither dissolution nor origination, neither bondage nor release; and lastly how the *yati* could know the truth and after knowing how he should live in the world. Here again Śaṅkara seems to be substantially correct in his statement that the purpose of the second chapter is to establish through reason the illusoriness of the world of duality.

As regards the relation between the second and the third chapter, Prof. Bhattacharya's objection, as we have already seen, is that if the object of the third chapter was what Śaṅkara regards

it to be, then there should be no need for this chapter at all, as all the arguments for non-duality could be included in one chapter. As a preliminary observation we may point out here that the treatment of the same topic in two successive chapters is not uncommon even in modern books. But that apart, does Śaṅkara say or mean to say that the object of the second and the third chapters is the same? Is it not his view that while the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa establishes through reason the illusoriness of duality, the Advaita-prakaraṇa seeks to show the non-illusoriness of non-duality? The two are related topics, no doubt; but they are not identical. The contention of Prof. Bhattacharya is that non-duality, though mentioned in the third chapter, is not its main topic, but something else. And this will be clear, he says, if one examines the contents with some amount of care. The following is his own account of the contents of the third chapter: "Here at the beginning (III, 1-2) the author tells us about 'non-origination' (*ajāti*) and having established it concludes in the end (III, 48) that it is the highest truth (*uttama satya*). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a *samādhi* 'intense abstract concentration' called *asparśayoga* meant for the realization of the Truth".¹² We have no quarrel with this analysis. But what does it show? How is *ajāti* a topic different from *advaita*? Why is non-origination the truth? Is it not because the truth is non-duality alone? Prof. Bhattacharya admits that Gauḍapāda asserts in this chapter the absence of difference between jīva and Brahman. If this is not *advaita*, what else is it? And what is *asparśayoga* if it is not the path to the realisation of non-duality?

The fourth chapter, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, points out the mutual contradictions that are to be found in the systems opposed to Advaita and establishes non-duality by a process of negative reasoning. Where in this chapter is a detailed discussion, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, of the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, assuming that they are wrong because of their mutual contradiction? And secondly where is the allusion to Vaināśikas as opponents, whose views Gauḍapāda accepts by implication throughout the book? Before we make an attempt to answer these questions we may notice in passing the argument that the

Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa must be an independent treatise as it commences with a *maṅgalācaraṇa*. Prof. Bhattacharya himself dismisses this argument as not carrying much weight. In a Bauddha work, the *Pañjika* of Prajñākaramati on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* which consists of nine chapters, there is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. But where is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the first prakaraṇa of the *Kārikā*? It has been answered by the commentators that OM with which the Upaniṣad begins is itself the *maṅgalācaraṇa*. Not only at the beginning of the fourth chapter but also at the end there is *maṅgalācaraṇa* in the form of obeisance. Does it not imply, asks Prof. Bhattacharya, that the prakaraṇa is an independent work and complete in itself? We do not, however, see the implication because there is nothing unintelligible in a book ending with an obeisance. Now about the other questions. The Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa just immediately after the *maṅgalācaraṇa* refers to the disputants who uphold the reality of origination and quarrel among themselves. Then there is an elaborate and detailed dialectical criticism of the category of origination, the concept of cause. Is not the notion of cause one of the cardinal doctrines of the pluralists (*dvaitinaḥ*), and in criticising it in detail, is not the author of the *Kārikā* examining the view of those who are opposed to *Advaita*? The next question is about the reference to Vaināśikas. In his notes on *Kārikā*, III, 3, Prof. Bhattacharya says that among the Buddhists the Vaibhāṣikas maintain satkāryavāda, and the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold asatkāryavāda. The verse in question maintains that the two views regarding the causal relation are mutually contradictory, and in subsequent verses Gauḍapāda provides a critique of the causal category and rejects it finally. Is this not an implicit criticism of the Vaināśika views, at any rate of the three schools of Buddhism mentioned above?¹³ There is one more question raised by Prof. Bhattacharya. A number of *kārikās* from the second and third chapters are repeated in the fourth; the *ajātivāda* discussed already in the third chapter is discussed again in the fourth. Why is this repetition? Is it not useless? In reply it need only be pointed out that repetition is not a defect in an *upadeśa-grantha*.

That the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* was considered to be an *upadeśagrantha* will be evident from the colophons in some of the

12. *Āgamaśāstra*, p. lil.

13. We shall examine the question of Bauddha influence later.

manuscripts.¹⁴ The main object of the work is to teach students of Advaita the essentials of non-dualism. And the teacher, Gauḍapāda grades his lessons in an intelligent manner. After setting forth the purport of Scripture in the first chapter, he justifies it through reasoning in the next two chapters. The *Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad* teaches the illusoriness of the worlds of waking and of dreaming and the absolute reality of the Self, the Turiya. The second chapter is concerned with the former and the third with the latter. Having expounded the philosophy of Advaita through Scripture and reasoning, Gauḍapāda examines in the fourth chapter the views opposed to Advaita, exhibits their contradictions and shows the excellence of his own system. Such a view of the *Kārikā*, we submit, is the most rational one to take, having regard to the nature of the work and the topics dealt with therein.

III

Contrary to the traditional Advaita view which holds the 29 verses of the first chapter to be Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* consisting of the 12 prose passages, Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the verses or *kārikās* must have been already in existence before the prose passages came to be composed. The reasons offered for his view by the Professor are these: (1) After the 6th, 7th 11th and 12th mantras of what is called the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the *kārikās* are introduced in the words 'atraite ślokā bhavanti' (here are these ślokas). In other Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadarāṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* similar expressions are employed to introduce ślokas in support of the prose passages that precede them. It follows, therefore, that the prose portions must have come into existence after the verses, and not *vice versa*.

(2) A comparison of the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding verses bears out this view. If the *kārikās* were really explanations of the prose passages, they should throw light on those portions of the latter which are difficult or obscure and should not omit the most important words of the original. But what are the actual facts? (a) The *kārikās* 1-5 which are supposed to explain the prose passages 3-5 omit altogether the words 'saptāṅgaḥ' and 'ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ' the most difficult

ones which require explanation. (b) In the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara*; but in the corresponding *kārikās* the word *viśva* is used. The business of a commentator is to explain the original word and not introduce a word which is not identical or synonymous with it. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapana-sthāna*, and *suṣuptasthāna* of the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively are not found in the *kārikās*. (d) That the so-called Upaniṣad, instead of being the original, is really a commentary on the verses will be evident from the fact that taking a word or two from the *kārikās* it expands and explains the idea contained therein. For instance the terms *ghanaprajña* (1), and *ānandabhuj* or (3) *ānanda* (4) are explained in prose passage 5. (e) The *kārikā* I, 19 says that *Viśva* is identical with *a* the first letter of *Om* because each of them is the first (*ādi*) in its series and each is pervasive (*āpti*). The corresponding Upaniṣad clearly says that the identity is *either* because of each being the first *or* because of each being pervasive (*āpter ādimattvād vā*). This option seems to be a later development. (f) There is divergence as regards two words between *kārikā* I, 21 and Upaniṣad 11. In the former there are the word *māna* 'measure' from *mā* 'to measure' and the word *āpiti* 'disappearance' from *api-i*, while in the latter there are *miti* 'measure' from *mi*, and *laya* 'disappearance'. (g) The *kārikās* (I. 10-15) make a distinction between Turiya and the other three, viz. *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*; but no such distinction is found in the Upaniṣad. (h) The Upaniṣad (1) says that Brahman or *Ātman* has four quarters (*catuspād*); but there is no such mention in the *kārikās*.

(3) Lastly, there is the view of Ācāryas like Madhva that the 29 verses of the *Āgamaprakaraṇa* form part of the Upaniṣad, and that the verses are older than the prose passages. On these grounds Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the *kārikās* of the first chapter are not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, that the Upaniṣad is mainly based on the *Kārikās*, and that it must have been composed later 'with a tinge of the language used in the *Brāhmaṇas*'.¹⁵

Let us examine the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya *seriatim*. (1) There is nothing unintelligible in the *Kārikā-kāra* introducing his explanatory verses in the words 'atraite ślokā

bhavanti'. In some manuscripts these are said to be the words of the Vārttika-kāra.¹⁶ The Vārttika-kāra here referred to is Gauḍapāda, for the Kārikā is also known by the name *Māṇḍūkya-vārttika*.¹⁷

(2) Before answering the next set of questions, it may be useful to ask ourselves as to what sort of a commentary we hold the 29 verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be. Certainly they are not meant to be a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages.¹⁸ They re-arrange the concepts found in the Upaniṣad in a more logical manner with a view to show that the Turiya is the absolute non-dual reality; and this again is only a foundation for the succeeding three chapters. Those expressions in the Upaniṣad which are not materially useful are passed over, and certain implications which are not expressly stated in the Upaniṣad are explained because they are regarded as important by the author of the Kārikā for the development of his thesis. A case in point is the mention and criticism of the several creationistic theories. Without departing from the spirit of what is declared in the Upaniṣad, the Kārikā-kāra prepares his own *precis* of the passages and makes it the nucleus of his subsequent philosophical construction. Now we may turn to answer the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya against regarding the Upaniṣad as the earlier text. (a) Since the object of the first five verses is to analyse the three manifestations of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, and to show that Reality is one in the three states though the contents and types of enjoyment vary, the verses leave out expressions which are not useful for this purpose. Viśva and Taijasa being endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths is of no metaphysical consequence subserving the purpose Gauḍapāda has in view. It is points of contrast that are important; for the philosopher wants to show that in spite of apparent differences there is an underlying unity. Hence it is that to the differences in objects of consciousness and modes of enjoyment mentioned in the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda adds the differences in principal locations and types of satisfaction. The reason we

16. See Anandāśrama edition of the Kārikā with Anandagiri's Tīkā, p. 25; atha vārttikakāroktamvākyam.

17. Rāmakaṣṇa Paṇḍita in his commentary on the *Pañcadaśī* (II, 29) refers to the Kārikā (III, 39) as Vārttika. Whether the name Vārttika as applied to Gauḍapāda's work is proper or not is not germane to the present discussion.

18. See S. K. Belvalkar: *Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I, p. 193.

have just given will also explain why the author of the Kārikā has nothing to comment on the first two mantras of the Upaniṣad, though at a later stage and in its proper place he refers to Omkāra and its *mātras*. (b) The terms Viśva and 'Vaiśvānara', whatever be their etymological significance, have come to mean the same in Advaita usage. Probably, Gauḍapāda's intention is to show the identity of the self of the waking state with the all-consciousness which has the manifest universe for its object, the identity, in short, of the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* forms of the self. Hence it is that he describes 'Viśva' as all-pervading (*vibhu*). The suggestion, however, comes from the *Śruti* itself. The Upaniṣadic passage 6 describes Prājña, the self in sleep, as the Lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, etc. Since it is the same self that persists in and through the changing states, the Kārikā-kāra identifies the apparently individual soul that is awake with the self of the universe. (c) The terms *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapnasthāna* and *suṣuptasthāna*, need not be repeated in the Kārikā, because the verses, as we said, present only a summary of the Upaniṣadic passages for a set purpose which their author has in view. They are not, however, unnoticed, for the fifth verse refers to them together in the words 'in the three states' (*triṣu dhāmasu*). (d) That a prose passage is longer than the corresponding verse or verses can be no argument for its subsequent composition. In the Upaniṣad 5 the state of sleep is explained and the self of that state is described. In fact, we have an independent passage for each of the three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. Gauḍapāda adopts a different method. The first four kārikās speak of all the three, and the trio are compared in respect of their objects of consciousness, types of enjoyment, locations and kinds of satisfaction. Viewed in this light, it may be seen that Gauḍapāda has incorporated in his verses all the terms that are necessary from the Upaniṣadic passage 5. (e) The kārikā I. 19 identifies Viśva with *a* because each is the first in its series and each is pervasive. The Upaniṣad calls them identical for either of the two reasons. From this alleged difference between the Kārikā and the Upaniṣad Prof. Bhattacharya concludes that the latter must have been composed later. But what is the force of 'or' (*vā*) in the Upaniṣadic text? Is it used in the sense of a disjunction either of ignorance or of exclusion? We do not think that the Upaniṣad means to say that 'Viśva' and *a* are to be identified either only because each is the first or only because each is pervasive. Both are equally valid reasons for identification. And it is this meaning that is expressed by the word 'and' (*ca*)

in the *Kārikā*, 19. (f) We have already said that the verses of the first prakaraṇa do not constitute a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages. And so it does not matter from which root a particular word is formed in the *Kārikā* provided it expresses the same idea. Prof. Bhattacharya himself admits that there is no difference in meaning between *māna* and *miti*, and between *apīti* and *laya*. (g) The *kārikās* 10-15 make a distinction between the Turiya and the other three Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. The Turiya is the changeless lord of all, one without a second; it is unconditioned eternal consciousness; in it there is neither the veiling of the true nor the projection of the untrue. Prof. Bhattacharya holds that there is nothing corresponding to this idea in the Upaniṣad. But what do the two Upaniṣadic passages, 7 and 12, which set forth the nature of the Turiya mean? Do they not declare that the Turiya is trans-phenomenal (*prapañcopaśama*) and thereby distinguish it from the three, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña? (h) There is no mention in the *Kārikā*, says Prof. Bhattacharya, of the four quarters of Brahman or Ātman declared in the Upaniṣad. This, however, is not the case. The *Kārikā* 24 makes mention of the *pādas* (quarters); and that they are four will be evident from the description of Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña, and Turiya, in the preceding verses.

(3) As for the rival tradition which regards the prose passages and the 29 verses of the first prakaraṇa as constituting the Upaniṣad, it must be noted that it does not lend countenance to Prof. Bhattacharya's view that the prose passages came into being after the *kārikās*. If the entire prakaraṇa is *śruti*, in the sense in which the orthodox schools of Vedānta accept the term, its different parts cannot be dated in sequence. It is not our task here to examine the *rationale* of the tradition which holds the *Kārikās* of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to be part of the Upaniṣad. We are only concerned with pointing out that the Advaita tradition is an old one—at least as old as Śaṅkara—and that it is not either unpalatable or unjustifiable. That the tradition is an ancient one is admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself. Even if the evidence of the commentator on the *Kārikā* is set aside as that of a spurious Śaṅkara, there are unmistakable references in Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya* and Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* from which one may gather that according to these two Advaitins, master and pupil, the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa are not *śruti*. Śaṅkara quotes the *kārikā* I, 16 in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II, i, 9, and

says that it is a statement made by the teacher who knows the tradition of the Vedānta.^{19 20} Sureśvara quotes the *Kārikā* I, 11, in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, IV, 41, and says that it is stated by the worshipful Gauḍas. It is no doubt true that some of the verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa which are cited by Advaita teachers are declared as *śrutis*. But this only shows that in their view the verses were composed after the *Māṇḍūkya-śruti*. The term Upaniṣad is rather loosely employed by the old teachers. For instance, the *Bhagavad-gītā* is called 'Upaniṣad'. In some of the manuscripts of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* all the four prakaraṇas are called 'Upaniṣads'. Kamalaśīla, a disciple of Śāntirakṣita (705-763 A.D.) quotes in his *Pañjikā* some verses from the Vaitathya—and Advaita-prakaraṇas and speaks of them as belonging to *Upaniṣat śāstra*.²¹ And so, the verses of the first prakaraṇa, when they are characterised as *śruti* or Upaniṣad, must be considered so in the secondary and not the primary sense.

IV

There is one more problem of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* which we shall discuss here in brief. It is believed that Gauḍapāda, if he himself was not a Bauddha, ought to have been greatly influenced by Bauddha views which he accepted and incorporated in his *Kārikā*. Especially the idealist schools of Buddhism, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika, it is thought, must have appealed to him as sponsoring views very much like his own, and so without any hesitation or scruple he made use of the arguments advanced by these Bauddha schools to prove his thesis of the non-reality of the world and its absolute non-origination. The contents of the fourth chapter are indistinguishable from those of any Mādhyamika work. The terms and phrases employed there are those of Nāgārjuna. Even the title of the chapter, '*Alātaśānti*', is borrowed from Bauddha terminology. Though the first three chapters cite here and there the authority of Scripture, no Upaniṣadic passage is quoted or referred to by Gauḍapāda in the last prakaraṇa.²² Probably the great teacher was so much struck with the close

19 & 20. atoktam vedānta-saṃpradāya-vidbhir ācāryaiḥ.

21. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. xxxviii n.

22. Ibid., p. lxxxxiii.

parallelism between his Vedānta view and the views of the Bauddhas that after finishing the third chapter he wrote an independent work calling it 'Alātaśānti', advocating therein the Bauddha views and thereby preaching non-hostility to them.

The question of Bauddha influence is a vexed one, and we do not propose to enter into the details here. Certain general considerations will suffice to show that Gauḍapāda's main object in the *Kārikā* is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It is true that in accomplishing this object he presses into service some of the arguments of the Bauddha idealists and even their terminology. But that does not prove his Bauddha leanings or agreement with the conclusions of Buddhism. In the first place, it must be remembered that those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who refer to his *Kārikā*, do not regard him as a Bauddha or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śāntirakṣita quotes in his *Madhyamakālaṅkārikā* verses from Gauḍapāda's work, while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas. Kamalaśīla refers to the *Kārikā* in his *Pañjikā* as an *Upaniṣat śāstra*. That the metaphysical position of the Mādhyamikas is nihilism in the primary sense is urged not only by Advaitins but also by Jaina writers.^{23 24} The Mādhyamikas themselves do not refute the charge of nihilism brought against their view, though they carefully distinguish their philosophical nihilism from 'common or vulgar nihilism'.²⁵ No one denies a certain measure of similarity between Advaita and the idealistic schools of Buddhism, especially in the matter of their negative logic. Śāṅkara the commentator himself says that the *kārikās* IV, 25-27 employ the arguments of the Vijñānavādins for the purpose of refuting the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects.²⁶ The procedure is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists of the West in their criticism of Realistic doctrines. But it does not follow that either Advaita or Absolutism is identical with Subjectivism. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the *Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa* where he employs Bauddha terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away from the Upaniṣadic moorings. It is not true to say that there is no

reference to Upaniṣadic passages in the fourth chapter. As Dr. Belvalkar has pointed out, familiar Upaniṣadic expressions are employed in IV, 78, 80, 85, and 92. That these expressions are used by Bauddha writers also can only show that they were borrowed by them from the Upaniṣads. And it is significant that Gauḍapāda should have used such expressions as 'brāhmaṇyam padam', and 'amṛtatva' in the concluding portion of his work, and that he should have stated at the end 'naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' (This was not declared by the Bauddha).²⁷ Thus it will be clear that Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* is essentially a work on Vedānta inspired by the Upaniṣads. The exigencies of his time must have made him employ Bauddha terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the west to-day feel the necessity for clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions.

It would appear that Prof. Bhattacharya agrees with this view to a large extent when he says, "It goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion", "And among the Vedāntists Gauḍapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being Advaita 'non-duality'".²⁸ The Professor even grants in one place that "Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntist".²⁹ But we do not find our way to agree with him when he says that there are two schools of Vijñānavādins, (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head.³⁰ He himself sets forth the distinction between the two schools in clear terms. The real difference between them, he says, is with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom *māyā* is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the *vāsanā* is with the *citta*.³¹ Even where Gauḍapāda applies the term *citta* to signify reality, he uses it as a synonym for *Brahman*. While to the Vijñānavādin, the Ālayavijñāna is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and continuous like a current (*dhruva*), to the Advaitin Brahman-Ātman is eternal (*nitya*). Therefore it helps in no way philosophically to call

23 & 24. See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 8.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

26. *Mem. Edn.* Vol. 5, p. 196.

27. Prof. Bhattacharya gives a novel interpretation of this sentence. See *Āgamaśāstra*, p. 212.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. cxxvii and cxxviii.

29. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxii.

30. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxii.

31. *Ibid.*, p. cxxxiii.

Advaita a school of Vijñāna-vāda. And tradition is not wrong in regarding Gauḍapāda as a stalwart Vedāntin, the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara.

V

In conclusion we repeat that the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is a single work of Gauḍapāda setting forth the quintessence of Vedānta, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that its first chapter, the *Āgama-prakaraṇa*, is a verse-summary of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* which is made the nucleus for the rational exposition of the system of Advaita in the subsequent three chapters. We hold no brief for tradition. Yet we cannot help pointing out that the Advaita tradition as regards Gauḍapāda and his *Kārikā* is essentially sound, neither taxing our credulity nor involving us in contradictions.

Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Buddha

By

MR. A. P. GURUSWAMY,
Ceylon

Gazing forth, like the sage of Lucretius, from the serene heights of wisdom, over the varied world of life, but radiating forth, unlike that sage rays of kind feeling and love in every direction; calm amid storms, because withdrawn into a trance of dreamless unconsciousness, undisturbed because allowing no external object to gain any hold on sense or emotion or even on thought; owing nothing and wanting nothing; resolute, fearless, firm as a pillar, in utter isolation from all other beings, except by feeling kindly to them all, such is the ideal conquerer of Buddhism.

There are three things that I intend to do in this paper: (1) To try and compare Gautama Buddha with Jesus Christ; (2) To expound Nirvana. Not only the Oxford Dictionary, but also innumerable writers and speakers, more especially Christians, have done a grave disservice to Buddhism by their imperfect understanding and erroneous representation of Nirvana; (3) To seek to explain why Buddhism died in the land of her birth—India.

FIRST THEN THE STUDY IN CONTRASTS :

Gautama and Jesus ! The Buddha and the Christ ! Comparisons of this kind seldom serve any useful purpose; they generally involve too much simplification of human character; and they are at times even odious. But in the present case the comparison has so often been insisted upon that today it is almost impossible to avoid it. To mention only the more familiar instances, the comparison is implicit in Edwin Arnold's "Light of Asia", which purports to be 'the Scripture of the Saviour of the World'; Thoreau himself 'named the Buddha beside Christ' though he was aware that in so doing he was laying himself open to the censure of devout Christians.

The problem, however, needs some clear definition. In fact, it is not one problem: there are two. Firstly, there is the question whether there are any points of similarity between the Buddhist



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THE AJĀTIVĀDA OF GAUDAPĀDA

By

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Gaudapāda, whom tradition regards as Śaṅkara's parama-guru (preceptor's preceptor), is the earliest known systematic exponent of Advaita. His *Kārikā*, which is more than a verse-commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, contains the quintessence of the teaching of Vedānta.¹ The work consists of 215 couplets arranged in four chapters. Following the Upaniṣad, the first chapter, Āgama-prakaraṇa, analyses the three *avasthās*, waking, dream, and deep sleep, and finds that the Self which is referred to as the Turiya underlies and transcends these changing states. The second chapter, Vaitathya-prakaraṇa, seeks to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality, on the analogy of dreams, and through a criticism of creationistic hypotheses. The third chapter, Advaita-prakaraṇa, sets forth the arguments for the truth of non-dualism, gives citations from scripture in support thereof, and discusses the path to the realisation of non-duality, called Asparśa-yoga. The last chapter, Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa, repeats some of the arguments of the earlier chapters, shows the unintelligibility of the concept of causality through dialectic, explains the illusoriness of the phenomenal world, comparing it to the non-real designs produced by a fire-brand (alāta) and pressing into service modes of Bauddha reasoning, and establishes the supreme truth of non-duality which is unoriginated, eternal, self-luminous bliss.

I

The central theme of Gaudapāda's philosophy is that nothing is ever born (ajāti), not because 'nothing' is the ultimate truth, as in Śūnya-vāda, but because the Self is the only reality. 'No jīva is born; there is no cause for such birth; this is the supreme truth, nothing whatever is born.'² From the standpoint of the Absolute there is no duality, there is nothing finite or non-eternal. The Absolute alone is; all else is appearance, illusory and non-real. They are deluded who take the pluralistic universe to be real. Empirical distinctions of knower and object known, mind and matter, are the result of Māyā. One cannot explain how they arise. But on enquiry they will be

1. The commentator on the *Kārikā* says: vedāntārtha-sāra-saṅgraha-bhūtam.

2. III, 48; IV, 71.

na kaścij-jāyate jīvaḥ sambhavo 'sya na vidyate,
etat-tad-uttamaṁ satyaṁ yatra kiñcin-na jāyate.

found to be void of reality. If one sees them, it is like seeing the foot-prints of birds in the sky.³ The Self is unborn; there is nothing else to be born. Duality is mere illusion; non-duality is the supreme truth.⁴

II

Gaudapāda expounds his philosophy of non-origination or non-birth in several ways and through many an argument. The reality of the non-dual self he first establishes through an enquiry into the purport of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Though extremely brief, the *Māṇḍūkya* contains the essentials of Vedānta. For the liberation of those who desire release, says the *Muktikopaniṣad*, the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough.⁵ The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* begins with the equation 'Om=all=Brahman=self' and proceeds to describe the three states of the self, waking, dream and sleep, as well as the fourth (Turiya) which is not a state alongside the others but the transcendent nature of the self—the non-dual peace, the self *per se*. Gaudapāda makes this declaration of the Upaniṣad the basis of his metaphysical quest and seeks to show through reasoning that non-origination is the final truth.

Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña are the names by which the self is known in the three states, waking, dream, and sleep. Viśva is conscious of the external world, enjoys what is gross and is satisfied therewith. Taijasa is conscious of what is within,⁶ enjoys what is subtle and finds satisfaction there. Prājña is a consciousness-mass without the distinctions of seer and seen; its enjoyment and satisfaction is bliss. The three, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña, are not distinct selves. It is one and the same self that appears as three.⁷ To show that all the three aspects are present in waking, Gaudapāda assigns localities to them. Viśva has its seat in the right eye; Taijasa in the mind; and Prājña in the ether of the heart.⁸ And the three should also be thought of as identical with the three cosmic forms of the self, Virāt, Hiraṇyagarbha, and Avyākṛta or Īśvara. It is to indicate this identity that the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* describes the Prājña-self as the lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, the source of all, the origin and end of beings.⁹ The recognition of Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña in the waking state, and the identification of the three individual forms of the self with the three cosmic forms, are for the purpose of realising non-duality.

The non-dual reality is the Turiya. It has no distinguishing name;

3. IV, 28.

4. I, 17, māyā-mātraṁ idaṁ dvaitaṁ advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ.

5. *Muktikā*, I, 26.

6. The distinctions of 'within' and 'without', it must be remembered, are from the standpoint of waking experience; for it is in this state that inquiry is possible.

7. I, i. eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ.

8. I, 2. See commentary.

9. *Māṇḍūkya*, 6.

hence it is called 'the fourth' (turiya¹⁰). It is the self-luminous self, changeless, non-dual, one without a second. The states that change and pass, with their worlds and enjoyments, are illusory, products of *Māyā*. *Māyā* is two-fold in its functioning; it veils the one and projects the many. Non-apprehension of the real (tattvā-pratibodha) and the apprehension of it otherwise (anyathā-grahaṇa). For the Prājñā in the state of sleep there is non-apprehension alone, and not misapprehension. It knows neither the self in its real nature nor the not-self. The Turiya is free from both the aspects of *Māyā*. It is consciousness *per se*, without even a trace of ignorance. It is unfailing light, omniscient sight.¹¹ The metaphysical implication of sleep is that it hides the true, and of dream that it projects the untrue. Viśva and Taijasa are associated with dream and sleep; Prājñā is associated with dreamless sleep; for the Turiya there is neither dream nor sleep. Real awakening comes with the realisation of the Turiya, with the transcendence of *Māyā* in its double role of veiling the real and showing up the non-real. When the jīva wakes from the beginningless sleep of illusion, it knows its true nature as unborn, as that in which there is neither sleep nor dream nor duality.¹²

In the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa,¹³ Gauḍapāda teaches the same theory of the three avasthās, employing Bauddha terminology. Waking, dream, and sleep are there called laukika, śuddha-laukika, and lokottara respectively. The difference between the first two is that while in the former there are external objects (savastu), in the latter there is none (avastu); but in both there is consciousness of duality (sopalambha). In the lokottara there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of ideas, and consequently there is no apprehension of duality; ignorance, however, persists. It is only he who knows these three as non-real states that knows the truth. For him there is no duality, nor ignorance, the seed of duality. When the real is known, there is not the world of duality.¹⁴

III

As a result of the inquiry into the avasthās it must be evident that the pluralistic world is illusory, as the self alone is real. That the world which we take to be real in waking is illusory, Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa on the analogy of the dream-world. Judged by the standards of waking, it will be readily seen that the world of dreams is unreal. A person may dream of elephants and chariots; but on waking he realises that all of them must have been illusory because they appeared within him, within the small space of his body.¹⁵ The dream-contents do not form part

of the external world which we take to be real in waking; and so they are illusory. Nor do they conform to the laws of space and time which govern the waking world. In a trice of waking time one may travel far and wide in dream. There is no real going to the place of dream, for on waking one does not find oneself there. Nor are the objects experienced in dream real, for when the dream-spell is broken one does not see them.¹⁶ Because chariot, etc., seen in dream are non-existent, they are illusory.¹⁷

The world of waking is in many respects similar to that of dream. The objects of waking are *perceived* as the dream-objects are; and they are evanescent as well, like the contents of dream. What is non-existent in the beginning and at the end, is so even in the present.¹⁸ That is real which is not conditioned by time. *Per contra* that which is conditioned by time cannot be real. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone neither before nor after, even so the objects of waking are experienced in the state of waking alone. A difference between the two states cannot be made out on the ground that, while the objects experienced in waking are practically efficient, those seen in dream are not; for even the objects of waking experience are fruitful in practice only in that state and not in dream; and the dream-objects are useful in their own way in the state of dream. It is true that the dream-water cannot quench actual thirst. But it is equally true that the so-called actual water cannot quench the dream-thirst either.¹⁹ It may be argued that the contents of dream are unreal because, unlike the objects of waking, they are strange and abnormal. But when and to whom do they appear abnormal? To him who has returned to waking after a dream. In the dream state itself the contents are not realised to be strange. With perfect equanimity the dreamer may watch even the dismemberment of his own head. We are told that the denizens of heaven have their own peculiarities which to us are all abnormal. Similarly, from the side of waking the dream-contents may seem abnormal; but in themselves they are quite normal.²⁰ That there is an essential similarity between the contents of dream and the objects of waking may be shown by a closer scrutiny of the two states. In the state of dream, the dreamer imagines certain ideas within himself and sees certain things outside; and he believes that, while the former are unreal, the latter are real. But as soon

16. II, 2.

17. II, 3; see *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV, iii, 10.

18. II, 6; IV, 31.

śādāv-ante ca yan-nāsti vartamān 'pi tat tathā.

19. II, 7; IV, 32.

20. II, 8. See J. A. C. Murray, B.D.: *An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy* (T. & T. Clark), p. 252; Waking consciousness is, after all, a limited affair, narrowed by the immediacies of the five senses, and concentrated at every moment on but one moving point. In dreams, we seem to enter a wider kingdom, freed from the fears and restraints of normal life, a field where earthly forces and laws are set at naught, and where the whole immensity of the sub-conscious can have freer speech, and like a rising tide, submerge the petty logics of our daily life.

10. Here again it must be noted that the real is called 'the fourth' from the empirical standpoint; in truth, the category of number is inapplicable to it.

11. I, 12. turiyaḥ sarvadṛk sadā.

12. I, 13-16.

13. IV, 87, 88.

14. I, 18. jñāte dvaitam na vidyate.

15. II, i; IV, 33.

as he wakes from the dream, he realises the unreality of even the things which he saw in dream *as if* outside. Similarly in waking, we have our fancies which we know to be unreal, and we experience facts which we take to be real. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled, the so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be illusory appearance.²¹ Therefore it is that the wise characterise waking as a dream.²² Just as the dream-soul arises and perishes, the souls of waking come into being and pass away.²³ It is the self that posits the dream-contents as well as the external world. The things created in the mind within and those posited in the world without—both these are the illusory imaginations of the Ātman. The difference between the two sets of things is that while the dream-contents last only till the mind of the dreamer imagines them (*cittakālāḥ*) and are peculiar thereto, the objects of the external world are perceived by other subjects²⁴ as well (*dvayakālāḥ*), and are cognised through the sense-organs. Illusoriness (*vaitathya*), however, is common to both.²⁵ In dream as well as in waking it is the mind that moves impelled by *Māyā*, and creates the appearance of plurality. As identical with the self the mind is non-dual; but owing to nescience duality is figured and there is the consequent *samsāra*.²⁶

Illustrations for illusoriness are to be found even in the state of waking. Just as in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a streak of water, the self is imagined to be the world through nescience. And as when the rope is known as rope the posited snake, etc., vanish, so also when the self is known as non-dual, the pluralistic world disappears.²⁷ Like the Palace city of Fairy Morgana (*gandharva-nagara*), the universe is seen but is not real.²⁸ The things of the world are believed to exist because they are perceived (*upalambhāt*) and because they answer to certain practical needs (*samācārāt*). But these two reasons cannot make them real; for even the objects like the elephant conjured up by the necromancer are observed and are practically efficient but are not real.²⁹ One more illustration Gauḍapāda gives in the fourth chapter, viz. the *alāta* or fire-brand. When a fire-brand is moved, it appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on; and when the movement stops, the appearances vanish. They do not really come from the fire-brand in motion, nor do they enter into it when it comes to rest. The patterns of fire that appear with the movement of the fire-brand are illusory; they have no substance whatsoever. Similarly, consciousness appears in manifold forms due to *Māyā*. These do not come out of it, in reality, nor

21. II, 9 & 10; IV, 63-66.

22. II, 5. *svapna-jāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur maṇiṣiṇaḥ*. An ancient Chinese sage said: "Last night I dreamt that I was a butterfly and now I do not know whether I am a man dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is a man."

23. IV, 68.

24. Who are also positions of the supreme Self.

25. II, 11-15.

26. III, 29, 30; IV, 61, 62.

27. II, 17, 18.

28. II, 31.

29. IV, 44.

do they return to it; for they are naught.³⁰ There is no dissolution, no origination; no one in bondage, no one who desires release, no one who is released—this is the supreme truth.³¹

IV

The establishment of the non-reality of the world by Gauḍapāda does not mean that the great teacher subscribes to the view of ontological unreality (*śūnyavāda*). We have already seen how in the *Āgama-prakaraṇa* he expounds the meaning of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and shows through an inquiry into the nature of the three *avasthās* that the Self (*turiya*) is the sole reality. That this is so Gauḍapāda argues through reasoning in the *Advaita-prakaraṇa*, and cites in support the evidence of passages from other scriptural texts as well.

The self is unlimited like ether, undivided and the same throughout. The *jīvas* are apparent distinctions therein, as pots, etc., produce in ether divisions as it were. We speak of a plurality of souls and a multiplicity of material objects, even as we speak of pot-ether, pitcher-ether, and so on. The one Ātman appears as the many *jīvas*, as the same ether seems divided, enclosed in the different things. When the things are destroyed, the distinctions in ether too vanish; so also when the *jīvas* are realised to be illusory manifestations due to *Māyā*, the self alone remains. There is no contingency of the defects of one *jīva* being occasioned in the other *jīvas* or the defects of the *jīvas* defiling the purity of the self. It must be noted that Gauḍapāda's theory is not *eka-jīva-vāda* but *ekā-tma-vāda*. Since the empirical plurality of *jīvas* is recognised, there is not the contingency of the defects of one *jīva* being occasioned in the others or the experiences of one being confused with those of the rest. And by the defilements of the *jīvas* the self is not affected, as dust, smoke, etc., present in the pots or pitchers do not make ether foul. Forms, functions, and names differ from object to object; but there is no difference in ether. Similarly, the *jīvas* vary in their physical make-up, mental and moral endowment, in station and status; but the self is unvarying, formless, functionless, and nameless. Just as children attribute wrongly dirt etc., to the sky, the ignorant superpose on the unsullied self defects like birth and death, pleasure and pain. But these are changes that are not real and do not touch the self. The birth of the *jīvas* and their death, their coming and going, do not alter the Ātman. They are not products of the self, nor are they parts thereof. The non-dual reality is partless; it neither causes anything, nor is caused by anything.³²

30. IV, 47-52.

31. II, 32.

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhaḥ,
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣā paramārthatā.

32. III, 3-9.

Scripture in many places proclaims the non-duality of the self and deprecates the delusion of duality. Through an inquiry into the five sheaths (kośas) that cover the soul, the *Taitirīya Upaniṣad*³³ exhibits the self as the non-dual bliss, not to be confused with the mutable coverings. In the 'Honey section' of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*³⁴ the principle behind the cosmic elements is identified with the self which is the substrate of the body and its functions. What is without is within as well. The same 'honey' pervades all beings. It is immortal, the self, Brahman, the all. As the spokes are fixed in the nave of a wheel, so are all beings centred in the self. Thus scripture declares the non-difference of the jīva from the self and denounces plurality. Difference is illusory; the one appears as many through Māyā. "There is no plurality here."³⁵ "Indra through *māyās* assumes diverse forms."³⁶ "Though unborn he appears variously born."³⁷ The *Īśāvāsyā*³⁸ denies birth of the self, and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* asks, "Who indeed could produce him?"³⁹ Of what is real birth is incomprehensible; and what is unreal cannot even be born.⁴⁰

It is true that in some contexts scripture speaks of creation. Through the illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., creation of the many from the one is described. But this is only to enable those who are dull-witted and middlings to understand the fundamental unity of reality. Śruti declares creation in some places, and non-creation in others. The two sets of passages cannot have equal validity. That teaching should be taken as the purport of scripture which is ascertained through inquiry (niścitam) and is reasonable (yukti-yukta). If birth is predicated of the real, it must be in the sense of an illusion, and not in the primary sense. The self is unborn, sleepless and dreamless, nameless and formless, self-luminous and all-knowing.⁴¹

V

That the self is unborn and that nothing else there is which is born, Gauḍapāda seeks to demonstrate through a dialectical criticism of the causal category in the fourth chapter. Causation, like all other relations, falls within the realm of nescience, because on analysis it turns out to be unintelligible. There are two rival views on causation which are totally opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya theory is that the effect is pre-existent in the cause and is not produced *de novo*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the effect is non-existent prior to its production. On either of these hypotheses there will not result causation. If the effect is already existent, there is no need for any causal operation; it is meaningless to say that what is existent is born. If the effect is non-existent, it can never be produced; what is non-existent like

33. Second vallī.

34. II, v.

35. Bṛh. Up., IV, iv, 19; Kaṭha Up. IV, 11.

36. Rg Veda, VI, 47, 18; Bṛh. Up., II, v, 19.

37. Tait. Ār. III, 13, 1.

38. Īśa, 12.

39. III, 9, 28.

40. GK, III, 11-13, 24-26.

41. III, 14-16, 23, 36.

the barren woman's son is not at any time seen to take birth.⁴² Even without their knowing the two rival schools, *satkārya-vāda* and *asatkārya-vāda*, are thus seen to support the view of non-creation or non-origination.⁴³

Of what is really unborn the disputants predicate birth. But this is a flagrant violation of the laws of contradiction. How can that which is unborn and therefore immortal become mortal? The immortal cannot become mortal, nor the mortal immortal; for it is impossible for a thing to change its nature. If what is by nature immortal were to become mortal, then it would cease to be changeless, and attain artificiality, illusoriness. But this is impossible for what is immortal by nature. The Sāṅkhya thinks that the unborn and beginningless Prakṛti evolves itself into the manifold evolutes that constitute the universe. But this view cannot be justified by any canon of logic. If Prakṛti *becomes* the world, it cannot be unborn (aja) and eternal (nitya). Even to admit that there is a first cause is to confess the failure of causation as a principle of explanation. To add to the confusion the Sāṅkhya says that the effect is non-different from the cause. Now, is the effect born or unborn? If it is born, it cannot be non-different from the cause which is unborn. If it is unborn, then it cannot be called 'effect', as the effect is that which is *produced*. And if the effect is produced and is non-different from the cause, the cause cannot be permanent or unchanging. There is no illustration that could be instanced to prove the production of the effect from the unborn cause. If to avoid this difficulty it be said that the cause too is born, then there should be a cause for that cause, a still further cause for that other cause, and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴⁴

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause and the effect are reciprocally dependent. Merit and demerit are responsible for producing the body; and the body occasions merit and demerit. The chain of causes and effects is without beginning, each alternating with the other, like the seed and the sprout. Here again we meet with insuperable difficulties. If the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, then both cause and effect are begun. How can they be beginningless? Moreover, there is a paradox in the very thesis that is proposed. To say that the antecedent of the cause is its effect is like saying that the son begets his father.⁴⁵ There must be some definite sequence recognised as between cause and effect. It is no use believing that the two are reciprocally dependent. If the cause and the effect can be indifferently antecedent or consequent, there would be no distinction whatever between them, and to call one a cause and the other an effect would be entirely arbitrary and void of meaning. Now, there are three possible ways of stating the sequence. It may be said that first there is the cause and subsequently the effect takes place (pūrva-krama); or it may be

42. IV; 4. bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate.

43. IV, 3-5.

44. IV, 6-8, 11-13.

45. IV, 15, putrāṃ janma pitur yathā.

held that the effect is followed by the cause (apara-krama); or it may be thought that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (saha-krama). None of these alternatives is intelligible. That the cause cannot produce the effect we have shown already. If the cause is unborn, it cannot change and therefore cannot produce; if it is born there is infinite regress. The reverse order too is impossible; for, as we said, it is just like making the son antecedent to the father. The effect by definition is that which is produced by the cause; and if the cause is not there before the effect, how can the effect be produced? And from the unproduced effect how can the cause come into being? The third alternative also is untenable. If what are simultaneous be causally related, there must be such a relation between the two horns of an animal. But as a matter of experience it is well known that the two horns are not so related. This, then, is the crux of the problem. Without settling the sequence, the distinction of cause and effect would be unintelligible. And it is impossible to settle the sequence. In despair, appeal might be made to the illustration of seed and sprout. But a little thought would reveal that these—seed and sprout—cannot serve as illustration. It is only when the causal sequence has been settled that the relation between seed and sprout would become intelligible. Since the latter is a particular falling under the wider relation of cause and effect, it cannot be used as an illustration. It is, in short, *sādhya-sama*, still to be proved.⁴⁶

A thing is not produced either from itself or from another. A pot is not produced from the self-same pot, nor from another pot. It may be urged that pot is produced from clay. But how is pot related to clay? Is it non-different, different, or both different and non-different from it? If pot is non-different from clay, it cannot be produced, since clay is already existent. If it is different, there is no reason why it should not be produced from another pot or a piece of cloth which are also different. And it cannot be both different and non-different, because of contradiction. Similarly, neither the existent nor the non-existent nor what is existent and non-existent can be produced. It is meaningless to say that what exists is produced. The non-existent cannot be produced even because of its non-existence. The third alternative involves us in contradiction.⁴⁷

It is true that empirical distinctions are observed between knower and known, pain and the source of pain, etc. From the standpoint of reasoning based on relative experience (yukti-darśanāt), there is difference as also causal relation governing the differents. But from the standpoint of the Absolute (bhūta-darśanāt) there is no difference and the concept of cause is unintelligible.⁴⁸

46. IV, 14-18, 20.

48. IV, 24, 25.

47. IV, 22.

VI

Gauḍapāda admits creation in the sphere of the empirical. But creation, according to him, is neither *de novo* nor transformation of an original stuff. It is of the nature of Māyā, illusory manifestation or transfiguration. The world is not related to the self either as a piece of cloth to the threads or as curds to milk. In fact, no relation is intelligible. The one reality somehow appears as the pluralistic universe through its own Māyā (ātma-māyā). The complexes that constitute the world are projections, like the dream-contents, effected by the illusion of the Ātman.⁴⁹ Things are said to be born only from the standpoint of empirical truth (saṃvṛti-satya); they have therefore no permanence. Just as an illusive sprout shoots from an illusive seed, all things arise from Māyā.⁵⁰

There are several theories of creation. Some philosophers favour materialistic origins for the world. For example, there are thinkers who attribute the origination of the universe to Time. Theists, however, regard God as the first cause of things. Some of them ascribe to Him efficient causality alone, others both efficient and material causality. The former say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord, while the latter hold that it is His expansion. Some maintain that God creates for the sake of His enjoyment. Others urge that creation is His sport. But how can desire be in God who is *āpta-kāma* and has no end to achieve? In our ignorance we must content ourselves with saying that creation is His nature or māyā. Like dream and magic it is illusory.⁵¹ The non-dual is imagined to be the manifold world. The latter is neither different from the self nor identical therewith. Hence it is declared to be indeterminable.⁵²

The philosophers of the different schools characterise the real in different ways and give their own schemes of categories. Each emphasises one particular aspect of reality and holds on to it as if it were the whole. The self has been variously conceived as life, elements, constituents of Primal Nature, things, worlds, Vedas, sacrifice, what is subtle, what is gross, what has form, what has no form, and so on. According to the Sāṅkhyas, there are twenty-five tattvas or principles. To these, the followers of the Yoga system add one more, viz. God. In the view of the Pāśupatas there are twenty-one categories. There are others who make the categories endless in number. All these theories are but the imaginations of their respective advocates.⁵³ There is only one self which appears as many through self-delusion as it were.⁵⁴ First the jīvas are imagined and then the various things, exter-

49. III, 10. saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātma-māyā-visarjitāḥ.

50. IV, 57-59.

51. I, 7-9.

52. II, 33, 34.

53. II, 20-29. For details see *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, edited by Vidu-shekhara Bhattacharya, pp. 30-37.

54. II, 19. māyaisā tasya devasya yayāyam mohitaḥ svayam.

nal and internal. The world of souls and things is an appearance superposed on the self, as the snake-form is imposed on the rope-substance in the dark.⁵⁵

The teaching of creation has no final purport. As has been shown already, what is real cannot be really born. If it is said to be born, it must be in the sense of an illusory appearance.⁵⁶ Ordinarily it is stated that *saṃsāra* which has no beginning comes to an end when release is attained. But this is figurative language. If *saṃsāra* had no beginning, it could not have an end. If release is attained, it is liable to be lost again.⁵⁷ If the universe really existed, it would be destroyed. As we have observed, duality is *māyā-mātra*, mere illusion. Removal of *saṃsāra* and attainment of *mokṣa* are figurative. These have to be taught in language which needs must relate to duality. When the real is known, there is no duality whatever.⁵⁸

VII

True to its character as an *upadeśa-śāstra*, the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* contains practical teaching at the end of each chapter. The purpose of a *śāstra* is to enable the aspirant to cross the sea of *saṃsāra* and reach the shore of blessedness which is the highest human goal (*parama-puruṣārtha*). The vicious circle of empirical life dependent on the law of cause and effect is evil (*anartha*). This, however, as has been shown above, is a product of *avidyā* or *Māyā*. As long as there is an obstinate faith in causality which is illusory (*āvidyaka*), the chain of birth and death will not cease. When that false belief is destroyed through knowledge, *saṃsāra* is removed.⁵⁹ The cause of birth and death is ignorance as regards the ultimate truth which is causeless. When this is realised, there is no further cause for metempsychosis, and we attain release which is freedom from sorrow, desire, and fear. Attachment to the non-real is responsible for the illusory wanderings in the wilderness of *saṃsāra*. When one becomes non-attached through knowledge, one turns back from the false pursuit of the non-real, and reaches the non-dual reality which is homogeneous and unborn.⁶⁰

The real bliss is veiled and the non-real sorrow is projected on account of the perception of illusory plurality. Enshrouded by the darkness of ignorance, those of immature knowledge (*bālīśaḥ*) dispute about what they consider to be the nature of reality. Some say, it is ; some, it is not ; others, it is and is not ; yet others, it neither is nor is not.⁶¹ All these are *kṛpaṇas*, narrow-minded, who see fear in the fearless,⁶² and follow the way of difference, getting themselves engrossed therein. Opposed to these are the great

55. II, 16, 17.

56. III, 27. sato hi māyayā janma yujyate na tu tattvataḥ.

57. IV, 30.

58. I, 18.

59. IV, 56.

60. IV, 78-80.

61. IV, 82-84.

62. III, 39. abhaye bhaya darśinaḥ.

knowers (*mahājñānāḥ*) who are settled in their wisdom about the unborn, unchanging reality.⁶³

The knowledge which saves is not that which remains a mere theoretical comprehension, but that which has become a direct experience. Study of scripture, ethical discipline, detachment from objects of sense and intense longing for release—these are essential for realising the self. The aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and acquire freedom from passions like attachment, fear, and anger (*vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ*); and he should fix his thoughts on the non-dual reality.⁶⁴ GauḢapāda teaches two methods of concentrating the mind on the non-dual, *Prāṇava-yoga* in the first chapter and *Asparśa-yoga* in the third. These are to serve as auxiliaries to the knowledge of the Absolute methods to loosen the cords of ignorance.

Asparśa-yoga is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realises the supra-relational reality. *Śaṅkalpa* is the root of activity and bondage. The mind contemplates objects and gets distracted and shattered with the result that there is no peace or happiness. Acceptance and desistance are motivated by the centrifugal tendency of thought-processes. The out-going mind should be called back and controlled. Controlling the mind is difficult, indeed, as difficult as emptying the ocean drop by drop by the tip of a *kuśa* grass. But it is not an impossible task ; only it requires relentless effort. If the mind is restrained through discrimination, the end will certainly be reached. One must remember first that all is misery and turn back from desires and enjoyments. The mind that moves out must be brought to unity. But in this process care must be taken that it does not fall into sleep. When the mind goes to sleep, it must be awakened ; when it tries to go out, it must be calmed. When the stormy mind is stilled, there is the thrill of quietitude. But one should not revel even in this *yogic* trance. Anything that is *enjoyed* must belong to duality ; it cannot be unlimited or lasting happiness. The mind must become non-mind (*amanibhāva*); the relations of subject and object, enjoyer and enjoyment must be transcended. This will come only through the knowledge of the non-dual self. Knowledge and the self are not different. Knowledge is the self or Brahman. Hence it is said that through the unborn (knowledge) the unborn (Brahman) is known.⁶⁵ Self-established, the unborn knowledge attains its natural equanimity or sameness. This is called *asparśa-yoga*, the yoga which is pleasing and good to all beings, and which is beyond dispute and contradiction.⁶⁶

The same end may be reached through meditation on OM (*prāṇava-yoga*). 'Om' is the term indicative of the Brahman-self. It consists of three *mātras*, *a*, *u*, *m*, and a soundless fourth which is *amātra*. *A* stands for *Viśva*, *u* for *Taijasa*, and *m* for *Prājña*. Meditation on the significance of the three

63. IV, 94.95.

64. II, 35, 36.

65. III, 33. ajenā-jan vibudhyate.

66. III, 31-46, IV, 2.

sounds respectively will lead to the realisation of the three aspects of the self. The sound 'om' proceeds from and is resolved in the soundless *amātra*. Similarly, the Turiya is the absolute which is unchanging and non-dual, but which appears as many and changing. When the meaning of the soundless culmination of Om is realised, there is no leading to or attainment of anything; for the Turiya is no other than the real and only self. Thus the Praṇava is to be meditated upon and known. It is the beginning, middle and end of all things. It is the lord established in the hearts of all beings. There is nothing before it nor anything after it, nothing outside it nor anything other than it. Understanding the Praṇava in this manner, one attains the supreme.⁶⁷

Mokṣa or release is not a *post-mortem* state; it can be realised even here (iha), while in embodiment.⁶⁸ To speak of it as an attainment or realisation is but figurative. It is the eternal and inalienable nature of the self. He who knows this is released, he is a *jīvan-mukta*. Because he has attained full omniscience and is free from the delusion of duality, there is nothing for him which he can desire.⁶⁹ He is not elated by praise nor depressed by blame. He does not offer obeisance to any, nor does he perform any rite. He has no fixed home, and subsists on what comes his way. He lies like a non-conscious being, and lives as he likes.⁷⁰ Though he has no obligations, his conduct can never be immoral. Virtues like humility, equanimity, calmness, and self-control are natural to him.⁷¹ His is the immortal state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn, ever the same, and fearless.⁷² He sees the truth everywhere. He delights in the truth and does not swerve from it. He is the truth.⁷³

VIII

From the account of Gauḍapāda's philosophy given above it will be clear that this great teacher was an Advaitin the earliest known to us—who in his *Kārikā* laid the foundations of a system which was to become a glorious edifice through the immortal work of Śaṅkara. While making use of logical reasoning and the dialectical method, he does not deviate from the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Even where he employs Bauddha terminology, he takes care to point out that his system should not be confused with Buddhism. While denying absolute reality to the world, he is firm in proclaiming that the non-dual Brahman-self is the supreme truth. He has no quarrel with any system of philosophy because, in his view, all systems if properly understood are pointers to non-duality. While the dualists oppose one another, the doctrine of non-duality does not conflict with them.⁷⁴ *Ajāti* or the unborn reality is the final goal of all metaphysical quest.

67. I, 19-29.

70. II, 36, 37.

73. II, 38.

68. IV, 89.

71. IV, 86.

74. III, 17.

69. IV, 85.

72. IV, 100.

PROPERTY—HOW IT IS ACQUIRED AND MANAGED

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One may acquire property by earning, inheritance, or gift. Earning can be either lawful or unlawful. The Islamic teachings condemn all methods of acquiring property by unlawful means, such as gambling, theft, and the like. The Quran says: "They ask thee concerning wine and gambling."¹ Say: "In them is great sin, and some profit for men; but the sin is greater than the profit."² The principle on which the objection is based, is, that a gambler gets the profit easily without any effort. He gains what he has not earned or loses a mere chance.³

"O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, dedication of stones, and divination by arrows are an abomination, of Satan's handiwork. Eschew them that you may prosper. Satan's plan is to excite enmity and hatred between you with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer. Will you not then abstain?"⁴

Intoxicants and gambling are mentioned together and the main reason for their prohibition is that they are the source of enmity and hatred among men.

"As to the thief" the Quran says, "male or female, cut off his or her hands. A punishment by way of example, from God, for their crime. And God is exalted in power."⁵

The canon law jurists are not unanimous as to the value of the property stolen which would involve the penalty of the cutting off of the hand. The majority are of opinion that petty thefts are exempt from this penalty.

The general principles of inheritance is laid down in the following verse of the Quran:

"From what is left by parents and those nearest related there is share

1. In India there are various forms of gambling. In Arabia the form most familiar to the Arabs was gambling by casting lots by means of arrows on the principle of lottery. The arrows which were marked, served the purpose of a modern lottery ticket. The marked arrows together with the blank ones were drawn from a bag. Those who drew the blank arrows got nothing. The marked arrows indicated prizes, big or small.

2. Ch. 2, 219.

3. Dice and wagering are held to be within the definition of gambling. But insurance is not gambling when conducted on business lines.

4. Ch. 5, 93-94.

5. Ch. 5, 41.

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The following six works—

- (1) उक्तिनिष्ठापरित्राणम्
- (2) गुणदोषदर्पणः
- (3) न्यासोल्लासभावचन्द्रिका
- (4) न्यासपरिशुद्धिविमर्शनम्
- (5) तत्त्वबोधिनी
- (6) दूषणे निराकरणम् bound
together, by Sri Ranga
Ramanujaswami,
Kumbhakonam.

All about the Vedas in Tamil,
by M. R. Jambunathan,
Madras.

विक्रमांक (उत्तरार्ध), संवत् २००१ वैक्रम,
नागरीप्रचारिणी सभा, काशी.

Ancient Wisdom of Wales, by
D. Jeffrey Williams, Adyar
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
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AN UNNOTICED ASPECT OF GAUḌAPĀDA'S

MĀṆḌŪKYA KĀRIKĀS

BY

P. T. Raju

There have already been many articles on Gauḍapāda and his *Kārikās*; but all of them have been occupied either with proving that he was a Buddhist, or that he was a vedantin who was greatly influenced by Buddhist ideas, which he incorporated into the Vedānta, or that neither was he a Buddhist nor was he influenced by Buddhist ideas. Pandit Vidhusekhar Sastri practically maintained the extreme position that Gauḍapāda wrote the last chapter of his *Kārikās* to develop the Upaniṣadic theory into the Buddhist *Vijñānavāda*, thereby showing the superiority of the latter to the former.¹ Of course, it may easily be shown that Gauḍapāda was not a Buddhist, that the *Kārikās*, or even the fourth chapter was not meant to show the superiority of the *Vijñānavāda* to the Vedānta. Even the fourth chapter praises *Vipras*² or Brahmins and speaks of *brahmanyam padam*.³ It is true that Buddha very often spoke of the Brahmins with respect and that Asaṅga, the author of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, spoke of the realisation of the Brahman as the highest achievement. But this only proves the influence of the Vedānta on Buddhism, that some of the Upaniṣadic ideas were securing a place in Buddhist thought. If Gauḍapāda had really been a Buddhist and wanted to show that the *Vijñānavāda* was truer than the Vedānta, he would not have used Vedantic terms. Besides, the word *Aja*, which Gauḍapāda so glorifies, is, though it means *anutpanna*, particularly a Vedantic term. Just as it is said that Śaṅkara explains away the term *buddha*, it may be said that the Buddhist interpretation of the *Kārikās* will have to explain away *Aja*. Further, it is not reasonable to take the

fourth chapter apart from the other three chapters. And if Gauḍapāda defends the Vedānta in the latter, he must be doing the same in the former. And there is no evidence to show that he changed his mind later after writing the first three chapters or that he meant the first three chapters to be only stepping stones for proving the final validity of the *Vijñānavāda*.

But we cannot so easily controvert the opinion that Gauḍapāda was greatly influenced by the *Vijñānavāda*. It may be shown that the word *vijñāna*, even in the sense of the highest reality, is common to both the Upaniṣads¹ and Buddhism, though, in the former, *vijñāna* is more often used with reference to *vijñānamayakośa* and *buddhi*. But there are many other words which are distinctly technical (*pāribhāṣika*) terms of Buddhist philosophy. *Dharma* in the sense of a phenomenal thing,² *bhāva* in the sense of a perishable thing,³ *dhātu* in the sense of *vastu*,⁴ *buddha* in the sense of awakened, cannot easily be explained away as non-Buddhistic also. Particularly the words *buddha* and *dharma* in the peculiarly Buddhistic sense occur too often. There are other words also like *saṃvṛti satya*,⁵ *saṃghāta*,⁶ *alātaśānti*, which is the heading of the fourth chapter, *asparśayoga*,⁷ and *lakṣaṇāśūnyam*,⁸ which are common to the Advaita also. And it may be admitted that the sentence, *naitadbuddhena bhāṣitam*,⁹ can be interpreted both according to the Advaita and the *Vijñānavāda*. But on the whole, the influence of the *Vijñānavāda* is very obvious. Also, it is likely that Gauḍapāda was converted to Buddhism first or might have been a born Buddhist before he accepted Vedantism and gave it his own interpretation. There is also another possibility, which we shall have to accept in the absence of any definite evidence in favour of other possibilities, namely, there must have been a ferment of ideas both in the Buddhist and Vedantic folds, due to mutual criticism and discussion, and what appeared to be the

¹ *Proceedings of the Oriental Conference*, 1922.

² Stanza 86. ³ Stanza 85.

¹ *Māṇḍūkya Kārikās*, IV, 45, 48, 50, etc., *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* III, 9, 28 *vijñānamānandam brahma*. Also cp. III, 4, 2 *vijñāturvijñātāram* but not merely *vijñāturvijñātāram*.

² IV, 6, 8, 10, 21, 46, 53, etc., etc. ³ II, 1, 13, 16, 19. ⁴ IV, 81.

⁵ II, 1, 4; IV, 33, 57, 73, 74. ⁶ III, 3, 10. ⁷ III, 39; IV, 2.

⁸ IV, 67. ⁹ IV, 99.

most cogent ideas might have been incorporated, with slight differences, by both schools. But in the development of metaphysical systems, so far as available literature goes, Buddhism seems to have taken the lead. The *Prajñāpāramitās*, out of which both the Madhyamika and the Vijñānavāda schools sprung up, are earlier than Nāgārjuna (2nd. century A. D.). But the *Prajñāpāramitās* themselves must have developed out of ideas borrowed from the Upaniṣads. The Buddhists must have entered into controversies with the Vedantins during and before the time of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, after which the former must have brought together the results of the controversies in a somewhat systematic form. And as shown by Bādarāyaṇa's references to earlier Vedantins, the Upaniṣadic ideas also must have been grouped together in some systematic form by Kaśa-kṛtsna and others. But these are lost for us, and were lost probably even for Gauḍapāda, who makes no reference to them. The *Brahmasūtras* themselves required interpretation and systematisation. And Gauḍapāda, therefore, must have approached the Upaniṣads themselves from the side of the *Vijñānavāda*, which might have appeared as the best metaphysical system of the time, nearest to the Upaniṣadic teachings. The *Māṇḍūkya* contains the central teaching of the Upaniṣads and constitute the inner approach to the philosophical problem for all orthodox systems. Gauḍapāda therefore must have attempted to interpret the *Māṇḍūkya* itself from the side of the *Vijñānavāda*, which was incorporated into the Vedānta.

II

What has so far been discussed has been noticed by a number of scholars, and the discussion is briefly given here only so far as it concerns the purpose of the present paper. Now, there is another aspect of the *Kārikās*, which seems to have escaped notice so far. The ferment of philosophic ideas of the age must have contained not only the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist ideas but also the Śaivite. It is difficult to say that the Śaivite ideas are not Upaniṣadic; but they have a peculiar quality or colour of their own. They have their own terminology. That the world is the *spanda* of Śiva or Śiva's Śakti is a theory peculiar to Śaivism.

Gauḍapāda uses the word *spanda* in as many as six stanzas.¹ At one place he speaks of the world as the *spanda* of *manas*,² at another as the *spanda* of *citta*,³ and in three places as *vijñāna-spanda*,⁴ and compares all these to *alāta-spanda*.⁵ *Manas* and *citta* may be taken to mean the same for the *Kārikās*. Then the world has to be understood as the *spanda* of *vijñāna* or *citta*, so far as the teaching of the *Kārikās* is concerned. Gauḍapāda uses the word *Māyā* more than once :⁶ but he does not speak of the *spanda* of *Māyā*. And for him, *Māyā* is not existent.⁷ Anyway, he must have meant that *citta-spanda* and *vijñāna-spanda* are the same, though not directly at least indirectly. He asserts also that the *spanda* and its effects cannot enter *vijñāna*, which is *acala*.⁸ (We may indeed raise the question how *vijñāna*, which is *acala*, can have any *spanda* : to which we cannot find a direct answer, or the only answer possible, consistent with the *ajātivāda*, is that even the *spanda* of *vijñāna* is *Māyā*, which is not *sat* (*nā vidyate*). Vidyāraṇya probably would have said that this *spanda* is the *śakti* of *vijñāna*, and that *spanda* has no existence means that it is not a separate entity from *vijñāna*.⁹ It is not necessary now to go farther into this ultimate logical question; we are interested only in showing that Gauḍapāda uses the word *spanda* in a very significant sense. Just as we see straight lines, curved lines, circles etc., so long as there is *alāta-spanda*, we see the world so long as there is *vijñāna-spanda*. And just as, when the *spanda* of the *alāta* ceases, these figures do not enter the *alāta*; when the *spanda* of *vijñāna* ceases, the world of forms due to that *spanda* does not enter *vijñāna*. That is, *vijñāna* as such is pure : it is *vijñānamātra*.¹⁰

III

Such a significant usage of the concept of *spanda* makes us think that Gauḍapāda was influenced not only by the ideas of the *Vijñānavāda* but also by the *spanda* doctrine. The question may now be raised whether this *spanda* doctrine was incorporated

¹ III, 29; IV, 47, 48, 49, 51, 72. ² III, 29. ³ IV, 72.

⁴ IV, 47, 48, 51. ⁵ IV, 49. ⁶ II, 19; IV, 58. ⁷ IV, 58.

⁸ IV, 51, 52. ⁹ See *Pañcadaśī*, II, 47.

¹⁰ Cf. Saṃkara's Commentary on *Kārikā*, IV, 52. *Vijñānamātre jātvyādibuddhirmrṣaiva*.

from Śaivism or from some other independent system, for it is not to be found in the principal Upaniṣads. Even the *Śvetāśvatara*, which is Śaivite, does not speak of *spanda*, though it speaks of *Māyā*. And we have no evidence to prove the existence of a non-Śaivite *spanda* system. If we therefore take it as belonging to Śaivism, we may further ask whether it is the same as the Kasmir *spanda* system expounded by Vasugupta and his followers. We know that Gauḍapāda is earlier than Vasugupta, who belonged to about the first half of the 9th century A. D. Even Śaṅkara, the grand disciple of Gauḍapāda, belonged to the 8th century A. D. Gauḍapāda therefore cannot be much later than the 7th. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, in his *Indian Philosophy*, writes: "He must be much earlier, since Walliser states that the *Kārikā* is quoted in the Tibetan translation of Bhavaviveka's *Tarkajvālā*. The latter author is earlier than Yuan Chwang, and Gauḍapāda must be therefore about A. D. 550." If this is true, then Gauḍapāda must have lived about one and half centuries after Aśaṅka, the famous *viññānavādin* and the author of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*. In any case, he is undoubtedly earlier than Vasugupta, the first well-known exponent of the *spanda* doctrine.

We have therefore to think that the *spanda* doctrine must have been current, in some form or other, during the time of Gauḍapāda. And this *spanda* doctrine has very close resemblance to that expounded by Vasugupta. The ultimate *tattva* for Gauḍapāda is *viññāna*, and for Vasugupta, is Śiva, whose nature is *jñāna*. Even the original Upaniṣad speaks of the fourth state as Śiva, which of course need not be identified with the Śiva of Śaivism; and Gauḍapāda also speaks of the *ātman* as Śiva,² *Prabhu*, *Īśāna*, *Īśvara* and so forth. Just as the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* are based on the interpretation of the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep, the *Spandakārikās* are based on their interpretation,³ the only difference being that the former maintain that the fourth state (*turiyāvasthā*) is identical with Śiva, while the latter contend that there is a fourth state beyond the three, which is still *mohātmikā*,⁴ and that only in the fifth state can we be identical

with Śiva. Both are thus based on the explanation of the three states. Even the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* speak of *bijandīdrū* or sleep which is the matrix of the world.¹ It is well known that, according to Śaivism, *Māyāśakti*, out of which the world issues forth, is the *Nīdrū* of Śiva. The *Spandakārikās* speak of Śiva as *anāvṛta*,² which is the same as *asamvṛta*. The *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* also speak of *samvṛti*.³ The idea of *samvṛtisatya* is innately connected with these ideas. One feels that the *āvaraṇaśakti* is the same as this *samvaraṇa* or *samvṛti* and the *vikṣepaśakti* the same as *spanda*. Or these ideas might have some common root ideas. Very likely, there were some common ideas belonging to the philosophical atmosphere of the time, and they gradually developed and took some definite shapes in the different systems. However, Gauḍapāda speaks of *icchāmātram prabhossṛṣṭi*⁴ as not a very tenable view, and is perhaps refuting the theory that the world is due to the *icchāśakti* of Śiva. And we can understand him, because he is interested in proving that *Māyā* is not *sat*, whereas those that maintain that the world is a *pariṇāma* of Śiva's Śakti, hold that it is *sat*. But we cannot clinch this point, because Abhinavagupta, who belongs to the same Kasmir school of Śaivism, writes:

*Samsāroṣṭi na tattvatastanubhṛtū bandhasya vārtaiva kū
bandho yasya na jātu tasya vitathā muktasya muktikriyū
mithyāmohakṛdeṣa rajjubhujagacchāyāpiśācabhramo
mā kimcityaya mū grhāṇa vilasa svastho yathāvaśhitah*⁵

and practically supports Gauḍapāda every way. For this stanza involves *ajātivāda*, the view that the world is not existent, and that it is *bhrama* (*māyā*). The *Spandakārikās* describe the fourth stage as a great *ākāśa* (*mahāvyaoman*), which though devoid of the duality of subject and object, is yet *mohātmikā* and *āvṛta*, because of the absence of *īśvaraśaktipāta*.⁶ But as there is no such fourth state in the *Māṇḍūkya*, the highest itself is compared to pure *ākāśa*. Such comparison is very common in both the Upaniṣads and Buddhist works, and is not peculiar to any. But an important point to note in this connection is that the fourth state of

¹ Vol. II, p. 452 footnote. ² I, 29. ³ I, 2, 14; II, 1, 2 etc.

⁴ See the *Viṁśti* of Rāmakāṇṭha, II, 9.

⁵ I, 13. ⁶ I, 2. ⁷ II, 1, 4; IV, 33, 57, 73, 74. ⁸ I, 8.

⁹ *Anuttarāṣṭikā*, ¹⁰ See Rāmakāṇṭha's Comm. on II, 9.

the *Spandakārikās* is generally equated by the Kaśmir Śaivites to the *Śūnya* of the Mādhyanikas, whose highest truth is thereby shown to be lower than that of the *spanda* system.¹ This shows that Kaśmir Śaivism tried, in a way slightly different from that of Gaudapāda, to incorporate some of the important ideas of Buddhism. Or perhaps while Gaudapāda tried to absorb *viññānavāda*, the *spanda* system of Kaśmir tried to absorb both *viññānavāda* and *śūnyavāda*.

The point of our present interest is that Gaudapāda incorporated the *spanda* doctrine into his philosophy, and this *spanda* doctrine significantly resembles the *spanda* doctrine of Kaśmir, which was much later. It is believed by some that the Kaśmir Śaivādvaita sprung up after Śaṅkara's visit to Kaśmir in the 8th century.² But the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* show that the *spanda* ideas must have been current in India at least a century before Śaṅkara. Hence it cannot be true that the *spanda* ideas took shape only after Śaṅkara. But the earlier Śaiva teachers of Kaśmir, influenced by the Advaita of Śaṅkara, might have imported *spanda* ideas from outside. But the greatest possibility is that they entered Kaśmir, if they entered from outside at all, along with Śaṅkara, who must have inherited the teachings of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* from his *paramaguru*, Gaudapāda. If such is the truth, then the *spanda* system, though it developed in Kaśmir, might have originated outside Kaśmir. And the ideas must have been current in the country to which Gaudapāda belonged.

It is said that the family cult of Śaṅkara was Śaktism and that he was worshipping Śiva.³ So both Śaivism and Śaktism must be existing throughout India by that time and also by the time of Gaudapāda. We read that Lakuli, the founder of Paśupata, belonged to the 1st century A. D., and that all the sects of Śaivism originated from his teachings. And Gaudapāda's teaching shows that the *spanda* doctrine must have been existent in

¹ Abhinavagupta's *Pratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Vol. II, p. 234. Interestingly enough, K. M. Sen points out that *śūnya* stands for the highest truth in a number of Śaiva and Sakta tantras. See his "Conception and Development of the Śūnya Doctrine in Medieval India", *Proceedings of the Oriental Conference*, 1933.

² K. C. Pandey; *Abhinavagupta*, p. 91.

³ Sir S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 418,

the 7th century, if not in the 6th or even earlier. The period from the 1st century A. D. right up to about the 7th must have been an age of intense philosophical activity in India, when there must have been a great ferment of ideas and attempts at system making. The *Prajñapāramitās*, which are earlier than Nāgārjuna, must be assigned at least the 1st century A. D. The *Sūtras* of Vyāsa, Kaṇāda and Gautama must have belonged to about the 2nd and the 3rd centuries.¹ From about the 2nd onward, Mahāyāna systems were developing, though the Mahāyāna itself might have been formed earlier. The Mahāyāna systems must have been giving a great impetus to the development of metaphysical systems in the orthodox fold. Through mutual criticism and borrowing, the current schools were developing their systems, and making them more and more adequate to a common fund of innate spiritual experiences. Śaivism also must have developed its *spanda* doctrines to an appreciable extent even by the time of Gaudapāda. The fact that Gaudapāda, though later than Bādarāyaṇa, makes no reference to his *Sūtras*, indicates that he thought out his system independently and constructed it with elements from the Upaniṣads, the *Viññānavāda* and the *spanda* doctrine. And perceiving that the origin of most of these ideas could be traced to the Upaniṣads and the rest developed out of them, he professed to be a *smārta*. But later, his disciples and their disciples might have noticed the kinship of his ideas to earlier *advaita* and brought his ideas into relationship with the *Brahmasūtras*. That Gaudapāda developed his theories independently of the *Brahmasūtras* and in consonance with the Upaniṣads may be one of the reasons why Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Sūtras* appears to be more in agreement with the Upaniṣads than with the *Sūtras*. Gaudapāda himself must have known these famous *Sūtras*, but somehow he ignored them.

¹ There are some who say that all these are much earlier. In any case, the period must have been one of mutual influence and ferment of ideas, particularly due to the growth of Buddhism, which was heterodox and yet was developing good logic and metaphysics,

The conclusion of this discussion is obvious: Gaudapāda was a *smārta* Vedantin and not a Buddhist. He utilised not only the ideas of the *Vijñānavāda* but also of *spanda*, which must have been current by his time. The *spanda* doctrine could not have originated in Kaśmir as late as the 8th or the 9th century, but must be earlier and must have belonged at least to the country where Gaudapāda was living. (Or was Gaudapāda himself the originator of that doctrine?) The Buddhist metaphysics was overwhelmed not only by the Vedānta but also by Śaivism, both of which incorporated the Mahāyāna ideas. And each of the three was borrowing not only metaphysical ideas but also spiritual experiences from the other two. There might also have been a fund of spiritual experience common to all, which none was able to deny in controversies.

NOTES ON A FEW WORDS

BY

BIMALACHARAN DEB

I

The student of Sanskrit is set an interesting problem when he finds two or more words, which he had been told were synonymous, used in one single passage. It is only natural that he thinks they are not really synonymous as he had been told, and that there must be some distinction between them so as to justify their juxtaposition, and this starts him on an enquiry.

The enquiry thus started is often a baffling one. He finds that, either there is no commentary available, or, if there is one, it reminds him of the well-known gibe दुर्बोधं यदतीव &c. Moreover, he finds that the farther a commentator (or lexicographer) is away in point of time from the book in relation to which information is sought, the more likely he is to be uncertain or mistaken as to the meanings of words, and sometimes the wrong explanation is due to obsession of class interests or to ignorance of the particular branch of knowledge regarding which he is giving information. I shall have occasion to illustrate these points by citing actual cases as I go on. The *kośas*, and modern Dictionaries and commentaries (which, more often than not, rely very much on the *kośas*), are, accordingly, sometimes disappointing and sometimes positively confusing.

Another difficulty which confronts the student is लिपिकरप्रमाद. And the position is rendered extremely difficult indeed when an inadvertent (or incompetent) editor perpetuates it in print, and the error, almost as a matter of course, finds its way into a Dictionary. I shall here give one of the instances which have come to my notice.

Mahābhārata 4. 4. 26 (C. P.) reads in the text नाहमस्य प्रियोऽस्मीति मत्वा सेवेत पंडितः; and in the Nilakanṭha ṭīkā पंडितः सिल्हके कवौ इति विश्वः; Medini (Calcutta, 1869) also reads पंडितः सिल्हके कवौ.

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The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda (In Mahāyāna Technology)

The position of Gauḍapāda in the history of Hindu Philosophy is unique. So far as the extant literature goes, he was the first to make an effort to explain the *śruti* from the standpoint of absolute monism which means, in short, that there is an eternal principle of absolute homogeneity which is truly existent while the world of multiplicity is truly non-existent. This standpoint he has set forth in a metrical treatise of four chapters, called *prakaraṇas*, subjoined to the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the smallest of the ten principal *Upaniṣads*. It was undoubtedly this treatise which gave Śaṅkara the inspiration to explain all the ten *Upaniṣads* in the same light, for he was not able to quote any other exposition of the *śruti* in support of his view and himself wrote a commentary on it. Indeed, Śaṅkara was a disciple of Govindapāda who was in the line of disciples of Gauḍapāda.

Absolute monism one may deduce from the *śruti* when one has got an idea of it from somewhere else, but the *śruti* nowhere states it in its fullness. The truth of the universal principle called Brahma is no doubt the theme of the ten *Upaniṣads*, but they nowhere posit that the world which evolves in it is false in the sense of being non-existent. To say, as Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have said, that true monism cannot rationally stand unless the world is considered really non-existent and so the *śruti* teaches absolute monism, is to beg the question, for here you first depend on a particular form of reasoning to get the idea of absolute monism and then impose it on the *śruti*. All previous commentaries on the *śruti* have been lost except the *Brahmasūtra*. Our present knowledge about them is limited to Śaṅkara's stray references to them. The

ancient commentary, called the *Vṛtti*, on the *Brahmasūtra* is also lost and here also we have to depend on Śaṅkara's references to it for knowing its purport. None of these commentaries maintained that the *śruti* or the *Brahmasūtra* taught absolute monism. And since the advent of Śaṅkara great Hindu teachers have firmly declared that absolute monism, however logical it might be, is not warranted by the *śruti*. The *śruti* nowhere states that the world is non-existent, unborn, like a flower in the sky or a city of the Gandharvas, a dream a *māyā*. But this is the proposition which Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in every one of the *prakaraṇas* or chapters of his book. In the 17th *kārikā* or verse of the 1st *prakaraṇa*, the only chapter which deals directly with the contents of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, he says, "This dual world is nothing but a *māyā*." In the 31st verse of the 2nd *prakaraṇa*, in which the unreality of the world is sought to be established on a consideration of the dreaming state, he says, "As a dream and a *māyā* are seen, as a city of the Gandharvas is seen, so is the world seen by those who are proficient in the Vedāntas." At the outset (verse 2) of the 3rd *prakaraṇa* he clearly states his proposition, "I shall establish unlimited, universal *ajāti* (non-birth), how the things which are seen to be born on all sides are not born." In verse 23 of the same *prakaraṇa* he says that he will depend on reasoning in proving this proposition. The *śruti* speaks of creation equally from the born and from the unborn. What is undoubtedly in accordance with reasoning, that is the fact and nothing else. This 3rd *prakaraṇa* he devotes mainly to the consideration of a number of passages from the Upaniṣads, seeking therefrom to establish that the *śruti* teaches an ultimate monistic principle and non-birth of the world. These three chapters together comprise 115 verses.

Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa

The elaborate reasoning by which the proposition of non-birth is to be proved is reserved for the 4th *prakaraṇa*, a chapter containing 100 verses, that is, almost as big as the three previous chapters taken together. In it are included some of the verses on dream of the 2nd *prakaraṇa* and, with slight variations, some verses of the 1st and 3rd *prakaraṇas*. It is called *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*, that is the chapter on the quietude of the fire-brand, the meaning of which will come out in the

course of the exposition of the contents of the chapter. The chapter enunciates the principle of absolute monism in five verses and the rest of it is devoted to the proof of the proposition thus enunciated.

The most important question for consideration here is, whence did Gauḍapāda get the idea of the non-birth of the world if he did not get it from the *śruti*? In verse 31 of the 2nd chapter, which has been quoted before, he himself says that this idea was held by wise men proficient in the Vedāntas, and so he was not its originator. Now, who were these wise men if they were not the orthodox commentators of the Vedāntas and the Brahmasūtra? It may sound strange at present to announce that these wise men were the Buddha and his followers, for since the disappearance of Buddhism and Buddhist literature from India we have been persistently taught by all the writers on Hindu Philosophy, great and small, that the Buddha was a great renegade who had absolutely no faith in the teaching of the *śruti* and considered the world to be merely a flux of mentation with no abiding principle underlying it, and that his followers gradually ended by proclaiming a theory of absolute nihilism which gave denial not only to an ultimate reality but also to the perception of the world. And this culminating madness the Hindu writers ascribed to the great Nāgārjuna, who is said to be the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, and preached the doctrine of *Śūnyatā* or Emptiness which he had learnt from the Mahāyāna scriptures. But the days were different when Gauḍapāda lived probably in the 3rd or 4th century A.D. within about two centuries from the time of Nāgārjuna. He accepted the Brahmapāda of Yājñavalkya and other *śrauta ṛṣis*, supplemented it with the *Ajativāda* of Buddha and his followers and finished with full-fledged absolute *Advaitavāda* as is laid down in the Mahāyāna scriptures. He took for his text the shortest *Upaniṣad* in which the ultimate Brahma-principle is clearly set forth without any admixture of talks about creation, proceeded in the first three chapters to elucidate the Brahma-principle from the standpoint of *Ajativāda* quoting the *śruti* and Nāgārjuna in the same breath and finished in the last chapter with a systematic summary of the Mahāyānasūtra. In this summary we find all the details of the theory and exposition of absolute monism contained in the voluminous Sūtra presented within a short compass, remarkably well-arranged and retaining all the technicalities of the Sūtra in expression and diction.

Noble indeed was the effort of Gauḍapāda and other Vedantists to bridge the gulf between the *Āryajñāna* of orthodox Brahmins and the *Āryajñāna* of the Buddhist reformers, and so successful was it that even when the name of the Buddha was an anathema, Śaṅkara, while he was leading the attack against Buddhism with his giant intellect and unflinching energy, was unwittingly preaching the Mahāyāna and preserving and elucidating its essence in his immortal commentaries. And for all this we are indebted solely to Gauḍapāda, for Śaṅkara, though he never dreamt that absolute monism was Mahāyāna Buddhism, preached it on his authority. Now that we have the Buddhist texts discovered in foreign lands, it seems strange to us that, coming only about three hundred years after Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara was not struck by the peculiarly un-*śrauta* character of his terminology. The result was that the terms of the Mahāyāna used by Gauḍapāda were misinterpreted. Gauḍapāda himself was presented as an anti-Buddhist and his references to the Buddha were considered as references to anti-Buddhist wise men (the word *buddha* literally means the wise man). It was only in the last but one verse that the term Buddha could by no means be interpreted as a mere wise man, but here also by the displacement of a *na*, Śaṅkara denied to the Buddha the excellent teaching which was his and his only. But in spite of all these vital defects in Śaṅkara's understanding of Gauḍapāda, he caught from him the principle of absolute monism, stuck to it and brought to bear such a fund of erudition and reasoning on it as has ever been the wonder of learned men.

We shall present the reader with a skeleton of Mahāyāna technology to enable him to see how closely Gauḍapāda has followed it.

1. *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*

Existence, reality (*sattā*) or truth (*satya*), which terms are almost synonymous from the philosophical standpoint, is two-fold, namely, *samvṛti* and *paramārtha*. *Samvṛti* means convention or usage, and *paramārtha* means highest reality or ultimate reality. The truth of convention underlies the world which is really unreal, while the truth of ultimate reality is the ever-abiding truth or reality. [Verses 57, 73 and 74 of *Alāśāntiprakaraṇa* (henceforth abbreviated as *Asp.*) deal with *samvṛti* and *paramārtha*].

2. *Parikalpita*, *Paratantra* and *Pariniṣpanna svabhāvas*

Existence is further subdivided, according to *svabhāva* or nature, into *parikalpita* (imaginary), *paratantra* (mutually dependent or relative) and *pariniṣpanna* (absolute). These are also the three *svabhāvas* according to the *Laṅkāvatāra*. The *Parikalpita svabhāva* is the imaginary nature of illusions like a mirage and a flower in the sky. The *Paratantra svabhāva* is the relative or mutually dependent nature of the practical world where all things are mutually dependent, nothing exists independently of all other things. The *Pariniṣpanna svabhāva* is the absolute nature of the ultimate reality which is neither *parikalpita* nor *paratantra*. *Parikalpita*, or, merely *kalpita*, and *paratantra* are subdivisions of *saṃvṛti* while *pariniṣpanna* is the same as *paramārtha* which term is retained by Gauḍapāda in his delineation of the three *svabhāvas*. [Verse 24 of *Asp.* speaks of *paratantra* existence while verses 73 and 74 speak of all the three forms of existence].

3. Five Dharmas

Existence, subdivided into three *svabhāvas*, is sub-divided into five *dharmas* or characteristic types. They are—*nimitta* (form), *nāma* (name), *vikalpa* (discrimination), *samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge) and *tathatā* (suchness)

Nimitta (form)—The word means cause and here signifies the world which binds a being to *saṃsāra* through attachment to it. *Rūpa* is another word for *nimitta* which is translated into form or appearance meaning "that which reveals itself to the visual sense and is perceived as form, and, in like manner, that which appearing to the sense of smelling, tasting, the body or the *Manovijñāna* is perceived as sound, odour, taste, tactility or idea. (*L. Sūtra.*, lxxxiii). It is an inner or outer object perceived by the mind alone or through any of the external senses. Or, better, it is a sensual or mental image which is called an object.

Nāma (name)—A name is not merely the sound that is heard when it is uttered. As the sound it is a *nimitta* a form, an appearance, an object of hearing. But the real significance of a name lies in its intimate connection with the object which it denotes as well as connotes. In merely denoting it points to an object and in connoting it refers to the class and individual marks of the object which combine to pick it out

from other objects. A name is thus descriptive, serving to draw the attention of the person to whom it is spoken to the object which it describes. If a dog is called Caesar, the term is not merely a sound-form but is also descriptive of the significant general characteristics of the particular dog-object; otherwise, it would not refer to a dog and the particular dog. As a *nimitta* is a sensual or mental image, so a *nāma* is a description in particular reference to it. Thus a *nimitta* and its *nāma* are inseparably bound together.

Vikalpa (discrimination)—“By ‘discrimination’ is meant that by which names are declared, and there is thus the indicating of (various) appearances. Saying that this is such and no other, for instance, saying that this is an elephant, a horse, a woman or a man, each idea thus discriminated is so determined” (*L. Sūtra*, lxxxiii). Discrimination is that faculty of the mind which recognises or imagines distinguishing characteristic marks in objects and thus assigns names to them. It is what makes a being live in a world of *nimitta* and *nāma*. The basic distinction underlying a person’s worldly existence is that between himself the cogniser and his cognised world, the subject and the object, and on it depend all other distinctions, namely, those existing between the cognised objects. Hence discrimination is mainly concerned with the distinction between the subject and the object.

These three *dharmas*, namely, *nimitta*, *nāma* and *vikalpa*, constitute the *parikalpita* and *paratantra svabhāvas* of existence, the unreal reality, the *samvrti*.

Samyag-jñāna (right knowledge)—“By ‘right knowledge’ is meant this: when names and appearances are seen as unattainable owing to their mutual conditioning, there is no more rising of the *viññānas*, for nothing comes to annihilation, nothing abides everlastingly; and when there is no more falling back into the stage of the philosophers, Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas, it is said that there is right knowledge.” (*L. Sūtra*, lxxxiii). Right knowledge is where there is no thought of the reality of the phenomenal world of name and form, and no discrimination of subject and object. It is knowledge in perfection, pure, eternal and universal. It is unattainable but is revealed when the *manoviññāna* is destroyed by a thorough understanding of the unreality of the world. When it is revealed, the true existence, which is *Tathatā*, is revealed, for it is one with it. *Samyag-jñāna* which is knowledge itself is also *samyaksattva*,

that is, Existence itself to which *Tathatā* (suchness) and other names are given according to different characters attributed to it.

Tathatā (suchness)—“When erroneous views based on the dualistic notion of assertion and negation are got rid of, and when the *viññānas* cease to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances, this I call ‘Suchness.’ Mahāmāti, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is established on Suchness attains the state of imagelessness.” (*L. Sūtra*, lxxxiii). *Tathatā* or Suchness is the unchanging, eternal, infinite, homogeneous monistic principle which alone exists and nothing else. As such it is undefinable and is hence called Suchness, that is, Such-as-it-is. Every definition must perforce contain a statement of the characteristics of the object defined. But the Ultimate is characterless and so cannot be defined. Our language is, moreover, limited to the limitations of our sense-perception and so always dualistic, and cannot, therefore, exactly define the unlimited. Even such terms as eternal, infinite, homogeneous, monistic and unborn do not correctly define the Reality, for they are all terms of dualism, dichotomous, eternity refers to non-eternity, infinity refers to finiteness and so forth; but the Reality has nothing to do with the dualism of eternity-non-eternity and so forth. Nevertheless, we have to express it in language and this we do by attributing to it characters contrary to the characters of worldly objects. We conceive and characterise it in a negative way. It is eternal because worldly objects are non-eternal. It is suchness, that is, such-as-it-is, because it is undefinable while worldly objects are definable. It is *Brahma*, that is, universal, or *Dharmadhātu*, that is, the universal basic principle in all *dharmas*, because worldly objects are isolated. It is Light, Consciousness, Knowledge, because the world is dark, unconscious, ignorant. It is fearlessness, because the world is frightful. It is Bliss, because the world is sorrowful. It is homogeneous (*sama*), because the world is heterogeneous. It is *nirvāṇa*, because the world is *samsāra*. It is the container of all merits because the world is so deficient in them. Again, there is the idea that because it alone exists while the world does not, the world which is perceived as existing is in it or of it. Hence it is called *Bhūtataṭhatā* (Existent-such-as-it-is, absolute Existence), *Ālaya-viññāna* (the home of the *viññānas*, or repository consciousness), *Tathāgatarbha* (the womb of *Tathāgata*), *Dharmadhātu* (the material of the *dharmas*), and *Dharmakāya* (the body of the *dharmas*). It is *Citta-mātra*, or,

Mind itself, because while it has no mentation it is the basic principle of the worldly mind which mentates (verse 27). It is *Vijñāna-mātra*, or Consciousness itself, because while it is not conscious of any object, it is the source of the worldly consciousness of objects (verses 45-47). Says Āśvaghoṣa, "If the mind being awakened perceives an external world, then there will be something that cannot be perceived by it. But the essence of the mind has nothing to do with perception (which presupposes the dual existence of a perceiving subject and an object perceived); so there is nothing that cannot be perceived by it (that is the world of relativity is submerged in the oneness of suchness). Thence we assign to Suchness this quality, the universal illumination of the universe (it is the *Dharmadhātu*)." (*Awakening of Faith*, p. 97). The *Dharmadhātu*, that is, the *dharmas* as *Tathatā*, and the world, that is, the *Dharmas* as *nimitta*, *nāma* and *vikalpa*, being thus in one sense contradictory and in another sense the same, the qualities which we attribute to the *Dharmadhātu* with our eye to it on the one hand and the world on the other, must of necessity be incomprehensible, heterogeneous from the worldly standpoint and homogeneous from the transcendental standpoint. Hence Āśvaghoṣa says, "There is no heterogeneity in all these *Buddha-dharmas* (qualities of the Buddha) which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be neither identical (*ekārtha*) nor non-identical (*nānārtha*), and which, therefore, are out of the range of our comprehension" (*Awakening of Faith*, p. 96). But if we can turn our eye from the world with a deep conviction that it is not, our vision will land on the transcendent Such-as-it-is which is neither ignorance nor knowledge, neither *samsāra* (birth-and-death) nor *nirvāṇa* (emancipation), neither the *dharmas* nor the *Dharmadhātu*. Hence the Buddha said, "The discriminated by discrimination exist not, and discrimination does not obtain; discrimination being thus unobtainable, there is neither transmigration nor *nirvāṇa*" (*L. Sūtra*, Sagāthakam 621). And, again, "In all things there is no self-nature, they are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality. *Nirvāṇa* is like a dream, nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything enter into *nirvāṇa*. (*L. Sūtra*, xxxiv). With an eye to the world we must say, "Suchness, emptiness, (reality-) limit, *nirvāṇa*, the *Dharmadhātu*, no-birth of all things, self-being—these characterise the highest truth" (Sagāthakam 576). Taking out our eye from the world we have to say, "In the state of imagelessness there is no reality, no

parikalpita, no *paratantra*, no five *dharmas* no two-fold mind" (Sagāthakam 560). Nāgārjuna formulated his eight "No's" for defining the Ultimate Reality in these words:—

अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतमनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमन् ।

यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपोशमं शिवं देशयामास सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

(माध्यमिक-कारिका).

I adore the greatest of speakers, the fully-enlightened one, who taught the Reality in which there is no destruction, no origination, no annihilation, no eternality, no one-thingness, no many-thingness, no coming in, no going out, mutual origination, quiescence of the multiple world. In the same spirit Gauḍapāda formulates his six "No's" for the same purpose:

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ (वैतथ्यप्रकरण ३२)

No destruction, no origination, nobody in bondage, no devotee, nobody desirous of emancipation, nobody emancipated, this is the essence of *paramārtha* (ultimate reality).

Tathatā, or, Suchness, is undefinable. But, for that reason, we are not to think that it is not, it is Such-as-it-is. The sense of the verb "to be" is inherent in everybody, it is the springhead of every one of our activities, physical or mental. I can never reasonably say that I am not, for that very 'saying' proves that I am. In fact nobody feels his non-existence. But every thoughtful man feels that the form which his existence takes varies and in our worldly life we are concerned with only forms of existence which are impermanent and therefore unreal. Existence itself must, for this reason, be different from the forms of existence which are perceptible to us. In this sense the world is unborn as is the flower in the sky, without any substantiality or self-nature or *ātmā*, that is, permanent principle of individuality, in it. In another sense the worldly forms of existence are nothing but Existence itself as it appears to our worldly vision and are hence permanent and eternal, not as individuals and particulars but as the universal Existence itself which is consequently termed the *Dharmadhātu*. What has been said above about Existence itself is true also about Light itself, named *Citta* or *Vijñāna*, for they are one and not different—to say that there is existence that is not revealed amounts to saying that existence is not existent. It

is also Bliss itself, for here there is eternal rest from the conflicts of the dualistic world. The Buddha said, "When it is understood that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind itself, discrimination no more rises, and one is thus established in his own abode which is the realm of no-work." (L. *Sūtra*, lxxvii). Thus *Tathatā* is Existence, Light and Bliss, the three being one in it although differently perceived in the dualistic vision. This teaching is conveyed in verses 91 to 93 of *Asp*.

The two *dharmas*, *Samyag-jñāna* and *Tathatā*, which are really the one absolute monistic principle, form the *Pariniṣpanna svabhāva* of existence, the true reality, the *paramārtha*.

iNimitta, nāma and *vikalpa* (correspond to) *Parikalpita* and *Paratantra svabhāvas*, and *Samyag-jñāna, Tathatā* to the *Pariniṣpanna*. (L. *Sūtra*, xxiii).

"*Samyag-jñāna* and *Tathatā*, Mahāmāti, are indestructible and thus they are known as *Pariniṣpanna*". (L. *Sūtra*, lxxxi).

As the *dharmas* cannot be dealt with separately as independent ones, they are generally treated together throughout the treatise. Verses 24 to 74 of *Asp* are, however, devoted specially to *nimitta, nāma* and *vikalpa*, and verses 75 to 100 to *Samyag-jñāna* and *Tathatā*.

Three kinds of *jñāna*—*Laukika, Śuddhalaukika* and *Lokottara*

In *Laukika jñāna* there is object as well as perception, in *Śuddhalaukika jñāna* there is no object but there is perception, in *Lokottara jñāna* there is neither object nor perception.

Existence and knowledge go together, for existence is the object of knowledge, the knowable. In the dualistic world they are different, but in the monistic realm they are one. Hence corresponding to existence as *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* there is knowledge as *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*, and to existence as *Parikalpita, Paratantra* and *Pariniṣpanna* (or *Paramārtha*) there is knowledge as *Parikalpita, Paratantra* and *Pariniṣpanna* (or *Paramārtha*). In the subdivision of existence into five *dharmas*, *Paramārtha*, the monistic existence, is subdivided, for easy comprehension by the unenlightened people, into *Samyag-jñāna* and *Tathatā*, but here knowledge and the knowable being one and the same, the corresponding knowledge which embraces both of them in its transcendental and self-revealing grasp is called transcendental knowledge or *Lokottara jñāna* or, simply, *jñāna*. It is called in Mahāyāna literature *Ārya-jñāna*, or noble wisdom, and *Prajñā* or the highest knowledge. It is "the wise know-

ledge, the wise insight, the wise transcendental vision of the wise which is neither human nor celestial" (L. *Sūtra* lxix). "It is the inner realisation by noble wisdom of noble wisdom, and in this there is no thought of existence or non-existence" (L. *Sūtra* xxiii and xxxv). It is inexpressible, for here the triple distinction between the knower, knowledge and known vanishes and thus there is triple emancipation. It is knowledge which is unattainable, for it is the eternal truth and infinite. Dualistic knowledge is divided into *Laukika* (worldly) and *Śuddhalaukika* (super-worldly) according as it refers to the gross perception of objects as they are perceived by ignorant people, or to the subtle or refined (*śuddha*) perception of such advanced people as feel that objects are unreal but are still not so firmly established in true *jñāna* as to be able to give denial to their perception of them. He to whom the world is like a flower in the sky, never born, is the truly wise man possessed of *Lokottara jñāna*. [Verses 87 to 89 of *Asp* deal with this tripartite division of knowledge].¹

The eight vijñānas

The world and the super-world, as explained above, constitute the *saṃsāra* which is the play-ground of the triple combination of the perceiver, the perceived and perception, the light or consciousness which established a connection between the perceiver and the perceived. It is also the essence of the perceiver and the perceived, for on it depends their very existence. Transcendental knowledge is the spring-head from which issue the three conjoined streams of the perceiver, the perceived and perception. It is *vijñāna* or *vijñāna* itself (*vijñānamātra*) and, as issuing from it, the three are also nothing but *vijñānas*. This is the monistic idea. *Vijñāna* itself is the *Paramārtha* while the three are *saṃvṛti*. They are *vijñāna* itself as it appears through the veil of ignorance which though obtaining in the *saṃsāra* since beginningless time is an unreality, a nothing. Thus *vijñāna* can be divided primarily

¹ Ryukan Kimura in *A Historical Study of the terms Hinayāna and Mahāyāna and the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Calcutta University) says that the doctrine that both subject and object are existing is of the *Sthāviravādins* and *Sarvāstivādins*, that subject is existing but object is not existing is the *Yogācāra* doctrine that both are not-existing is the *Mādhyamika* doctrine." (p. 185).

into two kinds, namely, *paramārtha vijñāna* and *saṃvṛti vijñāna*. *Paramārtha vijñāna* is called *Ālaya-vijñāna* because it is the source of *saṃvṛti vijñāna*. It is also called *Citta* (Mind) or *Citta-mātra* (Mind itself).² The objective world is *cittadṛśya*, that is Mind-sight, the sight of Mind, or what is seen of Mind itself. In many places Gauḍapāda has not used this term for the objective world (*vide* verses 28, 64, 66). The subjective world is composed of *Manas* (the ego) and *Manovijñāna* (ego-consciousness). Gauḍapāda has not used these terms, but has referred to the subject as *jīva* (living being), *dyk* (seer) and *grāhaka* (cogniser). Then there are the five *vijñānas* of the five senses. Thus in *saṃvṛti* we have seven *vijñānas*, namely, *Manas*, *Manovijñāna* and the five sense-*vijñānas*, which with *Vijñāna* itself, the *Paramārtha*, make up the number eight. For a fuller explanation of the terms of this classification it would be better to quote from the *Laṅkāvatara-sūtra*.

The Buddha says:—"With the *Manovijñāna* as cause and supporter, Mahāmati, there rise the seven *vijñānas*. Again, the *Manovijñāna* is kept functioning as it discerns a world of objects and becomes attached to it, and by means of manifold habit,—energy (or memory) it nourishes the *Ālaya-vijñāna*. The *Manas* is evolved along with the notion of an ego and its belongings, to which it clings and on which it reflects. It has no body of its own, nor its own marks; the *Ālayavijñāna* is its cause and support. Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning. Like the waves of the ocean, Mahāmati, the world which is the mind-manifested, is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves. Thus, Mahāmati, when the *Manovijñāna* is got rid of, the seven *vijñānas* are also got rid of (*L. Sūtra līṅ*)."

The following analysis made by Aśvaghōṣa is interesting and instructive:—"By the law of causation (*hetupratyaya*) in the domain of birth-and-death (*saṃsāra*) we mean that depending on the Mind (i.e. *Ālayavijñāna*) an evolution of ego (*Manas*) and consciousness (*Vijñāna*) takes place in all beings. What is meant by this? In the all-conserving

² Gauḍapāda has used both the terms *Vijñāna* and *Citta* for it, *vide* verses 26-28, 45, 54, 72.

Mind (*Ālayavijñāna*) ignorance obtains; and from the non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises. This is called the ego (*Manas*). Five names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness (*Karmavijñāna*) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed. The second name is evolving-consciousness (*Pravṛtti-vijñāna*, that is, the subject) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness, in the sense that the ego (*Manas*) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clear mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously and without any effort. The fourth name is particularisation-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness (i.e. memory), in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness (or attention, *manaskāra*) it (*Manas*) retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any *karma*, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come.

"Therefore the three domains (*triloka*) are nothing but the self-manifestation of the Mind (i.e. *Ālayavijñāna* which is practically identical with Suchness, *Bhūtataṭhata*). Separated from the Mind, there would be no such things as the six objects of sense. Why? Since all things owing to the principle of their existence to the Mind (*Ālayavijñāna*), are produced by subjectivity (*smṛti*), all the modes of particularisation are the self-particularisation of the Mind. The Mind in itself (or the soul as Suchness) being, however, free from all attributes, is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (*avidyā*) and subjectivity (*smṛti*) on the part of all beings, have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They evolve simply from the ideality of a particularising mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multi-

plicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.

"By ego-consciousness (*Manovijñāna*) we mean that all ignorant minds through their succession-consciousness cling to the conception of I and not-I (that is, a separate objective world) and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, or phenomena particularising-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (*āsrava*), intellectual as well as affectional.

"While the essence of the mind (*viññāna*) is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But inspite of the defiled mind, the Mind (itself) is eternal, clear, pure and not subject to transformation.

"Further, as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence.

"When the oneness of the totality of things (*dharmadhātu*) is not recognised, then ignorance as well as particularisation arises, and all phases of the defiled mind are thus developed. But the significance of this doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and no others" (*Awakening of Faith*, pp. 75-80).

The principle enunciated above is strictly followed by Gauḍapāda throughout the *prakaraṇa*.

As regards the five sense *viññānas*, the Buddha says; "The reasons whereby the eye-consciousness arises are four. What are they? They are: (1) The clinging to an external world, not knowing that it is of Mind itself; (2) the attaching to form and habit-energy accumulated since beginningless time by false reasoning and erroneous views, (3) the self-nature inherent in the *viññāna*, (4) the eagerness for multiple forms and appearances. By these four reasons, Mahāmati, the waves of the evolving *viññānas* are stirred on the *Ālayaviññāna* which resembles the waters of a flood. The same (can be said of the other sense-consciousnesses) as of the eye-consciousness. This consciousness arises at once or by degrees in every sense-organ including its atoms and pores of the skin; the sense-field is apprehended like a mirror reflecting objects, like the ocean swept over by a wind. Mahāmati, similarly the waves of the

mind-ocean are stirred uninterruptedly by the wind of objectivity; cause, deed and appearance condition one another inseparably; the functioning *viññānas* and the original *viññāna* are thus inextricably bound up together; and because the self-nature of form etc. is not comprehended, Mahāmati, the system of the five consciousnesses (*viññānas*) comes to function. Along with this system of the five *viññānas*, there is what is known as *Manovijñāna* (i.e., the thinking function of consciousness) whereby the objective world is distinguished and individual appearances are distinctly determined, and in this the physical body has its genesis. But the *Manovijñāna* and other *viññānas* have no thought that they are mutually conditioned and that they grow out of their attachment to the discrimination which is applied to the projections of Mind itself. Thus the *viññānas* go on functioning mutually related in a most intimate manner and discriminating a world of representations" (*L. Sutra ix*).

As regards the rise, abiding and ceasing of the *viññānas* the Buddha says:—"There are two ways, Mahāmati, in which the rise, abiding and ceasing of the *viññānas* take place, and this is not understood by the philosophers. That is to say, the ceasing takes place as regards continuation and form. In the rise of the *viññānas*, also, these two are recognisable; the rise as regards continuation and the rise as regards form. In the abiding, also, these two (are distinguishable), the one taking place as regards continuation and the other as regards form.

"(Further), three modes are distinguishable in the *viññānas*: (1) the *viññāna* as evolving, (2) the *viññāna* as producing effects, and (3) the *viññāna* as remaining in its original nature.

"(Further), Mahāmati, in the *viññānas*, which are said to be eight, two functions generally are distinguishable, the perceiving and the object-discriminating. As a mirror reflects forms, Mahāmati, the perceiving *viññāna* perceives (objects). Mahāmati, between the two, the perceiving *viññāna* and the object-discriminating *viññāna*, there is no difference; they are mutually conditioning. Then, Mahāmati, the perceiving *viññāna* functions because of transformations taking place (in the mind) by reason of a mysterious habit energy, while, Mahāmati, the object-discriminating *viññāna* functions because of the mind's discriminating an objective world and because of the habit-energy accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time.

"Again, Mahāmati, by the cessation of all the sense-*viññānas* is meant

the cessation of the *Ālayavijñāna*'s variously accumulating habit-energy which is generated when unrealities are discriminated. This, Mahāmāti, is known as the cessation of the form-aspect of the *vijñānas*.

"Again, Mahāmāti, the cessation of the continuation-aspect of the *vijñānas* takes place in this wise: that is to say, Mahāmāti, when both that which supports (the *vijñānas*) and that which is comprehended (by the *vijñānas*) cease to function. By that which supports (the *vijñānas*) is meant the habit-energy (or memory) which has been accumulated by erroneous reasoning since beginningless time; and by that which is comprehended (by the *vijñānas*) is meant the objective world perceived and discriminated by the *vijñānas*, which is, however, no more than Mind itself.

"Mahāmāti, it is like a lump of clay and the particles of dust making up its substance, they are neither different nor not-different; again, it is like gold and various ornaments made of it. If, Mahāmāti, the lump of clay is different from its particles of dust, no lump will ever come out of them. But as it comes out of them it is not different from the particles of dust. Again, if there is no difference between the two, the lump will be indistinguishable from its particles.

"Even so, Mahāmāti, if the evolving *vijñānas* are different from the *Ālayavijñāna*, even in its original form the *Ālaya* cannot be their cause. Again, if they are not different the cessation of the evolving *vijñāna*, will mean the cessation of the *Ālaya-vijñāna*, but there is no cessation of its original form. Therefore, Mahāmāti, what ceases to function is not the *Ālaya* in its original self-form, but is the effect-producing form of the *vijñānas*. When this original self-form ceases to exist, then there will indeed be the cessation of the *Ālaya-vijñāna*. If, however, there is the cessation of the *Ālayavijñāna*, this doctrine will in no wise differ from the nihilistic doctrine of the philosophers." (*L. Śūtra*, iv).

The substance of these quotations is beautifully set forth in verses 45 to 57 of *Asp.* through the illustration of a fire-brand.

JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

The Subsidiary System in Rajputana*

Towards the close of the eighteenth century the once powerful State of Jaipur was rapidly approaching dissolution. Its troubles were in a large measure due to the character of the reigning Prince, Sawai Pratap Singh (1778—1803). A modern historian observes "Sawai Pratap Singh had no brains, but was not harmless and quiescent like most other imbeciles; his folly burst out in capricious violence. Anticipating the decadent Nawabs of Oudh, he used to dress himself like a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the harem. His time was mostly devoted to drinking and attending songs and dancessometimes he would sally forth at night with the ruffianly companions of his wine-cup, raid the houses of the bankers and jewellers, beat them and snatch away their money! In addition to his unkingly and unmanly vices, his reckless speech and violent temper alienated the proud Rajput nobility and they left his capital for their seats in shame and disgust."¹ Naturally the administration became inefficient and corrupt. Powerful vassals like the Shekhawat chiefs and Pratap Singh Naruka of Macheri seized Jaipur territory. Mahadji Sindhia employed De Boigne's battalions to realise tribute from Jaipur.²

In 1794 J. Pillet, a French military adventurer in the service of Sawai Pratap Singh, suggested the conclusion of an alliance between Jaipur and the East India Company.³ In a letter addressed to Colonel John Murray, Military Auditor-General in Bengal, he observed, "I see nothing except a well-formed alliance between the Jaipur Rajah

* For the Subsidiary System in Mewar and Marwar see the present writer's articles in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, December-1945, September-1946.

¹ Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. III, p. 337.

Tod (*Annals of Amber*, ch. III) gives a different view of Sawai Pratap Singh's character: "He was a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment; but neither gallantry nor prudence could successfully apply the resources of his petty state against its numerous predatory foes and its internal dissensions." Collins describes him as "a compound of pride, meanness, cunning and avarice." (*Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. VIII, No. 172). See also Pillet's remarks in *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. VIII, No. 1.

² See Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 340-345, 349-392. See also his articles in *Modern Review*, May-1934, February-1944.

³ *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. VIII, No. 1.